Those who have damned Durkheim have also heaped lavish praise on him, and those who have eulogized him have not failed to see serious shortcomings in his reconstruction and interpretation of religion. Bitterness is mingled with deep admiration for the tremendous intellectual tour de force which he produced in his *Elementary Forms*; praise is tempered by the haunting feeling that whereas in many specific details he showed astonishing insight, his major thesis was wrong. Lowie (*Primitive Religion*), for example, before going into a denunciation of his theory of origins, makes it clear that his book "represents an estimable intellectual achievement" and is "the only comprehensive effort since Tylor's day to unify religious data from a wholly novel

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angle." Radcliffe-Brown ("The Sociological Theory of Totemism"), who is a lineal descendant of Durkheimian sociology and adheres closely to many of the ideas contained in the Elementary Forms, says that Durkheim's attempt to provide a sociological theory of totemism "fails in certain important respects." Most criticisms are directed against that aspect of the theory that deals with origins; the part that deals with symbolism and role is usually unchallenged. Perhaps the most scathing critique of the former has come from the pen of Alexander Goldenweiser, a man of great intellectual talents and extensive philosophic background. He perhaps tends in some instances to warp Durkheim's meanings, as in the case of the part played by the "crowd" in generating an emotional state conducive to a feeling of the sacred, but on the whole his arguments are sound. Goldenweiser is interested in the problem of the origins of religion, not its functions.

Few problems have occupied the minds of thinking men so persistently and intensely as the problem of the origin and nature of religion. The psychologist vies with the sociologist and anthropologist, the philosopher with the philologist and theologian, in their attempts to enhance our comprehension of that peculiar phenomenon, which in its distribution is at least coextensive with man, and possesses, as an emotional value, but few rivals in the entire gamut of psychic experiences. Of the many theories on record three deserve our attention here: naturalism, animism, animatism. According to the naturalistic theory, proclaimed by Max Müller, Kuhn, and others, nature itself is responsible for the religious sentiment. The powers of nature, so often mysterious, inexplicable, gruesome, strange, frightful, arouse in man an emotional response, which constitutes the core of religion. The animistic theory, represented most prominently by Tylor and Spencer, is of interest in two of its aspects. On the one hand, it contains the doctrine of spirits; on the other (in the case of Spencer), a theory of worship. While agreeing with Tylor in the essentials of the animistic doctrine, Spencer derives all forms of worship from the cult of ancestors. The animatistic theory, finally, finds its most enthusiastic representative in R. R. Marett. By the adherents of this doctrine, the most recent and popular of the three, animism is regarded as a mere incident in the development of religion; the fundamental religious concept becomes that of power, impersonal magic potency, mana, to which, on the subjective side, corresponds the religious thrill.

Of these theories, only the animatistic one makes any attempt to analyze the religious consciousness, to interpret its nature psychologically. In the vision of the animist and the naturalist, the savage is very much alone with his religion; the social milieu is left out altogether; the process, moreover, through which religion comes to be, is conceived of as somewhat in the nature of a conscious rationalistic act, of a problem, posited and solved. In animatism the emphasis is shifted to the emotional side; we also hear that religion is "congregational" and must be treated sociologically. The derivation of the concept of mana, however, remains a purely individual affair; other individuals are understood to be there, but, so far as the origin of mana is concerned, their part is that of a stage setting.

An attempt to furnish a sociopsychological interpretation of religion, an attempt much more elaborate and pretentious than any of the above, has recently been made by Émile Durkheim, the French sociologist, in his La vie religieuse. The author aims to present a psychological analysis of the religious consciousness as well as an example of the most primitive religious complex. As the subtitle of the work indicates, the scene is laid in Australia, a field eminently within the competence of the author, whose Australian researches have extended over a quarter of a century. Durkheim's argument is, in brief, as follows.

