A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY
OF RELIGION
ITS ORIGIN, FUNCTION, AND FUTURE

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APPENDIX

DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION AND CRITICAL COMMENTS

AN APPENDIX TO PART I, CHAPTER II

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DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION AND CRITICAL COMMENTS

In this appendix will be found a large number of definitions not given in chapter II, "Constructive Criticism of Current Conceptions of Religion" and also a fuller exposition and criticism of a few of those discussed in that chapter. I have divided these definitions roughly into three groups—intellectualistic, affectivistic, and voluntaristic—and I have added at the end Wundt's classification, together with his criticism of the three types of conceptions represented in his classification. It need hardly be said that no attempt has been made to provide an exhaustive list of definitions.

I trust that the perusal of these forty-eight definitions will not bewilder the reader, but that he will see in them a splendid illustration both of the versatility and the one-sidedness of the human mind in the description of a very complex yet unitary manifestation of life.

I

INTELLECTUALISTIC POINT OF VIEW

Max Müller. (See p. 25 of this book.) —In the Introduction to the Science of Religion, Müller wrote: "Religion is a mental faculty or disposition, which, independent of, nay in spite of, sense and reason, enables man to apprehend the Infinite under different names, and under varying disguises. Without that faculty no religion, not even the lowest worship of idols and fetiches, would be possible; and if we will but listen attentively, we can hear in all religions a groaning of the spirit, a struggle to conceive the inconceivable, to utter the unutterable, a longing after the Infinite, a love of God." (Pp. 13-14.) This "mental faculty" he calls "faith."

This use of the term "faculty" was vigorously attacked. Müller, yielding in a measure to the objections, declared, in the
Origin of Religion, that he did not mean to say that there is a separate religious consciousness. "When we speak of faith as a religious faculty, in man, all that we can mean is our ordinary consciousness so developed and modified as to enable us to take cognizance of religious objects... This is not meant in a new sense... it is simply the old consciousness applied to new objects." If "faculty" is an ambiguous or dangerous word, he is ready to replace it by "potential energy," and to define the subjective side of religion as "the potential energy which enables man to apprehend the Infinite." (P. 23.) That "faculty" or "potential energy," also called "faith," is, like reason, a development of sensuous perceptions, but a development of a different kind. The human mind, according to Müller, is made up of three "faculties" or "potential energies": sense, reason, faith. The last two are different developments of sensuous perception. "Our apprehension of the Infinite takes place independently of, nay in spite of, sense and reason." The facts of Religion, subjective and objective, can be explained only by an appeal to that third "potential energy." "We have in that perception of the Infinite the root of the whole historical development of the human faith." He admits, however, that this perception is at first obscure.¹

To make religion proceed from a special faculty or potential energy is to open a chasm between secular and religious life, without any sufficient reason for so doing. One clear result of the psychological investigations of religion has been to show that no particular faculty is needed to account for religious life.

Max Müller's use of the words "perception" and "infinite" is also open to serious criticism. At times perception seems to be

¹ Tiele cannot agree with Max Müller that "the perception or apprehension of the Infinite, the yearning of the soul after God, is the source of all religion." The point he will not admit is that primitive man "perceives" the Infinite "because such perception requires a considerable measure of self-knowledge and reflection, which is only attainable long after religion has come into existence, long after the religious spirit has revealed itself. The origin of religion consists in the fact that man has the Infinite within him, even before he is himself conscious of it, whether he recognizes it or not.''

"It is man's original, unconscious innate sense of infinity that gives rise to his first stammering utterances of that sense, and to all his beautiful dreams of the past and the future." (Elements of the Science of Religion, Vol. II, Lecture IX, pp. 230, 233.)
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synonymous with feeling, and at other times with apprehension. In the *Origin of Religion*, he writes, for instance, "With every finite perception there is a concomitant perception, or, if that word should seem too strong, a concomitant sentiment or presentiment of the Infinite." (P. 43.) As to the word "infinite," I am of the opinion that the chief service it renders in a definition of religion is to betray man's ineradicable megalomania. What other function it fulfils in Max Müller's writings, I do not know.

Has any one ever mistaken the principles of physiology for therapeutics or the sense of beauty for art? Max Müller has to admit that throughout a whole volume he confused dogma with religion! In his *Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion*, he refers to the criticisms directed against his conception of religion and says: "The fact was that in my former writings I was chiefly concerned with dogmatic Religion. . . . Still I plead guilty to not having laid sufficient emphasis on the practical side of religion; I admit that mere theories about the Infinite, unless they influence human conduct, have no right to the name of Religion." But although he thus formally recognized this truth, it never acquired in his mind its full meaning. He continued to write as if a particular "perception" or "apprehension" constituted religion.

HERBERT SPENCER. (See p. 26 of this book.)—Religion has from the beginning dimly discerned the ultimate verity and has never ceased to insist upon this truth,—"that all things are manifestations of a Power that transcends our knowledge." "The consciousness of a mystery is traceable to the rudest fetichism. Each higher religious creed, rejecting those definite and simple interpretations of Nature previously given, has become more religious by doing this. As the quite concrete and conceivable agencies alleged as the causes of things have been replaced by agencies less concrete and conceivable, the element of mystery has of necessity become more predominant. . . . And so Religion has ever been approximating towards that complete recognition of this mystery which is its goal. . . . No exposure of the logical inconsistency of its conclusions . . . has been able to weaken its allegiance to that ultimate verity for which it stands. . . . there still remained the consciousness of a truth
which, however faulty the mode in which it had been expressed, was yet a truth beyond cavil." (First Principles, pp. 99, 100.)

