In 2017 my Website was migrated to the clouds and reduced in size.
Hence some links below are broken.
One thing to try if a “www” link is broken is to substitute “faculty” for “www”
For example a broken link
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Pictures.htm
can be changed to corrected link
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Pictures.htm
However in some cases files had to be removed to reduce the size of my Website
Contact me at 
rjensen@trinity.edu if you really need to file that is missing

 

 

Bob Jensen's Web Site

Top of Document

Start of Glossary

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FAS 133 and IAS 39 Glossary and Transcriptions of Experts
Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities
Bob Jensen at Trinity University

 

Warning 1:  Many of the links were broken when the FASB changed all of its links.  If a link to a FASB site does not work , go to the new FASB link and search for the document.  The FASB home page is at http://www.fasb.org/ 

Warning 2: The DIG documents are not yet available in the Codification Database, but they can now be accessed at  http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
Over 300 pages of  DIG pronouncements can be downloaded from  http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/allissuesp2.pdf 

Warning 3:  Some of 2018 updates are not factored into the modules of this document
Kawaller:  2018 Update on Hedge Accounting Rules ---
https://www.cpajournal.com/2018/04/11/update-on-hedge-accounting-rules/


Hi Barbara,

 
I don't know of a decent textbook on accounting for derivatives and hedging activities. You might take a look at the following reference, but it is weak on illustrations:
PwC:  Derivative instruments and hedging activities - 2013 second edition (updated July 2015) ---
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/cfodirect/publications/accounting-guides/guide-to-accounting-for-derivative-instruments-and-hedging-activities-2013-edition.html



 
When I was teaching this material I assigned the original FAS 133 and FAS 138 standards. Bot were tremendous sources of illustrations. Later came the FASB summary books (one with a green cover).


 
Of course all of this material is dated somewhat but not entirely since FAS 133 and its early amendments did not change much in recent years.


 
I recommend looking at some of my Excel helpers.


 
The best Excel workbook that I created to introduce students to derivatives is at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/Graphing.xls


 
The CD I distributed for my FAS 133 dog and pony shows is at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/


 
You may find parts of my PowerPoint files useful ---
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/JensenPowerPoint/


 
For reference you might link your students to my glossary at
http://faculty.Trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm

 

 

Examples of great FAS 133 illustrations are as follows:

              
[   ] 133ex01a.xls                     12-Jun-2008 03:50  345K  
[   ] 133ex02.doc                      17-Feb-2004 06:00  2.1M  
[   ] 133ex02a.xls                     12-Jun-2008 03:48  279K  
[   ] 133ex03a.xls                     04-Apr-2001 06:45   92K  
[   ] 133ex04a.xls                     12-Jun-2008 03:50  345K  
[TXT] 133ex05.htm                      04-Apr-2001 06:45  371K  
[   ] 133ex05a.xls                     12-Jun-2008 03:49  1.5M  
[TXT] 133ex05aSupplement.htm           26-Mar-2005 13:59   57K  
[   ] 133ex05aSupplement.xls           26-Mar-2005 13:50   32K  
[TXT] 133ex05d.htm                     26-Mar-2005 13:59   56K  
[   ] 133ex06a.xls                     29-Sep-2001 11:43  123K  
[   ] 133ex07a.xls                     08-Mar-2004 16:26  1.2M  
[   ] 133ex08a.xls                     29-Sep-2001 11:43  216K  
[   ] 133ex09a.xls                     12-Jun-2008 03:49   99K  
[   ] 133ex10.doc                      17-Feb-2004 16:37   80K  
[   ] 133ex10a.xls 
[TXT] 133summ.htm                      13-Feb-2004 10:50  121K  
[TXT] 138EXAMPLES.htm                  30-Apr-2004 08:39  355K  
[TXT] 138bench.htm                     07-Dec-2007 05:37  139K  
[   ] 138ex01a.xls                     09-Mar-2001 13:20  1.7M  
[TXT] 138exh01.htm                     09-Mar-2001 13:20   31K  
[TXT] 138exh02.htm                     09-Mar-2001 13:20   65K  
[TXT] 138exh03.htm                     09-Mar-2001 13:20   42K  
[TXT] 138exh04.htm                     09-Mar-2001 13:20  108K  
[TXT] 138exh04a.htm                    09-Mar-2001 13:20  8.2K  
[   ] 138intro.doc                     09-Mar-2001 13:20   95K  
[TXT] 138intro.htm                     09-M

Others --- http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/

 
My tutorials on FAS 133  and IAS 39 are summarized at
http://faculty.Trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

 


From the IFRS Report Newsletter on the AICPA on February 6, 2014

IASB completes hedge-accounting model
The International Accounting Standards Board has completed its hedge-accounting model to be added to IFRS 9 Financial Instruments. The principles-based standard is intended to reflect risk-management activities more closely in financial statements. Key areas of change include more identifiable risk components, a reduced burden of proving the efficacy of a hedge and changes in accounting for the time value of an option. Financial Director (U.K.) (1/16)

Jensen Comment
Put another way the IASB yielded to pressures to go soft on rules to allow hedge accounting. If you are looking for differences between IFRS versus FASB standards, this is one of the biggest differences in accounting standards. If it intended to disclose more about risk management activities dropping the previous IAS 39 requirement to identify and possibly bifurcating embedded derivatives is a loser. Reduced standards on testing for hedge effectiveness is another huge loser.

Accounting Standard Convergence Dreams Turning Into Divergence Reality in IFRS 9

From the CPA Newsletter on April 3, 2014

Convergence efforts flounder on IFRS 9
The International Accounting Standards Board and the Financial Accounting Standards Board have not been able to come to an agreement on a common financial-instruments accounting standard (that includes accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedging actictivities). Hans Hoogervorst, IASB chairman, said regulators could impose additional disclosures to bridge the gap, but one IASB member opined that the failure to achieve convergence on IFRS 9 was a "terrible disappointment" for global investors. Financial Director (U.K.) (3/5)
http://r.smartbrief.com/resp/fHeJBYbWhBCCfUknCidmwjCicNRoKW?format=standard

Jensen Comment
I blame a lot of this divergence on the unwillingness of the IASB to standup to the EU lawmakers who in turn are unwilling to resist the lobbying efforts of thousands on European banks who want weaker standards for financial instruments and less costly accounting standards to implement, e.g., wanting to avoid the costs of discovering and bifurcating embedded derivative clauses in financial instrument contracts. Aside from ignoring embedded financial instruments risk the milk toast accounting of hedging effectiveness is a real softening of IAS 39 that will soon move into IFRS 9.

Bob Jensen's threads on hedge accounting are at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm


From the CPA Newsletter on November 6, 2014

FASB issues hedge-accounting guidance, seeks feedback on fair value measurement rule ---
http://r.smartbrief.com/resp/gjagBYbWhBCKzchwCidKtxCicNqthI?format=standard

The Financial Accounting Standards Board has issued a derivatives and hedge-accounting standard to decide whether a hybrid instrument issued as a share should be treated like debt or equity. Separately, FASB is seeking feedback on a proposal to change how companies apply fair value measurement regulations to some investments.
Compliance Week/Accounting & Auditing Update blog (11/5)

From the IFRS Report Newsletter on the AICPA on February 6, 2014

IASB completes hedge-accounting model
The International Accounting Standards Board has completed its hedge-accounting model to be added to IFRS 9 Financial Instruments. The principles-based standard is intended to reflect risk-management activities more closely in financial statements. Key areas of change include more identifiable risk components, a reduced burden of proving the efficacy of a hedge and changes in accounting for the time value of an option. Financial Director (U.K.) (1/16)

From the CFO Journal's Morning Ledger on February 12, 2014

Companies unclear on EU derivatives rules.
New reporting requirements for over-the-counter derivatives trades in Europe take effect today, but companies are still uncertain about whether the regulation applies to them, according to a survey by Chatham Financial. The European Market Infrastructure Regulation, known as EMIR, requires European and multinational companies to report over-the-counter and listed derivatives transactions with an EU-recognized trade repository. To comply, CFOs will need to report more than 60 data points for each transaction, and will also need to choose a repository,
Saranya Kapur notes. They may also decide to contract with a third party or delegate reporting responsibility to their bank counterparties, if all of their trade counterparties agree to take on the operational responsibility.

Jensen Comment
The bottom line is that the forthcoming IAS 9 is replete with "principles-based" subjectivity ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#BrightLines

Put another way the IASB yielded to pressures to go soft on rules to allow hedge accounting. If you are looking for differences between IFRS versus FASB standards, this is one of the biggest differences in accounting standards. If it intended to disclose more about risk management activities dropping the previous IAS 39 requirement to identify and possibly bifurcating embedded derivatives is a loser. Reduced standards on testing for hedge effectiveness is another huge loser.

Jensen Comment
Hedge accounting is one of the areas where the IASB departed dramatically from the very complicated FAS 133 and its subsequent amendments ---

PwC:  IFRS and US GAAP: similarities and differences - 2014 edition (224 pages) --- Click Here
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/cfodirect/issues/ifrs-adoption-convergence/ifrs-and-us-gaap-similarities-and-differences.jhtml?display=/us/en/cfodirect/issues/accounting-reporting

Table of contents
Importance of being financially bilingual 4
IFRS first-time adoption 7
Revenue recognition 11
Expense recognition—share-based payments 30
Expense recognition—employee benefits 41
Assets—nonfinancial assets 54
Assets—financial assets 80
Liabilities—taxes 102
Liabilities—other 114
Financial liabilities and equity 123
Derivatives and hedging 139
Consolidation 157
Business combinations 177
Other accounting and reporting topics 185
IFRS for small and medium-sized entities 205
FASB/IASB project summary exhibit 209 Noteworthy updates 211
 Index 215

Similarities and Differences - A comparison of IFRS for SMEs and 'full IFRS' ---
http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/ifrs-reporting/pdf/Sims_diffs_IFRS_SMEs.pdf

 

FASB:  Important Differences in Accounting for Embedded Derivatives in FAS 133 Versus IFRS 9
http://www.iasplus.com/en-us/standards/ifrs-usgaap/embedded-derivatives

 

ASC = Accounting Standard Codification of the FASB

January 8, 2013 message from Zane Swanson

Another faculty person created a video (link follows)
http://www.screencast.com/t/K8gruSHTv

which introduces the ASC.  This video has potential value at the beginning of the semester to acquaint students with the ASC.  I am thinking about posting the clip to AAA commons.  But, where should it be posted and does this type of thing get posted in multiple interest group areas?

 Any thoughts / suggestions?

Zane Swanson
www.askaref.com a handheld device source of ASC information

Jensen Comment
A disappointment for colleges and students is that access to the Codification database is not free. The FASB does offer deeply discounted prices to colleges but not to individual teachers or students.

There are other access routes that are not free such as the PwC Comperio ---
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/comperio/index.jhtml

Hi Zane,
 
This is a great video helper for learning how to use the FASB.s Codification database.
 
An enormous disappointment to me is how the Codification omits many, many illustrations in the pre-codification pronouncements that are still available electronically as PDF files. In particular, the best way to learn a very complicated standard like FAS 133 is to study the illustrations in the original FAS 133, FAS 138, etc.
 
The FASB paid a fortune for experts to develop the illustrations in the pre-codification  pronouncements. It's sad that those investments are wasted in the Codification database.
 
What is even worse is that accounting teachers are forgetting to go to the pre-codification pronouncements for wonderful illustrations to use in class and illustrations for CPA exam preparation ---
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/PreCodSectionPage&cid=1218220137031
 
Sadly the FASB no longer seems to invest as much in illustrations for new pronouncements in the Codification database.

Bob Jensen

 

Examples of great FAS 133 pre-codification illustrations are as follows:

              
[   ] 133ex01a.xls                     12-Jun-2008 03:50  345K  
[   ] 133ex02.doc                      17-Feb-2004 06:00  2.1M  
[   ] 133ex02a.xls                     12-Jun-2008 03:48  279K  
[   ] 133ex03a.xls                     04-Apr-2001 06:45   92K  
[   ] 133ex04a.xls                     12-Jun-2008 03:50  345K  
[TXT] 133ex05.htm                      04-Apr-2001 06:45  371K  
[   ] 133ex05a.xls                     12-Jun-2008 03:49  1.5M  
[TXT] 133ex05aSupplement.htm           26-Mar-2005 13:59   57K  
[   ] 133ex05aSupplement.xls           26-Mar-2005 13:50   32K  
[TXT] 133ex05d.htm                     26-Mar-2005 13:59   56K  
[   ] 133ex06a.xls                     29-Sep-2001 11:43  123K  
[   ] 133ex07a.xls                     08-Mar-2004 16:26  1.2M  
[   ] 133ex08a.xls                     29-Sep-2001 11:43  216K  
[   ] 133ex09a.xls                     12-Jun-2008 03:49   99K  
[   ] 133ex10.doc                      17-Feb-2004 16:37   80K  
[   ] 133ex10a.xls 
[TXT] 133summ.htm                      13-Feb-2004 10:50  121K  
[TXT] 138EXAMPLES.htm                  30-Apr-2004 08:39  355K  
[TXT] 138bench.htm                     07-Dec-2007 05:37  139K  
[   ] 138ex01a.xls                     09-Mar-2001 13:20  1.7M  
[TXT] 138exh01.htm                     09-Mar-2001 13:20   31K  
[TXT] 138exh02.htm                     09-Mar-2001 13:20   65K  
[TXT] 138exh03.htm                     09-Mar-2001 13:20   42K  
[TXT] 138exh04.htm                     09-Mar-2001 13:20  108K  
[TXT] 138exh04a.htm                    09-Mar-2001 13:20  8.2K  
[   ] 138intro.doc                     09-Mar-2001 13:20   95K  
[TXT] 138intro.htm                     09-M

Others --- http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/

 

 

Warning 3:  The international standard IAS 39 has been amended many times and continued to be amended. The IASB tends to change paragraph numbers with many of its amendments and directly amends the preceding version of a standard. Hence some of the IAS 39 paragraphs quoted in this glossary may be relocated and/or altered in the latest and greatest version of IAS 39. IAS 39 changes will eventually be contained in IFRS 9.

Warnign 4:  IFRS 9 Anemia

U.S. GAAP Financial Reporting Taxonomy Now Available (2014 Glossary and XBRL)---
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176163688345 

Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm

"A Look at the IASB’s Draft of Hedge Accounting Requirements," Deloitte via the CFO Journal, October 19, 2012 ---
http://deloitte.wsj.com/cfo/2012/10/19/a-look-at-the-iasbs-draft-of-hedge-accounting-requirements/

Jensen Comment
This is the most extensive review I've seen of the proposed IFRS 9 departures from IAS 39 in terms of hedge accounting. It covers such things as when a financial instrument can get get hedge accounting previously restricted to derivative financial instruments. Many of the changes are quite technical. The bottom line is that IFRS 9 will allow much more subjective judgment for hedge accounting. In my opinion, this will make financial statements potentially less comparable between companies and thereby destroys to some extent the argument that having global accounting standards increases the comparability in financial reporting.

FAS 133 (as amended a number of times), IAS 39 (as amended a number of times) and IFRS 9 (still being written) are arguably the most difficult accounting standards to teach and apply in practice. The major problems are the technicalities of the accounting added on top of the complicated technicalities of understanding how derivative financial instruments affect financial risks in the management of such risks in both the public and private sectors (e.g., government pension funds use derivatives to manage risks and possibly even speculate).

Deloitte's review does not go far in helping you understand the forthcoming IFRS 9. It goes a long ways in showing you how you're going to have to spend a lot more time and possibly money to understand IFRS 9 before you will ever be able to teach IFRS 9 to students.

The bad news is that hedge accounting will continue to have the worst coverage of all accounting standards in intermediate accounting textbooks.

The good news is that hedge accounting is probably too complicated to ever become a worrisome hurdle in Chartered Accountancy Examinations, CPA examinations, and other certification examinations. Hedge accounting is something you must learn on your own and on the job. IAS 39 was very similar to FAS 133, FAS 133/138 originally had some great illustrations where I learned most of what I know about hedge accounting. Sadly, the FASB eliminated most of those great illustrations when it moved to the Codification database. Boo on the FASB for this! Some of my Excel tutorials on those illustrations can be found in the listing of files at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/

Also see
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

Sadly, I probably will not be updating my tutorials for IFRS 9 --- hey I'm supposed to be retired!

Bob Jensen's free tutorials on hedge accounting ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm


References for Comparisons of IFRS versus U.S. GAAP

From Ernst & Young in November 2012
US GAAP versus IFRS: The basics 
While convergence was a high priority for the FASB and the IASB in 2012, differences continue to exist between US GAAP and IFRS. In this guide, we provide an overview by accounting area of where the standards are similar, where differences are commonly found in practice, and how and when certain differences are expected to disappear
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssetsAL/IFRSBasics_BB2435_November2012/$FILE/IFRSBasics_BB2435_November2012.pdf

Jensen Comment
This is only a 54-page cocument. I still prefer the somewhat older but much longer PwC document.

Older links to such comparisons:

 

US GAAP versus IFRS: The basics
2011 Edition, 56 Pages
Free from Ernst & Young
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssetsAL/IFRSBasics_BB2280_December2011/$FILE/IFRSBasics_BB2280_December2011.pdf

IFRS and US GAAP: Similarities and Differences
2011 Edition, 238 Pages
From PwC
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/issues/ifrs-reporting/publications/ifrs-and-us-gaap-similarities-and-differences.jhtml
Note the Download button!

From Deloitte
Comparisons of IFRS With Local GAAPS
http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/pubs.htm#compare1109
IFRS and US GAAP
July 2008 Edition, 76 Pages
http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/0809ifrsusgaap.pdf

Jensen Comment
At the moment I prefer the PwC reference
My favorite comparison topics (Derivatives and Hedging) begin on Page 158 in the PwC reference
The booklet does a good job listing differences but, in my opinion, overly downplays the importance of these differences. It may well be that IFRS is more restrictive in some areas and less restrictive in other areas to a fault. This is one topical area where IFRS becomes much too subjective such that comparisons of derivatives and hedging activities under IFRS can defeat the main purpose of "standards." The main purpose of an "accounting standard" is to lead to greater comparability of inter-company financial statements. Boo on IFRS in this topical area, especially when it comes to testing hedge effectiveness!

One key quotation is on Page 165

IFRS does not specifically discuss the methodology of applying a critical-terms match in the level of detail included within U.S. GAAP.
Then it goes yatta, yatta, yatta.

Jensen Comment
This is so typical of when IFRS fails to present the "same level of detail" and more importantly fails to provide "implementation guidance" comparable with the FASB's DIG implementation topics and illustrations.

PwC:  Download: IFRS and US GAAP: similarities and differences - 2015 edition ---
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/cfodirect/assets/pdf/accounting-guides/pwc-ifrs-us-gaap-similarities-and-differences-2015.pdf
Bob Jensen's Threads on Controversies in Accounting Standard Setting ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting

Similarities and Differences - A comparison of IFRS for SMEs and 'full IFRS' ---
http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/ifrs-reporting/pdf/Sims_diffs_IFRS_SMEs.pdf

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedging activities ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm


PwC Dataline: Accounting for centrally cleared derivatives Understanding the accounting implications of Dodd-Frank Title VII (No. 2013-30) --- Click Here 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/cfodirect/publications/dataline/2013-30-centrally-cleared-derivatives.jhtml?display=/us/en/cfodirect/publications/dataline&j=346566&e=rjensen@trinity.edu&l=621246_HTML&u=15025430&mid=7002454&jb=0

Dodd-Frank Title VII (Dodd-Frank) significantly changed the trading requirements for derivative instruments, such as mandating that certain derivatives be centrally cleared.

A number of financial reporting implementation questions have arisen as companies consider the Dodd-Frank requirements. These include determining fair value of centrally cleared derivatives, accounting for collateral, assessing the impact on hedge accounting, and determining the appropriate presentation (gross versus net).

This Dataline discusses the financial reporting implications of the new requirements, primarily focusing on end-users that trade in the affected derivatives and who do not qualify for the end-user exception.

Continued in article

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedging activities ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

 


"IASB Previews New Hedge Accounting Rules," by Emily Chason, CFO Report, September 7, 2012 ---
http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2012/09/07/iasb-previews-new-hedge-accounting-rules/?mod=wsjpro_hps_cforeport

The draft is available from the IASB --- Click Here
http://www.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/Financial-Instruments-A-Replacement-of-IAS-39-Financial-Instruments-Recognitio/Phase-III-Hedge-accounting/Pages/Draft-of-IFRS-General-Hedge-Accounting.aspx 

Jensen Comment
Today I must leave early in the morning to take Erika to Concord for a medical treatment. I've not yet had time to read the above draft in detail. It appears, however, that this draft for IFRS 9 retains changes in IAS 39 that are objectionable to me relative to what I think is better in FAS 33 as amended.

Firstly, the thrust of the IFRS 9 changes will be to add more subjectivity (relative to FAS 133), especially in the area of hedge effectiveness testing. For example, if a farmer has hedges a growing crop of corn, he is likely to do so on the basis of standardized corn quality of corn futures and options trading on the CBOT or CME. It is unlikely that the corn that he ultimately takes to market will have the identical quality moisture content. In addition he will have trucking costs of getting his corn from say South Dakota to the trading market in Chicago. As a result of all this, his hedging contract acquired in June on the CBOT or CME exchange is not likely to be perfectly effective relative to the corn he brings to market in October. Thus there will be hedging ineffectiveness.

The original IAS 39, like FAS 133, had some bright line tests for the degree to which hedge accounting was allowed when there is hedge ineffectiveness. See the slide show illustrations at
www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/JensenPowerPoint/06effectiveness.ppt   

There is greater likelihood that in a particular instance of hedge ineffectiveness, the original IAS 39 would result in Client A having identical accounting for the hedge ineffectiveness as Client B. Under the new IFRS 9 this becomes less assured since clients are given considerable subjective judgment in deciding how to deal with hedge ineffectiveness.

Also under FAS 133, embedded derivatives in financial contracts must be evaluated and if the embedded derivative's underlying is not "clearly and closely related" to the underlying in the host contract, the embedded derivatives must be bifurcated and accounted for separately. This leads to a lot of work finding and accounting for embedded derivatives. IFRS 9 will eliminate all that work by not making clients look for embedded derivatives. Hence, the risk that comes from having embedded derivative underlyings not clearly and clossely associated with the underlyings of the host contract can simply be ignored. I don't by into this IFRS 9 bad accounting for the sake of simplification.

I think there are other areas of difference expected differences between IFRS 9 and FAS 133 as amended. Most of the differences lie in the subjectivity allowed in accounting for hedging contracts under IFRS 9 that is not allowed in FAS 133.

September 10, 2012 reply from Bob Jensen

This afternoon received a message from PwC about the IASB's proposed changes to hedge accounting. The PwC reply is consistent with, albeit somewhat more extensive, then my reply that I sent to the AECM early this morning.

The PwC response is at --- Click Here
http://cfodirect.pwc.com/CFODirectWeb/Controller.jpf?ContentCode=MSRA-8Y2HHH&SecNavCode=MSRA-84YH44&ContentType=Content 

Note that the IASB is not really opening up these proposed hedge accounting amendments to comments. Wonder why?

Also note that the proposed IASB's amendments diverge from rather than converge toward U.S. GAAP under FAS 133 as amended. At this point in time I don't think the IASB really cares about convergence of hedge accounting rules.

My quick and dirty response is that the revised hedge accounting standards under IFRS 9 is carte blanche for having two different clients and their auditors account differently for identical hedge accounting transactions because so much subjectivity will be allowed under IFRS 9. We may even have subsidiaries of the same client accounting for identical transactions differently.

Such is the myth of comparability one is supposed to get under principles-based global standards.

Further more, it may challenge auditing Firm X that has one client claiming a hedge is effective when another client would claim the hedge is ineffective. Will auditing Firm X certify divergent accounting for the same hedge. The answer is probably yes these days if both clients are too big to lose.

Bob Jensen

So Much for the Myth That Accounting Standards Are Neutral in Terms of Business Strategy (of course it did not take IFRS 9 to reveal this to us)
"Under New Accounting Standard, CFOs Could Change Hedging Strategies:
Will finance chiefs come under more pressure to adopt hedge accounting — even though it remains entirely optional under the new standard?
"
by Andrew Sawyers
CFO.com, September 12, 2012
http://www3.cfo.com/article/2012/9/gaap-ifrs_hedge-accounting-ias-39-iasb-ifrs-derivatives-80-125-test-hedge-effectiveness 

A new international financial reporting standard (IFRS) on hedge accounting could prompt finance chiefs to change their companies’ hedging strategies under a more accommodating, principles-based regime that requires less testing.

The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has been pondering hedge accounting for several years in an effort to find a way to replace the unloved standard IAS 39: so unloved that it’s not part of the package of accounting standards endorsed by the European Commission for listed companies. The standard has made it tough to employ hedge accounting, which can be favorable to companies in certain circumstances.

In a recent podcast, Kush Patel, director in Deloitte’s U.K. IFRS Centre of Excellence, summarized the impact of the new rules: “More hedge-accounting opportunities, less profit and loss volatility — so as you’d expect, this has been well received.”

Under IAS 39, he said, “we saw a lot of companies change the way they manage risk: we saw them reduce the amount of complex, structured derivatives that were being used to hedge and they went for more vanilla instruments that could [qualify for] hedge accounting more easily. Now that IFRS 9 will remove some of these restrictions, I think it’s fair to say risk management could change.”

Andrew Vials, a technical-accounting partner at KPMG, said in a statement, “A company will be able to reflect in its financial statements an outcome that is more consistent with how management assesses and mitigates risks for key inputs into its core business.”

Will CFOs come under more pressure to adopt hedge accounting — even though it remains entirely optional under the new standard? “If hedge accounting becomes easier, there may be more emphasis on them to achieve hedge accounting — so although it’s voluntary, there is an element that they may feel more compelled to do hedge accounting” says Andrew Spooner, lead global IFRS financial-instruments partner at Deloitte.

The final draft of the new hedge-accounting rules was published on September 7 and will be incorporated into the existing IFRS 9 Financial Instruments at the end of the year. The IASB says it’s not seeking comments on this final draft, but is making it available “for information purposes” to allow people to familiarize themselves with it. The new rules will take effect from January 1, 2015, but companies will be allowed to adopt them sooner if they wish.

Spooner and Patel note three main areas in which the new rules are different from the old:

Changes to the instruments that qualify. It’s now easier, for example, to use option contracts without increasing income-statement volatility.

Changes in hedged items. It may not be possible, for example, for a company to hedge the particular type of coffee beans a food company buys. But it could hedge a benchmark coffee price, because it is closely related to the item it would like to hedge. Another change for the better: companies in the euro zone that want to hedge dollar purchases of oil can now more easily hedge the dollar price of the oil, then later hedge the foreign-exchange exposure without the oil-price hedge being deemed ineffective. There are also more favorable rules for hedging against credit risk and inflation.

Changes to the hedge-effectiveness requirements. Under IAS 39, a company could use hedge accounting only if a hedge is “highly effective,” meaning it must be capable of offsetting the risk by a range of 80%–125%. But the 80–125 test has been scrapped to be replaced by a principle-based test that is based on economic relationship: “You have to prove that there is a relationship between the thing you are hedging and the thing you are using,” says Patel. Having gotten rid of the quantitative threshold, there are “more opportunities for companies to reduce the amount of testing they do,” he says. “It’s a welcome change.”

Continued in article

"IASB Previews New Hedge Accounting Rules," by Emily Chason, CFO Report, September 7, 2012 ---
http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2012/09/07/iasb-previews-new-hedge-accounting-rules/?mod=wsjpro_hps_cforeport

The PwC response is at --- Click Here
http://cfodirect.pwc.com/CFODirectWeb/Controller.jpf?ContentCode=MSRA-8Y2HHH&SecNavCode=MSRA-84YH44&ContentType=Content 

The draft is available from the IASB --- Click Here
http://www.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/Financial-Instruments-A-Replacement-of-IAS-39-Financial-Instruments-Recognitio/Phase-III-Hedge-accounting/Pages/Draft-of-IFRS-General-Hedge-Accounting.aspx 

Bob Jensen's free tutorials on accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedging activities ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm


Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments and Hedging Activities

Hi Patricia,

The bottom line is that accounting authors, like intermediate textbook authors, provide lousy coverage of FAS 133 and IAS 39 because they just do not understand the 1,000+ types of contracts that are being accounted for in those standards. Some finance authors understand the contracts but have never shown an inclination to study the complexities of FAS 133 and IAS 39 (which started out as a virtual clone of FAS 133).

My 2006 Accounting Theory syllabus before I retired can be viewed at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/acct5341.htm 

There are some great textbooks on derivatives and hedging written by finance professors, but those professors never delved into the complexities of FAS 133 and IAS 39. My favorite book may be out of print at the moment, but this was a required book in my theory course: Derivatives: An Introduction by Robert A Strong, Edition 2 (Thomson South-Western, 2005, ISBN 0-324-27302-9)

Professor Strong's book provides zero about FAS 133 and IAS 39, but my students were first required to understand the contracts that they later had to account for in my course. Strong's coverage is concise and relatively simple.

When first learning about hedging, my Trinity University graduate students and CPE course participants loved an Excel workbook that I made them study at
www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/Graphing.xls 
Note the tabs on the bottom that take you to different spreadsheets.

There are some really superficial books written by accounting professors who really never understood derivatives and hedging in finance.

Sadly, much of my tutorial material is spread over hundreds of different links.

However, my dog and pony CD that I used to take on the road such as a training course that I gave for a commodities trading outfit in Calgary can be found at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/  T
his was taken off of the CD that I distributed to each participant in each CPE course, and now I realize that a copyrighted item on the CD should be removed from the Web.

In particular, note the exam material given at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/ExamMaterial/ 
My students had access to this material before they took my exams.

Note that some of the illustrations and exam answers have changed over time. For example, the exam material on embedded derivatives is still relevant under FASB rules whereas the IASB just waved a magic wand and said that clients no longer have to search for embedded derivatives even though they're not "clearly and closely related" to the underlyings in their host contracts. I think this is a cop out by the IASB.

Links to my tutorials on FAS 133 and IAS 39, including a long history of multimedia, can be found at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

Probably the most helpful thing I ever generated was the glossary at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm 

What made me the most money consulting in this area can be found at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm 

But the core of what I taught about derivatives and hedge accounting in my accounting theory course can be found in the FAS 133 Excel spreadsheets listed near the top of the document at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/ 

I also salted my courses with real world illustrations of scandals regarding derivatives instruments contracts, a continuously updated timeline of which is provided at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds 

Hope this helps. Once again you may want to look at the exam material at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/ExamMaterial/ 

The bottom line is that accounting authors like intermediate textbook authors provide lousy coverage of FAS 133 and IAS 39 because they just do not understand the 1,000+ types of contracts that are being accounted for in those standards. Some finance authors understand the contracts but have never shown an inclination to delve into the complexities of FAS 133 and IAS 39 (which started out as a virtual clone of FAS 133).

Respectfully,
Bob Jensen

 


Question
What could possibly be wrong with mark-to-market accounting for financial instruments and derivative financial instruments?

Hint
It's called "asymmetric accounting" and the topic has been debated over an over again on the AECM (largely by Tom Selling versus Bob Jensen). This is also a topic that I recently recommended that Marc introduce to his "logic" analysis of fair value accounting for financial securities.

"GAAP IS CRAP: THE CASE OF JP MORGAN," by Anthony H. Catanach and J. Edward Ketz, Grumpy Old Accountants Blog, May 31, 2012 ---
http://blogs.smeal.psu.edu/grumpyoldaccountants/archives/694

Abraham Briloff complained that sometimes the accounting standard setters do a pathetic job by creating rules that enhance the ability of managers to manage earnings.  At those times, he indicated that GAAP becomes cleverly rigged accounting ploys.  The CRAP acronym is tart, but precise.

David Reilly has written an excellent example of this proposition in his Wall Street Journal article, Heard on the Street: J.P. Morgan, Hedges and ‘Asymmetric Accounting.’”  The issue pivots on the use of portfolio hedging and the “asymmetric accounting” that arises when the portfolio hedge is accounted for by mark-to-mark accounting, and at least some of the hedged items are treated as available for sale securities.  This situation creates a mismatch in the accounting for these items, thereby potentially subjecting an entity to large gains or losses in the derivative, while gains or losses of the hedged items bypass the income statement, and going directly into stockholders’ equity.

David Henry also has a nice essay about this chain of events, entitledJPMorgan Chase Sells $25 Billion in Securities To Offset ‘London Whale’ Losses.”  He quotes former SEC Chief Accountant Lynn Turner who said JP Morgan made two stupid mistakes. They did not comprehend the risks they took with these complex derivatives and they covered half the losses with gains from high income assets that they no longer enjoy.

Jamie Dimon addressed these issues in a corporate conference call on May 10, 2012.  From an edited transcript of this conference call by Thomson Reuters StreetEvents, we read these comments by Mr. Dimon:

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
Below is a reply that I wrote years ago on the AECM



 

If a student asks why FAS 133 had to become so complicated tell them that it's because of the difference between economists and accountants. Economists allow hedging even when hedged items have not been booked by accountants. This causes all sorts of misleading accounting outcomes if hedge accounting relief is not provided for derivative contracts that are hedges rather than speculations.


Students may still ask why FAS 133 became the most complicated accounting standard in the history of the world.


Before FAS 133, companies were getting away with enormous off-balance-sheet-financing (OBSF) with newer types of derivative financial instruments. FAS 80 covered booking of options and futures contracts, but forward contracts and swaps were not booked when they were either speculations or hedges. After interest rate swaps were invented by Wall Street n the 1980s, for example, swap contracting took off like a rocket in worldwide finance. Trillions of dollars in swap debt were being transacted that were not even booked until FAS 133 went into effect in the 1990s.


Originally the FASB envisioned a relatively simple FAS 133. Most derivative financial instruments contracts (forwards, swaps, futures, and options) would be initially booked at fair value (with is zero in most instances except for options) and then reset to changed fair value at least every 90 days. All changes in value would then be booked as current earnings or current losses. Sounds simple except for some dark problems of trying to value some of these contracts.


But then, in the exposure draft period, companies made the FASB aware of an enormous problem that arose because of a difference between economists and accountants. Economists invented hedging contracts without caring at all whether a hedged items were booked or not booked by accountants. For example, the hedged item might be a forecasted transaction by Corp X to issue $100 million in bond debt at spot rates ten months from now. Economists showed Corp X how to hedge the cash flow risk of this unbooked forecasted transaction with a forward contract or swap contract.


Perfect hedges have zero effect on accounting earnings volatility when both the hedged item and its hedging derivative contract are booked by accountants --- such as when existing booked debt is changed from floating rate debt to fixed rate debt with an interest rate swap derivative contract.


Perfect hedges could have an enormous effect on earnings volatility when the hedged item is not booked and the hedging derivative contract is booked. For example, all changes up and down in the fair value of the booked derivative contracts would not be offset in the books by changes in value of the unbooked hedged items even though from an economics standpoint there is no change in economic earnings when changes in value of the booked derivative contract are perfectly offset by changes in value of the unbooked hedged item.


And most hedging circumstances are such that the hedging contract is booked under FAS 133 and the hedged item is not booked such as forecasted purchases of jet fuel by Southwest Airlines over the next two years.

 

Companies that hedged unbooked assets or liabilities would thereby punished with enormous accounting earnings volatility when they hedged economic earnings. The FASB ultimately agreed that this was misleading and thereby introduced hedge accounting relief in FAS 133 by keeping changes in the booked value of hedging contracts out of booked current earnings. For cash flow hedges and foreign currency hedges this is accomplished by using OCI. OCI is not used for fair value hedging, but hedge accounting relief is provided for fair value hedges in other ways. Look up fair value hedging under "Hedge" at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#H-Terms 


Because there are thousands of  types of hedging contracts, FAS 133 became the most complicated standard ever issued by the FASB. It's the only standard that became so complicated that an implementation group (called the DIG) was organized by the FASB  to field implementation questions by auditors and their clients. DIG pronouncements, in turn, became so complicated that at times most accountants could not understand these pronouncements. DIG links are surrounded by red boxes at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm 



One of the most difficult aspects of FAS 133 is that hedge accounting relief is allowed only to the extent that hedges are effective. Hedges are seldom perfectly effective in terms of value changes at interim points in time even though they may be perfectly effective when hedges mature. Hedge effectiveness tests have become extremely complicated. FAS 133 still has some bright lines whereas the IASB in IFRS 9 is making hedge effectiveness testing principles based in IFRS 9. That's like giving an alcoholic a case of booze every week.


Thus if a student asks why FAS 133 had to become so complicated tell them that it's because of the difference between economists and accountants. Economists allow hedging even when hedged items have not been booked by accountants. This causes all sorts of misleading accounting outcomes if hedge accounting relief is not provided for derivative contracts that are hedges rather than speculations.


Respectfully,

Bob Jensen

 

 

 


Warning 4:  In 2009, the FASB and the IASB are contemplating huge changes in FAS 133 and IAS 39.

SERIOUS Doubts Over Proposed Changes to FAS 133 and IAS 39

The FASB proposes dubious changes in FAS 133 on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments and Hedging Activities while the IASB is studying similar changes in IAS 39. With the SEC currently sitting on the fence in deciding if and when to replace FASB standards with IASB standards, I fully predict that IAS 39 will pretty much follow the revise FAS 133 as it did when IAS 39 was initially adopted, although IAS 39 will continue to have wider coverage of financial instruments in general whereas FAS 133 will narrowly focus on derivative financial instruments and hedge accounting.

When the FASB initially signaled possible revisions for changing hedge accounting rules in FAS 133, a wave of protests from industry hit the fan. The article below is the response of Ira Kawaller who serves on the FASB's Derivatives Implementation Group (DIG) and who is one of the leading consultants on FAS 133 and hedging in general which is his where he has historic roots as a PhD in economics --- http://www.kawaller.com/about.shtml
Ira has written nearly 100 trade articles on FAS 133. I don't think he consults on IAS 39. Ira's home page is at http://www.kawaller.com/about.shtml
Ira also maintains a small hedge fund where he walks the talk about interest rate hedging. However, I'm no expert on hedge funds and will not comment on any particular hedge fund.

I might note in passing for enthusiasts of the new FASB Codification Database for all FASB standards that FAS 133 coverage in the Codification database is relatively sparse. Professionals and students in hedge accounting most likely will have to connect back to original (non-codified) FASB literature. For example, none of the wonderful illustrations in Appendices A and B of FAS 133 are codified. And the extremely helpful, albeit complicated, pronouncements of the FASB's Derivatives Implementation Group (DIG) are excluded from the Codification database --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/
Most of the DIG pronouncements are included in context at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm
I will never have a lot of respect for the Codification database until it includes much, much more on FAS 133.

Below is a publication in which Dr. Kawaller presents serious doubts regarding revisions to FAS 133 that the FASB is now considering (and the IASB is now considering for IAS 39).

The problem is even more severe for entities with fixed-rate exposures. In this case, there’s a clear disconnect between what swaps are designed to do versus what the FASB requires for hedge accounting.
"Paved With Good Intentions:  The Road to Better Accounting for Hedges," The CPA Journal, August 2009 --- http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/CPA_Paved_w_Good_Intent_Aug_2009.pdf

With 10 years of experience under the current regime of accounting for derivative contracts and hedging transactions, the FASB has determined that it’s time to make some adjustments. Accountants should be wary of the changes. Besides affecting the accounting procedure relating to these instruments and activities, the proposed changes may also seriously impact the manner in which certain derivative hedges are structured— particularly in connection with interest rate risk management activities.

Accounting rules for derivatives and hedging transactions were put forth by the FASB in SFAS 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities. This standard was initially issued in June 1998. It has been amended twice since then, with relatively minor adjustments, but in 2008 the FASB issued a more substantive exposure draft with significant proposed changes. Although the comment period on this exposure draft is over, the project appears to be in limbo. Proposed changes have neither been accepted nor rejected. Further adjustments are likely to be made as the FASB moves to harmonize U.S. accounting guidance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). When attention turns to derivatives, this latest exposure draft could very likely serve as a starting point. The prospective decisions about the accounting treatment for these derivatives could have a profound impact on the structure and composition of derivatives transactions

The Current Standard SFAS 133 has long been recognized as one of the most complicated accounting standards the FASB has ever issued. A core principle of this standard is that derivative instruments must be recognized on the balance sheet as assets or liabilities at their fair market value. The critical issue, then, is the question of how to handle gains or losses. Should they be reported in current income or elsewhere? Ultimately, SFAS 133 ended up providing different answers for different situations. The “normal” treatment simply requires gains and losses recognized in earnings. This treatment, however, is often problematic for companies that use derivatives for hedging purposes. For such entities, the preferred treatment would recognize gains or losses of derivatives concurrently with the earnings impacts of the items being hedged. The normal accounting treatment generally won’t yield this desired result, but the alternative “hedge accounting” will.

For purposes of this discussion, attention is restricted to the two primary hedge accounting types: cash flow and fair value. For cash flow hedges, the exposure being hedged (i.e., the hedged item) must be an uncertain cash flow, forecasted to occur in a later time period. In these cases, effective gains or losses on derivatives are originally recorded in other comprehensive income (OCI) and later reclassified from OCI to earnings when the hedged item generates its earnings impact. Ineffective results are recorded directly in earnings. In essence, this accounting treatment serves to defer the derivatives’ gains or losses—but only for the portion of the derivatives’ results that are deemed to be effective—thus pairing the earnings recognition for the derivative and the hedged item in a later accounting period.

Continued in article

 

Bob Jensen and Tom Selling have been having an active, to say the least, exchange over hedge accounting where Tom Selling advocates elimination of all hedge accounting (by carrying all derivatives at fair value with changes in value being posted to current earnings). Bob Jensen thinks this is absurd, especially for derivatives that hedge unbooked transactions such as forecasted transactions or unbooked purchase contracts for commodities. Not having hedge accounting causes asymmetric distortions of earnings where the changes in value of the hedging contracts cannot be offset by changes in value of the (unbooked) hedged items. You can read more about our exchanges under the terms "Insurance Contracts" at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#I-Terms
Scroll down to "Insurance Contracts"

 


Message from Ernst & Young on February 10, 2011

To the Point: Hedge accounting - FASB seeks reaction to IASB's proposed model

The FASB is seeking comment on the IASB's December 2010 hedge accounting proposal. The proposed IASB model would significantly change hedge accounting, going well beyond the changes the FASB proposed last year. Notably, the IASB proposes allowing hedges of components of non-financial risk (e.g., commodity risk) and hedges of net positions that share a common risk. Based on the feedback it receives, the FASB will contemplate whether (and how) to incorporate the IASB's ideas into the FASB's hedging model. Comments are due by 25 April 2011.

Reply from Bob Jensen to the AECM on February 10, 2011

The problem in the Academy is that nearly all accounting professors do not understand IAS 39 well enough to even comprehend the awful changes that are being proposed.

I think that the myth that the IASB is trying to make hedge accounting more transparent and less complex is just that --- a myth.

In the message below Ernst & Young does not mention my biggest gripe about the IASB's proposal. Replacing hedge effectiveness guidelines (such as the 80-125 dollar offset guideline in IAS 39) with ambiguities does not constitute simplification. What it really does is complicate both the task of auditing and the task of financial statement analysis.

Ernst & Young does hit hit on two changes below that also greatly complicate auditing and financial statement analysis.
.
The IASB proposed changes are yet another illustration that "the road to hell is paved with good intentions."

The problem in the Academy is that nearly all accounting professors do not understand IAS 39 well enough to even comprehend the awful changes that are being proposed.

Respectfully,
Bob Jensen

Bob Jensen's tutorials on FAS 133 and IAS 39 are at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm


Differences (Comparisons) between FAS 133 and IAS 39/IFRS 9 --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/canada.htm

2011 Update

"IFRS and US GAAP: Similarities and Differences" according to PwC (2011 Edition)
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/issues/ifrs-reporting/publications/ifrs-and-us-gaap-similarities-and-differences.jhtml
Note the Download button!
Note that warnings are given throughout the document that the similarities and differences mentioned in the booklet are not comprehensive of all similarities and differences. The document is, however, a valuable addition to students of FASB versus IASB standard differences and similarities.

It's not easy keeping track of what's changing and how, but this publication can help. Changes for 2011 include:

This continues to be one of PwC's most-read publications, and we are confident the 2011 edition will further your understanding of these issues and potential next steps.

For further exploration of the similarities and differences between IFRS and US GAAP, please also visit our IFRS Video Learning Center.

To request a hard copy of this publication, please contact your PwC engagement team or contact us.

Jensen Comment
My favorite comparison topics (Derivatives and Hedging) begin on Page 158
The booklet does a good job listing differences but, in my opinion, overly downplays the importance of these differences. It may well be that IFRS is more restrictive in some areas and less restrictive in other areas to a fault. This is one topical area where IFRS becomes much too subjective such that comparisons of derivatives and hedging activities under IFRS can defeat the main purpose of "standards." The main purpose of an "accounting standard" is to lead to greater comparability of inter-company financial statements. Boo on IFRS in this topical area, especially when it comes to testing hedge effectiveness!

One key quotation is on Page 165

IFRS does not specifically discuss the methodology of applying a critical-terms match in the level of detail included within U.S. GAAP.
Then it goes yatta, yatta, yatta.

Jensen Comment
This is so typical of when IFRS fails to present the "same level of detail" and more importantly fails to provide "implementation guidance" comparable with the FASB's DIG implementation topics and illustrations.

I have a huge beef with the lack of illustrations in IFRS versus the many illustrations in U.S. GAAP.

I have a huge beef with the lack of illustrations in IFRS versus the many illustrations in U.S. GAAP.

I have a huge beef with the lack of illustrations in IFRS versus the many illustrations in U.S. GAAP.

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting standards setting controversies ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting

 

 

2010 IASB Exposure Draft

"IASB publishes exposure draft on hedge accounting," IAS Plus, December 9, 2010 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has published for public comment an exposure draft on the accounting for hedging activities. The exposure draft proposes requirements designed to enable companies to better reflect their risk management activities in their financial statements, and, in turn, help investors to understand the effect of those activities on future cash flows.

The proposed model is principle-based, and is designed to more closely align hedge accounting with risk management activities undertaken by companies when hedging their financial and non-financial risk exposures.

Summary of the ED proposals

  • A new hedge accounting model which combines a management view that aims to use information produced internally for risk management purposes and an accounting view that seeks to address risk management issue of the timing of recognition of gains and losses
  • Look only at whether a risk component can be identified and measured, as opposed to determining what can be hedged by type of item (financial or non-financial)
  • Base qualification for hedge accounting on how entities design hedges for risk management purposes and permit hedging relationships to be adjusted without necessarily stopping and potentially restarting hedge accounting
  • Treat the time value premium of a purchased option as a cost of hedging, which will be presented in other comprehensive income (OCI)
  • Extending the use of hedge accounting to net positions (to improve the link to risk management)
  • A comprehensive set of new disclosures that focus on the risks being hedged, how those risks are being managed and the effect of hedging those risks upon the primary financial statements

The exposure draft forms part of the IASB’s overall project to replace IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, and when its proposals are confirmed they will be incorporated into IFRS 9 Financial Instruments. The exposure draft does not include consideration of portfolio macro hedge accounting which the IASB will continue to discuss.

The exposure draft ED/2010/13 Hedge Accounting is open for comment until 9 March 2011. The IASB intends to finalise and issue the proposals during the first half of 2011.

Click for:

Jensen Comment
Because preparers and auditors complained over the years about the complexity of IAS 39, the IASB in this ED mistakenly assumes that doing away with bright lines in favor of ambiguity reduces complexity. But replacing bright lines with ambiguity in and of itself creates more rather than less complexity. It is analogous to replacing a bright line speed sign reading "20 mph maximum" with "Drive Safely in this School Zone."

For example the ED replaces the bright line 80-125 rule for effectiveness limits of in offset testing of effectiveness with ambiguity about when a hedge of a hedged item should be deemed effective. Similarly, IAS 39 was relatively clear about when portfolios of hedged items could be hedged as a portfolio. The ED creates a very ambiguous term "Group Hedging" that is both ambiguous and takes international hedge accounting further and further away from the U.S. FAS 133 standard that allows portfolio or group hedging in under vastly more limiting and clear cut rules.

Effectiveness testing of purchased options used as hedging instruments is pretty clear cut under FAS 133 and IAS 39. The new IASB ED complicates accounting for the time values of options used for hedging purposes. It introduces the concept of "aligned time value" which will really confuse most auditors and financial analysts.

The net result will be that two different companies are likely to treat many hedging contracts differently when applying hedge accounting under the revised IFRS 9 into which FAS 39 is to be phased into IFRS 9. By introducing greater ambiguity the price will be that comparability between financial statements of different companies will be destroyed or highly uncertain.

I repeat that replacing bright lines with ambiguity may actually increase complexity rather than reduce complexity. The complexity of hedge accounting essentially arises from the immense complexity and variations of hedge accounting contracts. IAS 39 was rooted in FAS 133 which I viewed as a good standard, as amended,  that provided more consisted accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedging activities. The new IAS 39 ED is a move in the wrong direction from FAS 133.

Greater ambiguity is not the solution to dealing with complexity. Ambiguity does eliminate the main problems accountants have with derivatives when the main problems are not really understanding derivatives rather than writing ambiguous accounting standards for complex derivatives contracts.

Bob Jensen's reply to Pat Walter's assertion that the IASB and FASB should just do away with hedge accounting alternatives and post all gains and losses on derivative financial instruments.

Hi Pat,
Can you think of a better way to distinguish between speculating and hedging in financial reporting? There's no distinction if hedge accounting relief is not built into the standards. .

Also making accounting standards simple and easy to understand for auditors should not trump the need for complications in accounting standards. The FASB and IASB have never seriously considered simplifying FAS 133 and IAS 39 to take away special hedge accounting relief altogether. The boards believe that investors will be misinformed by not making a distinction between speculating in derivatives versus managing risk with hedging derivatives. .

Historically, I think the FASB initially did not think that special hedge accounting relief was necessary when FAS 133 was first being formulated. FAS 133 would've been about 50 pages long and no big deal other than some technical problems of measuring derivative financial instrument fair values of customized contracts traded over the counter rather than on exchanges. Hedge accounting made FAS 133 and its amendments extended FAS 133 to over 700 pages long and requires that auditors learn about risk management contracts they never had to understand prior to FAS 133 and IAS 39. .

It took about a NY minute for companies that manage risk by hedging, tens of thousands of companies,to convince the FASB that this was far more than a neutrality issue. What this could do is mask the information content value of eps with with all that was to be gained by bringing derivative financial instruments into the financial statements. .

For example, the genuine value of having eps vary with changes in value of speculative derivative derivative contract investments (e.g., a speculative call option on gold) could be totally obscured by a changes in value of hedging contacts (e.g., a hedging option on gold) simply because the changes in the value of unbooked hedged items could not offset the value changes of their hedging contracts. .

In other words, not having hedge accounting could erase the value of having changed accounting rules for speculators if there is no distinction between hedging and speculating in FAS 133 and IAS 39. .

For this reason neither the FASB nor the IASB have seriously considered doing away with special treatment for hedge accounting even though it greatly complicates the lives of accountants and auditors. .

Your solution of doing away with hedge accounting certainly would make the lives of auditors easier because then they really could sign off on complicated derivatives contracts without truly having to understand those contracts beyond the trouble of finding their fair values. .

Can you think of a better way to distinguish between speculating and hedging in financial reporting?

Bob Jensen

 

Bob Jensen's free tutorials, audio clips, and videos on FAS 133 and IAS 39 are linked at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm


Warning 5:  In February 2008 the FASB for the first time allowed users free access to its "FASB Accounting Standards Codification" database. Access will be free for at least one year, although registration is required for free access. Much, but not all, information in separate booklets and PDF files may now be accessed much more efficiently as hypertext in one database. The Glossary below has not been updated for the Codification Database. Although the database is off to a great start, there is much information in this Glossary and in the FASB standards that cannot be found in the Codification Database. You can read the following at http://asc.fasb.org/asccontent&trid=2273304&nav_type=left_nav

Welcome to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Accounting Standards Codification™ (Codification).

The Codification is the result of a major four-year project involving over 200 people from multiple entities. The Codification structure is significantly different from the structure of existing accounting standards. The Notice to Constituents provides information you should read to obtain a good understanding of the Codification history, content, structure, and future consequences.

The FASB's Accounting Standard Codification Online Database (FASCOD) --- http://asc.fasb.org/home

I have been using FASCOD regularly, especially Section 815 on accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedging. I find this quite easy to use and appreciate the cross referencing to other standards. It would help in some instances to also reference to the printed standards.

Although there are narrowed-down glossaries for some of the sections like Section 815 (10)(S20), there is also a wonderful "Master Glossary" at http://asc.fasb.org/glossary&nav_type=left_nav#null

When you are into a section's outline, especially note the "Collapse" and "Expand" hot words that let you expand or collapse the outline for a desired level of detail and links to illustrations. Some of the illustrations are new in Section 815. Also there are links to SEC standards and interpretations that have been added to the database.

I did encounter a problem trying to print FASCOD quotations. For some reason, FASCOD pastes as hidden text. I could read it in a MS Word document but not in Print Preview or in printed hard copy. In MS Word I went to Tools, Options, View and clicked on Hidden Text. That did not solve my problem --- not being able to print FASCOD quotations. Then I went to Tools, Options, Print and clicked on Hidden Text. That made my FASCOD quotations appear in both Print Preview and hard copy.

FASB member Tom Linsmeier has been in charge of the FASCOD development. Tom indicates that his team was unaware of the above hidden text problem that some users are having. He says that his team is now looking into why the hidden text printing problem arose in the first place. It may well be that the above problem for some of us will disappear in the future.

Now if we only had such an IASCOD database for international standards. In fairness, the IASB standards, interpretations, exposure drafts, and a glossary can be downloaded into your computer and updated for an annual fee. This database has useful cross referencing and database search features. In many ways it is quite well done. However, it does not slice and dice content into better codification schema.

The IASB has some political correctness issues when it appears to be copying United States GAAP and/or technology. Hopefully the IASB will look at the economics involved in developing FASCOD over four years with over 200 professionals and millions of dollars and decide that the codification schema used by the FASB is suitable, with some tweaking, for the international standards. Of course the actual IASCOD content will be international GAAP rather than U.S. GAAP. It will still be a huge expense to slice and dice international GAAP for purposes of IASCOD. It will also entail a change in delivery. IASCOD will be served up online, whereas the current IASB database of standards, interpretations, exposure drafts, etc. must be downloaded into each user's computer for a fee initially and for annual updates.

The current IASB database can be downloaded from http://www.iasb.org/Home.htm
I find that it is best to leave its red-circle icon as a Startup icon on my computer screen (it could be just a bit smaller). Then it 's very easy to click the database on and off. In some ways the downloaded IASB database is programmed quite cleverly, especially the way it does database search. I give five stars for its search engine.

I hope that the IASB will invest in more illustrations if and when it develops IASCOD. One of the severe weaknesses of the IASB standards is that they cannot compare with the FASB standards in terms of abundant and useful illustrations. This is especially helpful for those of us in education and training. For example, when teaching IAS 39 having very few illustrations, I often run to FAS 133 and its amendments and DIGs for some illustrations. Now I can turn to Section 815 of FASCOD for added illustrations.

A drawback of the current Section 815 FASCOD content is that it does not yet have sliced and diced content of all the Derivative Implementation Group (DIG) pronouncements. Hopefully the DIG's will be added soon to FASCOD.

Bob Jensen

"Framing the Future: A first look at FASB’s GAAP codification, by Bruce Pounder, Journal of Accountancy, May 2008 --- http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/may2008/fasb_gaap.htm 

In less than a year, FASB’s Accounting Standards Codification will affect the day-to-day work of nearly every CPA who practices, teaches or researches accounting in accordance with U.S. GAAP.

By April 2009, FASB is expected to make the codification the single source of authoritative GAAP, overriding all existing literature. In other words, the codification content—not the original pronouncements from which the content was derived—will be GAAP. And the online codification research system—not books, loose-leaf services or CDs—will be the primary way that accountants access GAAP.

For many historical reasons, GAAP has become a minimally organized collection of many kinds of accounting pronouncements issued by various standard setters over many decades, as well as “widely recognized and prevalent” industry practices that are not the product of any formal standard-setting process. The present components of GAAP vary greatly in format, structure, completeness, authority and accessibility. As a result, practicing CPAs and financial statement preparers who attempt to apply GAAP often find themselves confused and frustrated. Likewise, accounting students frequently struggle to learn GAAP.

If a standard setter were to develop a body of accounting standards from scratch today, those standards presumably would not resemble the challenging jumble that GAAP has become. Rather than start from scratch, FASB has done the next best thing in an attempt to make GAAP more understandable and user-friendly—FASB has sought to simplify the structure of GAAP by codifying it.

In January, FASB released the Accounting Standards Codification for public review and verification. The codification is not merely a new entrant into the market for products and services designed to help CPAs understand and apply GAAP. Rather, the codification completely changes the way that GAAP will be documented, updated, referenced and accessed. It organizes in an entirely new way thousands of existing authoritative financial accounting and reporting standards and delivers the content via an Internet based research system that helps users search and access the material.

One often–overlooked aspect of the codification is that it will eliminate or flatten the GAAP hierarchy. In other words, there will be no more House of GAAP—no tiered structure with varying levels of authority on each floor. Under the codification, there’s no distinction—all standards are uniformly authoritative.

FASB expects that the codification will help mitigate the risk of noncompliance with accounting standards, provide real time updates as standards change and reduce the amount of time and effort required to research accounting issues.

A MAJOR RESTRUCTURING The primary goal of the codification project is not to change GAAP’s content, but rather to organize it in a more useful way. The codification will contain all current, authoritative accounting standards for nongovernmental entities that have been issued by U.S. standard setters, including FASB, FASB’s Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF), and the AICPA Accounting Standards Executive Committee (AcSEC). Certain SEC guidance also is included.

The codification has, for the most part, left standards unchanged. Appendix A of the Notice to Constituents, an overview document on the codification Web site, highlights areas in which FASB is recommending changes to standards to resolve conflicts in GAAP.

As used above, the word “authoritative” refers to GAAP from levels A through D in the current GAAP hierarchy. Undocumented industry practices and documented but-nonauthoritative guidance have been excluded from the codification. Because there are some exceptions regarding what is included in the codification, users are advised to consult FASB’s Notice to Constituents.

The project effectively disassembled each existing authoritative pronouncement and reassembled the pieces, organizing them into approximately 90 topics. Contents in each topic are further organized first by subtopic, then section and finally paragraph. The paragraph level is the only level that contains substantive content; all higher levels in the topical structure exist merely to organize the paragraph-level content.

Continued in article


Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory and standard setting --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm

Bob Jensen’s Amendment to the Teaching Note prepared by Smith and Kohlbeck for the following case:  “Accounting for Derivatives and Hedging Activities Comparisons of Cash Flow Versus Fair Value Accounting,” by Pamela A. Smith and Mark J. Kohlbeck
     Issues in Accounting Education, Volume 23, Number 1, February 2008, pp. 103-118
Bob Jensen's Amendment is at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/CaseAmendment.htm

The DIG documents are not yet available in the Codification Database, but they can now be accessed at  http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
Over 300 pages of  DIG pronouncements can be downloaded from  http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/allissuesp2.pdf 

For technical details see the following book:
Structured Finance and Collateralized Debt Obligations: New Developments in Cash and Synthetic Securitization (Wiley Finance) by Janet M. Tavakoli (2008)

Bob Jensen's Web Site

Top of Document

Start of Glossary

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |

FAS 133 and IAS 39 Glossary and Transcriptions of Experts
Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities
Bob Jensen at Trinity University

The FASB's Derivatives and Hedging Glossary (in the Accounting Standards Codification Database) ---
http://asc.fasb.org/subtopic&trid=2229141&nav_type=left_nav

FASB Accounting  Standards Codification online databaase  --- http://asc.fasb.org/home
Section 815 pertains to FAS 133 --- http://asc.fasb.org/section&trid=2229142&query=Derivative

A Glossary is provided in this Codification database in Section 815 (A20).

Also see the Codification Master Glossary at http://asc.fasb.org/glossary&nav_type=left_nav#null

Timeline of scandals and legislation leading up to FAS 133 and IAS 39 http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds

Bob Jensen's CD --- http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/

I'm sharing some old (well relatively old) accounting theory quiz and exam material that I added to a folder at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/


Question
What are hedge funds, especially after Bernie Madoff made them so famous?

When people ask me this question, my initial response is that a hedge fund no longer necessarily has anything to do with financial risk hedging. Rather a hedge fund is merely a "private" investment "club" that does not offer shares to the general public largely because it would then subject itself to more SEC, stock exchange, and other regulators. Having said this, it's pretty darn easy for anybody with sufficient funds to get into such a "private" club. Minimum investments range from $10,000 to $1,000,000 or higher.

Since Bernie Madoff made hedge funds so famous, the public tends to think that a hedge fund is dangerous, fraudulent, and a back street operation that does not play be the rules. Certainly hedge funds emerged in part to avoid being regulated. Sometimes they are risky due to high leverage, but some funds skillfully hedge to manage risk and are much safer than mutual funds. For example, some hedge funds have shrewd hedging strategies to control risk in interest rate and/or foreign currency trading.

Most hedge funds are not fraudulent. In general, however, it's "buyer beware" for hedge fund investors.

I would never invest in a hedge fund that is not audited by a very reliable CPA auditing firm. Not all CPA auditing firms are reliable (Bernie Madoff proved you can engage a fraudulent auditor operating out of a one-room office). Hence, the first step in evaluating a hedge fund is to investigate its auditor. The first step in evaluating an auditor is to determine if the auditing firm is wealthy enough to be a serious third party in law suits if the hedge fund goes belly up.

But the recent multimillion losses of Carnegie Mellon, the University of Pittsburgh, and other university endowment funds that invested in a verry fraudulent hedge fund purportedly audited by Deloitte suggests that the size and reputation of the auditing firm is not, by itself, sufficient protection against a criminal hedge fund (that was supposedly given a clean opinion by Deloitte in financial reports circulated to the victims of the fraud).

When learning about hedge funds, you may want to begin at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hedge_Fund

"What is a hedge fund and how is it different from a mutual fund?" by Andy Samuels, Business and Finance 101 Examiner, June 10, 2009 --- Click Here
Jim Mahar pointed out this link.

Having migrated away from their namesake, hedge funds no longer  focus primarily on “hedging” (attempting to reduce risk) because hedge funds are now focused almost blindly on one thing: returns.

Having been referred to as “mutual funds for the super rich” by investopedia.com, hedge funds are very similar to mutual funds in that they pool money together from many investors. Hedge funds, like mutual funds, are also managed by a financial professionals, but differ because they are geared toward wealthier individuals.

Hedge funds, unlike mutual funds, employ a wider array of ivesting techniques, which are considered more aggresive. For example, hedge funds often use leverage to amplify their returns (or losses if things go wrong).

The other key difference between hedge funds and mutual funds is the amount of regulation involved. Hedge funds are relatively unregulated because investors in hedge funds are assumed to be more sophisticated investors, who can both afford and understand the potential losses. In fact, U.S. laws require that the majority of investors in the fund are accredited.

Most hedge funds draw in investors because of the trustworthy reputations of the executives of the fund. Word-of-mouth praise and affiliations are often the key to success. Bernie Madoff succeed in luring customers based on two leading factors:  (1) His esteemed reputation on Wall Street and (2) His highly regarded connections in the Jewish community where he drew in most of his victims.

Bob Jensen's threads on frauds are linked at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
In particular see http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm
And see http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm

 

 


"What’s a Couple of Hundred Trillion When You’re Talking Derivatives?" by Floyd Norris, The New York Times, September 23, 2006 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/23/business/23charts.html

Everett McKinley Dirksen, the Senate Republican leader in the 1950’s, is supposed to have said, “A billion here and a billion there, and pretty soon you’re talking real money.” What would he have thought of derivatives today?

The International Swaps and Derivatives Association, a trade group, reported this week that the outstanding nominal value of swaps and derivatives at the end of June was $283.2 trillion.

Compare that with the combined gross domestic product of the United States, the European Union, Canada, Japan and China, which is about $34 trillion. The total value of all homes in the United States is about the same amount.

To be sure, notional value is an exaggerated term as it greatly overstates the amount at risk in many contracts. But the growth rate is real, and in the fastest-growing area of swaps — credit default swaps — notional value is closer to the amount at risk, because such swaps promise to make up the losses if a borrower defaults on the notional amount.

The value of outstanding credit default swaps doubles every year — a trend that must eventually stop — and now equals $26 trillion. That is about the same as the total amount of bond debt in the United States, and corporate debt, on which most credit swaps are traded, comes to just $5.2 trillion.

The credit derivatives cover the risks of default by individual companies, and offer insurance against default for bond indexes and specified bond portfolios.

The growth of the market has forced the swaps and derivatives association to change the way its credit swaps work. It used to be that if a company defaulted, the writer of a credit swap would have to pay par value for the bond he had guaranteed, and could then sell the bond to reduce his losses.

But in some cases defaults led to bond rallies, as those who had purchased credit swaps scrambled to get bonds to deliver. Now traders can choose cash settlements, with the amounts to be paid determined through auctions.

Until 1997, the association provided separate numbers on currency and interest rate contracts, but innovations blurred the distinction between those categories, and now it publishes a combined total. At the end of June, the figure was $250.8 trillion, up 25 percent over the previous 12 months.

Growth in that market slowed markedly early in this decade, as worldwide markets cooled, and there was even one annual decline, from mid-2000 to mid-2001. But growth picked up in 2002 as economies began to recover.

The volume outstanding of equity derivatives is rising by about 30 percent a year, and now totals $5.6 trillion. It could go farther, with world stock market capitalization now about $41 trillion, according to Standard & Poor’s.

Robert Pickel, the chief executive of the association, said that the growth in derivatives enables “more and more firms to benefit from these risk management tools.” On the other hand, the situation allows more and more traders to load up on risk if they choose, and hedge funds have become major derivatives traders.

The combination of large unregulated hedge funds trading ever larger amounts of unregulated derivatives in nontransparent markets makes some people nervous. But so far, anyway, little is being done to change the situation, and nothing devastating has happened to markets.

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
One of the main differences between a "financial instrument" versus a "derivative financial instrument" is that the notional is generally not at risk in a "derivative financial instrument." For example if Company C borrows $600 million from Bank B in a financial instrument, the notional amount ($600 million) is at risk immediately after the notional is transferred to Company C. On the other hand, if Company C and Company D contract for an interest rate swap on a notional of $600 million using Bank B as an intermediary, the $600 million notional never changes hands. Only the swap payments for the differences in interest rates are at risk and these are only a small fraction of the $600 million notional. Sometimes the swap payments are even guaranteed by the intermediary, thereby eliminating credit risk.

So where's the risk of a derivative financial instrument that caused all the fuss beginning in the 1980s and led to the most complex accounting standards ever written (FAS 133 in the U.S. and IAS 39 internationally)?

Often there is little or no risk if the derivative contracts are held to maturity. The problem is that derivatives are often settled before maturity at huge gains to one party and huge losses to the counterparty. For example, if Company C swaps fixed-rate interest payments on $600 million (having current value risk with no cash flow variation risk) for variable-rate interest payments on $600 million (having cash flow variation risk but no market value variation risk), Company C has taken on enormous cash flow risk that may become very large if interest rates change greatly in a direction not expected by Company C. If Company C wants to settle its swap contract before maturity it may have to pay an enormous amount of money to do so either to counterparty Company D or to some other company who will take the swap off the hands of Company C. The risk is not the $600 million notional; Rather the risk is in the shifting value of the swap contract itself which can be huge even if it is less than the $600 million notional amount.

Perhaps derivative financial instrument risk is even better illustrated by futures contracts. Futures contracts are traded on organized exchanges such as the Chicago Board of Trade. If Company A speculates in oil futures on January 1, there is no exchange of cash on a 100,000 barrel notional that gives Company A the right to sell oil at a future date (say in one year) at a forward price (say $100 per barrel) one year from now. As a speculation, Company A has gambled by hoping to buy 100,000 barrels of oil one year from now for less than $100 per barrel and sell it for the contracted $100 price.

But futures contracts are unique in that they are net settled in cash each day over the entire one year contract period. If the spot price of oil is $55 on January 12 and $60 on January 13, Company A must provide $500,000 = ($60-$55)(100,000 barrels) to the counterparty on January 13 even though the futures contract itself does not mature until December 31. If Company A has not hedged its position, its risk can become astounding if oil prices dramatically rise. Company A's futures contract had zero value on January 1 (futures contracts rarely have value initially except in the case of options contracts), but the value of the futures contract may become an enormous asset or an enormous liability each each day thereafter depending upon oil spot price movements relative to the forward price ($100) that was contracted.

Hence, derivative contracts may have enormous risks even though the notionals themselves are not at risk. Prior to FAS 133 these risks were generally not booked or even disclosed. In the 1980s newer types of derivative contracts emerged (such as interest rate swaps) in part because it was possible to have enormous amounts of off-balance-sheet debt that did not even have to be disclosed, let alone booked, in financial statements. Astounding frauds transpired that led to huge pressures on the SEC and the FASB to better account for derivative financial instruments.

Most corporations adopted policies of not speculating in derivatives by allowing derivatives to be used only to hedge risk. However, such policies are very misleading since there are two main types of risk --- cash flow risk versus value risk. It is impossible to simultaneously hedge both types of risk, and hedging one type increases the risk of the other type. For example, a company that swaps fixed for floating rate interest payments increases cash flow risk by eliminating value risk (which it may want if it plans to settle debt prior to maturity). The counterparty that swaps floating rate interest payments for fixed rate payments eliminates cash flow risk by taking on value risk. It is impossible to hedge both cash flow and value risk simultaneously.

Hence, to say that a corporation has a policy allowing hedging but not speculating in derivative financial instruments is nonsense. A policy to only hedge cash flow risk may create enormous value risk. A policy to only hedge value risk may create enormous cash flow risk.

As the NYT article above points out that derivative financial instruments are increasingly popular in world commerce. As a result risk exposures have greatly increased even if all contracts were used for hedging purposes only. The problem is that a hedge only reduces or eliminates one type of risk at the "cost" of increasing the other type of risk. Derivative contracts increase one type or the other type of risk the instant they are signed.  Hedging shifts risk but does not eliminate risk per se.

You can read more about scandals in derivative financial instruments contracting (such as one company's "trillion dollar bet" that nearly toppled Wall Street and Enron's derivative scandals) at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds

You can download the CD containing my slide shows and videos on how to account for derivative financial instruments at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/

My FAS 133 and IAS 39 Glossary is Below.


Table of Contents and Links

Bob Jensen's FAS 133 Glossary on Derivative Financial Instruments and Hedging Activities

          Also see a comprehensive risk and trading glossary at
http://risk.ifci.ch/SiteMap.htm

Glossary for the energy industry --- Also see http://snipurl.com/EnergyGlossary  

Related glossaries are listed at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/bookbus.htm 

Click here for tutorial links 

Risk Glossary --- http://www.riskglossary.com/

If you are having trouble finding something try a Google search.  Especially note that you can add terms and phrases at http://www.google.com/advanced_search?hl=en
For example, you can add a phrase in the second cell and individual words in the top cell.  You can fill in both cells simultaneously to narrow your search.

Also note that you can seek definitions in Google.  In the top cell type in --- define “phrase” where your phrase can be one word like “contango” or “backwardation” or a phrase like “asian option”.
It is important to first type in the word “define” without quotation marks.

Second try a search within the standard itself.  
You can find digital versions of FAS 133 by scrolling down at http://www.fasb.org/st/#fas153 
DIG text is can be searched at http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
Free digital versions of IAS 39 are available but they are difficult to find in EU law.  Fee-based versions are available at http://www.iasb.org/ 

 


Bob Jensen's FAS 133 and IAS 39 helpers --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

Why there are new rules of accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedge accounting --- See Why!

Bob Jensen's FAS 133,and FAS 138 Cases --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

Examples Illustrating Application of FASB Statement No. 138, Accounting for Certain Derivative Instruments and Certain Hedging Activities-an amendment of FASB Statement No. 133 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/examplespg.shtml
or try clicking here.

Flow Chart for FAS 133 and IAS 39 Accounting --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133flow.htm 

 

FAS 133 Excel Workbooks Solutions to Examples and Cases --- http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/
For example, my Excel wookbook for the Solution to Example 1 in Appendix B of FAS 133 is the file 133ex01a.xls
Note that in many instances, I have expanded upon the FASB examples to make more well-rounded presentation.

Bob Jensen's video tutorials on accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedging activity under FAS 133 and IAS 39 standards --- http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/acct5341/fas133/WindowsMedia/ 

Comparisons of International IAS Versus FASB Standards --- http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/pocketiasus.pdf

Flow Chart for FAS 133 Accounting --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133flow.htm
Flow Chart for IAS 39 Accounting    --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/39flow.htm

Differences between FAS 133 and IAS 39 --- http://www.iasplus.com/country/compare.htm

Intrinsic Value Versus Full Value Hedge Accounting --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/IntrinsicValue.htm 

Canadian Workshop Topics --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000indexLinks.htm

Accounting for Executory Contracts Such as Purchase/Sale Commitments and Loan Commitments ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/TheoryOnFirmCommitments.htm

Illustrations --- See Illustrations 

Two Questions
How did Bob Jensen spend his summer vacation?
What can physicists do when they can't find jobs in physics?

Answers

I've spent a great deal of my summer and my Fall 2004 Semester leave plowing through a book entitled Quantitative Finance and Risk Management:  A Physicists Approach by Jan W. Dash, (World Scientific Publishing, 2004, ISBN 981-238-712-9)
This is a great book by a good writer.

For a more introductory warm up I recommend Derivatives:  An Introduction by Robert A Strong, Edition 2 (Thomson South-Western, 2005, ISBN 0-324-27302-9)

And what about opportunities for physicists?
See "A Geek's Walk on Wall Street," by Peter Coy, Business Week, November 15, Page 26.  This is a review of a book entitled My Life as a Quant, by Emanuel Derman (Wiley, 2005) --- http://www.businessweek.com/@@x3mnUmYQYMjg7RMA/premium/content/04_46/b3908024_mz005.htm 

As one of Wall Street's leading quants, Derman did throw off some intense gamma radiation. He worked at Goldman from 1985 until 2003 except for one year at Salomon Brothers. At Goldman, he moved from fixed income to equity derivatives to risk management, becoming a managing director in 1997. He co-invented a tool for pricing options on Treasury bonds, working with Goldman colleagues Bill Toy and the late Fischer Black, who co-invented the Black-Scholes formula for valuing options on stocks. Derman received the industry's "Financial Engineer of the Year" award in 2000. Now he directs the financial-engineering program at Columbia University.

Derman failed at what he really wanted, which was to become an important physicist. He was merely very smart in a field dominated by geniuses, so he kicked around from one low-paying research job to another. "At age 16 or 17, I had wanted to be another Einstein," he writes. "By 1976...I had reached the point where I merely envied the postdoc in the office next door because he had been invited to give a seminar in France." His move to Wall Street -- an acknowledgment of failure -- brought him financial rewards beyond the dreams of academic physicists and a fair measure of satisfaction as well.

In the tradition of the idiosyncratic memoir, My Life As a Quant is a grab bag of the author's interests. It quotes Schopenhauer and Goethe while supplying not one but three diagrams of a muon neutrino colliding with a proton. There is a long section on the brilliant and punctilious Fischer Black; a glimpse of physicist Richard Feynman; and an embarrassing encounter with finance giant Robert Merton, who sat next to the author on a long flight (Derman treated him rudely before realizing who he was).

Derman's mood seems to vary from bemused on good days to sour on bad ones. The chapter on his postdoc travels is titled "A Sort of Life"; his brief career at Bell Labs, "In the Penal Colony"; his tenure at Salomon Brothers, "A Severed Head." Pre-IPO Goldman Sachs comes off as relatively gentle yet stimulating. He writes: "It was the only place I never secretly hoped would crash and burn."

Continued in the article

Bob Jensen's threads (including video tutorials) on derivative financial instruments and the Freddie and Fannie scandals are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

Bob Jensen's threads on the trillions of dollars of worldwide frauds using derivative financial instruments are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds 

September 25, 2003 message from editor jda [editor.jda@gmx.de]

Dear Professor Bob Jensen,

The Journal of Deivatives Accounting (JDA) is preparing to publish its first issue and I would be grateful if you could post the following announcement on your web site.