All attempts to account for religion by drawing upon the properties of nature are doomed to failure. The savage knows no natural, hence he can have no conception of the supernatural. Nature, moreover, is utterly devoid of those characteristics which, in themselves, could arouse religious emotions. We must note, in addition, that the
most insignificant objects or creatures often figure as recipients of religious regard. Religious values then are not derived from nature, but are superadded upon it. The derivation of fundamental religious conceptions from dreams and similar experiences is also at fault. Religion, with its universal appeal, cannot, in the last analysis, be due to an illusion; at the root of it must lie some concrete reality of experience.

Before proceeding with any analysis of religion, we must realize that a definition of religion may not be restricted to its emotional content, but must be extended so as to include the conceptional side of religion, theology, and its activational side, ritual. There is no religion without a church. When analyzed from this point of view the fundamental fact in all religions seems to be a dichotomy of experience into sacred and profane. Acts, things, beings, which are holy, sacred, are juxtaposed to acts, things, beings, which are commonplace, trite, profane. The quest for the origin of religion thus resolves itself into a search for that reality which underlies the dichotomy of experience into sacred and profane.

To find the fundamental core of religion we must turn to a religious complex which can be shown to be primitive. Such a complex is represented by Australian totemism; for totemism is based on the clan organization, and the clan is the most primitive social unit. Australian totemism reveals all the traits which, in higher forms, reappear in the world's great religions: it has a social aspect, clan totemism, and an individual aspect, the belief in guardian spirits; it possesses a cosmogony; it involves prayer and sacrifice and a belief in the soul.

An analysis of the totemic complex reveals the fact that the experience of the Australian is conceived as sacred or profane according to its inclusion in or exclusion from the totemic cycle of ideas, emotions, and activities. The totem is the criterion of sacredness. Further examination, moreover, shows that while the totemic emblems, the totems, the totemites, all participate in the sacred realm, the veneration of the clan-mates is not directed to any of these beings. Acts, things, symbols, as such, but to a sacred and mysterious substance, the "totemic principle," which pervades them all.

A comparison of the "totemic principle" with mana, impersonal magic power, believes in by the Indians of North America, the Melanesians, and other peoples, discloses the identity of the two concepts. The "totemic principle" is mana which, when dominated by a clan system, as in Australia, appears in what might be called a pluralistic or distributive form; when, on the other hand, the tribe acquires precedence over the clan, as in North America, the mana concept, freed from the restraining influence of the social units, appears in its familiar form of an undifferentiated, impersonal, all-pervasive power. What will explain the "totemic principle," then, will explain mana, the sacred, religion.

The life of the Australian fluctuates between two radically distinct cycles of experiences. On the one hand, he fulfills the round of his daily pursuits, indifferent, monotonous, drab; on the other hand, he participates, at certain regularly recurring periods, in the ceremonial activities of the tribe, the clan, in the sacred totemic rites. At such periods, the gray monotony of daily experience gives way to excitement, frenzy, the charm of taboo, the passionate whirl of sacred songs and dances. The individual is transformed. His thoughts, emotions, acts, altogether transcend their accustomed level. He feels himself acted upon, carried away, by a power which is of himself, yet also external to him. That power which exalts and constrains arouses the sense of the sacred. Thus religion is born. The rest is infection through association, contact, deliberate transfer. Religion, then, the sacred, mana, the "totemic principle," are but so many symbols of society itself, and the most primitive form of a society is the totemic clan.

Durkheim's argument embraces the following fundamental propositions: nature, as such, cannot inspire the religious emotion; religion cannot, in the last analysis, be based on an illusion, but must be rooted in a concrete reality, derived from experience; an adequate definition of religion must recognize in it a complex of conceptual, emotional, and activational elements; the fundamental fact in all religions is a dichotomy of experience into sacred and profane; the most primitive religious complex is totemism; the "totemic principle," the source of the sacredness of the totemic cycle, is identical with mana; mana is a symbol of society, the "totemic principle," of the clan. We may now take up
these propositions, one by one, and subject them to a brief critical analysis.

Nature as such cannot inspire the religious emotion.