The views of Müller and Spencer are not so different as they might seem at first glance. The two men might have reached the same conclusion if one of them had not remained entangled by the way. Max Müller affirms nothing that cannot be brought into agreement with Spencer's opinion, provided the words "perception," "apprehension," "sentiment," used interchangeably by Müller, be replaced by "recognition"; and, provided that "Infinite" be interpreted as meaning the ultimate mystery of things. This liberal interpretation of Max Müller will not appear far-fetched if the fact is recalled that he names the faculty by which we apprehend the infinite "faith," and also that he sees no objection to regarding the infinite as an object of "sentiment" rather than as an object of "perception."

What place is occupied by feeling in Spencer's intellectual interpretation is not altogether clear. But this at least is evident: the feelings which "respond" to religious ideas — the religious feelings — are not the "vital elements" of religion.

EDUARD VON HARTMANN.—Hartmann's utterances on religion leave one with the impression that he had not reached complete clearness. According to him religion, although it is an "affair of the feelings," has for its foundation metaphysical conceptions. A system of metaphysics must arouse feelings of a certain kind before it becomes religion.

"The man who carries within himself metaphysical conceptions of such a nature that his emotions are positively affected by them possesses religion . . . every man has need of metaphysical ideas in order to satisfy his need of religion . . . it must be a system of metaphysics which will serve to satisfy, even in those persons who are strangers to science, directly, the need of metaphysics, and, indirectly, the religious need.

"This metaphysics, which we might call popular metaphysics, is religion. However, religion consists of something more than the metaphysical ideas of the masses; it contains the capability of discerning the means and directions for arousing in a strong and lasting form the religious sentiment with this metaphysics for its foundation, — that is to say, religious cultus; and secondly, reli-
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... tion contains the deductions drawn from this metaphysics for the practical conduct of men; in other words, religious ethics. . . .

"Thus we see that religion constitutes the whole of the philosophy of the masses. . . . In fine, religion comprises all the idealism of the masses, art not being accessible to them, except under a form too coarse to elevate them to artistic idealism. . . .

"The masses do not know metaphysics by name, but they do know what they require of religion; namely, that it should give them 'the truth'; not all the truths as they lie scattered in the various special sciences, but the truth which the universal science, philosophy, strives to attain, the one and eternal truth able to satisfy their unconscious need of metaphysics." (The Religion of the Future, pp. 73, 74, 75.)

In another passage he describes the nature of the "metaphysical" ideas which lie at the foundation of religion. Although religion "needs ideas as a foundation for the feelings, yet these ideas must be as little abstract as possible, and the reverse of distinct and definite. Indeed, an idea which is intended to rouse the religious feelings should be intuitive, figurative, fantastic, and confused to the last degree." (The Religion of the Future, p. 28.)

Other passages in Hartmann's work suggest a view of religion very like that which I have discussed under the third class,—that religion is "a consciousness of our practical relation to an invisible spiritual order." He writes, for instance: "Moreover, all taboos do not belong to religion proper, that is, they are not always rules of conduct for the regulation of man's contact with deities that, when taken in the right way, may be counted on as friendly. . . ." And again he says that religion in the true sense begins "with a loving reverence for known gods, who are knit to their worshippers by strong bonds of kinship."

James Martineau. — Martineau understands by religion "the belief in an ever living God, that is, in a Divine Mind and Will ruling the Universe and holding moral relations with mankind." (A Study of Religion, p. 1.)

G. J. Romanes. — "The distinguishing feature of any theory which can properly be termed a religion is that it should refer
to the ultimate source or sources of things; that it should suppose this source to be an objective, intelligent, and personal nature. . . . To speak of the Religion of the Unknowable, the Religion of Cosmism, the Religion of Humanity, and so forth, where the personality of the First Cause is not recognized, is as unmeaning as it would be to speak of the love of a triangle, or the rationality of the equator. . . .

"Religion is a department of thought having for its object a self-conscious and intelligent Being." (Thoughts on Religion, p. 41.)

HEGEL. — Hegel defines religion as "the knowledge possessed by the finite mind of its nature as absolute mind."

In the opening pages of the Philosophy of Religion, he describes religion in an eloquent passage: "It is the realm where all enigmatical problems of the world are solved; where all contradictions of deep musing thoughts are unveiled and all pangs of feeling soothed. . . . The whole manifold of human relations, activities, joys, everything that man values and esteems, wherein he seeks his happiness, his glory, and his pride—all find their final middle point in religion, in the thought, consciousness, and feeling of God. God is therefore the beginning and the end of everything. . . . By means of religion man is placed in relation to this centre, in which all his other relations converge, and is elevated to the realm of highest freedom, which is its own end and aim. This relation of freedom on the side of feeling is joy which we call beatitude; . . . on the side of activity its sole office is to manifest the honor and to reveal the glory of God, so that man in this relation is no longer chiefly concerned with himself, his own interests and vanity, but rather with the absolute end and aim." (Quoted from Sterrett's Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, pp. 38–39.)