Regards

Mamouda

Dear Colleagues,

There is a new addition to accounting research Journals. The Journal of Derivatives Accounting (JDA) is an international quarterly publication which provides authoritative accounting and finance literature on issues of financial innovations such as derivatives and their implications to accounting, finance, tax, standards setting, and corporate practices. This refereed journal disseminates research results and serves as a means of communication among academics, standard setters, practitioners, and market participants.

The first and special issue of the JDA, to appear in the Winter of 2003, will be dedicated to:

"Stock Options: Developments in Share-Based Compensation (Accounting, Standards, Tax and Corporate Practice)"

This special issue will consider papers dealing with:

* Analysis of applicable national and international accounting standards * Convergence between IASB and FASB * Accounting treatment (Expensing) * Valuation * Corporate and market practice * Design of stock options * Analysis of the structure of stock options contracts * Executives pay incentives and performance * Taxation * Management and Corporate Governance

For more details on how to submit your work to the journal, please visit http://www.worldscinet.com/jda.html 

Sincerely,
The Editorial Board Journal of Derivatives Accounting (JDA)


JOURNAL OF DERIVATIVES ACCOUNTING 

Hedge Effectiveness Analysis Toolkit
Vol. 1, No. 2 (September 2004) out now!! In this issue issue of JDA, Guy Coughlan, Simon Emery and Johannes Kolb discuss the Hedge Effectiveness Analysis Toolkit, which is JPMorgan’s latest addition to a long list of innovative and cutting-edge risk management solutions. View the Table of Contents @ http://www.worldscinet.com/jda/01/0102/S02198681040102.html


FASB staff posts derivatives compilation of all subsequent changes made to the guidance in the February 10, 2004, edition of the bound codification, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities (also referred to as the Green Book) --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/07-10-06_green_book_changes.pdf

Bob Jensen's tutorials on accounting for derivative financial instruments are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm


In May of 2003, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Statement No. 149, Amendment of Statement 133 on Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities. The Statement amends and clarifies accounting for derivative instruments, including certain derivative instruments embedded in other contracts, and for hedging activities under Statement 133 --- http://www.fasb.org/news/nr043003.shtml 

Norwalk, CT, April 30, 2003—Today the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Statement No. 149, Amendment of Statement 133 on Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities. The Statement amends and clarifies accounting for derivative instruments, including certain derivative instruments embedded in other contracts, and for hedging activities under Statement 133.

The new guidance amends Statement 133 for decisions made:

The amendments set forth in Statement 149 improve financial reporting by requiring that contracts with comparable characteristics be accounted for similarly. In particular, this Statement clarifies under what circumstances a contract with an initial net investment meets the characteristic of a derivative as discussed in Statement 133. In addition, it clarifies when a derivative contains a financing component that warrants special reporting in the statement of cash flows. Statement 149 amends certain other existing pronouncements. Those changes will result in more consistent reporting of contracts that are derivatives in their entirety or that contain embedded derivatives that warrant separate accounting.

Effective Dates and Order Information

This Statement is effective for contracts entered into or modified after June 30, 2003, except as stated below and for hedging relationships designated after June 30, 2003. The guidance should be applied prospectively.

The provisions of this Statement that relate to Statement 133 Implementation Issues that have been effective for fiscal quarters that began prior to June 15, 2003, should continue to be applied in accordance with their respective effective dates. In addition, certain provisions relating to forward purchases or sales of when-issued securities or other securities that do not yet exist, should be applied to existing contracts as well as new contracts entered into after June 30, 2003.

Copies of Statement 149 may be obtained through the FASB Order Department at 800-748-0659 or by placing an order on-line at the FASB website.


SAS 92 auditing standard entitled "Auditing Derivative Instruments, Hedging Activities, and Investments in Securities."  Click Here.


An earlier FAS 133 Amendment on the Heels of the Previous (FAS 138) Amendment --- A Mere 104 Pages

Amendment of Statement 133 on Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities (Exposure Draft)

The News Release reads as follows at http://www.fasb.org/news/nr050102.shtml 

Today the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued an Exposure Draft, Amendment of Statement 133 on Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities. The Exposure Draft amends Statement No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, to clarify the definition of a derivative. A copy of the Exposure Draft is available on the FASB’s website at www.fasb.org. The comment period concludes on July 1, 2002.

In connection with Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. D1, "Application of Statement 133 to Beneficial Interests in Securitized Financial Assets," the Board addressed issues related to the accounting for beneficial interests in securitized financial assets, such as beneficial interests in securitized credit card receivables. In resolving those issues, the FASB decided that an amendment was needed to clarify the definition of a derivative, as set forth in Statement 133.

The purpose of the Exposure Draft is to improve financial reporting by requiring that financial contracts with comparable characteristics be accounted for in the same way. The Statement would clarify under what circumstances a financial contract—either an option-based or non-option-based contract—with an initial net investment would meet the characteristic of a derivative discussed in paragraph 6(b) of Statement 133. The FASB believes the proposed change will produce more consistent reporting of financial contracts as either derivatives or hybrid financial instruments.

The proposed effective date for the accounting change is the first day of the first fiscal quarter beginning after November 15, 2002, which, for calendar year end companies, will be January 1, 2003.

Bob Jensen's threads on FAS 122 and IAS 39 are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/casea


The FASB staff has prepared a new updated edition of Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities. This essential aid to implementation presents Statement 133 as amended by Statements 137 and 138. Also, it includes the results of the Derivatives Implementation Group (DIG), as cleared by the FASB through December 10, 2001, with cross-references between the issues and the paragraphs of the Statement.

“The staff at the FASB has prepared this publication to bring together in one document the current guidance on accounting for derivatives,” said Kevin Stoklosa, FASB project manager. “To put it simply, it’s a ‘one-stop-shop’ approach that we hope our readers will find easier to use.”

Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities—DC133-2

Prices: $30.00 each copy for Members of the Financial Accounting Foundation, the Accounting Research Association (ARA) of the AICPA, and academics; $37.50 each copy for others.

International Orders: A 50% surcharge will be applied to orders that are shipped overseas, except for shipments made to U.S. possessions, Canada, and Mexico. Please remit in local currency at the current exchange rate.

To order:


FASB staff posts derivatives compilation of all subsequent changes made to the guidance in the February 10, 2004, edition of the bound codification, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities (also referred to as the Green Book) --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/07-10-06_green_book_changes.pdf

Bob Jensen's tutorials on accounting for derivative financial instruments are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm


Derivative Financial Instruments Frauds --- 
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm

A Condensed Multimedia Overview With Video and Audio from Experts --- http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/000overview/mp3/133summ.htm 

A Longer and More Boring Introduction to FAS 133, FAS 138, and IAS 39 --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

Flow Chart for FAS 133 and IAS 39 Accounting --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133flow.htm

Differences between FAS 133 and IAS 39 --- http://www.iasplus.com/country/compare.htm

Intrinsic Value Versus Full Value Hedge Accounting --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/IntrinsicValue.htm

The Devil's Derivatives Dictionary at http://www.margrabe.com/Devil/DevilF_J.html 

To understand more about derivative financial instruments, I suggest that you begin by going to the file at 
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm
  
Especially note the discussion of the shortcut method at the end of the above document.

A helpful site on FAS 133 is at http://fas133.com 

Differences between FAS 133 and IAS 39 --- http://www.iasplus.com/country/compare.htm 


Auditing Requirements for Derivative Financial Securities
Auditing Derivative Instruments, Hedging Activities, and Investments in Securities

http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/auditstd/riasai/sas92.htm 

A Nice Summary of SAS 92 is Available Online (Auditing, Derivative Financial Instruments, Hedging)

SAS 92-New Guidance on Auditing Derivatives and Securities
by Joe Sanders, Ph.D., CPA and Stan Clark, Ph.D., CPA 
http://www.ohioscpa.com/member/publications/Journal/1st2001/page10.asp
  

Auditors face many challenges in auditing derivatives and securities. These instruments have become more complex, their use more common and the accounting requirements to provide fair value information are expanding. There is also an increasing tendency for entities to use service organizations to help manage activities involving financial instruments. To assist auditors with these challenges, the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) issued SAS 92, Auditing Derivative Instruments, Hedging Activities and Investments in Securities. The ASB is also currently developing a companion Audit Guide. SAS 92 supersedes SAS 81, Auditing Investments.

SAS 92 provides a framework for auditors to use in planning and performing auditing procedures for assertions about all financial instruments and hedging activities. The Audit Guide will show how to use the framework provided by the SAS for a variety of practice issues. The purpose of this article is to summarize and explain some of the more significant aspects of SAS 92.

Scope SAS 92 applies to:

Derivative instruments, as defined in SFAS 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activity. Hedging activities which also fall under SFAS 133. Debt and equity securities, as defined in SFAS 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities. The auditor should also refer to APB 18, The Equity Method of Accounting for Investments in Common Stock. Special Skill or Knowledge

SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, in his speech on renewing the covenant with investors stated, "I recognize that new financial instruments, new technologies and even new markets demand more specialized know-how to effectively audit many of today's companies".1 One of the first items noted in SAS 92 is that the auditor may need to seek assistance in planning and performing audit procedures for financial instruments. This advice is based primarily on the complexity of SFAS 133. Understanding an entities' information system for derivatives, including work provided by a service organization, may require the auditor to seek assistance from within the firm or from an outside expert. SAS 73 provides guidance on using the work of a specialist.

Inherent Risk Assessment

The inherent risk related to financial instruments is the susceptibility to a material misstatement, assuming there are no related controls. Assessing inherent risk for financial instruments, particularly complex derivatives, can be difficult. To assess inherent risk for financial instruments, auditors should understand both the economics and business purpose of the entity's financial activities. Auditors will need to make inquiries of management to understand how the entity uses financial instruments and the risks associated with them. SAS 92 provides several examples of considerations that might affect the auditor's assessment of the inherent risk for assertions about financial instruments:2

The complexity of the features of the derivative or security. Whether the transaction that gave rise to the derivative or security involved the exchange of cash. The entity's experience with derivatives or securities. Whether the derivative is freestanding or an embedded feature of an agreement. The evolving nature of derivatives and the applicable generally accepted accounting principles. Significant reliance on outside parties. Control Risk Assessment

SAS 92 includes a section on control risk assessment. Control risk is the risk that a material misstatement could occur and would not be prevented or detected in a timely manner by an entity's internal control. Management is responsible for providing direction to financial activities through clearly stated policies. These policies should be documented and might include:

Policies regarding the types of instruments and transactions that may be entered into and for what purposes. Limits for the maximum allowable exposure to each type of risk, including a list of approved securities broker-dealers and counterparties to derivative transactions. Methods for monitoring the financial risks of financial instruments, particularly derivatives, and the related control procedures. Internal reporting of exposures, risks and the results of actions taken by management. Auditors should understand the contents of financial reports received by management and how they are used. For example, "stop loss" limits are used to protect against sudden drops in the market value of financial instruments. These limits require all speculative positions to be closed out immediately if the unrealized loss on those positions reaches a certain level. Management reports may include comparisons of stop loss positions and actual trading positions to the policies set by the board of directors.

The entity's use of a service organization will require the auditor to gain an understanding of the nature of the service organization's services, the materiality of the transactions it processes, and the degree of interaction between its activities and those of the entity. It may also require the auditor to gain an understanding of the service organization's controls over the transactions the service organization processes for it.

Designing Substantive Procedures Based on Risk Assessments

The auditor should use the assessed levels of inherent and control risk to determine the acceptable level of detection risk for assertions about financial instruments and to determine the nature, timing, and extent of the substantive tests to be performed to detect material misstatements of the assertions. Substantive procedures should address the following five categories of assertions included in SAS 31, Evidential Matter:

1. Existence or occurrence. Existence assertions address whether the derivatives and securities reported in the financial statements through recognition or disclosure exist at the balance sheet date. Occurrence assertions address whether changes in derivatives or securities reported as part of earnings, other comprehensive income, cash flows or through disclosure occurred. Examples of substantive procedures for existence or occurrence assertions include:3

Confirmation with the holder of the security, including securities in electronic form or with the counterparty to the derivative. Confirmation of settled or unsettled transactions with the broker-dealer counterparty. Physical inspection of the security or derivative contract. Inspecting supporting documentation for subsequent realization or settlement after the end of the reporting period. Performing analytical procedures. 2. Completeness. Completeness assertions address whether all of the entity's derivatives and securities are reported in the financial statements through recognition or disclosure. Since derivatives may involve only a commitment to perform under a contract and not an initial exchange of tangible consideration, auditors should not focus exclusively on evidence relating to cash receipts and disbursements.

3. Rights and obligations. These assertions address whether the entity has rights and obligations associated with derivatives and securities reported in the financial statements. For example, are assets pledged or do side agreements exist that allow the purchaser of a security to return the security after a specified period of time? Confirming significant terms with the counterparty to a derivative or the holder of a security would be a substantive procedure testing assertions about rights and obligations.

4. Valuation. Under SFAS 115 and SFAS 133 many financial instruments must now be measured at fair value, and fair value information must be disclosed for most derivatives and securities that are measured at some other amount.

The auditor should obtain evidence corroborating the fair value of financial instruments measured or disclosed at fair value. The method for determining fair value may be specified by generally accepted accounting principles and may vary depending on the industry in which the entity operates or the nature of the entity. Such differences may relate to the consideration of price quotations from inactive markets and significant liquidity discounts, control premiums, commissions and other costs that would be incurred to dispose of the financial instrument.

If the derivative or security is valued by the entity using a valuation model (for example, the Black-Scholes option pricing model), the auditor should assess the reasonableness and appropriateness of the model. The auditor should also determine whether the market variables and assumptions used are reasonable and appropriately supported. Estimates of expected future cash flows, for example, to determine the fair value of long-term obligations should be based on reasonable and supportable assumptions.

The method for determining fair value also may vary depending on the type of asset or liability. For example, the fair value of an obligation may be determined by discounting expected future cash flows, while the fair value of an equity security may be its quoted market price. SAS 92 provides guidance on audit evidence that may be used to corroborate these assertions about fair value.

5. Presentation and disclosure. These assertions address whether the classification, description and disclosure of derivatives and securities are in conformity with GAAP. For some derivatives and securities, GAAP may prescribe presentation and disclosure requirements, for example:

Certain securities are required to be classified into categories based on management's intent and ability such as trading, available-for-sale or held-to-maturity. Changes in the fair value of derivatives used to hedge depend on whether the derivative is a fair-value hedge or an expected cash flow hedge, and on the degree of effectiveness of the hedge. Hedging Transactions

Hedging will require large amounts of documentation by the client. For starters, the auditor will need to examine the companies' established policy for risk management. For each derivative, management should document what risk it is hedging, how it is expected to hedge that risk and how the effectiveness will be tested. Without documentation, the client will not be allowed hedge accounting. Auditors will need to gather evidence to support the initial designation of an instrument as a hedge, the continued application of hedge accounting and the effectiveness of the hedge.

To satisfy these accounting requirements, management's policy for financial instrument transactions might also include the following elements whenever the entity engages in hedging activities:

An assessment of the risks that need to be hedged The objectives of hedging and the strategy for achieving those objectives. The methods management will use to measure the effectiveness of the strategy. Reporting requirements for the monitoring and review of the hedge program. Impairment Losses

Management's responsibility to determine whether a decline in fair value is other than temporary is explicitly recognized in SAS 92. The auditor will need to evaluate whether management has considered relevant information in determining whether other-than-temporary impairment exists. SAS 92 provides examples of circumstances that indicate an other-than-temporary impairment condition may exist:4

Management Representations

The auditor must obtain written representations from management confirming their intent and ability assertions related to derivatives and securities. For example, the intent and ability to hold a debt security until it matures or to enter into a forecasted transaction for which hedge accounting is applied. Appendix B of SAS 85 (AU Sec. 333.17) includes illustrative representations about derivative and security transactions.

Summary

SAS 92 provides guidance for auditing derivatives and securities. Accounting requirements related to these instruments, SFAS 115 and SFAS 133, are very complex and because of their extensive use of fair value measures require significant use of judgment by the accountant. SAS 92 establishes a framework for auditors to assess whether the entity has complied with the provisions of SFAS 115 and SFAS 133. However, because of the subjective nature of many of the requirements of these two standards, considerable auditor judgment will be required to comply with SAS 92.

Effective Date

This SAS is effective for audits of financial statements for fiscal years ending on or after June 30, 2001. Early adoption is permitted.

 


Keeping Up With Financial Instruments Derivatives

Bob Jensen's CD --- http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/

I'm sharing some old (well relatively old) accounting theory quiz and exam material that I added to a folder at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/

You can find some great tutorials go to CBOE at http://www.cboe.com/education/ .   But these do not help with learning how to account for the derivatives under FAS 133 and IAS 39.  The same holds for the CBOT at http://www.cbot.com/cbot/pub/page/0,3181,909,00.html  and the CME at http://www.cme.com/edu/ 

New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) for energy and metals under the Education tab at http://www.nymex.com/jsp/index.jsp 

Optionetics has some good tutorials with respect to options but these do not explain options accounting --- http://www.optionetics.com/education/trading.asp 

Daniel Oglevee's Course Site --- http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/autumn2004/723.htm 

In 2000, ISDA filed a letter to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) urging changes to FAS 133, its derivatives and hedge accounting standard. ISDA’s letter urged alterations to six areas of the standard: hedging the risk-free rate; hedging using purchased options; providing hedge accounting for foreign currency assets and liabilities; extending the exception for normal purchase and sales; and central treasury netting. The FASB subsequently rejected changes to purchased option provisions, conceded some on normal purchases and sales, extending the exception to contracts that implicitly or explicitly permit net settlement, declined to amend FAS 133 to facilitate partial term hedging and agreed to consider changing the restrictions on hedge accounting for foreign currency. 
ISDA ®INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC.http://www.isda.org/wwa/Retrospective_2000_Master.pdf
  

A good tutorial on energy futures and options hedging is given by the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) under the Education tab at http://www.nymex.com/jsp/index.jsp 

Two Questions
How did Bob Jensen spend his summer vacation?
What can physicists do when they can't find jobs in physics?

Answers

I've spent a great deal of my summer and my Fall 2004 Semester leave plowing through a book entitled Quantitative Finance and Risk Managment:  A Physicists Approach by Jan W. Dash, by Jan W. Dash (World Scientific Publishing, 2004, ISBN 981-238-712-9)
This is a great book by a good writer.

For a more introductory warm up I recommend Derivatives:  An Introduction by Robert A Strong, Edition 2 (Thomson South-Western, 2005, ISBN 0-324-27302-9)

And what about opportunities for physicists?
See "A Geek's Walk on Wall Street," by Peter Coy, Business Week, November 15, Page 26.  This is a review of a book entitled My Life as a Quant, by Emanuel Derman (Wiley, 2005) --- http://www.businessweek.com/@@x3mnUmYQYMjg7RMA/premium/content/04_46/b3908024_mz005.htm 

As one of Wall Street's leading quants, Derman did throw off some intense gamma radiation. He worked at Goldman from 1985 until 2003 except for one year at Salomon Brothers. At Goldman, he moved from fixed income to equity derivatives to risk management, becoming a managing director in 1997. He co-invented a tool for pricing options on Treasury bonds, working with Goldman colleagues Bill Toy and the late Fischer Black, who co-invented the Black-Scholes formula for valuing options on stocks. Derman received the industry's "Financial Engineer of the Year" award in 2000. Now he directs the financial-engineering program at Columbia University.

Derman failed at what he really wanted, which was to become an important physicist. He was merely very smart in a field dominated by geniuses, so he kicked around from one low-paying research job to another. "At age 16 or 17, I had wanted to be another Einstein," he writes. "By 1976...I had reached the point where I merely envied the postdoc in the office next door because he had been invited to give a seminar in France." His move to Wall Street -- an acknowledgment of failure -- brought him financial rewards beyond the dreams of academic physicists and a fair measure of satisfaction as well.

In the tradition of the idiosyncratic memoir, My Life As a Quant is a grab bag of the author's interests. It quotes Schopenhauer and Goethe while supplying not one but three diagrams of a muon neutrino colliding with a proton. There is a long section on the brilliant and punctilious Fischer Black; a glimpse of physicist Richard Feynman; and an embarrassing encounter with finance giant Robert Merton, who sat next to the author on a long flight (Derman treated him rudely before realizing who he was).

Derman's mood seems to vary from bemused on good days to sour on bad ones. The chapter on his postdoc travels is titled "A Sort of Life"; his brief career at Bell Labs, "In the Penal Colony"; his tenure at Salomon Brothers, "A Severed Head." Pre-IPO Goldman Sachs comes off as relatively gentle yet stimulating. He writes: "It was the only place I never secretly hoped would crash and burn."

Continued in the article

Bob Jensen's threads (including video tutorials) on derivative financial instruments and the Freddie and Fannie scandals are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

Bob Jensen's threads on the trillions of dollars of worldwide frauds using derivative financial instruments are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds 

 

You can read a great deal about energy derivatives in The Derivatives 'Zine at http://www.margrabe.com/Energy.html 
Other topics include the following:

The Derivatives 'Zine by Dr. Risk
THE WILLIAM MARGRABE GROUP, INC., CONSULTING, PRESENTS
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A question of sufficiently general interest to make it into the 'Zine, tends to generate a more comprehensive response. All questions and answers become the property of The William Margrabe Group, Inc


QUANTITATIVE FINANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT A Physicist's Approach
by Jan W Dash

This book is designed for scientists and engineers desiring to learn quantitative finance, and for quantitative analysts and finance graduate students. Parts will be of interest to research academics --- http://www.worldscientific.com/books/economics/5436.html 
804pp Pub. date: Jul 2004
ISBN 981-238-712-9 US$98 / £73


Contents:


The above sources are not much good about accounting for derivatives under FAS 133, FAS 138, and IAS 39.  For that, go to the following source:

http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 


FAS 133 Tutorial, SmartPros --- http://www.smartpros.com/x33017.xml 

FAS 133, the standard for financial reporting of derivatives and hedging transactions, was adopted in 1998 by the Financial Accounting Standards Board to resolve inconsistent previous reporting standards and practices. It went into effect at most U.S. companies at the beginning of 2001.

Courtesy of Kawaller & Company, SmartPros presents this FAS 133 tutorial to help you understand the provisions of the standard. For news pertaining to FAS 133, click on the links to the right in Related Stories.

PwC Tutorial on IAS 39 --- http://www.pwcglobal.com/images/gx/eng/fs/bcm/032403iashedge.pdf 


PowerPoint Show Highlighting Some Complaints About IAS 39 and IAS 32 --- http://www.atel.lu/atel/fr/publications/Publications/030524_EACT%20mtg_Milan.ppt 


"IAS 32 and IAS 39 Revised:  An Overview," Ernst & Young, February 2004  --- http://www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/International/IAS32-39_Overview_Febr04/$file/IAS32-39_Overview_Febr04.pdf 
I shortened the above URL to http://snipurl.com/RevisedIAS32and39 


Sharing Professor  --- John Hull (who writes about financial instrument derivatives) --- http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/~hull/

His great books (not free) are great, but he also shares (for free) some software and data --- http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/~hull/

Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives, 5th Edition 

Fundamentals of Futures and Options Markets, 4th Edition


Forwarded by Carl Hubbard on September 12, 2003

I would like to bring to your attention Analysis of Derivatives for the CFA(r) Program by Don M. Chance, CFA, recently published this year by the Association for Investment Management and Research(r). While designed for the CFA program, this publication is a terrific text for academic derivatives and risk management courses.

The treatment in this volume is intended to communicate a practical risk management approach to derivatives for the investment generalist. The topics in the text were determined by a comprehensive job analysis of investment practitioners worldwide. The illustrative in-chapter problems and the extensive end-of-chapter questions and problems serve to reinforce learning and understanding of the material.

We believe that this text responds to the need for a globally relevant guide to applying derivatives analysis to the investment process. We hope you will consider adopting Analysis of Derivatives for the CFA(r) Program for a future course.

Thank you for your attention.

Sincerely,

Helen K. Weaver
Associate
AIMR

656 PAGES
0-935015-93-0 
HB 2003


Message from Ira Kawaller on August 4, 2002

Hi Bob,

I posted a new article on the Kawaller & Company website: “What’s ‘Normal’ in Derivatives Accounting,” originally published in Financial Executive, July / August 2002. It is most relevant for financial managers of non-financial companies, who seek to avoid FAS 133 treatment for their purchase and sales contracts. The point of the article is that this treatment may mask some pertinent risks and opportunities. To view the article, click on http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/FE.pdf  .

I'd be happy to hear from you if you have any questions or comments.

Thanks for your consideration.

Ira Kawaller Kawaller & Company, LLC http://www.kawaller.com 

kawaller@kawaller.com 717-694-6270

Bob Jensen's documents on derivative financial instruments are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 


March 8, 2002 Message from the Risk Waters Group [RiskWaters@lb.bcentral.com

ONLINE TRADING TRAINING NOW AVAILABLE (Investments, Finance, Derivatives) … 
‘Introduction to Trading Room Technology’ from Waters Training. A low-cost, Web-based training solution for financial professionals. Go at your own pace, travel nowhere, and learn about the core trading processes and key technology issues from your own desktop. For more information, go to http://www.waters-training.com  to find out more. Lastly, if you have any colleagues, training managers or business associates who would be interested in this new product, please forward them this message. 
Thank you
.

If you are interested in email messages regarding financial risk news, you may be interested in contacting:

Christopher Jeffery  mailto:cjeffery@riskwaters.com 
Editor, RiskNews
http://www.risknews.net 


Governmental Disclosure Rules for Derivative Financial Instruments ---  see Disclosure.


The DIG
In the meantime, the FASB formed the FAS 133 Derivatives Implementation Group (DIG) to help resolve particular implementation questions, especially in areas where the standard is not clear or allegedly onerous.  The FASB's DIG website (that contains its mission and pronouncements) is at http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/  DIG issues are also summarized (in red borders) at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#0000Begin.


IAS 138 Implementation Guidance
"Implementation of SFAS 138, Amendments to SFAS 133," The CPA Journal, November 2001. (With Angela L.J. Huang and John S. Putoubas), pp. 54-56 --- http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2001/1100/dept/d115401.htm


April 25, 2002 message from Charlie Stutesman [southwestern.email@swcollege.com

Dear Professor Jensen,

In direct contrast to most trade training derivatives texts which emphasize issues related to the pricing and hedging of derivatives, this groundbreaking text is designed for those who want to teach students how to manage derivatives to maximize firm value through risk management. DERIVATIVES AND RISK MANAGEMENT presents the crucial tools necessary for executives and future derivatives players to effectively hedge with derivatives in order to protect firms from losses.

* WRITTEN TO EMPHASIZE THE ROLE OF MANAGERS: Managers will use derivatives to maximize firm value as opposed to traders who may use derivatives to speculate.

* MANAGERIAL APPLICATION BOXES: Preparing users to meet the challenges of today's business decisions, real-world applications bring chapter concepts to life.

* TECHNICAL BOXES: Concepts presented within the chapters are taken to a higher level of conceptual or mathematical rigor.

We encourage you to request a complimentary exam copy of DERIVATIVES AND RISK MANAGEMENT (ISBN: 0-538-86101-0) by Stulz. Simply reply to this message, contact your South-Western, Thomson Learning representative, call the Thomson Learning Academic Resource Center at 1-800-423-0563, or go to:

http://esampling.thomsonlearning.com/s1.asp?Rid=1+JWA+1719&SC=2SCF2262 

South-Western has helped provide generations of learners with a solid foundation and true understanding of finance. Now more than ever, follow the proven leader into a new century with relevant, comprehensive, and up-to-date finance products and information.

Sincerely,

Charlie Stutesman 
Senior Marketing Manager
 
charlie.stutesman@swlearning.com
 


IAS 39 Implementation Guidance

Supplement to the Publication
Accounting for Financial Instruments - Standards, Interpretations, and Implementation Guidance
http://www.iasc.org.uk/docs/ias39igc/batch6/39batch6f.pdf

The IASB’s Exposure Draft of the macro hedging compromise is entitled “Amendments to IAS 39:  Recognition and Measurement Fair Value Hedge Accounting for a Portfolio Hedge of Interest Rate” and for a short time can be downloaded free from http://www.iasc.org.uk/docs/ed-ias39mh/ed-ias39mh.pdf
See Macro Hedging 

Also see Bob Jensen's Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation,  and Yield Curves
for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm 

Hi Patrick,

The term "better" is a loaded term. One of the main criticisms leveled at IASC standards is that they were too broad, too permissive, and too toothless to provide comparability between different corporate annual reports. The IASC (now called IASB) standards only began ot get respect at IOSCO after they started becoming more like FASB standards in the sense of having more teeth and specificity.

I think FAS 133 is better than IAS 39 in the sense that FAS 133 gives more guidance on specific types of contracts. IAS 39 is so vague in places that most users of IAS 39 have to turn to FAS 133 to both understand a type of contract and to find a method of dealing with that contract. IAS 39 was very limited in terms of examples, but this has been recitified somewhat (i.e., by a small amount) in a recent publication by the IASB: Supplement to the Publication Accounting for Financial Instruments - Standards, Interpretations, and Implementation Guidance http://www.iasc.org.uk/docs/ias39igc/batch6/39batch6f.pdf 

In theory, there are very few differences between IAS 39 and FAS 133. But this is like saying that there is very little difference between the Bible and the U.S. Commercial Code. Many deals may be against what you find in the Bible, but lawyers will find it of less help in court than the U.S. Commercial Code. I admit saying this with tongue in cheek, because the IAS 39 is much closer to FAS 133 than the Bible is to the USCC.

Paul Pacter wrote a nice paper about differences between IAS 39 and FAS 133. However, such a short paper cannot cover all differences that arise in practice. The paper is somewhat dated now, but you can find more recent updates on differences at Differences between FAS 133 and IAS 39 --- http://www.iasplus.com/country/compare.htm

Although there are differences between FAS 133 and IAS 39, I would not make too big a deal out of such differences. IAS 39 was written with one eye upon FAS 133, and the differences are relatively minor. Paul Pacter's summary of these differences can be downloaded from http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?s=490603&sc={65834A68-1562-4CF2-9C09-D1D6BF887A00}&sd=860888892&n=3288 

Also note "Comparisons of International IAS Versus FASB Standards" --- http://www.iasplus.com/country/compare.htm

Hope this helps,

Bob (Robert E.) Jensen Jesse H. Jones Distinguished Professor of Business Trinity University, San Antonio, TX 78212 Voice: (210) 999-7347 Fax: (210) 999-8134 Email: rjensen@trinity.edu http://faculty.Trinity.edu/rjensen 

-----Original Message----- 
From: Patrick Charles [mailto:charlesp@CWDOM.DM]  
Sent: Tuesday, February 26, 2002 11:54 AM 
To: CPAS-L@LISTSERV.LOYOLA.EDU 
Subject: US GAAP Vs IASB

Greetings Everyone

Mr Bolkestein said the rigid approach of US GAAP could make it easier to hide companies' true financial situation. "You tick the boxes and out come the answer," he said. "Having rules is a good thing, but having rigid rules is not the best thing.

http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=FT3AHWRLXXC&live=true&tagid=FTDCZE6JFEC&subheading=accountancy

Finally had a chance to read the US GAAP issue. Robert you mentioned IAS 39, do you have other examples where US GAAP is a better alternative to IASB, or is this an European ploy to get the US to adopt IASB?

Cheers

Mr. Patrick Charles charlesp@cwdom.dm  ICQ#6354999

"Education is an admirable thing, but it is well to remember from time to time that nothing that is worth knowing can be taught."



Bob Jensen's Glossary of FAS 133 and IAS 39

Bob Jensen's Overview of FAS 133 (With Audio) http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation,  and Yield Curves
for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments 

See http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm

FAS 133 flow chart  http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133flow.htm

Bob Jensen's Document on the Missing Parts of FAS 133

Summary of Key Paragraphs in FAS 133 on Portfolio/Macro Hedging.

Bob Jensen's Weekly Assignments and Hints Regarding FAS 133

Bob Jensen's Technology Glossary (Includes an Extensive Listing of Accounting and Finance Glossaries)

ACCT 5341 International Accounting Theories Course Helpers

Yahoo Finance is Bob Jensen's Favorite Place to learn more about the mechanics and widespread use of derivative financial instruments.  That web site, however, will not help much with respect to accounting for such instruments under FAS 133.

Bob Jensen's Mexcobre Case

For a FAS 133 flow chart, go to http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133flow.htm 

Internet Links of Possible Interest

Bob Jensen's Transcripts of Presentations by Experts

PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) Summary Tables (With Some Notes Added by Bob Jensen) 


Derivatives Implementation Group (DIG) 

Hi George,

That depends upon what you mean by "support." If you mean failing to adhere to any FASB standard in the U.S. on a set of audited financial statements, then auditors are sending an open invitation to all creditors and shareholders to contact their tort lawyers --- lawyers always salivate when you mention the magic words "class action lawsuit".

If you mean sending mean-spirited letters to the FASB, then that's all right, because the FASB is open to all communications in what it defines as "due process."

I am a strong advocate of FAS 133 --- corporations got away with hiding enormous risks prior to FAS 133. Could FAS 133/138 and IAS 39 be simplified? Well that's a matter of opinion. The standards will be greatly simplified if your Canadian friends and my U.S. friends support the proposal to book all financial instruments at fair value (as advocated by the JWG and IASB Board Member Mary Barth). But whether this is a simplification is a matter of conjecture since estimation of fair value is a very complex and tedious process for instruments not traded in active and deep markets. In the realm of financial instruments there are many complex financial instruments and derivatives created as custom and unique contracts that are nightmares to value and re-value on a continuing basis. One needs only study how inaccurate the estimated bond yield curves are deriving forward rates. In some cases, we might as well consult astrologers who charge less than Bloomberg and with almost the same degree of error.

My bottom line conclusion: We could simplify the wording of the financial instruments and derivative financial instruments standards by about 95% if we go all the way in adopting fair value accounting for all financial instruments and derivative financial instruments.

But simplifying the wording of the standard does not necessarily simplify the accounting itself and will add a great deal of noise to the measurement of risk. In the U.S., the banking industry is so opposed to fair value accounting that the Amazon river will probably freeze over before the FASB passes what the JWG proposes. See http://www.aba.com/aba/pdf/GR_tax_va6.PDF 

Readers interested in downloading the Joint Working Group IASC Exposure Draft entitled Financial Instruments: Issues Relating to Banks should follow the downloading instructions at http://www.aba.com/aba/pdf/GR_TAX_FairValueAccounting.pdf  
(Trinity University students may find this on J:\courses\acct5341\iasc\jwgfinal.pdf  ).

On December 14, 1999 the FASB issued Exposure Draft 204-B entitled Reporting Financial Instruments and Certain Related Assets and Liabilities at Fair Value. I'm not sure where you can find this buried document at the moment. 
(Trinity University students can find the document at J:\courses\acct5341\fasb\fvhtm.htm  ).

 

Bob Jensen

-----Original Message----- 
From: glan@UWINDSOR.CA [mailto:glan@UWINDSOR.CA]  
Sent: Monday, February 25, 2002 5:33 PM 
To: AECM@LISTSERV.LOYOLA.EDU 
Subject: Re: Intrinsic Versus Time Value

I have seen the credit to be Paid-in Capital- Stock Options or to Stock Options Outstanding rather than to a liability. It would be interesting to learn more about what the accounting firms stand to gain by not supporting FAS133. 

George Lan

For a FAS 133 flow chart, go to http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133flow.htm 

Differences between FAS 133 and IAS 39 --- http://www.iasplus.com/country/compare.htm

Side by Side: IAS 39 Compared with FASB Standards (FAS 133), by Paul Pacter, as published in Accountancy International Magazine, June 1999 --- http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm 
Also note "Comparisons of International IAS Versus FASB Standards" --- http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/pocketiasus.pdf

IAS 39 history --- http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?s=6941204&sc={CB32B469-886C-4486-86B7-36E49358DDE5}&sd=617116004&n=3306 

Limited Revisions to IAS 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement (E66) --- http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?s=6941204&sc={CB32B469-886C-4486-86B7-36E49358DDE5}&sd=268256258&n=3222

Recognition and Measurement (E66)

E66, Proposed Limited Revisions to IAS 39 and Other Related Standards, proposed the following limited revisions to IAS 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, and other related Standards:
  • changes to require consistent accounting for purchases and sales of financial assets using either trade date accounting or settlement date accounting. IAS 39 currently requires settlement date accounting for sales of financial assets, but permits both trade date and settlement date accounting for purchases;
  • elimination of the requirement in IAS 39 for a lender to recognise certain collateral received from a borrower in its balance sheet;
  • improvement of the wording on impairment recognition;
  • changes to require consistent accounting for temporary investments in equity securities between IAS 39 and other International Accounting Standards; and
  • elimination of redundant disclosure requirements for hedges in IAS 32, Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation.
None of the proposed revisions represents a change to a fundamental principle in IAS 39. Instead, the purpose of the proposed changes is primarily to address technical application issues that have been identified following the approval of IAS 39 in December 1998. The IASC Board’s assessment is that the proposed changes will assist enterprises preparing to implement IAS 39 for the first time in 2001 and help ensure a consistent application of the Standard. No further changes to IAS 39 are contemplated.

 

At its meeting in March 2000, the Board appointed a Committee to develop implementation guidance on IAS 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition. The guidance is expected to be published later this year, after public comment, as a staff guidance document. The IAS 39 Implementation Guidance Committee may refer some issues either to the SIC or to the Board.  http://www.iasc.org.uk/frame/cen2_139.htm

Recommended Reading

Recommended Links

Bob Jensen's Glossary of FAS 133 and IAS 39

 


A message from Ira Kawaller on January 13, 2002

Hi Bob,

I wanted to alert you to the fact that I posted another article on the Kawaller and Company website, "The New World Under FAS 133." It came out in the latest issue of the GARP Review. It deals with the economics and accounting considerations relating to the use of cross-currency interest rate swaps. The link below brings you to the paper:

http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/garpswaps.pdf

I also posted a new calendar of events, at

http://www.kawaller.com/schedule/calendar.pdf

To navigate to the links in this email message, click on them. If that does not work, copy the link and paste it into the address field of your browser.

Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions, comments, or suggestions. Thanks for your consideration.

Ira Kawaller kawaller@kawaller.com 
http://www.kawaller.com

Bob Jensen's documents on FAS 133, FAS 138, and IAS 39 are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 


PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) Summary Tables

Source:  A Guide to Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities (New York, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 1999, pp. 4-5 and pp. 19-22)  

Note that the FASB's FAS 133 becomes required for calendar-year companies on January 1, 2001.  Early adopters can apply the standard prior to the required date, but they cannot apply it retroactively.   The January 1, 2001 effective date follows  postponements from the original starting date of June 15, 1999 stated in Paragraph 48 on Page 29 of FAS 133.   For fiscal-year companies, the effective date is June 15, 2000.  The international counterpart known as the IASC's IAS 39 becomes effective for financial statements for financial years beginning on the same January 1, 2001.  Earlier application permitted for financial years ending after 15 March 1999.  

Note that Bob Jensen has added notes (in red),

OVERVIEW & EXPECTED IMPACT of FAS 133 and IAS 39

FAS 133 and IAS 39

Pre-FAS 133

U.S. FAS 133:  All derivatives must be carried on the balance sheet at fair value.  ¶5

Notes from Jensen:  
International:  IAS 39 differs in that it requires fair value adjustments of "all" debt securities, equity securities, and other financial assets except for those whose value cannot be reliably estimated. ¶s 1,5,6, 95, and 96.  There are exceptions where value estimates are unreliable such as in the case of unlisted equity securities (see IAS ¶s 69, 93, and 95).   FAS 133 requires an active market for value estimation of non-trading items.  Under FAS 133, unquoted equity securities are measured at cost subject to an impairment test whether or not value can be estimated reliably by other means. 

FASB requires fair value measurement for all derivatives, including those linked to unquoted equity instruments if they are to be settled in cash but not those to be settled by delivery, which are outside the scope of FAS 133.

There are some exceptions for hybrid instruments as discussed in  IAS 39  ¶ 23c and FAS 133  ¶ 12b.  

Derivatives are reported on the balance sheet on a variety of bases (including fair value, forward value, spot rates, intrinsic value, historical cost) or not recorded at all.

Synthetic (accrual) accounting model for interest-rate swaps is prohibited.

Synthetic (accrual) accounting model is widely used for interest-rate swaps that hedge debt.

Gains and losses on derivative hedging instruments must be recorded in either other comprehensive income or current earnings.  They are not deferred as liabilities or assets.

Note from Jensen
One area of difference between IAS 39 and FAS 133 is that FAS 133 requires that certain gains and losses of hedging instruments be carried in equity (as OCI) whereas IAS 39 provides an option of equity versus current earnings.

Derivative gains and losses for hedges of forecasted transactions and firm commitments are deferred as liabilities or assets on the balance sheet under FAS 52 and FAS 80.

Derivative gains and losses for hedges of forecasted transactions are required to be reported in other comprehensive income (equity), thus causing volatility in equity.

Note from Jensen:
One of the major sources of difference between FAS 133 and IAS 39 concerns embedded derivatives.  In general, net profit or loss will be the same under IAS and FASB Standards, but the balance sheet presentation will be net under IAS and gross under FASB.  See cash flow hedge.

Derivative gains and losses for hedges of forecasted transactions are permitted to be deferred on the balance sheet as assets or liabilities and, as such, do not affect equity.

Hedge accounting is permitted for forward contracts that hedge foreign-currency-denominated forecasted transactions (including intercompany foreign-currency-denominated forecasted transactions).

FAS 52 does not permit hedge accounting for forward contracts that hedge foreign-currency-denominated forecasted transactions.

Some hybrid instruments (i.e., contracts with embedded derivatives), must be bifurcated into their component parts, with the derivative component accounted for separately.

Note from Jensen
IAS 39's definition of a derivative differs in that IAS 39 does not require "net settlement" provisions that are required under FAS 133.

There are some exceptions for hybrid instruments as discussed in  IAS 39  ¶s 23b & 23c;  FAS 133  ¶s 12b & 12c.

Bifurcation of many hybrid instruments is not required under current practice and, therefore, such instruments generally are not bifurcated.

Limited use of written options to hedge is permitted (e.g., when changes in the fair value of the written option offset those of an embedded purchased option).

Current practice generally prohibits hedge accounting for written options.

Hedge accounting is prohibited for a hedge of a portfolio of dissimilar items, and strict requirements exist for hedging a portfolio of "similar" items.

Less stringent guidelines are applied in practice for portfolio hedging.

Demonstration of enterprise or transaction risk reduction is not required -- only the demonstration of a high effectiveness of offset in changes in the fair value of cash flows of the hedging instrument and the hedged. item.

Demonstration of enterprise risk reduction is required for hedge transactions with futures contracts and, by analogy, option contracts.  Demonstration of transaction risk reduction is required for foreign-currency hedges.

The definition of a derivative is broader than in current practice (e.g., it includes commodity-based contracts).

Note from Jensen
IAS 39's definition of a derivative differs in that IAS 39 does not require "net settlement" provisions that are required under FAS 133.

The definition of a derivative excludes certain commodity and other contracts involving nonfinancial assets.

 

Table of Derivatives-Contract Types

Contract

Derivative within the scope
of FAS 133?

Underlying

Notional Amount of
Payment Provision

1.

Equity security

No. An initial net investment is required to purchase a security

-

-

2.

Debt security or loan

No. It requires an initial net investment of the principal amount or (if purchased at a discount or premium) an amount calculated to yield a market rate of interest.

-

-

3.

Regular-way security trade (e.g., trade of a debt or equity security)

No. Such trades are specifically excluded from the scope of FAS 133 (paragraph 10(a)).

-

-

4.

Lease

No. It requires a payment equal to the value of the right to use the property.

-

-

5.

Mortgage-backed security

No. It requires an initial net investment based on market interest rates adjusted for credit quality and prepayment.

-

-

6.

Option to purchase or sell real estate

No, unless it can be net-settled and is exchange-traded.

Price of the real estate

A specified parcel of the real estate

7.

Option to purchase or sell an exchange-traded security

Yes

Price of the security

A specified number of securities

8.

Option to purchase or sell a security not traded on an exchange

No, unless it can be net-settled.

Price of the security

A specified number of securities

9.

Employee stock option

No; for purposes of the issuer's accounting. It is specifically excluded as a derivative by paragraph 11.

-

-

10.

Futures contract

Yes. A clearinghouse (a market mechanism) exists to facilitate net settlement.

Price of a commodity or a financial instrument

A specified quantity or fact amount

11.

Forward contract to purchase or sell securities

No, unless it can be net-settled, or if the securities are readily convertible to cash and the forward contract does not qualify as a "regular way" trade.

Price of a security

A Specified number of securities or a specified principal or face amount

12.

A nonexchange traded forward contract to purchase or sell manufactured goods

No, unless it can be net-settled and neither party owns the goods.

Price of the goods

A specified quantity

13.

A nonexchange traded forward contract to purchase or sell a commodity

No, unless it can be net-settled or the commodity is readily convertible to cash and the purchase is not a "normal purchase."

Price of the commodity

A specified quantity

14.

Interest-rate swap

Yes

An interest rate

A specified amount

15.

Currency swap

Yes. Paragraph 257.

An exchange rate

A specified currency amount

16.

Swaption

Yes. It requires the delivery of a derivative or can be net-settled.

Value of the swap

The notional amount of the swap

17.

Stock-purchase warrant

Yes, for the holder, if the stock is readily convertible to cash. No, for the issuer, if the warrant is classified in stockholders' equity.

Price of the stock

A specified number of shares

18.

Property and casualty insurance contract

No. Specifically excluded.

-

-

19.

Life insurance contract

No. Specifically excluded.

-

-

20.

Financial-quarantee contract -- payment occurs if a specific debtor fails to pay the guaranteed party.

No. Specifically excluded.

-

-

21.

Credit-indexed contract -- payment occurs if a credit index (or the creditworthiness of a specified debtor or debtors) varies in a specified way.

Yes

Credit index or credit rating

A specified payment amount (which may vary, depending on the degree of change, or, which may be fixed)

22.

Royalty agreement

No. It is based on sales of one of the parties, which is an excluded underlying.

-

-

23.

Interest-rate cap

Yes

An interest rate

A specified amount

24.

Interest-rate floor

Yes

An interest rate

A specified amount

25.

Interest-rate collar

Yes

An interest rate

A specified amount

26.

Adjustable-rate loan

No. An initial net investment equal to the principal amount of the loan is required.

-

-

27.

Variable annuity contracts

No. Such contracts require an initial net investment.

-

-

28.

Guaranteed investment contracts

No. Such contracts require an initial net investment.

-

-


Other References --- See References 



Beginning of Bob Jensen's FAS 133 and IAS 39 Glossary
Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities

 

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M |
| N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |

Note that the FASB's FAS 133 becomes required for calendar-year companies on January 1, 2001.  Early adopters can apply the standard prior to the required date, but they cannot apply it retroactively.   The January 1, 2001 effective date follows  postponements from the original starting date of June 15, 1999 stated in Paragraph 48 on Page 29 of FAS 133.   For fiscal-year companies, the effective date is June 15, 2000The international counterpart known as the IASC's IAS 39 becomes effective for financial statements for financial years beginning on the same January 1, 2001.  Earlier application permitted for financial years ending after 15 March 1999

For a FAS 133 flow chart, go to http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133flow.htm  

Bob Jensen's Web Site

Top of Document

Start of Glossary

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |

A-Terms

Accounting Exposure =

a term used in alternate ways. In one context, accounting exposure depicts foreign exchange exposure that cannot be captured by the accounting model. In some textbooks accounting exposure is synonymous with translation exposure. See translation exposure.  Also see risks.

Amortization of Basis Adjustments = see basis adjustment.

Anticipated Transaction = see forecasted transaction.

AOCI = accumulated other comprehensive income.  See comprehensive income.

Arbitrage

By definition, arbitraging entails investing at zero market (price) risk coupled with the risk of losing relatively minor transactions costs of getting into and closing out contracts.  There might be other risks.  Especially when dealing in forward contracts, there may be credit risks.  Forward contracts are often private agreements between contracting individuals.  Other arbitraging alternatives such as futures and options contracts are generally obtained in trading markets such as the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE).  In markets like the CBOT or the CBOE, the trading exchanges themselves guarantee payments such that there is no credit risk in hedging or speculating strategies.  Arbitrage entails a hedging strategy that eliminates all market (price) risk while, at the same time, has no chance of losing any money and a positive chance of making a profit.  Sometimes the profit is locked in to a fixed amount in advance.  At other times, the profit is unknown, but can never be less than zero (ignoring transactions costs).

Generally arbitrage opportunities arise when the same item is traded in different markets where information asymmetries between markets allows arbitragers with superior information to exploit investors having inferior information.  In perfectly efficient markets, all information is impounded in prices such that investors who "know more" cannot take advantage of investors who are not up on the latest scoop.  Only in inefficient markets can there be some differences between prices due to unequal impounding of information.

FAS 133 says nothing about arbitrage accounting.  Thus it is necessary to drill arbitrage trans actions down to their basic component contracts such as forwards, futures, and options.  See derivative financial instruments and hedge.

You can learn more about arbitrage from my tutorial on arbitraging at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/muppets.htm 

You will find the following definition of arbitrage at http://risk.ifci.ch/00010394.htm 

1) Technically, arbitrage consists of purchasing a commodity or security in one market for immediate sale in another market (deterministic arbitrage). (2) Popular usage has expanded the meaning of the term to include any activity which attempts to buy a relatively underpriced item and sell a similar, relatively overpriced item, expecting to profit when the prices resume a more appropriate theoretical or historical relationship (statistical arbitrage). (3) In trading options, convertible securities, and futures, arbitrage techniques can be applied whenever a strategy involves buying and selling packages of related instruments. (4) Risk arbitrage applies the principles of risk offset to mergers and other major corporate developments. The risk offsetting position(s) do not insulate the investor from certain event risks (such as termination of a merger agreement or the risk of delay in the completion of a transaction) so the arbitrage is incomplete. (5) Tax arbitrage transactions are undertaken to share the benefit of differential tax rates or circumstances of two or more parties to a transaction. (6) Regulatory arbitrage transactions are designed to provide indirect access to a market where one party is denied direct access by law or regulation. (7) Swap- driven arbitrage transactions are motivated by the comparative advantages which swap counterparties enjoy in different debt and currency markets. One counterparty may borrow relatively cheaper in the intermediate- or long-term United States dollar market while the other may have a comparative advantage in floating rate sterling. A cross-currency swap can improve both of their positions. 

At-the-Money = see option and intrinsic value.

Auditing See SAS 92

Available-for-Sale (AFS) Security =

is one of three classifications of securities investments under SFAS 115.  Securities designated as "held-to-maturity" need not be revalued for changes in market value and are maintained at historical cost-based book value.  Securities not deemed as being held-to-maturity securities are adjusted for changes in fair value.  Whether or not the unrealized holding gains or losses affect net income depends upon whether the securities are classified as trading securities versus available-for-sale securities.  Unrealized holding gains and losses on available-for-sale securities are deferred in comprehensive income instead of being posted to current earnings.  This is not the case for securities classified as trading securities rather than trading securities.  See FAS 133 Paragraph 13.  The three classifications are of vital importance to cash flow hedge accounting under FAS 133.  See cash flow hedge and held-to-maturity.   Also see equity method and impairment.

Flow Chart for AFS Hedge Accounting --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133flow.htm 

Classification of an available-for-sale security gives rise to alternative gain or loss recognition alternatives under international rules.  Changes in the value of an available-for-sale instrument either be included in earnings for the period in which it arises; or recognized directly in equity, through the statement of changes in equity ( IAS 1 Paragraphs 86-88) until the financial asset is sold, collected or otherwise disposed of, or until the financial asset is determined to be impaired (see IAS Paragraphs 117-119), at which time the cumulative gain or loss previously recognized in equity should be included in earnings for the period.  See IAS 39 Paragraph 103b.

A trading security (not subject to APB 15 equity method accounting and as defined in SFAS 115) cannot be a FAS 133 hedged item.  That is because SFAS 115 requires that trading securities be revalued (like gold) with unrealized holding gains and losses being booked to current earnings.  Conversely, Paragraphs 4c on Page 2, 38 on Page 24, and 479 on Page 209 of FAS 133 state that a forecasted purchase of an available-for-sale can be a hedged item, because available-for-sale securities are revalued under SFAS 115 have holding gains and losses accounted for in comprehensive income rather than current earnings.  Unlike trading securities, available-for-sale securities can be FAS 133-allowed hedge items.   Mention of available-for sale is made in Paragraphs 4, 18, 23, 36, 38, 49, 52-55, 123, 479-480, and 534 of FAS 133.  Held-to-maturity securities can also be FAS 133-allowed hedge items.

Note that if unrealized gains and losses are deferred in other comprehensive income, the deferral lasts until the transactions in the hedged item affect current earnings.  This means that OCI may carry forward on the date hedged securities are purchased and remain on the books until the securities are sold.  This is illustrated in Example 19 on Page 228 of the Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998).  The Example 5.5 illustration on Page 165 notes that hedge effectiveness need only be assessed for price movements in one direction for put and call options since these only provide one-way price protection.

Suppose a company expects dividend income to continue at a fixed rate over the two years in a foreign currency.  Suppose the investment is adjusted to fair market value on each reporting date.  Forecasted dividends may not be firm commitments since there are not sufficient disincentives for failure to declare a dividend.  A cash flow hedge of the foreign currency risk exposure can be entered into under Paragraph 4b on Page 2 of FAS 133.  Whether or not gains and losses are posted to other comprehensive income, however, depends upon whether the securities are classified under SFAS 115 as available-for-sale or as trading securities.   There is no held-to-maturity alternative for equity securities.

One of the things that the FASB has never properly addressed is how to account for hedges of interest rate risk in Available-for-Sale (AFS) securities where gains and losses of both the hedged item and the hedging derivative go to OCI. Based on an old idea from KPMG, I developed my own thoughts on this ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/CaseAmendment.htm

The difference between a forward exchange rate and a spot rate is not excluded from a fair value hedging relationship for firm commitments measured in forward rates.  However Footnote 22 on Page 68 of FAS 133 reads as follows:

If the hedged item were a foreign-currency-denominated available-for-sale security instead of a firm commitment, Statement 52 would have required its carrying value to be measured using the spot exchange rate. Therefore, the spot-forward difference would have been recognized immediately in earnings either because it represented ineffectiveness or because it was excluded from the assessment of effectiveness.

Available-for-Sale  investments are elaborated upon in March 2003 by the FASB in an exposure draft entitled "Financial Instruments --- Recognition and Measurement," March 2003 --- http://www.cica.ca/multimedia/Download_Library/Standards/Accounting/English/e_FIRec_Mea.pdf 

 

Bob Jensen's Web Site

Top of Document

Start of Glossary

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |

B-Terms

Backwardation = see basis and contango swap.

Banker Opinions = 

Joint Working Group of Banking Associations Financial Instrument Issues Relating to Banks

- banksjwg.pdf - Discussion Paper 
- jwgfinal.pdf - Final Position on Fair Value Accounting

Hi Dr. Jensen!

It is the official site about the Financial Instruments - Comprehensive Project of the IASC http://www.iasc.org.uk/frame/cen3_112.htm  The site of the IAS Recognition and Measurement Project is: http://www.iasc.org.uk/frame/cen2_139.htm 

Your Trinity-Homepages on Derivatives SFAS No. 133 is my favorite on this subject, espicially the illustrative examples (and the account simulations).

Currently I am focusing on splitting up hybrid financial instruments, especially those with embedded optional building blocks. The book of Smith/Smithson/Willford (1998) Managing Financial Risk and that from Das S. (1998) and Walsey J. (1997) provides a good guidance on how these products are structured.

Best Regard Christian

Basis =

difference between the the current spot price and the forward (strike) price of a derivative such as a futures contract or the forward component  in an options contract.     The basis is negative in normal backwardation.  The basis is is postive in the normal contango.  Various theories exist to explain the two differing convergence patterns. 

There are other definitions of basis found in practice.  Some people define basis as the difference between the spot and futures price.  Alternately basis can be viewed as the benefits minus the costs of  holding the hedged spot underlying until the forward or futures settlement date. 

Still another definition of this term is based on the U.S. tax code where basis is the carrying value of an asset.  It is the last definition that gives rise to the term basis adjustment.  See intrinsic value.  Also see the terms that use "basis" that are listed below.

Still another term is the difference between commodity prices as the difference between physical locations or product quality grades.

Basis Adjustment =

the adjustment of the booked value of an asset or liability as required by SFAS 80 but is no longer allowed for cash flow and foreign currency hedges under FAS 133 according to Paragraph 31 and Paragraphs 375-378 of FAS 133.    Basis adjustment is required for fair value hedges under Paragraphs 22-24 on Pages 15-16 of FAS 133.   An illustration of amortization of fair value hedge basis adjustments appears in Example 2 beginning in Paragraph 111 on Page 60 of FAS 133.   Also see short-cut method.

The carrying value of a hedging offset account (OCI, Firm Commitment, or Balance Sheet Item) may be written off prematurely whenever the hedge becomes severely ineffective.

Under IAS 39, the carrying value of an effective hedge is written off when the hedge expires or is dedesignated. See Paragraphs 162 and 163 of IAS 39.

Under FAS 133, the carrying value of an effective hedge is carried forward until the ultimate disposition of the hedged item (e.g. inventory sale or depreciation of equipment). See Paragraph 31 of FAS 133.

The FASB decision to ban basis adjustment on the date the hedging contract is settled is controversial, although the controversy is a tempest in a teapot from the standpoint of reported net earnings each period.  Suppose you are enter into a firm commitment on 1/1/99 to purchase a building for the amount of yen that you can purchase for $5 million on 1/1/99.  The financial risk is that this commitment requires a payout in Japanese yen on 7/1/99 such that the building's cost may be higher or lower in terms of how many yen must be purchased on 7/1/99.   To hedge the dollar/yen exchange rate, you enter into a forward contract that will give you whatever it takes make up the difference between the yen owed and the yen that $5 million will purchase on 7/1/99.  On 1/1/99 the forward contract has zero value.  Six months later, assume that the forward contract has been value adjusted to $1 million because of the decline in the yen exchange rate. The offsetting credit is $1 million in OCI if since this was not designated as a fair value hedge. 

To close out the derivative on 7/1/99, you debit cash and credit the forward contract for $1 million.    To basis adjust the cost of the building, you would debit OCI for $1 million and credit the building fixed asset account.   The building would end up being booked on 7/1/99 for $4 million instead of its 1/1/99 contracted $5 million.  If you did not basis adjust, the credit would stay in OCI and leave the building booked at a 7/1/99 value of $5 million.   Paragraph 376 on Page 173 of FAS 133 requires that you no longer adjust the basis to $4 million as a result of the foreign currency hedge.   Hence depreciation of the building will be more each year than it would be with basis adjustment. 

The controversy stems over how and when to get that $1 million out of  OCI and into retained earnings.  Under SFAS 80, suppose that with basis adjustment the impact would have been a reduction of annual depreciation by $50,000 over the 20-year life of the building.  In other words,  depreciation would have been $50,000  less each year smaller $4 million adjusted basis rather than the $5 million unadjusted basis.   One argument against basis adjustment in this manner is that the company's risk management outcomes become buried in depreciation expense and are not segregated on the income statement.

Without basis adjustment under FAS 133, you get $50,000 more annual depreciation but identical net earnings because you must amortize the $1 million in OCI over the life of the building.  Here we will assume the amortization is $50,000 per year.  Each year a $50,000 debit is made to OCI and a credit is made to the P&L closing account. When OCI is amortized, investors are reminded on the income statement that, in this example, a $50,000 per year savings accrued because the company successfully hedged $1 million in foreign currency risk exposure.

In Paragraph 31 on Page 22 of FAS 133, the amortization approach is required for this cash flow hedge outcome. You cannot basis adjust in order to take $50,000 per year lowered depreciation over the life of the building.  But you report the same net earnings as if you had basis adjusted.   In any case, FAS 133 does not allow you to take the entire $1 million into 7/1/99 earnings.  Paragraph 376 on Page 173 of FAS 133  elaborates on this controversy. 

What is wrong with the FAS 133 approach, in my viewpoint, is that it may give the appearance that a company  speculated when in fact it merely locked in a price with a cash flow or foreign currency hedge.  The hedge locks in a price.  But the amortization approach (in the case of a long-term asset) or the write-off at the time of the sale (in the case of inventory) isolates the hedge cash flow as an expense or revenue as if the company speculated.   In the above example, the company reports $50,000 revenue per year from the forward contract.  This could have been a $50,000 loss if the dollar had declined against the yen between 1/1/99 and 7/1/99.  If the $50,000 was buried in depreciation charges, it would seem less likely that investors are mislead into thinking that the $50,000 per year arose from speculation in forward contracts.  Companies also point out that the amortization approach greatly adds to record keeping and accounting complexities when there are many such hedging contracts.  Basis adjustment gives virtually the same result with a whole lot less record keeping.

It should also be noted that to the extent that the hedge is ineffective, the ineffective portion gets written off to earnings on the date the asset or liability is acquired.  In the above example, any ineffective portion would have to be declared on 1/199 and never get posted to OCI.   Hence it would never be spread over the life of the building.  According to Paragraph 30 of FAS 133, ineffectiveness is to be defined at the time the hedge is undertaken.  Hedging strategy and ineffectiveness definition with respect to a given hedge defines the extent to which interim adjustments affect interim earnings.

Click here to view the IASC's Paul Pacter commentary on basis adjustment.

 

Two illustrations of basis adjustment taken from http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/CaseAmendment.htm
Especially note my reasoning under Illustration 2 shown below

Illustration 1

Prices of oil per unit

 

10/31

11/30

12/31

1/31

3/31

Oil Price (Spot)

$35

$40

$38

$44

$46

Forward Price

$36

$41

$39

$44

 

 

Fair Value Hedge of a Firm Commitment

Assume that Warfield makes a deal with an oil supplier to buy 100,000 units of oil for $35 per barrel which is $1 less than the $36 derivatives market forward price on October 31. There can be many reasons such as customer relations and delivery costs that motivate buyers and suppliers to contract for something other than forward prices in a derivatives instruments market exchange and over the counter. Warfield thinks that prices are going to plunge so it hedges the fair value of this firm commitment with a fair value hedge using a forward contract that will settle for the difference between the January 31 spot price and the $35 forward price.

 

Cash Flow Hedge of a Forecasted Transaction
Assume that Warfield has a forecasted transaction to purchase 100,000 units of oil at the January 31 spot rate. In order to hedge cash flow risk, Warfield enters into a forward contract to that will settle for the difference between the January 31 spot price and a $35 forward price.

 

 

Using Jensen Prices

 

 

Date

No Inventory on Hand

Fair Value Hedge of a Firm Commit.

Jensen Solution --- Cash Flow Hedge of Forecasted Trans.

 

Date

Ledger Account

Debit

Credit

Balance

Ledger Account

Debit

Credit

Balance

10/31

No entry for hedge
No inventory on hand

 

 

 

No entry for hedge
No inventory on hand

 

 

 

 

$35 ppb firm commit.
$36 ppb forward price
$35 ppb spot price
100,000 notional
$0 forward contract value

 

 

 

No firm commitment
$36 ppb forward price
$35 ppb spot price
100,000 notional
$0 forward contract value

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

11/30

Firm commitment

500,000

 

$500,000

OCI or AOCI

0

500,000

($500,000)

 

G/L (I/S)

0

 

$0

G/L (I/S)

 

0

$0

 

Forward contract

 

500,000

($500,000)

Forward contract

500,000

 

$500,000

 

-To adjust the forward contract to fair value with Delta = abs($41-$36)/
             abs($40-$35)

          = 1.0 or 100%
Hence this is a perfect hedge at this point.

 

 

 

-To adjust the forward contract to fair value with Delta = abs($41-$36)/
             abs($40-$35)

          = 1.0 or 100%
Hence this is a perfect hedge at this point.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

12/31

Firm commitment

 

200,000

$300,000

OCI or AOCI

200,000

 

($300,000)

 

G/L (I/S)

 

0

$0

G/L (I/S)

0

 

0

 

Forward contract

200,000

 

($300,000)

Forward contract

 

200,000

$300,000

 

-To adjust the forward contract to fair value with Delta = abs($39-$36)/
             abs($38-$35)

          = 1.0 or 100%
Hence hedge accounting is now fully allowed with a perfect cumulative Delta

 

 

 

-To adjust the forward contract to fair value with Delta = abs($39-$36)/
             abs($38-$35)

          = 1.0 or 100%
Hence hedge accounting is now fully allowed with a perfect cumulative Delta

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1/31

Firm commitment

500,000

 

$800,000

OCI or AOCI

0

500,000

($800,000)

 

G/L (I/S)

 

 

$0

G/L (I/S)

 

 

 

 

Forward contract

 

500,000

($800,000)

Forward contract

500,000

 

$800,000

 

-To adjust the forward contract fair value for a perfectly effective fair value hedge..

 

 

 

- To adjust the forward contract fair value for a perfectly effective cash flow hedge.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1/31

Forward contract

800,000

 

$0

Forward contract

 

800,000

$0

 

Cash

 

800,000

($800,000)

Cash

800,000

 

$800,000

 

-To record unfavorable settlement of fair value  hedging contract

 

 

 

-To record favorable settlement of cash flow  hedging contract

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1/31

Oil inventory

4,400,000

 

$4,400,000

Oil inventory

4,400,000

 

$4,400,000

 

G/L (I/S)

 

900,000

($900,000)

G/L (I/S)

 

0

$0

 

Cash

 

3,500,000

($4,300,000)

Cash

 

4,400,000

($4,000,000)

 

-To record purchase of the oil inventory at the $35 firm commitment price

 

 

 

-To report purchase of the oil inventory at spot price

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3/31

Cash

4,600,000

 

$300,000

Cash

4,600,000

 

$600,000

 

Oil inventory

 

4,400,000

$0

Oil inventory

 

4,400,000

$0

 

G/L (I/S)

 

200,000

($1,100,000)

G/L (I/S)

 

200,000

($200,000)

 

-To record the sale of the oil inventory at the spot price

 

 

 

-To record the sale of the oil inventory at the spot price

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3/31

G/L (I/S)

800,000

 

$300,000

G/L (I/S)

 

$800,000

($1,000,000)

 

Firm commitment

 

800,000

$0

OCI or AOCI

$800,000

 

$0

 

-This is the basis adjustment that accompanies the sale of all the oil inventory.

 

 

 

-This is the basis adjustment that accompanies the sale of all the oil inventory.

 

 

 

 

Fair Value Hedge Summary (using Jensen’s prices)
+$1,100,000 = March 31 profit without a hedge = $4,600,000 sale on March 31 - $3,500,000 purchase on January 31 at firm commitment price
   +$300,000  = March 31 profit with a hedge = $1,100,000 profit without a hedge - $800,000 loss on fair value hedging contract

A company that wants to hedge fair value of its purchase commitments must be prepared to accept the cash flow risk and loss of opportunity value its firm commitment price is way below the current spot price when the oil is purchased.

Hedging ineffectiveness with the revised prices was greatly eliminated in the second example that did not use the Smith and Kohlbeck prices.

A fair value hedge creates cash flow risk.
A cash flow hedge creates fair value risk.

Basis adjustment for the $800,000 loss on the firm commitment fair value hedge is controversial due to ambiguity in FAS 133 regarding basis adjustment of the Firm Commitment equity account. My way of doing this above is explained under Exhibit 5 shown below.

Cash Flow Hedge Summary (using Jensen’s prices)
+$200,000 = March 31 profit without a hedge = $4,600,000 sale on March 31 - $4,400,000 purchase on January 31
+$1,000,000  = March 31 profit with a hedge = $200,000 profit without a hedge + $800,000 gain on cash flow hedging contract


A company that wants to hedge cash flows of its forecasted transactions must be prepared to accept the fair value risk and loss of opportunity value its decision to pay spot prices.

Hedging ineffectiveness with Jensen’s revised prices was greatly eliminated in the second example that did not use the Smith and Kohlbeck prices. Hedging against cash flow risk of price increases is a good deal when spot prices soar and a bad deal when spot prices plunge.

A fair value hedge creates cash flow risk.
A cash flow hedge creates fair value risk.


The above solution for the cash flow hedge shows the correct way to basis adjust the gain of $800,000 on the hedging contract on the date of sale rather than the date of purchase of the inventory. Smith and Kohlbeck incorrectly basis adjust all cash flow hedges on the date of the hedge settlement. Basis adjustment should be on the date inventory is sold under FAS 133, but under IAS 39 basis should be adjusted when the hedge is settled or dedesignated.

Paragraph 377 of FAS 133 reads as follows:

377. The Board decided to require that the gain or loss on a derivative be reported initially in other comprehensive income and reclassified into earnings when the forecasted transaction affects earnings. That requirement avoids the problems caused by adjusting the basis of an acquired asset or incurred liability and provides the same earnings impact. The approach in this Statement, for example, provides for (a) recognizing the gain or loss on a derivative that hedged a forecasted purchase of a machine in the same periods as the depreciation expense on the machine and (b) recognizing the gain or loss on a derivative that hedged a forecasted purchase of inventory when the cost of that inventory is reflected in cost of sales

 

 

Illustration 2

Instead of buying oil inventory on January 31 at a $35 firm commitment price, suppose the firm purchased the inventory for $35 on October 31 and enters a forward contract to protect the value of the inventory. The hedge accounting is somewhat different for these two types of fair value hedges. The main difference is that for inventory value, the “Firm Commitment” account invented by the FASB is not used for fair value hedge accounting. Instead the accounting for the inventory itself is changed from historical cost to fair value accounting during the hedging period.

 

They are compared below.

 

I will now illustrate hedge accounting using case prices that have more effective hedging outcomes.


Jensen Prices

 

10/31

11/30

12/31

1/31

3/31

Oil Price (Spot)

$35

$40

$38

$44

$46

Forward Price

$37

$41

$40

$44

 

 

Fair Value Hedge of Existing Inventory

Assume buys 100,000 units of oil for $35 per barrel on October 31. Warfield thinks the prices might go down and decides to enter into a forward contract to hedge the fair value of this inventory. The forward contract will settle for the difference between the spot rate on January 31 and $37.

 

Fair Value Hedge of a Firm Commitment

Assume that Warfield makes a deal with an oil supplier to buy 100,000 units of oil for $37 per barrel which is at the $37 derivatives market forward price on October 31. There can be many reasons such as customer relations and delivery costs that motivate buyers and suppliers to contract for something other than forward prices in a derivatives instruments market exchange and over the counter. Warfield thinks that prices are going to plunge so it hedges the fair value of this firm commitment with a fair value hedge using a forward contract that will settle for the difference between the January 31 spot price and the $37 forward price.

 

 

Using Jensen Prices

With Inventory on Hand

With No Inventory on Hand

Date

 

Fair Value Hedge of a Inventory

Fair Value Hedge of a Firm Commitment

 

Date

Ledger Account

Debit

Credit

Balance

Ledger Account

Debit

Credit

Balance

10/31

No entry for forward
Contract

 

 

 

No entry
No inventory on hand

 

 

 

 

$37 ppb forward price
$35 ppb spot price
100,000 notional
$0 forward contract value

 

 

 

$37 ppb firm commit.
$36 ppb forward price
$35 ppb spot price
100,000 notional
$0 forward contract value

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

10/31

Oil inventory

3,500.000

 

$3,500,000

 

 

 

 

 

Cash

 

3,500,000

($3,500,000)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

11/30

Oil inventory

500,000

 

$4,000,000

Firm commitment

500,000

 

$500,000

 

G/L (I/S)

0

100,000   

($100,000)

G/L (I/S)

 

100,000  

($100,000)

 

Forward contract

 

400,000

($400,000)

Forward contract

 

400,000

($400,000)

 

-To adjust the forward contract to fair value with Delta = abs($41-$37)/
              abs($40-$35)

          = 0.8 or 80%
Hence this is a 80% effective fair value hedge..

 

 

 

- To adjust the forward contract to fair value with Delta = abs($41-$37)/
              abs($40-$35)

          = 0.8 or 80%
Hence this is a 80% effective fair value hedge..

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

12/31

Oil inventory

 

200,000

$3,800,000

Firm commitment

 

200,000

$300,000

 

G/L (I/S)

100,000

0

$0

G/L (I/S)

100,000

 

$0

 

Forward contract

100,000

 

($300,000)

Forward contract

100,000

 

($300,000)

 

-To adjust the forward contract to fair value with Delta = abs($40-$37)/
             abs($38-$35)

          = 1.0 or 100%
Hence hedge accounting is now fully allowed with a perfect cumulative Delta

 

 

 

-To adjust the forward contract to fair value with Delta = abs($40-$37)/
             abs($38-$35)

          = 1.0 or 100%
Hence hedge accounting is now fully allowed with a perfect cumulative Delta

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1/31

Oil inventory

600,000

 

$4,400,000

Firm commitment

100,000

 

$400,000

 

G/L (I/S)

 

500,000

($500,000)

G/L (I/S)

 

 

$0

 

Forward contract

 

100,000

($400,000)

Forward contract

 

100,000

($400,000)

 

-To adjust the forward contract to fair value at a pending $41-$37 unfavorable pending settlement.

 

 

 

- To adjust the forward contract to fair value at a pending $41-$37 unfavorable pending settlement.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1/31

Forward contract

400,000

 

$0

Forward contract

400,000

 

$0

 

Cash

 

400,000

($400,000)

Cash

 

400,000

($400,000)

 

-To record unfavorable settlement of fair value  hedging contract

 

 

 

-To record unfavorable settlement of fair value  hedging contract

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1/31

Oil inventory

 

 

$4,400,000

Oil inventory

4,400,000

 

$4,400,000

 

G/L (I/S)

 

0

($500,000)

G/L (I/S)

 

700,000

($700,000)

 

Cash

 

0

($3,900,000)

Cash

 

3,700,000

($4,100,000)

 

-No entry

 

 

 

-To record purchase of the oil inventory at the $37 firm commitment price

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3/31

Cash

4,600,000

 

700,000

Cash

4,600,000

 

$500,000

 

Oil inventory

 

4,400,000

$0

Oil inventory

 

4,400,000

$0

 

G/L (I/S)

 

200,000

($700,000)

G/L (I/S)

 

200,000

($900,000)

 

-To record the sale of the oil inventory at the spot price

 

 

 

-To record the sale of the oil inventory at the spot price

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3/31

G/L (I/S)

 

 

($700,000)

G/L (I/S)

400,000

 

($500,000)

 

Firm commitment

 

 

 

Firm commitment

 

400,000

$0

 

-This is the basis adjustment is not necessary for inventory on hand.

 

 

 

-This is the basis adjustment that accompanies the sale of all the oil inventory.

 

 

 

 

Fair Value Hedge Summary of Hedging the Fair Value of Inventory
+$1,100,000 = March 31 profit without a hedge = $4,600,000 sale on March 31 - $3,500,000 purchase on October 31
   +$700,000  = March 31 profit with a hedge = $1,100,000 profit without a hedge - $400,000 loss on fair value hedging contract

First it might be noted that hedge accounting is not allowed for commodities that are carried or will be carried at fair value in the ledger accounts. Only inventories maintained at historical cost can get hedge accounting. Oil inventory is normally carried at historical cost except during the hedging period of a fair value hedge under FAS 133 rules.

The main difference between hedging the fair value of inventory and the fair value of a firm commitment is that the “Firm Commitment” account is not used for existing  inventory fair value hedging. Instead existing inventory (the hedged item) normally carried at historical cost is carried at fair value during the hedging period. After the hedge is settled or dedesignated, the company must revert to historical cost valuation of inventories.

A fair value hedge creates cash flow risk of existing inventory.
The can be no cash flow hedge since there is no cash flow risk of existing inventory.

Fair Value Hedge Summary of Hedging the Fair Value of a Firm Commitment
+$900,000 = March 31 profit without a hedge = $4,600,000 sale on March 31 - $3,700,000 purchase on January 31
+$500,000  = March 31 profit with a hedge = $900,000 profit without a hedge - $400,000 loss on fair value hedging contract

The solutions above ignore the time value of money. FAS 133 recommends and in some cases requires that hedge accounting be further complicated with time value of money adjustments.

When inventory is on hand, the effective part of the hedge is carried forward in the Oil Inventory account whose fair value changes offset the changes in value of the hedging contract. That is consistent with Paragraphs 22-24 in FAS 133.