When dealing with the remote periods in the course of which the birth of religion may be supposed to have occurred, one must of necessity take recourse to inference and analogy. In questions, however, of such generality as man's susceptibility to the impressions derived from his contact with nature, argument by analogy may be accepted as a guide of sufficient reliability. Now, our familiarity with man, modern, ancient, and primitive, leaves no room for doubt that at all times and places man was strongly susceptible to the impressions produced on him by the phenomena of nature and that such impressions assumed in his consciousness the form of quasi-religious sentiments. Earthquakes, the eruptions of volcanoes; tempests, floods, and torrential rains; comets, and the aurora borealis; eclipses of the sun and the moon; falling stars; forest and prairie fires, and extreme variations in weather and climate; these and many other manifestations of the powers of nature always did, as they still do, impress themselves on the mind of man and arouse in him that thrill or recoil which constitutes the emotional nucleus of all religion. And what is true of these phenomena applies with a difference of degree only to those slighter shocks and thrills evoked in man by the contact with his superiors, physically or mentally, whether these be animals or men. May we not, moreover, discern "the psychologist's fallacy" in Durkheim's assertion that primitive man, knowing no natural order, could have no concept of the supernatural? To be sure, the cleavage between the two realms does not, in primitive minds, fall where we would have it; transformations of animals into men and vice versa are to the savage natural everyday occurrences, while a visit to a chemical laboratory or even a stroll along Broadway would, for him, be replete with supernatural experiences. The study of primitive custom, mythology, language, moreover, brings irrefutable evidence of the presence of the concepts "natural" and "supernatural" in the mind of the savage. To these we must refer Professor Durkheim for particulars.

Religion cannot be based on an illusion, but must be rooted in a concrete basic fact of experience.

This view of Durkheim's might well be discarded as of secondary importance, but for the significant use made of it in his work. What, may we ask, does the author call an "illusion"? Surely, in a study of religion, we need not be concerned with the objective reality behind the conceptual constructs of the religious consciousness! The religious experience itself is the reality which counts. Is it not so with the esthetic experience, or the ethical experience as well? There are, of course, certain objective facts or relations underlying these experiences, but the subjective aspect of them does not in any of these situations, whether religious or esthetic or ethical, represent, or mimic, or symbolize, the objective aspect: it is the reaction of consciousness, in the form of an emotional intellectual complex, which counts. At best, moreover, it is the notion of spirit which is based on what Durkheim calls an illusion, not the emotional thrill or recoil attending the supernatural experience; in the latter, however, our author does not believe, at least not as an ultimate fact.

Religion must be defined as a complex of conceptual, emotional, and activational elements. There is no religion without a Church.

If the above proposition is merely taken to signify that every religion, as an institution, embraces a theology, a faith, a ritual, little exception can be taken to the statement. Although, even in that interpretation, it is true only in a most general way, as a limiting concept, to which every religion, in its institutional aspect, tends to approximate. Otherwise, the three aspects are most unevenly represented in different religions. Thus Buddhism and Confucianism represent conceptual edifices with but little faith and practically no ritual, whereas the religion of the Todas stands for pure ritualism with faith and theology attenuated to scarcely appreciable forms. The error involved in Durkheim's mode of approach is, however, a more serious one. The author defines and analyzes institutional religion, as if the conceptual-emotional-activational complex were a homogeneous phenomenon, culturally, historically, and psychologically, and, therefore, could be studied in toto, so to say, and with the use of the same methodological tools. This is very far from being the fact. A reli-
gion, like every other institution, represents historically and psychologically a highly heterogeneous complex. In such a complex live emotional elements go hand in hand with "evaporated emotions," serving as a petrified fringe to the religious concept or act; subjective experiences are intermingled with purely objective features; dynamic creative ideas exist side by side with traditional rite and form. Now, different as are the psychic and social mechanisms involved in these different aspects of institutional religion, so also must be the methods by means of which they can be investigated. The dogmas are recorded in written or oral tradition, and to them the scholastic methods of the bookman may well be applied. The rites must be seen and studied on the spot or laboriously reconstructed from written or oral accounts or numerous witnesses. The subjective experiences, finally, are varied in the extreme, and at best only a representative set of them can be secured by intensive investigation, involving great intimacy with the individuals concerned. In the domain of primitive religion, for instance, which for years has occupied the attention of scholars and practical workers of varied interests, training, abilities, only the last few years have brought glimpses into the psyche of the primitive devotee; and what meager results have been achieved were altogether due to the application of a painstaking linguistic method.