F. B. Jevons. — "Religion as a form of thought is the perception of the invisible things of Him through the things that are made." (History of Religion, pp. 9–10.)

LADD, GEORGE T. — In the following, Ladd identifies religion with a theory of reality. "For religion is, as a matter of histori-
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cal and psychological fact, always metaphysical. It is always a naive or a reasoned theory of reality. It is an attempt to explain human experience by relating it to invisible existences that belong, nevertheless, to the real world. Indeed, monotheism finds in its One and Alone God the Ultimate Reality, the Being from whom all finite beings proceed, on whom they all depend, and to whom they all owe the devotion of their lives in a faithful allegiance. This, however, is ontological doctrine — somehow postulated rationally, or reasoned out, or superstitiously and vainly imagined." (Jr. of Phil., Psy., and Scientific Methods, 1904, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 9.)

Hugo Münsterberg. — "Thus we claim that religion and philosophy have the same task. Both aim to apprehend the worlds of values as ultimately identical with each other, and therefore the world — totality — as absolutely valuable. Both philosophy and religion must transcend the life-experience for that end. . . . But the supplementation of all possible experience in religion and philosophy takes opposite directions. . . . We may say that religion transcends experience, but that philosophy goes back to the presuppositions of experience. Religion constructs a superstructure which overarches the experienced world; philosophy builds a substructure which supports the experienced world. For that reason religion creates God, who gives the value of holiness to the world; philosophy seeks the ultimate foundation in the external act, which gives to the world the value of absoluteness." And further: "Religion is accordingly also a form of apprehension through the overpersonal consciousness. . . . It is the form in which this combined content must be thought in order to become a common self-asserting world at all. But religion is the form of forms; it is the absolutely valid form for the connection of that which is itself found in various forms." (The Eternal Values, p. 358.)

In the above passage Professor Münsterberg speaks of religion as "constructing," "creating" gods, as a "form" in which the various contents of consciousness must be thought. The term "religion" as he uses it there denotes, it is clear, the system of ideas, of conceptions, within which religious life moves, and the mental activities by which it is built up. Religion and philosophy
thus understood have, of course, the same task; but, in this sense, "religion" means the philosophy of religious life, not religious life itself.

A more discriminating use of the term "religion" appears in the following passage: —

"Religion is the completion [Ergänzung] of experience. It does not complete merely actual experience; that is the task of science, and faith would do more than simply fill up the gaps in science. Such gaps can be filled only by means of possible experience, while faith, not only with transcendent but also with immanent conceptions of God, goes beyond all that is given. The given universe and the given individual powers are not sufficient to enable us to experience the totality of the ideal. The individual who feels values completes the universe through revelation and his own powers through prayer." (Grundzüge, p. 166.)

That Professor Münsterberg is dealing here with religion itself and no longer with the concepts of religion is made clear by the sense given to the word Ergänzung: it is made to include the making of oneself whole.

II

AFFECTIVISTIC POINT OF VIEW

F. Schleiermacher. (See p. 33 of this book.) Schleiermacher does not believe that feeling can exist independently of the other mental processes. He says explicitly of perception, feeling, and activity, that "they are not identical and yet are inseparable."

For him religion consists in certain feelings holding a definite relation to the life of action (morality), and to the life of thought (science, philosophy). Religion is passivity, contemplation. By itself it does not urge men to activity. "If you could imagine it implanted in man quite alone, it would produce neither these nor any other deeds. The man . . . would not act, he would only feel." (Speeches on Religion p. 57.) But if religion does not belong to the world of action, no more does it belong to the world of thought: "Religion cannot and will not originate in the pure impulse to know. What we feel and are conscious of in religious emotions is not the nature of things, but their operation upon us.
What you may know or believe about the nature of things is far beneath the sphere of Religion." (Ibid., p. 48.) He makes, legitimately, a sharp distinction between the feelings themselves and the ideas which arise when the feelings are made the objects of reflection: "If you call these ideas," says he, "religious principles and ideas, you are not in error. But do not forget that this is scientific treatment of religion, knowledge about it, and not religion itself." (Ibid., pp. 46, 47.)

These two points — namely, that religion is not morality, and that it is not knowledge — are persistently emphasized in Schleiermacher's writings. It is not clearly explained how the feelings which constitute religion are generated and how they differ from the non-religious feelings. "Your feeling," he says, "is piety [a word for him synonymous with religion], in so far as it expresses . . . the being and life common to you and to the All." (Ibid., p. 45.) Religion is the feeling produced upon us by any particular object, i.e. by any part of the universe, when it is received, felt as a part of the whole, "not as limited and in opposition to other things, but as an exhibition of the Infinite in our life. Anything beyond this, any effort to penetrate into the nature and the substance of things, is no longer religion, but seeks to be a science of some sort." (Ibid., p. 49.) Further on, he tries again to describe the kind of apprehension which determines the religious feeling: "The sum total of Religion is to feel that, in its highest unity, everything that stirs our emotions is one in feeling; to feel that aught single and particular is only possible by means of this unity; to feel, that is to say, that our being and living is a being and living in and through God." He adds, "But it is not necessary that the Deity should be presented as also one distinct object." (Ibid., p. 50.) Within the limits set in the preceding quotations, i.e. provided the feeling aroused by the particular object reveals the unity of the whole, every feeling is religion. This, then, is clearly affirmed in the discourse on the Nature of Religion, that it is the action of particular things upon us that underlies all religious emotions; we cannot "have" religion except through the influence exercised upon us by concrete, particular things.