These are two paragraphs from the Fair Value section of Section 815 of the FASB’s Codification database

35-8   The adjustment  of the carrying amount of a hedged asset or liability required by paragraph 815-25-35-1(b) shall be accounted for in the same manner as other components of the carrying amount of that asset or liability. For example, an adjustment of the carrying amount of a hedged asset held for sale (such as inventory) would remain part of the carrying amount of that asset until the asset is sold, at which point the entire carrying amount of the hedged asset would be recognized as the cost of the item sold in determining earnings.

35-9   An adjustment of the carrying amount of a hedged interest-bearing financial instrument shall be amortized to earnings. Amortization shall begin no later than when the hedged item ceases to be adjusted for changes in its fair value attributable to the risk being hedged.

But consider the case of the hedge of the firm commitment when there is no inventory on hand. In this case, the Firm Commitment account absorbs the changes in value of the hedging contract. If the Firm Commitment account is basis adjusted (zeroed out) when the hedge is settled or otherwise terminated, you are not being consistent with the way the hedge settlement is deferred with the inventory is on hand, i.e., until the inventory is sold. The risk being hedged was the change in spot rates and the gain or loss being deferred, in my viewpoint, should be deferred until the purchased inventory is sold so as to be consistent with the hedge accounting when the inventory was on hand when the hedging period commenced.

Hence in the two illustrations above, the ($4,211,111-$3,500,000 = $711,111) change in the value of inventory when the hedge was settled unfavorably on January 31 is deferred from being recognized in current earnings until the inventory is sold on March 31. (The fair value is not hedged between January 31 and March 31 and fair value accounting is not used for the inventory in the unhedged period).

Similarly, when the inventory was not on hand and the fair value of the firm commitment was being hedged, the $711,111 in the Firm Commitment account should not be basis adjusted on January 31. Instead it should be basis adjusted when the inventory is sold since this unfavorable hedge settlement is not buried in the Inventory account like it was when we hedge the fair value of inventory on hand.

Actually, I’ve not been successful in finding examples contrasting these two situations so we have to reason this one through. It seems as though both approaches illustrated above are consistent with each other in deferring the hedge settlement basis adjustment until the inventory is sold. Basis adjusting the Firm Commitment account on January 31 is not consistent with the basis adjustment when we hedged inventory on hand for fair value. This would not be basis adjustment deferral.

It seems to me that my approach is consistent with Paragraph 35-8 above and Paragraphs 22-24 of FAS 133. I’ve been bothered by the sorry way the FASB has explained the accounting for fair value hedging a firm commitment. Of course this is no problem in IAS 39 since basis adjustment always takes place when the hedge is dedesignated or settled.

The Firm Commitment account is always an equity (never an asset or liability) account and is a place to defer the hedge gain or loss to the point of sale for inventory. That’s what basis adjustment deferral is all about. It is just like AOCI in the sense that between the date of the purchase of the inventory and the date of the sale of inventory, the equity account (whether AOCI for cash flow hedges or Firm Commitment for fair value hedges) remains constant until part or all of the inventory is sold. Then basis is adjusted by reclassifying the hedge gain or loss deferral into earnings at the time of the sale.

The purchase price is $35 and the spot price is $44 giving rise to a gain at the time of purchase of $44-$35=$9 per unit or a total gain of $900,000 due to a favorable purchase price. This gain is to be immediately recognized on the date of purchase whether or not we hedge. Commodity inventories are to be booked at fair value on the date of purchase irrespective of the actual purchase price. This has nothing to do with hedging the fair value of the firm commitment.

The question is whether the gain or loss on the hedging derivative should be recognized on the date of the purchase or the date of the sale. In this illustration the hedging derivative lost $800,000 on the date of the purchase of the inventory. The fair value hedge was effective for 89% or $711,111 and ineffective for 11% or $88,889.

Under Smith and Kohlbeck (SK) approach you would basis adjust on January 31 for the full $800,000 hedging derivative loss. Under my approach I would only charge the ineffective $88,889 portion to January 31 earnings and defer the $711,111 effective portion in an equity account (Firm Commitment) until the inventory is sold on March 31.

The issue was never whether to recognize the $900,000 total gain on January 31. Commodity inventories have to be carried at fair value on the date they are purchased even if they are purchased a lower or higher firm commitment price. If the firm commitment price was higher than fair value we certainly would not want to record inventory at above its fair value. The question was never whether to recognize the difference between the firm commitment price and the fair value on the date of purchase and to book this difference in current earnings.

The issue was whether to hit all the hedge derivative loss of $800,000 to earnings on the January 31 date of purchase (SK approach) or to defer the effective portion of the hedging contract’s loss ($711,111) until basis adjustment on the date of the sale (the Jensen approach). I grant you that the FASB does not seem to be clear on this issue for fair value hedges of firm commitments, but it is very clear with respect to deferred basis adjustment for cash flow hedges.

Paragraph 377 of FAS 133 reads as follows:

377. The Board decided to require that the gain or loss on a derivative be reported initially in other comprehensive income and reclassified into earnings when the forecasted transaction affects earnings. That requirement avoids the problems caused by adjusting the basis of an acquired asset or incurred liability and provides the same earnings impact. The approach in this Statement, for example, provides for (a) recognizing the gain or loss on a derivative that hedged a forecasted purchase of a machine in the same periods as the depreciation expense on the machine and (b) recognizing the gain or loss on a derivative that hedged a forecasted purchase of inventory when the cost of that inventory is reflected in cost of sales.

I think my solution is consistent with the above paragraph for fair value hedges vis-à-vis cash flow hedges.

I think my solution is consistent with what happens for a fair value hedge of existing inventory.

I think my solution is consistent with Paragraph 24 (in the Fair Value Hedging Section of FAS 113).

I think my solution is consistent with what companies do in practice when a fair value hedge is dedesignated before maturity. The Firm Commitment equity account is carried forward until the hedged item revenue cycle is completed in whole or in part.

Harris Preferred Capital is carrying forward the hedge settlement until the earnings cycle is completed whether the hedge is desesignated early or settled at maturity.

 You can read the following in the 2005 10-K of the HARRIS PREFERRED CAPITAL CORPORATION ---
http://yahoo.brand.edgar-online.com/EFX_dll/EDGARpro.dll?FetchFilingHTML1?SessionID=bkB8jTdF57B95gG&ID=4306792

 

When hedge accounting is discontinued because a fair value hedge is no longer highly effective, the derivative instrument continues to be recorded on the balance sheet at fair value but the hedged item is no longer adjusted for changes in fair value that are attributable to the hedged risk. The carrying amount of the hedged item, including the basis adjustments from hedge accounting, is accounted for in accordance with applicable generally accepted accounting principles. For a hedged loan, the basis adjustment is amortized over its remaining life. When hedge accounting is discontinued because the hedged item in a fair value hedge no longer meets the definition of a firm commitment, the derivative instrument continues to be recorded on the balance sheet at fair value and any asset or liability that was recorded to recognize the firm commitment is removed from the balance sheet and recognized as a gain or loss in current period earnings. When hedge accounting is discontinued because a cash flow hedge is no longer highly effective, the gain or loss on the derivative that is in accumulated other comprehensive income ("AOCI") remains there until earnings are impacted by the hedged item and the derivative instrument is marked to market through earnings. When hedge accounting is discontinued because it is no longer probable that the forecasted transaction in a cash flow hedge will occur, the gain or loss on the derivative that was in AOCI is recognized immediately in earnings and the derivative instrument is marked to market through earnings. When hedge accounting is discontinued and the derivative remains outstanding, the derivative may be redesignated as a hedging instrument as long as the applicable hedge criteria are met under the terms of the new contract.

Bob Jensen’s illustrations of hedge effectiveness testing can be found using the following links:

 

 

 

Basis Point =

interest rate amount equal to .0001 or 0.01%.

Basis Risk

risk of financial exposure of a basis difference as defined under "basis" above.  For example in energy hedging there may be location basis risk due to the differences in location such as the difference between capacity at a supply terminal and a demand terminal.  This risk is commonly hedged with swaps.

Interest rate basis risk is the difference arises from a difference between the index of the hedged item vis-a-vis the exposure risk.  

A basis swap is the swapping of one variable rate for another variable rate for purposes of changing the net interest rate.

Also see interest rate swap.

Basis Swap = see interest rate swap.

Benchmark = the designated risk being hedged.  In FAS 133/138, the term applies to interest rate risk.

From the CFO Journal's Morning Ledger on October 26, 2018

The Financial Accounting Standards Board on Thursday expanded the list of U.S. benchmark interest rates permitted in hedge accounting. The FASB added the overnight index swap rate based on the Secured Overnight Financing Rate to its list of eligible benchmark interest rates, reports CFO Journal's Tatyana Shumsky.

The move comes as global financial regulators are pushing for the transition away from the scandal-plagued London interbank offered rate, or Libor. The SOFR, a Treasury repurchase agreement financing rate, was identified as the preferred alternative to Libor.

The FASB said the accounting standards update will facilitate the Libor to SOFR transition and give adequate time for companies to prepare for changes to interest-rate hedging strategies.

 

In FAS 133, the FASB did not take into account how interest rate risk is generally hedged in practice.  FAS 133 based the hedging rules upon hedging of sector spreads for which there are no hedging instruments in practice.  The is one of the main reasons why FAS 138 amendments to FAS 133 were soon issued.  Components of interest rate risk are shown below:

Risk-free rate u(0) = 
LIBOR spread l(0)-u(0) = 
LIBOR(0) rate l(0) = 
Unhedged credit sector spread s(0)-l(0) = 
Total systematic interest rate risk s(0) = 
Unhedged unsystematic risk v(0)-s(0) = 
Full value effective rate v(0) = 
Premium (discount) on the debt issue f(0)-v(0)= 
Nominal (coupon) rate f(0) = 

In FAS 138, the FASB moved away from sector spread hedging and defined benchmarked interest rate hedging based upon only two allowed interest rate spreads (i.e., the U.S. Treasury risk-free rate with no spread or the LIBOR rate with only the LIBOR spread.  Sector spread hedging can no longer receive hedge accounting.

For an extensive numerical example of benchmark hedging, go to http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/000overview/138bench.htm 

FAS 138 Introduces Benchmarking

Examples Illustrating Application of FASB Statement No. 138, Accounting for Certain Derivative Instruments and Certain Hedging Activities-an amendment of FASB Statement No. 133 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/examplespg.shtml
or try clicking here.

FAS 138 Amendments expand the eligibility of many derivative instrument hedges to qualify FAS 133/138 hedge. Such qualifications in accounting treatment that reduces earnings volatility when the derivatives are adjusted for fair value. 

It is very popular in practice to have a hedging instrument and the hedged item be based upon two different indices.  In particular, the hedged item may be impacted by credit factors.  For example, interest rates commonly viewed as having three components noted below:

·        Risk-free risk that the level of interest rates in risk-free financial instruments such as U.S. treasury T-bill rates will vary system-side over time.

·        Credit sector spread risk that interest rates for particular economic sectors will vary over and above the risk-free interest rate movements.  For example, when automobiles replaced horses as the primary means of open road transportation, the horse industry’s credit worthiness suffered independently of other sectors of the economy.  In more recent times, the dot.com sector’s sector spread has suffered some setbacks.

·        Unsystematic spread risk of a particular borrower that varies over and above risk-free and credit sector spreads.  The credit of a particular firm may move independently of more system-wide (systematic) risk-free rates and sector spreads.

Suppose that a hedge only pays at the T-Bill rate for hedged item based on some variable index having credit components.  FAS 133 prohibited “treasury locks” that hedged only the risk-free rates but not credit-sector spreads or unsystematic risk.  This was upsetting many firms that commonly hedge with treasury locks.  There is a market for treasury lock derivatives that is available, whereas hedges for entire interest rate risk are more difficult to obtain in practice.  It is also common to hedge with London’s LIBOR that has a spread apart from a risk-free component.

The DIG confused the issue by allowing both risk-free and credit sector spread to receive hedge accounting in its DIG Issue E1 ruling.  Paragraph 14 of FAS 138 states the following:

Comments received by the Board on Implementation Issue E1 indicated (a) that the concept of market interest rate risk as set forth in Statement 133 differed from the common understanding of interest rate risk by market participants, (b) that the guidance in the Implementation Issue was inconsistent with present hedging activities, and (c) that measuring the change in fair value of the hedged item attributable to changes in credit sector spreads would be difficult because consistent sector spread data are not readily available in the market. 

In FAS 138, the board sought to reduce confusion by reducing all components risk into just two components called “interest rate risk” and “credit risk.”  Credit risk includes all risk other than the “benchmarked” component in a hedged item’s index.  A benchmark index can include somewhat more than movements in risk-free rates.  FAS 138 allows the popular LIBOR hedging rate that is not viewed as being entirely a risk-free rate.  Paragraph 16 introduces the concept of “benchmark interest rate” as follows:

Because the Board decided to permit a rate that is not fully risk-free to be the designated risk in a hedge of interest rate risk, it developed the general notion of benchmark interest rate to encompass both risk-free rates and rates based on the LIBOR swap curve in the United States.

FAS 133 thus allows benchmarking on LIBOR.  It is not possible to benchmark on such rates as commercial paper rates, Fed Fund rates, or FNMA par mortgage rates.

Readers might then ask what the big deal is since some of the FAS 133 examples (e.g., Example 5 beginning in Paragraph 133) hedged on the basis of LIBOR.  It is important to note that in those original examples, the hedging instrument (e.g., a swap) and the hedged item (e.g., a bond) both used LIBOR in defining a variable rate?  If the hedging instrument used LIBOR and the hedged item interest rate was based upon an index poorly correlated with LIBOR, the hedge would not qualify (prior to FAS 138) for FAS 133 hedge accounting treatment even though the derivative itself would have to be adjusted for fair value each quarter.  Recall that LIBOR is a short-term European rate that may not correlate with various interest indices in the U.S.  FAS 133 now allows a properly benchmarked hedge (e.g., a swap rate based on LIBOR or T-bills) to hedge an item having non-benchmarked components.

The short-cut method of relieving hedge ineffectiveness testing may no longer be available.  Paragraph 23 of FAS 138 states the following:

For cash flow hedges of an existing variable-rate financial asset or liability, the designated risk being hedged cannot be the risk of changes in its cash flows attributable to changes in the benchmark interest rate if the cash flows of the hedged item are explicitly based on a different index.  In those situations, because the risk of changes in the benchmark interest rate (that is, interest rate risk) cannot be the designated risk being hedged, the shortcut method cannot be applied.  The Board’s decision to require that the index on which the variable leg of the swap is based match the benchmark interest rate designated as the interest rate risk being hedged for the hedging relationship also ensures that the shortcut method is applied only to interest rate risk hedges.  The Board’s decision precludes use of the shortcut method in situations in which the cash flows of the hedged item and the hedging instrument are based on the same index but that index is not the designated benchmark interest rate.  The Board noted, however, that in some of those situations, an entity easily could determine that the hedge is perfectly effective.  The shortcut method would be permitted for cash flow hedges in situations in which the cash flows of the hedged item and the hedging instrument are based on the same index and that index is the designated benchmark interest rate.

In other words, any hedge item that is not based upon only a benchmarked component will force hedge effectiveness testing at least quarterly.  Thus FAS 138 broadened the scope of qualifying hedges, but it made the accounting more difficult by forcing more frequent effectiveness testing.

FAS 138 also permits the hedge derivative to have more risk than the hedged item.  For example, a LIBOR-based interest rate swap might be used to hedge an AAA corporate bond or even a note rate based upon T-Bills.

There are restrictions noted in Paragraph 24 of FAS 138:

This Statement provides limited guidance on how the change in a hedged item’s fair value attributable to changes in the designated benchmark interest rate should be determined.  The Board decided that in calculating the change in the hedged item’s fair value attributable to changes in the designated benchmark interest rate, the estimated cash flows used must be based on all of the contractual cash flows of the entire hedged item.  That guidance does not mandate the use of any one method, but it precludes the use of a method that excludes some of the hedged item’s contractual cash flows (such as the portion of interest payments attributable to the obligor’s credit risk above the benchmark rate) from the calculation.  The Board concluded that excluding some of the hedged item’s contractual cash flows would introduce a new approach to bifurcation of a hedged item that does not currently exist in the Statement 133 hedging model.

The FASB provides some new examples illustrating the FAS 138 Amendments to FAS 133 at http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/derivatives/examplespg.html
Example 1 on interest rate benchmarking begins as follows:

Example: Fair Value Hedge of the LIBOR Swap Rate in a $100 Million A1-Quality 5-Year Fixed-Rate Noncallable Debt On April 3, 20X0, Global Tech issues at par a $100 million A1-quality 5-year fixed-rate noncallable debt instrument with an annual 8 percent interest coupon payable semiannually. On that date, Global Tech enters into a 5-year interest rate swap based on the LIBOR swap rate and designates it as the hedging instrument in a fair value hedge of the $100 million liability. Under the terms of the swap, Global Tech will receive a fixed interest rate at 8 percent and pay variable interest at LIBOR plus 78.5 basis points (current LIBOR 6.29%) on a notional amount of $101,970,000 (semiannual settlement and interest reset dates). A duration-weighted hedge ratio was used to calculate the notional amount of the swap necessary to offset the debt's fair value changes attributable to changes in the LIBOR swap rate.

An extensive analysis of the above illustration is provided at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/000overview/138bench.htm

Some DIG Issues Affecting Interest Rate Hedging

Issue E1—Hedging the Risk-Free Interest Rate
http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/
(Cleared 02/17/99)
Issue E1 heavily influenced FAS 138 as noted above.

*Issue G6—Impact of Implementation Issue E1 on Cash Flow Hedges of Market Interest Rate Risk
(Cleared 5/17/00)

With regard to a cash flow hedge of the variability in interest payments on an existing floating-rate financial asset or liability, the distinction in Issue E1 between the risk-free interest rate and credit sector spreads over the base Treasury rate is not necessarily directly relevant to assessing whether the cash flow hedging relationship is effective in achieving offsetting cash flows attributable to the hedged risk. The effectiveness of a cash flow hedge of the variability in interest payments on an existing floating-rate financial asset or liability is affected by the interest rate index on which that variability is based and the extent to which the hedging instrument provides offsetting cash flows.

If the variability of the hedged cash flows of the existing floating-rate financial asset or liability is based solely on changes in a floating interest rate index (for example, LIBOR, Fed Funds, Treasury Bill rates), any changes in credit sector spreads over that interest rate index for the issuer's particular credit sector should not be considered in the assessment and measurement of hedge effectiveness. In addition, any changes in credit sector spreads inherent in the interest rate index itself do not impact the assessment and measurement of hedge effectiveness if the cash flows on both the hedging instrument and the hedged cash flows of the existing floating-rate financial asset or liability are based on the same index. However, if the cash flows on the hedging instrument and the hedged cash flows of the existing floating-rate financial asset or liability are based on different indices, the basis difference between those indices would impact the assessment and measurement of hedge effectiveness.

*Issue E6—The Shortcut Method and the Provisions That Permit the Debtor or Creditor to Require Prepayment 
http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/derivatives/issueg6.html
(Cleared 5/17/00)

An interest-bearing asset or liability should be considered prepayable under the provisions of paragraph 68(d) when one party to the contract has the right to cause the payment of principal prior to the scheduled payment dates unless (1) the debtor has the right to cause settlement of the entire contract before its stated maturity at an amount that is always greater than the then fair value of the contract absent that right or (2) the creditor has the right to cause settlement of the entire contract before its stated maturity at an amount that is always less than the then fair value of the contract absent that right. A right to cause a contract to be prepaid at its then fair value would not cause the interest-bearing asset or liability to be considered prepayable under paragraph 68(d) since that right would have a fair value of zero at all times and essentially would provide only liquidity to the holder. Notwithstanding the above, any term, clause, or other provision in a debt instrument that gives the debtor or creditor the right to cause prepayment of the debt contingent upon the occurrence of a specific event related to the debtor's credit deterioration or other change in the debtor's credit risk (for example, the debtor's failure to make timely payment, thus making it delinquent; its failure to meet specific covenant ratios; its disposition of specific significant assets (such as a factory); a declaration of cross-default; or a restructuring by the debtor) should not be considered a prepayment provision under the provisions of paragraph 68(d). Application of this guidance to specific debt instruments is provided below.

Issue E10—Application of the Shortcut Method to Hedges of a Portion of an Interest-Bearing Asset or Liability (or its Related Interest) or a Portfolio of Similar Interest-Bearing Assets or Liabilities   http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/derivatives/issuee10.html
(Released 4/00)

1.        May the shortcut method be applied to fair value hedges of a proportion of the principal amount of the interest-bearing asset or liability if the notional amount of the interest rate swap designated as the hedging instrument matches the portion of the asset or liability being hedged, and all other criteria for applying the shortcut method are satisfied? May the shortcut method similarly be applied to cash flow hedges of the interest payments on only a portion of the principal amount of the interest-bearing asset or liability if the notional amount of the interest rate swap designated as the hedging instrument matches the principal amount of the portion of the asset or liability on which the hedged interest payments are based? [Generally yes was the DIG’s answer.}

2.        May the shortcut method be applied to fair value hedges of portfolios (or proportions thereof) of similar interest-bearing assets or liabilities if the notional amount of the interest rate swap designated as the hedging instrument matches the notional amount of the aggregate portfolio? May the shortcut method be applied to a cash flow hedge in which the hedged forecasted transaction is a group of individual transactions if the notional amount of the interest rate swap designated as the hedging instrument matches the notional amount of the aggregate group that comprises the hedged transaction?  [Generally no was the DIG’s answer.}

*Issue F2—Partial-Term Hedging  http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/derivatives/issuef2.html
(Cleared 07/28/99)

A company may not designate a 3-year interest rate swap with a notional amount equal to the principal amount of its nonamortizing debt as the hedging instrument in a hedge of the exposure to changes in fair value, attributable to changes in market interest rates, of the company’s obligation to make interest payments during the first 3 years of its 10-year fixed-rate debt instrument. There would be no basis for expecting that the change in that swap’s fair value would be highly effective in offsetting the change in fair value of the liability for only the interest payments to be made during the first three years. Even though under certain circumstances a partial-term fair value hedge can qualify for hedge accounting under Statement 133, the provisions of that Statement do not result in reporting a fixed-rate 10-year borrowing as having been effectively converted into a 3-year floating-rate and 7-year fixed-rate borrowing as was previously accomplished under synthetic instrument accounting prior to Statement 133. Synthetic instrument accounting is no longer acceptable under Statement 133, as discussed in paragraphs 349 and 350.

*Issue G7—Measuring the Ineffectiveness of a Cash Flow Hedge under Paragraph 30(b) When the Shortcut Method is Not Applied
http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/derivatives/issueg7.html
(Cleared 5/17/00)

Three methods for calculating the ineffectiveness of a cash flow hedge that involves either (a) a receive-floating, pay-fixed interest rate swap designated as a hedge of the variable interest payments on an existing floating-rate liability or (b) a receive-fixed, pay-floating interest rate swap designated as a hedge of the variable interest receipts on an existing floating-rate asset are discussed below. As noted in the last section of the response, Method 1 (Change in Variable Cash Flows Method) may not be used in certain circumstances. Under all three methods, an entity must consider the risk of default by counterparties that are obligors with respect to the hedging instrument (the swap) or hedged transaction, pursuant to the guidance in Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. G10, "Need to Consider Possibility of Default by the Counterparty to the Hedging Derivative." An underlying assumption in this Response is that the likelihood of the obligor not defaulting is assessed as being probable.

Other DIG issues can be viewed at http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/derivatives/issuindex.html


Also see the following summary of FAS 138
"Implementation of SFAS 138, Amendments to SFAS 133," The CPA Journal, November 2001. (With Angela L.J. Huang and John S. Putoubas), pp. 54-56 --- http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2001/1100/dept/d115401.htm

Black-Scholes Model = see option.

Blockage Factor =

the impact upon financial instrument valuation of a large dollar amount of  items sold in one block.  In the case of derivatives, the FASB decided not to allow discounting of the carrying amount if that amount is to be purchased or sold in a single block.  Some analysts argue that if the items must be sold in a huge block, the price per unit would be less than marginal price of a single unit sold by itself.  Certain types of instruments may also increase in value due to blockage.  In the case of instruments that carry voting rights, there may be sufficient "block" of voting rights to influence strategy and control of an organization (e.g., a 51% block of voting shares or options for voting shares that provide an option for voting control).  If voting power is widely dispersed, less than 51% may constitute a blockage factor if the "block" is significant enough to exercise control. The FASB in SFAS 107does not allow blockage factors to influence the estimation of fair value up or down.  Disallowance of blockage is discussed in FAS 133, Pages 153-154, Paragraphs 312-315. See fair value.

Bookout --- 

The term "bookout" can be used in a variety of contexts such as when firms make a paper transaction in lieu of actual delivery of a product or service.  For an illustration in the power industry, see the Bonneville Dam illustration  under Normal Purchases Normal Sales 
See the DIG C16 resolution under Normal Purchases Normal Sales 

New Guidance on Loans and Revisions to DIG C15 (Bookouts) 
Cleared December 19, 2001 
 http://www.fas133.com/search/search_article.cfm?page=61&areaid=438  

Changes in determining how loans will be scoped in bring guidance closer to the statement itself, as more issues achieve closure.

At its meeting on December 19, the Board agreed to the staff's recommendation to change its final guidance on the application of FAS 133 to loans (and other credit arrangements): i.e., when they should be defined as derivatives for accounting purposes. The Board thus decided to override C13,"When a Loan Commitment is Included in the Scope of Statement 133," with broader guidance utilizing FAS 133's characteristic-based definition of a derivative (in particular, the net-settlement criteria found in paragraph 9b).

Under this approach, loans and other off-balance sheet credit arrangements that meet the statement's definition of a derivative would be scoped in. However, the key to this approach is to be found in the language the staff has drafted to help apply the FAS 133 definition of a derivative to such loans/credit arrangements. This language, which we understand will set a relatively high hurdle for loans to meet the 9b test, is to be posted on the FASB site soon, and subjected to a 35-day comment period. [There may be two issues: one to clarify the market mechanism need to qualify for 9b (net settlement) and a second to address the application of the derivative definition in accounting of the loan.]

Clarification on the question of MAC clauses (not to be considered) and asymmetrical accounting for borrower and lender (allowing borrowers to continue to account for loans deemed derivatives for banks as loans) as discussed below will also be included in the guidance posted to the FASB website. Notice will be given that the resulting guidance will be conditioned on amendments to Statements 65 and 91, which covered prior loan accounting.

Desperate for closure, the board stresses that this is essentially the final answer on the subject, and it will primarily consider comments that help improve the application of the derivative definition test. Note that this change sets a further precedent for seeking changes to existing, pre-cleared guidance that go back to the conceptual foundation of the statement itself.

Another issue of large concern to the electricity industry was the Board's discussion of further revisions to C15, "Normal Purchases and Sales Exception for Option-Type Contracts and Forward Contracts in Electricity." In October, the staff revised C15 to clarify the unique nature of capacity contracts in the electrical industry and define criteria under which contracts with certain option features and bookouts can qualify for the normal purchases and sales exception. The Board has given the final go- ahead, approving staff revisions which means C15 will be posted in its final form very soon. We are unclear as to what extent, if at all, these revisions will differ from the October 10 draft, but interested parties will want to scrutinize the words carefully.

Loan commitments and FAS 133 Prior to today's meeting, this issue had been addressed, in part, with C13, "When a Loan Commitment is Included in the Scope of Statement 133," which was posted as tentative guidance on the FASB website in January 2001. C13 provided that (1) loan commitments that relate to the origination or acquisition of mortgage loans that will be held for resale under Statement 65 must be accounted for as derivatives under Statement 133 by both the borrower and lender; (2) loan commitments that relate to the origination or acquisition of mortgage loans that will be held of investment continue to be accounted for under Statement 65 and (3) commitments that relate to the originations of non-mortgage loans continue to be accounted for under Statement 91.

However, C13 dealt mainly with mortgage loans, which would have required FASB to consider extending the guidance in C13 to non-mortgage loans held for resale.

As an alternative, the staff had recommended the Board switch gears and use the Statement's broader guidance on defining derivatives to determine when loans are scoped in, which the Board accepted.

A third and fourth alternative were also presented but not widely considered. The first of these would have imposed the need for both parties of a contract to have access to a market mechanism, in order for the contract to meet the paragraph 9b net settlement criteria. Going down this route would require a similar decision by the board on this "both counterparty" requirement for all 9b tests. The second of these alternatives suggested the Board simply carve out a specific subset of loans from FAS 133.

In discussing this question, one of the board members noted how divisive this issues was in the financial services industry, with constituents coming down almost equally on both sides (see I-bank vs. C-bank debate). This prevented easy consideration of a carve out, or any guidance, that drifted away from FAS 133's conceptual fundamentals.

The guidance in C13 (formerly E13) was already drifting away from the core FAS 133 concepts, but this reflected the Board's mistaken view that most all loan commitments were clearly not derivatives. However, C13 arose out of discussions at the DIG (see Item 11-4 discussions here and here) where DIG members pointed out market mechanisms that could emerge to facilitate net settlement in loans and how loans with option features were included in Statement 119 disclosure guidelines.

Moreover, C13 was potentially holding back the planned move to a fair value model for all financial instruments--a project discussed later at the meeting. As one of the new board members, Katherine Schipper, pointed out, going with the alternative to C13 not only provides an opportunity to fix a flawed approach to loan scope outs, but it brings GAAP further in the direction of the fair value model toward which the FASB is moving. Though, other board members, and the staff, said it was not clear whether more or fewer loans would be likely to be scoped in under the agreed upon C13 alternative.

Having reached on consensus on the first question concerning loans, the Board turned to the second and third questions framed by the staff.

Question 2 dealt with the effect of a subjective material change clause (Ma clause that may be invoked by the issuer based oive evaluation of the adverse change-on whethoped into FAS 133. Though not explicitly stated, this question was posed in order to prevent the insertion of MAC clauses into credit arrangements merely to trigger a scope exception.

The alternative guidance proposed by the staff dealt with the degree of control the issuer has over the MAC trigger:

Alternative 1 states that the existence of a subjective MAC clause always causeso be excluded from the scope of the staff's proposed guidance.

Alternative 2 would have the loan excluded only if it is remote that the issuer would invoke the MAC clause.

Alternative 3 would ignore the MAC altogether and not use it as a consideration in excluding the contract.

The board had no objections to the staff recommendation to ignore the MAC clause (alternative 3).

The third question arising from the loan discussion asked if asymmetrical accounting would be allowed for loans falling under the scope of FAS 133. In other words, a market mechanism might exist for the issuer (lender), but not the holder (borrower), which would make the contract a derivative from the former's perspective but not the latter's.

As a pure practical matter, the Board concluded that asymmetrical accounting would be allowed on an exception basis where the holder (borrower) does not account for the contract as a derivative--even where it meets the test for the issuer (lender). Otherwise, borrowers would have to phone their lenders and ask how they were accounting for the loan in order to arrive at proper accounting.

With respect to Firm Commitments vs. Forward Contracts, the key distinction is Part b of Paragraph 540 of the original FAS 133 (I have an antique copy of the original FAS 133 Standard.)

Those of us into FAS 133’s finer points have generally assumed a definitional distinction between a “firm commitment” purchase contract to buy a commodity at a contract price versus a forward contract to purchase the commodity at a contracted forward price. The distinction is important, because FAS 133 requires booking a forward contract and adjusting it to fair value at reporting dates if actual physical delivery is not highly likely such that the NPNS exception under Paragraph 10(b) of FAS 133 cannot be assumed to avoid booking.

Accounting for Executory Contracts Such as Purchase/Sale Commitments and Loan Commitments ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/TheoryOnFirmCommitments.htm

The distinction actually commences with forecasted transactions that include purchase contracts for a fixed notional (such as 100,000 units of fuel) at an uncertain underlying (such as the spot price of fuel on the actual future date of purchase). Such purchase contracts are typically not booked. These forecasted transactions become “firm commitments” if the future purchase price is contracted in advance (such $2.23 per gallon for a future purchase three months later). Firm commitments are typically not booked under FAS 133 rules, but they may be hedged with fair value hedges using derivative financial instruments. Forecasted transactions (with no contracted price) can be hedged with cash flow hedges using derivative contracts.

There is an obscure rule (not FAS 133) that says an allowance for firm commitment loss must be booked for an unhedged firm commitment if highly significant (material) loss is highly probable due to a nose dive in the spot market. But this obscure rule will be ignored here.

One distinction between a firm commitment contract and a forward contract is that a forward contract’s net settlement, if indeed it is net settled, is based on the difference between spot price and forward price at the time of settlement. Net settlement takes the place of penalties for non-delivery of the actual commodity (most traders never want pork bellies dumped in their front lawns). Oil companies typically take deliveries some of the time, but like electric companies these oil companies generally contract for far more product than will ever be physically delivered. Usually this is due to difficulties in predicting peak demand.

A firm commitment is gross settled at the settlement date if no other net settlement clause is contained in the contract. If an oil company does not want a particular shipment of contracted oil, the firm commitment contract is simply passed on to somebody needing oil or somebody willing to offset (book out) a purchase contract with a sales contract. Pipelines apparently have a clearing house for such firm commitment transferals of “paper gallons” that never flow through a pipeline. Interestingly, fuel purchase contracts are typically well in excess (upwards of 100 times) the capacities of the pipelines.  

The contentious FAS 133 booking out problem was settled for electricity companies in FAS 149. But it was not resolved in the same way for other companies. Hence for all other companies the distinction between a firm commitment contract and a forward price contract is crucial.

In some ways the distinction between a firm commitment versus a forward contract may be somewhat artificial. The formal distinction, in my mind, is the existence of a net settlement (spot price-forward price) clause in a forward contract that negates a “significant penalty” clause of a firm commitment contract.

The original FAS 133 (I still have this antique original version) had a glossary that reads as follows in Paragraph 540:

Firm commitment

An agreement with an unrelated party, binding on both parties and
usually legally enforceable, with the following characteristics:

a. The agreement specifies all significant terms, including the
quantity to be exchanged, the fixed price, and the timing of the
transaction. The fixed price may be expressed as a specified
amount of an entity's functional currency or of a foreign
currency. It may also be expressed as a specified interest rate
or specified effective yield.

b. The agreement includes a disincentive for nonperformance that is
sufficiently large to make performance probable.

The key distinction between a firm commitment and a forward contract seems to be Part b above that implies physical delivery backed by a “sufficiently large” penalty if physical delivery is defaulted.  The net settlement (spot-forward) provision of forward contracts generally void Part b penalties even when physical delivery was originally intended.

Firm commitments have greater Part b penalties for physical non-conformance than do forward contracts. But in the case of the pipeline industry, Part b technical provisions in purchase contracts generally are not worrisome because of a market clearing house for such contracts (the highly common practice of booking out such contracts by passing along purchase contracts to parties with sales contracts, or vice versa, that can be booked out) when physical delivery was never intended. For example, in the pipeline hub in question (in Oklahoma) all such “paper gallon” contracts are cleared against each other on the 25th of every month. By “clearing” I mean that “circles” of buyers and sellers are identified such that these parties themselves essentially net out deals. In most cases the deals are probably based upon spot prices, although the clearing house really does not get involved in negotiations between buyers and sellers of these “paper gallons.”

Accounting for Executory Contracts Such as Purchase/Sale Commitments and Loan Commitments ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/TheoryOnFirmCommitments.htm

See Forward Transaction and Firm Commitment

Business Combinations =

contacts for purchases and/or poolings that require special accounting treatment.  In summary, the major exceptions under FAS 133 for APB Opinion No. 16 are discussed in (FAS 133Paragraph 11c).  

Exceptions are not as important in IAS 39, because fair value adjustments are required of all financial instruments.  However, exceptions or special accounting for derivatives are discussed in IAS 39 Paragraph 1g --- Also note  IAS 22 Paragraphs 65-76)

 

Bob Jensen's Web Site

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C-Terms

Call = see option.

CAP =

a risk bound.  For example, a cap writer, in return for a premium, agrees to limit, or cap, the cap holder's risk associated with an increase in interest rates. If rates go above a specified interest-rate level (the strike price or the cap rate), the cap holder is entitled to receive cash payments equal to the excess of the market rate over the strike price multiplied by the notional principal amount. Issuers of floating-rate liabilities often purchase caps to protect against rising interest rates, while retaining the ability to benefit from a decline in rates. Examples are given in SFAS Paragraphs 182-183 beginning on Page 95 of FAS 133.  Also see Footnote 6 to Paragraph 13 on Page 8 of FAS 133.

The opposite of a cap is termed a floor.  A floor writer, in return for a premium, agrees to limit, or floor, the cap holder's risk associated with an decrease in interest rates. If rates go below a specified interest-rate level (the strike price or the floor rate), the floor holder is entitled to receive cash payments equal to the difference between the market rate over the strike price multiplied by the notional principal amount.  See Footnote 6 to Paragraph 13 on Page 8 of FAS 133

A collar combines a cap and a floor.  In Paragraph 181 on Page 95 of FAS 133, a timing collar is discussed.  Another example is given in Paragraph 182 beginning on Page 95 of FAS 133.  See collar.

Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) =

a model for valuing a corporation in which estimated future cash flows are discounted at a rate equal to the firm's weighted average cost of capital multiplied by the beta, which is a measure of the volatility of a firm's stock priceThe CAPM is a single-index model and, as such, has enormous structural deficiencies.  Alternate approaches and problems in all approaches are discussed in http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/149wp/149wp.htm    Also see option pricing theory.

Capacity Risk see Risks

Cash Flow Hedge =

a derivative with a periodic settlement based upon cash flows such as interest rate changes on variable rate debt. Major portions of FAS 133 dealing with cash flow hedges include Paragraphs 28-35, 127-130, 131-139, 140-143, 144-152, 153-158, 159-161, 162-164, 371-383, 422-425, 458-473, and 492-494.   See hedge and hedge accounting.  The IASC adopted the same definition of a cash flow hedge except that the hedge has also to affect reported net income (See IAS 39 Paragraph 137b).

Flow for Cash Flow Hedge Accounting --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133flow.htm 

The key distinction of a cash flow hedge versus a fair value hedge is that FAS 133 allows deferral of unrealized holding gains and losses on the revaluation of the derivative to be posted to Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) rather than current earnings.  Paragraph 30 on Page 21 of FAS 133 discusses the posting to OCI. Paragraph 31 deals with reclassifications from OCI into earnings. Also see derecognition and dedesignation.

In FAS 133, derivative financial instruments come in three basic types that are listed in Paragraph 4 on Page 2 of FAS 133.  One of these types is described in Section a and Footnote 2 below:

Paragraph 4 on Page 2 of FAS 133.
This Statement standardizes the accounting for derivative instruments, including certain derivative instruments embedded in other contracts, by requiring that an entity recognize those items as assets or liabilities in the statement of financial position and measure them at fair value. If certain conditions are met, an entity may elect to designate a derivative instrument as follows:

a.
A hedge of the exposure to changes in the fair value of a recognized asset or liability, or of an unrecognized firm commitment, \2/ that are attributable to a particular risk (referred to as a fair value hedge)
==========================================================================
Footnote 2
\2/ An unrecognized firm commitment can be viewed as an executory contract that represents both a right and an obligation. When a previously unrecognized firm commitment that is designated as a hedged item is accounted for in accordance with this Statement, an asset or a liability is recognized and reported in the statement of financial position related to the recognition of the gain or loss on the firm commitment. Consequently, subsequent references to an asset or a liability in this Statement include a firm commitment.
==========================================================================

With respect to Section a above, a firm commitment cannot have a cash flow risk exposure because the gain or loss is already booked.  For example, a contract of 10,000 units per month at $200 per unit is unrecognized and has a cash flow risk exposure if the payments have not been made. If the payments have been prepaid, that prepayment is "recognized" and has no further cash flow risk exposure. The booked firm commitment, however, can have a fair value risk exposure.

Another key distinction is between a forecasted transaction versus a firm commitment.  Firm commitments without any foreign currency risk cannot have cash flow hedges, because there is no variability in expected future cash flows (except for credit risks for which cash flow hedges are not allowed under Paragraph 29e on Page 20, Paragraph 32 on Page 22,  and Paragraph 61c on Page 41 of FAS 133 ).  Example 9 beginning in Paragraph 162 on Page 84 of FAS 133 illustrates a forward contract cash flow hedge of a forecasted series of transactions in a foreign currency.  When the forecasted transactions become accounts receivable, a portion of the value changes in the futures contract must be taken into current earnings rather than other comprehensive income.  Controversies between the FASB's distinction between forecasted transactions versus firm commitments are discussed in Paragraphs 324-325 on Page 157 of FAS 133.  Firm commitments can have fair value hedges even though they cannot have cash flow hedges.  See Paragraph 20 on Page 11 of FAS 133.  

Cash flow hedges must have the possibility of affecting net earnings.  For example, Paragraph 485 on Page 211 of FAS 133 bans foreign currency risk hedges of forecasted dividends of foreign subsidiary.  The reason is that these dividends are a wash item and do not affect consolidated earnings.  For reasons and references, see equity methodA nonderivative instrument, such as a Treasury note, shall not be designated as a hedging instrument for a cash flow hedge (FAS 133 Paragraph 28d). 

Paragraph 40 beginning on Page 25 bans a forecasted transaction of a subsidiary company from being a hedged item if the parent company wants to hedge the cash flow on the subsidiary's behalf.  However Paragraph 40a allows such cash flow hedging if the parent becomes a party to the hedged item itself, which can be a contract between the parent and its subsidiary under Paragraph 36b on Page 24 of FAS 133.

Paragraph 399 on Page 180 of FAS 133 does not allow covered call strategies that permit an entity to write an option on an asset that it owns.  In a covered call the combined position of the hedged item and the derivative option is asymmetrical in that exposure to losses is always greater than potential gains.  The option premium, however, is set so that the option writer certainly does not expect those "remotely possible" losses to occur.   Only when the potential gains are at least equal to potential cash flow losses will Paragraph 28c on Page 19 of FAS 133 kick in to allow a cash flow hedge under FAS 133.   Also see Paragraph 20c on Page 12.  See written option.

Paragraph 28 beginning on Page 18 of FAS 133 requires that the hedge be formally documented from the start such that prior contracts such as options or futures contracts cannot later be declared hedges.  (Existing assets and liabilities can be hedged items, but the hedging instruments must be new and fully documented at the start of the hedge.)   Paragraphs 29c and 29f on Page 20 of FAS 133 require direct cash flow risk exposures rather than earnings exposures such as a hedge to protect equity-method accounting for an investment under APB 16 rules.   See ineffectiveness.

FAS 133 is silent as to whether a single asset or liability can be hedged in part (as opposed to a portfolio of items having different risks).  For example, can an interest rate swap be used to hedge the cash flows of only the last five years of a ten-year note?  There seems to be nothing to prevent this (as is illustrated in Examples 13 and 15 beginning on Page 225 of the Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998).

Paragraph 18 of FAS 133 allows for using only a portion of a single derivative to hedge an item if, and only if, the selected portion has the risk exposure of the portion is equal to the risk of the whole derivative.  For example, a four-year interest rate swap designated as hedging a two-year note probably does not meet the Paragraph 18 test, because the risk exposure in the first two years most likely is not the same as the risk level in the last two years.

Suppose a company expects dividend income to continue at a fixed rate over the two years in a foreign currency.  Suppose the investment is adjusted to fair market value on each reporting date.  Forecasted dividends may not be firm commitments since there are not sufficient disincentives for failure to declare a dividend.  A cash flow hedge of the foreign currency risk exposure can be entered into under Paragraph 4b on Page 2 of FAS 133.  Whether or not gains and losses are posted to other comprehensive income, however, depends upon whether the securities are classified under SFAS 115 as available-for-sale or as trading securities.   There is no held-to-maturity alternative for equity securities.

With respect to Paragraph 29a on Page 20 of FAS 133, KPMG notes that if the hedged item is a portfolio of assets or liabilities based on an index, the hedging instrument cannot use another index even though the two indices are highly correlated.  See Example 7 on Page 222 of the Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998.

Accounting for Executory Contracts Such as Purchase/Sale Commitments and Loan Commitments ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/TheoryOnFirmCommitments.htm

The hedging instrument  (e.g., a forecasted transaction or firm commitment foreign currency hedge) must meet the stringent criteria for being defined as a derivative financial instrument under FAS 133.  This includes the tests for being clearly-and-closely related.  It also includes strict tests of Paragraphs 21 beginning on Page 13 , 29 beginning on Page 20, and Paragraph 56 on Page 33 of FAS 133 with respect to the host contracts that are being hedged.  Those tests state that if the forecasted "transaction" is in reality a group or portfolio of individual transactions, all transactions in the group must bear the same risk exposure within a 10% range discussed in Paragraph 21.    Also see Footnote 9 on Page 13 of FAS 133.  The grouping tests are elaborated upon in the following Paragraphs:

The tests can become tricky.  For example, suppose a company has a firm commitment to buy 1,000 units of raw material per month at a unit price of 5,000DM Deutsche Marks. Can this firm commitment be designated as a hedged item on a foreign currency risk exposure of 500 units each month?  The answer according to Paragraph 21a's Part (2b) requires that which units be designated such as the first 500 units or the last 500 unites each month.

A group of variable rate notes indexed in the same way upon LIBOR can be a hedged item, whereas having different indices such as LIBOR and U.S. Prime rate underlyings will not qualify.  Also, anticipated purchases cannot be combined with anticipated sales in the same grouping designated as a forecasted transaction even if they have the same underlying.   Paragraph 477 on Page 208 of FAS 133 makes an exception for a portfolio of differing risk exposures for financial instruments designated in foreign currencies so not to conflict with Paragraph 20 of SFAS 52.  For more detail see foreign currency hedge.

Those tests also state that a compound grouping of multiple derivatives (e.g., a portfolio of options or futures or forward contracts or any combination thereof) is prohibited from "separating a derivative into either separate proportions or separate portions and designating any component as a hedging instrument or designating different components as hedges of different exposures."   See Paragraphs 360-362 beginning on Page 167 of FAS 133.  Paragraphs dealing with compound derivative issues include the following:

Section c(4) of Paragraph 4 is probably the most confusing condition mentioned in Paragraph 4. It allows hedging under "net investment" criteria under Paragraph 20 of SFAS 52.  The gain or loss is reported in other comprehensive income as part of the cumulative translation adjustment. This is an exception to Paragraph 29a on Page 20 of FAS 133.  Reasons for the exception are given in Paragraph 477 on Page 208 of FAS 133:

The net investment in a foreign operation can be viewed as a portfolio of dissimilar assets and liabilities that would not meet the criterion in this Statement that the hedged item be a single item or a group of similar items. Alternatively, it can be viewed as part of the fair value of the parent's investment account. Under either view, without a specific exception, the net investment in a foreign operation would not qualify for hedging under this Statement. The Board decided, however, that it was acceptable to retain the current provisions of Statement 52 in that area. The Board also notes that, unlike other hedges of portfolios of dissimilar items, hedge accounting for the net investment in a foreign operation has been explicitly permitted by the authoritative literature.

For a derivative not designated as a hedging instrument, the gain or loss is recognized in earnings in the period of change.  Section 4(c) of Paragraph 4 of FAS 133 amends SFAS 52 on Foreign Currency Translation, to permit special accounting for a hedge of a foreign currency forecasted transaction with a derivative.  For more detail see foreign currency hedge.

Paragraph 42 on Page 26 reads as follows:

.A derivative instrument or a nonderivative financial instrument that may give rise to a foreign currency transaction gain or loss under Statement 52 can be designated as hedging the foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation. The gain or loss on a hedging derivative instrument (or the foreign currency transaction gain or loss on the nonderivative hedging instrument) that is designated as, and is effective as, an economic hedge of the net investment in a foreign operation shall be reported in the same manner as a translation adjustment to the extent it is effective as a hedge. The hedged net investment shall be accounted for consistent with Statement 52; the provisions of this Statement for recognizing the gain or loss on assets designated as being hedged in a fair value hedge do not apply to the hedge of a net investment in a foreign operation. 

These Section c(4) confusions in Paragraph 4 are illustrated in Examples 11-13 beginning on Page 270 of the Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998.

Paragraph 18 on Page 10 does allow a single derivative to be divided into components provided but never with partitioning of  "different risks and designating each component as a hedging instrument."  For example, suppose Rippen Company enters into forward contracting with Bank A to sell Dutch guilders and purchase French francs. The purpose is to hedge two combined unrelated foreign currency risks from two related companies, one a Holland subsidiary and the other a French subsidiary. Bank A is independent of all the interrelated companies in this scenario.  If the forward contracting entails one forward contract, it cannot be partitioned into components having different risks of U.S. dollars against guilders versus francs.

Paragraph 29d precludes forecasted transactions from being the hedged items in cash flow hedges if those items, when the transaction is completed, will be remeasured on each reporting date at fair value with holding gains and losses taken directly into current earnings (as opposed to comprehensive income).  See Paragraph 36 on Page 23 of FAS 133.  Paragraphs 220-231 beginning on Page 123 of FAS 133 leave little doubt that the FASB feels "fair value is the most relevant measure for financial instrument and the only relevant measure for derivative instruments."    Allowing gains and losses from qualified FAS 133-allowed cash flow hedges to be deferred in OCI was more of a political compromise that the FASB intends for the long-term.  But the compromise extends only so far as present GAAP.  It allows OCI deferral on cash flow hedges only if the hedged items are carried at cost under GAAP.  For example, lumber inventory is carried at cost and can be hedged with OCI deferrals of gains and losses on the derivative instrument such as a forward contract that hedges the price of lumber.  The same cannot be said for gold inventory.

The forecasted purchase of lumber inventoried at cost can be a hedged item, but the forecasted purchase of gold or some other "precious" market commodity cannot qualify for OCI deferral as a hedged item.   The reason is that  "precious" items under GAAP are booked at maintained at market value.  For example, suppose a forward contract is entered into on January 1 when commodity's price is $300 per unit.  The "political issue" issue faced by the FASB is merely a matter of when gains and losses on the derivative contract are posted to current earnings.  If the price goes up to $400 per unit on July 1 when the commodity is actually purchased, there is a $100 per unit deferred gain on the forward contract that is transferred from OCI to current earnings if the commodity is lumber.  If the commodity is "precious" gold, however, the there is no intervening credit to OCI because of Paragraph 29d on Page 20 of FAS 133.  Illustrative journal entries are shown below:

 

Transactions

in Lumber

Transactions

in Gold

Date

Accounts

Debit

Credit

Debit

Credit

1/1/x1

Forward

0

 

0

 

        Cash

 

0

 

0

 

 

 

 

Various dates

Forward

100

 

100

 

        OCI

 

100

 

 

       P&L

 

 

 

100

 

 

 

 

7/1/x1

Inventory

400

 

400

 

        Cash

 

400

 

400

 

 

 

 

7/1/x1

Cash

100

 

100

 

        Forward

 

100

 

100

 

 

 

 

7/1/x1

OCI

100

 

 

 

        P&L

 

100

 

 

 

 

 

 

The forward contract was not a FAS 133-allowed cash flow hedge even though it was an economic hedge.  The reason goes back to Paragraph 29d on Page 20 of SFAS 130.

For this same reason, a trading security (not subject to APB 15 equity method accounting and as defined in SFAS 115) cannot be a FAS 133 hedged item.  That is because SFAS 115 requires that trading securities be revalued (like gold) with unrealized holding gains and losses being booked to current earnings.  Conversely, Paragraphs 4c on Page 2, 38 on Page 24, and 479 on Page 209 of FAS 133 state that a forecasted purchase of an available-for-sale security can be a hedged item, because available-for-sale securities revalued under SFAS 115 have holding gains and losses accounted for in comprehensive income rather than current earnings.  Unlike trading securities, available-for-sale securities can be FAS 133-allowed hedge items.   Mention of available-for sale is made in Paragraphs 4, 18, 23, 36, 38, 49, 52-55, 123, 479-480, and 534 of FAS 133.  Held-to-maturity securities can also be FAS 133-allowed hedge items.

Held-to-maturity securities may not be hedged for cash flow risk according to Paragraphs 426-431 beginning on Page 190 of FAS 133.  See held-to-maturity.  Suppose a firm has a forecasted transaction to purchase a held-to-maturity bond investment denominated in a foreign currency.  Under SFAS 115, the bond will eventually, after the bond purchase, be adjusted to fair value on each reporting date.  As a result, any hedge of the foreign currency risk exposure to cash flows cannot receive favorable cash flow hedge accounting under FAS 133 rules (as is illustrated in Examples 6 beginning on Page 265 of the Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998).   Before the bond is purchased, its forecasted transaction is not allowed to be a hedged item under Paragraph 29d on Page 20 of FAS 133 since, upon execution of the transaction, the bond "will subsequently be remeasured with changes in fair value ...."  Also see Paragraph 36 on Page 23 of FAS 133.

Even more confusing is Paragraph 29e that requires the cash flow hedge to be on prices or interest rates rather than credit worthiness.  For example, a forecasted sale of a specific asset at a specific price can be hedged for spot price changes under Paragraph 29e.  The forecasted sale's cash flows may not be hedged for the credit worthiness of the intended buyer or buyers.  Example 24 in Paragraph 190 on Page 99 of FAS 133 discusses a credit-sensitive bond.  Because the bond's coupon payments were indexed to credit rating rather than interest rates, the embedded derivative could not be isolated and accounted for as a cash flow hedge.  See also credit risk swaps.

A  swaption can be a cash flow hedge.   See swaption.

Paragraph 21c on Page 14 and Paragraph 29f on Page 20 of FAS 133 prohibits forecasted cash flows from minority interests in a consolidated subsidiary from being designated as a hedged item in a cash flow hedge.  Reasons are given in Paragraph 472 beginning on Page 206 of FAS 133.  See minority interest.

Cash flow hedges are accounted for in a similar manner but not identical manner in both FAS 133 and IAS 39 (other than the fact that none of the IAS 39 standards define comprehensive income or require that changes in fair value not yet posted to current earnings be classified under comprehensive income in the equity section of a balance sheet):

To the extent that the cash flow hedge is effective, the portion of the gain or loss on the hedging instrument is recognized initially in equity. Subsequently, that amount is included in net profit or loss in the same period or periods during which the hedged item affects net profit or loss (for example, through cost of sales, depreciation, or amortization).

Paul Pacter states the following at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm (emphasis added):

IAS 39 Cash Flow Hedge Accounting
For a hedge of a forecasted asset and liability acquisition, the gain or loss on the hedging instrument will adjust the basis (carrying amount) of the acquired asset or liability. The gain or loss on the hedging instrument that is included in the initial measurement of the asset or liability is subsequently included in net profit or loss when the asset or liability affects net profit or loss (such as in the periods that depreciation expense, interest income or expense, or cost of sales is recognised).

FAS 133 Cash Flow Hedge Accounting
For a hedge of a forecasted asset and liability acquisition, the gain or loss on the hedging instrument will remain in equity when the asset or liability is acquired. That gain or loss will subsequently included in net profit or loss in the same period as the asset or liability affects net profit or loss (such as in the periods that depreciation expense, interest income or expense, or cost of sales is recognised). Thus, net profit or loss will be the same under IAS and FASB Standards, but the balance sheet presentation will be net under IAS and gross under FASB.

Cash Flow Hedges Create Fair Value Risk

Cash flow risk commonly arises in forecasted transactions with an unknown value of the underlying.  Interbank rates that banks charge each other is often used for benchmarking in hedge effectiveness testing.  For example, suppose the underlying is a benchmarked interest rate is the ever-popular London Inter-bank Offering Rate (LIBOR) where a firm borrows $1 million for two years at a  fixed rate of 6.41%.  This loan has fair value risk since the amount required to pay the loan off prematurely at the end of any quarter will vary with interest rate movements in the same manner as bond prices move up and down depending upon the spot market of interest rates such as LIBOR.    The loan does not have cash flow risk since the interest rate is locked in at 6.41% (divided by four) for each quarterly interest payment.

The firm can lock in fixed fair value by entering into some type of derivative such as an interest rate swap contract that will pay a variable benchmarked rate that moves up and down with interest rates.  For example, assume the receivable leg of the swap  is fixed at 6.65%.  Each quarter the difference between 6.65% and the current spot rate of LIBOR determines the net settlement of the interest rate swap payment that locks in a fixed return of 6.65% + 2%.  To read more about this particular cash flow hedge and the hedge accounting that is allowed under FAS 133, go to Example 5 in Appendix B of FAS 133 beginning with Paragraph 131.  Bob Jensen elaborates and extends this example with a video and Excel workbook at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm 

Financial instruments have a notional and an underlying.  For example, an underlying might be a commodity price and the notional is the quantity such as price of corn and the quantity of corn.  An underlying might be an interest rate such as the U.S. Treasury rate of the London Inter-bank Offering Rate and the notional might be the principal such as the $10 million face value of 10,000 bonds having a face value of $1,000 each.

The unhedged investment of $10 million has cash flow risk but no fair value risk.  The hedged investment has no cash flow risk but the subsequent combination of the hedge and the hedged item creates fair value risk.  The fair value of the interest rate swap used as the hedging instrument fluctuates up and down with the current spot rate of LIBOR used in determining the quarterly swap payments.  For example, in Example 5 mentioned above, the swap begins with a zero value but moves up to a fair value of $24,850 a the end of the first quarter, $73,800 at the end of the second quarter, and even drops to a negative ($42,820) after four quarters.

Companies do trillions of dollars worth of cash flow  hedging with interest rate swaps.  Two enormous examples are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  Both of these giant companies hedge millions of dollars of outstanding fixed-rate mortgage investments with interest rate swaps that lock in fair value.  You can read more about their cash flow hedging strategy in their annual reports for Years 2001, 2002, and 2003.  Both companies made headlines for not complying with FAS 133 hedge accounting years.  See http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

 

Fair Value Hedges Create Cash Flow Risk

Fair value risk commonly arises in fore firm commitments with a contracted value of the underlying.  For example, suppose the underlying is a benchmarked interest rate such as the London Inter-bank Offering Rate (LIBOR) where a firm invests $10 million for two years that pays a quarterly return of the spot rate for LIBOR plus 2.25%.  This investment has cash flow risk since the quarterly values of LIBOR are unknown.  The investment does not fair value risk since the value is locked in at $10 million due to the fact that the returns are variable rather than fixed.  

The firm can lock in a fixed return rate by entering into some type of derivative such as an interest rate swap contract that will lock in the current LIBOR forward rate.  For example, assume the payable leg of the swap  is fixed at 6.41%.  Each quarter the difference between 6.41% and the current spot rate of LIBOR determines the net settlement of the interest rate swap payment that will vary with interest rate movements.  To read more about this particular cash flow hedge and the hedge accounting that is allowed under FAS 133, go to Example 2 in Appendix B of FAS 133 beginning with Paragraph 111.  Bob Jensen elaborates and extends this example with a video and Excel workbook at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm 

The unhedged loan of $1 million has fair value risk but no fair value risk.  The hedged investment has no fair value risk but the subsequent combination of the hedge and the hedged item creates cash flow risk.  If the hedge is perfectly effective,  fair value of the interest rate swap used as the hedging instrument fluctuates exactly to offset any value change in the loan such that the combined value of the loan plus the swap is fixed at $1 million. For example, in Example 2 mentioned above, the swap begins with a zero value but down down to a fair value of a negative liability of )$16,025) when the value of the loan drops to ($998,851) such that the sum of the two values is the constant $1 million.  The swap costs the borrower an outflow of $16,025 at the end of the first quarter to offset the decline in the value of the loan.  

The point here is that a hedge for fair value risk creates cash flow risk.  

Why would a firm want to enter into a fair value hedge that causes cash flow risk?  There can be many reasons, but one is that the borrower may predict that interest rates are going to fall and it would be advantageous to prepay the fixed-rate loan at some point in time before maturity and borrow at anticipated lower rates.  In Example 2 mentioned above, LIBOR dropped to 6.31% in the fourth quarter such at the firm would have to pay $1,001,074 to prepay the loan (e.g., by buying it back in the market).  However, due to the hedge, the interest rate swap would pay $1,074 such that the net cost is only the $1 million locked in fair value fixed by the interest rate swap hedge.

Companies do a somewhat surprising amount of fair value hedging with interest rate swaps.  Two enormous examples are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  Both of these giant companies hedge millions of dollars of outstanding variable rate debt with interest rate swaps that lock in fair value.  Both companies thereby create cash flow risk.  Fannie Mae lost $24 billion in derivatives trading, and much of this was due to fair value hedging.  See "$25 Billion in Derivatives Losses at Fannie Mae" --- http://worldvisionportal.org/WVPforum/viewtopic.php?t=192 

An independent analysis of Fannie's accounts suggests it may have incurred losses on its derivatives trading of $24bn between 2000 and third-quarter 2003. That figure represents nearly all of the $25.1bn used to purchase or settle transactions in that period. Any net losses will eventually have to be recognised on Fannie Mae's balance sheet, depressing future profits.

You can read more about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac fair value hedging strategy in their annual reports for Years 2001, 2002, and 2003.  Both companies made headlines for not complying with FAS 133 hedge accounting years.  See http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

 

 

 

 

DIG issues at http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/  
Section G: Cash Flow Hedges

*Issue G1—Hedging an SAR Obligation (Cleared 02/17/99)

*Issue G2—Hedged Transactions That Arise from Gross Settlement of a Derivative ("All in One" Hedges) (Cleared 03/31/99)

*Issue G3—Discontinuation of a Cash Flow Hedge (Cleared 03/31/99)

*Issue G4—Hedging Voluntary Increases in Interest Credited on an Insurance Contract Liability (Cleared 07/28/99)

*Issue G5—Hedging the Variable Price Component
(Cleared 11/23/99)

Issue G6—Impact of Implementation Issue E1 on Cash Flow Hedges of Market Interest Rate Risk
(Released 11/99)

Issue G7—Measuring the Ineffectiveness of a Cash Flow Hedge of Interest Rate Risk under Paragraph 30(b) When the Shortcut Method is Not Applied
(Released 11/99)

Issue G8—Hedging Interest Rate Risk of Foreign-Currency-Denominated Floating-Rate Debt
(Released 11/99)

See Illustrations  and Ineffectivness.

Cash Flow Statement Presentation

From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on May 9, 2003

TITLE: FASB Rules Derivatives Must Be Part of Financing Cash Flow 
REPORTER: Cassell Bryan-Low 
DATE: May 01, 2003 
PAGE: C4 
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB105174180092459600,00.html  
TOPICS: Debt, Derivatives, Financial Accounting

SUMMARY: The FASB issued this ruling "in an attempt to crack down" on companies that undertake transactions requiring prepayments by a customer. Some companies have been including those prepayments in cash flows from operations.

QUESTIONS: 

1.) Define financing, investing, and operating cash flows--be specific by referring to authoritative literature for these definitions. Cite your source.

2.) How do financial statement users utilize the three sections of the statement of cash flows to assess a companies financial health? Cite all ways you can think of in which these amounts are used.

3.) Summarize the transaction addressed in the article. Why does the headline define these items as derivatives? What is the support for including the cash flows associated with these transactions in the operating section of the statement of cash flows? What is the argument supporting presenting these cash flows in the financing section?

4.) What is free cash flow? Is this concept defined in authoritative accounting literature? How do financial statement readers use this concept in assessing a company's financial health?

5.) How do the transactions described in this article impact a company's free cash flow? How will they impact free cash flow after implementing the new requirements issued by the FASB?

6.) What does the author mean when he writes of the fact that, because banks such as J.P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup financed delivery of commodities, companies using these transactions, such as Dynegy and Enron, were "able to bury that financing in their trading accounts..."

CBOE =

Chicago Board Options Exchange.  See http://www.cboe.com/    Also see CBOT and CME.

You can find some great tutorials at http://www.cboe.com/education/   For the best educational materials at CBOE, you have to download the Authorware player. But that is free and easy to download.

CBOT =

Chicago Board of TradeSee http://www.cbot.com/   Also see CBOE and CME.

There are a number of Internet sources for options and futures prices ---  http://www.cbot.com/  
For example, look under Quotes and Data, Agricultural Futures.  

You can read about contract specifications by clicking on the tab "Education" and choosing the alternative for "Contract Specifications."  This should take you to http://www.cbot.com/cbot/pub/page/0,3181,21,00.html 

Especially note the definitions at http://cbotdataexchange.if5.com/FeaturesOverview.aspx 

A glossary and tutorials are listed at http://www.cbot.com/cbot/pub/page/0,3181,909,00.html 
The CBOT tutorials hang up quite often when downloading.
The CME tutorials are easier to download and use --- http://www.cme.com/edu/ 
The CME Glossary is at http://www.cme.com/edu/res/glos/index.html 

Also note the FAQs --- http://cbotdataexchange.if5.com/Helpfaq.aspx 

Note that sometimes when you click on "Home" that it does not take you back to the "Real Home" at http://www.cbot.com/ 

Choose the day you are studying this question.  For example, suppose you go to www.cbot.com on January 29, 2004 .  On that day you will find vectors (arrays of prices) called forward prices for futures contracts on commodities such as corn, wheat, etc.  Each price is for a contract having a different expiration date such as contracts settling in March 4, May 4, July 4, etc.  These forward contract prices remain fixed throughout the life of the contract.  Spot prices vary minute to minute and day to day.  The spot price used on the contract date of closing is the settlement price.

The prices you first see listed are the forward prices.  To find spot prices, click on the link called "Charts."  Scroll down to the bottom of the charts page and change the "Month" to "Nearby."  For example, if it currently reads "Mar" for the month, change March to "Nearby."  

At times you will see a Free Historical Data spot price table on the right side of the home page of the CBOT.  You must have a paid subscription to Realtime Services for current spot rates.  A great free foreign exchange (FX) spot rate provider is at http://www.xe.com/ucc/ 

Bob,

The USDA Agricultural Marketing Service provides daily prices for commodities at multiple U.S. locations. Go to: http://www.ams.usda.gov/marketnews.htm . Another place to get cash price data is from Farmers Supply at: www.farmersupply.com .

For LIBOR rates, the following site gives regularly updated LIBOR

rates: http://www.libor-loans.com/libor_rate.html .

I hope that this helps.

Regards,

Fred Seamon
Advisory Economist
Chicago Board of Trade

To find details regarding each futures contract at the CBOT, click on "Futures Contract Specs."  There you will find that each contract is for 5,000 bu. and each tic is 1/4 of a cent which is the increments that traders flash with hand signals in the pit of the trading floor at the CBOT.

You can read more about use of the CBOT at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/class02.htm 
Note the references at the end of the above document.

CDO Collateralized Debt Obligation = see Credit Derivatives 

Circus =

a hedging combination that entails both an interest rate swap and a foreign currency swap.   As a   single-contract derivative, the circus swap runs into trouble in FAS 133 because it simultaneously hedges a price (or interest rate) risk and foreign currency risk.   Suppose a U.S. company has a trading or available-for-sale portfolio containing a variable rate note receivable in Brazilian reals.   Suppose the company enters into a circus swap that hedges both interest rate and foreign currency risks.  Since SFAS 115 requires that the hedged item (the Brazilian note) be remeasured to fair value at each interest rate date (with foreign currency gains and losses being accounted for under SFAS 52), Paragraph 21c on Page 14 and Paragraph 36 on Page 23 of FAS 133 prohibit the Brazilian note for being the basis of a cash flow hedge.  Paragraph 18 on the top of Page 10 prohibits "separating a compound derivative into components representing different risks .... "  Example 14 beginning on Page 271 illustrates the same problem with a note payable illustration in Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998. 

If the Brazilian note was instead classified as held-to-maturity, the booked value is not remeasured to fair value on each balance sheet date.  That overcomes the Paragraph 21c revaluation objection on Page 14 of FAS 133.  Since the note is not an equity investment, other barriers in Paragraph 21c do not apply.  However, held-to-maturity securities may not be hedged for cash flow risk according to Paragraphs 426-431 beginning on Page 190 of FAS 133.  And Paragraph 18 on Page 10 looms as a lingering barrier.

To circumvent the Paragraph 18 problem of having compound risk hedges in a single contract, the U.S. company could enter into to separate derivative contracts such as an interest rate swap accompanied by an independent forward contract that hedges the foreign currency risk.  Then the issue for a cash flow hedging combination is whether the Brazilian note qualifies as a hedging instrument qualifies under Paragraph 29 rules beginning on Page 20 of FAS 133.  Paragraph 20e bans interest rate hedging if the note is declared held-to-maturity.   Paragraph 20d bans interest rate hedging for a note declared as a trading security under SFAS 115.  Conversely, Paragraphs 4c on Page 2, 38 on Page 24, and 479 on Page 209 of FAS 133 state that a forecasted purchase of an available-for-sale security can be a hedged item, because available-for-sale securities revalued under SFAS 115 have holding gains and losses accounted for in comprehensive income rather than current earnings.  Unlike trading securities, available-for-sale securities can be FAS 133-allowed hedge items.   Mention of available-for sale is made in Paragraphs 4, 18, 23, 36, 38, 49, 52-55, 123, 479-480, and 534 of FAS 133.  Even if this results in accounting for the two derivatives as a cash flow hedge of the Brazilian note, the same cannot be said for a fair value hedge since the forward contract hedging foreign currency risk must be carried at fair value.  Somewhat similar conclusions arise for a foreign currency note payable illustration in Example 15 on Page 272 of Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998.

One of my students wrote the following case just prior to the issuance of FAS 133:

Brian T. Simmons For his case and case solution entitled ACCOUNTING FOR CIRCUS SWAPS: AN INSTRUCTIONAL CASE click on http://www.resnet.trinity.edu/users/bsimmons/circus/framecase.htm .  He states the following:

This case examines a basic circus swap which involves not only the exchange of floating interest rate for fixed, but also one currency for another. Separation of the effects from both interest rate and foreign currency fluctuations is no simple matter. In fact, no formal accounting pronouncements specifically address this issue. (prior to FAS 133).

The introduction first reviews the history and reasoning of pronouncements leading up to Exposure Draft 162-B. For years, institutions have relied on settlement accounting to record their derivative instruments. With growing concern over the risk of these instruments, however, the SEC and FASB have attempted to increase the detail of disclosure regarding the value and risk of their derivative portfolio. The case provides an example of a hybrid instrument in the form of a circus swap. The case questions review the accounting for these types of instruments under the current settlement accounting guidelines as well as the new fair-value method. Additionally, a simplistic measure of Risk Per Contract (RPC) is developed. By using information that is easy for management to obtain, the likelihood of the benefits of RPC outweighing the costs is greatly enhanced.

Clearly-and-Closely Related Criteria (or Clearly and Closely Related) =

criteria that determine when and when not to treat an embedded derivative as a freestanding contract apart from its host contract.  An embedded derivative that is both deemed to be free standing and is not clearly-and-closely related" must be accounted for separately rather than remain buried in the accounting for the host contract.  Relevant sections of FAS 133 include Paragraphs 304-311 in Pages 150-153 and Paragraphs 443-450 in Pages 196-198.  The FASB reversed its ED 162-B position on compound derivatives.   Examples 12-34 beginning in Paragraph 176 on Page 93 illustrate clearly-and-closely-related criteria in embedded hybrid derivative instruments.  For example, a call option cannot be accounted for separately if it is clearly-and-closely related to to a hybrid instrument that is clearly an equity instrument on a freestanding basis and, thereby, is not subject to FAS 133 rules.  If a prepayment option on a in a variable rate mortgage is based upon an interest rate index, the option is clearly-and-closely related to the host contract and cannot be accounted for separate from its host.  On the other hand, if the option is instead based upon a stock price index such as the Standard and Poors 500 index. the option is no longer clearly-and-closely related to to the host contract.  See hedge.

For example suppose a bond receivable has a variable interest rate with an embedded range floater derivative that specifies a collar of 4% to 8% based upon LIBOR.  The bond holder receives no interest payments in any period where the average LIBOR is outside the collar.  In this case, the range floater embedded option cannot be isolated and accounted for apart from the host bond contract.  The reason is that the option is "clearly-and-closely related" to the interest payments under the host contract (i.e., it can adjust the interest rate).  See Paragraph 12 beginning on Page 7 of FAS 133.

Some debt has a combination of fixed and floating components.  For example, a "fixed-to-floating" rate bond is one that starts out at a fixed rate and at some point (pre-determined or contingent) changes to a variable rate.   This type of bond has a embedded derivative (i.e., a forward component for the variable rate component that adjusts the interest rate in later periods.   Since the forward component is  "clearly-and-closely related"adjustment of interest of the host contract, it cannot be accounted for separately according to Paragraph 12a on Page 7 of FAS 133 (unless conditions in Paragraph 13 apply). 

Illustrations are provided under cap and floater.

See DIG Issue B5 under embedded derivatives.

CME =

Chicago Mercantile ExchangeSee http://www.cme.com   Also see CBOE and CBOT.

Collar=

a hedge that confines risk to a particular range. For example, one form of collar entails buying a call option and selling a put option in such a manner that extreme price variations are hedged from both sides. In Paragraph 181 on Page 95 of FAS 133, a timing collar is discussed.  A collar combines a cap and a floor.  Another example is given in Paragraph 182 beginning on Page 95 of FAS 133. Also see cap and  floater.

Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) = see Credit Derivatives 

Collateralized Mortgage Obligation CMO =

a priority claim against collateral used to back mortgage debt. This is considered a derivative financial instrument, because the value is derived from another asset whose value, in turn, varies with global and economic circumstances.

Combination Option = see compound derivatives and option.

Commitment Exposure =

economic exposure arising from the effects of foreign currency fluctuations on the cost curves of competitors. See firm commitment and hedge.

Commodity-Indexed Embedded Derivative =

a derivative embedded in a contract such as an interest bearing note that changes the amount of the payments according to movements of a commodity price index.  When a contract has such a provision, the embedded portion must be separated from the host contract and be accounted for as a derivative according to Paragraph 61i on Page 43 of FAS 133.   This makes embedded commodity indexed derivative accounting different than credit indexed and   inflation indexed embedded derivative accounting rules that do not allow separation from the host contract.  In this regard, credit indexed embedded derivative accounting is more like equity indexed accounting.In this regard, credit indexed embedded derivative accounting is more like equity indexed accounting. See index, equity-indexed, derivative financial instrument and embedded derivatives

In my viewpoint, not all commodity indexed derivatives fail the Paragraph 61i test.  See my Mexcobre Case.

Competitive Exposure =

economic exposure arising from the effects of foreign currency fluctuations on the cost curves of competitors.

Compound Derivatives  =

derivatives that encompass more than one contractual provision such that different risk exposures are hedged in the compound derivative contract.  Paragraph 18 on Pages 9-10 prohibits separation of a compound derivative into components to designate different risks and then use only one or a subset of components as a hedging instrument.  FAS 133, Pages 167-168, Paragraphs 360-361 discusses how the FASB clung to its position on pro rata decomposition in FAS 133 vis-à-vis the earlier Exposure Draft 162-B that also did not allow pro rata decomposition. Further discussion is given in Paragraphs 523-524.  See circus, derivative, embedded derivatives, and option.

Closely related are synthetic instruments arising when multiple financial instruments are synthetically combined into a single instrument, possibly to meet hedge criteria under FAS 133. FAS 133 does not allow synthetic instrument accounting. See Paragraphs 349-350 on Page 164 of FAS 133.  Examples 12-34 beginning in Paragraph 176 on Page 93 illustrate clearly-and-closely-related criteria in embedded hybrid derivative instruments.  These criteria are discussed under hedge.  For a case illustration of a synthetic instrument hedging situation see D.C. Cerf and F.J. Elmy, "Accounting for Derivatives:  The Case Study of a Currency Swap Used to Hedge Foreign Exchange Rate Exposure," Issues in Accounting Education, November 1999, 931-956.

In summary, for hedging purposes, a compound grouping of multiple derivatives (e.g., a portfolio of options or futures or forward contracts or any combination thereof) is prohibited from "separating a derivative into either separate proportions or separate portions and designating any component as a hedging instrument or designating different components as hedges of different exposures."   See Paragraphs 360-362 beginning on Page 167 of FAS 133.  Paragraphs dealing with compound derivative issues include the following:

  • Paragraph 18 beginning on Page 9,

  • Footnote 13 on Page 29,

  • Paragraphs 360-362 beginning on Page 167,

  • Paragraph 413 on Page 186,

  • Paragraphs 523-524 beginning on Page 225.