So much for institutional religion. But within every culture religious experiences occur which are but weakly institutionalized, while some of these, although likewise provided with a traditional background, remain almost altogether unsupported by similar experiences of other individuals. This vast domain of religious fact is completely eliminated through Durkheim's formal method.

The cardinal fact in all religions is the dichotomy of experience into sacred and profane.

A partial critique of this proposition is contained in the remarks on the preceding one. On the one hand, all acts, beings, objects, experiences, involved in a religion, are sacred—for such is the nature of the religious. So far, the statement, while true, is tautological. On the other hand, if any religion is analyzed in its concrete cultural setting, one finds that the domain of the sacred does not represent a psychologically heterogeneous phenomenon. In Australia, for instance, the sacredness of the magical act and of the magician is not that of the totem; nor the sacredness of the menstrual taboos that of the unclean animals, not eaten because possessed by evil spirits. Similarly, in our own society, the sacredness of the national flag is not that of the law, nor the sacredness of the family name that of the college pin or banner, nor the sacredness of the Church to which one belongs that of one to which he does not belong. The sacred, then, is an aggregate as psychologically heterogeneous as is the profane. To characterize religion, therefore, by a dichotomy of experience into sacred and profane, is to create an artificial situation as well as to establish a presumption in favor of an interpretation of the sacred through some one general principle, a pitfall which Professor Durkheim has not succeeded in evading.

Totemism is the most primitive religious complex.

Durkheim's selection of Australian totemism as the most primitive form of religion and as a proper setting for the origin of the religious emotion is supported by two considerations. Totemism, argues the author, is based on the most primitive type of social unit, the clan, hence totemism itself must be primitive; moreover, totemism, while primitive, embraces all the characteristic traits of the higher religions; hence it is a genuine religion. Durkheim's argument bristles with fallacies. We may not have reached final solutions in our search for the origins of organized society, but that the clan is not a primitive institution we may safely maintain, at the hand of ethnological fact and theory. The most primitive tribes known lack a clan system, the local groups and the family serving as a basis of organization. On the other hand, it is a priori obvious that a clan system, or any other system, cannot be regarded as a primitive institution, but that the most primitive society must have been based on a natural grouping, a natural biological grouping into families, combined with a natural territorial grouping into local communities. But were we to grant, for argument's sake, that the clan is primitive, the admission would not make totemism primitive; for, on the one hand, totemism might be regarded as associated only with highly evolved clan-systems (of which fact, indeed, there is plentiful evidence); on the other, the
primitiveness of a social organization is no guarantee of the primitiveness of a form of religion associated with it, just as we find complex social organization coupled with primitive material arts, as in Australia, or primitive social organization with advanced arts, as among the Eskimo. Durkheim’s identification of totemism with most primitive religion, moreover, implies an unexpressed belief in the universality of totemism, a thoroughly exploded doctrine, for there is not a shred of evidence that tribes like the Eskimo, or the Thompson, or the Blackfoot, or the Shoshone, ever were totemic.

Again, Durkheim’s interpretation of totemism as a genuine religion must be regarded as one of the fatal consequences of his definition of religion. Most of the aspects of totemism carefully passed in review by the author can be shown, or at least suspected, to be of nontotemic origin. So-called “individual totemism” may not be regarded as a derivative of clan totemism. The guardian-spirit belief is most widespread among the Indians of North America, and nowhere does it flourish with greater exuberance than among the tribes of the so-called Plateau Area, tribes that are not totemic nor, for all we know, ever were totemic. Again, it would seem, at first sight, that what Durkheim calls the totemic cosmogony is a true offspring of totemism. But when one considers how common an ethnological feature is the cosmological projection of social organization, he is inclined to believe that the totemic cosmogony may also have been sociological, but not totemic in origin, having later become saturated with totemic values. A similar point may be raised with reference to the belief in souls which, in Australia, has a totemic coloring. But if various traits of totemism can be shown to have been nontotemic in origin, having become totemic through subsequent association, such traits may no longer be regarded as organic ingredients of a totemic religion.