In the Christliche Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher gives a definition of religion which differs in its wording from that found in the Reisen. It is in this later work that he reaches the oft-quoted
The essence of religion consists in the feeling of an absolute dependence.” To render fully his thought, the words “upon the Universe,” or “upon God,” should be added. This formula attempts to complete, not to correct, the earlier statement. He had said, “Religion is feeling,” it is the feeling generated in us by single experiences when these are viewed as intimations of the whole of which they are parts. But he had not said what kind of feeling would be produced under these circumstances. In the Glaubenlehre he adds that the intuition of the whole through the presentation of a particular object produces a feeling of dependence. It will be a feeling of dependence, because in these experiences man realizes that the reaction called forth by the particular object is utterly insufficient, since at bottom it is a reaction by which he tries to meet, not the particular thing which has called it forth, but the whole which it represents.

In his earlier writings Schleiermacher avoided the word “God” and was satisfied to use impersonal terms: the All, the Whole, the Universe, the Infinite. Later on the word “God” appears, and we find him making a distinction between the Universe and God which he does not seem to have had in mind previously. He distinguishes between the Whole as an aggregate of mutually conditioned parts of which we ourselves are one, and the Unity underneath this coherence which conditions all things and conditions our relations to the other parts of the Whole.

No criticism need be made here other than that which the reader has found in Chapter II.

C. P. Tiele. (See p. 33.) — “I am satisfied that a careful analysis of religious phenomena compels us to conclude that they are all traceable to the emotions — traceable to them, I say, but not originating in them. Their origin lies deeper.” (Science of Religion, Vol. II, p. 15.) He means that in the emotion we have the “beginning of religion, which is merely the awakening of religious consciousness,” not its origin. (Ibid., p. 25.)

“In the sphere of religion the emotion consists in the consciousness that we are in the power of a Being whom we revere as the highest, and to whom we feel attracted and related; it consists in the adoration which impels us to dedicate ourselves entirely to the
adored object, yet also to possess it and to be in union with it.”

(Ibid., p. 19.)

“We mean . . . that religion is, in truth, that pure and reverential disposition or frame of mind which we call piety . . . Now, whenever I discover piety . . . I maintain that its essence, and therefore the essence of religion itself, is adoration. In adoration are united those two phases of religion which are termed by the schools ‘transcendent’ and ‘immanent’ respectively, or which, in religious language, represent the believer as ‘looking up to God as the Most High’ and as ‘feeling himself akin to God as his Father.’ For adoration necessarily involves the elements of holy awe, humble reverence, grateful acknowledgment of every token of love, hopeful confidence, lowly self-abasement, a deep sense of one’s own unworthiness and shortcomings, total self-abnegation, and unconditional conservation of one’s whole life and one’s whole faculties . . . But at the same time — and herein consists its other phase — adoration includes a desire to possess the adored object, to call it entirely one’s own.” (Ibid., pp. 198, 199.)

Concerning the origin of religion, Tiele writes that it “begins with conceptions awakened by emotions and experiences, and these conceptions awakened produce definite sentiments, which were already present in germ in the first religious emotions, but which can only be aroused to consciousness by these conceptions; and these sentiments manifest themselves in actions.” (Ibid., p. 67.)

JOHN McTAGGART. — “Religion is clearly a state of mind. It is also clear that it is not exclusively the acceptance of certain propositions as true. It seems to me that it may best be described as an emotion resting on a conviction of a harmony between ourselves and the universe at large.” This presupposes, in the author’s mind, belief in the ultimate goodness of the universe; otherwise there would be, according to him, no religion possible. He holds that this definition is wide enough to include among religious men Plato, Spinoza, and Hegel, who did not accept any of the historical religions. (Some Dogmas of Religion, London, 1906, p. 3.)

G. SIMMEL. — “The religious life means the whole existence pitched in a certain key [Tonart]. The religious feeling [Tonart]
arises in the relation of man to external nature, to fate, to humanity. At times certain sociological conditions and relations possess, as such, the religious coloring. The relation of the pious child to his parents, of the enthusiastic patriot to his country, or of the humanitarian cosmopolitan to mankind, the relation of the workman to his fellow-laborers, or of the proud feudal lord to his class, the relation of the subject to the master under whose command he stands, or of the faithful soldier to the army—all these relations have, regarded from the psychological standpoint, a common 'tone,' which we must call religious." (Die Religion, Frankfurt a. M., Rutten u. Loening, p. 79.)