Section c(4) of Paragraph 4 on Page 2 of FAS 133 makes an exception to Paragraph 29a on Page 20 for portfolios of dissimilar assets and liabilities. It allows hedging under "net investment" criteria under Paragraph 20 of SFAS 52.  The gain or loss is reported in other comprehensive income as part of the cumulative translation adjustment. Reasons are given in Paragraph 477 on Page 208 of FAS 133:

The net investment in a foreign operation can be viewed as a portfolio of dissimilar assets and liabilities that would not meet the criterion in this Statement that the hedged item be a single item or a group of similar items. Alternatively, it can be viewed as part of the fair value of the parent's investment account. Under either view, without a specific exception, the net investment in a foreign operation would not qualify for hedging under this Statement. The Board decided, however, that it was acceptable to retain the current provisions of Statement 52 in that area. The Board also notes that, unlike other hedges of portfolios of dissimilar items, hedge accounting for the net investment in a foreign operation has been explicitly permitted by the authoritative literature.

For a derivative not designated as a hedging instrument, the gain or loss is recognized in earnings in the period of change.  Section 4(c) of Paragraph 4 of FAS 133 amends SFAS 52 on Foreign Currency Translation, to permit special accounting for a hedge of a foreign currency forecasted transaction with a derivative.  For more detail see foreign currency hedge.

Paragraph 42 on Page 26 reads as follows:

.A derivative instrument or a nonderivative financial instrument that may give rise to a foreign currency transaction gain or loss under Statement 52 can be designated as hedging the foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation. The gain or loss on a hedging derivative instrument (or the foreign currency transaction gain or loss on the nonderivative hedging instrument) that is designated as, and is effective as, an economic hedge of the net investment in a foreign operation shall be reported in the same manner as a translation adjustment to the extent it is effective as a hedge. The hedged net investment shall be accounted for consistent with Statement 52; the provisions of this Statement for recognizing the gain or loss on assets designated as being hedged in a fair value hedge do not apply to the hedge of a net investment in a foreign operation.  nonderivative financial instrument that may give rise to a foreign currency transaction gain or loss under Statement 52 can be designated as hedging the foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation. The gain or loss on a hedging derivative instrument (or the foreign currency transaction gain or loss on the nonderivative hedging instrument) that is designated as, and is effective as, an economic hedge of the net investment in a foreign operation shall be reported in the same manner as a translation adjustment to the extent it is effective as a hedge. The hedged net investment shall be accounted for consistent with Statement 52; the provisions of this Statement for recognizing the gain or loss on assets designated as being hedged in a fair value hedge do not apply to the hedge of a net investment in a foreign operation. 

These Section c(4) confusions in Paragraph 4 are illustrated in Examples 11-13 beginning on Page 270 of the Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998.

Paragraph 18 at the top of  Page 10 does allow a single derivative to be divided into components  but never with partitioning of  "different risks and designating each component as a hedging instrument."   An example using Dutch guilders versus French francs is given under cash flow hedge.  The problem is troublesome in circuses.

Compound derivative rules do not always apply to compound options such as a combination of put and call options.  Paragraph 28c on Page 19 of FAS 133 highlights these exceptions for written compound options or a combination of a written option and a purchased option.  The test is that for all changes in the underlying, the hedging outcome provides positive cash flows that are never less than the unfavorable cash flows.  See Example 16 beginning on Page 273 of of the Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998.

See Structure and Synthetic.

Comprehensive Income or Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) 
Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) and Accumulated OCI (AOCI)

OCI is equal to the change in equity of a business entity during a period from transactions and other events and circumstances from nonowner sources.   Paragraph 5 40 on Page 243 of FAS 133 defines it as follows:

The change in equity of a business enterprise during a period from transactions and other events and circumstances from nonowner sources.   It includes all changes in equity during a period except those resulting from investments by owners and distributions to owners (FASB Concepts Statement No. 6, Elements of Financial Statements, paragraph 70).

Comprehensive income includes all changes in equity during a period except those resulting from investments by owners and distributions to owners (FASB Concepts Statement No. 6, Elements of Financial Statements paragraph 70). The FASB’s ED 162-A proposed a standard on comprehensive income accounting that eventually became a standard in SFAS 130. FAS 133 sought to book financial instrument derivatives without changing net earnings levels prior to issuance of FAS 133. Accordingly, booking of derivative hedgings at fair market value, especially cash flow hedges, entails deferral of earnings in Other Comprehensive Income until cash settlements transpire. Comprehensive income is discussed at various points in FAS 133, notably Paragraphs 46-47, 18c, 127-130, 131-139, 140-143, 144-152, 162-164, 165-172, 173-177, and 338-344.  The acronym AOCI is sometimes used to depict accumulated other comprehensive income. 

The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) has not yet defined or required comprehensive statements or the Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) account.  This is especially important since it causes important reproted earnings differences  between IAS 39 versus FAS 133.  Under FAS 133, the OCI account is used for cash flow hedges.  OCI is not used under IAS 39.

See also struggle statement.

OCI and the Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income (AOCI) accounts are used in hedge accounting to keep booked changes in value of cash flow hedges and FX hedges from impacting current earnings to the extent such hedges are deemed effective.  See Hedge Accounting and Ineffectiveness.

Summary of FAS 130

Reporting Comprehensive Income (Issued 6/97)

Summary --- http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/stsum130.shtml 

This Statement establishes standards for reporting and display of comprehensive income and its components (revenues, expenses, gains, and losses) in a full set of general-purpose financial statements. This Statement requires that all items that are required to be recognized under accounting standards as components of comprehensive income be reported in a financial
statement that is displayed with the same prominence as other financial statements. This Statement does not require a specific format for that financial statement but requires that an enterprise display an amount representing total comprehensive income for the period in that financial statement.

This Statement requires that an enterprise (a) classify items of other comprehensive income by their nature in a financial statement and (b) display the accumulated balance of other comprehensive income separately from retained earnings and additional paid-in capital in the equity section of a statement of financial position.

This Statement is effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1997. Reclassification of financial statements for earlier periods provided for comparative purposes is required.

"Watch Out for OCI Accounting,"  April 8, 2002 --- http://www.fas133.com/search/search_article.cfm?page=51&areaid=955 

When Reliant Resources finally released its earnings in mid-March (see TRAS, 2/11/02), it became clear where the company’s FAS 133 hedge accounting went wrong; it’s a mistake other companies should ensure they do not repeat.

While in Reliant’s case, the mistake ended up contributing $134 million to the company’s 2001 net income, had the fair value of the derivatives in question gone the other way, the result would have been more ominous.

In essence, the FAS 133 mistake had to do with four “structured transactions” involving energy forwards which Reliant initially considered cash flow hedges and in retrospect, did not meet the definition.

In particular, the four transactions involved a series of individual forward contracts, mostly off-market (assuming a lower-than-market price initially in return for a higher-than-market price later).

While the combination of forwards was priced at market, the individual contracts were not. Some even involved some prepayment for credit reasons. Still, Reliant chose to account for each forward contract individually as a cash flow hedge set against an underlying transaction.

The real problem was in the initial accounting for the forwards. Under the original accounting, according to Reliant’s 8-K, “the Company recorded each applicable contract in its hedge accounting records on an individual basis, resulting in the recognition of a non-trading derivative asset or liability on the balance sheet with an offsetting entry in accumulated other comprehensive income at inception for each contract.”

Under FAS 133 cash flow hedge rules, however, OCI can only be used to record subsequent changes in the value of a hedging derivative. At inception, the forward should have had a fair value of 0. (Since they were off market, they have a fair value greater or lesser than 0).

Once you begin the hedge accounting with a debit/credit into OCI on day one of the hedge, “you’ve basically introduced a cancer into the balance sheet that will bleed errors into the income statement as the debits and credits get reclassified,” one accounting expert explains.

Under that original accounting, Reliant recorded a net loss in 2001 and ultimately would result in income being recorded for 2002 and 2003 related to these four structured transactions.

In some ways, the accounting did reflect the economics of the transaction, whereby Reliant agreed to sell below market initially in return for being able to sell at higher levels later on. Economically, it wanted to “levelize” what it considered high prices which were unlikely to last.

However, “the recognition of other comprehensive income was in error, because the fair value of each contract in each structure resulted not from changes in the fair value of any anticipated transaction, but rather from the fact that the individual contracts were not at market at inception,” the 8-K explains.

"Preliminary Lessons From Reliant Resources,"  February 27, 2002 --- http://www.fas133.com/search/search_article.cfm?areaid=454&page=51 

While financial hedges retained many of their risk management accounting features under FAS 133 (carry-overs from FAS 52 and FAS 80), in the area of commodity risk management accounting there's been some fundamental changes. It's perhaps an indication of the resulting complexity of the rules that Reliant Resources announced it has made an error in its Q2/Q3 financials, which will necessitate a restatement of earnings.

Earning restatements are bad news in any environment. Against the current backdrop of accounting-transparency debate in the wake of Enron, restatements because of accounting errors look even worse. However, Reliant Resources had to do just that - delay its earning release (so far there's no new release date) because it discovered FAS 133-related errors in its income statement.

The errors, according to the company, result from gas hedges in Q2 and Q3 of 2001. These were previously accounted for as cash flow hedges. Now, the company believes that they do not meet the requirements under FAS 133. This error will affect earning upward of $100 million. Basically, it means that the company now believes that it needs to carry the hedges at fair value, hence reclassifying gains that had been parked in OCI into current income. Reliant says it did not expect to recognize this income until this year and next year (presumably, these were one and two-year hedges).

It's hard to say exactly what happened. That's because the company is saying precious little about what led to its discovery. "Our people are not interested in going into details about the accounting, we're still working it out," says Sandy Fruhman, a PR contact at Reliant. As to when the new figures will be available, Ms. Fruhman says she has not been given a timeframe. "We're eager to get our yearend earnings reported," she notes.

No question about that, since any restatement of earnings (even a revision upward as was the case with Reliant), against the current accounting-focused marketplace, leads to a stock market penalty. The negative market reaction is proof enough that the restatement is not a matter of choice (i.e., earning manipulation). The FASB and the SEC had been previously concerned that some companies might terminate cash flow hedges when they are in a gain position in order to book the gains in income, for instance during years when earnings are down. "I would be surprised if that were the case," noted a partner at a big-five firm. "The market hammered them, so I don't suspect anything 'evil.' My guess is that they were just being honest."

All Reliant is willing to say is that in the course of preparing its annual report, its accounting department came to the conclusion that some of the gas hedges on its books, originally entered into in the second and third quarter of 2001, failed to meet cash flow hedge accounting rules and therefore must be marked to market in income. As a result, Reliant said it expects earnings for the two periods to increase by an amount between $100 million and $130 million. "The restatement, due to a reclassification of several specific transactions, will change the timing of earnings recognition, with the effect that the company will recognize earnings in 2001 that it previously expected to recognize in 2002 and 2003," the company noted.

A quick look at the company's quarterly filings reveals that it held a deferred gain of $495 million (see below) at the end of the third quarter. That's the same amount it disclosed in its Q2 report, and slightly under the Q1 deferred gain.

Contango Swap = the following according to one of my students:

A contango swap is a commodity curve swap, which enables the user to lock in a positive spread between the forward price and the spot price. A producer of a commodity, for example, might pay an amount equal to the 6-month futures contract and receive a floating payment equal to the daily price plus a spread. This enables the commodity producer to lock-in the positive spread and hedge against anticipated backwardation.    Her project on such a swap is as follows:

Debra W. Hutcheson For her case and case solution on Accounting for Commodity and Contango Swaps, click on http://www.resnet.trinity.edu/users/dhutches/project.htm .  She states the following:

This case examines the interplay of a cotton consumer and a cotton producer, both participating in a commodity swap, one of the many commodity-based financial instruments available to users. Each party wants to protect itself from commodity price risk and the cotton swap allows each participating party to "lock-in" a price for 6 million pounds of cotton. One party might lose in the cotton swap and, therefore, must enter into some other derivative alternatives. Additionally, this case examines the requirements for accounting for these contracts under the FASB’s latest exposure draft on accounting for derivatives and the "forward-looking" disclosure required by the SEC.

The term "contango" is also used in futures trading.  It refers to situations in which the spot price is higher than the futures price and converges toward  zero from above the futures price.  In contrast, backwardation arises when the spot price is lower than the futures price, thereby yielding an upward convergence as maturity draws near.  See basis.

Contingent Consideration =

outcomes that have maturities or payouts that depend upon the outcome of a a contingency such as a civil lawsuit.  Contingent consideration in a business combination as defined in Paragraph 78 of APB 16 are excluded (for the issuer) from the scope of FAS 133 under Paragraph 11c on Page 7.  Accounting for this type of transaction remains as originally required for the issuer in APB 16.  Contingent lease rentals based on related sales volume, inflation indexed rentals, and contingent rentals based upon a variable interest rate are also excluded from FAS 133 in Paragraph 61j on Page 43.

Convertible Debt =

a debt contract that has an embedded derivative such as an option to convert the instrument debt into common stock must be viewed as having an embedded option.  When a contract has such a provision, the embedded portion must be separated from the host contract and be accounted for as a derivative according to Paragraph 61k on Page 43 of FAS 133.   See derivative financial instrument and embedded option.

Covered Call and Covered Put  =

simultaneous writing (selling) of a call option coupled with ownership (long position) of the underlying asset.  The written call option is a short position that exposes the call option writer to upside risk.  A covered call transfers upside potential of the long position to the buyer of the call and, thereby, may create more upside price risk than downside price expected benefit.    Paragraph 399 on Page 180 does not allow hedge accounting for covered calls, because the upside potential must be equal to or greater than the downside potential.   In the case of a covered call, the upside risk may exceed the downside potential..   

A covered put entails writing (selling) a put option (long position) coupled with having a short position (e.g., a short sale contract) on the underlying asset.  In the case of a covered put, the downside risk may exceed the downside potential.

Paragraph 399 on Page 180 of FAS 133 does not allow covered call strategies that permit an entity to write an option on an asset that it owns.   In a covered call the combined position of the hedged item and the derivative option is asymmetrical in that exposure to losses is always greater than potential gains.  The option premium, however, is set so that the option writer certainly does not expect those "remotely possible" losses to occur.  Only when the potential gains are at least equal to potential cash flow losses will Paragraph 28c on Page 19 of FAS 133 kick in to allow a cash flow hedge under FAS 133.  Also see Paragraph 20c on Page 12.

Also see option and written option.

Credit Derivative and Credit Risk Swap =

Jensen Comment
Credit derivatives (usually credit default swaps that have a periodic premium paid for and pay periodically for credit insurance) are currently scoped into FAS 133 and IAS 39. I think that this is a mistake. These contracts are really insurance contracts and financial guarantees that should be accounted for as such and not as derivatives scoped into FAS 133 and IAS 39. Be that as it may, these controversial contracts that brought AIG and other Wall Street banks to its knees are accounted for as derivative contracts.

I really don’t think credit derivatives are appropriately accounted for under either FAS 133 or IAS 39. The problem is that the intermediary that brokers an interest rate risk swap can guarantee the interest rate risk swap payments since these swaps are only dealing with payments on the net changes in interest rates with the notionals not being at risk. It seems to me that with credit default swaps, the entire notionals themselves might be at risk and the intermediaries that broker the swaps are not guaranteeing the swap payments equal to complete wipeouts of notionals. Hence, I don’t thinks CDS swaps properly meet the definitions of derivatives since notionals are at risk. It seems to me that CDS contracts should be accounted for as insurance contracts.

This is one of those instances where I think auditors should look at the substance of the transactions rather than rules per se.

 

Credit Default Swap (CDS) at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credit_default_swap

A credit default swap (CDS) is an instrument to transfer the credit risk of fixed income products. Using technical terms, it is a bilateral contract, in which two counterparties agree to isolate and separately trade the credit risk of at least one third-party reference entity. The buyer of a credit swap receives credit protection. The seller 'guarantees' the credit worthiness of the product. In more technical language, a protection buyer pays a periodic fee to a protection seller in exchange for a contingent payment by the seller upon a credit event (such as a default or failure to pay) happening in the reference entity. When a credit event is triggered, the protection seller either takes delivery of the defaulted bond for the par value (physical settlement) or pays the protection buyer the difference between the par value and recovery value of the bond (cash settlement). Simply, the risk of default is transferred from the holder of the fixed income security to the seller of the swap. For example, a mortgage bank, ABC may have its credit default swaps currently trading at 265 basis points (bp). In other words, the annual cost to insure 10 million euros of its debt would be 265,000 euros. If the same CDS had been trading at 7 bp a year before, it would indicate that markets now view ABC as facing a greater risk of default on its mortgage obligations.

Credit default swaps resemble an insurance policy, as they can be used by debt owners to hedge, or insure against credit events such as a default on a debt obligation. However, because there is no requirement to actually hold any asset or suffer a loss, credit default swaps can also be used to speculate on changes in credit spread.

Credit default swaps are the most widely traded credit derivative product.[1] The typical term of a credit default swap contract is five years, although being an over-the-counter derivative, credit default swaps of almost any maturity can be traded.

"Everything You Wanted to Know about Credit Default Swaps--but Were Never Told," by Peter J. Wallison, RGE, January 25, 2009 ----
Click Here 
Also see http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#Bailout

Credit default swaps (CDSs) have been identified in media accounts and by various commentators as sources of risk for the institutions that use them, as potential contributors to systemic risk, and as the underlying reason for the bailouts of Bear Stearns and AIG. These assessments are seriously wide of the mark. They seem to reflect a misunderstanding of how CDSs work and how they contribute to risk management by banks and other intermediaries. In addition, the vigorous market that currently exists for CDSs is a significant source of market-based judgments on the credit conditions of large numbers of companies--information that is not publicly available anywhere else. Although the CDS market can be improved, excessive restrictions on it would create considerably more risk than it would eliminate.

There are so many potential culprits in the current financial crisis that it is difficult to keep them all straight or to assess their relative culpability. Greedy investment banks, incompetent rating agencies, predatory lenders and mortgage brokers--even the entire system of asset securitization--have all been blamed for the current condition of the financial markets. The oddest target, however, is CDSs. Almost every media report and commentary about the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September and the ensuing freeze in the credit markets mentions CDSs as one of the contributing causes, just as similar reports and commentary accompanied the government's decision to rescue Bear Stearns in March and AIG in September. One conventional explanation for the Bear rescue has been that CDSs made the financial markets highly "interconnected." It is in the nature of credit markets to be interconnected, however: that is the way money moves from where it is less useful to where it is most useful, and that is why financial institutions are called "intermediaries." Moreover, there is very little evidence that Bear was bailed out because of its involvement with CDSs--and some good evidence to refute that idea. First, if the government rescued Bear because of CDSs, why did it not also rescue Lehman? If the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve really believed that Bear had to be rescued because the market was interconnected through CDSs, they would never have allowed Lehman--a much bigger player in CDSs than Bear--to fail. In addition, although Lehman was a major dealer in CDSs--and a borrower on which many CDSs had been written--when it failed there was no discernible effect on its counterparties. Within a month after the Lehman bankruptcy, the swaps in which Lehman was an intermediary dealer were settled bilaterally, and the swaps written on Lehman itself ($72 billion notionally) were settled by the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC). The settlement was completed without incident, with a total cash exchange among all counterparties of $5.2 billion. There is no indication that the Lehman failure caused any systemic risk arising out of its CDS obligations--either as one of the major CDS dealers or as a failed company on which $72 billion in notional CDSs had been written.

Nevertheless, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) chairman Christopher Cox was quoted in a recent Washington Post series as telling an SEC roundtable: "The regulatory black hole for credit-default swaps is one of the most significant issues we are confronting in the current credit crisis . . . and requires immediate legislative action. . . . The over-the-counter credit-default swaps market has drawn the world's major financial institutions and others into a tangled web of interconnections where the failure of any one institution might jeopardize the entire financial system." Readers of this Outlook should judge for themselves whether this is even a remotely accurate portrayal of the dangers posed by CDSs.1

The fact that AIG was rescued almost immediately after Lehman's failure led once again to speculation that AIG had written a lot of CDS protection on Lehman and had to be bailed out for that reason. When the DTCC Lehman settlement was completed, however, AIG had to pay only $6.2 million on its Lehman exposure--a rounding error for this huge company. As outlined in a recent Washington Post series on credit risk and discussed below, AIG's exposure was not due to Lehman's failure but rather the result of the use (or misuse) of a credit model that failed to take account of all the risks the firm was taking.2 It is worth mentioning here that faulty credit evaluation on mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) have also been the cause of huge losses to commercial and investment banks. As I argue in this Outlook, there is no substantial difference between making a loan (or buying a portfolio of MBS) and writing protection on any of these assets through a CDS. Faulty credit evaluation in either case will result in losses.

If CDSs did not trigger the rescue of Bear and AIG, what did? The most plausible explanation is that in March, when Bear was about to fail, the international financial markets were very fragile. There was substantial doubt among investors and counterparties about the financial stability and even the solvency of many of the world's major financial institutions. It is likely that the government officials who decided to rescue Bear believed that if a major player like Bear were allowed to fail, there would be a run on other institutions. As Fed chairman Ben Bernanke said at the time, "Under more robust conditions, we might have come to a different decision about Bear Stearns."3 When the markets are in panic mode, every investor and counterparty is on a hair-trigger alert because the first one out the door is likely to be repaid in full while the latecomers will suffer losses. The failure of a large company like Bear in that moblike environment can be responsible for a rush to quality; in a normal market, there would have been a much more muted reaction. For example, when Drexel Burnham failed in 1990, there was nothing like the worldwide shock that ensued after Lehman's collapse, although Drexel was as large a factor in the market at that time as Lehman was before its failure.

After the Lehman bankruptcy, there was a market reaction much like what would have happened if Bear had failed. The markets froze, overnight interbank lending spreads went straight north, and banks stopped lending to one another. In these circumstances, the rescue of AIG was inevitable, although it is likely that the company would have been allowed to fail if the reaction to the Lehman failure had not been so shocking. The Fed's statement on its rescue of AIG pointed to the conditions in the market--not to CDSs or other derivatives--as the reason for its actions: "The Board determined that, in current circumstances, a disorderly failure of AIG could add to already significant levels of financial market fragility and lead to substantially higher borrowing costs, reduced household wealth, and materially weaker economic performance."4  Indeed, the sensitivity of the markets and the government in September is shown by the reaction of the Treasury and the Fed when the Reserve Fund, a money market mutual fund, "broke the buck"--that is, allowed the value of a share to fall below one dollar. The fund had apparently invested heavily in Lehman commercial paper and thus suffered a loss that the manager could not cover. Treasury moved immediately to guarantee the value of money market fund shares, apparently on fear that the Reserve Fund's losses would trigger a run on all money market funds. Needless to say, money market funds are not "interconnected." The Treasury's action in backing money market mutual funds after Lehman's failure was another response to the market's panic.

So, if CDSs are not responsible for the financial crisis or the need to rescue financial companies, why are they so distrusted? Some observers may simply be drawing a causal connection between the current financial crisis and something new in the financial firmament that they do not fully understand. Misleading references to the large "notional amount" of CDSs outstanding have not helped. This Outlook will outline how CDSs work and explain their value both as risk management devices and market-based sources of credit assessments. It will then review the main complaints about CDSs and explain that most of them are grossly overblown or simply wrong. Improvements can certainly be made in the CDS market, but the current war on this valuable financial innovation makes no sense.

How Credit Default Swaps Work

Figure 1 shows a series of simple CDS transactions. Bank B has bought a $10 million bond from company A, which in CDS parlance is known as "the reference entity." B now has exposure to A. If B does not want to keep this risk--perhaps it believes A's prospects are declining, or perhaps B wants to diversify its assets--it has two choices: sell the bond or transfer the credit risk. For a variety of tax and other reasons, B does not want to sell the bond, but it is able to eliminate most or all of the credit risk of A by entering a CDS. A CDS is nothing more than a contract in which one party (the protection seller) agrees to reimburse another party (the protection buyer) against a default on a financial obligation by a third party (the reference entity). In figure 1, the reference entity is A, the protection buyer is B and the protection seller is C. Although figure 1 shows B purchasing protection against its entire loan to A, it is important to note that B also could have purchased protection for a portion of the principal amount of the $10 million bond. The amount of protection that B purchases is called the "notional amount."

image003_512_03.jpg

The CDS market is a dealer market, so transactions take place through dealers, over the counter rather than on an exchange. Accordingly, in purchasing protection against A's default, B's swap is with C, a dealer--one of many, including the world's leading banks, that operate in this market. The structure of the CDS is simple. C agrees to pay $10 million (or whatever notional amount the parties negotiate) if A defaults, and B agrees to make an annual premium payment (usually paid quarterly) to C. The size of this payment or premium will reflect the risk that C believes it is assuming in protecting B against A's default. If A is a good credit, the premium will be small, and correspondingly the premium would be larger when the market perceives greater credit risk in A. Under the typical CDS contract, B is entitled to request collateral from C in order to assure C's performance. As a dealer, C generally aims to keep a matched book. For every risk it takes on, it typically acquires an offsetting hedge. So C enters a CDS with D, and D posts collateral. The transfer of B's risk to C and then to D (and occasionally from D to E and so on) is often described by many CDS critics as a "daisy chain" of obligations, but this description is misleading. Each transaction between counterparties in figure 1 is a separate transaction, so B can look only to C if A defaults, and C must look to D. B will not usually deal directly with E. However, there are now services, such as those of a firm called Trioptima, that are engaged in "compressing" this string of transactions so that the intermediate obligations are "torn up." This reduces outstandings and counterparty risk.

Does this hypothetical string of transactions create any significant new risks that go beyond the risk created when B made its loan to A? In the transaction outlined in figure 1, each of the parties in the chain has two distinct risks--that its counterparty will be unable to perform its obligation either before or after A defaults. If C becomes bankrupt before A defaults, B will have to find a new protection seller; if C defaults after A defaults, B will lose the protection that it sought from the swap. The same is true for C and D if their respective counterparties default. In the CDS market, in which premiums are negotiated based on current views of the risk of A's default, the premium--also known as the spread--for new protection against A's default could be more costly for B, C, and D than the original premium negotiated. Although this might mean a potential loss to any of these parties, it is likely--if the risk of a default by A has been increasing--that the seller of protection will have posted collateral so that each buyer will be able to reimburse itself for the additional premium cost for a new CDS.

It is important at this point to understand how the collateral process works. Either the buyer or the seller in a CDS transaction may be "in the money" at any point--that is, the CDS spread, which is moving with market judgments, may be rising or falling, depending on the market's judgment of the reference entity's credit. At the moment the CDS transaction was entered, the buyer and seller were even, but if the credit of the reference entity begins to decline, the CDS spread will rise, and at that point the buyer is "in the money"--it is paying a lower premium than the risk would warrant. Depending on the terms of the original agreement, the seller then may have to post collateral--or more collateral. But if the reference entity's credit improves--say, its business prospects are better--then the CDS spread will fall and the seller is in the money. In this case, the buyer may have to put up collateral to ensure that it will continue to make the premium payments.

What happens if A defaults? Assuming that there are no other defaults among the parties in figure 1, there is a settlement among the parties, in which E is the ultimate obligor (conceptually, C has paid B, D has paid C, and E has paid D. But if E defaults, D becomes the ultimate payer, and if D defaults, C ends up holding the bag. Of course, D then would have a claim against E or E's bankrupt estate, and the same for C if D defaults. Critics of CDSs argue that this "daisy chain" is an example of interconnections created by CDSs that might in turn create systemic risk as each member of the string of transactions defaults because of the new liability it must assume. But this analysis is superficial. If CDSs did not exist, B would suffer the loss associated with A's default, and there is no reason to believe that the loss would stop with B. B is undoubtedly indebted to others, and its loss on the loan to A might cause B to default on these obligations, just as E's default might have caused D to default on its obligations to C. In other words, the credit markets are already interconnected. With or without CDSs, the failure of a large enough participant can--at least theoretically--send a cascade of losses through this highly interconnected structure. CDSs simply move the risk of that result from B to C, D, or E, but they do not materially increase the risk created when B made its loan to A. No matter how many defaults occur in the series of transactions presented in figure 1, there is still only one $10 million loss. The only question is who ultimately pays it.

The Role of Credit Default Swaps in the Financial Economy

Financial regulators have few resources that will materially reduce risk-taking. They can insist on more capital, which both provides a cushion against losses and a nest egg that management has an incentive to protect, and they can clamp down on innovation, which can always be a source of uncertainty and therefore risk. But beyond that, they are limited to ensuring that banks, securities firms, and insurance companies--to the extent that they are regulated for safety and soundness--carefully review the risks they take and have the records to show for it. The current credit crunch is testimony to the ineffectiveness of regulation. Despite the most comprehensive oversight of any industry, the banking sector is riddled with bad investments and resulting losses. In fact, by creating moral hazard, it is likely that the regulation of banks has reduced the private-sector scrutiny that banks would have received as part of a fully operating system of market discipline.

In light of the consistent failure of traditional regulation, a sophisticated and intelligent regulatory process should now foster risk-management innovations that have been developed by the private sector, especially the derivative instruments that have greater potential to control risk than government oversight. CDSs are one of these instruments, but not the only one. A simple example of effective risk-shifting is the interest rate swap, which--like the CDS--was developed by financial intermediaries looking for ways to manage risk. The documentation for interest rate swaps, as well as for CDSs, was developed by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). Interest rate swaps have been an important and useful risk-management device in the financial markets for at least twenty-five years. The value of an interest rate swap is that it allows financial intermediaries to match their assets and their liabilities and thus to reduce their interest rate risks. Say that a bank has deposits on which it must pay a market or "floating" rate of interest, but it also holds mortgages on which it receives only a fixed monthly interest payment. This is a typical position for a bank--but a risky one. If interest rates rise, it may be forced to pay more interest to its depositors than it is receiving from the mortgages it holds, and thus would suffer losses. Ideally, it would want to trade the fixed rate it receives on its mortgage portfolio for a floating rate that will more closely match what it has to pay its depositors. That way, it is protected against increases in market rates. An interest swap, in which the bank pays a fixed rate to a counterparty and receives a floating rate in return, is the answer; it matches the bank's interest rate receipts to its payment obligations.

But what kind of entity would want to do such a swap? Consider an insurance company that has fixed obligations to pay out a certain sum monthly on the fixed annuities it has written. Insurance companies try to match this obligation with bonds and notes that are the ultimate source of the funds for meeting its fixed obligations, but these do not necessarily yield a fixed return for periods long enough to fully fund its annuity commitments. Instead, they mature well before its annuity obligations expire, and may--if interest rates decline--yield less than it is required to pay out to annuitants. The insurance company, then, would be able to avoid risk with a swap that is the exact mirror image of what the bank needs. Into this picture steps a swap dealer, which arranges a fixed-for-floating interest rate swap between the bank and insurance company. The notional amount can be set at any number--its purpose in an interest rate swap is simply to provide the principal amount on which the interest will be paid--so the parties agree on $100 million. The bank agrees to pay the insurance company a fixed amount--say, 5 percent--on the notional amount of $100 million, and the insurance company agrees to pay the bank a floating rate of interest on the same notional amount. If interest rates rise to 6 percent, the bank is "in the money" and the insurance company pays the bank the 1 percent difference, and, if they fall to 4 percent, the bank pays the insurance company 1 percent.

The important thing to notice about this transaction is that both the bank and the insurance company are better off--both have reduced their risks. The bank now gets a floating payment that assures it of the funds necessary to pay its depositors no matter how high interest rates rise, and the insurance company is better off because it gets a fixed payment from the bank that allows it to pay its annuitants no matter how far interest rates fall. Both parties have hedged their interest rate risk through use of a derivative. The notional amount of interest rate swaps currently outstanding grew to $464.7 trillion by June 30, 2008.5 This is a frighteningly large number, but--as discussed below--its only reality is as the basis on which counterparties are exchanging fixed for floating rates. No one actually owes anyone any portion of this $464.7 trillion. The payment obligations are only interest. The interest rate swap is a classic example of a private-sector mechanism for risk management that could not have been developed or implemented by a regulatory agency. It is also a good way to think about CDSs, which have risk-management characteristics much like interest rate swaps.6 Let's assume that a bank holds a loan to a corporate customer that makes oil field equipment. The bank is receiving a stream of payments on the loan with which it is satisfied, but it concludes as a matter of risk management that it has too much credit exposure to the oil business. If oil prices fall, its loans to the industry may be in jeopardy. One of the objectives of risk management is diversification, but even better is holding uncorrelated assets--that is, assets that do not rise or fall in value or marketability at the same time. Still better, from the risk-management standpoint, are assets that are negatively correlated--that rise in value when the others are falling. For example, a bank would like to hold loans to both an auto manufacturer and an oil company; as oil prices rise, the auto manufacturer becomes weaker but the oil company becomes stronger; other things being equal, the bank's risks are balanced.

Using this strategy, the hypothetical bank we are discussing would like to divest some of its oil industry exposure and instead balance its portfolio with exposure to the risk of, say, auto sales. In a world where CDSs are available, this is easily done. The bank enters a swap with an intermediary CDS dealer in which the dealer promises to reimburse the bank if the oil field services company defaults. The dealer must now find a hedge in the form of a company that is willing to sell protection on the oil services company. A logical protection seller might be an insurance company. The insurance company has substantial outstanding loans on commercial real estate. Taking on the risk of an oil service company would provide needed diversification and could be uncorrelated--or even negatively correlated--with the places where the insurance company's commercial real estate is located. Through this transaction, the bank has reduced or eliminated the credit risk of a loan to the oil industry, but the loan remains on its books and it keeps the oil company's stream of interest and principal payments, as well as its commercial relationship with this client. Now the bank enters another CDS, this time with a hedge fund, in which the bank promises to indemnify the fund against losses on a portfolio of loans to auto dealers. For this protection, the hedge fund makes a monthly payment to the bank (for simplicity, we are disregarding the intermediary dealer). After these two transactions, the bank has somewhat diversified and balanced its portfolio by substituting the credit risk of a portfolio of auto loans for an oil industry loan. Because the portfolio of auto loans may be negatively correlated with the oil industry risks, the bank's portfolio is now likely to be more stable. The insurance company has done the same. Once again, a derivative has operated as an effective risk management tool, reducing the credit risk profile of two financial intermediaries.

It is also important to note that the same risk-management purposes can be served by a bank or any other financial intermediary taking on a risk that diversifies its portfolio, even if it has no relation at all to a reference entity. Because the party writing the protection is paid for assuming the credit risk, the CDS functions in much the same way, from a risk management perspective, as an actual loan. This issue is discussed more fully below in the section on whether CDSs represent "gambling" or "betting."

CDSs also offer an increasingly important window into risk-taking that has not previously existed. In this, CDSs can help both investors and regulators. On November 25, for example, a newswire reported: "Credit default swaps protection generally narrowed Tuesday amid improvement in key spread product markets such as the commercial mortgage-backed securities and asset-backed arena."7 Similarly, on December 10, the interim assistant treasury secretary for financial stability, Neel Kashkari, told the House Financial Services Committee that "one indicator that points to reduced risk of default among financial institutions is the average credit default swap spread for the eight largest U.S. banks, which has declined more than 200 basis points since before Congress passed the [Emergency Economic Stabilization Act]."8

The fact that CDSs are available as an indicator of risk in the financial markets generally, and with respect to particular institutions, is vastly important. Up to now, there has been no generally available, market-based source of credit assessments about financial institutions. Interest rate spreads and stock prices are not as valuable because they are influenced by many factors other than risk-taking and creditworthiness. If properly used, the data on CDS spreads for reference entities can alert regulators to problems at individual banks, securities firms, or insurance companies. Even more important, it can assist investors and creditors in exerting market discipline over financial institutions. In light of the general failure of regulation for controlling risk-taking, the enhancement of market discipline is extremely important. A widening of a reference entity's CDS spread will alert investors that they should investigate risk-taking more fully before advancing funds. Even if CDSs were not important for risk management, the existence of the information generated by the CDS market would alone provide economic justification for allowing this market to operate freely and without restrictions. The importance of this development cannot be overstated. Virtually since their inception, banks have been the repositories of credit information about borrowers. As the securities market grew and public disclosure became more complete, banks lost some of their role as the preferred intermediaries between investors and borrowers; many public companies went to the securities market for credit financing. At the same time, rating agencies began to substitute for credit analysis by some institutional lenders and bond buyers. The growth of CDSs provides for the first time a market-based credit assessment available to all institutional lenders and bond buyers. At a time when the value of rating agencies is being questioned,9 the CDS market offers critical new information to use in credit assessment.

Myths about Credit Default Swaps

Despite these significant benefits, criticism of CDSs is widespread. It is not uncommon to find statements by market observers that CDSs have no economic purpose, create enormous risks for the financial economy, create systemic risks, are little more than irresponsible gambling by market participants, and create hidden liabilities that do not appear in financial statements. Almost all of these claims are either grossly exaggerated or wrong.

Claim: The Notional Amount of CDSs Outstanding Represents a Huge Risk for the World's Financial System. One of the most striking elements associated with credit default swaps is the notional amount outstanding at any one time. As a measure of the growth of CDSs, the aggregate notional amount is of some use, but as a measure of the risk in the market, it is meaningless. Nevertheless, critics of CDS use the aggregate notional amount number to suggest that huge risks are being created in some mysterious way. Shortly after Bear Stearns was rescued, George Soros wrote: "There is an esoteric financial instrument called credit default swaps. The notional amount of CDS contracts outstanding is roughly $45 [trillion]. . . . To put it into perspective, this is about equal to half the total US household wealth."10 This is not putting CDSs "into perspective." Coming from a sophisticated financier, it seems more like a deliberate attempt to mislead. The notional amount of CDSs outstanding--although suitable for scaring people--is not in any sense relevant to the size of the risks associated with CDSs.

Returning again to the hypothetical transaction in figure 1, we can calculate the notional amount that comes out of the reporting of the transaction by the various participants. B reports that it is paying a premium for protection on a notional amount of $10 million (the loan to A), C reports that it has sold protection for this amount, as have D and E and the dealer intermediary between D and E. Thus, the total notional amount arising from this series of transactions is $50 million, or five times the actual potential loss in the event that A defaults. The DTCC recently began publishing data on CDSs from its Trade Information Warehouse, which gathers about 90 percent of all CDS transactions.11 The DTCC's data eliminate the multiple-counting in each swap transaction and report that as of the week ending December 12, what the DTCC calls the "gross notional amount" of CDSs outstanding was $25.6 trillion.12

This amount is many times the actual potential loss on all CDSs outstanding at any time because the protection sold must be reduced by the protection bought. The result is called the net notional amount and has been estimated at 10 percent of the gross notional amount in the market.13 Accordingly, using the gross notional figure reported by the DTCC, we can estimate that the net notional amount is about $2.5 trillion (a total of $2.75 trillion with the additional 10 percent not reported by DTCC), a sum that is a fraction of the figure Soros used. These are not small numbers, of course, but they are far less than the number usually used to describe the total risk in the CDS market. And even these numbers are only "real" if every reference entity were to default and if sellers' recoveries after these defaults were zero.

Claim: CDSs Are Written by or between Parties That Do Not Understand the Risks They Are Assuming. In one sense, this statement is true. There are always lenders who lose money because they do not understand the risk they are assuming, and there are undoubtedly writers of CDS protection who also do not understand the credit risk to which they are exposed. If the statement is meant to communicate the idea that a CDS risk is different from or more complex than a loan (or the acquisition of a portfolio of MBS), however, it is wrong. First, almost all swaps are negotiated through dealers, who serve as the actual counterparties. Dealers typically carry matched books, which means that they hedge their risks by entering offsetting CDSs. To remain in business, they must be sure of the quality of the counterparties they choose. In figure 1, for example, B buys protection from C, a dealer. C then enters a corresponding swap with D, which sells protection to C to cover C's exposure to B. If D does not have a AAA credit rating (and maybe even if it does), it probably has to post collateral to protect C, and C may have to post collateral to assure B that it is protected. In fact, 63 percent of all CDSs--and 65 percent of the dollar exposure--are collateralized,14 precisely because the parties that are paying for protection want to make sure it is there when they need it. In addition, recalling the earlier discussion of counterparties moving in and out of the money, a protection buyer and a protection seller may have obligations to post collateral if the spread on a particular reference entity rises or falls. No institution that enters this market does so lightly.

The AIG case is a good illustration of the CDS process and was covered extensively in the Washington Post series cited above. Initially, AIG's counterparties generally agreed that AIG would not be required to post collateral because it was rated AAA, but when it was downgraded by the rating agencies, it was immediately required by its swap agreements to post collateral. In addition, AIG had written a lot of protection on MBS and CDO portfolios, and, as these declined in value, it was again required by its counterparties to post collateral to cover its increased exposure. When AIG could not do so, it was threatened with bankruptcy, and that is when the Fed stepped in with a rescue. The rescue of AIG, as noted above, had nothing to do with Lehman's failure, but it did have a lot to do with AIG's failure to assess the risks of MBS and CDOs. Does this sound familiar? Of course it does--it is the same problem faced by many banks that also failed to assess properly the risk of these assets. Apparently, AIG relied excessively on a credit risk model that did not adequately account for both the sharp decline in the mortgage market or a downgrade of AIG's credit rating.

This points up a fact that gets too little attention in the discussion of CDSs: that the best analogy for these instruments is an ordinary commercial loan. A seller of protection is taking on virtually the same risk exposure as a lender. It is no more mysterious than that. Successful lending requires expertise in assessing credit--the same skill required for writing CDS protection. AIG, like many banks, misjudged the riskiness of a portfolio of MBS and CDOs. That does not mean that CDSs are any riskier than loans; if AIG, instead of selling protection on various portfolios of MBS and CDOs, had bought the portfolios themselves, there would have been very little commentary other than clucking about the company's poor credit judgment. For some reason, the fact that it did substantially the same thing by selling protection on these instruments through CDSs has caused commentators to see the issue as a problem created by the swaps rather than as a simple example of poor credit assessment.

Recently, in order to eliminate the constant calls for more collateral, the Fed purchased the portfolios of MBS and CDOs on which AIG had written protection. An article in the Wall Street Journal then noted that this was a "blessing" for the banks that had bought protection from AIG. Indeed it was; that is why the banks bought the protection. If AIG had not covered this liability, the banks would have taken these losses. This illustrates another central point about CDSs: one institution's loss is another's gain. The risk was already in the market. It was created when some bank or investment bank borrowed the funds necessary for assembling a portfolio of MBS or CDOs. The fact that AIG was the final counterparty and suffered the loss means that someone else did not. Ultimately, there is only one real risk, represented by the original loan or purchase transaction (in the case of an asset like an MBS portfolio). CDSs, to the extent that they are initiated by parties that are actually exposed to a risk, merely transfer that risk, for a price, to someone else.

A recent article in the Wall Street Journal focused on an instrument called a synthetic CDO and noted that many buyers of these instruments suffered losses because of the meltdown in the U.S. mortgage market.15 Because a CDS is a part of a synthetic CDO, the article once again raised the question of whether protection sellers in the CDS transaction understand the risks they are assuming. However, the writers of the article did not make clear (or failed to understand) that, despite a fancy name and the presence of a CDS, the buyers of these instruments were taking a risk that was essentially identical to investing in a portfolio of loans. In an ordinary CDO, a number of loans are bundled into a pool, and debt instruments are sold to investors backed by the assets in the pool. A CDO, then, is just a generalized term for the same process in which the more familiar MBS are created. The investor in a CDO takes the risk that the instruments in the pool will not lose value or default. In a synthetic CDO, an investor buys a security issued by a special purpose vehicle (SPV) and becomes the seller of protection in a CDS in which the SPV is the protection buyer. The SPV is usually created by a bank that is seeking CDS protection on a portfolio of loans it intends to continue to hold. The SPV uses the cash investment to buy a portfolio of high-quality debt securities. The low yield on the high-quality debt securities is supplemented by the premium on a CDS, and two yields in effect replicate the yield that the investor would have received--and the risk it would have taken--if it had invested in the same portfolio of loans that the bank is holding. Once again, there is no essential difference between investing in the actual loans or investing in the synthetic CDO. The credit risk and the yield are the same.

The Journal story noted that "towns, charities, school districts, pension funds, insurance companies and regional banks" have taken on the risk of these synthetic CDOs and that some have suffered losses as a result of the weakening credit markets. Of course, many (maybe most) have profited from the premiums they have received over time for taking this risk. Two things should be noted at this point. The first is that while synthetic CDOs replicate the risks associated with a portfolio of loans, they are complex investments; there is a question whether they are suitable investments for towns, school districts, and other investors that may not be able properly to evaluate the risks. To the extent that this happened, it would be a violation of the "investor suitability" rules applicable in the United States and any equivalent rules in the countries where these investments were sold. The second point is that the fault in this process was not with the CDSs that were part of the synthetic CDOs, any more than a corporation would be at fault if a bond dealer sold one of its bonds to an investor who could not understand the risks. The role of the CDS is to replicate the risk of owning a portfolio of loans, and the risk they create is not any greater than that.

Writing CDS protection is much the same as making a loan or buying a bond. In order to participate in this market, an institution must have the capability to evaluate credit risk. It is not a market for individuals or even institutions that do not have credit-evaluation skills or access to them. Even institutions with credit-evaluation skills suffer losses on some risks they acquire--as shown by the AIG case--but it is certainly not true that, in general, those institutions that buy and sell CDSs are not aware of the risks they are assuming.

Claim: Transactions between Parties That Have Nothing to Do with the Reference Entity Are Simply Gambling and Have No Independent Value. Because CDSs are much like loans, they can be used to take on the same risk as a loan or a bond. If an institutional investor believes that an issuer will grow stronger over time, it can buy the company's bonds and profit from the strengthening of the issuer's credit position. Alternatively, the investor can sell protection on the same notional amount as the bond--that is, taking on the same exposure without actually buying the bond--and profit in the same way. If the issuer's prospects improve, the CDS rises in value because the premium received is now greater than it would need to be for the lower risk involved. The seller of protection is now "in the money" in the sense that it has an asset that has appreciated in value.

The risk management benefits of CDSs exist independently of whether a lender has any financial interest in a particular reference entity. Thus, the bank that bought protection on its loan to an oil service company could achieve the same risk management purposes--reducing its exposure to the oil industry--by buying protection on an equivalent notional amount of an oil company's outstanding obligations, even though it does not have any direct exposure to the oil company. If the risk is highly correlated with the oil service company's risk, the bank can nearly duplicate the same risk management result. Just as an investor can do this for risk management or hedging purposes, it can also do it as speculation, without having any direct financial interest in the issuer that is the reference entity. Indeed, when a dealer is approached by an institution to buy or sell protection, it is impossible to tell whether the purpose is hedging an existing risk or speculating on the change in the risk profile of the reference entity. Is this simply betting, as some suggest, or does it have a value apart from its value to the two parties involved?

In discussing this subject, it would be useful to avoid the pejorative terms "betting" or "gambling" and use the term "speculation," which more closely approximates what is happening when a party buys or sells protection without any connection to the reference entity involved. Speculation is frequently denounced, while "hedging" is considered good and prudent, yet it is very difficult to tell the difference between the two. Commodity futures have for a long time permitted farmers to protect themselves in the event of a decline in prices when their crop is ready for market. Most people would call this prudent hedging, but what are the investors on the other side of the futures trade doing? In effect, they are selling protection, just like the seller in the CDS transaction. Some observers might call this speculation because the seller of protection to the farmer is speculating (others might call it "gambling" or "betting") that the price will be higher than what he has agreed to pay the farmer. Thus, speculation can have an important role in making markets work.

It may be objected, however, that in hedging or speculation transactions, real things like wheat or loan exposure are involved, while buying or selling CDSs without any connection to the reference entity is different. Consider then puts and calls--options to sell or buy stocks--that are traded regularly on the Chicago Board Options Exchange. These are an accepted part of equity markets and are known as equity derivatives. They can be used for hedging a stock position without selling or buying the stock, or they can be used--without owning the stock--simply to speculate that a stock's price will go up or down. The function of puts and calls is exactly the same as the role played by those who buy or sell CDSs without any connection to a reference entity. The transaction adds to the liquidity and the total information in the market. That is in part why the buying and selling of CDSs provides a continuous, market-based assessment of the credit of a large number of commercial or industrial companies and financial institutions. Some people consider speculation in a security or a commodity to be betting, but economists recognize that this activity provides benefits to a market through added market liquidity and mitigation of bubbles. In the case of CDSs, however, the exogenous benefits of speculation are particularly strong because it provides a market-based credit judgment about the financial position of individual issuers that is not available anywhere else.

Claim: There Is No Way to Know by Looking at a Company's Balance Sheet How Much CDS Exposure It Has Taken On. Exposures to CDS transactions as a protection seller are shown on all balance sheets where that exposure is deemed to be material. The exposure is shown in the aggregate, without listing particular transactions or risks, just as a bank would show its commercial and industrial loans in the aggregate. Normally, parties selling protection have hedged themselves, and it is very unlikely that all, or even most, exposures will result in liability at the same time. So, for the most part, CDS liabilities are carried on balance sheets at somewhere between 1 and 2 percent of their notional amount, reflecting both hedges and the likelihood of losses on a diversified portfolio. Of course, as risks rise or fall, these values are adjusted. The nature of these liabilities is then described in a footnote.

Because CDSs sold or bought by dealers are marked to market every day, it is possible that the risk associated with protecting a counterparty will increase as the financial condition of the reference entity deteriorates. This may require the liability of the protection seller to be written up on its balance sheet, and will almost certainly require more collateral. The opposite is also true. If the reference entity's financial condition markedly improves--perhaps its business prospects are better--the liability on the protection seller's balance sheet will diminish and the collateral requirement could be reduced, eliminated entirely, or moved to the buyer of protection if the seller is now "in the money." This also means that a CDS can move from a liability to an asset on the balance sheet of the buyer or seller, depending on whether the spread on the reference entity has risen (advantage to the buyer) or declined (advantage to the seller) since the CDS was contracted.

Conclusion

Although the Lehman failure demonstrated that the CDS market works well even under severe stress, there are proposals for improvements and reforms. These reforms--including a clearinghouse or an exchange for CDSs and perhaps some additional form of regulation for the CDS market as a whole--are beyond the scope of this Outlook. However, because CDSs and their value are not well understood, there is a serious danger of excessive regulation that will impair the value of CDSs for risk management and credit assessment purposes. As reform proposals take shape, I may revisit this issue in a subsequent Outlook.

Far from creating new or significant risks, CDSs simply move risks that already exist from one place to another. For this reason, they are a major advance in risk management for all financial intermediaries, and restrictions on their use will create more risk in the financial system than it will eliminate. In addition, the vigorous and liquid current market in CDSs provides a market-based reading of the risks of companies that is not available from any other source and that can be of major assistance to regulators, as well as investors and creditors.

 


The Oxford Handbook of Credit Derivatives (Oxford Handbooks)

Customers who have purchased or rated Credit Derivatives: Instruments, Applications, and Pricing (Frank J. Fabozzi Series) by Mark J. Anson PhD CFA might like to know that The Oxford Handbook of Credit Derivatives (Oxford Handbooks) will be released on March 22, 2011.  You can pre-order yours by following the link below.

The Oxford Handbook of Credit Derivatives (Oxford Handbooks)
Alexander Lipton
 
List Price: $150.00
Price: $139.21
 

Actually only $67 at Amazon.


The book looks strong on explaining CDS contrracts but weak on FAS 133 and IAS 9/39 rules for accounting for such contracts.
 
Before buying, readers may want to look up the term "credit derivatives" at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm

 


"Coming Soon ... Securitization with a New, Improved (and Perhaps Safer) Face,   Knowledge@Wharton, April 2, 2008 ---
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm;jsessionid=a83051431af9532a7261?articleid=1933

 


"FASB Issues FSP Requiring Enhanced Disclosure for Credit Derivative and Financial Guarantee Contracts,"  by Mark Bolton and Shahid Shah, Deloitte Heads Up, September 18, 2008 Vol. 15, Issue 35 --- http://www.iasplus.com/usa/headsup/headsup0809derivativesfsp.pdf

September 18, 2008

Vol. 15, Issue 35

The FASB recently issued FSP FAS 133-1 and FIN 45-4,1 which amends and enhances the disclosure requirements for sellers of credit derivatives (including hybrid instruments that have embedded credit derivatives) and financial guarantees. The new disclosures must be provided for reporting periods (annual or interim) ending after November 15, 2008, although earlier application is encouraged. The FSP also clarifies the effective date of Statement 161.2

The FSP defines a credit derivative as a "derivative instrument (a) in which one or more of its underlyings are related to the credit risk of a specified entity (or a group of entities) or an index based on the credit risk of a group of entities and (b) that exposes the seller to potential loss from credit-risk-related events specified in the contract." In a typical credit derivative contract, one party makes payments to the seller of the derivative and receives a promise from the seller of a payoff if a specified third party or parties default on a specific obligation. Examples of credit derivatives include credit default swaps, credit index products, and credit spread options.

The popularity of these products, coupled with the recent market downturn and the potential liabilities that could arise from these conditions, prompted the FASB to issue this FSP to improve the transparency of disclosures provided by sellers of credit derivatives. Also, because credit derivative contracts are similar to financial guarantee contracts, the FASB decided to make certain conforming amendments to the disclosure requirements for financial guarantees within the scope of Interpretation 45.3

Credit Derivative Disclosures

The FSP amends Statement 1334 to require a seller of credit derivatives, including credit derivatives embedded in hybrid instruments, to provide certain disclosures for each credit derivative (or group of similar credit derivatives) for each statement of financial position presented. These disclosures must be provided even if the likelihood of having to make payments is remote. Required disclosures include:

In This Issue:

• Credit Derivative Disclosures

• Financial Guarantee Disclosures

• Effective Date and Transition

• Effective Date of Statement 161

1 FASB Staff Position No. FAS 133-1 and FIN 45-4, "Disclosures About Credit Derivatives and Certain Guarantees: An Amendment of FASB Statement No. 133 and FASB Interpretation No. 45; and Clarification of the Effective Date of FASB Statement No. 161."

2 FASB Statement No. 161, Disclosures About Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities.

3 FASB Interpretation No. 45, Guarantor’s Accounting and Disclosure Requirements for Guarantees, Including Indirect Guarantees of Indebtedness of Others.

4 FASB Statement No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities.

• The nature of the credit derivative, including:

o The approximate term of the derivative.

o The reason(s) for entering into the derivative.

o The events or circumstances that would require the seller to perform under the derivative.

o The status of the payment/performance risk of the derivative as of the reporting date. This can be based on a recently issued external credit rating or an internal grouping used by the entity to manage risk. (If an internal grouping is used, the entity also must disclose the basis for the grouping and how it is used to manage risk.)

• The maximum potential amount of future payments (undiscounted) the seller could be required to make under the credit derivative contract (or the fact that there is no limit to the maximum potential future payments). If a seller is unable to estimate the maximum potential amount of future payments, it also must disclose the reasons why.

• The fair value of the derivative.

• The nature of any recourse provisions and assets held as collateral or by third parties that the seller can obtain and liquidate to recover all or a portion of the amounts paid under the credit derivative contract.

For hybrid instruments that have embedded credit derivatives, the required disclosures should be provided for the entire hybrid instrument, not just the embedded credit derivative.

Financial Guarantee Disclosures

As noted previously, the FASB did not perceive substantive differences between the risks and rewards of sellers of credit derivatives and those of financial guarantors. With one exception, the disclosures in Interpretation 45 were consistent with the disclosures that will now be required for credit derivatives. To make the disclosures consistent, the FSP amends Interpretation 45 to require guarantors to disclose "the current status of the payment/performance risk of the guarantee."

Effective Date and Transition

Although it is effective for reporting periods ending after November 15, 2008, the FSP requires comparative disclosures only for periods presented that ended after the effective date. Nevertheless, it encourages entities to provide comparative disclosures for earlier periods presented.

Effective Date of Statement 161

After the issuance of Statement 161, some questioned whether its disclosures are required in the annual financial statements for entities with noncalendar year-ends (e.g., March 31, 2009). To address this confusion, the FSP clarifies that the disclosure requirements of Statement 161 are effective for quarterly periods beginning after November 15, 2008, and fiscal years that include those periods. However, in the first fiscal year of adoption, an entity may omit disclosures related to quarterly periods that began on or before November 15, 2008. Early application is encouraged.

Jensen Comment
Credit derivatives (usually credit default swaps that have a periodic premium paid for and pay periodically for credit insurance) are currently scoped into FAS 133 and IAS 39. I think that this is a mistake. These contracts are really insurance contracts and financial guarantees that should be accounted for as such and not as derivatives scoped into FAS 133 and IAS 39. Be that as it may, these controversial contracts that brought AIG and other Wall Street banks to its knees are accounted for as derivative contracts.

I really don’t think credit derivatives are appropriately accounted for under either FAS 133 or IAS 39. The problem is that the intermediary that brokers an interest rate risk swap can guarantee the interest rate risk swap payments since these swaps are only dealing with payments on the net changes in interest rates with the notionals not being at risk. It seems to me that with credit default swaps, the entire notionals themselves might be at risk and the intermediaries that broker the swaps are not guaranteeing the swap payments equal to complete wipeouts of notionals. Hence, I don’t thinks CDS swaps properly meet the definitions of derivatives since notionals are at risk. It seems to me that CDS contracts should be accounted for as insurance contracts.

This is one of those instances where I think auditors should look at the substance of the transactions rather than rules per se.

From the financial rounds blog on December 29, 2008

How Do You Use Credit Default Swaps (CDS) To Create "Synthetic Debt"?

There's been a lot of talk in recent months about "synthetic debt". I just read a pretty good explanation of synthetics in Felix Salmon's column, so I thought I'd give a brief summary of what it is, how it's used, and why.

First off, let's start with Credit Default Swaps (CDS). A CDS has a lot of similarities to an insurance policy on a bond (it's different in that the holder of the CDS needn't own the underlying bond or even suffer a loss if the bond goes into default).

The buyer (holder) of a CDS will make yearly payments (called the "premium"), which is stated in terms of basis points (a basis point is 1/100 of one percent of the notional amount of the underlying bond). The holder of the CDS gets paid if the bond underlying the CDS goes into default or if other stated events occur (like bankruptcy or a restructuring).

So, how do you use a CDS to create a synthetic bond? here's the example from Salmon's column:

Let's assume that IBM 5-year bonds were yielding 150 basis points over treasuries. In addition, Let' s assume an individual (or portfolio manager) wanted to get exposure to these bonds, but didn't think it was a feasible to buy the bonds in the open market (either there weren't any available, or the market was so thin that he's have to pay too high a bid-ask spread). Here's how he could use CDS to accomplish the same thing:
 

·         First, buy $100,000 of 5-year treasuries and hold them as collateral

·         Next, write a 5-year, $100,000 CDS contract

·         he's receive the interest on the treasuries, and would get a 150 basis point annual premium on the CDS
 

So, what does he get from the Treasury plus writing the CDS? If there's no default, the coupons on the Treasury plus the CDS premium will give him the same yearly amount as he would have gotten if he's bought the 5-year IBM bond, And if the IBM bond goes into default, his portfolio value would be the value of the Treasury less what he would have to pay on the CDS (this amount would be the default losses on the IBM bond). So in either case (default or no default), his payoff from the portfolio would be the same payments as if he owned the IBM bond.

So why go through all this trouble? One reason might be that there's not enough liquidity in the market for the preferred security (and you'd get beaten up on the bid-ask spread). Another is that there might not be any bonds available in the maturity you want. The CDS market, on the other hand, is very flexible and extremely liquid.

One thing that's interesting about CDS is that (as I mentioned above), you don't have to hold the underlying asset to either buy or write a CDS. As a result, the notional value of CDS written on a particular security can be multiple times the actual amount of the security available.

I know of at least one hedge fund group that bought CDS as a way of betting against housing-sector stocks (particularly home builders). From what i know, they made a ton of money. But CDS can also be used to hedge default risk on securities you already hold in a portfolio.


To read Salmon's column, click here, and to read more about CDS, click here

 


Questions
What's a financial long bet and how does it win or lose?
What's the distinction between a long bet speculation versus hedge?

From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on April 1, 2011

Hedge Funds Had Bets Against Japan
by: Gregory Zuckerman and Tom Lauricella
Date: Mar 15, 2011 

SUMMARY: The catastrophe in Japan has placed renewed focus on the country's already fragile economy-and brought unexpected profits to investors who have long bet that the nation eventually will be dragged down by its debt problems.

DISCUSSION: 

  1. What is a hedge fund? How is a hedge fund different from mutual funds or individual investing? What type of investor would invest in such funds? What are the risk levels involved with investing in hedge funds?
  2. How did these hedge funds 'bet against Japan'? Why did some investors think it wise to invest this way? How has the earthquake in Japan impacted this type of investment?
  3. What were the issues facing Japan before the earthquake? How has the earthquake changed the situation? What is the long-term outlook for business in the country? What are Japan's borrowing levels? How would this impact investment in the country by businesses? By individuals?

"Hedge Funds Had Bets Against Japan," by: Gregory Zuckerman and Tom Lauricella, The Wall Street Journal, March 15, 2011 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703363904576200990107993916.html?mod=djem_jie_360

The catastrophe in Japan has placed renewed focus on the country's already fragile economy—and brought unexpected profits to investors who have long bet that the nation eventually will be dragged down by its debt problems.

In recent years, a chorus of voices has warned that Japan is facing an inevitable crisis to be brought on by a stagnant economy, a shrinking population and the worst debt profile of any major industrialized country.

Hedge-fund managers from Kyle Bass of Hayman Advisors LP in Dallas to smaller firms like Commonwealth Opportunity Capital have made money since the earthquake on long-held bets on Japan's government and corporate bonds.

Though the economic toll of the earthquake is far from clear, the immediate response in the financial markets has been a decline in stock prices, with the Nikkei Stock Average down 7.8% in two days (including Friday, when the quake hit near the end of the trading day). The price for insuring against a default by Japan on its government debt, a popular way to position for a financial crisis in Japan, has jumped. But in a move that runs counter to the expectations of some long-term Japan bears, the yen has strengthened on expectations that Japanese investors and corporations will be buying yen as they bring money home in coming weeks and months.

The price for insuring $10 million of Japanese sovereign debt for five years in the credit-default-swap market soared to $103,000 on Monday, from $79,000 on Friday, according to data provider Markit.

Reflecting the skepticism about Japan's outlook, even before the disaster, the net notional amount of Japanese debt being insured in the swaps market had surged to $7.4 billion from $4.1 billion a year ago, according to data from the Depository Trust & Clearing Corp. through March 4. The number of contracts outstanding has more than doubled.

Fresh DTCC data are due on Tuesday and will include only the early effects of the earthquake.

Credit-default swaps of many corporate bonds have become even more valuable, rewarding those that bet on them. Among the biggest moves was in Tokyo Electric Power Co., owner of the nuclear-power plants crippled by the earthquake.

Commonwealth Opportunity Capital, a $90 million hedge fund in Los Angeles, made a profit of several million dollars on Tokyo Electric on Monday, from an investment of less than $200,000. The annual cost of protecting $10 million of Tokyo Electric's debt jumped to $240,000 on Monday from $40,700 on Friday.

"Nobody wants bad things to happen to people," said Adam Fisher, who helps run Commonwealth Opportunity Capital. He said the firm has been betting against Japanese corporate bonds for two years. "But it shows how fragile that heavily levered nation is; there's very little margin for error."

Betting against Japan has been a losing proposition for many investors for years. Despite all the debt problems, bond prices have continued to move higher partly because deflation, not inflation, has been the concern. Also, domestic investors own most of the government's debt and have been reluctant to sell.

But now, facing at least a short-term hit to the economy from the earthquake and the likely need to issue more debt to pay for reconstruction efforts, Japan is seeing its problems magnified.

"Japan's choices are very, very bad," said John Mauldin, president of Millennium Wave Advisors. "Japan has an aging population, which is saving less, their savings rate will go negative sometime in the next few years at which point they will have to significantly reduce their spending, increase taxes or print money or some combination of the three.

"In the grand scheme of things, does the earthquake technically move it up further? Yes, but they were already well down the path."

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
Note how long positions on national debt are often a losing proposition unless they are hedges. In hedging situations these gains and losses are offset by gains and losses on the hedged items to the extent that the hedging contracts are effective. For example, a hedge fund might invest in U.S. Treasury bonds paying a fixed rate. There is no cash flow risk on interest payments or repayment of the face value of the bonds. However, there is value risk since the price of these outstanding bonds in the financial markets goes up and down daily. The hedge fund can lock in fixed value by entering into a fair value hedge such as by entering into a plain vanilla interest rate swap in which the fixed-amount interest payments are swapped for variable rate payments. The value of the bonds plus the value of the swap is thereby locked into a fixed value for which there is no value risk. However, when hedging value risk the investor has inevitably taken on cash flow risk. It's impossible to hedge both fair value risk and cash flow risk. Investors must choose between one or the other.

Hedging against debt default entire is an extreme form of fair value hedging and is usually done with a different type of hedging contract. Here the investor is not so much concerned with interim interest payments (or interim changes in value due to shifts in market interest rates) as he/she is concerned with possible default on payback of the entire principal of the debt. In other words it's more like insurance against a creditor declaring bankruptcy to get out of repayment of all or a great portion of debt repayment.

Credit Default Swap --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credit_default_swap

A credit default swap (CDS) can almost be thought of as a form of insurance. If a borrower of money does not repay her loan, she "defaults." If a lender has purchased a CDS on that loan from an insurance company, the lender can then use the default as a credit to swap it in exchange for a repayment from an insurance company. However, one does not need to be the lender to profit from this situation. Anyone (usually called a speculator) can purchase a CDS. If a borrower does not repay his loan on time and defaults not only does the lender get paid by the insurance company, but the speculator gets paid as well. It is in the lender's best interest that he gets his money back, either from the borrower, or from the insurance company if the borrower is unable to pay back his loan. However, it is in the speculator's best interest that the borrower never repay his loan and default because that is the only way that the speculator can then take that default, turn it into a credit, and swap it for a cash payment from an insurance company.

A more technical way of looking at it is that a credit default swap (CDS) is a swap contract and agreement in which the protection buyer of the CDS makes a series of payments (often referred to as the CDS "fee" or "spread") to the protection seller and, in exchange, receives a payoff if a credit instrument (typically a bond or loan) experiences a credit event. It is a form of reverse trading.

A credit default swap is a bilateral contract between the buyer and seller of protection. The CDS will refer to a "reference entity" or "reference obligor", usually a corporation or government. The reference entity is not a party to the contract. The protection buyer makes quarterly premium payments—the "spread"—to the protection seller. If the reference entity defaults, the protection seller pays the buyer the par value of the bond in exchange for physical delivery of the bond, although settlement may also be by cash or auction. A default is referred to as a "credit event" and includes such events as failure to pay, restructuring and bankruptcy.[2] Most CDSs are in the $10–$20 million range with maturities between one and 10 years.

A holder of a bond may “buy protection” to hedge its risk of default. In this way, a CDS is similar to credit insurance, although CDS are not similar to or subject to regulations governing casualty or life insurance. Also, investors can buy and sell protection without owning any debt of the reference entity. These “naked credit default swaps” allow traders to speculate on debt issues and the creditworthiness of reference entities. Credit default swaps can be used to create synthetic long and short positions in the reference entity. Naked CDS constitute most of the market in CDS. In addition, credit default swaps can also be used in capital structure arbitrage.

Credit default swaps have existed since the early 1990s, but the market increased tremendously starting in 2003. By the end of 2007, the outstanding amount was $62.2 trillion, falling to $38.6 trillion by the end of 2008.

Most CDSs are documented using standard forms promulgated by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), although some are tailored to meet specific needs. Credit default swaps have many variations.[2] In addition to the basic, single-name swaps, there are basket default swaps (BDS), index CDS, funded CDS (also called a credit linked notes), as well as loan only credit default swaps (LCDS). In addition to corporations or governments, the reference entity can include a special purpose vehicle issuing asset backed securities.

Credit default swaps are not traded on an exchange and there is no required reporting of transactions to a government agency. During the 2007-2010 financial crisis the lack of transparency became a concern to regulators, as was the trillion dollar size of the market, which could pose a systemic risk to the economy. In March 2010, the DTCC Trade Information Warehouse (see Sources of Market Data) announced it would voluntarily give regulators greater access to its credit default swaps database

Credit Default Swap (CDS)
This is an insurance policy that essentially "guarantees" that if a CDO goes bad due to having turds mixed in chocolates in a diversified portfolio, the "counterparty" who purchased the CDO will recover the value fraudulently invested in turds. On September 30, 2008 Gretchen Morgenson of The New York Times aptly explained that the huge CDO underwriter of CDOs was the insurance firm called AIG. She also explained that the first $85 billion given in bailout money by Hank Paulson to AIG was to pay the counterparties to CDS swaps. She also explained that, unlike its casualty insurance operations, AIG had no capital reserves for paying the counterparties for the the turds they purchased from Wall Street investment banks.

"Your Money at Work, Fixing Others’ Mistakes," by Gretchen Morgenson, The New York Times, September 20, 2008 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/business/21gret.html
Also see "A.I.G., Where Taxpayers’ Dollars Go to Die," The New York Times, March 7, 2009 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/business/08gret.html

What Ms. Morgenson failed to explain, when Paulson eventually gave over $100 billion for AIG's obligations to counterparties in CDS contracts, was who were the counterparties who received those bailout funds. It turns out that most of them were wealthy Arabs and some Asians who we were getting bailed out while Paulson was telling shareholders of WaMu, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch to eat their turds.

You tube has a lot of videos about a CDS. Go to YouTube and read in the phrase "credit default swap" ---
http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=Credit+Default+Swaps&search_type=&aq=f
In particular note this video by Paddy Hirsch --- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kaui9e_4vXU
Paddy has some other YouTube videos about the financial crisis.

 

Bob Jensen's discussion of accounting rules for credit default swaps can be found under the C-Terms at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm

Credit default swaps turned into a disaster for AIG and the U.S. Government when black swans flew over in 2008 ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm

The Commission's Final Report --- http://c0182732.cdn1.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/fcic_final_report_full.pdf
(This report is really more of a misleading whitewash of government agencies and Congress relative to the real causes of the subprime disaster.)

Greatest Swindle in the History of the World ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#Bailout

Bob Jensen's discussion of accounting rules for credit default swaps can be found under the C-Terms at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm

 

 


"Your Money at Work, Fixing Others’ Mistakes," by Gretchen Morgenson, The New York Times, September 20, 2008 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/business/21gret.html

 

What Ms. Morgenson failed to explain, when Paulson eventually gave over $100 billion for AIG's obligations to counterparties in CDS contracts, was who were the counterparties who received those bailout funds. It turns out that most of them were wealthy Arabs and some Asians who we were getting bailed out while Paulson was telling shareholders of WaMu, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch to eat their turds.

 

You tube has a lot of videos about a CDS. Go to YouTube and read in the phrase "credit default swap" --- http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=Credit+Default+Swaps&search_type=&aq=f
In particular note this video by Paddy Hirsch --- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kaui9e_4vXU
Paddy has some other YouTube videos about the financial crisis.

 


Simoleon Sense Reviews Janet Tavakoli’s Dear Mr. Buffett ---
http://www.simoleonsense.com/simoleon-sense-reviews-janet-tavakolis-dear-mr-buffett/

What’s The Book (Dear Mr. Buffett) About

Dear Mr. Buffett, chronicles the agency problems, poor regulations, and participants which led to the current financial crisis. Janet accomplishes this herculean task by capitalizing on her experiences with derivatives, Wall St, and her relationship with Warren Buffett. One wonders how she managed to pack so much material in such few pages!

Unlike many books which only analyze past events, Dear Mr. Buffett, offers proactive advice for improving financial markets. Janet is clearly very concerned about protecting individual rights, promoting honesty, and enhancing financial integrity. This is exactly the kind of character we should require of our financial leaders.

Business week once called Janet the Cassandra of Credit Derivatives. Without a doubt Janet should have been listened to. I’m confident that from now on she will be.

Closing thoughts

Rather than a complicated book on financial esoterica, Janet has created a simple guide to understanding the current crisis. This book is a must read for all students of finance, economics, and business. If you haven’t read this book, please do so.

Warning –This book is likely to infuriate you, and that’s a good thing! Janet provides indicting evidence and citizens may be tempted to initiate vigilante like witch trials. Please consult with your doctor before taking this financial medication.

Continued in article

September 1, 2009 reply from Rick Lillie [rlillie@CSUSB.EDU]

Hi Bob,

I am reading Dear Mr. Buffett, What an Investor Learns 1,269 Miles from Wall Street, by Janet Tavakoli. I am just about finished with the book. I am thinking about giving a copy of the book to students who perform well in my upper-level financial reporting classes.

I agree with the reviewer’s comments about Tavakoli’s book. Her explanations are clear and concise and do not require expertise in finance or financial derivatives in order to understand what she (or Warren Buffet) says. She explains the underlying problems of the financial meltdown with ease. Tavakoli does not blow you over with “finance BS.” She does in print what Steve Kroft does in the 60 Minutes story.

Tavakoli delivers a unique perspective throughout the book. She looks through the eyes of Warren Buffett and explains issues as Buffett sees them, while peppering the discussion with her experience and perspective.

The reviewer is correct. Tavakoli lets the finance world, along with accountants, attorneys, bankers, Congress, and regulators, have it with both barrels!

Tavakoli’s book is the highlight of my summer reading.

Best wishes,

Rick Lillie

Rick Lillie, MAS, Ed.D., CPA Assistant Professor of Accounting Coordinator - Master of Science in Accountancy (MSA) Program Department of Accounting and Finance College of Business and Public Administration CSU San Bernardino 5500 University Pkwy, JB-547 San Bernardino, CA. 92407-2397

Telephone Numbers: San Bernardino Campus: (909) 537-5726 Palm Desert Campus: (760) 341-2883, Ext. 78158

For technical details see the following book:
Structured Finance and Collateralized Debt Obligations: New Developments in Cash and Synthetic Securitization (Wiley Finance) by Janet M. Tavakoli (2008)

Financial WMDs (Credit Derivatives) on Sixty Minutes (CBS) on August 30, 2009 ---
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5274961n&tag=contentBody;housing
The free download will only be available for a short while. I downloaded this video (a little over 5 Mbs) using a free updated version of RealMedia --- Click Here
http://www.real.com/dmm/superpass?pcode=cj&ocode=cj&cpath=aff&rsrc=1275588_10303897_SPLP

 

Steve Kroft examines the complicated financial instruments known as credit default swaps and the central role they are playing in the unfolding economic crisis. The interview features my hero Frank Partnoy. I don't know of anybody who knows derivative securities contracts and frauds better than Frank Partnoy, who once sold these derivatives in bucket shops. You can find links to Partnoy's books and many, many quotations at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds

For years I've used the term "bucket shop" in financial securities marketing without realizing that the first bucket shops in the early 20th Century were bought and sold only gambles on stock pricing moves, not the selling of any financial securities. The analogy of a bucket shop would be a room full of bookies selling bets on NFL playoff games.
See "Bucket Shop" at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bucket_shop_(stock_market)

 

I was not aware how fraudulent the credit derivatives markets had become. I always viewed credit derivatives as an unregulated insurance market for credit protection. But in 2007 and 2008 this market turned into a betting operation more like a rolling crap game on Wall Street.

 

Bob Jensen's Rotten to the Core threads are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on the current economic crisis are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm
For credit derivative problems see http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#Bailout

Also see "Credit Derivatives" under the C-Terms at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#C-Terms

Bob Jensen's free tutorials and videos on how to account for derivatives under FAS 133 and IAS 39 ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

Bob Jensen’s threads on accounting for credit default swaps are under the C-Terms at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#C-Terms

Bob Jensen's threads on CDO accounting are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#CDO

Bob Jensen's threads on FIN 46 are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm

 

 


"Default Swaps: One Boom in the Crunch; Volume Soared in '07 As Woes Worsened; Hedging and Betting," by Serena Ng, The Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2008; Page C2 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120826572928916145.html?mod=todays_us_money_and_investing

The bond market's love affair with credit derivatives continued during the market chaos of 2007, as volumes of instruments such as credit-default swaps surged to new highs.

Credit-default swaps, which are private financial contracts that act as a form of insurance against bond and loan defaults, were written on $62.2 trillion of debt at the end of 2007, according to data from the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, an industry group.

The latest numbers mark a 37% jump from the $45.5 trillion in so-called "notional" values of credit-default swaps in mid-2007, and compare with $34.5 trillion at the end of 2006. The gain indicates that the use of such swaps grew at a faster pace during the credit crunch in the second half of last year, possibly as banks and investors scrambled to protect themselves from possible defaults on mortgage debt and other bonds and loans.