What has been said in this section establishes a presumption against Durkheim’s ultimate interpretation of religion, in so far as any “origin” of the religious emotion derived from the conditions given by a totemic complex must needs fall short in point of universality and primitiveness.

The “totemic principle” is identical with mana.

The “totemic principle” appears in Durkheim’s argument somewhat after the fashion of a deus ex machina, and it may well be doubted whether the introduction of this concept does not involve a marked rationalization of the Australian totemic situation. Possibly, however, the author’s idea of the “totemic principle” does not really imply that character of abstractness which the text suggests. We may, therefore, accept the term as a conceptualized interpretation of the sacred totemic cycle of participation. But the author identifies the “totemic principle” with mana, of which it is a forerunner, the two concepts being identical in content, but different in form. Mana is free, the “totemic principle” limited to the clan; mana is monistic, the “totemic principle” pluralistic.

At this point decided exception must be taken to the author’s position. A full vindication of the concept of mana—which, if space permitted, could be shown to represent one of the two cardinal concepts of all religion, the other being the concept of spirit—cannot be given here. Suffice it to say that rapidly accumulating ethnological evidence brings abundant proof of the existence of the concept of mana, or impersonal power, among primitive peoples. On the other hand, the greater claim to universality and primitiveness of mana rather than the “totemic principle,” may be gathered from the reflection that whereas the “totemic principle” is indissolubly bound to a definite form of social organization, itself of a limited distribution, mana requires nothing but nature, acting, and man’s mind, acted upon; whereas the “totemic principle” can be psychologically derived only from the highly specialized conditions given by a totemic complex, the psychological derivation of the concept of mana can be made from almost any conceivable religious situation. Mana, then, not the “totemic principle,” can claim universality and primitiveness. Hence, even if a similarity of nature were conceded to the two concepts, a psychological derivation of mana would not improbably apply also to the “totemic principle”; but the reverse would not be true.

The “totemic principle” is a symbol of the clan; the reality underlying religion is society.

This proposition represents the fundamental and ultimate aspect of Durkheim’s theory. The thought is bold and original. No
ory. All the marvels of social control are these varied and significant manifestations, which surely are of prime concern to the individual, does not figure in Durkheim’s theory. All the marvels of social control are achieved through the medium of the crowd-psychological situation. Durkheim’s theory, then, is a crowd-psychological one; but is his crowd psychology sound? The author will have us believe that the religious thrill, the sense of the sacred, arises from the reaction of the individual consciousness to social pressure, or rather from the ratiocination of that reaction. The elements involved in the situation utilized in the author’s theory are still to be found in society, hence his contention is subject to verification by our modern experience. Now, how does the individual react to social pressure which overwhelms him in a crowd-psychological situation, and what construction does he place on his reaction? The reaction is very much as Durkheim has described it: in the theater, at a political meeting, in a mob, at a revival, in church, in a panic, the action of the group on the individual is characteristic and decisive. But how does he rationalize his participation in the group action or experience? Not by contrasting his daily life with the special crowd situation, nor by representing himself as actuated upon by a superior and external power—quite on the contrary: the individual identifies himself with the group, with the crowd; he represents himself as sharing in the power which is of the crowd, of the group. We thought, we felt, we did, is for him descriptive also of his own part in the proceedings. Social settings of this variety are so constant, so common an experience in the life of man, primitive or modern, that the average, that is, not exceptionally reflective individual, never thinks of contrasting these experiences with others, or of regarding his crowd or group self as transcending the self of his daily routine. On the contrary, the crowd or group self is the self par excellence, as well as the self at its best. Again, the crowd or group setting obviously does not create the specific psychic state involved. The joyful ecstasy of a jubilant crowd remains a feeling of joy; a panic of fear; the hatred of a lynching mob is hatred; the adoration of a religious gathering is adoration. In all of these instances, and ennumerable others, the specific emotion experienced is not of crowd derivation. What is common in the above situations is the crowd psychology: through a summation of stimuli, and through imitation, the emotions become intensified; the higher mental processes, involving deliberation and concentration, be-
come paralyzed; the instinctive and reflexive responses, on the contrary, which have
through past ages become attuned to the particular emotion involved, arise into prom-
ience. What results then is an intensified expression of a given emotion in terms of in-
stinctive and reflexive reactions, reactions, that is, which belong to a relative low level
in human development. But the specific emo-
tion so expressed is not born of the crowd,
and differs in different crowd-psychological
situations. Thus, a series of corroborees does
not make an initium, nor do the secular
dances of the North American Indians be-
come identified with the religious dances. A
crowd-psychological situation may intensify
or even transform a religious thrill, but it
cannot create one. Thus the sociological ar-
gentum is also opposed to Durkheim's the-
ory.