O. PFELEDERER. — "In the religious consciousness all sides of the whole personality participate. Of course we must recognize that knowing and willing are here not ends in themselves as in science and morality, but rather subordinated to feeling as the real centre of religious consciousness. . . . This is not a simple feeling, but a combination of feelings of freedom and independence." (The Notion and Problem of the Philosophy of Religion, Phil. Rev., Vol. II, 1893, pp. 1-23.)

TH. RIBOT. — "In every religious belief, two things are necessarily included: an intellectual element, i.e. an item of knowledge constituting the object of the belief; an effective state, i.e. a feeling which accompanies the former and expresses itself in acts. Whoever does not possess this second element knows not the religious feeling, but only abstract and metaphysical conceptions." (La Psychologie des Sentiments, pp. 297-298.)

GEORGE M. STRATTON. — Religion is the appreciation of an unseen world, usually an unseen company; and religion is also whatever seems clearly to be moving toward such an appreciation or to be returning from it. Or perhaps it might better be described as man's whole bearing toward what seems to him the "Best or Greatest." "Religion is the gradual awakening to the weight and import of a particular order of objects." (The Psychology of the Religious Life, pp. 343, 345.)

A. RITSCHEL. — "In all religion the endeavor is made, with the help of the exalted spiritual power which man adores, to
solve the contradiction in which man finds himself as a part of the natural world, and as a spiritual personality, which makes the claim to rule nature.”

In another place: “All religion is interpretation of the course of the world, in whatever compass it is recognized, in the sense that the exalted spiritual powers (or the spiritual power), which rule in or over it, maintain or confirm for the personal spirit its claims or its independence against limitation by nature or the natural operations of human society.” (Ritschl, A., Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung, Vol. III, pp. 189, 17, as quoted by Garvie, The Ritschlian Theology, pp. 162, 163.)

W. Herrmann. — “The religious view is an answer to the question, ‘How must the world be judged, if the highest good is to be real?’ while metaphysics deals with facts. In it we inquire in what universal forms all being and happening can be represented without contradiction. For the correctness of these representations it does not in any way matter in what relation to the aims of our wills, to our weal or woe, things stand.”

“For theology to seek a basis in metaphysics and not in the certainties of the religious experience, would be to lean on an arm of flesh and to distrust ‘the spirit of the living God.’”

“The concern of Religion is to regard the multiplicity of the world as the orderly whole of means by which the highest value of the pious man, which is expressed in feeling, is realized.” (Herrmann, W., Die Metaphysik in der Theologie, as reported by Garvie, The Ritschlian Theology, pp. 64, 65, 174.)

Daniel Greenleaf Thompson. — “Religion is the aggregate of those sentiments in the human mind arising in connection with the relations assumed to subsist between the order of nature (inclusive of the observer) and a postulated supernatural.” (The Religious Sentiment of the Human Mind.)

J. A. Comenius. — “By religion we understand that inner veneration by which the mind of man attaches and binds itself to the supreme Godhead.” (Great Didache, Keatinge tr., p. 190.)
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III

VOLUNTARISTIC OR PRACTICAL POINT OF VIEW

WILLIAM JAMES. (See p. 39.)—Professor James starts with a very broad definition, which he gradually narrows until he brings into agreement with the common use of the word "religion." "In the broadest and most general terms possible one might say that religious life consists of the belief that there is an unseen order and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto. This belief and this adjustment are the religious attitude of the soul." (The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 53.)

But however justifiable this conception may be, it is too inclusive to agree with the meaning generally given to religion. No attitude is accounted religious unless it is grave and serious; the trifling, sneering attitude of a Voltaire must be excluded if we would not strain too much the ordinary use of the word. But if religion does not include light irony, neither does it include grumbling and complaint. The mood of a Schopenhauer or of a Nietzsche, though often relieved by an ennobling sadness, is almost as often mere peevishness running away with the bit between its teeth. The sallies of such men "lack the purgatorial note which religious sadness gives forth... There must be something solemn, serious, and tender about any attitude which we denominate religious. If glad, it must not grin or snicker; if sad, it must not scream or curse."

But still further elimination is needed; for the conception as it now stands would include the chilling reflections of Marcus Aurelius on the eternal reason, as well as the passionate outcry of Job. It would encompass what we are tempted to call philosophical or ethical rather than religious attitudes; the grave, austere submission of the stoic, as well as the "enthusiastic temper of espousal" characteristic of the mood commonly called religious. (Ibid., p. 38. See the whole of Lecture II.)

A. RÉVILE. — "Religion rests above all upon the need of man to realize an harmonious synthesis between his destiny and the opposing influences he meets in the world." (La Religion des peuples non-civilisés, Vol. I, p. 120.)
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H. Bosanquet. — "A man's religion, it may be said, is that set of objects, habits, and convictions, whatever it might prove to be, which he would die for rather than abandon, or at least would feel himself excommunicated from humanity if he did abandon. It would follow from this that his actual religion may differ in any degree from his nominal creed. On the other hand, it might be contended by students of the philosophy of religion that only those convictions which are called religious par excellence in the normal sense are capable of affording in the fullest degree that support, and that sense of triumphant unity, which seem to be the central facts of religious experience." (Baldwin's Dictionary, art. Religion, Philosophy of.)

G. Sergi. — Religion, according to Sergi, is "a pathological manifestation of the protective function, a sort of deviation of the normal function . . . , a deviation caused by ignorance of natural causes and of their effects." (Les Emotions, p. 404.)