In a credit default swap, one firm makes regular payments to another firm, which agrees to compensate it if a specified bond or loan defaults. Some investors and financial institutions buy these swaps to hedge their debt investments, but many others trade them to make bets on whether default risk is rising or falling. As such, the notional volumes of the contracts far exceed the actual amount of debt on which they are written.

ISDA's survey also found that the notional amount of interest-rate derivatives grew to $382.3 trillion at the end of 2007, up 10% from mid-2007 and 34% from a year earlier. These include interest-rate swaps, where firms exchange fixed interest payments on debt for floating-rate payments.

The market for equity derivatives including options and forward contracts covered $10 trillion in notional volumes at the end of 2007, unchanged from the mid-year but up 39% from a year earlier.

While notional amounts across all the asset classes add up to an eye-popping number of $454.5 trillion, ISDA says the numbers measure derivative activity rather than risk. It estimates that gross credit exposure of the firms that trade derivatives is around $9.8 trillion.

Still, the large volumes have raised concerns about "counterparty risk," or the risk that one or more firms may not be able to make good on their trades and create problems for other firms .

Continued in article

Read about a Credit Default Swap (CDS) at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credit_default_swap

IAS 39 Paragraph B18 (g) allows some leeway as to whether companies want to account for such contracts as insurance contracts or derivative financial instruments.

FAS 133 Paragraph 59 is somewhat more explicit as to whether or not a credit derivative is scoped into FAS 133.


"The Credit Default Swap," by Richard K. Skora --- http://www.skora.com/default.pdf 

This article shows how risk neutral pricing theory can be applied to price a credit default swap. The price is obtained by explicitly constructing a hedge from the underlying cash market instruments. 

A credit default swap is the most straightforward type of a credit derivative. It is an agreement between two counterparties that allows one counterparty to be “long” a third-party credit risk, and the other counterparty to be “short” the credit risk. Explained another way, one counterparty is selling insurance and the other counterparty is buying insurance against the default of the third party. 

For example, suppose that two counterparties, a market maker and an investor, enter into a two-year credit default swap. They specify what is called the reference asset, which is a particular credit risky bond issued by a third-party corporation or sovereign. For simplicity, let us suppose that the bond has exactly two years’ remaining maturity and is currently trading at par value. 

The market maker agrees to make regular fixed payments (with the same frequency as the reference bond) for two years to the investor. In exchange the market maker has the following right. (For simplicity assume default can occure only at discrete times, namely, at the times the coupon payment is due.) If the third party defaults at any time within that two years, the market maker makes his regular fixed payment to the investor and puts the bond to the investor in exchange for the bond’s par value plus interest. The credit default swap is thus a contingent put – the third party must default before the put is activated. 

In this simple example there is little difference in terms of risk between the credit default swap and the reference bond. Because the swap and the bond have the same maturity, the market maker is effectively short the bond and the investor is long the bond. (In the real world, it is often the case that the bond tenor is longer than the swap tenor. This means that the swap counterparties have exposure to credit risk, but do not have exposure to the full market risk of the

The simplicity of our example helps clarify how the instrument is priced. Pricing the credit default swap involves determining the fixed payments from the market-maker to the investor. In this case it is sufficient to extract the price from the bond market. One does not need to model default or any other complicated credit risk process. To apply risk neutral pricing theory one needs to construct a hedge for the credit default swap. In this simple example, it is sufficient to construct a static hedge. This means the cash instruments are purchased once, and once only, for the life of the credit default swap; they will not have to be sold until the termination of the credit default swap.

The hedge is different for the market maker and investor. If the market-maker were to hedge the credit default swap, then it would need to go long the bond. As illustrated in Figure B, the market-maker borrows money in the funding markets at Libor and uses those funds to purchase the corporate bond, which pays Libor + X basis points. The hedge is paying the market-maker a net cash flow of X basis points.

Continued in the article.


Danger:  What if everybody uses the same formula? 
Banker David Li's computerized financial formula has fueled explosive growth in the credit derivatives market. Now, hundreds of billions of dollars ride on variations of the model every day.  When a credit agency downgraded General Motors Corp.'s debt in May, the auto maker's securities sank. But it wasn't just holders of GM shares and bonds who felt the pain. Like the proverbial flap of a butterfly's wings rippling into a tornado, GM's woes caused hedge funds around the world to lose hundreds of millions of dollars in other investments on behalf of wealthy individuals, institutions like university endowments -- and, via pension funds, regular folk.
Mark Whitehouse, "How a Formula Ignited Market That Burned Some Big Investors:  Credit Derivatives Got a Boost From Clever Pricing Model; Hedge Funds Misused It Inspiration," The Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2005; Page A1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB112649094075137685,00.html?mod=todays_us_page_one


February 7, 2008 question from Miklos A. Vasarhelyi [miklosv@ANDROMEDA.RUTGERS.EDU]

Does anyone understand what this is?
miklos

Jensen Comment
Miklos forwarded interactive graphics video link on monoline insurance --- Click Here

February 7, 2008 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

Miklos,

Buyers of bonds can insure against default risks by buying policies from monoline insurance companies who service exclusively the capital markets. To protect against default by the monoline on its policy, you buy a credit swap on it from another monoline insurance company (which would be obligated to either buy the bonds at face value or to pay the difference between that and the recovery value in case of default).

When such trades take place, the buyer of the bonds (usually investment banks) have theoretically transferred the risk in bonds, and so can account for the bundle of transactions and recognise "profits".

Apparently, these trades have been very lucrative for banks and so have taken the profits in such transactions over the entire life of the bonds at the consummations of such transactions.

The problem with such accounting for profits is that, if the monoline insurance companies are downgraded, the risk on the bonds reverts to the holder (bank), who must reverse the profits.

The usual culprits in these fancy transactions are investment banks. It is difficult to account for the "profits" because the bonuses paid to the traders on such transactions might have been paid years ago.

What a wonderful fiction we accountants have created wheere profits are not what they seem. Alice in Wonderland pales by comparison.

I should have stuck with my first intended profession (actuary).

Regards,

Jagdish

February 7, 2008 reply from Paul Williams [Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]

Jagdish,

Thank you for explaining this. The fault is not entirely ours. Deregulated finance entrepreneurs have invented these complex transactions, which, frankly, can't be accounted for (part of the motivation for their design is precisely because they can't be accounted for). In theory the probability that a bond issuer will default is not altered by these arrangements.

All they do is shift the risk many degrees removed from where it originated. An interesting empirical issue is whether the probability of default does change in the presence of these risk shifting transactions. How does it alter the monitoring of debtors by their creditors when their creditors may not even know they are their creditors?

Do these risk shifting arrangements change the risk? Anyone out there know of any literature that addresses the issue?

February 7, 2008 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Miklos, Jagdish, Paul, and others,

Actually there’s a very good module (one of the best) on the history of monoline insurance in Wikipedia --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monolines  There are excellent references as to when (belatedly) and why monoline insurance companies have been put under review by credit rating agencies.

Credit rating agencies placed the other monoline insurers under review [16]. Credit default swap markets quoted rates for default protection more typical for less than investment grade credits. [17] Structured credit issuance ceased, and many municipal bond issuers spurned bond insurance, as the market was no longer willing to pay the traditional premium for monoline-backed paper[18]. New players such as Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway Assurance entered the market[19]. The illiquidity of the over-the-counter market in default insurance is illustrated by Berkshire taking four years (2003-06) to unwind 26,000 undesirable swap positions in calm market conditions, losing $400m in the process. By January 2008, many municipal and institutional bonds were trading at prices as if they were uninsured, effectively discounting monoline insurance completely. The slow reaction of the ratings agencies in formalising this situation echoed their slow downgrading of sub-prime mortgage debt a year earlier. Commentators such as investor David Einhorn [20] have criticized rating agencies for being slow to act, and even giving monolines undeserved ratings that allowed them to be paid to bless bonds with these ratings, even when the bonds were issued by credits superior to their own.

It has been particularly problematic for investors in municipal bonds.

Bob Jensen

 


"Credit Derivatives Get Spotlight," by Henny Sender, The Wall Street Journal, July 28, 2005; Page C3 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB112249648941697806,00.html?mod=todays_us_money_and_investing

A group of finance veterans released its report on financial-markets risk yesterday, highlighting the mixed blessing of credit derivatives, financial instruments that barely existed the last time the markets seized up almost seven years ago.

"The design of these products allows risk to be divided and dispersed among counterparties in new ways, often with embedded leverage," the report of the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group II states, adding that "transparency as to where and in what form risks are being distributed may be lost as risks are fragmented and dispersed more widely."

Credit-default swaps are at the heart of the credit-derivatives market. They allow players to buy insurance that compensates them in the case of debt defaults. The market enables parties to hedge against company or even country debt, but the market's opacity makes it difficult for regulators and market participants to sort out who is involved in various trades.

The report also notes that credit derivatives can potentially complicate restructurings of the debt of ailing companies and countries. "To the extent primary creditors use the credit-default swap market to dispose of their credit exposure, restructuring in the future may be much more difficult," the report says.

Already, there have been cases where some banks have been accused of triggering defaults after they had already hedged their risk through the credit-derivatives markets. In other cases, when the cost of credit-default protection on a company has risen, market participants have taken that as a harbinger of more troubles to come, making it harder for a company to get financing, and thereby forcing it into a sale or a restructuring.

Continued in article


"Credit Derivatives Survive a Series of Stress Tests As Demand for the Hedging Instruments Grows," by Michael Mackenzie, The Wall Street Journal, January 21, 2003, Page C13 

Having roughly doubled in size in each of the past five years, credit derivatives have lately survived a series of stress tests. Wall Street is hoping that this encourages even broader participation by new investors.

Last year was certainly the year for fallen credit angels, headlined by the default of Argentina and the bankruptcy of Enron Corp. -- the latter was an actively traded name in the credit derivatives market over the past three years. But Wall Street figures that successful negotiation of these credit craters has set the stage for further growth of credit derivatives, such as default swaps, total-return swaps and synthetic collateralized debt obligations.

Some fear that broader participation by inexperienced players raises the risk of big blowups in the credit-derivatives market. Indeed, a few analysts are predicting headlines from such an event this year.

Still, these instruments, once assigned to the fringes of risk management, encountered only a minimum of legal complications in the Enron and Argentine cases.

"Credit derivatives earned their stripes in the aftermath of Enron filing for bankruptcy," said John McEvoy, cofounder of Creditex, a trading platform for credit derivatives. "The market did what it was supposed to do and that has apprised many investors of the value credit derivatives hold for hedging credit risk."

And the continued expansion of the credit-derivatives market derives not just from the perspective of hedging credit risk, but also from investors on the other side of the trade seeking a source of synthetic liquidity.

A credit default swap acts like an insurance position that allows buyers to transfer the risk of defaults or other kinds of credit events, such as debt restructurings, to a selling counterparty, who is paid a premium that is derived from the notional amount of the contract.

In effect, the seller or underwriter of the default swap establishes a synthetic long position in the credit of the company without having to purchase the underlying cash bond.

Investors are increasingly using default swaps to "increase or reduce credit risk without the liquidity constraints of the cash market," said William Cunningham, director of credit strategy at J.P. Morgan Chase in New York.

Indeed, liquidity in credit derivatives has grown so much that two-way activity is often better than that of the notoriously illiquid cash bond market. "We are increasingly seeing the derivative dictate activity in the underlying cash bond," said Mr. McEvoy. "Credit derivatives act as a barometer for the underlying cash market as they concentrate solely upon credit risk."

The growth of credit derivatives has also created better liquidity for less-popular issues as derivatives trading has encouraged greater use of cash bonds for derivatives traders hedging their positions.

It "has created more demand for off-the-run paper," said John Cieslowski, vice president for credit derivatives at Goldman, Sachs & Co. in New York.

Hedge funds have been particularly active users of these instruments. Jeff Devers, president of Palladin Group LP in Maplewood N.J., a hedge fund that seeks to minimize risk and enhance returns from convertible bonds, uses credit derivatives to "isolate credit risk." This way his fund solely takes on the equity exposure of a convertible bond. Mr. Devers expects further growth of credit derivatives to add even more liquidity to the convertible bond market.

Another key development has been the use of synthetic collateralized debt obligation baskets, which are a series of default swaps upon a range of credits bundled together. These credits are divided into tranches that reflect different risk ratings, appealing to the divergent risk appetites of investors.

The two counterparties to a synthetic CDO are either offsetting the credit risk through such trades or are taking exposure to a diverse number of credits that can augment the performance of their underlying portfolios.

Exposure to synthetic CDOs also raises a money manager's level of assets under management and either lowers or raises the level of exposure to a particular credit.

Creditex, which brokers trading between counterparties in CDOs, has been a beneficiary of this growth. "The past year saw many traditional CDO players enter the synthetic CDO market in credit derivatives and this contributed to a substantial rise in market activity," noted Mr. McEvoy.


From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on April 3, 2003

TITLE: Lending Less, "Protecting" More: Desperate for Better Returns, Banks Turn to Credit-Default Swaps 
REPORTER: Henny Sender and Marcus Walker 
DATE: Apr 01, 2003 
PAGE: C13 
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB104924410648100900,00.html  
TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Banking, Fair Value Accounting, Financial Analysis, Insurance Industry

SUMMARY: This article describes the implications of banks selling credit-default swap derivatives. Firtch Ratings has concluded in a recent report that banks are adding to their own risk as they use these derivatives to sell insurance agains default by their borrower clients.

QUESTIONS: 1.) Define the term "derivative security" and describe the particular derivative, credit-default swaps, that are discussed in this article.

2.) Why are banks entering into derivatives known as credit-default swaps? Who is buying these derivatives that the bank is selling?

3.) In general, how should these derivative securities be accounted for in the banks' financial statements? What finanicial statement disclosures are required? How have these disclosures provided evidence about the general trends in the banking industry that are discussed in this article?

4.) Explain the following quote from Frank Accetta, an executive director at Morgan Stanley: "Banks are realizing that you can take on the same risk [as the risk associated with making a loan] at more attractive prices by selling protection."

5.) Why do you think the article equates the sale of credit-default swaps with the business of selling insurance? What do you think are the likely pitfalls of a bank undertaking such a transaction as opposed to an insurance company doing so?

6.) What impact have these derivatives had on loan pricing at Deutsche Bank AG? What is a term that is used to describe the types of costs Deutsche Bank is now considering when it decides on a lending rate for a particular borrower?

"Banks' Increasing Use of Swaps May Boost Credit-Risk Exposure, by Henny Sender and Marcus Walker, The Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2003 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB104924410648100900,00.html 

When companies default on their debt, banks in the U.S. and Europe increasingly will have to pick up the tab.

That is the conclusion of Fitch Ratings, the credit-rating concern. Desperate for better returns, more banks are turning to the "credit default" markets, a sphere once dominated by insurers. In a recent report, Fitch says the banks -- as they use these derivatives to sell insurance against default by their borrowers -- are adding to their credit risk.

The trend toward selling protection, rather than lending, could well raise borrowing costs for many companies. It also may mean greater risk for banks that increasingly are attracted to the business of selling protection, potentially weakening the financial system as a whole if credit quality remains troubled. One Canadian bank, for example, lent a large sum to WorldCom Inc., which filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection last year. Rather than hedging its loan to the distressed telecom company by buying protection, it increased its exposure by selling protection. The premium it earned by selling insurance, though, fell far short of what it both lost on the loan and had to pay out to the bank on the other side of the credit default swap.

"The whole DNA of banks is changing. The act of lending used to be part of the organic face of the bank," says Frank Accetta, an executive director at Morgan Stanley who works in the loan-portfolio management department. "Nobody used to sit down and calculate the cost of lending. Now banks are realizing that you can take on the same risk at more attractive prices by selling protection."

Despite its youth, the unregulated, informal credit-default swap market has grown sharply to total almost $2 trillion in face value of outstanding contracts, according to estimates from the British Bankers Association, which does the most comprehensive global study of the market. That is up from less than $900 billion just two years ago. (The BBA says the estimate contains a good amount of double counting, but it uses the same method over time and thus its estimates are considered a good measuring stick of relative change in the credit-default swap market.) Usually, banks have primarily bought protection to hedge their lending exposure, while insurers have sold protection. But Fitch's study, as well as banks' own financial statements and anecdotal evidence, shows that banks are becoming more active sellers of protection, thereby altering their risk profiles.

The shift toward selling more protection comes as European and American banks trumpet their reduced credit risk. And it is true that such banks have cut the size of their loan exposures, either by taking smaller slices of loans or selling such loans to other banks. They also have diversified their sources of profit by trying to snare more lucrative investment-banking business and other fee-based activity.

Whether banks lend money or sell insurance protection, the downside is generally similar: The bank takes a hit if a company defaults, cushioned by whatever amount can eventually be recovered. (Though lenders are first in line in bankruptcy court; sellers of such protection are further back in the queue.)

But the upside differs substantially between lenders and sellers of protection. Banks don't generally charge their corporate borrowers much when they make a loan because they hope to get other, more lucrative assignments from the relationship. So if a bank extends $100 million to an industrial client, the bank may pocket $100,000 annually over the life of the loan. By contrast, the credit-default swap market prices corporate risk far more systematically, devoid of relationship issues. So if banks sell $100 million of insurance to protect another party against a default by that same company, the bank can receive, say, $3 million annually in the equivalent of insurance premiums (depending on the company's creditworthiness).

All this comes as the traditional lending business is becoming less lucrative. The credit-derivatives market highlights the degree to which bankers underprice corporate loans, and, as a result, bankers expect the price of such loans to rise.

"We see a change over time in the way loans are priced and structured," says Michael Pohly, head of credit derivatives at Morgan Stanley. "The lending market is becoming more aligned with the rest of the capital markets." In one possible sign of the trend away from traditional lending, the average bank syndicate has dropped from 30 lenders in 1995 to about 17 now, according to data from Loan Pricing Corp.

Some of the biggest players in the market, such as J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., are net sellers of such insurance, according to J.P. Morgan's financial statements. In its annual report, J.P. Morgan notes that the mismatch between its bought and sold positions can be explained by the fact that, while it doesn't always hedge, "the risk positions are largely matched." A spokesman declined to comment.

But smaller German banks, some of them backed by regional governments, are also active sellers, according to Fitch. "Low margins in the domestic market have compelled many German state-guaranteed banks to search for alternative sources of higher yielding assets, such as credit derivatives," the report notes. These include the regional banks Westdeutsche Landesbank, Bayerische Landesbank, Bankgesellschaft Berlin and Landesbank Hessen-Thueringen, according to market participants. The state-owned Landesbanken in particular have been searching for ways to improve their meager profits in time for 2005, when they are due to lose their government support under pressure from the European Union.

Deutsche Bank AG is one of biggest players in the market. It is also among the furthest along in introducing more-rational pricing to reflect the implicit subsidy in making loans. At Deutsche Bank, "loan approvals now are scrutinized for economic shortfall" between what the bank could earn selling protection and what it makes on the loan, says Rajeev Misra, the London-based head of global credit trading.

 

A credit default swap is a form of insurance against default by means of a swap. See Paragraphs 190 and 411d of FAS 133. See Risks.

Somewhat confusing is Paragraph 29e on Page 20 of FAS 133 that requires any cash flow hedge to be on prices or interest rates rather than credit worthiness.  For example, a forecasted sale of a specific asset at a specific price can be hedged for spot price changes under Paragraph 29e.  The forecasted sale's cash flows may not be hedged for the credit worthiness of the intended buyer or buyers.  Example 24 in Paragraph 190 on Page 99 of FAS 133 discusses a credit-sensitive bond.  Because the bond's coupon payments were indexed to credit rating rather than interest rates, the embedded derivative could not be isolated and accounted for as a cash flow hedge.

One of my students wrote the following case just prior to the issuance of FAS 133:.  John D. Payne's case and case solution entitled A Case Study of Accounting for an Interest Rate Swap and a Credit Derivative appear at http://www.resnet.trinity.edu/users/jpayne/coverpag.htm .  He states the following:

The objective of this case is to provide students with an in-depth examination of a vanilla swap and to introduce students to the accounting for a unique hedging device--a credit derivative. The case is designed to induce students to become familiar with FASB Exposure Draft 162-B and to prepare students to account for a given derivative transaction from the perspective of all parties involved. In 1991, Vandalay Industries borrowed $500,000 from Putty Chemical Bank and simultaneously engaged in an interest rate swap with a counterparty. The goal of the swap was to hedge away the risk that variable rates would increase by agreeing to a fixed-payable, variable-receivable swap, thus hopefully obtaining a lower borrowing cost than if variable rates were used through the life of the loan. In 1992, Putty Chemical Bank entered into a credit derivative with Mr. Pitt Co. in order to eliminate the credit risk that Vandalay would default on repayment of its loan principal to Putty.

Greg Gupton's site is a major convergence point of research on credit risk and credit derivatives --- http://www.credit-deriv.com/crelink.htm 

A good site on credit risk is at http://www.numa.com/ref/volatili.htm   

Example 24 in Paragraph 190 on Page 99 of FAS 133 discusses a credit-sensitive bond.

Misuses of Credit Derivatives

JP Morgan – whose lawyers must be working overtime – is refuting any wrongdoing over credit default swaps it sold on Argentine sovereign debt to three hedge funds. But the bank failed to win immediate payment of $965 million from the 11 insurers it is suing for outstanding surety bonds.
Christopher Jeffery Editor, March 2, 2002, RiskNews http://www.risknews.net 
Note from Bob Jensen:  The above quotation seems to be Year 2002 Déjà Vu  in terms of all the bad ways investment bankers cheated investors in the 1980s and 1990s.  Read passage from Partnoy's book quoted at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/book02q1.htm#022502 

Enron was its own investment bank on many deals, especially in credit derivatives. You can read the following at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm 

Selected quotations from "Why Enron Went Bust: Start with arrogance. Add greed, deceit, and financial chicanery. What do you get? A company that wasn't what it was cracked up to be." by Benthany McLean, Fortune Magazine, December 24, 2001, pp. 58-68.

Why Enron Went Bust: Start with arrogance. Add greed, deceit, and financial chicanery. What do you get? A company that wasn't what it was cracked up to be."

In fact , it's next to impossible to find someone outside Enron who agrees with Fasto's contention (that Enron was an energy provider rather than an energy trading company). "They were not an energy company that used trading as part of their strategy, but a company that traded for trading's sake," says Austin Ramzy, research director of Principal Capital Income Investors. "Enron is dominated by pure trading," says one competitor. Indeed, Enron had a reputation for taking more risk than other companies, especially in longer-term contracts, in which there is far less liquidity. "Enron swung for the fences," says another trader. And it's not secret that among non-investment banks, Enron was an active and extremely aggressive player in complex financial instruments such as credi8t derivatives. Because Enron didn't have as strong a balance sheet as the investment banks that dominate that world, it had to offer better prices to get business. "Funky" is a word that is used to describe its trades.

I was particularly impressed, as were all people who phoned in, by the testimony of Scott Cleland (see Tuesday, January 15) and then click on the following link to read his opening remarks to a Senate Committee on December 18. If you think the public accounting profession has an "independence problem," that problem is miniscule relative to an enormous independence problem among financial analysts and investment bankers --- two professions that are literally rotten to the core. Go to http://www.c-span.org/enron/scomm_1218.asp#open 

A portion of Mr. Cleland's testimony is quoted below:

Four, it's common for analysts to have a financial stake in the companies they're covering. That's just like, essentially, allowing athletes to bet on the outcome of the game that they're playing in.

Five, most payments for investment research is routinely commingled in the process with more profitable investment banking and proprietary trading. The problem with this is it effectively means that most research analysts work for the companies and don't work for investors.

Six, credit agencies may have conflicts of interest.

Seven, analysts seeking investment banking tend to be more tolerant of pro-forma accounting and the conflict there is, essentially, the system is allowing companies to tell -- you know, to make up their own accounting. To describe their own financial performance, that no one then can compare objectively with other companies.

Eight, surprise, surprise, companies routinely beat the expectations of a consensus of research analysts that are seeking their investment banking business.

See how banks use/misuse credit derivatives with  tranches.

A Bankers Primer on Credit Derivatives --- http://www.citissb.com/home/Creddriv.pdf 

What are Credit Derivatives?

Credit derivatives have three basic structures: credit default swaps, total return swaps and credit spread options. In a credit default swap, a buyer pays a seller a fixed fee in return for indemnification against losses should a credit event occur. Credit default swaps are used for risk management, capital management and investment management. Buyers of protection reduce credit concentrations or open up credit lines. Buyers may also obtain capital relief, redeploying the capital in more profitable business lines or buying back stock.

Primus Financial Services offers credit derivatives --- http://www.tfibcm.com/news/story/default.asp?734 

Kicking off what analysts are calling a small trend, New York-based Primus Financial Products recently became the first company structured solely to be a swap counterparty, selling protection via credit default swaps. "We're not a dealer, we're not a CDO, and we're not an insurance company," said Chief Executive Officer Tom Jasper. "What we are is a credit derivatives company."

As derivatives are becoming a more and more widely accepted method of transferring risk, it is not surprising that at least two additional companies - both at different stages of development - are following suit. The two are said to be familiar names in the asset-backed market, and the first will likely launch in mid-summer, according to Moody's Investors Service, which, along with Standard & Poor's, has awarded Primus a triple-A counterparty rating. Primus will begin trading in the next few weeks, Jasper said. In the first year of trading, Primus is planning to build a portfolio of about $5.5 billion in single name investment-grade corporate and sovereign credits.

"The plan is to take advantage of what we believe is a pretty efficient capital model and cost model, and to become a very efficient investor in investment-grade risk, using, as the transfer vehicle, the credit default swap," Jasper said. "So we're transferring risk synthetically versus a cash instrument."

Though many of its clients, which could include CDOs, insurance company portfolio managers, hedge funds, banks and other cash investors, might be using PFP to establish hedges, Primus is not incorporating a hedging strategy for its own portfolio, and, only in special situations, will buy credit protection for its exposures. Its triple-A counterparty rating is based primarily on its capital levels, or other resources, being sized to match the expected loss (Moody's) of its referenced obligations.

Also, contrary to some players' initial impressions of the company, Primus doesn't plan to launch any CDOs from its portfolio.

"It's not contemplated that we would securitize the risk that we will take on," Jasper said. "We're very happy to hold the risk to maturity."

March 2002 - Former dealers from Salomon Smith Barney and Bank of America yesterday set up what they claimed to be the first boutique focusing purely on default swap credit derivatives.

Question:
When does a hedge become a speculation?  

Answer:
There are essentially two answers.  Answer 1 is that a speculation arises when the hedge is not perfectly effective in covering that which is hedged such as the current value (fair alue hedge) of the hedged item or the hedged cash flow (cash flow hedge).  Testing for hedge ineffectiveness under FAS 133 and IAS 39 rules is very difficult for auditors.  Answer 2 is that a speculation arises when unsuspected credit risk arises from the settlements themselves such as when dealers who brokered hedge derivatives cannot back the defaults all parties contracted under the derivatives themselves.  Hedges may no longer be hedges!  Answer 2 is even more problematic in this particular down economy.

There is a lot of complaining around the world about need for and technicalities of the U.S. FAS 133 and the international IAS 39 standards on Accounting for Financial Instruments Derivatives and Hedging Activities.  But recent scandals adding to the pile of enormous scandals in derivatives over the past two decades suggest an increased  need for more stringent rather than weakened standards for accounting for derivatives.  The main problem lies in valuation of these derivatives coupled with the possibility that what is a safe hedge is really a risky speculation.  A case in point is Newmont Mining Corporation's Yandal Project in Australia as reported by Steve Maich in "Newmont's Hedge Book Bites Back," on  Page IN1 of the March 4, 2003 edition of Canada's Financial Post --- http://www.financialpost.com/ 

Even by the gold industry's relatively aggressive standards, Yandal's derivatives exposure is stunning.  The unit has 3.4 million ounces of gold committed through hedging contracts that had a market value of negative US$288-million at the end of 2002.

That would be a problem for any major producer, but the situation is particularly dire for Yandal because the development's total proven and provable gold reserves are just 2.1 million ounces.  In other words, the project has, through its hedging contracts, committed to sell 60% more gold than it actually has in the ground.

Making matters worse, the mine's counterparties can require Yandal to settle the contracts in cash, before they come due.  In all, about 2.8 million ounces are subject to these cash termination agreements by 2005, which could cost the company US$223.7-million at current market prices.

With insufficient gold to meet its obligations, and just US$58-million in cash to make up the difference, bankruptcy may be the only option available to Yandal, analysts said.

Comparing Yandal's reserves to its hedging liabilities "suggests that the Yandal assets may be worth more dead than alive," CIBC World Markets analyst Barry Cooper said in a report to clients.

All this is raising even bigger questions about the impact that the Yandal situation might have on the industry's other major hedgers.  Companies such as Canada's Barrick Gold Corp. and Placer Dome Ltd. have lagged the sector's strong rally of the past year, largely because many investors and analysts distrust the companies' derivative portfolios.

One thing that is not stressed hard enough in FAS 133 is the credit risk of the dealers themselves.  The FAS 133 standard and its international IAS 39 counterpart implicitly assume that when speculating or hedging with derivatives, the dealers who broker these contracts are highly credit worthy.  For example, in the case of interest rate swaps it is assumed that the dealer that brokers the swap will stand behind the swapping party and counterparty default risks.  There are now some doubts about this in the present weak economy.

"Derivatives Market a 'Time Bomb':  Buffet," Financial Post, March 4, 2003, Page IN1 --- http://www.financialpost.com/ 
Berkshire chairman warns of risks in shareholder letter --- http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/letters.html 
(The above link is not yet updated for the Year 2002 forthcoming annual Shareholder Letter.)

Billionaire investor Warren Buffett calls derivative contracts "financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that while now latent are potentially lethal," according to excerpts from his forthcoming annual letter to Berkshire Hathaway Inc. shareholders.

Mr. Buffett, whose company is now seeking to divest of derivatives business tied to its General Re purchase, also worries that substantial credit risk has become concentrated "in the hands of relatively few derivatives dealers."

"Divided on Derivatives Greenspan:  Buffett at Odds on Risks of the Financial Instruments," by John M. Berry, The Washington Post, March 6, 2003, Page E01 --- http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A48287-2003Mar5.html 

The use of derivatives has grown exponentially in recent years. The total value of all unregulated derivatives is estimated to be $127 trillion -- up from $3 trillion 1990. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. is the world's largest derivatives trader, with contracts on its books totaling more than $27 trillion. Most of those contracts are designed to offset each other, so the actual amount of bank capital at risk is supposed to be a small fraction of that amount.

Previous efforts to increase federal oversight of the derivatives market have failed, including one during the Clinton administration when the industry, with support from Greenspan and other regulators, beat back an effort by Brooksley Born, the chief futures contracts' regulator. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) has introduced a bill to regulate energy derivatives because of her belief that Enron used them to manipulate prices during the California energy crisis, but no immediate congressional action is expected.

Randall Dodd, director of the Derivatives Study Center, a Washington think tank, said both Buffett and Greenspan are right -- unregulated derivatives are essential tools, but also potentially very risky. Dodd believes more oversight is needed to reduce that inherent risk.

"It's a double-edged sword," he said. "Derivatives are extremely useful for risk management, but they also create a host of new risks that expose the entire economy to potential financial market disruptions."

Buffett has no problem with simpler derivatives, such as futures contracts in commodities that are traded on organized exchanges, which are regulated. For instance, a farmer growing corn can protect himself against a drop in prices before he sells his crop by buying a futures contract that would pay off if the price fell. In essence, derivatives are used to spread the risk of loss to someone else who is willing to take it on -- at a price.

Buffett's concern about more complex derivatives has increased since Berkshire Hathaway purchased General Re Corp., a reinsurance company, with a subsidiary that is a derivatives dealer. Buffett and his partner, Charles T. Munger, judged that business "to be too dangerous."

Because many of the subsidiary's derivatives involve long-term commitments, "it will be a great many years before we are totally out of this operation," Buffett wrote in the letter, which was excerpted on the Fortune magazine Web site. The full text of the letter will be available on Berkshire Hathaway's Web site on Saturday. "In fact, the reinsurance and derivatives businesses are similar: Like Hell, both are easy to enter and almost impossible to exit."

One derivatives expert said several of General Re's contracts probably involved credit risk swaps with lenders in which General Re had agreed to pay off a loan if a borrower -- perhaps a telecommunications company -- were to default. In testimony last year, Greenspan singled out the case of telecom companies, which had defaulted on a significant portion of about $1 trillion in loans. The defaults, the Fed chairman said, had strained financial markets, but because much of the risk had been "swapped" to others -- such as insurance companies, hedge funds and pension funds -- the defaults did not cause a wave of financial-institution bankruptcies.

"Many people argue that derivatives reduce systemic problems, in that participants who can't bear certain risks are able to transfer them to stronger hands," Buffett acknowledged. "These people believe that derivatives act to stabilize the economy, facilitate trade and eliminate bumps for individual participants. And, on a micro level, what they say is often true. Indeed, at Berkshire, I sometimes engage in large-scale derivatives transactions in order to facilitate certain investment strategies."

But then Buffett added: "The macro picture is dangerous and getting more so. Large amounts of risk, particularly credit risk, have become concentrated in the hands of relatively few derivatives dealers, who in addition trade extensively with one another. The troubles of one could quickly infect the others. On top of that, these dealers are owed huge amounts by nondealer counterparties," some of whom are linked in such a way that many of them could run into problems simultaneously and set off a cascade of defaults.

March 7, 2003 message from Risk Waters Group [RiskWaters@lb.bcentral.com

Alan Greenspan, chairman of the US Federal Reserve, today once again defended the use of derivatives as hedging tools, especially credit derivatives. His comments come in the wake of Warren Buffett's criticism of derivatives as "time bombs" and Peter Carr - recipient of Risk's 2003 quant of the year award this week - saying that in a [hypothetical] argument between quants convinced of the infallibility of their models and derivatives sceptics such as Buffett, he would probably side with Buffett.

But Greenspan, speaking at the Banque de France's symposium on monetary policy, economic cycle and financial dynamics in Paris, said derivatives have become indispensable risk management tools for many of the largest corporations. He said the marriage of derivatives and securitisation techniques in the form of synthetic collateralised debt obligations has broadened the range of investors willing to provide credit protection by pooling and unbundling credit risk through the creation of securities that best fit their preferences for risk and return.

This probably explains why credit derivatives employees reap the highest salaries, with an Asian-based managing director in synthetic structuring at a bulge-bracket firm earning an average basic plus bonus of £1.35 million last year. These were the findings of a first-of-its-kind survey conducted by City of London executive search company Napier Scott. The survey found that most managing directors working in credit derivatives at the top investment banks earn more than £1 million, with synthetic structurers commanding the highest salary levels. Asia-based staff earn 12-15% more than their US counterparts, with UK-based staff not far behind their Asia-based counterparts. Even credit derivatives associates with one or two years' experience earn in excess of £150,000 a year on average at a tier-1 bank.

In more people news, Merrill Lynch has hired four ex-Goldman Sachs bankers for its corporate risk management group focused on Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Roberto Centeno was hired as a director with responsibility for Iberia. Andrea Anselmetti and Luca Pietrangeli, both directors, and Ernesto Mercadente, an associate, will focus on expanding the corporate risk management and foreign exchange business in the Italian region. The corporate risk management group focuses on providing advice and execution for corporate clients, covering all risk management issues, including foreign exchange, interest rate risk and credit risk. All four will report to Patrick Bauné, co-head of Merrill Lynch's global foreign exchange issuer client group, and Damian Chunilal, head of the EMEA issuer client group, and are expected to join within the next two weeks. Merrill also hired Scott Giardina as a director in credit derivatives trading, based in London. He will report to Jon Pliner, managing director of credit trading EMEA, and Neil Walker, managing director of structured credit trading, EMEA. Giardina also joins from Goldman Sachs.

Christopher Jeffery
Editor, RiskNews

www.risknews.net
cjeffery@riskwaters.com

 

April 11, 2003Update on Accounting for Credit Derivatives
April 11, 2003 message from Risk Waters Group [RiskWaters@lb.bcentral.com

Jean-Claude Trichet, governor of the Bank of France, said transparency is essential to prevent a "herd mentality" in the financial market that can create artificial swings in market prices. During a keynote address at the Professional Risk Managers' International Association 2003 European Summit in Paris this week, Trichet called for a "strengthening of market transparency" and the disclosure of "complete and reliable information". He added that "no satisfying disclosure" yet exists for the credit derivatives market-place, and that while a January study by the Bank for International Settlements cast "some light" on this market, "these efforts should be pursued by central banks as well as market participants". Trichet said transparency is not just an issue for investors and savers but a fundamental tenet underpinning anti-cyclicality. "If information is not transparent, behaving as a 'herd' is a natural reaction," Trichet said.

Banks and Credit Derivatives
From Jim Mahar's blog on August 17, 2005

Minton, Stulz, and Williamson have an important look at banks' usage of credit derivatives. The short version? Very few banks are using them! In 2003, only about 6% of banks with over $1B in assets report using this form of derivatives. Consistent with what we have seen on other derivative usage, these banks tend to be much larger than average. Best guess as for the low usage? Transaction costs driven by moral hazard and adverse selection costs.

Slightly longer version of the paper

Minton, Stulz, and Williamson begin by documenting that the credit derivative market (measured by notional principle) has grown in recent years. Regulators (and even Alan Greenspan himself) have claimed that this reduces the risks that banks face. The paper investigates banks' use of credit derivatives and find that as of 2003, few banks were using credit derivatives. Those banks that were using the derivatives tended to be larger and have a greater need for the risk reduction.

In the words of the paper's authors:

"...net buyers of protection have higher levels of risk than other banks: they have lower capital ratios, lower balances of liquid assets, a higher ratio of risk-based assets to total assets, and a higherfraction of non-performing assets than the non-users of credit derivatives."

Why the limited use? Transaction costs undoubtedly play a role. Like in other derivatives "know-how" can be expensive to obtain and this largely fixed cost may explain a portion of the limited use. However, the very nature of credit derivatives also makes them prone to moral hazard and adverse selection costs. (Tried another way, banks typcially know more about the borrowers (and are often in a better position to monitor), than do derivative market participants. This results in less liquidity (higher transaction costs) for the very loans that would make the most sense to hedge.)

Again in the authors' words:

"These adverse selection and moral hazard problems make the market for credit derivatives illiquid for single name protection precisely for the credit risks that banks would often want to hedge with such protection. The positive coefficient estimates on C&I loan and foreign loan shares in a bank’s loan portfolio are consistent with the hypothesis that banks are more likely to hedge with credit derivatives if they have more loans to credits for which the credit derivatives market is more liquid."

So what does this all mean? The conclusion hints that the benefits of credit derivatives may be overstated but apparently the cost of hedging in papers is lower than in the credit derivative market as the paper ends covering both sides of the debate:

"To the extent that credit derivatives make it easier for banks to maximize their value with less capital, they do not increase the soundness of banks as much as their purchases of credit derivatives would imply. However, if credit derivatives enable banks to save capital, they ultimately reduce the cost of loans for bank customers and make banks more competitive with the capital markets for the provision of loans."

Not only are few banks using the derivatives to hedge, the exact loans that the banks would want to hedge are the most expensive to do. This really should not be surprising. What is more surprising is that these costs are so high as to prevent the use of the derivatives. Going forward in time, it will be interesting to see if this remains the case or if as the market develops, new ways evolve to lower the costs which would allow more effective hedging with credit derivatives. Stay Tuned.

Cite:
Minton, Bernadette A, Rene Stulz, and Rohan Williamson.
"How much do banks use credit derivatives to reduce risk?",
Ohio State working paper,
http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/dice/papers/2005/2005-17.pdf 


From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on June 13, 2008

 

 
SEC, Justice Scrutinize AIG on Swaps Accounting
by Amir Efrati and Liam Pleven
The Wall Street Journal

Jun 06, 2008
Page: C1
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121271786552550939.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
 

TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Auditing, Derivatives, Fair Value Accounting, Internal Controls, Mark-to-Market Accounting

SUMMARY: The SEC "...is investigating whether insure American International Group Inc. overstated the value of contracts linked to subprime mortgages....At issue is the way the company valued credit default swaps, which are contracts that insure against default of securities, including those backed by subprime mortgages. In February, AIG said its auditor had found a 'material weakness' in its accounting. Largely on swap-related write-downs...AIG has recorded the two largest quarterly losses in its history."

CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Financial reporting for derivatives is at issue in the article; related auditing issues of material weakness in accounting for these contracts also is covered in the main article and the related one.

QUESTIONS: 
1. (Introductory) What are collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)?

2. (Advanced) What are credit default swaps? How are these contracts related to CDOs?

3. (Advanced) Summarize steps in establishing fair values of CDOs and credit default swaps.

4. (Introductory) What is a material weakness in internal control? Does reporting write-downs of such losses as AIG has shown necessarily indicate that a material weakness in internal control over financial reporting has occurred? Support your answer.
 

Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
 

RELATED ARTICLES: 
AIG Posts Record Loss, As Crisis Continues Taking Toll
by Liam Pleven
May 09, 2008
Page: A1
 


"SEC, Justice Scrutinize AIG on Swaps Accounting," by Amir Efrati and Liam Pleven, The Wall Street Journal,  June 6, 2008; Page C1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121271786552550939.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC

The Securities and Exchange Commission is investigating whether insurer American International Group Inc. overstated the value of contracts linked to subprime mortgages, according to people familiar with the matter.

Criminal prosecutors from the Justice Department in Washington and the department's U.S. attorney's office in Brooklyn, New York, have told the SEC they want information the agency is gathering in its AIG investigation, these people said. That means a criminal investigation could follow.

In 2006, AIG, the world's largest insurer, paid $1.6 billion to settle an accounting case. Its stock has been battered because of losses linked to the mortgage market. The earlier probe led to the departure of Chief Executive Officer Maurice R. "Hank" Greenberg.

Officials for AIG, the SEC, the Justice Department and the U.S. attorney's office declined to comment on the new probe. A spokesman for AIG said the company will continue to cooperate in regulatory and governmental reviews on all matters.

At issue is the way the company valued credit default swaps, which are contracts that insure against default of securities, including those backed by subprime mortgages. In February, AIG said its auditor had found a "material weakness" in its accounting.

Largely on swap-related write-downs, which topped $20 billion through the first quarter, AIG has recorded the two largest quarterly losses in its history. That has turned up the heat on management, including CEO Martin Sullivan.

AIG sold credit default swaps to holders of investments called collateralized-debt obligations, or CDOs, backed in part by subprime mortgages. The buyers were protecting their investments in the event of default on the underlying debt. In question is how the CDOs were valued, which drives both the value of the credit default swaps and the amount of collateral AIG must "post," or essentially hand over, to the buyer of the swap to offset the buyer's credit risk.

AIG posted $9.7 billion in collateral related to its swaps, as of April 30, up from $5.3 billion about two months earlier.

Law Blog: Difficulties in Valuation 'Best Defense'

Bob Jensen's threads on CDOs are at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#CDO

Bob Jensen's timeline of derivative financial instruments scandals and new accounting rules ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm


Disclosures about Credit Derivatives and Certain Guarantees: An Amendment of FASB Statement No. 133 and FASB Interpretation No. 45; and Clarification of the Effective Date of FASB Statement No. 161
FASB, September 12, 2008 --- http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fsp_fas133-1&fin45-4.pdf


Damocles sword waiting to fall
CDS = Credit Default Swap (or is the Credit Default Sword?)

Financial WMDs (Credit Derivatives) on Sixty Minutes (CBS) on August 30, 2009 ---
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5274961n&tag=contentBody;housing
I downloaded the video (5,631 Mbs) to http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/temp/FinancialWMDs.rv 

Steve Kroft examines the complicated financial instruments known as credit default swaps and the central role they are playing in the unfolding economic crisis. The interview features my hero Frank Partnoy. I don't know of anybody who knows derivative securities contracts and frauds better than Frank Partnoy, who once sold these derivatives in bucket shops. You can find links to Partnoy's books and many, many quotations at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds

For years I've used the term "bucket shop" in financial securities marketing without realizing that the first bucket shops in the early 20th Century were bought and sold only gambles on stock pricing moves, not the selling of any financial securities. The analogy of a bucket shop would be a room full of bookies selling bets on NFL playoff games.
See "Bucket Shop" at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bucket_shop_(stock_market)

I was not aware how fraudulent the credit derivatives markets had become. I always viewed credit derivatives as an unregulated insurance market for credit protection. But in 2007 and 2008 this market turned into a betting operation more like a rolling crap game on Wall Street.

Bob Jensen's Rotten to the Core threads are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on the current economic crisis are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm
For credit derivative problems see http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#Bailout

Also see "Credit Derivatives" under the C-Terms at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#C-Terms

 

"Hedge Funds in Swaps Face Peril With Rising Junk Bond Defaults," by David Evans, Bloomberg, May 20, 2008 ---
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aCFGw7GYxY14&refer=home

Backshall and his clients aren't the only ones spooked by the prospect of a CDS catastrophe. Billionaire investor George Soros says a chain reaction of failures in the swaps market could trigger the next global financial crisis.

CDSs, which were devised by J.P. Morgan & Co. bankers in the early 1990s to hedge their loan risks, now constitute a sprawling, rapidly growing market that includes contracts protecting $62 trillion in debt.

The market is unregulated, and there are no public records showing whether sellers have the assets to pay out if a bond defaults. This so-called counterparty risk is a ticking time bomb.

``It is a Damocles sword waiting to fall,'' says Soros, 77, whose new book is called ``The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What It Means'' (PublicAffairs).

``To allow a market of that size to develop without regulatory supervision is really unacceptable,'' Soros says.

`Lumpy Exposures'

The Fed bailout of Bear Stearns on March 17 was motivated, in part, by a desire to keep that sword from falling, says Joseph Mason, a former U.S. Treasury Department economist who's now chair of the banking department at Louisiana State University's E.J. Ourso College of Business.

The Fed was concerned that banks might not have the money to pay CDS counterparties if there were large debt defaults, Mason says.

``The Fed's fear was that they didn't adequately monitor counterparty risk in credit-default swaps -- so they had no idea of where to lend nor where significant lumpy exposures may lie,'' he says.

Those counterparties include none other than JPMorgan itself, the largest seller and buyer of CDSs known to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, or OCC.

The Fed negotiated the deal to bail out Bear Stearns by allowing JPMorgan to buy it for $10 a share. The Fed pledged $29 billion to JPMorgan to cover any Bear debts.

`Cast Doubt'

``The sudden failure of Bear Stearns likely would have led to a chaotic unwinding of positions in those markets,'' Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke told Congress on April 2. ``It could also have cast doubt on the financial positions of some of Bear Stearns's thousands of counterparties.''

The Fed was worried about the biggest players in the CDS market, Mason says. ``It was a JPMorgan bailout, not a bailout of Bear,'' he says.

JPMorgan spokesman Brian Marchiony declined to comment for this article.

Credit-default swaps are derivatives, meaning they're financial contracts that don't contain any actual assets. Their value is based on the worth of underlying loans and bonds. Swaps are similar to insurance policies -- with two key differences.

Unlike with traditional insurance, no agency monitors the seller of a swap contract to be certain it has the money to cover debt defaults. In addition, swap buyers don't need to actually own the asset they want to protect.

It's as if many investors could buy insurance on the same multimillion-dollar home they didn't own and then collect on its full value if the house burned down.

Bigger Than NYSE

When traders buy swap protection, they're speculating a loan or bond will fail; when they sell swaps, they're betting that a borrower's ability to pay will improve.

The market, which has doubled in size every year since 2000 and is larger in dollar value than the New York Stock Exchange, is controlled by banks like JPMorgan, which act as dealers for buyers and sellers. Swap prices and trade volume aren't publicly posted, so investors have to rely on bids and offers by banks.

Most of the traders are banks; hedge funds, which are mostly private pools of capital whose managers participate substantially in the profits from their speculation on whether the price of assets will rise or fall; and insurance companies. Mutual and pension funds also buy and sell the swaps.

Proponents of CDSs say the devices have been successful because they allow banks to spread the risk of default and enable hedge funds to efficiently speculate on the creditworthiness of companies.

`Seeing the Logic'

The market has grown so large so fast because swaps are often based on an index that includes the debt of scores of companies, says Robert Pickel, chief executive officer of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association.

``Whether you're a hedge fund, bank or some other user, you're increasingly seeing the logic of using these instruments,'' Pickel says, adding he doesn't worry about counterparty risk because banks carefully monitor the strength of investors. ``There have been a very limited number of disputes. The parties understand these products and know how to use them.''

Banks are the largest buyers and sellers of CDSs. New York- based JPMorgan trades the most, with swaps betting on future credit quality of $7.9 trillion in debt, according to the OCC. Citigroup Inc., also in New York, is second, with $3.2 trillion in CDSs.

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley, two New York- based firms whose swap trading isn't tracked by the OCC because they're not commercial banks, are the largest swap counterparties, according to New York-based Fitch Ratings, which doesn't provide dollar amounts.

Untested Until Now

The credit-default-swap market has been untested until now because there's been a steady decline in global default rates in high-yield debt since 2002. The default rate in January 2002, when the swap market was valued at $1.5 trillion, was 10.7 percent, according to Moody's Investors Service.

Since then, defaults globally have dropped to 1.5 percent, as of March. The rating companies say the tide is turning on defaults.

Fitch Ratings reported in July 2007 that 40 percent of CDS protection sold worldwide is on companies or securities that are rated below investment grade, up from 8 percent in 2002. On May 7, Moody's wrote that as the economy weakened, high-yield-debt defaults by companies worldwide would increase fourfold in one year to 6.1 percent by April 2009.

The pressure is building. On May 5, for example, Tropicana Entertainment LLC filed for bankruptcy after the casino owner defaulted on $1.32 billion in debt.

`Complicate the Crisis'

A surge in corporate defaults may leave swap buyers scrambling, many unsuccessfully, to collect hundreds of billions of dollars from their counterparties, says Satyajit Das, a former Citigroup derivatives trader and author of ``Credit Derivatives: CDOs & Structured Credit Products'' (Wiley Finance, 2005).

``This is going to complicate the financial crisis,'' Das says. He expects numerous disputes and lawsuits, as protection buyers battle sellers over the technical definition of default - - this requires proving which bond or loan holders weren't paid -- and the amount of payments due.

``It's going to become extremely messy,'' he says. ``I'm really scared this is going to freeze up the financial system.''

Andrea Cicione, a London-based senior credit strategist at BNP Paribas SA, has researched counterparty risk and says it's only a matter of time before the sword begins falling. He says the crisis will likely start with hedge funds that will be unable to pay banks for contracts tied to at least $35 billion in defaults.

$150 Billion Loss Estimate

``That's a very conservative estimate,'' he says, adding that his study finds that losses resulting from hedge funds that can't pay their counterparties for defaults could exceed $150 billion.

Hedge funds have sold 31 percent of all CDS protection, according to a February 2007 report by Charlotte, North Carolina-based Bank of America Corp.

Cicione says banks will try to pre-empt this default disaster by demanding hedge funds put up more collateral for potential losses. That may not work, he says. Many of the funds won't have the cash to meet the banks' requests, he says.

Sellers of protection aren't required by law to set aside reserves in the CDS market. While banks ask protection sellers to put up some money when making the trade, there are no industry standards, Cicione says.

JPMorgan, in its annual report released in February, said it held $22 billion of credit swap counterparty risk not protected by collateral as of Dec. 31.

`A Major Risk'

``I think there's a major risk of counterparty default from hedge funds,'' Cicione says. ``It's inconceivable that the Fed or any central bank will bail out the hedge funds. If you have a systemic crisis in the hedge fund industry, then of course their banks will take the hit.''

The Joint Forum of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, an international group of banking, insurance and securities regulators, wrote in April that the trillions of dollars in swaps traded by hedge funds pose a threat to financial markets around the world.

``It is difficult to develop a clear picture of which institutions are the ultimate holders of some of the credit risk transferred,'' the report said. ``It can be difficult even to quantify the amount of risk that has been transferred.''

Counterparty risk can become complicated in a hurry, Das says. In a typical CDS deal, a hedge fund will sell protection to a bank, which will then resell the same protection to another bank, and such dealing will continue, sometimes in a circle, Das says.

`Daisy Chain Vortex'

The original purpose of swaps -- to spread a bank's loan risk among a large group of companies -- may be circumvented, he says.

``It creates a huge concentration of risk,'' Das says. ``The risk keeps spinning around and around in this daisy chain like a vortex. There are only six to 10 dealers who sit in the middle of all this. I don't think the regulators have the information that they need to work that out.''

And traders, even the banks that serve as dealers, don't always know exactly what is covered by a credit-default-swap contract. There are numerous types of CDSs, some far more complex than others.

More than half of all CDSs cover indexes of companies and debt securities, such as asset-backed securities, the Basel committee says. The rest include coverage of a single company's debt or collateralized debt obligations.

A CDO is an opaque bundle of debt that can be filled with junk bonds, auto loans, credit card liabilities and home mortgages, including subprime debt. Some swaps are made up of even murkier bank inventions -- so-called synthetic CDOs, which are packages of credit-default swaps.

AIG $9.1 Billion Writedown

On May 8, American International Group Inc. wrote down $9.1 billion on the value of its CDS holdings. The world's largest insurer by assets sold credit protection on CDOs that declined in value. In 2007, New York-based AIG reported $11.5 billion in writedowns on CDO credit default swaps.

Michael Greenberger, director of trading and markets at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission from 1997 to 1999, says the Fed is fully aware of the risk banks and the global economy face if CDS holders can't cover their losses.

``Oh, absolutely, there's no doubt about it,'' says Greenberger, who's now a professor at the University of Maryland School of Law in Baltimore. He says swaps were very much on the Fed's mind when Bear Stearns started sliding toward bankruptcy.

``People who were relying on Bear for their own solvency would've started defaulting,'' he says. ``That would've triggered a series of counterparty failures. It was a house of cards.''

Risk Nightmare

It's concerns about that house of cards that have kept Backshall, the California fund adviser, up at night. His worries about a nightmare scenario started in early March. The details of what happened are still fresh in his mind.

It's Monday, March 10, and the market is rife with rumors that Bear Stearns will run out of cash. Some of Backshall's clients have pulled their accounts from Bear; others are considering leaving the bank. Backshall's clients are exposed to Bear in multiple ways: They keep their cash and other accounts at the firm, and they use the bank as their broker for trades. Backshall advises them to spread their assets among various banks.

That same day, Bear CEO Alan Schwartz says publicly, ``There is absolutely no truth to the rumors of liquidity problems.''

Backshall's clients are suspicious. They see other hedge funds pulling their accounts from Bear. In the afternoon after Schwartz's remarks, the cost of protection soars past 600 basis points from 450 before Schwartz's statement.

CEO Didn't Calm Fears

Swaps are priced in basis points, or hundredths of a percentage point. At 600 basis points, a trader would pay $6,000 a year to insure $100,000 of Bear Stearns bonds.

``I don't think his comments did anything to calm fears,'' Backshall says.

The next day, March 11, Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox says his agency is monitoring Bear Stearns and other securities firms.

``We have a good deal of comfort about the capital cushions at these firms at the moment,'' he says.

Cox's comments are overshadowed by rumors that European financial firms had stopped doing fixed-income trades with Bear, Backshall says.

``Nobody has a clue what's going on,'' he says. Bear swap costs are gyrating between 540 and 665.

For most investors, just getting default-swap prices is a chore. Unlike stock prices, which are readily available because they trade on a public exchange, swap prices are hard to find. Traders looking up prices on the Internet or on private trading systems see information that is hours or days old.

`Terribly Primitive'

Banks send hedge funds, insurance companies and other institutional investors e-mails throughout the day with bid and offer prices, Backshall says. For many investors, this system is a headache.

To find the price of a swap on Ford Motor Co. debt, for example, even sophisticated investors might have to search through all of their daily e-mails, he says.

``It's terribly primitive,'' Backshall says. ``The only way you and I could get a level of prices is searching for Ford in our inbox. This is no joke.''

In the past three years, at least two companies have developed software programs that automatically parse an investor's incoming messages, yank out CDS prices and build them into real-time price displays.

The charts show the highest bids and lowest offering prices for hundreds of swaps. Backshall tracks prices he gets from banks using the new software.

`It's Very Hard'

Backshall has been talking with hedge fund managers in New York all week.

``We'd quite frankly been warning them and giving them advice on how to hedge,'' he says of the Bear Stearns crisis and banks overall. ``It's very hard to hedge the counterparty risk. These institutions are thinly capitalized in the best of times.''

The night of Thursday, March 13, Backshall can't sleep. He lies awake worrying about Bear and counterparty risk. The next morning, he arrives at work at 5 a.m., two and a half hours before sunrise.

Through the window of his ninth-floor corner office, he takes a moment to watch the distant flickers of light in the rolling foothills of Mount Diablo. Across the street, he sees the still-dark Walnut Creek train station, about 30 miles (48 kilometers) east of San Francisco.

Backshall, wearing jeans and a blue, button-down shirt, sits at his desk, staring at a pair of the 27-inch (68.6- centimeter) monitors that display swap costs. CDS prices jumped by more than 10-fold in just a year. The numbers show rising fear, he says.

Until early in 2007, the typical price of a credit-default swap tied to the debt of an investment bank like Merrill Lynch & Co., Bear Stearns or Morgan Stanley was 25 basis points.

`Unknowns Are Out There'

If a swap buyer wanted to protect $10 million of assets in the event of a company default, the contract would cost about 0.25 percent of $10 million, or $25,000 a year for a five-year protection contract.

Backshall's screens tell him the cost of buying protection on Bear Stearns debt in the past 24 hours has been moving in a range between 680 and 755 basis points.

``The unknowns are out there,'' Backshall says.

He advises his clients not to buy CDS protection on Bear because the price is too high and the time is wrong. It's too late to buy swaps now, he says.

At 9:13 Friday morning in New York, JPMorgan announces it will loan money to Bear using funds provided by the Federal Reserve. The JPMorgan statement doesn't say how much it will lend; it says it will ``provide secured funding to Bear Stearns, as necessary.''

`Significantly Deteriorated'

Bear CEO Schwartz says his firm's liquidity has ``significantly deteriorated'' during the past 24 hours. Protection quotes drop immediately into the low 500s, as some dealers think a rescue has begun.

That doesn't last long.

``Very quickly, the trading action is swinging violently wider,'' Backshall says. Bear's swap cost jumps to 850 basis points that afternoon, his screen shows. ``When fear gets hold, fundamental analysis goes out the window,'' he says.

In the calmest of times, making reasoned decisions about swap prices is a challenge. Now, it's impossible. Traders don't have access to any company data more recent than Bear's February annual report. Sharp-eyed investors looking through that filing might have spotted a paragraph that's strangely prescient.

``As a result of the global credit crises and the increasingly large numbers of credit defaults, there is a risk that counterparties could fail, shut down, file for bankruptcy or be unable to pay out contracts,'' Bear wrote.

`Material Adverse Effect'

``The failure of a significant number of counterparties or a counterparty that holds a significant amount of credit-default swaps could have a material adverse effect on the broader financial markets,'' the bank wrote.

Even after JPMorgan's Friday morning announcement, the market is alive with rumors. Backshall's clients tell him they've heard some investment banks have stopped accepting trades with Bear Stearns and some money market funds have reduced their short-term holdings of Bear-issued debt.

On Sunday, March 16, the Federal Reserve effectively lifts the sellers of Bear Stearns protection out of their misery. JPMorgan agrees to buy Bear for $2 a share.

While that's devastating news for Bear shareholders -- the stock had traded at $62.30 just a week earlier -- it's the best news imaginable for owners of Bear debt. That's because JPMorgan agreed to cover Bear's liabilities, with the Fed pledging $29 billion to cover Bear's loan obligations.

Turned to Dust

For traders who sold protection on Bear's debt, the bailout is a godsend. Faced with the prospect of having to hand over untold millions to their counterparties just three days earlier, they now have to pay out nothing.

For traders who bought protection swaps just a few days earlier -- when prices were in the 600s to 800s -- the Fed bailout is crushing. Their investments have turned to dust.

On Monday morning, the cost of default protection on Bear plunges to 280. Backshall sits back in his chair and for the first time in two weeks, he can breathe easier.

``No wonder I look so tired all the time,'' he says, finally showing a bit of a smile.

When it bailed out Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve effectively deputized JPMorgan to monitor the credit-default- swap market, says Edward Kane, a finance professor at Boston College. Because regulators don't know where the risks lie, they're helpless, Kane says.

Default swaps shift the risk from a company's credit to the possibility that a counterparty might fail, says Kane, who's a senior fellow at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Center for financial Research.

`Off Balance Sheet'

``You've really disguised traditional credit risk, pushed it off balance sheet to its counterparties,'' Kane says. ``And this is not visible to the regulators.''

BNP analyst Cicione says regulators will be hard-pressed to prevent the next potential breakdown in the swaps market.

``Apart from JPMorgan, there aren't many other banks out there capable of doing this,'' he says. ``That's what's worrying us. If there were to be more Bear Stearnses, who would step in and give a helping hand? You can't expect the Fed to run a broker, so someone has to take on assets and obligations.''

Banks have a vested interest in keeping the swaps market opaque, says Das, the former Citigroup banker. As dealers, the banks see a high volume of transactions, giving them an edge over other buyers and sellers.

``Dealers get higher profitability through lack of transparency,'' Das says. ``Since customers don't necessarily know where the market is, you can charge them much wider margins.''

Banks Try to Hedge

Banks try to balance the protection they've sold with credit-default swaps they purchase from others, either on the same companies or indexes. They can also create synthetic CDOs, which are packages of credit-default swaps the banks sell to investors to get themselves protection.

The idea for the banks is to make a profit on each trade and avoid taking on the swap's risk.

``Dealers are just like bookies,'' Kane says. ``Bookies don't want to bet on games. Bookies just want to balance their books. That's why they're called bookies.''

The banks played the role of dealers in the CDO market as well, and the breakdown in that market holds lessons for what could go wrong with CDSs. The CDO market zoomed to $500 billion in sales in 2006, up fivefold from 2001.

Banks found a hungry market for CDOs because they offered returns that were sometimes 2-3 percentage points higher than corporate bonds with the same credit rating.

CDO Market Dried Up

By the middle of 2007, mortgage defaults in the U.S. began reaching record highs each month. Banks and other companies realized they were holding hundreds of billions in toxic debt. By August 2007, no one would buy CDOs. That newly devised debt market dried up in a matter of months.

In the past year, banks have written off $323 billion from debt, mostly from investments they created.

Now, if corporate defaults increase, as Moody's predicts, another market recently invented by banks -- credit-default swaps -- could come unstuck. Arturo Cifuentes, managing director of R.W. Pressprich & Co., a New York firm that trades derivatives, says he expects a rash of counterparty failures resulting in losses and lawsuits.

``There's a high probability that many people who bought swap protection will wind up in court trying to get their payouts,'' he says. ``If things are collapsing left and right, people will use any trick they can.''

Frank Partnoy, a former derivatives trader and now a securities law professor at the University of San Diego School of Law, says it's high time for the market to let in some sunshine.

Continued in article

"Pressure gauge," The Economist, August 21, 2008 --- http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11985964

IN THE weeks before Bear Stearns, a Wall Street bank, collapsed in March, nervous investors scanned not just its share price for a measure of its health, but the price of its credit-default swaps (CDSs), too. These once-obscure instruments, now widely enough followed that they have even earned a mention on an American TV crime series, clearly indicated that the firm’s days were numbered. The five-year CDS spread had more than doubled to 740 basis points (bps), meaning it cost $740,000 to insure $10m of its debt. The higher the spread, the greater the expectation of default.

Once again, CDS spreads on Wall Street banks are pushing higher, having fallen in March after the Federal Reserve extended emergency lending facilities to them. Reportedly one firm, Morgan Stanley, is monitoring its own CDS spreads to assess the market’s perception of its corporate health; if they rise too high, it intends to cut back its lending. Whether the CDS market is accurately assessing the creditworthiness of Lehman Brothers, trading on August 20th at 376 bps, double the level in early May, will be the next test of its worth.

There are some who doubt whether the CDS market is a reliable barometer of financial health. Though its gross value has ballooned in size from $4 trillion in 2003 to over $62 trillion, many of the contracts written on individual companies are thinly traded, lack transparency, and are prone to wild swings.

Recent spikes in CDS spreads on the three largest Icelandic banks are a case in point. In July spreads on Kaupthing and Glitnir rose to levels 35% higher than those observed for Bear Stearns in the days before it was bought out, according to Fitch Solutions, part of the Fitch rating and risk group. But the panic subsided after they released second-quarter earnings. Insiders say CDSs are increasingly used for speculation as well as hedging, which creates distracting “noise” particularly when the markets are as fearful as they have been recently.

On the other hand, although CDS spreads may overshoot, they do not generally stay wrong for long. Moody’s, another rating agency, says that market-implied ratings, such as those provided by CDS spreads, tally loosely with credit ratings 80% of the time. What is more, CDS spreads frequently anticipate ratings changes. Fitch Solutions reckons that the CDS market has anticipated over half of all observed ratings activities on CDS-traded entities as much as three months in advance. Though the magnitude of the moves may at times be unrealistic, the direction is usually at least as good a distress signal as the stock market.


"Credit Default Swap:  The Fed wants to give the blundering rating agencies even more power – this time over derivatives.." The Wall Street Journal, January 3, 2008 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123094475030650613.html?mod=djemEditorialPage

Could the political campaign to blame the financial panic on unregulated derivatives be losing momentum? Let's hope so, because this might save us from making new mistakes in the name of fixing the wrong problems.

We now know that the predicted disaster for credit default swaps (CDS) following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy never happened. The government also still hasn't explained how AIG's use of CDS to go long on housing would have destroyed the planet. And now the New York Federal Reserve's effort to regulate the CDS market is mired in a turf war. The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission have backed rival efforts in New York and Chicago.

But it is the New York Fed proposal that may pose the most immediate threat to taxpayers, because it is designed to include firms on at least one end of 90% of CDS contracts. After announcing its intention to begin by the end of 2008, the New York branch of the central bank is still awaiting approval from the Fed's Board of Governors to launch a central clearinghouse for CDS trades. Credit default swaps are essentially insurance against an organization defaulting on its debt, and they provide a real-time gauge of credit risk. This has proven particularly valuable because the Fed's method of judging risk -- relying on the ratings agencies S&P, Moody's and Fitch -- has been disastrous for investors.

Under pressure from the New York Fed, nine large CDS dealers -- giants like Goldman Sachs -- agreed to construct a central counterparty, which would backstop and monitor CDS trades. Called The Clearing Corp., it failed to catch on in the marketplace. So the big dealers recently gave an ownership stake to IntercontinentalExchange (ICE). In return, ICE agreed to make this government-created but privately owned institution work.

ICE has given the venture, now called ICE Trust, operational street cred, but the Fed-imposed architecture should still cause taxpayer concern. That's because it takes the widely dispersed risk in the CDS marketplace and attempts to centralize it in one institution. If not structured correctly, it may reward the participating firms with the weakest balance sheets. For this reason, some of the dealers who have resisted a central counterparty because it threatens their profits may now embrace it as a way to socialize their risks. What's more, if it allows these big Wall Street dealers to build an electronic trading platform on top of the central clearinghouse, the big banks could prevent pesky Internet start-ups from threatening their market share.

Here's how the New York Fed's central counterparty would change the market: Right now, CDS trades are conducted over-the-counter as private contracts between two parties. They are reported to the Trade Information Warehouse, so the market has some transparency, but nobody is on the hook besides the two parties to the agreement. This provides an incentive for each party to make an informed judgment on whether the counterparty can be relied upon to pay debts. The buyer of credit protection -- who is paying annual premiums for the right to be compensated if a company defaults on its bonds -- has every reason to study the balance sheet of the seller of a CDS contract.

In the New York Fed's judgment, the recent panic showed there wasn't enough transparency in CDS trades. This claim would have more credibility if the Fed would come clean about AIG. But in any case, the Fed's solution is to force CDS contracts into its central counterparty. There is a virtue here: A particular bank cannot throw out its collateral standards to please one large favored client, because the same standards apply to all participants. The nine large dealers plus perhaps four or five more participating firms would each contribute roughly $100 million to the central counterparty, and they'd have to cough up more money if failures burn through this cash reserve.

However, this system also introduces new risks, because all participants become liable for the potential failure of the weakest members. How does one appropriately judge the credit risk of a participant? ICE Trust and the Fed haven't released details. Sources tell us that participants will need to have a net worth of at least $1 billion, and, more ominously, that the Fed wants a high rating from a major credit-ratings agency as a crucial test of financial health.

If regulators learn nothing else from the housing debacle, they should recognize that their system of anointing certain firms to judge credit risk is structurally flawed and immensely expensive for investors. As Columbia's Charles Calomiris has explained on these pages, one reason the Basel II standards for bank capital failed is because they subcontracted risk assessments to the same ratings agencies that slapped AAA on dodgy mortgage paper.

Unfortunately, the Fed stubbornly refuses to learn this lesson. With its various lending facilities, the Fed continues to demand collateral rated exclusively by S&P, Moody's or Fitch. A rival ratings agency reports that the Fed recently rejected a request from a clearing bank to consider a ratings firm other than the big three.

No doubt ICE Trust has a strong incentive to monitor counterparty credit risk. Our concern is that the Fed's failed policy on credit ratings will increase risks even further if it is allowed to pollute the $30 trillion CDS market. The credit raters have shown they are usually the last to know if a bank is in trouble, yet under a credit-rating seal of approval such a bank could maintain the illusion that all is well. If you have trouble conceiving of such a scenario, reflect on the history of Enron, Bear Stearns, Lehman, Citigroup, the mortgage market, collateralized-debt obligations, etc. Now try to imagine how long it will take the Fed to commit taxpayer dollars if this central counterparty fails.

Any plan that seeks to minimize marketplace risks by concentrating them in one institution deserves skepticism. Relying on ratings from the big three to assess these risks would be an outrage.

Bob Jensen's Primer on Derivatives ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#Primer
Also see how AIG and some other Wall Street firms were bailed out of their credit default swaps ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#Bailout


"Stanford Research Team Proposes Changes to Credit Default Swaps to Lower Looming Risks of Sovereign Default," MarketWatch, May 15, 2012 ---
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/stanford-research-team-proposes-changes-to-credit-default-swaps-to-lower-looming-risks-of-sovereign-default-2012-05-15

STANFORD, Calif., May 15, 2012 (BUSINESS WIRE) --
STANFORD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS--If you're a bondholder of sovereign debt and think you've covered your risks by purchasing credit default swaps, think again.

According to Darrell Duffie, finance professor from the Stanford Graduate School of Business, and Stanford economics student Mohit Thukral, a flaw within credit default swap (CDS) contracts means that only a small fraction of bondholder losses may be covered in the event of a sovereign debt restructuring.

The flaw is tied to the fact that current CDS contracts only pay buyers of protection based on the price of the sovereign's outstanding bonds, even if the sovereign has just exchanged its legacy bonds for a much smaller amount of new bonds. This CDS payout ignores the additional loss to a bondholder from the effect of this "haircut."

In a recently released research paper, Duffie and Thukral propose tying CDS settlements to the face value of new bonds that is given to bondholders per unit face value of old bonds. The resulting CDS payment approximates actual bondholder losses, allowing for better sovereign default risk management and CDS pricing that more accurately reveals sovereign default risk.

"The current design of credit derivatives is of questionable value for managing the risk of sovereign default, which is a significant issue given the current stresses on the Eurozone," says Duffie. "Unless there is a change in the contract design, such as the one we propose, investors could be left without an effective tool for controlling their exposure to sovereign default, and CDS prices would be unreliable gauges of true default risk."

Furthermore, he explains, if the CDS market is not an effective tool for managing risk, investors may have even more reason to shy away from sovereign bond purchases, leading to unintended consequences for market stability.

Duffie and Thukral, an undergraduate economics major who recently took Duffie's MBA "Debt Markets" class, began their research following the restructuring of Greek sovereign debt in March of this year, when they realized the shortcomings of current CDS contracts. They propose a straightforward redesign of CDS contracts that would allow settlement based on the market value of whatever the sovereign government gives the bondholder in exchange for each old bond; this market value would be determined in a settlement auction.

In practice, a sovereign government may give a package of several financial instruments in exchange for each old bond. Bondholders of Greek debt, for example, received a combination of new bonds, GDP-linked securities, and PSI payment notes that are obligations of the European Financial Stability Facility.

According to Duffie and Thukral's proposal, the redesigned CDS contract would allow settlement based on the market value of the entire exchange package. This would mitigate one of the problems that arose with the Greek debt restructuring; namely, that the protection payment ignored the remainder of the exchange package.

In this way, the team's proposal also provides a mechanism whereby the bond market can digest the complex instruments that may be created in a sovereign debt restructuring. This is important because not all bondholders are well situated to deal with the package of instruments they may receive in a restructuring.

Continued in article

For Bob Jensen's threads on accounting for credit default swaps look under the C-terms at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm

 

 

 


Bob Jensen's timeline of derivative financial instruments scandals and new accounting rules --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm

 


Bob Jensen's threads on derivatives scandals can be found at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#DerivativesFraud 

Bob Jensen's helpers, tutorials, glossary, and instructional cases for FAS 133 and IAS 39 are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

 

Credit Sensitive Payments =

payments on a debt instrument that vary under an embedded option that adjusts the interest rate on the basis of changed credit rating of the borrower.  Paragraph 61c on Page 41 of FAS 133 defines these payments as clearly-and-closely related such that the embedded derivative cannot be accounted for separately under Paragraph 12 on Page 7.  This makes embedded credit derivative accounting different than commodity indexed and equity indexed embedded derivative accounting rules that require separation from the host contract such as commodity indexed, equity indexed, and inflation indexed embedded derivatives.  In this regard, credit indexed embedded derivative accounting is more like inflation indexed accounting.  See derivative financial instrument and embedded derivatives.

Cross-Currency Hedge = see foreign currency hedge.

Cross Rate =

the exchange rate between two currencies other than the dollar, calculated using the dollar exchange rates of those currencies.

Crude Oil Knock-in Note

a bond that has upside potential on the principal payback contingent upon prices in the crude oil market.  Such a note is illustrated in Example 21 in Paragraph 187 of FAS 133.

CTA = a term with alternate meanings.

Commodity Trading Advisor - One who provides advice on investing in currencies as a separate asset class. Some also act in a separate function as overlay managers, advising on hedging the currency risk in international asset portfolios.

Cumulative Translation Adjustment - An entry in a translated balance sheet in which gains and losses from transactions have been accumulated over a period of years.

Cumulative Dollar Offset = see ineffectiveness.

Currency Swap =

a transaction in which two counterparties exchange specific amounts of two different currencies at the outset and repay over time at a predetermined rate that reflects interest payments and possibly amortization of the principal as well. The payment flows are based on fixed interest rates in each currency.    An example of a currency swap in FAS 133 appears in Example 5 Paragraphs 131-139 on Pages 72-76.

Current Rate =

The exchange rate in effect at the relevant-financial-statement date.

 

 

 

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |

D-Terms

Dedesignation =

a change in status of a designated hedge such that all or a portion of the hedged amounts must be taken into current earnings rather being deferred.  Dedesignation for cash flow hedges is discussed in Paragraph 30 on Page 21 of FAS 133.  If a cash forecasted transaction becomes a firm commitment, its corresponding cash flow hedge must be dedesignated.  Controversies between the FASB's distinction between forecasted transactions versus firm commitments are discussed in Paragraphs 324-325 on Page 157 of FAS 133.

An illustration of dedesignation. is given in Example 9 in Paragraphs 165-172 on Pages 87-90 of FAS 133.  Example 9 illustrates a forward contract cash flow hedge of a forecasted series of transactions in a foreign currency.  When the forecasted transactions become accounts receivable, a portion of the value changes in the futures contract must be taken into current earnings rather than other comprehensive income.  Another illustration of dedesignation. is in Example 7 of FAS 133, pp. 79-80, Paragraphs 144-152.  See derecognition and  hedge.

Paul Pacter states the following at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm 

IAS 39
A financial asset is derecognised if

  • the transferee has the right to sell or pledge the asset; and

  • the transferor does not have the right to reacquire the transferred assets. (However, such a right does not prevent derecognition if either the asset is readily obtainable in the market or the reacquisition price is fair value at the time of reacquisition.)