In the third place, finally, we must take
issue with the author on a psychological
ground. The psychological argument has in
part been forestalled in another section. The
author's theory runs counter to the verdict
of experience, ancient and modern, in deny-
ing nature the power to impress, shock, and
thrill man, thus engendering in his psyche
the emotional nucleus of the religious senti-
ment. The author, moreover, fails to do jus-
tice to the contribution of the individual of
religious experience. While the religious
emotion, deeply rooted as it is in instinctive
reactions reaching far back into human and
possibly pre-human history, is to a marked
degree amenable to the transformations con-
ditioned by the crowd, the mob, and other
more complex types of social setting; reli-
gious experience has, on the other hand,
been enriched, elaborated, refined, by the
spiritual contributions of individuals. These
were either individuals of average potentiali-
ties for religious experience, but placed in
unalmost circumstances, or they belonged to
that group of exceptional individuals who, at
time and places, have shown uncommon
proclivities for the religious life. The first
category is exemplified by the Indian youth
who, at the dawn of maturity, retires to a
shanty in the woods, fasts, purifies himself
until he is so pure that "the spirits can see
through him"; then the vision of his life
comes to him in the shape of a spiritual ani-
mal or object; he receives a supernatural rev-
elation of certain powers which henceforth
are his for life, and never, after this, may he
kill or eat the earthly representatives of the
animal which, in spirit form, thus came to
visit him in his vision. To the second cate-
gory of individuals belongs that limited
group of men from which history has re-
cruited her religious teachers and reformers,
fanatics and miracle workers, revivalists,
founders and destroyers of religions, proph-
ets and saints. Now, it is emphatically char-
acteristic of both of these categories of men
(and women) that, temporarily or perma-
nently, they shun the crowd, they flee from
the world, they live in solitude, they are
proof against religions settings except those
of their own making; in their psychic consti-
tution lie infinite potentialities of religious
experience and ecstasy. Their god is within
their. The lives of such as they constitute a
glaring refutation of Durkheim's theory.

Our critique is drawing to a close. The ar-
guments advanced seem to show that Durk-
heim's theory of religion does not bear out
the expectations aroused by the wisdom,
 scholarship, and noted brilliancy of the au-
thor. Durkheim errs in denying the savage
the ability to differentiate between the natu-nel and the supernatural, and in denying na-
ture the power to cause the religious thrill;
he errs in accepting a mongrel definition of
religion and in regarding the dichotomy of
experience into sacred and profane as a psy-
chologically univocal determination of all
religion; he errs in identifying primitive
religion with totemism and the "totemic prin-
ciple" with mana; he errs, finally, in claiming
for mana, and its emotional concomitant, the
religious thrill, an exclusively crowd-psycho-
logical origin.

Thus Durkheim does not succeed in fur-
nishing a satisfactory solution of either of
the two problems which stand in the center
of his interest: the relation of individual to
social experience and the interpretation
of the nature and origin of the religious senti-
ment. Sharp as is the author's wit and bril-
liant as is his argumentation, one closes the
book with a melancholy assurance that
Durkheim has left these two perennial prob-
lems where he found them.