Hiram M. Stanley. — "We take it then that religion must be biologically defined as a specific mode of reaction to high superiorities of environment, or psychologically as a perception of a highly superior being, leading to a peculiar mode of emotion and will toward that being, and thus securing the most advantageous action. The reverential and worshipful emotion spent is the essence of religion, and whenever this is found among the lowest animals, or the highest specimens of mankind, there is religion." (On the Psychology of Religion, Psychol. Rev., 1898, Vol. V, p. 258.)

J. G. Frazer. — "By religion, then, I understand a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of Nature and of human life." (The Golden Bough, 2d. ed., Vol. I, p. 63.)

Goblet d'Alviella. — "These three elements, common to all organized religions, may be classed as follows:"

1. The belief in the existence of superhuman beings who intervene in a mysterious manner in the destinies of man and the course of nature.
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"2. Attempts to draw near to these beings or to escape them, to forecast the object of their intervention and the form it will take, or to modify their action by conciliation or compulsion.

"3. Recourse to the mediation of certain individuals supposed to have special qualifications for success in such attempts.

"4. The placing of certain customs under the sanction of the superhuman powers." (The Hibbert Lectures for 1891, p. 4.)

HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL. — Considering religion objectively, Marshall concludes that it consists in those special activities which imply restraint of individualism, and that these activities, or at least the general tendencies from which they spring, are instinctive. "The restraint of individualistic impulses to racial ones (the suppression of our will to a higher will) seems to me to be of the very essence of religion: the belief in the Deity, as usually found, being from the psychological point of view an attachment to, rather than of the essence of, the religious feeling." (Instinct and Reason, Macmillan, 1898, p. 329. See, for comparison, Benjamin Kidd's Social Evolution, p. 103, and Hiram M. Stanley's paper On the Psychology of Religion, Psychol. Rev., 1898, Vol. V, p. 258.)

Marshall's argument in support of the instinctiveness of religion runs somewhat as follows. Religion is not, on the whole, advantageous to the individual; on the contrary, it is in most cases clearly detrimental and would therefore not have remained a factor in human societies unless it was advantageous to the race. That religious activities are detrimental to the individual and advantageous to the race, is Marshall's thesis. Practices of this kind remain in existence through the survival of the fittest race. This implies the establishment of the practices, or at least of the tendencies leading to them, as instincts.

It appears in what precedes that Marshall includes under "instinct" not only congenital activities relatively definite, but also others. In instincts, "the definiteness and the fixity of the actions is of very secondary moment, that which is important being the fact that there exists a biological end which determines the trend of these organized activities." In this wider sense religion may well be called an instinct, but in this sense the "instinctive nature" of religion ceases to have any particular significance. For
if only “the tendencies to the main drift” of religion are instinctive, then what is true of religion in this respect is true also of every other human activity.

That religious activities are of value to the race, no one will doubt, but the opinion that they are on the whole detrimental to the individual seems to me the result of an insufficient investigation of religious life. The facts upon which Marshall places emphasis—seclusion, vision, fasting, one aspect of prayer, one aspect of sacrifice—do not at all represent the whole of religious life.

F. Tönnies. — Religion “is essentially social and . . . of a twofold nature, apparently contradictory, and indeed very often actually conflicting. For its function is first to validate and fortify authority, consequently to make the strong and powerful more strong and powerful . . .; but second, it goes very far in protecting and supporting the weak, notably women and children, old age, widows and orphans. . . . The influence of the first function is eminently political, while the second may be called ethical.” (The Origin and Function of Religion, a discussion, by A. E. Crawley and others, in Sociological Papers, 1906, Macmillan, Vol. III, p. 267.)

Benjamin Kidd. — “A religion is a form of belief providing an ultra-rational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interests of the social organism are antagonistic and by which the former are rendered subordinate to the latter in the general interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing.” (Social Evolution, p. 103.)

A. Comte. — “Religion, then, consists in regulating each one’s individual nature, and forms the rallying point for all the separate individuals.

“To constitute a complete and durable harmony what is wanted is really to bind together man’s inner nature by love and then to bind the man to the outer world by faith. Such, generally stated, is the necessary participation of the heart to the synthetical state, or unity, of the individual or the society.” (Catechism of Positive Religion, pp. 48, 51.)
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THOMAS DAVIDSON. — "A religion is that which places us in such harmony with our environment that we attain the highest possible development in knowledge, love, and will. But surely no institution was ever better calculated for this than our republic."

"I think, then, we may conclude, not only that Americanism is a religion, but that it is the noblest of all religions, that which best insures the realization of the highest manhood and womanhood, and points them to the highest goal,—a goal which it is their task throughout eternity to approach without reaching. It is a religion, too, that unifies our present life with eternal life, and identifies our civil with our religious life. It is a religion that can be taught to every human being, and that, when taught, will make all men brothers. It can be made the principle of ethical life in all its phases,—domestic, social, and political. Religion need no longer be banished from our public schools, as a mere matter of individual opinion, when it is really the mainspring of social life. In teaching children to lead the life of true Americans, we shall be leading them in the paths of eternal life." (American Democracy as a Religion, Internat. Jr. of Ethics, Vol. X, pp. 37, 38, 39.)