FAS 133
In addition to those criteria, FASB requires that the transferred assets be legally isolated from the transferor even in the event of the transferor’s bankruptcy.

 

Default Swap = See Credit Derivatives

Defeasance =

the early extinguishment of debt by depositing, in risk-free securities, the present value of the interest and principal payments in an irrevocable trust such that the earnings from the trust will service the debt and have sufficient funds to eventually extinguish the debt.  Exxon invented the concept in the 1970s.  In one instance Exxon captured $132 million of unrealized gain on $515 million of long-term debt acquired when interest rates were high.  The trust must be entirely under the control of an independent trustee. Defeasance was sometimes used to remove debt and capture gains when recalling the bonds had relatively high transaction costs.   The FASB allowed defeasance to capture gains and remove debt from the balance sheet in SFAS 76.  However, this  was rescinded in SFAS 125.  Defeasance can no longer remove debt from the balance sheet or be used to capture unrecognized gains due to interest rate increases.  See derecognition.

Defined-Benefit-Plan = see not-for-profit.

Delivered Floater = see floater.

Derecognition =

the opposite of recognizing an asset or liability on the balance sheet.  Assets are derecognized when they are sold or abandoned.   Liabilities are derecognized when they are paid or forgiven.  Derecognition, however, can be a more complex issue when rights or obligations are changed in other ways.   Paragraph 26 on Page 17 and Paragraph 491 on Page 213of FAS 133 require that the fair value of a firm commitment be derecognized when the hedged item no no longer meets the Paragraph 22 criteria.  The concept appears again in Paragraph 49.  See dedesignation.

Paul Pacter states the following at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm 

IAS 39
A financial asset is derecognised if

  • the transferee has the right to sell or pledge the asset; and

  • the transferor does not have the right to reacquire the transferred assets. (However, such a right does not prevent derecognition if either the asset is readily obtainable in the market or the reacquisition price is fair value at the time of reacquisition.)

FAS 133
In addition to those criteria, FASB requires that the transferred assets be legally isolated from the transferor even in the event of the transferor’s bankruptcy.

 

IAS 39
Guidance in IAS 39 includes the following example. A bank transfers a loan to another bank, but to preserve the relationship of the transferor bank with its customer, the acquiring bank is not allowed to sell or pledge the loan. Although the inability to sell or pledge would suggest that the transferee has not obtained control, in this instance the transfer is a sale provided that the transferor does not have the right or ability to reacquire the transferred asset.

FAS 133
While a similar example is not included in FASB Standards, FASB Standards might be interpreting as prohibiting derecognition by the transferor bank.

 

Derivative =

A financial instrument whose value is derived from changes in the value of some underlying asset such as a commodity, a share of stock, a debt instrument, or a unit of currency.  A nice review appears in Myron Scholes' Nobel lecture that is reprinted as "Derivatives in a Dynamic Environment," American Economic Review, June 1998, 350-370.  For further elaboration, see derivative financial instrument.    Especially note the terms hedge and disclosure.

Humor:  "The Idiot's Guide to Hedging and Derivatives" ---  http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud033103.htm#Idiot'sGuide 

Also see CBOE, CBOT, and CME for some great tutorials on derivatives investing and hedging.

Derivative Financial Instrument =

a financial instrument that by its terms, at inception or upon the occurrence of a specified event, provides the holder (or writer) with the right (or obligation) to participate in some or all of the price changes of an underlying (that is, one or more referenced financial instruments, commodities, or other assets, or other specific items to which a rate, an index of prices, or another market indicator is applied) and does not require that the holder or writer own or deliver the underlying.  A contract that requires ownership or delivery of the underlying is a derivative financial instrument if (a) the underlying is another derivative, (b) a mechanism exists in the market (such as an organized exchange) to enter into a closing contract with only a net cash settlement, or (c) the contract is customarily settled with only a net cash payment based on changes in the price of the underlying.  What is most noteworthy about derivative financial instruments is that in the past two decades, the global use of derivatives has exploded exponentially to where the trading in notional amounts is in trillions of dollars.  Unlike FAS 133, IAS 39 makes explicit reference also to an insurance index or catastrophe loss index and a climatic or geological condition. Also IAS 39 does not require net settlement.

Definitions of derivatives
  • IAS 39: Does not define “net settlement” as being required to be scoped into IAS 39 as a derivative such as when interest rate swap payments and receipts are not net settled into a single payment.
  • FAS 133: Net settlement is an explicit requirement to be scoped into FAS 133 as a derivative financial instrument.
  • Implications: This is not a major difference since IAS 39 scoped out most of what is not net settled such as Normal Purchases and Normal Sales (NPNS) and other instances where physical delivery transpires in commodities rather than cash settlements. IAS 39 makes other concessions to net settlement such as in deciding whether a "loan obligation" is a derivative.

 

The FASB's Derivatives and Hedging Glossary (in the Accounting Standards Codification Database) ---
http://asc.fasb.org/subtopic&trid=2229141&nav_type=left_nav


"The Origins of Derivative Instruments," by Stephen G. Cecchetti, Brandeis University ---
http://people.brandeis.edu/~cecchett/Textbook%20inserts/The%20Origin%20of%20Derivatives.htm

In financial markets, the term "derivatives" is used to refer to a group of instruments that derive their value from some underlying commodity or market.   Forwards, futures, swaps and options are all types of derivative instruments and are widely used for hedging or speculative purposes.   While trading in derivative products has grown tremendously in recent times, early evidence of these types of instruments can be traced back to ancient Greece.   Aristotle related a story about how the Greek philosopher Thalus profited handsomely from an option-type agreement around the 6th century b.c.   According to the story, one-year ahead, Thalus forecast the next olive harvest would be an exceptionally good one.   As a poor philosopher, he did not have many financial resources at hand. But he used what he had to place a deposit on the local olive presses.   As nobody knew for certain whether the harvest would be good or bad, Thalus secured the rights to the presses at a relatively low rate.   When the harvest proved to be bountiful, and so demand for the presses was high, Thalus charged a high price for their use and reaped a considerable profit.

A critical attribute of Thalus?s arrangement was the fact that its merit did not depend on his forecast for a good harvest being accurate.   The deposit gave him the right but not the obligation to hire the presses.   If the harvest had failed, his losses were limited to the initial deposit he paid.   Thalus had purchased an option.

There is evidence that the use of a type of forward contract was prevalent among merchants in medieval European trade fairs. When trade began to flourish in the 12th century merchants created a forward contract called a lettre de faire (letter of the fair).   These letters allowed merchants to trade on the basis of a sample of their goods, thus relieving them of the need to transport large quantities of merchandise along dangerous routes with no guarantee of a buyer at the journey?s end.   The letter acted as evidence that the full consignment of the specified commodity was being held at a warehouse for future delivery.   Eventually, the contracts themselves were traded among the merchants.  

The first record of organized trading in futures comes from 17th century Japan.   Feudal Japanese landlords would ship surplus rice to storage warehouses in the cities and then issue tickets promising future delivery of the rice.   The tickets represented the right to take delivery of a certain quantity of rice at a future date at a specified price.  These rice tickets were traded on the Dojima rice market near Osaka and in 1730.   Trading in rice tickets allowed landlords and merchants to lock the prices at which rice was bought and sold, reducing the risk they faced. The tickets also provided flexibility.  Someone holding a rice ticket but not a holder of a rice ticket but not wanting to take delivery could sell it in the market. The rules governing the trading on the Dojima market were similar to those of modern-day futures markets.

Moving forward 200 years, Chicago was central to the 19th century development of futures contracts in the US.   As in Japan, the seasonal nature of agricultural production was the main impetus behind the development of these financial instruments.   Farmers would traditionally bring their harvest to market once a year in search of buyers creating a seasonal glut and driving prices to extremely low levels.   At other times of year, shortages would emerge in the urban areas driving prices to extremely high levels.   This cycle was compounded by the fact that storage facilities in the cities were inadequate and transportation from rural areas was difficult.

In the early 1800s, forward arrangements began to appear to deal with the risk caused by market volatility.   These were known as ?to arrive? contracts and involved an agreement between a buyer and seller for the future delivery of grain.   The quantity and grade of the grain would be specified as well as the delivery date, as well an agreed-upon price.   Soon the contracts themselves began to be traded in anticipation of changes in the market price of grain.   With increases in trading volume increased came a realization of the benefits of standardization and the need for an organized exchange.  The result, in 1848, was the founding of the Chicago Board of Trade.   Other early exchanges involved in futures trading in the US included the New York Cotton Exchange, established in 1870, and the New York Coffee Exchange, set up in 1885

Various events in the early 1970s conspired to spur the development of modern derivatives markets. There was the collapse of the fixed-exchange rate system provided the impetus for the trading of foreign-exchange derivatives; while the theoretical advances of Black and Scholes allowed traders to compute the price of options so they could buy and sell them.  The first financial futures, seven foreign currency contracts, were traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in 1972, while the first swap agreements were executed by the Salomon Brothers in London in 1981.   Equity derivatives, based on underlying stock indices, began to emerge in the late 1980?s.   Today, derivative instruments based on a wide range of underlying markets are traded globally and complex "exotic" products can be built to hedge or assume almost any type of risk imaginable.

 

Definition from Wikipedia

Derivatives are financial instruments whose value changes in response to the changes in underlying variables. The main types of derivatives are futures, forwards, options, and swaps.

The main use of derivatives is to reduce risk for one party. The diverse range of potential underlying assets and pay-off alternatives leads to a huge range of derivatives contracts available to be traded in the market. Derivatives can be based on different types of assets such as commodities, equities (stocks), bonds, interest rates, exchange rates, or indexes (such as a stock market index, consumer price index (CPI) — see inflation derivatives — or even an index of weather conditions, or other derivatives). Their performance can determine both the amount and the timing of the pay-offs.

Insurance and Hedging

One use of derivatives is as a tool to transfer risk by taking the opposite position in the futures market against the underlying commodity. For example, a wheat farmer and a wheat miller could enter into a futures contract to exchange cash for wheat in the future. Both parties have reduced the risk of the future: the uncertainty of the price and the availability of wheat.

Speculation and arbitrage

Speculators may trade with other speculators as well as with hedgers. In most financial derivatives markets, the value of speculative trading is far higher than the value of true hedge trading. As well as outright speculation, derivatives traders may also look for arbitrage opportunities between different derivatives on identical or closely related underlying securities.

In addition to directional plays (i.e. simply betting on the direction of the underlying security), speculators can use derivatives to place bets on the volatility of the underlying security. This technique is commonly used when speculating with traded options. Speculative trading in derivatives gained a great deal of notoriety in 1995 when Nick Leeson, a trader at Barings Bank, made poor and unauthorized investments in index futures. Through a combination of poor judgement on his part, lack of oversight by management, a naive regulatory environment and unfortunate outside events like the Kobe earthquake, Leeson incurred a $1.3 billion loss that bankrupted the centuries-old financial institution.


For technical details see the following book:
Structured Finance and Collateralized Debt Obligations: New Developments in Cash and Synthetic Securitization (Wiley Finance) by Janet M. Tavakoli (2008)


Complexities in the Definition of a Derivative Financial Instrument

December 3, 2008 message from David Albrecht [albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]

Derivatives are contracts to be settled in the future. They have to be based on an asset, an index or a debt security.

Derivative contracts can be entered into for hedging purposes or speculative purposes

In the game of monopoly, there are several instances when there is a need for hedging (also known as insurance).

Frequently, players need to go to jail. The penalties for going to jail are (1) payment of $50 for getting out of jail, and (2) payment of any rent on the first turn when emerging from jail. A trip around the board (40 squares) takes about 5 turns. I have no idea, over the long run, what is your chance of going to jail at least once during a trip around the board. My uninformed guess is that 20% of the time you travel around the board you will end up in jail.

Early in the game, before there is much development of houses and hotels, your cost for going to jail is most likely only going to be $50. You may pay that immediately in cash, or you can attempt to roll doubles (a very bad strategy). All books on strategy for the game of Monopoly recommend paying the $50 and getting out of jail as quickly as possible if there are still unpurchased properties available.

I think the expected value or cost of going to jail in such circumstance is $10. Sometimes you are lucky and never go to jail, sometimes you are unlucky and go to jail a lot.

Later on in a game when an opponent has built hotels on St. James, Tennessee and New York (with rents of 900, 900 and 1,000), the cost of going to jail significantly increases when you consider that eventually you must exit jail and pay rent on any square upon which you land. For example, your odds of avoiding landing any orange property are about 65%. It's the 35% that is the killer.

I think that as a sideline, a player could offer "going to jail"

insurance every time someone reaches Go and starts a new trip around the board.

As I read the literature on derivatives and accounting for derivatives, it seems to me that both sides of the contract qualify as derivatives and therefore need to be accounted for if each token is an SEC reporting token. The token purchasing the insurance is hedging, and the token offering the insurance is speculating. Do I have this right? If an accounting period ends while an insured token still has a reasonable probability of getting sent to jail, then the derivative contract must be valued at some estimate of fair value. Again, do I have this right?

It also seems to me that depending on whether you are ahead or behind in a game, you might very well wish to offer and sell to other players an opportunity to make a pre-payment in exchange for a certain percentage of rent every time someone lands on your house or hotel, or you might wish to buy into such into either such arrangement. Aren't both sides of this contract for speculative purposes? On the other hand, you might want to offer rent discounts that expire after going around the board once. Again, wouldn't this be hedging for the party that purchases a rent discount and for speculation for the party that sells it?

I think also, that options can be built into a game of monopoly. For example, upon acquiring the final piece of property that creates a color group monopoly and before making any sort of building plans, you could offer opponents an option to pay future rents at a fixed level. Of course, if you don't build enough houses or a hotel, then the option would not be exercises by the purchasing opponent, but it would be exercises if you had built enough houses or hotels.

Of course, all sorts of speculative contracts could be entered into. For example, you might bet with opponent B that opponent C will go bankrupt on the current trip around the board. Isn't this also a derivative contract? It is entered into for speculative purposes, I presume. Another example would be to speculate (bet) on whether or not earnings reach a certain dollar amount for the coming accounting period.

Are there any

 

December 3m 2008 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi David,

I’ve never heard of a derivative contract on the net earnings of a company as a whole. The definition of “net earnings” is generally too complicated and subject to too many contingencies to get counterparties to agree on such complex contracts. I don’t think a net earnings hedge of an entire company would even be eligible for hedge accounting under either the FAS 133 or the IAS 39 standard.

It is possible to lock in a profit on a contracted commodity notional by hedging both the future purchase price and the future selling price in separate derivative contracts, but this is not the same as net earnings of an entire firm. More commonly the firm already has a position (even ownership of the notional itself) and is locking in a profit on a specific amount of notional.

Derivative contracts are written on more precise notionals and underlyings such as the price of a commodity or the default of a debt payment.

You should probably make your definition of derivatives more precise by defining a notional, underlying (index), and net settlement (required in FAS 133 for hedge accounting but not in IAS 39).

The Monopoly Game could add buying properties with credit (even with accelerated subprime mortgages) and credit derivative swaps (CDSs). It might also be a way of adding Black Swan Theory. But the game would probably become too complicated even for geeks.

What distinguishes credit derivatives from commodity derivatives is the possibility that the entire notional may be lost in a credit derivative and the virtual impossibility that the notional may be lost in a commodity derivative --- unless the spot price of a commodity like corn, wheat, copper, and oil drops to zero which is not likely even under the Black Swan Theory.

When Investor I enters into 40 corn futures contracts with Farmer F, most contracts are traded with a "net settlement clause" such the notional value of 100,000 bushels of corn "net settles" is never at risk. At settlement time, Farmer F and Investor I net settle on only the difference between the current spot price and the contracted future (strike) price. The corn itself never changes hands in a physical sense in futures markets. If Investor I really wants corn, he can then buy it at the spot price in the corn market even though his net price depends how he net settled his futures contracts in the futures market.

Put more simply, there are no black swans in most commodity derivative trades, but there may be black swans in credit derivative trades --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_swan_theory
There are also quite a few YouTube videos on the Black Swan Theory.

To distinguish traditional financial securities from derivative financial securities for my students, I always compared bond sales (financial securities sales where the notional changes hands on the date of the sale) with interest rate swaps (derivative financial securities where the notional changes hands).

When Investor I buys a bond for a $1 million notional from Debtor D, the risk of repayment is transferred from I to D the instant the $1 million is transferred to D.

When A and B enter into an interest rate swap on a $1 million notional, the notional never changes hands such that the notional itself is never at risk. Net settlement (usually quarterly throughout the life of the swap) is based on the difference between the spot rate of interest and the contracted forward rate. This makes such swaps ideal hedges to convert variable rate bonds to fixed rate risk and vice versa.

 

 

Credit derivative swaps are not interest rate swaps, and the notional of a credit derivative swap may be at risk if value of the notional itself drops to zero --- that black swan.

If you are going to teach derivatives, the following distinctions between the FAS 133 and IAS 39 standards should be emphasized, although don't make too much of the fact that the IAS 39 definition does not require net settlement for hedge accounting. Most derivatives encountered when applying IAS 39 will net settle.

 

*****************************

The terminology related to IAS 39 is very complicated. Bob Jensen maintains an extensive online glossary of FAS 133 and IAS 39 terminology.[1] Entries related to IAS 39 are boxed in green, and entries related to DIG implementation guidelines are blocked in red.

Paragraph 9 of IAS 39 reads, in part, as follows:

The following terms are used in this Standard with the meanings specified:

Definition of a derivative

A derivative is a financial instrument or other contract within the scope of this Standard (see Paragraphs 2–7) with all three of the following characteristics:

(a)           its value changes in response to the change in a specified interest rate, financial instrument price, commodity price, foreign exchange rate, index of prices or rates, credit rating or credit index, or other variable, provided in the case of a non-financial variable that the variable is not specific to a party to the contract (sometimes called the 'underlying');

(b)           it requires no initial net investment or an initial net investment that is smaller than would be required for other types of contracts that would be expected to have a similar response to changes in market factors; and

(c)           it is settled at a future date.

 

Later on this definition is elaborated in the following IAS 39 paragraphs:

 

AG9        Typical examples of derivatives are futures and forward, swap and option contracts. A derivative usually has a notional amount, which is an amount of currency, a number of shares, a number of units of weight or volume or other units specified in the contract. However, a derivative instrument does not require the holder or writer to invest or receive the notional amount at the inception of the contract. Alternatively, a derivative could require a fixed payment or payment of an amount that can change (but not proportionally with a change in the underlying) as a result of some future event that is unrelated to a notional amount. For example, a contract may require a fixed payment of CU1,000 if six-month LIBOR increases by 100 basis points. Such a contract is a derivative even though a notional amount is not specified.

 

AG10      The definition of a derivative in this Standard includes contracts that are settled gross by delivery of the underlying item (eg a forward contract to purchase a fixed rate debt instrument). An entity may have a contract to buy or sell a non-financial item that can be settled net in cash or another financial instrument or by exchanging financial instruments (eg a contract to buy or sell a commodity at a fixed price at a future date). Such a contract is within the scope of this Standard unless it was entered into and continues to be held for the purpose of delivery of a non-financial item in accordance with the entity's expected purchase, sale or usage requirements (see Paragraphs 5–7).

 

AG11      One of the defining characteristics of a derivative is that it has an initial net investment that is smaller than would be required for other types of contracts that would be expected to have a similar response to changes in market factors. An option contract meets that definition because the premium is less than the investment that would be required to obtain the underlying financial instrument to which the option is linked. A currency swap that requires an initial exchange of different currencies of equal fair values meets the definition because it has a zero initial net investment.

AG12      A regular way purchase or sale gives rise to a fixed price commitment between trade date and settlement date that meets the definition of a derivative. However, because of the short duration of the commitment it is not recognised as a derivative financial instrument. Rather, this Standard provides for special accounting for such regular way contracts (see Paragraphs 38 and AG53–AG56).

 

AG12A   The definition of a derivative refers to non-financial variables that are not specific to a party to the contract. These include an index of earthquake losses in a particular region and an index of temperatures in a particular city. Non-financial variables specific to a party to the contract include the occurrence or non-occurrence of a fire that damages or destroys an asset of a party to the contract. A change in the fair value of a non-financial asset is specific to the owner if the fair value reflects not only changes in market prices for such assets (a financial variable) but also the condition of the specific non-financial asset held (a non-financial variable). For example, if a guarantee of the residual value of a specific car exposes the guarantor to the risk of changes in the car's physical condition, the change in that residual value is specific to the owner of the car.[2]

 


The above definition differs somewhat from the definition of a derivative financial instrument scoped into FAS 133. The key difference is in the concept of “net settlement.”

Definitions of derivatives

  • IAS 39: Does not define “net settlement” as being required to be scoped into IAS 39 as a derivative such as when interest rate swap payments and receipts are not net settled into a single payment.
  • FAS 133: Net settlement is an explicit requirement to be scoped into FAS 133 as a derivative financial instrument.

Implications: This is not a major difference since IAS 39 scoped out most of what is not net settled such as Normal Purchases and Normal Sales (NPNS) and other instances where physical delivery transpires in commodities rather than cash settlements. Also IAS 39 applies net settlement as a criterion in scoping a loan commitment into IAS 39.[3]

And in B2 of IAS 39 we find the following examples of derivatives and examples of derivatives that are not scoped into IAS 39:



 

Type of contract

Main pricing-settlement variable (underlying variable)

Interest rate swap

Interest rates

Currency swap (foreign exchange swap)

Currency rates

Commodity swap

Commodity prices

Equity swap

Equity prices (equity of another entity)

Credit swap

Credit rating, credit index or credit price

Total return swap

Total fair value of the reference asset and interest rates

Purchased or written treasury bond option (call or put)

Interest rates

Purchased or written currency option (call or put)

Currency rates

Purchased or written commodity option (call or put)

Commodity prices

Purchased or written stock option (call or put)

Equity prices (equity of another entity)

Interest rate futures linked to government debt (treasury futures)

Interest rates

Currency futures

Currency rates

Commodity futures

Commodity prices

Interest rate forward linked to government debt (treasury forward)

Interest rates

Currency forward

Currency rates

Commodity forward

Commodity prices

Equity forward

Equity prices (equity of another entity)

 

The above list is not exhaustive. Any contract that has an underlying may be a derivative. Weather derivatives cannot get hedge accounting under FAS 133. They were excluded in the original version of IAS 39, but an amendment in 2003 made it possible to get hedge accounting treatment if hedged item does not fall under other IFRS 4. The above list provides examples of contracts that normally qualify as derivatives under IAS 39. Moreover, even if an instrument meets the definition of a derivative contract, special provisions of IAS 39 may apply, for example, if it is a weather derivative (see IAS 39.AG1), a contract to buy or sell a non-financial item such as commodity (see IAS 39.5 and IAS 39.AG10) or a contract settled in an entity's own shares (see IAS 32.21–IAS 32.24). Therefore, an entity must evaluate the contract to determine whether the other characteristics of a derivative are present and whether special provisions apply.[4]

Share-based employee compensation such as employee stock options (ESOs) is not scoped into either IAS 39 or FAS 133. Such compensation contracts are scoped in IFRS 2 and IAS 123(R).

A loan obligation is a contract to make or receive a loan in the future. If it is a firm commitment in the sense of a specified rate of interest, its accounting depends a great deal whether or not the loan commitment will net settle due to changes in market rates of interest. FAS 133 is very clear that loan commitments that do not net settle are not required to be booked as derivative financial instruments, although certain problems of conflict between FAS 133 versus FAS 65 had to be resolved in Paragraphs A26-A33 if FAS 149.

Loan commitments that net settle were more of a problem in IAS 39 since net settlement is not required in the IAS 39 definition of a derivative. However, IAS 39 added a net settlement condition for loan commitments as follows:

BC15       Loan commitments are firm commitments to provide credit under pre-specified terms and conditions. In the IAS 39 implementation guidance process, the question was raised whether a bank's loan commitments are derivatives accounted for at fair value under IAS 39. This question arises because a commitment to make a loan at a specified rate of interest during a fixed period of time meets the definition of a derivative. In effect, it is a written option for the potential borrower to obtain a loan at a specified rate.

 

BC16       To simplify the accounting for holders and issuers of loan commitments, the Board decided to exclude particular loan commitments from the scope of IAS 39. The effect of the exclusion is that an entity will not recognise and measure changes in fair value of these loan commitments that result from changes in market interest rates or credit spreads. This is consistent with the measurement of the loan that results if the holder of the loan commitment exercises its right to obtain financing, because changes in market interest rates do not affect the measurement of an asset measured at amortised cost (assuming it is not designated in a category other than loans and receivables).

 

BC17       However, the Board decided that an entity should be permitted to measure a loan commitment at fair value with changes in fair value recognised in profit or loss on the basis of designation at inception of the loan commitment as a financial liability through profit or loss. This may be appropriate, for example, if the entity manages risk exposures related to loan commitments on a fair value basis.

 

BC18       The Board further decided that a loan commitment should be excluded from the scope of IAS 39 only if it cannot be settled net.  If the value of a loan commitment can be settled net in cash or another financial instrument, including when the entity has a past practice of selling the resulting loan assets shortly after origination, it is difficult to justify its exclusion from the requirement in IAS 39 to measure at fair value similar instruments that meet the definition of a derivative.

 

BC19       Some comments received on the Exposure Draft disagreed with the Board's proposal that an entity that has a past practice of selling the assets resulting from its loan commitments shortly after origination should apply IAS 39 to all of its loan commitments. The Board considered this concern and agreed that the words in the Exposure Draft did not reflect the Board's intention. Thus, the Board clarified that if an entity has a past practice of selling the assets resulting from its loan commitments shortly after origination, it applies IAS 39 only to its loan commitments in the same class.

 

BC20       Finally, the Board decided that commitments to provide a loan at a below-market interest rate should be initially measured at fair value, and subsequently measured at the higher of (a) the amount that would be recognised under IAS 37 and (b) the amount initially recognised less, where appropriate, cumulative amortisation recognised in accordance with IAS 18 Revenue. It noted that without such a requirement, liabilities that result from such commitments might not be recognised in the balance sheet, because in many cases no cash consideration is received.

 

BC20A   As discussed in paragraphs BC21–BC23E, the Board amended IAS 39 in 2005 to address financial guarantee contracts. In making those amendments, the Board moved the material on loan commitments from the scope section of the Standard to the section on subsequent measurement (Paragraph 47(d)). The purpose of this change was to rationalise the presentation of this material without making substantive changes.[5]

 

 

Paragraph BC18 above especially brings IAS 39 closer to FAS 133 with respect to the net settlement criterion for loan commitments to be derivatives. Paragraph 4 of IAS 39 notes that installment payments are not the same as net settlements.

If a loan commitment with a locked in rate of interest net settles and is booked as a derivative financial instrument, a hedge of this loan commitment cannot get hedge accounting. However, if the loan commitment does not net settle and is not booked, then the question of hedge accounting depends upon how the loan eventually will be carried when it is transacted and booked. If it will be carried at fair value, then hedge accounting is not allowed for any derivative that hedges this unbooked loan commitment. If the loan will be carried at amortized cost, however, fair value hedge accounting is available for the hedging derivative just as it is for a purchase commitment of inventory and fixed assets. Cash flow hedging makes no sense since there is no cash flow risk on a loan commitment that has a contracted interest rate.

In matters of valuing loan commitments at fair value, if they meet the net settlement condition of a derivative and are booked at fair value, a question arises as to fair value measurement when future servicing rights are embedded in the value of the loan as is the case for most mortgage loans. A key paragraph of the SEC’s SAB 105 reads as follows:

Facts: Bank A enters into a loan commitment with a customer to originate a mortgage loan at a specified rate. As part of this written loan commitment, Bank A expects to receive future net cash flows related to servicing rights from servicing fees (included in the loan's interest rate or otherwise), late charges, and other ancillary sources, or from selling the servicing rights to a third party. If Bank A intends to sell the mortgage loan after it is funded, pursuant to paragraph 6 of FASB Statement No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, as amended by FASB Statement No. 149, Amendment of Statement 133 on Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities ("Statement 133"), the written loan commitment is accounted for as a derivative instrument and recorded at fair value through earnings (referred to hereafter as a "derivative loan commitment"). If Bank A does not intend to sell the mortgage loan after it is funded, the written loan commitment is not accounted for as a derivative under Statement 133. However, paragraph 7(c) of FASB Statement No. 159, The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities ("Statement 159"), permits Bank A to record the written loan commitment at fair value through earnings (referred to hereafter as a "written loan commitment"). Pursuant to Statement 159, the fair value measurement for a written loan commitment would include the expected net future cash flows related to the associated servicing of the loan.[6]

 

In summary, the loan commitment must in some instances be booked at fair value and in other instances it may be booked at fair value under the Fair Value Option (FVO) in FAS 159. However, FAS 159 makes fair value booking optional when it is not required under SAB 105, FAS 133, and FAS 149. If the loan commitment is not booked, the accounting for it would be much like the accounting for unbooked purchase/sale contracts illustrated by Bob Jensen.[7]

Additional Considerations

 

PwC in Comperio makes the following observation:

SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 105, Application of Accounting Principles to Loan Commitments (SAB 105), specifies that in estimating the fair value of loan commitments that are subject to FAS 133, an entity should exclude from its calculation the expected future cash flows related to the associated servicing of the loan. It is unclear whether the guidance in SAB 105 would also apply to loan commitments that are not subject to FAS 133 but are eligible for the FVO under FAS 159. The SEC Staff has requested that an industry group led by the Mortgage Bankers Association assist in resolving this issue[8]

 

Also consider DIG Issue No. C-13 as amended by FAS 149. Pursuant to FAS 156, a mortgage banking enterprise may elect to subsequently measure (BOOKED) servicing assets and servicing liabilities at fair value with changes in fair value reported in the period in which they occur. By electing the Fair Value Measurement Method, the mortgage banking enterprise may simplify its objective for hedge accounting because the Fair Value Measurement Method requires income statement recognition of the changes in fair value of those servicing assets and servicing liabilities, which will potentially offset the changes in fair value of the derivative instruments in the same accounting period without designating formal FAS 133 hedging relationships. The FASB’s Accounting Standards Codification online database provides useful information regarding recognition of derivatives. Derecognition of derivatives is also discussed.[9]

 

(i)                  Rationale and Synthesis

There are occasional differences between IAS 39 and FAS 133 in terms of what types of contracts must be booked as derivative financial instruments. Some examples of differences and similarities are listed below:

1.      FAS 133 requires that a derivative contract have at least one specified notional. IAS 39 makes some exceptions such as the exception illustrated in AG1 above. However, in nearly all cases derivatives have at least one specified notional upon which settlements are based. Paragraph B8 of IAS 39 also allows the notional to be variable in the case of foreign exchange (FX) hedging and illustrates this with a derivative settlement based on sales volume.

2.      FAS 133 requires that contract payments be net settled with only the difference between what is owed being transmitted in cash. For example, in an interest rate swap, FAS 133 requires that the swap receivable be netted against the swap payable on each settlement date with only the net difference actually being transmitted. Paragraph B3 of IAS 39 allows that gross payments be swapped. There are, however, no cross payments of the notionals themselves used in calculating the interest payments. The net versus gross settlement differences in the two standards is generally not very important. If a derivative is likely to entail physical delivery in place of cash settlement, it is not scoped into either FAS 133 or IAS 39.

3.      Both standards specify no initial investment or a very small investment (usually called a premium) that is nowhere close to the value of the notional of the contract. This is a main difference between a financial instrument (such as a bond or a purchase/sale contract) and a derivative financial instrument. The usual example of a small investment is the premium that is paid by the purchaser of an option to the writer (seller) of the option, although there can also be small premiums on other contracts such as interest rate swaps. Most forward, futures, and swap contracts have no initial investment and the risks involved are usually much less than the full value of the entire notional. IAS 39 allows interest rate swap payments to be prepaid without affecting the “no initial investment” constraint.[10] Like FAS 133, IAS 39 does not allow for prepayments at the full notional value of a forward contract.[11]

4.      IAS 39 Paragraph B18 (g) allows some leeway as to whether companies want to account for credit default swaps as insurance contracts or derivative financial instruments. FAS 133 in general is more specific as to what is to be accounted for as insurance by standards other than FAS 133 relative to discretion permitted under IAS 39 for insurance-like derivatives. Although various international standards cover some aspects of insurance, IFRS 4 is the main standard for insurance accounting guidelines.

 

*****************************

 


 

[2] Extracted from IAS 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. © IASC Foundation.

[3] Paragraph BC18 of IAS 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. © IASC Foundation.

[4] Extracted from IAS 39, Guidance on Implementing. © IASC Foundation.

[5] Extracted from IAS 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. © IASC Foundation.

[6] SAB105 of the Securities Exchange Commission --- http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab105.htm

[8] Comperio database available from PricewaterhouseCoopers --- https://www.pwccomperio.com/Common/Logon.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2f&https=true

[9] FASB Accounting  Standards Codification online database  --- http://asc.fasb.org/home .
Section 815-10 provides an introductory summary of accounting for derivative financial instruments.

Recognition of derivatives for booking purposes is discussed in Section 815-25.

Derecognition is discussed in Section 815-40.

[10] Paragraphs B4 and B5 of IAS 39.

[11] Paragraph B9 of IAS 39.

Bob Jensen


Mr. Buffett, who has interests in both companies, claimed there was another agenda (aside from hedging with derivatives). “The reason many of them do it (invest in derivative contracts) is that they want to smooth earnings,” he said, referring to the idea of trying to make quarterly numbers less volatile. “And I’m not saying there’s anything wrong with that, but that is the motivation.”
"Derivatives, as Accused by Buffett," by Andrew Ross Sorkin, The New York Times, March 14, 2011 ---
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/derivatives-as-accused-by-buffett/?ref=business

Mr. Buffett once described derivatives as “financial weapons of mass destruction.” Yet some of his most ardent fans have quietly raised eyebrows at his pontifications, given that he plays in the opaque market. In the fourth quarter alone, Berkshire made $222 million on derivatives. TheStreet.com published a column last spring with the headline: “Warren Buffett Is a Hypocrite.”

¶His comments, which were released last month by the financial crisis commission, come as the government is writing rules for derivatives as part of the Dodd-Frank financial regulatory overhaul. And the statements could influence the debate.

¶Mr. Buffett appeared to backpedal from his oft-quoted line, explaining: “I don’t think they’re evil per se. It’s just, they, I mean there’s nothing wrong with having a futures contract or something of the sort. But they do let people engage in massive mischief.”

¶The problems arise, Mr. Buffett said, when a bank’s exposure to derivatives balloons to grand proportions and uninformed investors start using them.

¶It “doesn’t make much difference if it’s, you know, one guy rolling dice against another, and they’re doing $5 a throw. But it makes a lot of difference when you get into big numbers.”

¶What worries him most is the big financial institutions that have millions of contracts. “If I look at JPMorgan, I see two trillion in receivables, two trillion in payables, a trillion and seven netted off on each side and $300 billion remaining, maybe $200 billion collateralized,” he said, walking through his thinking. “That’s all fine. But I don’t know what discontinuities are going to do to those numbers overnight if there’s a major nuclear, chemical or biological terrorist action that really is disruptive to the whole financial system.”

¶“Who the hell knows what happens to those numbers?” he asked. “I think it’s virtually unmanageable.”

¶Mr. Buffett defended Berkshire Hathaway’s use of derivatives, arguing that the company maintains a limited amount. At the time of the interview, the company had only about 250 derivative contracts. (It’s now down to 203.) “I want to know every contract, and I can do that with the way we’ve done it. But I can’t do it with 23,000 that a bunch of traders are putting on.”

¶He noted that when Berkshire bought General Re in 1998, the reinsurance company had 23,000 derivative contracts. “I could have hired 15 of the smartest people, you know, math majors, Ph.D.’s. I could have given them carte blanche to devise any reporting system that would enable me to get my mind around what exposure that I had, and it wouldn’t have worked,” he said to the government panel. “Can you imagine 23,000 contracts with 900 institutions all over the world with probably 200 of them names I can’t pronounce?” Berkshire decided to unwind the derivative deals, incurring some $400 million in losses.

¶Mr. Buffett said he used derivatives to capitalize on discrepancies in the market. (That’s what other investors must think they are doing — just not as successfully.)

¶Perhaps the most insightful nugget in the interview was Mr. Buffett’s explanation of why corporations use derivatives — and why they probably shouldn’t.

¶Many companies, as diverse as Coca-Cola and Burlington Northern, argue that they employ derivatives to hedge their risk.

¶The United States-based Coca-Cola tries to protect against fluctuations in currencies since it does business around the world. Burlington Northern, the railroad giant, uses the investments to limit the effect of fuel prices.

¶Mr. Buffett, who has interests in both companies, claimed there was another agenda. “The reason many of them do it is that they want to smooth earnings,” he said, referring to the idea of trying to make quarterly numbers less volatile. “And I’m not saying there’s anything wrong with that, but that is the motivation.”

¶The numbers all even out eventually, he cautioned, so derivatives don’t really make much difference in the long term.

¶“They’re going to lose as much on the diesel fuel contracts over time as they make,” he said of Burlington Northern. “I wouldn’t do it.”

Continued in article

Bob Jensen's threads on creative accounting, smoothing, and earnings management ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory02.htm#Manipulation

Bob Jensen's tutorials on accounting for derivative financial instruments ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

 

 


Free derivative financial instruments document from Ira Kawaller --- http://www.kawaller.com/

"10 Tenets of Derivatives" (loads very slow) --- http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/AFP_10Tenets.pdf 

Bob Jensen's tutorials on accounting for derivative financial instruments --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm


Paragraph 6 of FAS 133 reads as follows:

. A derivative instrument is a financial instrument or other contract with all three of the following characteristics:

a. It has (1) one or more underlyings and (2) one or more notional amounts \3/ or payment provisions or both. Those terms determine the amount of the settlement or
settlements, and, in some cases, whether or not a settlement is required. \4/

==========================================================================

\3/ Sometimes other names are used. For example, the notional amount is called a face amount in some contracts.

\4/ The terms underlying, notional amount, payment provision, and settlement are intended to include the plural forms in the remainder of this Statement. Including both the
singular and plural forms used in this paragraph is more accurate but much more awkward and impairs the readability.

==========================================================================

b. It requires no initial net investment or an initial net investment that is smaller than would be required for other
types of contracts that would be expected to have a similar response to changes in market factors.

c. Its terms require or permit net settlement, it can readily be settled net by a means outside the contract, or it provides for delivery of an asset that puts the recipient
in a position not substantially different from net settlement.

Most derivatives like forward, futures, and swap contracts are acquired at zero cost such that historical cost accounting is meaningless.  The exception is a purchased/written option where a small premium is paid/received to buy/sell the option.  Thus if the derivative financial instrument contract is defaulted a few minutes after being transacted there are generally zero or very small damages.  Such is not the case with traditional non-derivative financial instruments like bonds where the entire notional amounts (thousands or millions of dollars) change hands initially such that enormous damages are possible immediately after the notional amounts change hands.  In the case of of a derivative contract, the notional does not change hands.  It is only used to compute a contracted payment such as a swap payment.

For example, in the year 2004 Wells Fargo Bank sold $63 million in bonds with an interest rate "derived" from the price of a casino's common stock price.  The interest payments are "derivatives" in one sense, but the bonds are not derivative financial instruments scoped into FAS 133 due to Condition b in Paragraph 6 quoted above.  In the case of bonds, the bond holders made a $63 million initial investment of the entire notional amount.  If Wells Fargo also entered into an interest rate swap to lock in a fixed interest rate, the swap contract would be a derivative financial instrument subject to FAS 133.  However, the bonds are not derivative financial instruments under FAS 133 definitions.

"What Goes On in Vegas Reaches Wall Street:  Wells Fargo Sets Derivatives On Stations Casinos Inc. With $63 Million Bond Offering," by Joseph T. Hallinan, The Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2004, Page C1 --- 

Talk about leveraging your bets: Would you believe a bond whose value is tied to the stock performance of a casino?

In the increasingly complicated world of financial derivatives, Wells Fargo & Co. has come up with just such a wrinkle. The San Francisco bank has issued $63 million in 10-year notes whose return will be determined not by the actions of Alan Greenspan or the price of Treasury bills but by the stock price of a Las Vegas casino operator, Station Casinos Inc. (which isn't involved in issuing the derivatives).

For Wells, which has reported consistently strong growth in recent years, it means cheap money. Initially, the bank will pay holders of the note interest at a rate of just 0.25% annually. Over time, the holders may get more money, depending on the performance of the stock. So far this year, Station shares have soared about 60%. At 4 p.m. yesterday, Station was down five cents to $48.95 in New York Stock Exchange composite trading.

Wells said it crafted the unusual deal after one of its customers -- an institutional investor it declines to name -- approached the bank. The investor wanted exposure to Station's stock without actually owning it, says Nino S. Fanlo, Wells's treasurer.

The notes are callable by Wells after three years. When the bonds are cashed, holders may receive 17.6 times the closing price of the stock, or, if the stock price falls, they are guaranteed a return of principal. The notes may be resold to other investors. Banks and others previously have issued notes tied to a stock index or to a basket of stocks. But the Wells Fargo notes, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, are considered unusual. Wells says this is the first time it has issued a note tied to the performance of a single stock

Continued in the article

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting for derivative financial instruments are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

Derivative Financial Instruments Frauds --- 
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm

To understand more about derivative financial instruments, I suggest that you begin by going to the file at 
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm
  
Especially note the discussion of the shortcut method at the end of the above document.

The earliest records of transactions that had features of derivative securities occur around 2000 BC in the Middle East.  (Page 338)
Geoffrey Poitras, The Early History of Financial Economics 1478-1776 (Chelten, UK:  Edward Elgar)
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/book01q3.htm#Poitras  

During the Greek and Roman civilizations, transactions involving elements of derivative securities contracts had evolved considerably from the sale for consignment process.  Markets had been formalized to the point of having a fixed time and place for trading together with common barter rules and currency systems.  These early markets did exhibit a practice of contracting for future delivery. (Page 338)
Ibid

Like forward contracts, the use of options contracts or "privileges" has a long history. (Page 339)
Ibid

The heuristics of an options transaction involves the payment of a premium to acquire a right to complete a specific trade at a later date.  These types of transactions appear not only in early commercial activity but also in other areas.  For example, an interesting ancient reference to (sic) options-like transactions can be found in Genesis 29 of the Bible where Laban offers Jacob an option to marry his youngest daughter Rachel in exchange for seven years labour.  (Page 339)
Ibid

What is surprising is that it took over 4000 years (Until FAS 133 in June of 1998)  to finally requiring the booking of derivatives into the ledger.  However, Laban's contract falls outside the scope of FAS 133 if Rachel cannot readily be  converted into cash.
Bob Jensen at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/000overview/mp3/133intro.htm 

 

Derivative financial instruments accounting became a priority of the SEC, IASC, and FASB after the scandals of the early 1990s.  See "Derivatives Revisited," by Ed McCarthy, Journal of Accountancy, May 2000, pp. 35-43.  The online version is at http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/may2000/mccarthy.htm

Derivatives debacles have provided some of the past decade’s most devastating financial headlines. Names such as Long Term Capital Management, Orange County and Baring Brothers bring to mind situations where derivatives failed—often miserably (see exhibit 1, below, for details). Several losses were enormous—an estimated $2 billion for Orange County and $4 billion for Long Term Capital. Other incidents resulted in highly publicized lawsuits between derivatives buyers and sellers, such as Procter & Gamble’s lengthy dispute with Bankers Trust.

Exhibit 1: Derivatives Losses in the 1990s
Company/Entity Amount of Loss Area of Loss
Air Products $113,000,000 Leverage and currency swaps.
Askin Securities $600,000,000 Mortgage-backed securities.
Baring Brothers $1,240,500,000 Options.
Cargill (Minnetonka Fund) $100,000,000 Mortgage derivatives.
Codelco Chile $200,000,000 Copper and precious metals futures and forwards.
Glaxo Holdings PLC $150,000,000 Mortgage derivatives.
Long Term Capital Management $4,000,000,000 Currency and interest rate derivatives.
Metallgesellschaft $1,340,000,000 Energy derivatives.
Orange County $2,000,000,000 Reverse repurchase agreements and leveraged structured notes.
Proctor & Gamble $157,000,000 Leveraged German marks and U.S. dollars spread.
Source: Derivatives: Valuable Tool or Wild Beast? by Brian Kettel. Copyright © 1999 by Global Treasury News (www.gtnews.com). Reprinted with permission.

The causes of these losses varied. Among those frequently cited were traders working without adequate supervision, pricing models that failed to account for extreme market movements and market illiquidity. Although derivatives abuses have been absent from the headlines lately, some incidents still make news, such as Sweden’s Electrolux AB’s 1999 loss of more than 55 million German marks (approximately $28 million) due to an employee’s unauthorized futures trading.

 

How Companies Use Derivatives

Source: 1999 Survey of OTC Derivatives Use and Risk Management Practices by the Association for Financial Professionals. Copyright © 1999.

To see how banks use/misuse derivatives, see tranches

 

Tutorial:  Financial Derivatives in Plain English --- http://www.iol.ie/~aibtreas/derivs-pe/ 
There are some good examples of hedging and speculating strategies.  I did not, however, see anything on accounting for derivatives under FAS 133 or IAS 39.

A nonderivative financial instrument fails one or more of the above tests to qualify as a derivative in FAS 133.  Nonderivatives do not necessarily have to be adjusted to fair value like derivative instruments.  However, they may be used for economic hedges even though they do not qualify for special hedge accounting under FAS 133.  Exceptions in FAS 133 that afford special hedge accounting treatment for nonderivative instruments that hedge foreign currency fair value and/or hedge foreign currency exposures of net investment in a foreign operation.  See FAS Paragraphs 6c, 17d, 18d, 20c, 28d, 37, 39, 40, 42, 44, 45, 246, 247, 255, 264, 293-304, 476, 477, and 479.  Also see foreign currency hedge.

It is important to note that all derivatives in finance may not fall under the FAS 133 definition.  In FAS 133, a derivative must have a notional, an underlying, and net settlement.  There are other requirements such as a zero or minimal initial investment as specified in Paragraph 6b and Appendix A Paragraph 57b of FAS 133 and Paragraph 10b of IAS 39.  Examples of derivatives that are explicitly excluded are discussed in Paragraph 252 on Page 134 of FAS 133.  Paragraph 10c of IAS 39 also addresses net settlement.  IASC does not require a net settlement provision in the definition of a derivative.  To meet the criteria for being a derivative under FAS 133, there must be a net settlement provision.  

For a FAS 133 flow chart, go to http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133flow.htm

There must also be zero or small net investment to meet the definition of a derivative financial instrument  (FAS 133 Paragraphs 6b and Appendix A Paragraph 57b.  Also see IAS 39 IAS 39: Paragraph 10b)

Avoiding derivative accounting.
In an example of the legalistic nature of the accounting rules, Manufacturing could have avoided derivative accounting entirely if the loan and interest rate cap were structured differently. SFAS 133 excludes from its scope certain interest rate caps, floors, and collars that cannot be classified as either a derivative or an embedded derivative. Manufacturing could have embedded the interest rate cap in the loan while failing to meet the criteria of an embedded derivative.
Robert A. Dyson, "Accounting for Interest-Bearing Instruments as Derivatives and Hedges," The CPA Journal, http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2002/0102/features/f014202.htm

Keeping Up With Financial Instruments Derivatives

In 2000, ISDA filed a letter to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) urging changes to FAS 133, its derivatives and hedge accounting standard. ISDA’s letter urged alterations to six areas of the standard: hedging the risk-free rate; hedging using purchased options; providing hedge accounting for foreign currency assets and liabilities; extending the exception for normal purchase and sales; and central treasury netting. The FASB subsequently rejected changes to purchased option provisions, conceded some on normal purchases and sales, extending the exception to contracts that implicitly or explicitly permit net settlement, declined to amend FAS 133 to facilitate partial term hedging and agreed to consider changing the restrictions on hedge accounting for foreign currency. 
ISDA ®INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC.http://www.isda.org/wwa/Retrospective_2000_Master.pdf
  

You can read a great deal about energy derivatives in The Derivatives 'Zine at http://www.margrabe.com/Energy.html 
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The above sources are not much good about accounting for derivatives under FAS 133, FAS 138, and IAS 39.  For that, go to the following source:

http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

March 20, 2002 Message from Ira Kawaller

Hi Bob,
I just posted a recently published article on how to satisfy the FAS 133 disclosure requirements for interest rate hedges.  Although it was originally published by Bank Asset/Liablility Management (March 2000), the content is 
applicable to all firms with interest rate exposures -- not just banks.  
If you are interested, it is available at 
http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/BALMHedges.pdf 
You can also find additional information about derivatives, risk management, and FAS 133 in the various articles posted on the Kawaller & Company website:  
http://www.kawaller.com 
Please feel free to contact me with any questions, comments, or suggestions.
Ira Kawaller
Kawaller & Company, LLC
kawaller@kawaller.com 
(718) 694-6270

 

 

DIG FAS 133 Implementation Issue A1 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
QUESTION

If an entity enters into a forward contract that requires the purchase of 1 share of an unrelated company’s common stock in 1 year for $110 (the market forward price) and at inception the entity elects to prepay the contract pursuant to its terms for $105 (the current price of the share of common stock), does the contract meet the criterion in paragraph 6(b) related to initial net investment and therefore meet the definition of a derivative for that entity? If not, is there an embedded derivative that warrants separate accounting?

RESPONSE

Paragraph 6(b) of Statement 133 specifies that a derivative requires either no initial net investment or a smaller initial net investment than would be required for other types of contracts that would be expected to have a similar response to changes in market factors. If no prepayment is made at inception, the contract would meet the criterion in paragraph 6(b) because it does not require an initial net investment but, rather, contains an unexercised election to prepay the contract at inception. Paragraph 8 further clarifies paragraph 6(b) and states that a derivative instrument does not require an initial net investment in the contract that is equal to the notional amount or that is determined by applying the notional amount to the underlying. If the contract gives the entity the option to "prepay" the contract at a later date during its one-year term (at $105 or some other specified amount), exercise of that option would be accounted for as a loan that is repayable at $110 at the end of the forward contract’s one-year term.

If instead, the entity elects to prepay the contract at inception for $105, the contract does not meet the definition of a freestanding derivative. The initial net investment of $105 is equal to the initial price of the 1 share of stock being purchased under the contract and therefore is equal to the investment that would be required for other types of contracts that would be expected to have a similar response to changes in market factors. However, the entity must assess whether that nonderivative instrument contains an embedded derivative that, pursuant to paragraph 12, requires separate accounting as a derivative. In this example, the prepaid contract is a hybrid instrument that is composed of a debt instrument (as the host contract) and an embedded derivative based on equity prices. The host contract is a debt instrument because the holder has none of the rights of a shareholder, such as the ability to vote the shares and receive distributions to shareholders. (See paragraph 60 of Statement 133.) Unless the hybrid instrument is remeasured at fair value with changes in value recorded in earnings as they occur, the embedded derivative must be separated from the host contract because the economic characteristics and risks of a derivative based on equity prices are not clearly and closely related to a debt host contract, and a separate instrument with the same terms as the embedded derivative would be a derivative subject to the requirements of Statement 133.

 

Also see other DIG issues under net settlement.

Paul Pacter states the following at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm 

IAS 39
A derivative is a financial instrument—

(a) - whose value changes in response to the change in a specified interest rate, security price, commodity price, foreign exchange rate, index of prices or rates, a credit rating or credit index, or similar variable (sometimes called the ‘underlying’);

(b) - that requires no initial net investment or little initial net investment relative to other types of contracts that have a similar response to changes in market conditions; and

(c) - that is settled at a future date.

FAS 133
(a) – same as IAS 39

(b) – same as IAS 39

(c) – FASB definition requires that the terms of the derivative contract require or permit net settlement.

FAS 133 Paragraph 408 reads as follows:

The Board recognizes that entities are commonly exposed to a variety of risks in the course of their activities, including interest rate, foreign exchange, market price, credit, liquidity, theft, weather, health, catastrophe, competitive, and business cycle risks. The Exposure Draft did not propose detailed guidance on what risks could be designated as being hedged, other than to note in the basis for conclusions that special hedge accounting for certain risk management transactions, such as hedges of strategic risk, would be precluded. In redeliberating the issue of risk, the Board reaffirmed that hedge accounting cannot be provided for all possible risks and decided to be more specific about the risks for which hedge accounting is available.

Various exceptions are dealt with in Paragraph 58 of FAS 133.  For example, Paragraph 58c reads as follows:

Certain contracts that are not traded on an exchange. A contract that is not traded on an exchange is not subject to the requirements of this Statement if the underlying is:

(1) A climatic or geological variable or other physical variable. Climatic, geological, and other physical variables include things like the number of inches of rainfall or snow in a particular area and the severity of an earthquake as measured by the Richter scale.

(2) The price or value of (a) a nonfinancial asset of one of the parties to the contract unless that asset is readily convertible to cash or (b) a nonfinancial liability of one of the parties to the contract unless that liability requires delivery of an asset that is readily convertible to cash.

(3) Specified volumes of sales or service revenues by one of the parties. That exception is intended to apply to contracts with settlements based on the volume of items sold or services rendered, for example, royalty agreements. It is not intended to apply to contracts based on changes in sales or revenues due to changes in market prices.

If a contract's underlying is the combination of two or more variables, and one or more would not qualify for one of the exceptions above, the application of this Statement to that contract depends on the predominant characteristics of the combined variable. The contract is subject to the requirements of this Statement if the changes in its combined underlying are highly correlated with changes in one of the component variables that would not qualify for an exception.

Also see "regular-way" security trading exceptions in Paragraph 58a if FAS 133.  Also note the exception in DIG C1.  Some general DIG exceptions to the scope of FAS 133 are listed in the "C" category at http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/derivatives/issuindex.html 

A nice review of the theory and application (aside from accounting) of derivative financial instruments appears in Myron Scholes' Nobel lecture that is reprinted as "Derivatives in a Dynamic Environment," American Economic Review, June 1998, 350-370.   Types of embedded derivative  instruments are often indexed debt and investment contracts such as commodity indexed interest or principal payments, convertible debt, credit indexed contracts, equity indexed contracts, and inflation indexed contracts.  By "indexed" it is meant that an uncertain economic event that is measured by an economic index (e.g., a credit rating index, commodity price index, convertible debt, or inflation index) defined in the contract.  An equity index might be defined as a particular index derived from common stock price movements such as the Dow Industrial Index or the Standard and Poors 500 Index.   Derivative instruments may also be futures contracts, forward contracts, interest rate swaps, foreign currency derivatives, warrants, forward rate agreements, basis swaps,  and complex combinations of such contracts such as a circus combination.    Interest rate swaps are the most common form of derivatives in terms of notional amounts.  There are Paragraph 6b initial investment size limitations discussed under the term premium.

Derivatives that are covered by FAS 133 accounting rules must remeasured to fair value on each balance sheet date.  Paragraph 18 on Page 10 of FAS 133 outlines how to account gains and losses on derivative financial instruments designated for FAS 133 accounting.  See hedge accounting.

FAS 133 does not change the requirement banning the netting of assets and liabilities in the balance sheet (statement of financial position) unless there is a right of  setoff.  This rule goes back to APB 10, Omnibus Opinion.  Hence the aggregate of positive valued derivative financial instruments cannot be netted against those with negative values.  The only exception would be when there are contractual rights of offset.  FAS 133 is silent as to whether derivatives expiring in the very near future are cash equivalents in the cash flow statement.  KPMG argues against that in terms of SFAS 95 rules.  See Example 6 beginning on Page 347 of of the Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998.

FAS 133 requires disclosures of hedging gains and losses by risk type.  Paragraph 45 on beginning on Page 27 does require that aggregate net amounts be reported by type of hedge.  Disclosure by market risk category is required by the SEC. 

In this FAS 133 Glossary, there are added conditions to become a qualified derivative financial instrument under FAS 133 rules.   In certain instances a nonfinancial derivative will also suffice for accounting under FAS 133 rules.  Unless noted otherwise it will be assumed that such instruments meet the FAS 133 criteria.  The formal definition of a derivative financial instrument for purposes of FAS 133 is given in Paragraph 249 on Page 133.  Such an instrument must have all three of the following attributes:

a. 
It has (1) one or more underlyings and (2) one or more notional amounts or payment provisions or both.

b.
It requires no initial net investment or an initial net investment that is smaller than would be required for other types of contracts that would be expected to have a similar response to changes in market factors.

c.
Its terms require or permit net settlement, it can readily be settled net by means outside the contract, or it provides for delivery of an asset that puts the recipient in a position not substantially different from net settlement.

Initial investment is an important criterion for distinguishing a derivative instrument from a nonderivative instrument.  See Paragraph 6b on Page 3 of FAS 133.  Paragraph 256 on Page 135 contains the following example:

A party that wishes to participate in the changes in the fair value of 10,000 shares of a specific marketable equity security can, of course, do so by purchasing 10,000 shares of that security.  Alternatively, the party may enter into a forward purchase contract with a notional amount of 10,000 shares of that security and an underlying that is the price of that security. Purchasing the shares would require an initial investment equal to the current price for 10,000 shares and would result in benefits such as the receipt of dividends (if any) and the ability to vote the shares. A simple forward contract entered into at the current forward price for 10,000 shares of the equity instrument would not require an initial investment equal to the notional amount but would offer the same opportunity to benefit or lose from changes in the price of that security.

Paragraph 10c of IAS 39 also addresses net settlement.  IASC does not require a net settlement provision in the definition of a derivative.  To meet the criteria for being a derivative under FAS 133, there must be a net settlement provision.  

In FAS 133, derivative financial instruments come in three basic types that are listed in Paragraph 4 on Page 2 of FAS 133:

Paragraph 4 on Page 2 of FAS 133.
This Statement standardizes the accounting for derivative instruments, including certain derivative instruments embedded in other contracts, by requiring that an entity recognize those items as assets or liabilities in the statement of financial position and measure them at fair value. If certain conditions are met, an entity may elect to designate a derivative instrument as follows:

a.
A hedge of the exposure to changes in the fair value of a recognized asset or liability, or of an unrecognized firm commitment, \2/ that are attributable to a particular risk (referred to as a fair value hedge)
==========================================================================
Footnote 2
\2/ An unrecognized firm commitment can be viewed as an executory contract that represents both a right and an obligation. When a previously unrecognized firm commitment that is designated as a hedged item is accounted for in accordance with this Statement, an asset or a liability is recognized and reported in the statement of financial position related to the recognition of the gain or loss on the firm commitment. Consequently, subsequent references to an asset or a liability in this Statement include a firm commitment.
==========================================================================

b.
A hedge of the exposure to variability in the cash flows of a recognized asset or liability, or of a forecasted transaction, that is attributable to a particular risk (referred to as a cash flow hedge)

c.
A hedge of the foreign currency exposure of

(1) an unrecognized firm commitment (a foreign currency fair value hedge), (

(2) an available-for-sale security (a foreign currency fair value hedge),

(3) a forecasted transaction (a foreign currency cash flow hedge), or

(4) a net investment in a foreign operation.

With respect to Section a above, a firm commitment cannot have a cash flow risk exposure because the gain or loss is already booked.  For example, a contract of 10,000 units per month at $200 per unit is unrecognized and has a cash flow risk exposure if the payments have not been made. If the payments have been prepaid, that prepayment is "recognized" and has no further cash flow risk exposure. The booked firm commitment, however, can have a fair value risk exposure.

With respect to Section c(1) above, firm commitments can have foreign currency risk exposures if the commitments are not already recognized.  See Paragraph 4 on Page 2 of FAS 133. If the firm commitment is recognized, it is by definition booked and its loss or gain is already accounted for. For example, a purchase contract for 10,000 units per month at 100DM Deutsche Marks per unit is unrecognized and has a foreign currency risk exposure if the payments have not been made. If the payments have been prepaid, that prepayment is "recognized" and has no further foreign currency risk exposure.  Similar reasoning applies to trading securities that are excluded in c(2) above since their gains and losses are already booked.  These gains have been deferred in comprehensive income for available-for-sale securities.

Cash flow hedges must have the possibility of affecting net earnings.  For example, Paragraph 485 on Page 211 of FAS 133 bans foreign currency risk hedges of forecasted dividends of foreign subsidiary.  The reason is that these dividends are a wash item and do not affect consolidated earnings.  For reasons and references, see equity method.

Section c(4) of Paragraph 4 on Page 2 of FAS 133 makes an exception to  Paragraph 29a on Page 20 for portfolios of dissimilar assets and liabilities. It allows hedging under "net investment" criteria under Paragraph 20 of SFAS 52. The gain or loss is reported in other comprehensive income as part of the cumulative translation adjustment. Reasons are given in Paragraph 477 on Page 208 of FAS 133:

The net investment in a foreign operation can be viewed as a portfolio of dissimilar assets and liabilities that would not meet the criterion in this Statement that the hedged item be a single item or a group of similar items. Alternatively, it can be viewed as part of the fair value of the parent's investment account. Under either view, without a specific exception, the net investment in a foreign operation would not qualify for hedging under this Statement. The Board decided, however, that it was acceptable to retain the current provisions of Statement 52 in that area. The Board also notes that, unlike other hedges of portfolios of dissimilar items, hedge accounting for the net investment in a foreign operation has been explicitly permitted by the authoritative literature.

For a derivative not designated as a hedging instrument, the gain or loss is recognized in earnings in the period of change.  Section 4(c) of Paragraph 4 of FAS 133 amends SFAS 52 on Foreign Currency Translation, to permit special accounting for a hedge of a foreign currency forecasted transaction with a derivative.  For more detail see foreign currency hedge.

Paragraph 42 on Page 26 reads as follows:

.A derivative instrument or a nonderivative financial instrument that may give rise to a foreign currency transaction gain or loss under Statement 52 can be designated as hedging the foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation. The gain or loss on a hedging derivative instrument (or the foreign currency transaction gain or loss on the nonderivative hedging instrument) that is designated as, and is effective as, an economic hedge of the net investment in a foreign operation shall be reported in the same manner as a translation adjustment to the extent it is effective as a hedge. The hedged net investment shall be accounted for consistent with Statement 52; the provisions of this Statement for recognizing the gain or loss on assets designated as being hedged in a fair value hedge do not apply to the hedge of a net investment in a foreign operation.  nonderivative financial instrument that may give rise to a foreign currency transaction gain or loss under Statement 52 can be designated as hedging the foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation. The gain or loss on a hedging derivative instrument (or the foreign currency transaction gain or loss on the nonderivative hedging instrument) that is designated as, and is effective as, an economic hedge of the net investment in a foreign operation shall be reported in the same manner as a translation adjustment to the extent it is effective as a hedge. The hedged net investment shall be accounted for consistent with Statement 52; the provisions of this Statement for recognizing the gain or loss on assets designated as being hedged in a fair value hedge do not apply to the hedge of a net investment in a foreign operation. 

These Section c(4) confusions in Paragraph 4 are illustrated in Examples 11-13 beginning on Page 270 of the Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998.

A more confusing, at least to me, portion of Paragraph 36 reads as follows:

The criterion in paragraph 21(c)(1) requires that a recognized asset or liability that may give rise to a foreign currency transaction gain or loss under Statement 52 (such as a foreign-currency-denominated receivable or payable) not be the hedged item in a foreign currency fair value or cash flow hedge because it is remeasured with the changes in the carrying amount attributable to what would be the hedged risk (an exchange rate change) reported currently in earnings.  Similarly, the criterion in paragraph 29(d) requires that the forecasted acquisition of an asset or the incurrence of a liability that may give rise to a foreign currency transaction gain or loss under Statement 52 not be the hedged item in a foreign currency cash flow hedge because, subsequent to acquisition or incurrence, the asset or liability will be remeasured with changes in the carrying amount attributable to what would be the hedged risk reported currently in earnings. A foreign currency derivative instrument that has been entered into with another member of a consolidated group can be a hedging instrument in the consolidated financial statements only if that other member has entered into an offsetting contract with an unrelated third party to hedge the exposure it acquired from issuing the derivative instrument to the affiliate that initiated the hedge.

Investments accounted for under the equity method cannot be hedged items under FAS 133 accounting for reasons explained under the term "equity method."   Recall that the magic percentage of equity ownership is 20% of more.  Lower ownership share accounted for under the cost as opposed to equity method can be hedged. 

In summary, the major exceptions under FAS 133 are discussed in the following FAS 133 Paragraphs:

  • Business combinations APB Opinion No. 16 (FAS 133Paragraph 11c)

  • Shareholders' equity (FAS 133 Paragraph 11a)

  • Leases (FAS 133 Paragraph 10f)

  • Employee benefits (SFAS 123 (Paragraph 11b)

  • Insurance contracts (note exceptions in FAS 133 Paragraph 10c)

  • Financial guarantees (note exceptions in FAS 133 Paragraph 10d)

  • Physical indices (FAS 133 Paragraphs 10e, 58c)

  • Regular-way trades (FAS 133 Paragraphs 10b, 58b)

Accounting for Executory Contracts Such as Purchase/Sale Commitments and Loan Commitments ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/TheoryOnFirmCommitments.htm

Exceptions are not as important in IAS 39, because fair value adjustments are required of all financial instruments.  However, exceptions or special accounting for derivatives are discussed at various places in IAS 39:

  • Business combinations )IAS 39 Paragraph 1g --- Also note  IAS 22 Paragraphs 65-76)

  • Shareholders' equity IAS 39 Paragraph 1e)

  • Leases IAS 39 Paragraph 1b)

  • Employee benefits IAS 39 Paragraph 1c)

  • Insurance contracts IAS 39 Paragraph 1d)

  • Financial guarantees IAS 39 Paragraph 1f)

  • Physical indices (IAS 39 Paragraph 1h)

  • Regular-way trades (Not an explicit exception in IAS 39)

DIG Issue C1 at http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
QUESTION

If a contract’s payment provision specifies that the issuer will pay to the holder $10,000,000 if aggregate property damage from all hurricanes in the state of Florida exceeds $50,000,000 during the year 2001, is the contract included in the scope of Statement 133? Alternatively, if the contract specifies that the issuer pays the holder $10,000,000 in the event that a hurricane occurs in Florida in 2001, is the contract included in the scope of Statement 133?

RESPONSE

If the contract contains a payment provision that requires the issuer to pay to the holder a specified dollar amount based on a financial variable, the contract is subject to the requirements of Statement 133. In the first example above, the payment under the contract occurs if aggregate property damage from a hurricane in the state of Florida exceeds $50,000,000 during the year 2001. The contract in that example contains two underlyings — a physical variable (that is, the occurrence of at least one hurricane) and a financial variable (that is, aggregate property damage exceeding a specified or determinable dollar limit of $50,000,000). Because of the presence of the financial variable as an underlying, the derivative contract does not qualify for the scope exclusion in paragraph 10(e)(1) of Statement 133.

In contrast, if the contract contains a payment provision that requires the issuer to pay to the holder a specified dollar amount that is linked solely to a climatic or other physical variable (for example, wind velocity or flood-water level), the contract is not subject to the requirements of Statement 133. In the second example above, the payment provision is triggered if a hurricane occurs in Florida in 2001. The underlying in that example is a physical variable (that is, occurrence of a hurricane). Therefore, the contract qualifies for the scope exclusion in paragraph 10(e)(1) of Statement 133.

However, if the contract requires a payment only when the holder incurs a decline in revenue or an increase in expense as a result of an event (for example, a hurricane) and the amount of the payoff is solely compensation for the amount of the holder’s loss, the contract would be a traditional insurance contract that is excluded from the scope of Statement 133 under paragraph 10(c).

For a FAS 133 flow chart, go to http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133flow.htm 

See hedge and financial instrument.

Yahoo Finance is Bob Jensen's Favorite Place to learn more about the mechanics and widespread use of derivative financial instruments.  That web site, however, will not help much with respect to accounting for such instruments under FAS 133 and IAS 39.  Also see CBOE, CBOT, and CME for some great tutorials on derivatives investing and hedging.

Message from Ira Kawaller on August 4, 2002

Hi Bob,

I posted a new article on the Kawaller & Company website: “What’s ‘Normal’ in Derivatives Accounting,” originally published in Financial Executive, July / August 2002. It is most relevant for financial managers of non-financial companies, who seek to avoid FAS 133 treatment for their purchase and sales contracts. The point of the article is that this treatment may mask some pertinent risks and opportunities. To view the article, click on http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/FE.pdf  .

I'd be happy to hear from you if you have any questions or comments.

Thanks for your consideration.

Ira Kawaller Kawaller & Company, LLC http://www.kawaller.com 

kawaller@kawaller.com 717-694-6270

Bob Jensen's documents on derivative financial instruments are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

DIG

the Derivatives Implementation Group established by the FASB for purposes of helping firms implement FAS 133.  The web site is a http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/

The Derivatives Implementation Group is a task force that was created to assist the FASB in answering questions that companies will face when they begin implementing Statement 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities. The FASB’s objective in forming the group was to establish a mechanism to identify and resolve significant implementation questions in advance of the implementation of Statement 133 by many companies.

The role of the Derivatives Implementation Group is different from that of other task forces previously assembled by the FASB because it was established to address issues related to a new Statement that has not yet been implemented by most companies. The responsibilities of the Derivatives Implementation Group are to identify practice issues that arise from applying the requirements of Statement 133 and to advise the FASB on how to resolve those issues. In addition to members of the implementation group, any constituent or organization may submit questions to be debated by the group by sending a detailed letter to the group chairman, FASB Vice Chairman Jim Leisenring. The FASB staff also seeks input from the implementation group on selected technical inquiries that it resolves.

The model for the Derivatives Implementation Group is the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) with the key difference being that the Derivatives Implementation Group does not formally vote on issues to reach a consensus. Instead, it is the responsibility of the Chairman to identify an agreed-upon resolution that emerges based upon the group’s debate. Implementation group members are free submit written objections to any issue where the group reaches an agreed-upon resolution. In instances where no clear resolution of an issue emerges, the issue may be further discussed at a future meeting or handled by the FASB staff.

After each meeting of the Derivatives Implementation Group, the FASB staff has the responsibility of documenting tentative conclusions reached by the group. Those tentative conclusions are publicly available on the FASB web site approximately three weeks after a meeting of the Derivatives Implementation Group. Those conclusions will remain tentative until they are formally cleared by the FASB and become part of an FASB staff implementation guide (Q&A). The Board is typically not asked to formally clear the staff's tentative conclusions at a public Board meeting until those conclusions have been publicly available on the web site for at least one month. That delay provides constituents the opportunity to study those conclusions and submit any comments before the Board considers formal clearance.

Meetings of the Derivatives Implementation Group are held at the FASB offices in Norwalk, CT and are open to public observation. The group will meet bimonthly during 1998 and 1999 when companies are planning for transition to the new accounting requirements. The need for meetings of the group in the year 2000 will be assessed at a later date.

 FAS 133 Derivatives Implementation Group (DIG) Pronouncements (Issues)

Nearly 300 pages of  DIG pronouncements as of March 8, 2004 can be downloaded from  http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/allissuesp2.pdf 

 

If you click on menu choices (Edit, Find) or the binoculars icon in your web browser, you can enter the search term DIG to find various DIG issues in this glossary.  These are in tables with red borders.

Disclosure =

the disclosures of key information in footnotes, special schedules, or other parts of financial reports. FAS 133 deals with disclosure at various points, especially in Paragraphs 502-513 on Pages 216-221.  An entity that holds or issues derivative instruments (or nonderivative instruments that are designated and qualify as hedging instruments pursuant to /FAS 133 Paragraphs 37 and 42) shall disclose its objectives for holding or issuing those instruments, the context needed to understand those objectives, and its strategies for achieving those objectives.  The description shall distinguish between derivative instruments (and nonderivative instruments) designated as fair value hedging instruments, derivative instruments designated as cash flow hedging instruments, derivative (and nonderivative) instruments designated as hedging instruments for hedges of the foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation, and all other derivatives
(FAS 133 Paragraph 44)

The following must be disclosed if derivatives are used in hedging relationships (Paragraph 45)
  • Risk management policies must be specified, identifying exposures to be hedged and hedging strategies for managing the associated risks.
  • Identification of the type of hedging relationship (i.e., fair value, cash flow, net investment in foreign operation), if applicable.
  • The hedged item must be explicitly identified.
  • Ineffective hedge results must be disclosed.
  • Any component of the derivatives' results that is excluded from the hedge effectiveness assessment must be disclosed.
Specific requirements for fair value hedges (Paragraph 45a)
  • The place on the income statement where derivative gains or losses are reported must be disclosed.
  • When a firm commitment no longer qualifies as a hedged item, the net gain or loss recognized in earnings must be disclosed.
Specific requirements for cash flow hedges (Paragraph 45b)
  • A description of the conditions that will result in the reclassification of accumulated other comprehensive income into earnings, and a schedule of the estimated reclassification expected in the coming 12 months must be disclosed.
  • The maximum length of time over which hedging is anticipated (except for variable interest rate exposures) must be disclosed.
  • Entities must disclose the amount reclassified into earnings as a result of discontinued cash flow hedges because the forecasted transaction is no longer probable.
  • Specific requirements for hedges of net investments in foreign operations (Paragraph 45c)
  • Entities must disclose the amount of the derivatives' results that is included in the cumulative translation adjustment during the reporting period.

Summary of Statement No. 161---
http://www.fasb.org/st/index.shtml#fas161

Also see http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/fasb/sfas161/

Disclosures about Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities—an amendment of FASB Statement No. 133

Bob Jensen's FAS 133 and IAS 39 free tutorials are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

Bob Jensen's FAS 133 and IAS 39 Glossary is at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm 

Bob Jensen's PowerPoint Show on Derivative Financial Instrument Disclosure Requirements  --- http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/JensenPowerPoint/


 

Under IASC international disclosure rulings, financial statements should include all of the disclosures required by IAS 32, except that the requirements in IAS 32 for supplementary disclosure of fair values (IAS 39 Paragraphs 77 and 88) are not applicable to those financial assets and financial liabilities carried at fair value (Paragraph 166).  The following should be included in the disclosures of the enterprise's accounting policies as part of the disclosure required by IAS 32 Paragraph 47b:

(1) the methods and significant assumptions applied in estimating fair values of financial assets and financial liabilities that are carried at fair value, separately for significant classes of financial assets (see IAS 39 Paragraph 46)

2) whether gains and losses arising from changes in the fair value of those available-for-sale financial assets that are measured at fair value subsequent to initial recognition are included in net profit or loss for the period or are recognized directly in equity until the financial asset is disposed of; and

3) for each of the four categories of financial assets defined in paragraph 10, whether 'regular way' purchases of financial assets are accounted for at trade date or settlement date (see paragraph 30)
(IAS Paragraph 167)

In applying the above paragraph, an enterprise will disclose prepayment rates, rates of estimated credit losses, and interest or discount rates
(paragraph 168)

IAS 39 Paragraph 169
With the exception of the previously noted differences, Paragraph 169 is a long paragraph that requires virtually all disclosures of FAS 133.

 

The SEC has more controversial disclosure requirements for derivatives, especially requirements for quantification of risk. The required disclosures about accounting policies are specified in new Rule 4-08(n) of Regulation S-X and Item 310 of Regulation S-B. The required disclosures about market risk exposures are specified in new Item 305 of Regulation S-K and Item 9A of Form 20-F.   See http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/derivfaq.htm 

Some SEC rules, which amend Regulation S-X and Regulation S-K, require the following new market risk disclosures (unless a business is deemed a small business not subject to market risk disclosure rules and/or unless the market risks apply to trade accounts recievable or trade accounts payable):

  • detailed disclosures of registrants' accounting policies for derivative financial instruments and derivative commodity instruments;

  • quantitative and qualitative disclosures outside the financial statements about market risk information of derivatives and other financial instruments. The required information includes the fair values of the instruments and contract terms needed to determine expected cash flows for each of the next five years and aggregate cash flows thereafter. This information should be categorized by expected maturity dates. The information should be grouped based on whether the instruments are held for trading or for other purposes and summarized by market risk category, subdivided by specific characteristics within a risk category, such as US dollar/German mark and US dollar/Japanese yen foreign currency exchange risk. The subdivision based on characteristics should be made to the extent it better reflects the market risk for a group of instruments.

  • forward-looking information, which includes these quantitative and qualitative disclosures outside the financial statements.;

  • disclosures about the effects of derivatives on other positions.

The Rules allow registrants to select one of the following methods to make their quantitative disclosures for market risk sensitive instruments:

  • a tabular format --- a presentation of the terms, fair value, expected principal or transaction cash flows, and other information, with instruments grouped within risk exposure categories based on common characteristics;

  • a sensitivity analysis --- the hypothetical loss in earnings, fair values, or cash; (the minumum percentage change seems to be 10% in Item 3.A of the Instructions to Paragraphs 305a and 305b.)

  • flows resulting from hypothetical changes in rates or prices;

  • value-at-risk --- a measure of the potential loss in earnings, fair values, or cash;

  • flows from changes in rates or prices.

A registrant that holds nonderivative financial instruments that have material amounts of market risk, such as investments, loans, and deposits, is required to make the qualitative and quantitative disclosures of market risk, even though the registrant may hold no derivatives.

The new Rules are effective for filings that include financial statements for fiscal periods ending after June 15, 1997. However, for registrants that are not banks or thrifts and that have a market capitalization of $2.5 billion or less on January 28, 1997, the effective date for the quantitative and qualitative disclosures outside the financial statements about market risk is delayed one year.

Registrants are required to provide summarized quantitative market risk information for the preceding fiscal year. They should explain the reasons for material quantitative changes in market risk exposures between the current and preceding fiscal years in sufficient detail to enable investors to determine trends in market risk information.

For a reference on SEC disclosure rules, see T.J. Linsmeier and N.D. Pearson, "Quantitative Disclosures of Market Risk in the SEC Release," Accounting Horizons, March 1997, 107-135. 

Click here to view a nice commentary on the SEC financial risk disclosure choices.

Key Disclosure Lessons From FAS 133 Q1 July 6, 2001 By Nilly Essaides --- http://www.fas133.com/search/search_article.cfm?page=81&areaid=405 

A review of 40 10Qs reveals a great diversity in reporting for Q1/01 as well as some lessons on what constitutes a useful disclosure. Second quarter 10Q reports will soon begin to hit the SEC. With them will come Q2/FAS 133 disclosures for most companies. This next wave of 10Qs will certainly offer insight into the quarter-by-quarter effects of FAS 133. But judging from the first bunch, they may leave as much unsaid, as said.

A review of Q1 disclosures in 40 companies’ 10Qs reveals great diversity in reporting depth and quality. But perhaps the clearest revelation is that FAS 133 does not necessarily offer a clearer picture of a company’s derivatives strategy.

Perhaps the quality of disclosures depends on whether the company intends to conceal more than it reveals; perhaps, too, it indicates that MNCs are only at the start of their FAS 133 learning curve. Over time, best practices will hopefully emerge creating more readable 10Qs.

. . . 

What is/isn’t revealed T

his diversity obviously makes it hard to analyze 10Qs. (Difficult perhaps, but not impossible: FAS133.com is working on a matrix that would track, on a quarterly basis, various disclosures and impact on EPS/OCI for large MNCs).

Some trend observations do rise above the disclosure clutter:

• Effectiveness method. Only one registrant alluded to the critical terms methodology. No one else provided information about what effectiveness measures were being used.

• Time value. G20 will make a big difference for some companies, while having no effect at all for others. Many pre-G20 10Qs indicate that there is no time value being recorded in income. Even in cases where some time value was marked to market in income, the effect was minor.

There are exceptions, however. Microsoft’s said the following: “...the reduction to income was mostly attributable to a loss of approximately $300 million reclassified from OCI for the time value of options and a loss of approximately $250 million reclassified from OCI for derivatives not designated as hedging instruments.”

• Industry differences: Financial companies seem to be providing more information about their derivatives than non-financial MNCs., perhaps because they have more experience with fair values, have the necessary systems, and tend to have more non-compliant derivatives. Ditto for commodity companies, which must now account for many previously “non-derivatives” as derivatives.

• Qualified vs. non-qualified derivatives. The majority of 10Qs do not list substantial non-compliant derivatives, but there are some notable exceptions, including some written calls and non-qualified cross currency swaps or derivatives that hedge other derivatives.

• Embeddeds. Of all the 10Qs reviewed, only Lucent mentioned the existence of embeddeds (other than equity options in convertible bonds). “Lucent’s foreign currency embedded derivatives consist of sales and purchase contracts with cash flows indexed to changes in or denominated in a currency that neither party to the contract uses as [its] functional currency. Changes in the fair value of these embedded derivatives are recorded in earnings.”

Emerging best practices Of course, what constitutes good disclosure depends on one's perspective. Good from the point of view of the investor/analyst means in context and consistent with some forward-looking information.

Good from the company's standpoint may mean one of two things:

(1) Clearly communicate the intent and value of hedges so that gains and losses are understood and not misread; or

(2) Effectively conceals gains and losses on derivatives so that investors cannot figure out the effect of derivatives on income.

Perhaps, too, what makes good disclosure will take time to figure out, as for many of these companies are reporting FAS 133 info for the first time.

A checklist Still, from the 40 10Qs reviewed for this article, the following useful hints emerged:

• Divide hedge disclosu3 categories: Fair value, cash flow and net investment, with a discussion of strategy, fair values and ineffectiveness total for each category.

• Provide a chart or table summarizing all derivatives gain/loss, impact on income or OCI

• Include pointers as to where in the income statement particular derivatives numbers appear, in income and OCI.

• Listing how market risk exposures would affect derivatives positions.

Sources of volatility Finally, the Q1s reveal three sources of OCI/income volatility:

(1) Time value of options (this will presumably disappear for any hedging options that fall under G20).

(2) Gains/loss on non-qualified derivatives, either derivatives that do not meet the effectiveness standards or derivatives that hedge other derivatives. Of course, this does not mean the derivatives are speculative. There may be as many qualified derivatives as there are speculative, since those that are non-qualified ones may be true economic hedges.

(3) Finally, gains/losses on derivatives that were not accounted for previously as derivatives such as commercial contracts.

 

 

CANADA
DISCLOSURE OF ACCOUNTING POLICIES FOR DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND DERIVATIVE COMMODITY INSTRUMENTS Date Issued: September 5, 2002 
http://www.cica.ca/multimedia/Download_Library/Standards/EIC/English//EIC131.pdf
 

One of my students wrote the following: 

Joseph F. Zullo For his relational database project in Microsoft Access that disaggregates and then aggregates various types of risk on interest rate swaps, click on http://www.resnet.trinity.edu/users/jzullo/title.htm
The heart of this project is a relational database. The term project topic was "suggested aids for using emerging technologies in measuring and evaluating investment risk." To that end, I created a relational database that is able to track the use of derivative instruments and assign risk to individual contracts.   The creation of the database is an attempt at dissaggregated reporting. Theoretically, an investor could access the database through the Internet and compute custom reports and evaluate individual measures of risk associated with each derivative. The benefit of dissaggregated reporting lies in the investor’s ability to perform the aggregation of relevant data. In today’s environment, investors have to rely on annual financial statements of a company to acquire relevant information. The financial statements of a company do not always provide a complete picture of the financial condition of the company. Notably, off-balance sheet items such as derivative financial instruments do not appear in the body of the financial statements. The FASB and the SEC have made strides to overcome this reporting deficiency with pronouncements that require more informational disclosures in the financial statements.

Roger Debreceny wrote the following message on July 31, 1998:

Further to previous discussion on derivatives:

KPMG Derivatives and Hedging Handbook Offers Guidance on New Accounting Standards for Derivatives NEW YORK, July 27 /PRNewswire/ -- A comprehensive Derivatives and Hedging Handbook was published today by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, the accounting, tax and consulting firm, in response to the new accounting standard for derivative instruments and hedging activities issued on June 15, 1998 by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).

The FASB issued the new standard (Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities) to replace the rules that had been in effect since 1984.

"The estimated worldwide amount of derivative instruments is well above $60 trillion," said Michael A. Conway, partner-in-charge, KPMG Department of Professional Practice." We developed this handbook because the new standard is so complex and the potential impact on commercial companies and financial institutions is enormous.

"Implementing this standard may require changes in hedging strategies and accounting systems, with possible significant effects on financial statements," said Conway. "Therefore, we believe it’s important for organizations to immediately begin evaluating the impact of the standard on their operations and financial reporting. This handbook is designed to make that assessment easier."

The primary author of the handbook, Stephen Swad, KPMG partner, Department of Professional Practice, said that companies must consider several key issues, including recognizing all derivative instruments as either assets or liabilities measured at fair value; designating all hedging relationships anew; measuring transition adjustments that will affect earnings; and modifying accounting, risk management objectives and strategies, and information systems to comply with the requirements of the standard. The 425-page publication, the second in KPMG’s handbook series, provides over 100 examples illustrating some of the complex areas of the standard, and answers possible questions that might arise during implementation.

KPMG’s Web site is: http://www.us.kpmg.com.

March 20, 2002 Message from Ira Kawaller

Hi Bob,
I just posted a recently published article on how to satisfy the FAS 133 disclosure requirements for interest rate hedges.  Although it was originally published by Bank Asset/Liablility Management (March 2000), the content is 
applicable to all firms with interest rate exposures -- not just banks.  
If you are interested, it is available at 
http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/BALMHedges.pdf 
You can also find additional information about derivatives, risk management, and FAS 133 in the various articles posted on the Kawaller & Company website:  
http://www.kawaller.com 
Please feel free to contact me with any questions, comments, or suggestions.
Ira Kawaller
Kawaller & Company, LLC
kawaller@kawaller.com 
(718) 694-6270

Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket
"Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of Derivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis," by Robert P. Bartlett III, Harvard Law School Forum, May 27, 2010 ---
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/05/27/inefficiencies-in-the-information-thicket/

In the paper, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of Derivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, I provide an empirical examination of the effect of enhanced derivative disclosures by examining the disclosure experience of the monoline insurance industry in 2008. Conventional wisdom concerning the causes of the Financial Crisis posits that insufficient disclosure concerning firms’ exposure to complex credit derivatives played a key role in creating the uncertainty that plagued the financial sector in the fall of 2008. To help avert future financial crises, regulatory proposals aimed at containing systemic risk have accordingly focused on enhanced derivative disclosures as a critical reform measure. A central challenge facing these proposals, however, has been understanding whether enhanced derivative disclosures can have any meaningful effect given the complexity of credit derivative transactions.

Like AIG Financial Products, monoline insurance companies wrote billions of dollars of credit default swaps on multi-sector CDOs tied to residential home mortgages, but unlike AIG, their unique status as financial guarantee companies subjected them to considerable disclosure obligations concerning their individual credit derivative exposures. As a result, the experience of the monoline industry during the Financial Crisis provides an ideal setting with which to test the efficacy of reforms aimed at promoting more elaborate derivative disclosures.

Overall, the results of this study indicate that investors in monoline insurers showed little evidence of using a firm’s derivative disclosures to efficiently resolve uncertainty about a monoline’s exposure to credit risk. In particular, analysis of the abnormal returns to Ambac Financial (one of the largest monoline insurers) surrounding a series of significant, multi-notch rating downgrades of its insured CDOs reveals no significant stock price reactions until Ambac itself announced the effect of these downgrades in its quarterly earnings announcements. Similar analyses of Ambac’s short-selling data and changes in the cost of insuring Ambac debt securities against default also confirm the absence of a market reaction following these downgrade announcements.

Based on a qualitative examination of how investors process derivative disclosures, to the extent the complexity of CDOs impeded informational efficiency, it was most likely due to the generally low salience of individual CDOs as well as the logistic (although not necessarily analytic) challenge of processing a CDO’s disclosures. Reform efforts aimed at enhancing derivative disclosures should accordingly focus on mechanisms to promote the rapid collection and compilation of disclosed information as well as the psychological processes by which information obtains salience.

The paper is available for download from
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1585953

Bob Jensen's tutorials on accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedging activities ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

 


 

Illustrations of FAS 133 Disclosures

Adobe Systems’ 10Q for the second quarter provides a case study in best practices in FAS 133-related disclosures.

All 10Qs are not made equal. In the area of FAS 133-related disclosure, that truth is even more pronounced (see related item). Indeed, the current diversity in the content and organization of derivatives disclosures, which in part may reflect companies’ ambivalence about making this information public, calls for the emergence of best practices, or disclosure benchmarks.

The lack of uniformity in disclosure geography and format affect the quality of the information. It certainly makes it hard for users of financial statements to reach broad-based conclusions. But perhaps most important, it opens the door for misinterpretation and exaggeration of the financial impact of corporate derivatives activities.

Emerging benchmarks
What should companies use as a guide? To date, the FAS133.com review of 10Qs has surfaced five basic benchmarks of best practice in FAS 133 disclosure:

  • Divide hedge disclosure categories: Fair value, cash flow and net investment, with a discussion of strategy, fair values and ineffectiveness total for each category.
  • Explain risk management policy/strategy in clear language, providing hedge activity context.
  • Provide a chart or table summarizing all derivatives gain/loss, impact on income or OCI.
  • Include pointers as to where in the income statement particular derivatives numbers appear, in income and OCI.
  • List how market risk exposures would affect derivatives positions.

Leading by example: Adobe Systems

Some 10Qs contain various elements of best disclosure. Others are very hard to read. But perhaps one of the clearest examples of some of the best practices in FAS 133 disclosure can be found in the second quarter 10Q filed by Adobe Systems on July 16, 2001.

There are several reasons the Adobe 10Q represents best practice:

  1. It presents information in context. Disclosure of actual figures on derivatives gain/losses follow clear explanations of risk management strategy and objectives.
  2. It highlights strategy based on hedge objective. The context is presented in a very organized manner. Risk management activities are segregated based on their objectives, and the type of exposure being hedged.
  3. It summarizes gains/losses in table. Not only does the table provide figures and how they affect OCI, but Adobe lists both quarterly, and year to date information, giving the reader a chance to review the trend.
  4. It’s in “English.” Perhaps most important, the disclosures are clearly written, refraining from jargon and providing simple, “lay man’s” explanation of risk management activities.

Salute to treasury
The top-notch disclosure statement represents the product of treasury’s hard work. “We worked hard on it,” confesses Barbara Hill, Adobe’s treasurer. Indeed, the language and the disclosure were the work of the Adobe treasury team, and received only minor tweaking from the external auditor once complete. “We tried to spend a lot of effort to make it clear,” she says. Even at companies where accounting plays a more dominant role, she cautions, treasury’s input is critical. “You have to have someone who is trading and understands options, for example, to put together the disclosures.”

While Adobe reviewed other companies’ 10Qs and went back to the original standard to ensure all i's are dotted and t's are crossed, “we came up with the language in treasury,” Ms. Hill says. In part, Ms. Hill says her group was so well prepared for the task as a result of several months’ worth of FAS 133 studying with Helen Kane of Hedgetrackers (a consultancy).

This approach, Ms. Hill says, is in line with Adobe’s general approach to communications with its investors. “It’s part of our philosophy to be as forthcoming and open in our disclosures.

This straightforward approach carried tangible benefits, she notes. “You get a reputation for honesty and integrity, and analysts and investors know that they can trust your statements.” Overtime, the consistency in reporting helps build credibility “that’s invaluable over the long term,” she says. Basically, it helps determine whether investors and fund managers are interested in investing in the company, or not.

Perhaps the best part of the Adobe disclosure is the summary tables (see below). The tables are Ms. Hill’s idea. “It’s pretty bold,” she admits. She notes some 10Qs seem to lose the content in the language of FAS 133 (as well as in indeterminable geography, such as including ineffectiveness in “costs of good sold,” as some MNCs have).

The tables, she says, “are an offshoot of what I use from a big-pictures standpoint, to make sure that the numbers I see with regard to FX hedging make sense. It’s a tool I use internally, which makes it easy for me (and now investors) to spot problems right away.” Ms. Hill decided shareholders could benefit from sharing the information, which she gathers anyway for in-house performance evaluation purposes.

Continued at http://fas133.com/search/search_article.cfm?areaid=408 

  • Calpine

    One of the best illustrations of disclosure is SEC 10-K Year 2001 derivatives policy disclosures of Calpine Corporation --- http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/916457/000089161802001569/0000891618-02-001569-index.htm 

    An excerpt is shown below:

    Any hedging, balancing, and optimization activities that we engage in are directly related to exposures that arise from our ownership and operation of power plants and gas reserves and are designed to protect or enhance our “spark spread” (the difference between our fuel cost and the revenue we receive for our electric generation). In many of these transactions CES purchases and resells power and gas in contracts with third parties (typically trading companies). We also engage in limited trading activity as described below.

    We utilize derivatives, which are defined in Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (“SFAS”) No. 133, “Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities” to include many physical commodity contracts and commodity financial instruments such as exchange-traded swaps and forward contracts, to optimize the returns that we are able to achieve from our power and gas assets. While certain of our contracts are considered energy trading contracts as defined in Emerging Issues Task Force (“EITF”) Issue No. 98-10, our traders have very low capital at risk and value at risk limits for energy trading, and our risk management policy limits, at any given time, our net sales of power and our net purchases of gas to our generating capacity and fuel consumption requirements, respectively, calculated on a total portfolio basis. Total electricity and gas trading gains recognized in 2001, consisting of unrealized mark-to-market gains as well as realized gains, together accounted for approximately 12% of our gross profit. This model is markedly different from that of companies that actively and extensively engage in commodity trading operations that are unrelated to underlying physical assets. Following is a discussion of the types of electricity and gas hedging, balancing, optimization, and trading activities in which CES engages. The accounting treatment for these various types of activities is discussed in Note 19 to our consolidated financial statements and in management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operation.

    Electricity Transactions

    • Electricity hedging activities are done to reduce potential volatility in future results. An example of an electricity hedging transaction would be one in which we sell power at a fixed rate to allow us to predict the future revenues from our portfolio of generating plants. Hedging is a dynamic process; from time to time we adjust the extent to which our portfolio is hedged. An example of an electricity hedge adjusting transaction would be the purchase of power in the market to reduce the extent to which we had previously hedged our generation portfolio through fixed price power sales. To illustrate, suppose we had elected to hedge 65% of our portfolio of generation capacity for the following six months but then believed that prices for electricity were going to steadily move up during that same period. We might buy electricity on the open market to reduce our hedged position to, say, 50%. If electricity prices, do in fact increase, we might then sell electricity again to increase our hedged position back to the 65% level.

    • Electricity balancing activities are typically short-term in nature and are done to make sure that sales commitments to deliver power are fulfilled. An example of an electricity balancing transaction would be where one of our generating plants has an unscheduled outage so we buy replacement power to deliver to a customer to meet our sales commitment.

    • Electricity optimization activity, also generally short-term in nature, is done to maximize our profit potential by executing the most profitable alternatives in the power markets. An example of an electricity optimization transaction would be fulfilling a power sales contract with power purchases from third parties instead of generating power when the market price for power is below the cost of generation. In all cases, optimization activity is associated with the operating flexibility in our systems of power plants, natural gas assets, and gas and power contracts. That flexibility provides us with alternatives to most profitably manage our portfolio.

    • Energy trading activities are done with the purpose of profiting from movement in commodity prices or to transact business with customers in market areas where we do not have generating assets. An example of an electricity trading contract would be where we buy and sell electricity, typically with trading company counterparties, solely to profit from electricity price movements. We have engaged in limited activity of this type to date in terms of earnings impact. Mostly, it is done by CES through short-term contracts. Another example of an electricity trading contract would be one in which wetransact with customers in market areas where we do not have generating assets, generally to develop market experience and customer relations in areas where we expect to have generation assets in the future. We have done a small number of such transactions to date.

    Natural Gas Transactions

    • Gas hedging activities are also done to reduce potential volatility in future results. An example of a gas hedging transaction would be where we purchase gas at a fixed rate to allow us to predict the future costs of fuel for our generating plants or conversely where we enter into a financial forward contract to essentially swap floating rate (indexed) gas for fixed price gas. Similar to electricity hedging, gas hedging is a dynamic process, and from time to time we adjust the extent to which our portfolio is hedged. To illustrate, suppose we had elected to hedge 65% of our gas requirements for our generation capacity for the next six months through fixed price gas purchases but then believed that prices for gas were going to steadily decline during that same period. We might sell fixed price gas on the open market to reduce our hedged gas position to 50%. If gas prices do in fact decrease, we might then buy fixed price gas again to increase our hedged position back to the 65% level.

    • Gas balancing activities are typically short-term in nature and are done to make sure that purchase commitments for gas are adjusted for changes in production schedules. An example of a gas balancing transaction would be where one of our generating plants has an unscheduled outage so we sell the gas that we had purchased for that plant to a third party.

    • Gas optimization activities are also generally short-term in nature and are done to maximize our profit potential by executing the most profitable alternatives in the gas markets. An example of gas optimization is selling our gas supply, not generating power, and fulfilling power sales contracts with power purchases from third parties, instead of generating power when market gas prices spike relative to our gas supply cost.

    • Gas trading activities are done with the purpose of profiting from movement in commodity prices. An example of gas trading contracts would be where we buy and sell gas, typically with a trading company counterparty, solely to profit from gas price movements or where we transact with customers in market areas where we do not have fuel consumption requirements. We have engaged in a limited level of this type of activity to date. Mostly it is done by CES and through short-term contracts.

    In some instances economic hedges may not be designated as hedges for accounting purposes. The accounting treatment of our various risk management and trading activities is governed by SFAS No. 133 and EITF Issue No. 98-10, as discussed above. An example of an economic hedge that is not a hedge for accounting purposes would be a long-term fixed price electric sales contract that economically hedges us against the risk of falling electric prices, but which for accounting purposes is exempted from derivative accounting under SFAS No. 133 as a normal sale.


AOL-Time Warner's FAS 133-Related Financial Reporting: Ignoring Interest Rate Exposure?
By Ed Rombach
Link --- http://www.fas133.com/search/search_article.cfm?page=61&areaid=440 

Is AOL-Time Warner ignoring their interest rate exposure, or merely managing it in a way that avoids disclosure?

As one of the component companies in the 'Portfolio of 33' we are obliged to focus some attention on what, at first glance, may be perceived to be AOL-Time Warner's lack of disclosure into some of the details regarding risk management under FAS 133 accounting. Is it a fair question to ask why this company, with a market capitalization of $157 billion and net debt in excess of $19 billion, would not make use of interest-rate derivatives of some kind to modify that interest rate exposure?

Or, if they do make use of interest rate derivatives for risk management purposes, why is there no mention of it in their quarterly reports, which in accordance with FAS 133 requires that derivatives used for hedging activities be recorded at fair value?

These questions are all the more interesting when we consider the relationship Time Warner has had with the FASB's DIG: two of its recent assistant controllers were not only former SEC accountants, but observing and/or regular members of the DIG: Steve Swad and Pascal Desroches. We should assume, then, that AOL-TW might serve the financial reporting community as a paragon example of FAS 133-related financial reporting.

Are we just being impatient?
In fairness to AOL-TW, what they left out of recent quarterly reports they partially made up for in their last annual report for 2000. Under the heading QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DISCLOSURES ABOUT MARKET RISK, for example, it states: America Online is exposed to immaterial levels of market risk related to changes in foreign currency exchange rates and interest rates." The bulk of the company's exposure, per the 10-K, concerns its investment portfolio. "America Online is exposed to market risk as it relates to changes in the market value of its investments. America Online invests in equity instruments of public and private companies for business and strategic purposes, most of which are Internet and technology companies." Accordingly, the derivatives used to hedge this exposure get the bulk of the FAS 133-related attention in the company's financial reporting.

But is their interest rate risk really that immaterial? The third quarter 10Q reports as September 30, 2001, AOL Time Warner had $20.7 billion of debt and $1.5 billion of cash and cash equivalents for a net debt of $19.2 billion.

Fixed vs. Floating
It's not clear from the financial statements how much of the $19.2 billion outstanding debt is in fixed rate and how much is floating, but AOL-TW's web site itemizes some twenty six separately issued notes and debentures mostly by Time Warner and its consolidated subsidiaries, with remaining maturities of five, ten, twenty and thirty years (14.36 years on average), with an average coupon of 8.12%. This listing though doesn't provide the amounts issued per cusip so it is not possible to tell with any precision what the total amount of fixed rate debt is for the combined companies, and unfortunately, AOL-Time Warner treasury staff declined to comment on any of this publicly available information.

The company's 2000 10-K explains that a Bank Credit Agreement was in place permitting borrowings of up to $7.5 billion for general business purposes and in support of commercial paper borrowings of which amounts totaling $6.8 billion had been drawn down by Time Warner and its consolidated subsidiaries as of December 31, 2000. By April of 2001, AOL-TW had established a $5 billion commercial paper program allowing the company to issue commercial paper to investors periodically in maturities of up to 365 days for general corporate purposes including investments, capital expenditures, repayment of debt and financing acquisitions. However, it is still not quite clear from the public disclosures just how much of this program has been utilized to date.

 

Opportunity risk
Nevertheless, a cursory estimation using a rough metric suggests a ratio of about 65% to 35% of fixed rate vs. floating rate debt, a ratio that might be considered less than optimal during a quarter when the federal reserve cut the fed funds rate by 100 basis points and ten year swap rates fell by a corresponding amount. Assuming that 65% of AOL-TW's debt was fixed, at an average maturity of 14 years and at an average coupon rate of 8.12%, a drop in yields on that debt of 100 basis points implies a fair value change in present value terms of close to $1.2 billion. Not that they would want to eliminate all of their fixed rate debt, but if half of it was converted to floating via fixed to floating swaps, they still would have saved themselves a significant amount from the lower funding cost. Did that 10K really say company's exposure to interest rates was immaterial?


More illustrations --- see Illustrations 


The Emerging Issues Committee (EIC) of the CICA (Canada) issued for comment (by July 17, 2002) draft Abstract D21: Disclosure of Accounting Policies for Derivative Financial Instruments and Derivative Commodity Instruments.

The Committee reached a consensus that an enterprise should disclose the accounting policies for derivative financial instruments and derivative commodity instruments pursuant to CICA 1505, following the guidance in CICA 3860.48-51. 

Disclosures regarding accounting policies should include descriptions of the accounting policies used for derivative financial instruments and derivative commodity instruments and the methods of applying those policies that affect the determination of financial position, cash flows, or results of operation. This description should include each of the following items: 

(a) a discussion of each method used to account for derivative financial instruments and derivative commodity instruments — fair value method or hedge accounting methods (i.e., deferral, accrual or settlement methods); 
(b) the types of derivative financial instruments and derivative commodity instruments accounted for under each method; 
(c) the criteria required to be met for each hedge accounting method used, including a discussion of the criteria required to be met for hedge accounting as set out in AcG-13;
(d) the accounting method used if the criteria for hedge accounting specified in item (c) are not met; 
(e) if applicable to the period, the method used to account for terminations of derivatives designated as hedges, including the method used to account for derivative financial instruments and derivative commodity instruments designated as hedging items, as when: 

(i) the designated hedged item matures, is sold, is extinguished, or is terminated; 
(ii) the hedge is no longer effective;



The Emerging Issues Committee (EIC) of the CICA (Canada) issued for comment (by July 17, 2002) draft Abstract D21: Disclosure of Accounting Policies for Derivative Financial Instruments and Derivative Commodity Instruments.

The Committee reached a consensus that an enterprise should disclose the accounting policies for derivative financial instruments and derivative commodity instruments pursuant to CICA 1505, following the guidance in CICA 3860.48-51. 

Disclosures regarding accounting policies should include descriptions of the accounting policies used for derivative financial instruments and derivative commodity instruments and the methods of applying those policies that affect the determination of financial position, cash flows, or results of operation. This description should include each of the following items: 

(a) a discussion of each method used to account for derivative financial instruments and derivative commodity instruments — fair value method or hedge accounting methods (i.e., deferral, accrual or settlement methods); 
(b) the types of derivative financial instruments and derivative commodity instruments accounted for under each method; 
(c) the criteria required to be met for each hedge accounting method used, including a discussion of the criteria required to be met for hedge accounting as set out in AcG-13;
(d) the accounting method used if the criteria for hedge accounting specified in item (c) are not met; 
(e) if applicable to the period, the method used to account for terminations of derivatives designated as hedges, including the method used to account for derivative financial instruments and derivative commodity instruments designated as hedging items, as when: 

(i) the designated hedged item matures, is sold, is extinguished, or is terminated; 
(ii) the hedge is no longer effective;

April 2003
Unlike U.S. business firms, governmental organizations do not necessarily have to report derivative financial instruments are fair (mark-to-market) values.  However, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) proposed some new disclosure rules for derivatives, including rules for disclosing more about current values --- http://www.gasb.org/news/nr040203.html 

Governmental Accounting Standards Board Issues Technical Bulletin To Improve Disclosures About Derivatives

Norwalk, CT, April 2, 2003—In an effort to improve disclosures about the risks associated with derivative contracts, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) has released for public comment accounting guidance that would provide more consistent reporting by state and local governments. The proposed Technical Bulletin, Disclosure Requirements for Derivatives Not Presented at Fair Value on the Statement of Net Assets, is designed to increase the public’s understanding of the significance of derivatives to a government’s net assets and would provide key information about the potential effects on future cash flows.

While state and local governments use a vast array of increasingly complex derivative instruments to manage debt and investments, they also may be assuming significant risks. Governments must communicate those risks to financial statement users and the proposed Technical Bulletin would help clarify existing accounting guidance so that more consistent disclosures can be made across all governments.

In commenting on why the GASB believes this issue is so important, GASB Project Manager, Randal J. Finden, remarked, “The market for derivative instruments has recently exploded for state and local governments as current financing needs have changed in connection with a more constrained budgetary environment. Some derivative contracts may pose substantial risks, and we want to help governments better disclose those risks in their financial statements.”

Governments would be required to disclose the derivative’s objective, its terms, fair value and risks. The proposed accounting guidance would require governments to disclose in their financial statements credit risk, interest rate risk, basis risk, termination risk, rollover risk and market access risk.

This Technical Bulletin would be effective for periods ending after June 15, 2003. The proposed Technical Bulletin is available from the GASB’s website. Comments on the proposed documents may be made through May 16, 2003.

The proposed Technical Bulletin can be downloaded from http://www.gasb.org/exp/tb2003-a.pdf 

Some of the previous derivative financial instruments frauds and scandals have centered around governmental organizations such as the Orange County fraud --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#DerivativesFraud 

Bob Jensen's documents on accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedging activities are linked at 
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm
 

 

 

Discount = see premium.

Disincentives for nonperformance = see firm commitment.

Dollar Offset Method =

a computation of the cumulative derivative hedging gain or loss on the basis of multiple period historical changes in fair value of the hedging instrument vis-a-vis changes in the fair value of the underlying.   The dollar offset period change ratio is the ratio of the dollar gain or loss of the hedging instrument divided by the dollar gain or loss of the hedged item.  The cumulative dollar change ratio is the sum of the gains and losses of the hedging instrument divided by the sum of the gains and losses of the hedged item.  See net settlement.

Dynamic Portfolio Management =

a technique of assessing the risk and managing a portfolio or group of assets and liabilities. Dynamic management is characterized by continuous assessment and periodic adjustment of the portfolio components.  See the discussion of macro hedges under hedge.  Also see compound derivatives.  Also see value at risk (VAR)

 See Macro Hedge 

 

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |

E-Terms

Earnings Management

Interest rate swap derivative instruments are widely used to manage interest rate risk, which is viewed as a perfectly legitimate use of these hedging instruments.  I stumbled on to a rather interesting doctoral dissertation which finds that firms, especially banks, use such swaps to manage earnings.  The dissertation from Michigan State University is by Chang Joon Song under Professor Thomas Linsmeier.

"Are Interest Rate Swaps Used to Manage Banks' Earnings," by Chang Joon Song, January 2004 --- http://accounting-net.actg.uic.edu/Department/Songpaper.pdf 

This dissertation is quite clever and very well written.  

Previous research has shown that loan loss provisions and security gains and losses are used to manage banks’ net income. However, these income components are reported below banks largest operating component, net interest income (NII). This study extends the literature by examining whether banks exploit the accounting permitted under past and current hedge accounting standards to manage NII by entering into interest rate swaps. Specifically, I investigate whether banks enter into receive-fixed/pay-variable swaps to increase earnings when unmanaged NII is below management’s target for NII. In addition, I investigate whether banks enter into receive-variable/pay-fixed swaps to decrease earnings when unmanaged NII is above management’s target for NII. Swaps-based earnings management is possible because past and current hedge accounting standards allow receive-fixed/pay-variable swaps (receivevariable/ pay-fixed) to have known positive (negative) income effects in the first period of the swap contract. However, entering into swaps for NII management is not costless, because such swaps change the interest rate risk position throughout the swap period. Thus, I also examine whether banks find it cost-beneficial to enter into offsetting swap positions in the next period to mitigate interest rate risk caused by entering into earnings management swaps in the current period. Using 546 bank-year observations from 1995 to 2002, I find that swaps are used to manage NII. However, I do not find evidence that banks immediately enter into offsetting swap positions in the next period. In sum, this research demonstrates that banks exploit the accounting provided under past and current hedge accounting rules to manage NII. This NII management opportunity will disappear if the FASB implements full fair value accounting for financial instruments, as foreshadowed by FAS No. 133.

What is especially interesting is how Song demonstrates that such earnings management took place before FAS 133 and is still taking place after FAS 133 required the booking of swaps and adjustment to fair value on each reporting date.  It is also interesting how earnings management comes at the price of added risk.  Other derivative positions can be used to reduce the risk, but risks arising from such earnings management cannot be eliminated.

See Gapping and Immunization 

See interest rate swap and hedge 

Bob Jensen's threads on FAS 133 and IAS 39 are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

Effectiveness =  see ineffectiveness.

Embedded Derivatives =

portions of contracts that meet the definition of a derivative when the entire nonderivative contract cannot be considered a financial instruments derivative. Types of embedded derivative  instruments are often indexed debt and investment contracts such as commodity indexed interest or principal payments, convertible debt, credit indexed contracts, equity indexed contracts, and inflation indexed contracts.  Embedded derivatives are discussed in FAS 133, pp. 7-9, Paragraphs 12-16.  Embedded derivatives such as commodity indexed and equity indexed contracts and convertible debt require separation of the derivative from the host contract in FAS 133 accounting.  In contrast, credit indexed and inflation indexed embedded derivatives are not separable from the host contract.   Also see FAS 133 Paragraphs 51, 60, 61, 176-178, and 293-311. The overall contract is sometimes referred to as a "hybrid" that contains one or more embedded derivatives.  Embedded derivatives within embedded derivatives generally meet the closely-and-clearly related test and cannot be accounted for as separate derivatives.  The concept of "closely related is also discussed in IAS 39: paragraph 23a.  Rules for accounting for the host contract after an embedded derivative has be bifurcated are discussed in SFAS Paragraph 16).  If an embedded derivative should bifurcated but the firm cannot do so for some reason, SFAS 16 requires that the entire contract be treated as a trading security that is adjusted to fair value at least quarterly with changes and fair value being charged to current earnings rather than OCI.  See FAS 133 Paragraph 16 and IAS Paragraph 26.

Note that much of the discussion below has been changed:

"FASB and IASB agree on a three-category financial asset classification and measurement approach," PwC, May 22, 2012 --- Click Here
http://cfodirect.pwc.com/CFODirectWeb/Controller.jpf?ContentCode=GBAD-8UJRHU&SecNavCode=MSRA-84YH44&ContentType=Content

. . .

Under their respective approaches, debt investments (e.g., loans and debt securities) would be classified based on an individual instrument's characteristics (as further explained below) and the business strategy for the portfolio. However, before this week's meeting, the IASB had defined two categories whereas the FASB had defined three categories.

This week, the IASB agreed to introduce a third category in which debt investments are measured at fair value with changes in fair value recognized through other comprehensive income. The FASB also agreed on a revised definition for this category. As a result, the categories for debt investments would be broadly defined as follows:
 
  • Amortized cost – consists of debt investments where the primary objective is to hold the assets to collect the contractual cash flows.
  • Fair value with changes in fair value recognized in other comprehensive income – consists of debt investments with the primary objective of both holding the assets to collect contractual cash flows and realizing changes in fair value through sale. Interest and impairment would be recognized in net income in a manner consistent with the amortized cost category, and fair value changes would be recycled from other comprehensive income to net income when the asset is sold.
  • Fair value with changes in fair value recognized in net income – consists of debt investments that either (1) do not meet the instrument characteristics criterion or (2) meet the instrument characteristics criterion but do not meet one of the other category definitions (i.e., "the residual category").

In addition, the FASB agreed to adopt the IASB requirement for prospective reclassifications between categories when there is a significant change in business strategy, which is expected to be "very infrequent."

In previous meetings, the FASB had also agreed to incorporate the following aspects of the IASB's approach:
 
  • Instrument characteristics criterion. The contractual cash flows of the debt investment must represent solely payments of principal and interest in order to be eligible for the amortized cost or fair value with changes in fair value recognized in other comprehensive income categories.
     
  • Bifurcation of hybrid financial instruments. Separate accounting for financial asset host contracts and embedded derivatives in hybrid financial assets would be prohibited; instead the entire hybrid financial asset would be accounted for as a single instrument. However, hybrid financial liabilities would continue to be bifurcated.

 

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
I favor most of these changes, especially changes that use OCI to avoid fluctuations in current earnings that will never be realized. However, I think the fact that the FASB's caving in on the issue of not bifurcating embedded derivatives in hybrid financial assets is absurd since the financial risks may vary so greatly between the host contract and its embedded derivatives. And my love of symmetry is appalled at bifurcation of hybrid liabilities but not hybrid assets is broken hearted.

 

 

 

Paragraph 10 notes that interest only strips and principal only strips are not subject to FAS 133 accounting rules under conditions noted in Paragraph 14. In Paragraph 15, it is noted that embedded foreign currency derivatives "shall not be separated from the host contract and considered a derivative instrument."   Prepayment options on mortgage loans also do not qualify for accounting under FAS 133 according to Paragraph 293 on Page 146.  See compound derivative and   embedded option.

An example is a leveraged gold note that has the amount of note's principal vary with the price of gold. This type of note can be viewed as containing a series of embedded commodity (gold) option contracts.  These options can separated out and accounted for as derivatives apart from the host contract under Paragraph 12 on Page 7 of FAS 133 under the assumption that the price of gold is not "clearly-and-closely related" to interest rates. 

An equity-linked bear note is another example of a note with a series of embedded options that can be accounted for as separate derivative instruments under Paragraph 12 of FAS 133.  For example, suppose has 5% coupon bonds that increase interest rates at certain levels of movement up or down of an index such the S&P stock price index.  The embedded condition that interest rates may move up based upon an index can qualify as an embedded derivative that can be separated according to Paragraph 12 on Page 7 of FAS 133 provided the derivative is not clearly-and-closely related.   The S&P index is an equity index that is not clearly-and-closely reated, whereas an interest rate index such a LIBOR is a clearly-and-closely related index.  The host contract (hedged item)  must be an asset or liability that is not itself a derivative instrument.   In this example, the bonds are not derivatives, and the embedded derivatives can be separated from the host contract under FAS 133 rules.  See equity-indexed.

Derivatives cannot be embedded in other derivatives according to Paragraph 12c on the top of Page 8 of FAS 133..  For example, an index-amortizing interest rate swap cannot usually be accounted for as a derivative instrument (pursuant to FAS 133 under Paragraph 12 on Page 7 of FAS 133) when it is a derivative embedded in another derivative.  Suppose a company swaps a variable rate for a fixed rate on a notional of $10 million.  If an embedded derivative in the contract changes the notional to $8 million if LIBOR falls below 6% and $12 million if LIBOR rises above 8%, this index-amortizing embedded derivative cannot be separated under Paragraph 12 rules.  KPMG states that Paragraph 12 applies only "when a derivative is embedded in a nonderivative instrument and illustrates this with an index-amortizing Example 29 beginning on Page 75 of the Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998.    The prior Example 28 and the subsequent Example 30 illustrate index-amortizing embedded derivatives that qualifies since, in each example, the derivative is embedded in a nonderivative instrument.

One of the major sources of difference between FAS 133 and IAS 39 concerns embedded derivatives.  There are some exceptions for hybrid instruments as discussed in  IAS 39  Paragraphs 23b and 23c;  Also see FAS 133  Paragraphs 12b and 12c.

In summary, bifurcation under FAS 133 is required in the following examples:

  • Call/Put Debt Option --- If options alter maturity dates, they are clearly and closely related to a debt instrument that requires principal repayments unless both (1) the debt involves a substantial premium or discount and (2) the put/call option is only contingently exercisable.  See FAS 133 Paragraph 61d.  An example is given in FAS 133 Paragraph 186.  Also see IAS 39 Paragraph 24g.

  • Put/Call Equity Option on Host Equity Instrument --- A put option should abe separated from the host contract by the issuer of the equity instrument except in those cases in which the put option is not considered to be a derivative instrument pursuant to FAS 133 Paragraph 11(a), because it is classified in stockholders' equity.  A call option embedded in the related equity instrument would not be separated from the host contract by the issuer, but would be otherwise for the holder of the related equity instrument
    See FAS 133 Paragraphs 11a and 61b;  IAS 39 Paragraphs 11a, 24a, and 25b

  • Equity-indexed interest payments --- See FAS 133 Paragraph 61h and an example given in SFAS Paragraph 185.  Also see IAS Paragraph 24d.

  • Option to Extend Debt Maturity --- Variable annuity instruments are generally not subject to FAS 133 accounting rules except for specific components such as equity-index-based interest annuity and accumulation period payments discussed in Paragraph 200.  Also see IAS Paragraph 24c.

  • Credit-linked Debt --- These are not be separated from the host contract for debt instruments that have the interest rate reset in the event of (1) default, (2) a change in the debtor's published credit rating, or (3) a change in the debtor's creditworthiness indicated by a change in its spread over Treasury bond See Paragraph 61c of FAS 133.  An example is given in SFAS Paragraph 190..  Also see IAS 39 Paragraph 24h.

  • Equity Conversion Feature --- If an option is indexed to the issuer's own stock, a separate instrument with the same terms would be classified in stockholders' equity in the statement of financial position, so that the written option is not considered a derivative instrument.  See FAS 133 Paragraph 11a.  If a debt instrument is convertible into a shares of the debtor's common equity stock or another company's common stock, the conversion option must be separated from the debt host contract.  That accounting applies only to the holder if the debt is convertible to the debtor's common stock. See FAS 133 Paragraph 61k.  An example is provided in Paragraph 199 of FAS 133.  Also see IAS 39 Paragraph 24f.

  • Commodity-linked Notes --- A commodity-related derivative embedded in a commodity-indexed debt instrument must be separated from the a host contract under FAS 133 Paragraph 61i.  Examples are given in FAS 133  Paragraphs 187 and 188.  Also see IAS 39 Paragraph 24e.

Bifurcation under FAS 133 is not allowed in the following examples:

  • Loan Prepayment Options --- these are not bifurcated.  See Paragraphs 14, 189, and 198 of FAS 133 and Paragraph 25e of IAS 39.  This also included prepayment options embedded in interest-only strips or principal-only strips that (1) initially resulted from separating the right to receive contractual cash flows of a financial instrument that, in and of itself, did not contain an embedded derivative and that (2) does not contain any terms not present in the original host debt contract (IAS Paragraph 25f)

  • Contingent rentals --- these are not bifurcated.  Examples include Contingent rentals based upon variable interest rates (FAS 133 Paragraph 68j), related sales, inflation bonds (FAS 133 Paragraph 191).  There also is no bifurcation of a lease payment in foreign currency (FAS 133 Paragraph 196), although the derivative should be separated if the lease payments are specified in a currency unrelated to each party's functional currency.  Also see (FAS 133 Paragraph 197).  Also see IAS 39 Paragraph 25g.

  • Embedded Cap/Floor --- See FAS 133 Paragraph 183 for reasons why embedded caps and floors are not bifurcated.  See IAS Paragraph 25b.  

  • Indexed amortizing note --- See Paragraph 194 in FAS 133.  Also see IAS 39 Paragraph 25h.

  • Inverse Floater --- See Paragraphs 178 and 179 of FAS 133.  Birfurcation depends upon certain circumstances.   Inverse floaters are separated if the embedded derivative could potentially result in the investor's not recovering substantially all of its initial recorded investment.  In addition, Levered inverse floaters must be separated if there is a possibility of the embedded derivative increasing the investor's rate of return on the host contract to an amount that is at least double the initial rate of return on the host contract.  Also see IAS 39 Paragraph 25a.

  • Some Foreign Currency Embedded Derivatives --- Dual Currency Bond (FAS 133 Paragraph 194) and Short-Term Loan with a Foreign Currency Option (FAS 133 Paragraph 195) if both the principal payment and the interest payments on the loan had been payable only in a fixed amount of a specified foreign currency, in which case remeasurement will be done according to SFAS 52 (refer to paragraph 194).   However, foreign currency options not clearly and closely related to issuing a loan should be separated (refer to FAS 133 Paragraph 195.)  Also see IAS 39 Paragraph 25c.

 


Update on Embedded Derivatives Bifurcation

 

FASB:  Important Differences in Accounting for Embedded Derivatives in FAS 133 Versus IFRS 9
http://www.iasplus.com/en-us/standards/ifrs-usgaap/embedded-derivatives

 

An example of an embedded derivative is the option in a mortgage contract that allows the borrower to pay off the mortgage before the maturity  date of the mortgage. Most embedded derivatives have underlyings that are “clearly and closely related” to the underlyings of the host contracts, as is usually the case with an embedded option to pay off the balance due on a note before its maturity date. However, there are many instances where embedded options do not meet the “clearly and closely related” tests of FAS 133. When these tests are not met, the embedded options must be bifurcated and accounted for as derivative contracts under FAS 133 and its amendments.

 

 

I provide some illustrations of bifurcation in my free FAS 133 examination materials at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/ExamMaterial/PracticeQuestions/
Other examination helpers are at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/

 

 

There have been some recent changes in both the U.S. and international standards.

 

First the IASB parted ways with the FASB by not requiring embedded derivative contracts to be bifurcated for any such embedded derivatives even if the underlyings are not at all clearly and closely related.

 

Second, the FASB has now taken a step closer to the IASB by not requiring that certain credit derivatives be bifurcated even if they are not clearly and closely related to their host contracts ---
http://accountingeducation.com/index.cfm?page=newsdetails&id=150909

 

Today, the FASB issued Accounting Standards Update 2010-11, to clarify the type of embedded credit derivative that is exempt from embedded derivative bifurcation requirements. 

Only one form of embedded credit derivative qualifies for the exemption one that is related only to the subordination of one financial instrument to another.

As a result, entities that have contracts containing an embedded credit derivative feature in a form other than such subordination may need to separately account for the embedded credit derivative feature. 

When the Amendments Are Effective:

An entity must apply the amended guidance as of the beginning of its first fiscal quarter beginning after June 15, 2010. 

The update can be downloaded by
 clicking here.

Bob Jensen’s free tutorials and videos on accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedging activities are linked at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

 


I call your attention to the IAS Plus summary of the
Notes from the IASB Special Board Meeting
October 6,  2009 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

The IASB met for a special meeting relating to the IAS 39 replacement project. Several Board members including the Chairman, FASB members, and FASB staff joined the meeting via video link.

Many of these items are especially interesting when teaching IFRS, when teaching contemporary issues in accountancy, and when teaching about accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedge accounting (although recent amendments of IAS 39 have taken this famous/infamous and very complicated standard beyond the scope of the original IAS 39 and the current FAS 133 in the U.S.)

There are various items taken up in the October 6 IASB meeting not discussed below. Hence if you're interested in the entire meeting go to the IASB Special Board Meeting summary: 
October 6,  2009
--- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

One significant difference that will arise between IAS 39 and FAS 133 lies in the IAS decision to end the requirement of bifurcation of host contracts (such as mortgage loans) from embedded derivatives (such as the embedded option to pay the loan off before maturity) when the underlying (such as a LIBOR interest rate) of the host contract is not "clearly and closely related" to the underlying of the embedded derivative.

Accounting for embedded derivatives

The Board was presented with the alternative to eliminate bifurcation of embedded derivatives. Several Board members were concerned that this decision together with the frozen spread approach adopted for measurement of financial liabilities would lead to hybrid instruments with a financial liability as a host not to be valued at fair value. By implication this means that the derivative part of the hybrid instruments would be valued at the frozen spread approach and not fair value. The staff defended this position by arguing that the credit adjustment to the derivative portion of the hybrid contract would not be significant. One Board member was particularly concerned about the effect of this decision on convergence – a point reinforced by a FASB member who expressed his view that such IASB decision would make convergence in this area next to impossible.

Nonetheless, the Board narrowly approved the elimination of bifurcation of financial liabilities as well as financial assets.

The above decision will lead to fewer derivative financial instruments being booked under FAS 39 relative to what would be booked under FAS 133. It seems to me to be politically incorrect to bring about such changes at a time when the SEC is still wavering to eliminate U.S. GAAP in favor of IASB standards.

What the IASB seems to have ignored is the valuation problems created by unique (customized) instruments that are not traded in the markets. Suppose Security AB with a "closely related" embedded Option B is Bond A that is actively traded with the embedded embedded Option B for paying off the debt before maturity. Early payoff embedded options are extremely common in bonds that are actively traded in the securities markets. Usually the embedded options for early payoff are deemed clearly and closely related under IAS 39 rules such that the embedded Option B previously did not have to be bifurcated and accounted for separately as a derivative financial instrument. Market values of Security AB impound both the value of the security and its embedded (non-bifurcated) option. Until the IASB changed its position on October 6, however, embedded options that were not clearly and closely related had to be bifurcated and accounted for separately.

For example, suppose Security ABXY is Security AB plus embedded Options X and Y that are not "clearly and closely related" in terms of underlyings.  Further assume Options X and Y can be valued in their own options markets. In other words there are deep and active markets for valuing Security AB, Option X, and Option Y. There is no deep and active market for the customized Security ABXY. Security ABXY is a unique, customized security that is not traded in an active and deep market.

It is highly unlikely that the total value of Security ABXY is the additive sum of the values of Security AB plus the value of Option X plus the value of Option Y. These components of Security ABXY are likely to interact such that valuation of Security ABXY becomes exceedingly difficult if the embedded Options X and Y are not bifurcated. In terms of FAS 157, it is no longer possible to apply the sought-after Level 1 valuation for Security ABXY, even though Level 1 can be applied if the embedded Option X and Options Y were bifurcated.

Alas, throughout history accountants have been very good at naively adding up components of value that are not truly additive. For example, throughout the history of accounting firms have added up balance sheet asset values and reported the sum as the total value of Total Assets when the assets have interactions (covariances) that are totally ignored in the summation process. Only when buyers and sellers negotiate for the purchase/sale of the entire bundle (in mergers and acquisitions) do accountants reveal that, in truth, they understand that the accounting figure for "Total Assets" on the balance sheet is sheer nonsense.

 

 

 

Nothing the FASB has issued with respect to derivatives makes much sense unless you go outside the FASB literature for basic terminology, most of which is borrowed from finance. A hybrid instrument is financial instrument that possesses, in varying combinations, characteristics of forward contracts, futures contracts, option contracts, debt instruments, bank depository interests, and other interests. The host contract may not be a derivative contract but may have embedded derivatives. See the definition of embedded derivative at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#EmbeddedDerivatives 

The problem is that the value of the hybrid (which may be a market price or transaction price) is often difficult to bifurcate into component values when the components themselves are not traded on the market on their own. An excellent paper on how to value some bifurcated components is provided in "Implementation of an Option Pricing-Based Bond Valuation Model for Corporate Debt and Its Components," by M.E. Barth, W.R. Landsman, and R.J. Rendleman, Jr., Accounting Horizons, December 2000, pp. 455-480.

Some firms contend that the major problem they are having in implementing FAS 133 or IAS 39 lies in having to review virtually every financial instrument in search of embedded derivatives and then trying to resolve whether bifurcation is required or not required. Many of the embedded derivatives are so "closely related" that bifurcation is not required. See "closely related" in http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm 

Also listen to executives and analysts discuss the bifurcation problem in http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/000overview/mp3/133summ.htm 

Detecting derivatives and embedded derivatives to account for worldwide (bifurcation)

Bob Jensen

May 6, 2002 message from George Lan

I am trying to read the FASB draft (Questions and Answers Related to Derivative Financial Instruments Held or Entered into by a Qualifying Special-Purpose Entity (SPE))  and got stumped right at the beginning. Perhaps someone on the list can clarify these sentences for me: "Under FASB 133, hybrid instruments that must be bifurcated contain two components for accounting purpose-- a derivative financial instrument and a nonderivative host contract....Hybrid instruments that are not bifurcated ... are not considered to be derivative instruments." I am familiar with split accounting (methods of splitting the financial instrument into its bond and equity components, e.g) and with most of the common derivative contracts such as futures, forwards, options, swaps but am ignorant about hybrid instruments and why they must be or do not have to be bifurcated and would certainly appreciate some examples and assistance from AECMers.

I am also a little familiar with much of the derivative jargon, but expressions like "the floor purchased..." could perhaps be clarified to make the draft easier to read and understand by a wider audience.

Just a couple of thoughts,

George Lan 
University of Windsor

 

 

DIG Issue B1 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
QUESTION

An entity (Company A) issues a 5-year "debt" instrument with a principal amount of $1,000,000 indexed to the stock of an unrelated publicly traded entity (Company B). At maturity, the holder of the instrument will receive the principal amount plus any appreciation or minus any depreciation in the fair value of 10,000 shares of Company B, with changes in fair value measured from the issuance date of the debt instrument. No separate interest payments are made. The market price of Company B shares to which the debt instrument is indexed is $100 per share at the issuance date. The instrument is not itself a derivative because it requires an initial net investment equal to the notional amount; however, what is the host contract and what is the embedded derivative comprising the hybrid instrument?

RESPONSE

The host contract is a debt instrument because the instrument has a stated maturity and because the holder has none of the rights of a shareholder, such as the ability to vote the shares and receive distributions to shareholders. The embedded derivative is an equity-based derivative that has as its underlying the fair value of the stock of Company B. Paragraph 60 states:

...most commonly a financial instrument host contract will not embody a claim to the residual interest in an entity and, thus, the economic characteristics and risks of the host contract should be considered that of a debt instrument. For example, even though the overall hybrid instrument that provides for repayment of principal may include a return based on the market price...of XYZ Corporation common stock, the host contract does not involve any existing or potential residual interest rights (that is, rights of ownership) and thus would not be an equity instrument. The host contract would instead be considered a debt instrument, and the embedded derivative that incorporates the equity-based return would not be clearly and closely related to the host contract. Unless the hybrid instrument is remeasured at fair value with changes in value recorded in earnings as they occur, the embedded derivative must be separated from the host contract. As a result of the host instrument being a debt instrument and the embedded derivative having an equity-based return, the embedded derivative is not clearly and closely related to the host contract and must be separated from the host contract and accounted for as a derivative by both the issuer and the holder of the hybrid instrument.

DIG Issue B2 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
QUESTION

An investor purchases for $10,000,000 a structured note with a face amount of $10,000,000, a coupon of 8.9 percent, and a term of 10 years. The current market rate for 10-year debt is 7 percent given the single-A credit quality of the issuer. The terms of the structured note require that if the interest rate for single-A rated debt has increased to at least 10 percent at the end of 2 years, the coupon on the note is reduced to zero, and the investor must purchase from the issuer for $10,000,000 an additional note with a face amount of $10,000,000, a zero coupon, and a term of 3.5 years. How does the criterion in paragraph 13(a) apply to that structured note? Does the structured note contain an embedded derivative that must be accounted for separately?

RESPONSE

The structured note contains an embedded derivative that must be accounted for separately. The requirement that, if interest rates increase and the derivative is triggered, the investor must purchase the second $10,000,000 note for an amount in excess of its fair value (which is about $7,100,000 based on a 10 percent interest rate) generates a result that is economically equivalent to requiring the investor to make a cash payment to the issuer for the amount of the excess. As a result, the cash flows on the original structured note and the excess purchase price on the second note must be considered in concert. The cash inflows ($10,000,000 principal and $1,780,000 interest) that will be received by the investor on the original note must be reduced by the amount ($2,900,000) by which the purchase price of the second note is in excess of its fair value, resulting in a net cash inflow ($8,880,000) that is not substantially all of the investor’s initial net investment on the original note.

As described in paragraph 13(a) of Statement 133, an embedded derivative in which the underlying is an interest rate or interest rate index and a host contract that is a debt instrument are considered to be clearly and closely related unless the hybrid instrument can contractually be settled in such a way that the investor would not recover substantially all of its initial recorded investment. Paragraph 61(a)(1) clarifies that this test would be conducted by comparing the investor’s undiscounted net cash inflows over the life of the instrument to the initial recorded investment in the hybrid instrument. As demonstrated by the scenario above, if a derivative requires an asset to be purchased for an amount that exceeds its fair value, the amount of the excess — and not the cash flows related to the purchased asset — must be considered when analyzing whether the hybrid instrument can contractually be settled in such a way that the investor would not recover substantially all of its initial recorded investment under paragraph 13(a). Whether that purchased asset is a financial asset or a nonfinancial asset (such as gold) is not relevant to the treatment of the excess purchase price.

It is noted that requiring the investor to make a cash payment to the issuer is also economically equivalent to reducing the principal on the note. The note described in the question above could have been structured to include terms requiring that the principal of the note be substantially reduced and the coupon reduced to zero if the interest rate for single-A rated debt increased to at least 10 percent at the end of 2 years. That alternative structure would clearly have required that the embedded derivative be accounted for separately, because that embedded derivative’s existence would have resulted in the possibility that the hybrid instrument could contractually be settled in such a way that the investor would not recover substantially all of its initial recorded investment.

DIG Issue B3 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
QUESTION

Should an investor (creditor) account separately for a put or call option that is added to a debt instrument by a third party contemporaneously with or subsequent to the issuance of the debt instrument?

BACKGROUND

The last two sentences of paragraph 61(d) states, "In certain unusual situations, a put or call option may have been subsequently added to a debt instrument in a manner that causes the investor (creditor) to be exposed to performance risk (default risk) by different parties for the embedded option and the host debt instrument, respectively. In those unusual situations, the embedded option and the host debt instrument are not clearly and closely related." The references to the "embedded" option in the previous sentences refer to the added option.

Example 1 presents a transaction that involves the addition of a call option contemporaneously with or subsequent to the issuance of debt. Example 2 presents a group of transactions with a similar overall effect.

Example 1 Company X issues 15-year puttable bonds to an Investment Banker for $102. The put option may be exercised at the end of five years. Contemporaneously, the Investment Banker sells the bonds with an attached call option to Investor A for $100. (The call option is a written option from the perspective of Investor A and a purchased option from the perspective of the Investment Banker.) The Investment Banker also sells to Investor B for $3 the call option purchased from Investor A on those bonds. The call option has an exercise date that is the same as the exercise date on the embedded put option. At the end of five years, if interest rates increase, Investor A would presumably put the bonds back to Company X, the issuer. If interest rates decrease, Investor B would presumably call the bonds from Investor A.

Example 2 Company Y issues 15-year puttable bonds to Investor A for $102. The put option may be exercised at the end of five years. Contemporaneously, Company Y purchases a transferable call option on the bonds from Investor A for $2. Company Y immediately sells that call option to Investor B for $3. The call option has an exercise date that is the same as the exercise date of the embedded put option. At the end of five years, if rates increase, Investor A would presumably put the bonds back to Company Y, the issuer. If rates decrease, Investor B would presumably call the bonds from Investor A.

RESPONSE

Yes. A put or call option that is added to a debt instrument by a third party contemporaneously with or subsequent to the issuance of the debt instrument should be separately accounted for as a derivative under Statement 133 by the investor (that is, by the creditor); it must be reported at fair value with changes in value recognized currently in earnings unless designated in a qualifying hedging relationship as a hedging instrument. As a result, in Example 1 above, the call option that is attached by the Investment Banker is a separate derivative from the perspective of Investor A. Similarly, the call option described in Example 2 is a separate freestanding derivative that also must be reported at fair value with changes in value recognized currently in earnings unless designated as a hedging instrument.

The discussion in the last two sentences of paragraph 61(d) that refers to a put or call option that is added to a debt instrument by a third party subsequent to its issuance incorrectly uses the phrase embedded option in referring to that option. An option that is added or attached to an existing debt instrument by another party results in the investor having different counterparties for the option and the debt instrument and, thus, the option should not be considered an embedded derivative. The notion of an embedded derivative in a hybrid instrument refers to provisions incorporated into a single contract, and not to provisions in separate contracts between different counterparties. Consequently, such added or attached options should not have been discussed in paragraph 61, which discusses only embedded derivatives. (When the Board next considers a "technical corrections" amendment of the accounting literature, the staff plans to recommend deletion of the last two sentences of paragraph 61(d).)

DIG Issue B4 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 

QUESTION

Two entities enter into a long-term service contract whereby one entity (A) agrees to provide a service to the other entity (B), at market rates over a three-year period. Entity B forecasts it will pay 1,000 kroner to Entity A at the end of the three-year period for all services rendered under the contract. Entity A's functional currency is the kroner and Entity B's is the U.S. dollar. In addition to providing the terms under which the service will be provided, the contract includes a foreign currency exchange provision. The provision requires that over the term of the contract, Entity B will pay or receive an amount equal to the fluctuation in the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar and the kroner applied to a notional amount of 100,000 kroner (that is, if the U.S. dollar appreciates versus the kroner, Entity B will pay the appreciation, and if the U.S. dollar depreciates versus the kroner, Entity B will receive the depreciation). The host contract is not a derivative and will not be recorded in the financial statements at market value. For the purpose of applying paragraph 15, is the embedded foreign currency derivative considered to be clearly and closely related to the terms of the service contract?

BACKGROUND

Paragraph 12 of Statement 133 requires that an embedded derivative instrument be separated from the host contract and accounted for as a derivative instrument pursuant to the Statement if certain criteria are met. Paragraph 15 provides that an embedded foreign currency derivative instrument is not to be separated from the host contract and considered a derivative pursuant to paragraph 12 if the host contract is not a financial instrument and specifies payments denominated in either of the following currencies:

The currency of the primary economic environment in which any substantial party to the contract operates (that is, its functional currency)

The currency in which the price of the related good or service is routinely denominated in international commerce.

Paragraph 15 provides the exclusion to paragraph 12 on the basis that if a host contract is not a financial instrument and it is denominated in one of the two aforementioned currencies, then the embedded foreign currency derivative is considered to be clearly and closely related to the terms of the service contract.

RESPONSE

No, the embedded foreign currency derivative instrument should be separated from the host and considered a derivative instrument under paragraph 12.

In paragraph 311, "[t]he Board decided that it was important that the payments be denominated in the functional currency of at least one substantial party to the transaction to ensure that the foreign currency is integral to the arrangement and thus considered to be clearly and closely related to the terms of the lease." It follows that the exception provided by paragraph 15 implicitly requires that the other aspects of the embedded foreign currency derivative must be clearly and closely related to the host.

In the example discussed above, because the contract is leveraged by requiring the computation of the payment based on a 100,000 kroner notional amount, the contract is a hybrid instrument that contains an embedded derivative — a foreign currency swap with a notional amount of 99,000 kroner. That embedded derivative is not clearly and closely related to the host contract and under paragraph 12 of Statement 133 must be recorded separately from the 1,000 kroner contract. Either party to the contract can designate the bifurcated foreign currency derivative instrument as a hedging instrument pursuant to Statement 133 if applicable qualifying criteria are met.

DIG Issue B5 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
QUESTION

If the terms of a hybrid instrument permit, but do not require, the investor to settle the hybrid instrument in a manner that causes it not to recover substantially all of its initial recorded investment, does the contract satisfy the condition in paragraph 13(a), thereby causing the embedded derivative to be considered not clearly and closely related to the host contract?

BACKGROUND

Paragraph 13 of Statement 133 states:

For purposes of applying the provisions of paragraph 12, an embedded derivative instrument in which the underlying is an interest rate or interest rate index that alters net interest payments that otherwise would be paid or received on an interest-bearing host contract is considered to be clearly and closely related to the host contract unless either of the following conditions exist:

The hybrid instrument can contractually be settled in such a way that the investor (holder) would not recover substantially all of its initial recorded investment.

The embedded derivative could at least double the investor's initial rate of return on the host contract and could also result in a rate of return that is at least twice what otherwise would be the [current] market return for a contract that has the same terms as the host contract and that involves a debtor with a similar credit quality. [Footnote omitted.]

Even though the above conditions focus on the investor's rate of return and the investor's recovery of its investment, the existence of either of those conditions would result in the embedded derivative instrument being considered not clearly and closely related to the host contract by both parties to the hybrid instrument.

Paragraph 61(a) elaborates on the condition in paragraph 13(a) as follows:

...the embedded derivative contains a provision that (1) permits any possibility whatsoever that the investor's (or creditor's) undiscounted net cash inflows over the life of the instrument would not recover substantially all of its initial recorded investment in the hybrid instrument under its contractual terms.... RESPONSE

No. The condition in paragraph 13(a) does not apply to a situation in which the terms of a hybrid instrument permit, but do not require, the investor to settle the hybrid instrument in a manner that causes it not to recover substantially all of its initial recorded investment, assuming that the issuer does not have the contractual right to demand a settlement that causes the investor not to recover substantially all of its initial recorded investment. Thus, if the investor in a 10-year note has the contingent option at the end of year 2 to put it back to the issuer at its then fair value (based on its original 10-year term), the condition in paragraph 13(a) would not be met even though the note's fair value could have declined so much that, by exercising the option, the investor ends up not recovering substantially all of its initial recorded investment.

The condition in paragraph 13(a) was intended to apply only to those situations in which the investor (creditor) could be forced by the terms of a hybrid instrument to accept settlement at an amount that causes the investor not to recover substantially all of its initial recorded investment. For example, assume the investor purchased from a single-A-rated issuer for $10 million a structured note with a $10 million principal, a 9.5 percent interest coupon, and a term of 10 years at a time when the current market rate for 10-year single-A-rated debt is 7 percent. Assume further that the terms of the note require that, at the beginning of the third year of its term, the principal on the note is reduced to $7.1 million and the coupon interest rate is reduced to zero for the remaining term to maturity if interest rates for single-A-rated debt have increased to at least 8 percent by that date. That structured note would meet the condition in paragraph 13(a) for both the issuer and the investor because the investor could be forced to accept settlement that causes the investor not to recover substantially all of its initial recorded investment. That is, if increases in the interest rate for single-A-rated debt triggers the modification of terms, the investor would receive only $9 million, comprising $1.9 million in interest payments for the first 2 years and $7.1 in principal repayment, thus not recovering substantially all of its $10 million initial net investment.

DIG Issue B6 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
QUESTION

Three methods have been identified for determining the initial carrying values of the host contract component and the embedded derivative component of a hybrid instrument:

Estimating the fair value of each individual component of the hybrid instrument and allocating the basis of the hybrid instrument to the host instrument and the embedded derivative based on the proportion of the fair value of each individual component to the overall fair value of the hybrid (a "relative fair value" method).

Recording the embedded derivative at fair value and determining the initial carrying value assigned to the host contract as the difference between the basis of the hybrid instrument and the fair value of the embedded derivative (a "with and without" method based on the fair value of the embedded derivative).

Recording the host contract at fair value and determining the carrying value assigned to the embedded derivative as the difference between the basis of the hybrid instrument and the fair value of the host contract (a "with and without" method based on the fair value of the host contract).

Because the "relative fair value" method (#1 above) involves an independent estimation of the fair value of each component, the sum of the fair values of those components may be greater or less than the initial basis of the hybrid instrument, resulting in an initial carrying amount for the embedded derivative that differs from its fair value. Similarly, the "with and without" method based on the fair value of the host contract (#3 above) may result in an initial carrying amount for the embedded derivative that differs from its fair value. Therefore, both of those methods may result in recognition of an immediate gain or loss upon reporting the embedded derivative at fair value.

RESPONSE

The allocation method that records the embedded derivative at fair value and determines the initial carrying value assigned to the host contract as the difference between the basis of the hybrid instrument and the fair value of the embedded derivative (#2 above) should be used to determine the carrying values of the host contract component and the embedded derivative component of a hybrid instrument when separate accounting for the embedded derivative is required by Statement 133.

Statement 133 requires that an embedded derivative that must be separated from its host contract be measured at fair value. As stated in paragraph 301 of the basis for conclusions, "…the Board believes that it should be unusual that an entity would conclude that it cannot reliably separate an embedded derivative from its host contract." Once the carrying value of the host contract is established, it would be accounted for under generally accepted accounting principles applicable to instruments of that type that do not contain embedded derivatives. Upon separation from the host contract, the embedded derivative may be designated as a hedging instrument, if desired, provided it meets the hedge accounting criteria.

If the host contract component of the hybrid instrument is reported at fair value with changes in fair value recognized in earnings or other comprehensive income, then the sum of the fair values of the host contract component and the embedded derivative should not exceed the overall fair value of the hybrid instrument. That is consistent with the requirement of footnote 13 to paragraph 49, which states, in part:

"For a compound derivative that has a foreign currency exchange risk component (such as a foreign currency interest rate swap), an entity is permitted at the date of initial application to separate the compound derivative into two parts: the foreign currency derivative and the remaining derivative. Each of them would thereafter be accounted for at fair value, with an overall limit that the sum of their fair values could not exceed the fair value of the compound derivative." (emphasis added.) While footnote 13 to paragraph 49 addresses separation of a compound derivative upon initial application of Statement 133, the notion that the sum of the fair values of the components should not exceed the overall fair value of the combined instrument is also applicable to hybrid instruments containing a nonderivative host contract and an embedded derivative. However, in instances where the hybrid instrument is reported at fair value with changes in fair value recognized in earnings, paragraph 12(b) would not be met and therefore separation of the embedded derivative from the host contract would not be permitted.

DIG Issue B7 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
Embedded Derivatives: Variable Annuity Products and Policyholder Ownership of the Assets

DIG Issue B8 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
QUESTION

How does one determine the host contract in a nontraditional variable annuity contract (a hybrid instrument)?

BACKGROUND

While traditional variable annuity contracts represent the majority of contracts sold today by life insurance and other enterprises, those enterprises have also developed a wide range of variable annuity contracts with nontraditional features. Nontraditional features of traditional variable annuity contracts result in a sharing of investment risk between the issuer and the holder. Nontraditional variable annuity contracts provide for some sort of minimum guarantee of the account value at a specified date. This minimum guarantee may be guaranteed through a minimum accumulation benefit or a guaranteed account value floor. For example, the floor guarantee might be that, at a specified anniversary date, the contract holder will be credited with the greater of (1) the account value, as determined by the separate account assets, or (2) all deposits that are made, plus three percent interest compounded annually.

While these nontraditional variable annuity contracts have distinguishing features, they possess a common characteristic: the investment risk associated with the assets backing the contract is shared by the issuer and the policyholder. That is, in contrast to traditional variable annuity contracts, the investment risk is, by virtue of the nontraditional product features, allocated between the two parties and not borne entirely by only one of the parties (the holder in the case of a traditional variable annuity contract).

Paragraphs 12 and 16 of Statement 133 require that, in certain circumstances, an embedded derivative is to be accounted for separately from the host contract as a derivative instrument. An example illustrating the application of paragraph 12 to insurance contracts is provided in paragraph 200 of Statement 133. Paragraph 200, second bullet point entitled "Investment Component," concludes that the investment component of an insurance contract backed by investments owned by the insurance company is a debt instrument because ownership of those investments rests with the insurance company, noting that the investments are recorded in the general account of the insurance company. The same bullet point concludes that the investment component of an insurance contract backed by assets held in the insurance company's separate account is a direct investment of the policyholder because the policyholder directs and owns the investments. (Subsequent to the issuance of Statement 133, some have challenged the assertion that the policyholder "owns" the investments. The propriety of the conclusions reached in paragraph 200 relating to traditional variable annuities has been addressed in Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. B7, "Embedded Derivatives: Variable Annuity Products and Policyholder Ownership of the Assets.")

RESPONSE

The FASB staff guidance presented in Statement 133 Implementation Issue B7 indicates that a traditional variable annuity (as described in that Issue) contains no embedded derivatives that warrant separate accounting under Statement 133 even though the insurer, rather than the policyholder, actually owns the assets.

The host contract in a nontraditional variable annuity contract would be considered the traditional variable annuity that, as described in Issue B7, does not contain an embedded derivative that warrants separate accounting. Nontraditional features (such as a guaranteed investment return through a minimum accumulation benefits or a guaranteed account value floor) would be considered embedded derivatives subject to the requirements of Statement 133. Paragraph 12 of Statement 133, states, in part, that:

Contracts that do not in their entirety meet the definition of a derivative instrument such as … insurance policies… may contain "embedded" derivative instruments—implicit or explicit terms that affect some or all of the cash flows or the value of other exchanges required by the contract in a manner similar to a derivative instrument. The effect of embedding a derivative instrument in another type of contract is that some or all of the cash flows or other exchanges that otherwise would have been required by the contract, whether unconditional or contingent upon the occurrence of a specified event, will be modified based on one or more underlyings. [Emphasis added; reference omitted.] The economic characteristics and risks of the investment guarantee and those of the traditional variable annuity contract would typically be considered to be not clearly and closely related.

In determining the accounting for other seemingly similar structures, it would be inappropriate to analogize to the above guidance due to the unique attributes of nontraditional variable annuity contracts and the fact that the above guidance, which is based on Issue B7, can be viewed as an exception for nontraditional variable annuity contracts issued by insurance companies.

DIG Issue B9 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
QUESTION

Are the economic characteristics and risks of the embedded derivative (market adjusted value prepayment option) in a market value annuity contract (MVA or the hybrid instrument) clearly and closely related to the economic characteristics and risks of the host contract?

BACKGROUND

An MVA accounted for as an investment contract under FASB Statement No. 97, Accounting and Reporting by Insurance Enterprises for Certain Long-Duration Contracts and for Realized Gains and Losses from the Sale of Investments, given its lack of significant mortality risk, provides for a return of principal plus a fixed rate of return if held to maturity, or alternatively, a "market adjusted value" if the surrender option is exercised by the contract holder prior to maturity. The market adjusted value is typically based on current interest crediting rates being offered for new MVA purchases. As an example of how the market adjusted value is calculated at any period end, the formula typically takes the contractual guaranteed amount payable at the end of the specified term, including the applicable guaranteed interest, and discounts that future cash flow to its present value using rates currently being offered for new MVA purchases with terms equal to the remaining term to maturity of the existing MVA. As a result, the market value adjustment may be positive or negative, depending upon market interest rates at each period end. In a rising interest rate environment, the market adjustment may be such that less than substantially all principal is recovered upon surrender.

The following is an example of an annuity with a fixed return if held for a specified period or market adjusted value if surrendered early.

Single premium deposit: $100,000 on 12/31/98

Maturity Date: 12/31/07 (9 yr. term)

Guaranteed Fixed Rate: 7%

Fixed Maturity Value: $183,846 ($100,000 @ 7% compounded for 9 yrs.)

Market Value Adjustment Formula: Discount future fixed maturity value to present value at surrender date using currently offered market value annuity rate for the period of time left until maturity.

12/31/99 Valuation Date

(1) Fixed rate account value @7%
(2) Market Adjusted Value
3) Market Value Adjustment

5%

$107,000
  124,434
$ 17,434
========

9%

$107,000
    92,266
$  (14,734)
========

RESPONSE

Yes, the embedded derivative (prepayment option) is clearly and closely related to the host debt contract.

Paragraph 61(d) provides interpretation of the clearly and closely related criteria as it applies to debt with put options, noting that:

Call options (or put options) that can accelerate the repayment of principal on a debt instrument are considered to be clearly and closely related to a debt instrument that requires principal repayments unless both (1) the debt involves a substantial premium or discount (which is common with zero-coupon bonds) and (2) the put or call option is only contingently exercisable. Thus, if a substantial premium or discount is not involved, embedded calls and puts (including contingent call or put options that are not exercisable unless an event of default occurs) would not be separated from the host contract. The terms of MVAs do not include either feature. There is no substantial premium or discount present in these contracts at inception, and the put option is exercisable at any time by the contract holder (that is, it is not "contingently exercisable").

Since the embedded derivative has an underlying that is an interest rate index and the host contract is a debt instrument, the MVA contract must be analyzed under the criteria in paragraphs 13 and 61(a) as well. Pursuant to the tentative FASB staff guidance presented in Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. B5, the condition in paragraph 13(a) was intended to apply only to those situations in which the investor (creditor) could be forced by the terms of a hybrid instrument to accept settlement at an amount that causes the investor not to recover substantially all of its initial recorded investment. That is, because the investor always has the option to hold the MVA contract to maturity and receive the fixed rate and the insurance company cannot force the investor to surrender, the condition in paragraph 13(a) would not be met (that is, the insurance company does not have the contractual right to demand surrender and put the investor in a situation of not recovering substantially all of its initial recorded investment). The condition in paragraph 13(b) also would not be met in a typical MVA contract, since there is no leverage feature that would result in twice the initial and current market rate of return.