RENAN. — "My religion is now as ever the progress of reason; in other words, the progress of science." (The Future of Science, Preface.)

EDWARD CAIRD. — "Without as yet attempting to define religion, . . . we may go as far as to say that a man's religion is the expression of his ultimate attitude to the universe, the summed-up meaning and purport of his whole consciousness of things."

". . . it is always the consciousness, in some more or less adequate form, of a divine power as the principle of unity in a world of which we are not only spectators, but parts. Indeed, the presence of this unity as an element or presupposition of our consciousness is the only reason of man's being religious at all." (Evolution of Religion, Vol. I, pp. 30, 235.)

WILLIAM RALPH INGE. — "Our consciousness of the beyond is, I say, the raw material of all religion." (Christian Mysticism, Bampton Lectures for 1899, p. 5.)
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FELIX ADLER. — "Religion is that which brings man into touch with the infinite: this is its mission. If we put aside the materialistic explanations of morality, and see the majesty, the inexplicable augustness of it, we shall find that, in the moral life itself, the moral experience itself, we possess religion. Religion is at the core of it, for religion is the connection of man's life with the absolute, and the moral law is an absolute law." (The Religion of Duty, p. 94.)

A. SABATTIER. — Religion "is a commerce, a conscious and willed relation into which the soul in distress enters with the mysterious power on which it feels that it and its destiny depend." (Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, p. 27.)

"What we call the religious consciousness in a man is the feeling of the relation in which he stands, and wills to stand, to the universal principle on which he knows himself to depend, and with the universe in which he sees himself to be a part of one great whole."

"This feeling, filial in regard to God, fraternal in regard to man, is that which makes a Christian." (Ibid., pp. 147, 149.)

J. ROYCE. — "Religion is the consciousness of our practical relation to an invisible, spiritual order."

UPTON. — "It is the felt relationship in which the finite self-consciousness stands to the immanent and universal ground of all being, which constitutes religion." (The Basis of Religious Belief, Hibbert Lectures for 1893.)

R. J. CAMPBELL. — "All religion begins in cosmic emotion. It is the recognition of an essential relationship between the human soul and the great whole of things of which it is the outcome and expression. The mysterious universe is always calling, and, in some form or other, we are always answering. . . . But religion, properly so-called, begins when the soul consciously enters into communion with this higher-than-self as with an all-comprehending intelligence; it is the soul instinctively turning towards that from whence it came . . . it is the soul reaching forth to the great mysterious whole of things, the higher-than-self, and seeking
for closer and ever closer communion therewith.” (The New Theology, p. 16.)

E. Kant.—“Religion is (considered subjectively) the recognition of all our duties as divine commands.” (Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, Viertes Stuck, erster Theil.)

Prince Kropotkin.—This leader of the Anarchist movement stresses the social aspect of religion. For him, “a passionate desire for working out a new, better form of society” is a religious impulse. (The Ethical Need of the Present Day, The Nineteenth Century, August, 1904, Vol. LVI, pp. 207-226.)

F. W. H. Myers.—Religion is “the sane and normal response of the human spirit to all that we know of cosmic law; that is, to the known phenomena of the universe, regarded as an intelligible whole. . . . For, from my point of view, man cannot be too religious. I desire that the environing, the interpenetrating universe,—its energy, its life, its love,—should illumine in us, in our low degree, that which we ascribe to the World-Soul, saying, ‘God is Love,’ ‘God is Light.’ The World-Soul’s infinite energy of omniscient benevolence should become in us an enthusiasm of adoring cooperation,—an eager obedience to whatsoever with our best pains we can discern as the justly ruling principle—τη ἡγεμονία—without us and within.” (Human Personality, Vol. II, pp. 284-285.)

Daniel G. Brinton.—“There is no one belief or set of beliefs which constitutes a religion. We are apt to suppose that every creed must teach a belief in a god or gods, in an immortal soul, and in a divine government of the world. . . . No mistake could be greater. The religion which to-day counts the largest number of adherents, Buddhism, rejects every one of these items.” (Religions of Primitive Peoples, American Lectures on the History of Religions for 1896-1897, p. 28.)

After reviewing the principal theories of the origin of religion, he expresses his own opinion as follows: “The real explanation of the origin of religion is simple and universal. . . . It makes no difference whether we analyze the superstitions of the rudest
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savages, or the lofty utterances of John the Evangelist, or of Spinoza the 'god-intoxicated philosopher'; we shall find one and the same postulate to the faith of all.

"This universal postulate, the psychic origin of all religious thought, is the recognition, or, if you please, the assumption, that conscious volition is the ultimate source of all force. It is the belief that behind the sensuous, phenomenal world, distinct from it, giving it form, existence, and activity, lies the ultimate, invisible, immeasurable power of Mind, of conscious Will, of Intelligence, analogous in some way to our own; and,—mark this essential corollary,—that man is in communication with it.

"What the highest religions thus assume was likewise the foundation of the earliest and most primitive cults. The one universal trait amid their endless forms of expression was the unalterable faith in Mind, in the supersensuous, as the ultimate source of all force, all life, all being." (Religions of Primitive Peoples, American Lectures on the History of Religions for 1896–1897, pp. 47, 48.)

In an earlier book (The Religious Sentiment, p. 79) Brinton gave the following definition: "Expectant attention directed toward an event not under known control, with a concomitant idea of Cause and Power."

The authors of the three following quotations are concerned with the origin of religion.

Thomas Hobbes.—"And in these four things, Opinions of Ghosts, Ignorance of second causes, Devotion towards what men fear, and Taking of things Casuall for Prognostiques, consisteth the Naturall seed of Religion." (Leviathan, Cambridge, 1904, p. 73.)

David Hume.—"We may conclude, therefore, that in all nations . . . the first ideas of religion arose not from a contemplation of the works of nature, but from a concern with regard to the events of life, and from the incessant hopes and fears, which actuate the human mind." (Essays, Vol. II, 1889, The Natural History of Religions, p. 315.)

R. R. Marrett—"Though open to conviction, therefore, I still incline to regard awe as the bottom fact in religion, and to suppose wonder-working to have become distinctly religious just in so far as
it came to be regarded with awe, namely, as something supernormal. My counter-hypothesis, in short, is this, that the essence of religion is miracle, and that the ‘miracle of grace’ is but one form of miracle and therefore of religion.” (The Origin and Function of Religion, a discussion, by A. E. Crawley and others, in Sociological Papers, 1906, Macmillan, Vol. III, p. 267.)

W. Wundt. — “In my opinion, the question can only be answered in one way: all ideas and feelings are religious which refer to an ideal existence, an existence that fully corresponds to the wishes and requirements of the human mind.” “The endeavor after an existence that shall satisfy the wishes and requirements of the human mind” is “the original source of religious feeling.” (Ethics, Vol. I, The Facts of the Moral Life, tr. by Gulliver and Titchener, Macmillan, 1897, pp. 59, 60.) This ideal he characterizes as changeable, — crude or refined according to the intellectual and aesthetic culture of the people concerned. It is “a product of human feeling and imagination.”

Wundt’s Classification — Wundt finds three fundamentally different hypotheses in the field. “We may term them the autonomous, the metaphysical, and the ethical theories of religion.

“(1) The autonomous theory, plainly foreshadowed in the views of Hamann and Jacobi, became explicit in the work of Schleiermacher. It maintains that religion is an independent domain, above and beyond those of metaphysics and ethics. While the subject of metaphysics is theoretical knowledge of finite things, and that of ethics the relations of empirical conduct, religion is an ‘immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finitude in infinity, of all temporal things in things eternal,’ or, as Schleiermacher expressed it later, ‘a feeling of absolute dependence.’

“(2) The metaphysical theory identifies religion with speculative knowledge of the universe. This may either be regarded as a knowledge to which human thought attains by the mediation of ideas (the older rationalism), or made a phase of the dialectical development of the absolute mind (modern speculative idealism). Hegel’s definition of religion fits both conceptions equally well. It runs as follows: ‘Religion is the knowledge possessed by the finite mind of its nature as absolute mind.’ Here there is an
express intention to abolish the difference between religion and
philosophy, or at least to make it appear unessential and merely
external. . . .

"(3) Finally, the ethical theory sees in religion the realization
of moral postulates. This mode of thinking had its roots in the
'shadowed' deism of the eighteenth century; but its most in­
fluential representative was Kant, whose doctrines are still widely
current in philosophical and theological circles. Kant calls re­
ligion 'a knowledge of all our duties as divine commands,' and so
makes it the sum-total of all the hypotheses that we are compelled
to set up, whether to explain the existence of the moral law or to
assure its realization. As these presuppositions lead to transcen­
dental ideas, empty of experiential contents, they are objects of
faith and not of knowledge. . . ." (Ethics, Vol. I, The Facts of
the Moral Life, tr. by Gulliver and Titchener, Macmillan, 1897, pp.
49-51.)

Wundt criticises these three theories as follows:

"(1) The explanation proposed by the autonomous theory is too
indefinite. While it makes religion an immediate knowledge of
God, or a feeling of absolute dependence, it leaves the object of
this knowledge or feeling entirely undefined. (2) The answer
given by the ethical theory is too narrow. Even if we incline to
see the principal value of religion in its ethical effect, or believe
that religion is completely contained in morality, we cannot avoid
the conclusion that, as things are now, ethos and religion are
really not identical in the human consciousness, and that religion
is not to be regarded as a special ethical attitude. (3) Finally, the
fault of the metaphysical theory, in both its forms, is that it con­
found religious ideas with intellectual problems." (Ibid., pp.
57-58.)

THE AUTHOR'S PUBLICATIONS ON THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

1. Studies in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena [on conver­
2. The Psycho-Physiology of the Categorical Imperative; a chapter
in the psycho-physiology of ethics, Amer. Jr. of Psy., 1897,
Vol. VIII, pp. 528-559.
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If questions of priority were to arise regarding views advanced in this book, they should be settled by reference to the papers listed above in which have appeared much of the substance of this volume.

The topics treated in these publications cover, in a provisional manner, a much wider field than the present book. I hope to be able to complete, at a not too distant date, the task I have set myself.