Because the criteria in paragraphs 13, 61(a), and 61(d) are not met, the prepayment option is considered clearly and closely related to the host debt instrument.

As the above examples demonstrate, the prepayment option enables the holder simply to cash out of the instrument at fair value at the surrender date. The prepayment option provides only liquidity to the holder. The holder receives only the market adjusted value, which is equal to the fair value of the investment contract at the surrender date. As such, the prepayment option (the embedded derivative) has a fair value of zero at all times.

DIG Issue B10 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
Embedded Derivatives: Equity-Indexed Life Insurance Contracts

DIG Issue B11 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
Embedded Derivatives: Volumetric Production Payments

DIG Issue B12 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
Embedded Derivatives in Certificates Issued by Qualifying Special-Purpose Entities

DIG Issue B13 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
Embedded Derivatives: Accounting for Remarketable Put Bonds

DIG Issue B14 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
Purchase Contracts with a Selling Price Subject to a Cap and a Floor
(Released 11/99)
DIG Issue B15--- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/  
Separate Accounting for Multiple Derivative Features Embedded in a Single Hybrid Instrument
(Released 11/99)
DIG Issue B16 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/  
Calls and Puts in Debt Instruments
(Released 11/99)

 

DIG Issue K2 at http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
QUESTION

If a bond includes in its terms at issuance an option feature that is explicitly transferable independent of the bond and thus is potentially exercisable by a party other than either the issuer of the bond (the debtor) or the holder of the bond (the investor), should the option be considered under Statement 133 as an attached freestanding option or an embedded option by the writer and the holder of the option?

BACKGROUND

Certain structured transactions involving the issuance of a bond incorporate transferable options to call or put the bond. As such, those options are potentially exercisable by a party other than the debtor or the investor. For example, certain "put bond" structures involving three separate parties - the debtor, the investor, and an investment bank - may incorporate options that are ultimately held by the investment bank, giving that party the right to call the bond from the investor. Several put bond structures involving options that are exercisable by a party other than the debtor or investor are described in Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. B13, "Accounting for Remarketable Put Bonds."

RESPONSE

If a bond includes in its terms at issuance an option feature that is explicitly transferable independent of the bond and thus is potentially exercisable by a party other than either the issuer of the bond (the debtor) or the holder of the bond (the investor), that option should be considered under Statement 133 as an attached freestanding derivative instrument, rather than an embedded derivative, by both the writer and the holder of the option.

For example, a call option that is either transferable by the debtor to a third party and thus is potentially exercisable by a party other than the debtor or the original investor based on the legal agreements governing the debt issuance can result in the investor having different counterparties for the option and the original debt instrument. Accordingly, even when incorporated into the terms of the original debt agreement, such an option may not be considered an embedded derivative by either the debtor or the investor because it can be separated from the bond and effectively sold to a third party. The notion of an embedded derivative, as discussed in paragraph 12, does not contemplate features that may be sold or traded separately from the contract in which those rights and obligations are embedded. Assuming they meet Statement 133’s definition of a derivative, such features must be considered attached freestanding derivatives rather than embedded derivatives by both the writer and the current holder.

In addition, Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. B3, "Investor’s Accounting for a Put or Call Option Attached to a Debt Instrument Contemporaneously with or Subsequent to Its Issuance," require that an option that is added or attached to an existing debt instrument by a third party also results in the investor having different counterparties for the option and the debt instrument and, thus, the option should not be considered an embedded derivative.

An attached freestanding derivative is not an embedded derivative subject to grandfathering under the transition provisions of Statement 133.

FASB:  Important Differences in Accounting for Embedded Derivatives in FAS 133 Versus IFRS 9
http://www.iasplus.com/en-us/standards/ifrs-usgaap/embedded-derivatives

 

"IASB proposes amendments to clarify the accounting for embedded derivatives," IASB, December 22, 2008 ---
http://www.iasb.org/Current+Projects/IASB+Projects/Financial+Instruments/Financial+instruments.htm 

The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) today published for public comment proposals to clarify the accounting treatment for embedded derivatives.

The proposals respond to requests received from those taking part in the recent round-table discussions organised by the IASB and the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to clarify the requirements in IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement and IFRIC 9 Reassessment of Embedded Derivatives.

Participants asked the IASB to act in order to prevent any diversity in practice developing as a result of the amendments made to IAS 39 in October 2008 to permit the reclassification of particular financial assets. The proposals published today would require all embedded derivatives to be assessed and, if necessary, separately accounted for in financial statements.

Commenting on the proposals, Sir David Tweedie, IASB Chairman, said:

* In October 2008, in response to exceptional circumstances, the IASB amended accounting standards relating to the reclassification of financial instruments. Issuing that amendment without normal due process always carried the risk of unintended consequences, and these proposals seek to clarify the application of that amendment to embedded derivatives.

The proposals are set out in an exposure draft Embedded Derivatives, on which the IASB invites comments by 21 January 2009. The exposure draft is available on the Website from the 'open for comment' at www.iasb.org .

The Exposure Draft may be temporarily downloaded from
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/7421736D-6390-4F7B-9F0A-BE4B21CBCABD/0/ED_IFRIC9andIAS391208.pdf

IASB Financial Instruments Projects Page ---
http://www.iasb.org/Current+Projects/IASB+Projects/Financial+Instruments/Financial+instruments.htm

 

Embedded Option =

an option that is an inseparable part of another instrument. Most embedded options are conversion features granted to the buyer or early termination options reserved by the issuer of a security. A call provision of a bond or note that contractually allows for early extinguishment is an example of an embedded option.   See embedded derivatives and option.

Note that much of the discussion below is changed with respect to embedded derivatives:

"FASB and IASB agree on a three-category financial asset classification and measurement approach," PwC, May 22, 2012 --- Click Here
http://cfodirect.pwc.com/CFODirectWeb/Controller.jpf?ContentCode=GBAD-8UJRHU&SecNavCode=MSRA-84YH44&ContentType=Content

. . .

Under their respective approaches, debt investments (e.g., loans and debt securities) would be classified based on an individual instrument's characteristics (as further explained below) and the business strategy for the portfolio. However, before this week's meeting, the IASB had defined two categories whereas the FASB had defined three categories.

This week, the IASB agreed to introduce a third category in which debt investments are measured at fair value with changes in fair value recognized through other comprehensive income. The FASB also agreed on a revised definition for this category. As a result, the categories for debt investments would be broadly defined as follows:
 
  • Amortized cost – consists of debt investments where the primary objective is to hold the assets to collect the contractual cash flows.
  • Fair value with changes in fair value recognized in other comprehensive income – consists of debt investments with the primary objective of both holding the assets to collect contractual cash flows and realizing changes in fair value through sale. Interest and impairment would be recognized in net income in a manner consistent with the amortized cost category, and fair value changes would be recycled from other comprehensive income to net income when the asset is sold.
  • Fair value with changes in fair value recognized in net income – consists of debt investments that either (1) do not meet the instrument characteristics criterion or (2) meet the instrument characteristics criterion but do not meet one of the other category definitions (i.e., "the residual category").

In addition, the FASB agreed to adopt the IASB requirement for prospective reclassifications between categories when there is a significant change in business strategy, which is expected to be "very infrequent."

In previous meetings, the FASB had also agreed to incorporate the following aspects of the IASB's approach:
 
  • Instrument characteristics criterion. The contractual cash flows of the debt investment must represent solely payments of principal and interest in order to be eligible for the amortized cost or fair value with changes in fair value recognized in other comprehensive income categories.
     
  • Bifurcation of hybrid financial instruments. Separate accounting for financial asset host contracts and embedded derivatives in hybrid financial assets would be prohibited; instead the entire hybrid financial asset would be accounted for as a single instrument. However, hybrid financial liabilities would continue to be bifurcated.

 

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
I favor most of these changes, especially changes that use OCI to avoid fluctuations in current earnings that will never be realized. However, I think the fact that the FASB's caving in on the issue of not bifurcating embedded derivatives in hybrid financial assets is absurd since the financial risks may vary so greatly between the host contract and its embedded derivatives. And my love of symmetry is appalled at bifurcation of hybrid liabilities but not hybrid assets is broken hearted.

 

 

Convertible debt can be viewed as a debt instrument with a call option on equity securities of the issuer.  Interest rates on that option are not clearly-and-closely related.  Hence, the embedded option might be accounted for separately under Paragraph 6 on Page 3 of FAS 133.

DIG Issue K3 at http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
QUESTION

Should the combinations of purchased and written options described below be considered for accounting purposes as two separate option contracts or as a single forward contract:

An embedded (non-transferable) purchased call (put) option and an embedded (non-transferable) written put (call) option executed contemporaneously with the same counterparty as part of a single hybrid instrument?

A freestanding purchased call (put) option and a freestanding or embedded (non-transferable) written put (call) option that are executed contemporaneously with the same counterparty at inception but where the purchased option may be transferred?

A freestanding purchased call (put) option and a freestanding or embedded (non-transferable) written put (call) option that are executed contemporaneously with different counterparties at inception?

For the purposes of this question, in all cases, the purchased and written options have the same terms (strike price, notional amount, and exercise date) and the same underlying, and neither of the two options is required to be exercised. The notion of the "same counterparty" encompasses contracts entered into directly with a single counterparty and contracts entered into with a single party that are structured through an intermediary. In addition, consistent with the conclusion in Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. K2, "Are Transferable Options Freestanding or Embedded?", an option incorporated into the terms of a hybrid instrument at inception that is explicitly transferable should be considered a freestanding, rather than an embedded, derivative instrument.

RESPONSE

This section provides separate responses for each of the combinations of options in the Question section.

A combination of an embedded (non-transferable) purchased call (put) option and an embedded (non-transferable) written put (call) option in a single hybrid instrument that have the same terms (strike price, notional amount, and exercise date) and same underlying and that are entered into contemporaneously with the same counterparty, should be considered for accounting purposes as a single forward contract by both parties to the contracts. Those embedded options are in substance an embedded forward contract because they (a) convey rights (to the holder) and obligations (to the writer) that are equivalent from an economic and risk perspective to an embedded forward contract and (b) cannot be separated from the hybrid instrument in which they are embedded. Even though neither party is required to exercise its purchased option, the result of the overall structure is a hybrid instrument that will likely be redeemed at a point earlier than its stated maturity. That result is expected by both the hybrid instrument’s issuer and investor regardless of whether the embedded feature that triggers the redemption is in the form of two separate options or a single forward contract. (However, if either party is required to exercise its purchased "option" prior to the stated maturity date of the hybrid instrument, the hybrid instrument should not be viewed for accounting purposes as containing one or more embedded derivatives. In substance, the debtor (issuer) and creditor (investor) have agreed to terms that accelerate the stated maturity of the instrument and the exercise date of the "option" is essentially the hybrid’s actual maturity date. As a result, it is inappropriate to characterize the hybrid instrument as containing two embedded option contracts that are exercisable only on the actual maturity date or as containing an embedded forward contract that is a combination of an embedded purchased call (put) and a written put (call) with the same terms.)

Embedded options in a hybrid instrument that are required to be considered a single forward contract for accounting purposes as a result of the guidance contained herein may not be designated individually as hedged items in a fair value hedge in which the hedging instrument is a separate, unrelated freestanding option. Statement 133 does not permit a component of a derivative to be designated as the hedged item.

A combination of a freestanding purchased call (put) option and a freestanding or embedded (non-transferable) written put (call) option that have the same terms and same underlying and are entered into contemporaneously with the same counterparty at inception should be considered for accounting purposes as separate option contracts, rather than a single forward contract, by both parties to the contracts. Derivatives that are transferable are, by their nature, separate and distinct contracts. That is consistent with the conclusion in Issue K2 which states: "…a call option that is either transferable by the debtor to a third party or that is deemed to be exercisable by a party other than the debtor or the original investor based on the legal agreements governing the debt issuance can result in the investor having different counterparties for the option and the original debt instrument. Accordingly, even when incorporated into the terms of the original debt agreement, such an option may not be considered an embedded derivative by either the debtor or the investor because it can be separated from the bond and effectively sold to a third party…."

A combination of a freestanding purchased call (put) option and a freestanding or embedded (non-transferable) written put (call) option that have the same terms and same underlying and are entered into contemporaneously with different counterparties at inception should be considered for accounting purposes as separate option contracts, rather than a single forward contract, by both parties to the contracts. Similarly, a combination of a freestanding written call (put) option and an embedded (non-transferable) purchased put (call) option that have the same terms and same underlying and are entered into contemporaneously with different counterparties at inception should be considered for accounting purposes as separate option contracts, rather than a single forward contract, by both parties to the contracts. Separate purchased and written options with the same terms but that involve different counterparties convey rights and obligations that are distinct and do not warrant bundling as a single forward contract for accounting purposes under Statement 133.

 

Question
How should we account for this type of security?

"Liquidity Put Agreement," Sound Capital Management, March 2008 --- http://www.soundcapital.com/liquidityput.html

Under the terms of a Liquidity Put Agreement (LPA), the issuer will purchase a portfolio of Treasury securities which will mature in the amount of the DSRF requirement and provide interest income each year on a semi-annual basis. The portfolio will generally consist of two securities; a premium bond and a discount bond. The amount of each bond will be determined so as to produce an aggregate purchase price of par. In essence, the issuer will own a hybrid long-term Treasury security that pays a semi-annual coupon. If, during the term of the agreement, the issuer experiences a cash flow shortage necessitating a draw on the DSRF, the issuer can put the securities back to the Provider of the LPA and receive a price of par plus accrued interest. Thus, even if interest rates rise and the value of the securities fall, the issuer will always be able to put the securities back to the Provider at par, eliminating the need to mark the portfolio to market and cure any deficiencies.

In exchange for this agreement, the Provider will receive a fee based upon the size of the DSRF. This fee can be paid either annually out of DSRF interest or upfront, on a present value basis. If the latter is chosen, the mixture of securities in the DSRF portfolio can be adjusted so that the issuer will have no net out of pocket expense and instead receive a lower rate of return on the DSRF.

If the issuer desires to terminate the LPA for reasons other than a credit default (e.g., a refunding or replacement of the DSRF with a surety policy), the issuer may not exercise the put. Instead, the contract will be terminated and the issuer will pay to the Provider the present value of the remaining fees, if any. In the case of a refunding, though, the issuer can usually transfer the LPA on the DSRF to the refunding bond issue and only unwind that portion resulting from a decrease in the DSRF requirement.

On a net basis, LPAs can provide municipal issuers with yields based on long-term Treasury yields without the price volatility risk associated with such securities. Additionally, the LPA provides an issuer the structuring flexibility to receive an upfront payment representing the present value of all or a portion of future investment earnings. Certain issuers may find this structure as either an alternative funding source or as a means to capture negative arbitrage in other funds. Because most DSRFs are subject to arbitrage rebate under current law, any earnings above the arbitrage yield can be used to offset negative arbitrage in other funds (e.g., construction fund or capitalized interest fund).

In summary, LPAs permit the Trustee, on behalf of the Issuer, to hold a Treasury security with an option to put the security at par in case of a credit event. The par put allows the issuer to carry the security at par, eliminating the need for any mark-up when interest rates move higher.

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
Ignoring for the moment that this is a portfolio and pretending that it is a single investment contract, I would say that it is a security investment with an embedded derivative as defined in FAS 133 and IAS 39. The fee becomes a premium of the embedded put option that in essence is a fair value hedge creating cash flow risk. Without the option, the investment  has no cash flow risk with a fixed semi-annual coupon and an eventual redemption at par. As such, however, it has fair value risk if the investment is sold or settled prematurely at current market value different from the discounted value of par.

With the embedded put option hedge, the investment has no fair value risk, but it does have cash flow risk because if interest rate returns on the instrument and the derivative hedge combined vary with market interest rates.

One question is whether the embedded derivative must be bifurcated and accounted for separately. The question is whether its value changes of the option are perfectly and negatively correlated with the value of the hedged item. If it were purchased independently, I would say yes because options market changes in value are not generally perfectly correlated with hedged item prices, which is what makes option hedges notoriously ineffective hedges if settled prematurely. Usually only changes in intrinsic value can get hedge accounting relief. In this case, however, the option cannot be sold or settled apart from the host contract. It is thus perfectly effective as a fair value hedge, and I would say it does not have to be bifurcated and accounted for separately as a derivative financial instrument under FAS 133 and IAS 33 rules.

Since the hedged item in reality is a portfolio, the issue of whether this is a macro hedge must also be considered. The notionals and the maturity dates of the premium and discount bonds are identical. The way the two portfolio components interact to produce an aggregate fixed value (par) subject to fair value risk in this case. In my opinion this is a homogeneous portfolio that should be allowed macro hedging using the put option to hedge fair value risk due to changes in market interest rates..

The combined instrument of two bonds and a put option should be carried at the discounted value of par less netted against the discounted value of the premium fees. But in the case of almost any FAS 133 and IAS 39 puzzle, I'm never 100% certain of my answers to problems where I've not previously seen an authoritative solution (like the authoritative solutions in the DIG pronouncements and Appendices A and B of FAS 133.

My free tutorials on FAS 133 and IAS 39 are linked at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

My FAS 133 and IAS 39 glossary is at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm

You can find quite a few interesting problems and answers about embedded derivatives in my exam material at  http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/ExamMaterial/PracticeQuestions/

 

Also see compound derivative.

Equity Hedging

An equity derivative is a derivative financial instrument that derives its value in whole or in part by the value of equity share prices of corporations or other forms of equity ownership. Being a derivative itself it cannot get hedge accounting treatment under FAS 133 or IAS 39 because these standards do not allow hedge accounting for a derivative that hedges another derivative. You can read about equity derivatives at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equity_derivative

"What’s a Couple of Hundred Trillion When You’re Talking Derivatives?" by Floyd Norris, The New York Times, September 23, 2006 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/23/business/23charts.html

The volume outstanding of equity derivatives is rising by about 30 percent a year, and now totals $5.6 trillion. It could go farther, with world stock market capitalization now about $41 trillion, according to Standard & Poor’s.

 

FAS 133 and IAS 39 require that equity derivatives be carried at fair value unless they are intended to not be net settled, i.e., they will actually be settled by delivery of shares. There are some exceptions for hybrid instruments as discussed in IAS 39 Paragraph 23c and FAS 133 Paragraph 12b.

One of the main differences between a "financial instrument" versus a "derivative financial instrument" is that the notional is generally not at risk in a "derivative financial instrument." For example if Company C borrows $600 million from Bank B in a financial instrument, the notional amount ($600 million) is at risk immediately after the notional is transferred to Company C. On the other hand, if Company C and Company D contract for an interest rate swap on a notional of $600 million using Bank B as an intermediary, the $600 million notional never changes hands. Only the swap payments for the differences in interest rates are at risk and these are only a small fraction of the $600 million notional. Sometimes the swap payments are even guaranteed by the intermediary, thereby eliminating credit risk.

So where's the risk of a derivative financial instrument that caused all the fuss beginning in the 1980s and led to the most complex accounting standards ever written (FAS 133 in the U.S. and IAS 39 internationally)?

Often there is little or no risk if the derivative contracts are held to maturity. The problem is that derivatives are often settled before maturity at huge gains to one party and huge losses to the counterparty. For example, if Company C swaps fixed-rate interest payments on $600 million (having current value risk with no cash flow variation risk) for variable-rate interest payments on $600 million (having cash flow variation risk but no market value variation risk), Company C has taken on enormous cash flow risk that may become very large if interest rates change greatly in a direction not expected by Company C. If Company C wants to settle its swap contract before maturity it may have to pay an enormous amount of money to do so either to counterparty Company D or to some other company who will take the swap off the hands of Company C. The risk is not the $600 million notional; Rather the risk is in the shifting value of the swap contract itself which can be huge even if it is less than the $600 million notional amount.

Perhaps derivative financial instrument risk is even better illustrated by futures contracts. Futures contracts are traded on organized exchanges such as the Chicago Board of Trade. If Company A speculates in oil futures on January 1, there is no exchange of cash on a 100,000 barrel notional that gives Company A the right to sell oil at a future date (say in one year) at a forward price (say $100 per barrel) one year from now. As a speculation, Company A has gambled by hoping to buy 100,000 barrels of oil one year from now for less than $100 per barrel and sell it for the contracted $100 price.

But futures contracts are unique in that they are net settled in cash each day over the entire one year contract period. If the spot price of oil is $55 on January 12 and $60 on January 13, Company A must provide $500,000 = ($60-$55)(100,000 barrels) to the counterparty on January 13 even though the futures contract itself does not mature until December 31. If Company A has not hedged its position, its risk can become astounding if oil prices dramatically rise. Company A's futures contract had zero value on January 1 (futures contracts rarely have value initially except in the case of options contracts), but the value of the futures contract may become an enormous asset or an enormous liability each each day thereafter depending upon oil spot price movements relative to the forward price ($100) that was contracted.

Hence, derivative contracts may have enormous risks even though the notionals themselves are not at risk. Prior to FAS 133 these risks were generally not booked or even disclosed. In the 1980s newer types of derivative contracts emerged (such as interest rate swaps) in part because it was possible to have enormous amounts of off-balance-sheet debt that did not even have to be disclosed, let alone booked, in financial statements. Astounding frauds transpired that led to huge pressures on the SEC and the FASB to better account for derivative financial instruments.

Most corporations adopted policies of not speculating in derivatives by allowing derivatives to be used only to hedge risk. However, such policies are very misleading since there are two main types of risk --- cash flow risk versus value risk. It is impossible to simultaneously hedge both types of risk, and hedging one type increases the risk of the other type. For example, a company that swaps fixed for floating rate interest payments increases cash flow risk by eliminating value risk (which it may want if it plans to settle debt prior to maturity). The counterparty that swaps floating rate interest payments for fixed rate payments eliminates cash flow risk by taking on value risk. It is impossible to hedge both cash flow and value risk simultaneously.

Hence, to say that a corporation has a policy allowing hedging but not speculating in derivative financial instruments is nonsense. A policy to only hedge cash flow risk may create enormous value risk. A policy to only hedge value risk may create enormous cash flow risk.

As the NYT article above points out that derivative financial instruments are increasingly popular in world commerce. As a result risk exposures have greatly increased even if all contracts were used for hedging purposes only. The problem is that a hedge only reduces or eliminates one type of risk at the "cost" of increasing the other type of risk. Derivative contracts increase one type or the other type of risk the instant they are signed.  Hedging shifts risk but does not eliminate risk per se.

You can read more about scandals in derivative financial instruments contracting (such as one company's "trillion dollar bet" that nearly toppled Wall Street and Enron's derivative scandals) at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds

You can download the CD containing my slide shows and videos on how to account for derivative financial instruments at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/

Old accounting professors have fun thinking back to their days contemplating the difference between stock splits and stock dividends when they (as students) were green as grass in intermediate accounting courses. Always remember that a firm cannot profit from purchasing or selling or splitting its own shares, or at least that's the chapter and verse of those old textbooks. Nor can a company get hedge accounting for cash flow and value risks  in its own equity shares under FAS 133 and IAS 39. Accounting theory is tricky business!

From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on February 29, 2008

IBM Plots Another Share Buyback
by William M. Bulkeley
The Wall Street Journal

Feb 27, 2008
Page: B2
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120404278177393945.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
 

TOPICS: Accounting, Advanced Financial Accounting, Dividends, Stock Price Effects, Tax Avoidance, Taxation

SUMMARY: IBM "...has spent $46.2 billion the last five years on repurchasing its shares--a sum equal to about 30% of its current market capitalization...and more than twice the $20 billion it spent on acquisitions during that period." As well, the article refers to IBM's use of borrowing through a foreign subsidiary for stock purchases after structuring the transaction to avoid U.S. taxes on repatriated earnings under IRS section 367 (b). That technique was known as "Killer B" and is now prohibited by the IRS.

CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article covers the range of issues related to intermediate accounting courses' discussions of treasury stock and stockholders' equity, including dividends.

QUESTIONS: 
1.) In general, how are stock buybacks, or treasury stock purchases, accounted for? You may present the answer to this question in the form of summary journal entries, with comments.

2.) Refer to IBM's consolidated financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2007, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/51143/000104746908001731/a2181836zex-13.htm (Alternatively, you may click on the live link to International Business Machines in the on-line article, click on SEC filings on the left hand side of the page, click on the link to the 10-K filed on 02/27/2008, select the fourth item in the table of submitted documents (Exhibit 13) and scroll to the financial statements section beginning on page 58.) What financial statement shows information about the treasury stock purchases that IBM has made? Summarize the activity shown for the years 2005 through 2007 and describe how that information was used in the article.

3.) How extensive is the amount of IBM's treasury stock held relative to the shares still outstanding? State your answer in terms of shares outstanding and dollar amounts shown in the financial statements. From which financial statement(s) do you obtain this information?

4.) Has the amount of shares repurchased impacted the amount of dividends paid to shareholders in the last three years? In your answer, comment on the point in the article that IBM increased its dividend 33% last year.

5.) Summarize the reasons given in the article explaining why IBM has repurchased significant amounts of its outstanding common stock.

6.) Why do you think that a program of share repurchases can "speak to strong faith in [IBM's] business model" by company management? What arguments are made against this assessment as stated in the article?

7.) What tax implications did IBM integrate into their share repurchase plans?

8.) Refer again to question 7. Given that the IRS ultimately disallowed use of the tax plan that IBM developed in relation to share repurchases, would you characterize the company's action in undertaking the plan as tax avoidance or tax evasion? Support your answer.
 

Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
 

"IBM Plots Another Share Buyback," by William M. Bulkeley, The Wall Street Journal, February 27, 2008; Page B2 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120404278177393945.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC

International Business Machines Corp. announced its second $15 billion stock-buyback plan in less than a year, boosting its share price and igniting a stock-market rally.

The announcement helped convince investors that IBM, which had a strong fourth quarter, is confident in its strategy and outlook and believes its stock is underpriced. IBM shares rose $4.30, or 3.9%, to $114.38 in 4 p.m. composite trading on the New York Stock Exchange, leading a rally that boosted the Dow Jones Industrial Average by nearly 1%.

Few companies have relied on share buybacks as much as IBM. The Armonk, N.Y., company has spent $46.2 billion the last five years on repurchasing its shares -- a sum equal to about 30% of its current market capitalization, or stock-market value, and more than twice the $20 billion it spent on acquisitions during that period.

The latest buyback comes as Samuel J. Palmisano enters his sixth year as chief executive officer. During the early years of his tenure, IBM went through a rocky period of lowered forecasts and divestitures of businesses including its disk-drive and personal-computer units. Until recently, its stock was stuck at less than its level when Mr. Palmisano took over, while chief rival Hewlett-Packard Co. has seen a sharp rise in its share price.

IBM's growing profits from an expanded line of software, steady services business and sales in foreign markets have helped the company produce a lot of cash. Last year, it reported free cash flow of $12.4 billion, and it had $16.1 billion in cash at the end of the year.

IBM said it expects to spend about $12.4 billion of the latest authorized buyback amount during the current year. Funds will come from operations. It said the reduction in shares will increase its per-share earnings by five cents to at least $8.25 for the current year, up at least 16% from 2007. It has forecast $10 to $11 a share in 2010.

"The willingness to make continued share buybacks speaks to strong faith in the business model," said Thomas Smith, an equity analyst with Standard & Poor's who recommends the stock. Andrew Neff, an analyst with Bear Stearns Cos., said, "We like where they're positioned, in big markets where they have a compelling advantage." He said that IBM has been successful in purchasing software companies and increasing their sales by training its huge sales force to peddle the programs.

Last year, IBM spent $18.8 billion on stock buybacks, including a $12.5 billion accelerated share repurchase in May for which it borrowed money through a foreign subsidiary in order to avoid U.S. taxes. The Internal Revenue Service prohibited further use of that technique, which was known as a "Killer B" because it was designed to circumvent IRS Section 367 (b) covering U.S. tax on repatriated foreign earnings.

Despite the big gain in IBM shares yesterday, buybacks don't have a very good recent record of providing superior returns to shareholders and are sometimes criticized as poor uses of corporate cash. S&P said that 423 members of the S&P 500-stock index did buybacks in the 18-month period ended June 30, 2007, but only one-quarter of them, including IBM, outperformed the S&P index through Sept. 30. Buybacks reached record-setting levels in the first half of last year.

Ed Barbini, an IBM spokesman, said the company isn't stinting on investment in its operations and has increased spending on research and development in all but one of the past five years. He noted IBM also has been aggressively purchasing small companies, especially software makers. The company raised its dividend 33% last year.

Jensen Comment
It might be useful to assign this case to students with two added questions:

  1. What situations arise when a company may want to hedge cash flow risk in its own shares?
     
  2. What situations arise when a company may want to hedge fair value in its own shares?

Equity-Indexed Embedded Derivative =

a contract with payments derived from a common stock price index such as the Dow Industrial Price Index or the Standard and Poors 500 Index.  For example,when a   note's interest payments has an embedded derivative (e.g., a common stock price option on a particular stock or a stock index) pegged to equity prices, the embedded portion must be separated from the host contract and be accounted for as a derivative according to Paragraph 61h on Pages 42-43 of FAS 133.  This makes equity  indexed derivative accounting different than credit indexed and   inflation indexed embedded derivative accounting rules that do not allow separation from the host contract.  In this regard, credit-indexed embedded derivative accounting is more like commodity-indexed accounting.  An illustration is provided beginning in Paragraph 185 on Page 97 of FAS 133.  Also see Paragraph 250 on Page 133 of FAS 133.  FAS 133 does not cover derivatives in which the equity index is tied only to the firm's on common stock according to Paragraph 11a beginning on Page 6 of FAS 133.  Also see index-amortizing, derivative financial instrument and embedded derivative.

See DIG Issue B10 under embedded derivatives.

Equity-Linked Bear Note = see embedded derivatives.

Equity Method =

a naughty word for hedge accounting under FAS 133.  See Paragraph 29f on Page 20 of FAS 133.  Risks of cash flows, fair value and foreign currency cannot be hedged for securities accounted for under the equity method under SFAS 115 except under confusing net investment hedges discussed below.  For equity method accounting, ownership must constitute at least 20% of the outstanding voting (equity) shares of the security in question. Under the equity method the investment is adjusted for the owner's share of net earnings irrespective of cash dividends.  Since dividends do not affect earnings, the FASB does not allow cash flow hedges of forecasted dividends under equity method accounting.  

Cash flow hedges must have the possibility of affecting net earnings.  For example, Paragraph 485 on Page 211 of FAS 133 bans foreign currency risk hedges of forecasted dividends of foreign subsidiary.  The reason is that these dividends are a wash item and do not affect consolidated earnings.

Not allowing equity method investments to be hedged items is controversial.  The FASB defends its decision in Paragraph 455 beginning on Page 200 of FAS 133.  This reads as follows:

The Board decided to retain the prohibition in the Exposure Draft from designating an investment accounted for by the equity method as a hedged item to avoid conflicts with the existing accounting requirements for that item. Providing fair value hedge accounting for an equity method investment conflicts with the notion underlying APB Opinion No. 18, The Equity Method of Accounting for Investments in Common Stock. Opinion 18 requires an investor in common stock and corporate joint ventures to apply the equity method of accounting when the investor has the ability to exercise significant influence over the operating and financial policies of the investee. Under the equity method of accounting, the investor generally records its share of the investee’s earnings or losses from its investment. It does not account for changes in the price of the common stock, which would become part of the basis of an equity method investment under fair value hedge accounting. Changes in the earnings of an equity method investee presumably would affect the fair value of its common stock. Applying fair value hedge accounting to an equity method investment thus could result in some amount of double counting of the investor’s share of the investee’s earnings. The Board believes that result would be inappropriate. In addition to those conceptual issues, the Board was concerned that it would be difficult to develop a method of implementing fair value hedge accounting, including measuring hedge ineffectiveness, for equity method investments and that the results of any method would be difficult to understand. For similar reasons, this Statement also prohibits fair value hedge accounting for an unrecognized firm commitment to acquire or dispose of an investment accounted for by the equity method.

Section c(4) of Paragraph 4 is probably the most confusing condition mentioned in Paragraph 4. It allows hedging under "net investment" criteria under Paragraph 20 of SFAS 52.  The gain or loss is reported in other comprehensive income as part of the cumulative translation adjustment. Reasons are given in Paragraph 477 on Page 208 of FAS 133:

The net investment in a foreign operation can be viewed as a portfolio of dissimilar assets and liabilities that would not meet the criterion in this Statement that the hedged item be a single item or a group of similar items. Alternatively, it can be viewed as part of the fair value of the parent's investment account. Under either view, without a specific exception, the net investment in a foreign operation would not qualify for hedging under this Statement. The Board decided, however, that it was acceptable to retain the current provisions of Statement 52 in that area. The Board also notes that, unlike other hedges of portfolios of dissimilar items, hedge accounting for the net investment in a foreign operation has been explicitly permitted by the authoritative literature.

For a derivative not designated as a hedging instrument, the gain or loss is recognized in earnings in the period of change.  Section 4(c) of Paragraph 4 of FAS 133 amends SFAS 52 on Foreign Currency Translation, to permit special accounting for a hedge of a foreign currency forecasted transaction with a derivative.  For more detail see foreign currency hedge.

Paragraph 42 on Page 26 reads as follows:

.A derivative instrument or a nonderivative financial instrument that may give rise to a foreign currency transaction gain or loss under Statement 52 can be designated as hedging the foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation. The gain or loss on a hedging derivative instrument (or the foreign currency transaction gain or loss on the nonderivative hedging instrument) that is designated as, and is effective as, an economic hedge of the net investment in a foreign operation shall be reported in the same manner as a translation adjustment to the extent it is effective as a hedge. The hedged net investment shall be accounted for consistent with Statement 52; the provisions of this Statement for recognizing the gain or loss on assets designated as being hedged in a fair value hedge do not apply to the hedge of a net investment in a foreign operation. 

These Section c(4) confusions in Paragraph 4 are illustrated in Examples 11-13 beginning on Page 270 of the Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998.

A more confusing, at least to me, portion of Paragraph 36 reads as follows:

The criterion in paragraph 21(c)(1) requires that a recognized asset or liability that may give rise to a foreign currency transaction gain or loss under Statement 52 (such as a foreign-currency-denominated receivable or payable) not be the hedged item in a foreign currency fair value or cash flow hedge because it is remeasured with the changes in the carrying amount attributable to what would be the hedged risk (an exchange rate change) reported currently in earnings.  Similarly, the criterion in paragraph 29(d) requires that the forecasted acquisition of an asset or the incurrence of a liability that may give rise to a foreign currency transaction gain or loss under Statement 52 not be the hedged item in a foreign currency cash flow hedge because, subsequent to acquisition or incurrence, the asset or liability will be remeasured with changes in the carrying amount attributable to what would be the hedged risk reported currently in earnings. A foreign currency derivative instrument that has been entered into with another member of a consolidated group can be a hedging instrument in the consolidated financial statements only if that other member has entered into an offsetting contract with an unrelated third party to hedge the exposure it acquired from issuing the derivative instrument to the affiliate that initiated the hedge.

Executory Contract

Accounting for Executory Contracts Such as Purchase/Sale Commitments and Loan Commitments ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/TheoryOnFirmCommitments.htm

Exposed Net Asset Position =

the excess of assets that are measured or denominated in foreign currency and translated at the current rate over liabilities that are measured or denominated in foreign currency and translated at the current rate.

Exposure Draft 162-B =

a part of history in the Financial Accounting Standards Board leading up to FAS 133. See the Background Information section in FAS 133, pp. 119-127, Paragraphs 206-231. Especially note Paragraphs 214, 360-384, and 422-194.  See FAS 133.

 

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |




F-Terms

Fair Value =

the estimated best disposal (exit, liquidation) value in any sale other than a forced sale.  It is defined as follows in Paragraph 540 on Page 243 of FAS 133:

The amount at which an asset (liability) could be bought (incurred) or sold (settled) in a current transaction between willing parties, that is, other than in a forced or liquidation sale. Quoted market prices in active markets are the best evidence of fair value and should be used as the basis for the measurement, if available. If a quoted market price is available, the fair value is the product of the number of trading units times that market price. If a quoted market price is not available, the estimate of fair value should be based on the best information available in the circumstances. The estimate of fair value should consider prices for similar assets or similar liabilities and the results of valuation techniques to the extent available in the circumstances. Examples of valuation techniques include the present value of estimated expected future cash flows using discount rates commensurate with the risks involved, option- pricing models, matrix pricing, option-adjusted spread models, and fundamental analysis.  Valuation techniques for measuring assets and liabilities should be consistent with the objective of measuring fair value. Those techniques should incorporate assumptions that market participants would use in their estimates of values, future revenues, and future expenses, including assumptions about interest rates, default, prepayment, and volatility. In measuring forward contracts, such as foreign currency forward contracts, at fair value by discounting estimated future cash flows, an entity should base the estimate of future cash flows on the changes in the forward rate (rather than the spot rate). In measuring financial liabilities and nonfinancial derivatives that are liabilities at fair value by discounting estimated future cash flows (or equivalent outflows of other assets), an objective is to use discount rates at which those liabilities could be settled in an arm's-length transaction.

This is old news, but it does provide some questions for students to ponder.  The main problem of fair value adjustment is that many ((most?) of the adjustments cause enormous fluctuations in earnings, assets, and liabilities that are washed out over time and never realized.  The main advantage is that interim impacts that “might be” realized are booked.  It’s a war between “might be” versus “might never.”  The war has been waging for over a century with respect to booked assets and two decades with respect to unbooked derivative instruments, contingencies, and intangibles.

As you can see below, the war is not over yet.  In fact it has intensified between corporations (especially banks) versus standard setters versus members of the academy.

From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on April 2, 2004

TITLE: As IASB Unveils New Rules, Dispute With EU Continues 
REPORTER: David Reilly 
DATE: Mar 31, 2004 
PAGE: A2 LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108067939682469331,00.html  
TOPICS: Generally accepted accounting principles, Fair Value Accounting, Insider trading, International Accounting, International Accounting Standards Board

SUMMARY: Despite controversy with the European Union (EU), the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is expected to release a final set of international accounting standards. Questions focus on the role of the IASB, controversy with the EU, and harmonization of the accounting standards.

QUESTIONS: 
1.) What is the role of the IASB? What authority does the IASB have to enforce standards?

2.) List three reasons that a country would choose to follow IASB accounting standards. Why has the U.S. not adopted IASB accounting standards?

3.) Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of harmonization of accounting standards throughout the world. Why is it important the IASB reach a resolution with the EU over the disputed accounting standards?

4.) What is fair value accounting? Why would fair value accounting make financial statements more volatile? Is increased volatility a valid argument for not adopting fair value accounting? Does GAAP in the United States require fair value accounting? Support your answers.

There are a number of software vendors of FAS 133 valuation software.

One of the major companies is Financial CAD --- http://www.financialcad.com/ 

FinancialCAD provides software and services that support the valuation and risk management of financial securities and derivatives that is essential for banks, corporate treasuries and asset management firms. FinancialCAD’s industry standard financial analytics are a key component in FinancialCAD solutions that are used by over 25,000 professionals in 60 countries.

See software.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of requiring fair value accounting for all financial instruments as well as derivative financial instruments?

Advantages:

 

  1. Eliminate arbitrary FAS 115 classifications that can be used by management to manipulate earnings (which is what Freddie Mac did in 2001 and 1002.
  2. Reduce problems of applying FAS 133 in hedge accounting where hedge accounting is now allowed only when the hedged item is maintained at historical cost.
  3. Provide a better snap shot of values and risks at each point in time.  For example, banks now resist fair value accounting because they do not want to show how investment securities have dropped in value.

 

Disdvantages:

 

  1. Combines fact and fiction in the sense that unrealized gains and losses due to fair value adjustments are combined with “real” gains and losses from cash transactions.  Many, if not most, of the unrealized gains and losses will never be realized in cash.  These are transitory fluctuations that move up and down with transitory markets.  For example, the value of a $1,000 fixed-rate bond moves up and down with interest rates when at expiration it will return the $1,000 no matter how interest rates fluctuated over the life of the bond.
  2. Sometimes difficult to value, especially OTC securities.
  3. Creates enormous swings in reported earnings and balance sheet values.

"Derivatives and hedging:  An Analyst's Response to US FAS 133," by Frank Will, Corporate Finance Magazine, June 2002, http://www.corporatefinancemag.com/pdf/122341.pdf 

However, FAS 133 still needs further clarification and improvement as the example of Fannie Mae shows. Analysts focus more on the economic value of a company and less on unrealised gains and losses.  Much of the FAS 133 volatility in earnings and in equity does not consistently reflect the economic situation.  This makes it difficult to interpret the figures.  Therefore, analysts welcome the decision of some companies voluntarily to disclose a separate set of figures excluding the effect of FAS 133.

For more on Frank Will's analysis of FAS 133, Fair Value Accounting, and Fannie Mae, go to http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm 

Those threads dealing with fair value are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm

Accounting for Executory Contracts Such as Purchase/Sale Commitments and Loan Commitments ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/TheoryOnFirmCommitments.htm

From Paul Pacter's IAS Plus on July 13, 2005 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
Also see http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/IASBFairValueFAQ.pdf

 
The European Commission has published Frequently Asked Questions – IAS 39 Fair Value Option (FVO) (PDF 94k), providing the Commission's views on the following questions:
  • Why did the Commission carve out the full fair value option in the original IAS 39 standard?
  • Do prudential supervisors support IAS 39 FVO as published by the IASB?
  • When will the Commission to adopt the amended standard for the IAS 39 FVO?
  • Will companies be able to apply the amended standard for their 2005 financial statements?
  • Does the amended standard for IAS 39 FVO meet the EU endorsement criteria?
  • What about the relationship between the fair valuation of own liabilities under the amended IAS 39 FVO standard and under Article 42(a) of the Fourth Company Law Directive?
  • Will the Commission now propose amending Article 42(a) of the Fourth Company Directive?
  • What about the remaining IAS 39 carve-out relating to certain

 

The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) requires estimation of fair value for many types of financial instruments, including derivative financial instruments. The main guidelines are spelled out in SFAS 107 and FAS 133 Appendix F Paragraph 540.  If a range is estimated for either the amount or the timing of possible cash flows, the likelihood of possible outcomes shall be considered in determining the best estimate of future cash flows according to FAS 133 Paragraph 17.  For related matters under international standards, see IAS 39 Paragraphs 1,5,6, 95-100, and 165.  According to the FASB, fair value is the amount at which an asset (liability) could be bought (incurred) or sold (settled) in a current transaction between willing parties, that is, other than in a forced or liquidation sale. Quoted market prices in active markets are the best evidence of fair value and should be used as the basis for the measurement, if available. If a quoted market price is available, the fair value is the product of the number of trading units times that market price.  There are some exceptions for hybrid instruments as discussed in  IAS 39  Paragraph 23c and FAS 133  Paragraph 12b.  There are also exceptions where value estimates are unreliable such as in the case of unlisted equity securities (see IAS 39 Paragraphs 69, 93, and 95).   

If an item is viewed as a financial instrument rather than inventory, the accounting becomes more complicated under SFAS 115.  Traders in financial instruments adjust such instruments to fair value with all changes in value passing through current earnings.  Business firms who are not deemed to be traders must designate the instrument as either available-for-sale (AFS) or hold-to-maturity (HTM).  A HTM instrument is maintained at original cost.  An AFS financial instrument must be marked-to-market, but the changes in value pass through OCI rather than current earnings until the instrument is actually sold or otherwise expires.   

Under international standards, the IASC requires fair value adjustments for most financial instruments. This has led to strong reaction from businesses around the world, especially banks. There are now two major working group documents taking sides for and against fair value accounting for all financial instruments. 
Go to http://www.iasc.org.uk/frame/cen3_112.htm 

Paul Pacter states the following at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm 

IAS 39
All debt securities, equity securities, and other financial assets that are not held for trading but nonetheless are available for sale – except those unquoted equity securities whose fair value cannot be measured reliably by another means are measured at cost subject to an impairment test.

SFAF 133
All debt securities, equity securities, and other financial assets that are not held for trading but nonetheless are available for sale – except all unquoted equity securities are measured at cost subject to an impairment test.

FASB requires fair value measurement for all derivatives, including those linked to unquoted equity instruments if they are to be settled in cash but not those to be settled by delivery, which are outside the scope of 133

 

Paragraph 28 beginning on Page 18 of FAS 133 requires that the hedge be formally documented from the start such that prior contracts such as options or futures contracts cannot later be declared hedges. Under international accounting rules, a hedged item can be a recognized asset or liability, an unrecognized firm commitment, or a forecasted transaction (IAS 39  Paragraph 127). 

If quoted market prices are not available, the estimate of fair value should be based on the best information available in the circumstances. The estimate of fair value should consider prices for similar assets and liabilities and the results of valuation techniques to the extent available in the circumstances. Examples of valuation techniques include the present value of estimated expected future cash flows using a discount rate commensurate with the risks involved, option-pricing models, matrix pricing, option-adjusted spread models, and fundamental analysis. Valuation techniques for measuring assets and liabilities should be consistent with the objective of measuring fair value. Those techniques should incorporate assumptions that market participants would use in their estimates of values, future revenues, and future expenses, including assumptions about interest rates, default, prepayment, and volatility.

Under IAS 39 Paragraph 100, under circumstances when a quoted market price is not available, estimation techniques may be used --- which include reference to the current market value of another instrument that is substantially the same, discounted cash flow analysis, and option pricing models.  When an enterprise has matching asset and liability positions, it may use mid-market prices according to IAS 39 Paragraph 99.

In reality, the FASB in FAS 133 and the IASC in IAS 39 require continual adjustments of financial instruments derivatives to fair value without giving much guidance about such matters when the instruments are not traded on exchange markets or are traded in markets that are too thin to rely upon for value estimation.  Unfortunately, over half of the financial instruments derivative contracts around the world are customized contracts for which there are no markets for valuation estimation purposes.  The most difficult instruments to value are forward contracts and interest rate and foreign currency swaps.  In my Working Paper 231 I discuss various approaches for valuation of interest rate swaps.  See http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/231wp/231wp.htm .

The fair value of foreign currency forward contracts should be based on the change in the forward rate and should consider the time value of money. In measuring liabilities at fair value by discounting estimated future cash flows, an objective is to use discount rates at which those liabilities could be settled in an arm's-length transaction. Although the FASB  does not give very explicit guidance on estimation of a derivative’s fair market value, this topic appears at many points in FAS 133. See Paragraphs 312-319 and 432-457.See blockage factor and yield curve.

Paragraphs 216 on Page 122 and 220-231 beginning on Page 123 of FAS 133 leave little doubt that the FASB feels "fair value is the most relevant measure for financial instrument and the only relevant measure for derivative instruments."  This can be disputed, especially when unrealized gains and value hide operating losses. The December 1998 issue of the Journal of Accountancy provides an interesting contrast on fair value accounting.  On Pages 12-13 you will find a speech by SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt bemoaning the increasingly common practice of auditors to allow earnings management.  On Page 20 you will find a review of an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case in which a firm prevented the reporting of net losses for 1988 and 1989 by persuading its auditor to allow reclassification of a large a large hotel as being "for sale" so that it could revalue historical cost book value to current exit value and record the gain as current income.  Back issues of the Journal of Accountancy are now online at http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/joaiss.htm .

The FASB intends eventually to book all financial instruments at fair value. Jim Leisingring comments about " first shot in a religious war" in my tape31.htm. The IASB also is moving closer and closer to fair value accounting for all financial instruments for virtually all nations, although it too is taking that big step in stages.  Click here to view Paul Pacter's commentary on this matter.

See DIG Issue B6 under embedded derivatives.

At the moment, accounting standards dictate fair value accounting for derivative financial instruments but not all financial instruments.  However, the entire state of fair value accounting is in a state of change at the moment with respect to both U.S. and international accounting standards.

If a purchased item is viewed as an inventory holding, the basis of accounting is the lower of cost or market for most firms unless they are classified as securities dealers.  In other words, the inventory balance on the balance sheet does not rise if expected net realization rises above cost, but this balance is written down if the expected net realization falls below cost.  The one exception, where inventory balances are marked-to-market for upside and well as downside price movements, arises when the item in inventory qualifies as a "precious" commodity (such as gold or platinum) having a readily-determinable market value.    Such commodities as pork bellies, corn, copper, and crude oil, are not "precious" commodities and must be maintained in inventory at lower-of-cost-or market. 

If an item is viewed as a financial instrument rather than inventory, the accounting becomes more complicated under SFAS 115. Traders in financial instruments adjust such instruments to fair value with all changes in value passing through current earnings. Business firms who are not deemed to be traders must designate the instrument as either available-for-sale (AFS) or hold-to-maturity (HTM). A HTM instrument is maintained at original cost. An AFS financial instrument must be marked-to-market, but the changes in value pass through OCI rather than current earnings until the instrument is actually sold or otherwise expires. Under international standards, the IASC requires fair value adjustments for most financial instruments. This has led to strong reaction from businesses around the world, especially banks. There are now two major working group documents taking sides for and against fair value accounting for all financial instruments. 
Go to http://www.iasc.org.uk/frame/cen3_112.htm 

  • Financial Instruments: Issues Relating to Banks (strongly argues for fair value adjustments of financial instruments). The issue date is August 31, 1999.
    Trinity University students may view this paper at J:\courses\acct5341\iasc\jwgbaaug.pdf.  

  • Accounting for financial Instruments for Banks (concludes that a modified form of historical cost is optimal for bank accounting). The issue date is October 4, 1999.
    Trinity University students may view this paper at J:\courses\acct5341\iasc\jwgfinal.pdf 

Fair value accounting politics in the revised IAS 39

From Paul Pacter's IAS Plus on July 13, 2005 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

 
The European Commission has published Frequently Asked Questions – IAS 39 Fair Value Option (FVO) (PDF 94k), providing the Commission's views on the following questions:
  • Why did the Commission carve out the full fair value option in the original IAS 39 standard?
  • Do prudential supervisors support IAS 39 FVO as published by the IASB?
  • When will the Commission to adopt the amended standard for the IAS 39 FVO?
  • Will companies be able to apply the amended standard for their 2005 financial statements?
  • Does the amended standard for IAS 39 FVO meet the EU endorsement criteria?
  • What about the relationship between the fair valuation of own liabilities under the amended IAS 39 FVO standard and under Article 42(a) of the Fourth Company Law Directive?
  • Will the Commission now propose amending Article 42(a) of the Fourth Company Directive?
  • What about the remaining IAS 39 carve-out relating to certain hedge accounting provisions?

 


Teaching Case
Cost Accounting and Inventory Valuation
by Bob Jensen: 
Differences Between Mark-to-Market Accounting for Derivative Contracts Versus Commodity Inventories
---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Mark-to-MarketCorn.htm


 


"FASB Approves Fair Value Measurement Experiment Using Loan Commitments," October 2, 2003 --- http://www.fas133.com/search/search_article.cfm?areaid=1384&page=1 

The FASB Board agreed to a new project to clarify FAS 133 guidance on loan commitments accounted for as derivatives (at fair value). It expects the project to raise issues that will bring Fair Value accounting near its breaking point.

At its October 1 meeting, the FASB Board agreed to a new interpretation project to clarify FAS 133 guidance on loan commitments accounted for as derivatives (at fair value). Loan commitments contain a witches brew of fair value measurement issues that the Board’s attempts to resolve will either validate the fair value model are derail it.

What to do with loans has been a longstanding issue for FAS 133, since it was discovered that many loan contracts have derivative-like features that arguably could scope them into FAS 133 accounting. Fitting such loan commitments into the FAS 133 framework was never fully resolved, other than with guidance specific to the origination of mortgage loans (see C13). Those held for resale (by issuers), for example, would be accounted for as derivatives, but those held for investment purposes would not. While the fall out over Freddie Mac was not mentioned as a reason to conduct this experiment now, its influence on matters pertaining to mortgage lending and FAS 133 is hard to avoid.

To keep this project manageable given everything else seeking the FASB’s attention, its scope will be strictly limited to interpretation of how to measure the fair value of loan committments scoped into FAS 133. It will not seek to resolve the broader loans as derivatives questions. The primary focus is likely to be on valuation questions related to issuers of loan commitments generally falling under the heading of interest rate locks, which amounts to a written option on a mortgage loan at a set rate (though another potential project on mortgage servicing rights may be folded in at a later date).

Specifically the two questions proposed by the staff are:

1. What information the issuer should use to determine the fair value of a loan commitment that is accounted for as a derivative under Statement 133 (as amended), and

2. Whether it is appropriate for a loan commitment to be recorded as an asset by the issuer of that commitment.

As background, the staff noted that they had been made aware of a “diversity in practice,” regarding how issuers chose to fair value their loan commitments. Some market participants attempted to recognize the future benefit to be derived from the loan, for example, whereas others exclude such recognition until the option holder exercises and borrowed. While the latter approach appears sensible, it may not be "fair value" since so much of the option's value to the issuer is tied up in the expected loan. There is also the question of which markets to look to in determining fair value and what intangibles and indirect costs associated with conversion of the written option to a loan should be considered in the valuation. And the valuation method has a direct impact on revenue recognition. The asset classification question derives from the notion that under current guidance written options cannot be classified as assets, which among other things, creates capital constraints on issuers.

"Redefining Fair Value Through New GAAP Measurement Guidance," July 18, 2003 --- http://www.fas133.com/search/search_article.cfm?page=1&areaid=1338 

More Fair Value accounting headaches are coming soon to a treasury near you, as FASB accelerates its guidance on how to measure Fair Value in time for “Fair Value M&A.”

“Risk measures are based on Fair Value metrics and there is not intersection between accounting books and records and the Fair Value based on risk measurement calculations, so it’s a completely different set of measures.” -- Gregory J. Parseghian, Freddie Mac CEO(June 25, 2003 conference call: in response to an analyst questioning why Freddie’s accounting issue should not call its risk management into question,)

This statement, in the context of Freddie Mac’s recent restatements, helps sum up why FASB’s Fair Value Measurement project is under tremendous pressure to get its measurement guidance right. If its guidance remains at odds with market practice, as appears to be the case now with financial institutions’ risk management measures, then analyst’s questions may be easily (and perhaps believably) dismissed with statements like this. Unfortunately, someone still has to figure out how to get the accounting measures right to comply with GAAP and avoid a restatement headline. In the words of one of the analysts on the recent Freddie Mac call in considering the Fair Value accounting challenges for GAAP, regulatory capital and risk management, “good luck to us all.”

How should GAAP fair value be measured?

In bringing its Fair Value Measurement guidance into line with its current project, perhaps FASB should consider what value these measures have if firms elect to make disclosures on reconciliation between measures used for risk management and GAAP. If there is no incremental value, then why not just use the risk measures? And if there is value in the GAAP, what should then be disclosed about the differences?

But alas, FASB lacks the resources to pursue fair value disclosure and fair value measurement projects simultaneously. Thus, the decision at the July 9 Board meeting to shut down the FAS 107 Amendment project in order to focus FASB’s still limited resources on measurement. Indeed, the timely logic in this is that as more of GAAP moves to Fair Value, the Fair Value disclosure mandate changes significantly. Why seek to capture a moving target now? Surely, Freddie Mac is thinking the same.

Besides, there is some urgency to the Fair Value Measurement project, which was just launched in June, since the Board would like to be able to bring out an Exposure Draft to coincide with the ED for Business Combinations, which is due out before year-end. The reason being: The current phase of the Business Combinations project (Purchase Method Procedures), being undertaken in conjunction with the IASB, has advanced Fair Value guidance significantly in its deliberations on applying “accounting’s” evolving Fair Value concept (i.e., how to measure the “exchange value”) to Purchase Accounting, of which financial instruments are a mere subcomponent. [If Fair Value accounting causes such confusion in the derivatives/risk management arena, much less stock options, you can imagine what is going to be said to analysts when it gets applied on a much broader basis to corporate acquisitions.]

Rather than document all the Fair Value Measurement guidance in the Business Combinations ED, the Board thought it was more prudent to bring all this together under a separate, new Standard—which would also put in one place and make consistent, guidance on Fair Value Measurement that exists elsewhere in the accounting literature (the IASB’s as well).

"Fair Value Accounting Back in the Spotlight,"  June 19, 2003 --- http://www.fas133.com/search/search_article.cfm?page=11&areaid=1321

Two items in today’s news point to fair value accounting and why it’s returning to the spotlight.

The first item is the on-going investigation of what is behind the Freddie Mac earnings restatements. The second is a report on efforts by an insurance group led by AIG to derail IASB efforts at fair value accounting. Both items are part of developing stories that will soon impact corporates outside of the mortgage finance and insurance space.

FAS 133 flaws

As the Wall Street Journal is reporting, the Freddie Mac restatements will be in the billions, stemming from improper hedge accounting under FAS 133. There was always a greater likelihood that one of the mortgage finance giants would emerge as the FAS 133 Wall Street Journal headline, since the task of hedging the risks in mortgage finance, involving multiple interest, credit and optionality risks is a tough one, and Fannie and Freddie knew it would be tough to account for this.

At first, media reports painted as positive the fact that the Freddie Mac restatements were positive and not negative. In other words, the gains on the hedges that were deemed non-hedges for accounting purposes were no longer being deferred. This ignored the “hedging” notion that these gains were offsetting anticipated losses in the underlying (e.g. the mortgage paper), which presumably are still anticipated. The disconnect of hedge from hedged item in the accounting guidance was always the fundamental flaw in hedge accounting that FAS 133 inadequately addressed, preferring to focus on derivatives. This is also why it is difficult to glean the impact bringing forward the hedge gains will have on Freddie Mac’s future earnings.

Broader IASs

Just as Freddie Mac exposes flaws in a limited fair value approach, the insurance industry is aggressively seeking to counter acceleration of fair value accounting more broadly. According to the Wall Street Journal, an insurance group, led by AIG, is actively opposing international accounting standards (IAS 32/39) and the related IASB effort to push the fair value concept further into insurance accounting. These IASB efforts go further than FAS 133 and related FASB efforts to introduce fair value to a wider scope of accounting: financial instruments as opposed to just derivatives. Though the IASB has taken the lead on the fair value drive, FASB is set to follow, which is why the IASB trends should be followed closely by all concerned with US GAAP.

Fair value accounting has its flaws, not least of which is the AIG argument that it introduces meaningless volatility to earnings statements. However, insurance firms, aside from broker-dealer banking operators, have as good a shot as any at making fair value accounting work as a means of giving investors and the markets a more telling portrait of financial position.

Just as Freddie Mac has revealed how FAS 133 does not go far enough--it’s focus on derivatives has left financial statement readers in the dark on hedged items--the insurance firm complaints show how broadening the focus to financial assets and liabilities is not going to offer an easy solution. But, if accounting is going to move increasingly toward a fair value model, as its standard setters plan, they must use the IASB’s insurance market “test” to prove the model’s practical efficacy. The Exposure Draft of Phase I of this IASB project is due out in Q3, with a tight implementation timetable to become effective for EU adoption of IASB standards in 2005.

If fair value accounting cannot be made to work with insurance firms, it cannot be made to work with non-financial corporations, and the current course to fair value accounting should be reversed. Further, by establishing guidelines for accounting for insurance risk management activities, the IASB effort will help define accounting for all risk management activities. For example, at its meeting earlier this week, the IASB discussed the definition of insurance risk “as risk other than financial risk” (defined by IAS 39), along with other pre-ballot items to become part of the exposure draft.

This is a high stakes experiment that all should watch closely for its broader impact, not to mention its transforming effects on an insurance market already in the midst of a paradigm shift.

 

 

Inputs to and suggestions for fair value estimation are elaborated upon in March 2003 by the FASB in an exposure draft entitled "Financial Instruments --- Recognition and Measurement," March 2003 --- http://www.cica.ca/multimedia/Download_Library/Standards/Accounting/English/e_FIRec_Mea.pdf 

Inputs to valuation techniques 

A34 
An appropriate technique for estimating the fair value of a particular financial instrument would incorporate available market information about the market conditions and other factors that are likely to affect the instrument’s fair value. The fair value of a financial instrument will be based on one or more of the following (and perhaps other) factors: 

(a) The time value of money (i.e., interest at the basic or risk-free rate). Basic interest rates can usually be derived from observable government bond prices and are often quoted in financial publications. These rates typically vary with the expected dates of the projected cash flows along a yield curve of interest rates for different time horizons. For practical reasons, an entity may use a well-accepted and readily observable general rate, such as a LIBOR/swap rate, as the benchmark rate. Since a rate such as LIBOR is not the basic interest rate, the credit risk adjustment appropriate to the particular financial instrument would be determined on the basis of its credit risk in relation to the credit risk in this benchmark rate. In some countries, the central government’s bonds may carry a significant credit risk and may not provide a useful, stable benchmark basic interest rate for instruments denominated in that currency. Some entities in these countries may have better credit standings and lower borrowing rates than the central government. In such a case, basic interest rates may be more appropriately determined by reference to interest rates for the highest-rated corporate bonds issued in the currency of that jurisdiction. 

(b) Credit risk. The effect on fair value of credit risk (i.e., the premium over the basic interest rate for credit risk) may be derived from observ-able market prices for traded corporate bonds of varying credit quality or from observable interest rates charged by lenders for loans of various credit ratings. 

(c) Foreign currency exchange prices. Active currency exchange markets exist for most major currencies, and prices are quoted daily in financial publications. 

(d) Commodity prices. There are observable market prices for many commodities. 

(e) Equity prices. Prices (and indexes of prices) of traded equity securities are readily observable in some markets. Present-value-based techniques may be used to estimate the current market price of equity instruments for which there are no observable prices. 

(f) Marketability (the return market participants demand to compensate for the risk that they may not be able to sell an asset or obtain relief from a liability immediately). In some cases it may be reasonable to assume that the effects of marketability are included in the credit risk interest rate premium. In some other cases it may be reasonable to assume that there has been no significant change in the marketability of a financial instrument and the effect on the instrument’s fair value during a reporting period. 

(g) Volatility (i.e., the frequency and magnitude of future changes in price of the financial instrument or other item that is the subject of an option). Measures of the volatility of actively traded items can normally be reasonably estimated on the basis of historical market data. 

Relationship between discount rates and projected cash flows 

A35 
The present value of projected cash flows may be estimated using a discount rate adjustment approach or a cash flow adjustment approach, as appropriate. 

A36 Discount rate adjustment approach. Under the discount rate adjustment approach, the stream of contracted cash flows forms the basis for the present value computation, and the rate(s) used to discount those cash flows reflects the uncertainties of the cash flows. This approach is most readily applied to financial instrument contracts to receive or pay fixed cash flows at fixed future times (i.e., instruments for which the only significant uncertainties in amount and timing of cash flows are caused by credit risk). 

A37 The discount rate adjustment approach is consistent with the manner in which assets and liabilities with contractually specified cash flows are commonly described (as in “a 12 percent bond”) and it is useful and well accepted for those instruments. However, because the discount rate adjustment approach places the emphasis on determining the interest rate, it is more difficult to apply to complex financial instruments where cash flows are conditional or optional, and where there are uncertainties in addition to credit risk that affect the amount and timing of future cash flows. 

A38 Cash flow adjustment approach. Under the cash flow adjustment approach, the projected cash flows for a financial instrument reflect the uncertainties in timing and amount (i.e., they are weighted according to the probability of their occurrence), and adjusted to reflect the market’s evaluation of the non-diversifiable risk relating to the uncertainty of those cash flows. The cash flow adjustment approach has advantages over the discount rate adjustment approach when an instrument’s cash flows are conditional, optional, or otherwise particularly uncertain for reasons other than credit risk. 

A39 To illustrate this, suppose that an entity holds a financial asset such as a derivative that has no specified cash flows and the entity has estimated that there is a 10 percent probability that it will receive $100; a 60 percent probability that it will receive $200; and a 30 percent probability that it will receive $300. Further, suppose that the cash flows are expected to occur one year from the measurement date regardless of the amount. The expected cash flow is then 10 percent of $100 plus 60 percent of $200 plus 30 percent of $300, which gives a total of $220. The discount rate used to estimate the instrument’s fair value based on that expected cash flow would then be the basic (risk-free) rate adjusted for the premium that market participants would be expected to receive for bearing the uncertainty of expected cash flows with the same level of risk. 

A40 The cash flow adjustment approach also can incorporate uncertainties with respect to the timing of projected cash flows. For example, if the cash flow in the previous example was certain to be $200, and there was a 50 percent chance it would be received in one year and a 50 percent chance it would be received in three years, the present value computation would weight those possibilities accordingly. Because the interest rate for a two-year instrument is not likely to be the weighted average of the rates for one-year and three-year instruments, two separate present value computations would be required. One computation would discount $200 for one year at the basic interest rate for a one-year instrument and the other would discount $200 for three years at the basic interest rate for a three-year instrument. The ultimate result would be determined by probability-weighting the results of the two computations. Since the probabilities of each are 50 percent, the fair value would be the sum of 50 percent of the results of each present value computation, after adjustment for the estimated effect of any non-diversifiable risk related to the uncertainty of the timing of the cash flow. 

A41 The discount rate adjustment approach would be difficult to apply in the previous example because it would be difficult to find a discount rate that would reflect the uncertainties in timing.

 

On December 14, 1999 the FASB issued Exposure Draft 204-B entitled Reporting Financial Instruments and Certain Related Assets and Liabilities at Fair Value.  This document can be downloaded from http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/draft/draftpg.html (Trinity University students can find the document at J:\courses\acct5341\fasb\pvfvalu1.doc ).


"Accounting for Impaired Assets in Bank Credit Analysis, by Roger B Taillon, New York (1) 212-438-7400, Standard & Poor's, July 3, 2002 --- http://www.standardandpoors.com/ 

Accounting for impaired assets not only differs markedly from country to country, it also offers substantial scope for management judgment. The accounting method prescribed and the judgment exercised in following that method has a profound impact on bank balance sheets and income statements. Although not new, accounting for impaired assets probably remains the biggest accounting-related issue in the credit analysis of a bank. Whether triggered by systemic crises or by poor lending practices specific to a single bank, poor asset quality is the most common fundamental cause of bank failure, although a liquidity crisis when depositors or lenders begin to suspect the poor asset quality typically is the proximate cause. Thus, the credit analyst must understand accounting for impaired assets and attempt to adjust for differences in order to make more meaningful comparisons between banks, particularly banks in different countries. For rating purposes, Standard & Poor's will make these adjustments and generally opt for the more conservative accounting techniques, given the dangers of underestimating the extent of (or underreserving for) impaired assets.

The following major issues must be considered in accounting for impaired assets: What is the definition of an impaired asset? To what extent is interest accrued on impaired assets? What is the policy for providing or reserving against losses on impaired assets? What is the policy for finally writing off impaired assets?

Even the terminology of impaired assets differs from system to system. In some countries, both a contra-asset account used to reduce the accounting value of the loan portfolio and the income statement item used to create it are called "loan loss reserves" (or something similar). In other countries, both items are called "provisions." To distinguish between the two in its publications, Standard & Poor's calls the balance sheet item a "reserve" and the income statement item a "provision." Thus, in Standard & Poor's terminology, a provision creates a reserve. When the loan is ultimately judged to be uncollectable, it is either "written off" directly against the income statement or "charged off" by reducing a previously created reserve (although this may also be called a "write-off"). "Write-backs" refer to the reversal of a reserve no longer considered necessary, and "recoveries" refer to the recuperation of all or part of a previously written-off loan. Types of Impaired Assets Impaired assets can include loans, loan-related assets such as foreclosed properties, securities, off-balance-sheet assets such as guarantees receivable, or in-the-money derivatives. Additionally, there can be off-balance-sheet commitments that require provisioning, such as guarantees provided or LOCs payable, where the primary obligor is expected to default, and commitments to lend to problem borrowers. Securitized assets on which the bank still bears the risk are also off balance sheet.

In a number of cases, banks suffering from large amounts of problem loans have "sold" them to special purpose companies, sometimes called "bad banks," designed to remove the problem loan portfolios from the bank's balance sheets and liquidate them. On a few occasions, these companies have been set up by individual banks; more frequently, they have been set up by governments following a systemic crisis. In most cases, these special purpose companies have been funded by the banks, which also bear all or most of the risk of eventual losses. Standard & Poor's puts the assets sold to these companies back on a bank's balance sheet for the purpose of analyzing the amount of a bank's impaired assets and the adequacy of its reserves.

The loan portfolio is typically a bank's largest asset category; it is also the category most likely to suffer impairment. For this reason, knowing the definition of nonperforming loans (NPLs) is the key first step in analyzing asset quality. In the U.S., the definition of nonaccrual loans is standardized as loans that are maintained on a cash basis because of deterioration in the borrower's financial condition, where payment in full of principal or interest is not expected and where principal and interest have been in default for 90 days, unless the asset is both well-secured and in the process of collection. Restructured loans (loans restructured for credit reasons at a below-market interest rate) and "other real estate owned" (OREO, or properties obtained through or in lieu of foreclosure) must also be disclosed and are considered nonperforming.

In other countries, the definition can vary considerably. Nonperforming consumer loans and residential mortgage loans are typically identified by aging, but the past-due period necessary for the loan to be considered nonperforming can vary from as short as 30 days to as long as 180 days. Some countries and banks define delinquency on a contractual basis, and others define it on a recency of payments basis. If delinquency is defined on a recency basis, sometimes only full payments are counted, and sometimes partial payments are sufficient to show the loan as performing. In some countries, there can be different standards for mortgage and other consumer installment loans, with the mortgage loans being put in nonperforming categories only after longer periods.

In terms of corporate loans, in most countries management judgment is the most important factor in deciding whether a loan is classified as nonperforming or not. For certain types of loans, such as overdraft loans, which are very common in some countries such as the U.K., management judgment is actually the only possible standard for determining if the loan is performing or not, since there are no specific maturities as long as the borrower is within its credit limit. Deciding just how liberal or conservative management is in making that judgment is one of the most difficult parts of the analysis and is generally possible only after extensive discussions.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision proposed a "reference definition" of a default to be used by banks that plan to use the "internal ratings-based approach" to the proposed new capital standards. Under the proposed definition, "a default is considered to have occurred with regard to a particular obligor when one or more of the following events has taken place:

The obligor is unlikely to pay its debt obligations (principal, interest, or fees) in full; A credit loss event associated with any obligation of the obligor, such as a charge-off, specific provision, or distressed restructuring involving the forgiveness or postponement of principal, interest, or fees; The obligor is past due more than 90 days on any credit obligation; or The obligor has filed for bankruptcy or similar protection from creditors." If widely adopted, this definition would lead to greater standardization between countries, but it still relies heavily on management judgment.

There are also differences as to whether a particular loan is considered nonperforming only when it goes into arrears, or if all loans to that legal entity are treated as nonperforming. The most conservative method is to consider all loans to the defaulting entity and loans to closely related entities as nonperforming. In some countries, only that portion of a loan that is actually past due is considered nonperforming. In a few countries, the latter condition is the rule for mortgage loans, but the entire balance of other loans is considered nonperforming.

In addition, restructured loans may or may not be separately disclosed depending on the country. In many countries, the figures for restructured loans will not be disclosed, and loans may be reclassified from nonperforming to performing as soon as they are restructured. In other countries, they will be reclassified to performing only after they have met the new terms for a specified period.

Foreclosed properties are only grouped with NPLs in a few countries, as they are in the U.S. In most countries, they will not be considered in management discussions of nonperforming asset (NPA) trends. However, they frequently are available as a separate category on the balance sheet or else are disclosed in the footnotes.

Although the analysis of impaired assets is focused on the loan portfolio (and the real estate portfolio, to the extent that it represents foreclosed assets), impaired assets can also be present in the securities portfolio, including:

Debt securities either purchased as investments or as loan-equivalents, which have defaulted; and Debt and equity securities received in exchange for loans as part of reorganizations or debt restructurings, or as foreclosed collateral. Equity securities purchased as investments that declined sharply in value might also be considered impaired, but would be looked at separately rather than combined with NPAs.

For analytical purposes, Standard & Poor's believes a broad definition of NPAs is appropriate. According to that definition, NPAs should include:

The full amount of all loans 90 days or more past due, and any other loans to the same legal entity; The full amount of all loans to an entity whose creditworthiness is believed to be impaired to the point where collection is doubtful, which would typically include any closely related entities of borrowers that were nonperforming; All loans restructured at nonmarket rates of interest, even if they are performing according to the new terms; All foreclosed properties, and properties received in lieu of foreclosure; Impaired securities as described above; and Impaired off-balance-sheet assets, including loans sold to problem asset disposition companies where there is recourse back to the bank, and nonperforming securitized assets where the bank retains the risk. To the extent possible, Standard & Poor's will adjust total NPAs to conform to this broad definition. If this is not possible, Standard & Poor's will make qualitative distinctions to recognize the difference in definitions.

Policies on Accrual of Interest Policies related to the accrual of interest on NPAs also differ substantially from country to country. The cleanest method is that which is used currently in most countries, where interest is not accrued on NPLs. Even there, there are differences as to whether interest previously accrued but not received is reversed or capitalized. In addition, the treatment of cash interest received is a matter of management judgment: typically, it would flow into interest income if the bank believed it would likely recoup its principal, but if this were in doubt, it would be used instead to reduce the principal balance on the bank's books. In other countries, interest continues to accrue but is fully provisioned. On a bottom-line basis, this provides the same results as the first policy: net NPAs and net income are the same as they would be under the nonaccrual method. However, a number of line items will differ: gross NPAs, reserves on the balance sheet, gross and net interest income, and loan loss provisions charged to the income statement will all be higher than they would be at banks that use the nonaccrual method. Comparisons between banks in different countries using the two methods will have to be adjusted to take this into account.

From a credit analyst's viewpoint, the most pernicious policy is the methodology of ceasing to accrue interest or provide for it only in those cases where management believes that collateral on the loan will be insufficient for it to recover the interest. This is consistent with "mark-to-market" accounting (which will be covered more generally in a separate article that will be forthcoming from Standard & Poor's). This methodology suffers from the following disadvantages:

It relies more heavily on valuations of collateral. Even if collateral valuations are theoretically correct, a bank may have great difficulty realizing these values. The costs of workout and recovery can be very high. Unless detailed information is provided on how much interest is accrued on NPLs, comparisons with banks using more conservative accounting methods will be impossible. All of these issues concerning accrual of interest apply to restructured loans and nonperforming debt securities as well as to identified NPLs. This is particularly true in restructurings that involve grace periods or extremely low payments in early years, postponing the day of reckoning where the borrower's true ability to repay will be tested.

Unfortunately, it is generally impossible to actually adjust for differences in accrual policies where provisioning for interest is not done fully. However, in many cases the balance sheet asset of accrued interest receivable is available. If this figure grows significantly more rapidly than that of earning assets (taking into account interest rate fluctuations) or the liability item of accrued interest payable, it can be an indication of aggressive accounting.

Policies on Loan Loss Reserves Loan loss reserving policies also differ substantially from country to country, and can vary to a greater or lesser extent among banks within a country. The most conservative policy is to fully write off or reserve for any identified problem loans, as well as to establish general reserves for potential future loan losses that have not yet been identified as problems. In the U.S. the emphasis has been on writing off problem loans, while in most other countries the emphasis has been on reserving. The policy itself is much less important than the adequacy of the amount. Comparison between NPLs in systems emphasizing charge-offs and NPLs in systems emphasizing reserving needs must be made net of reserves, however.

The following factors must be considered in terms of reserves and provisioning:

Are necessary reserves determined based solely on the number of days past due, on regulatory or internal loan classification, or (for the larger loans) on loan-by-loan estimates of loss? To what extent is collateral taken into account in determining necessary reserves, how is its value calculated, and are related costs fully taken into account? How does the percentage coverage of NPLs by reserves compare to regulatory minimums, historical figures, and that of the bank's peers? Have reserves been constituted for other impaired assets, such as securities, and for off-balance-sheet items such as guarantees of debt of problem clients or commitments to lend to them, and are both the income-statement and balance sheet figures disclosed? In addition to (or instead of, if the bank charges off rapidly) "specific" reserves covering individual problem loans, are there "general" reserves? If so, how are they calculated? Are there also "country risk reserves"? How does the tax treatment of the provisions affect the adequacy of the reserves? Are loan loss provisions shown only as net, or are both gross new provisions and write-backs disclosed? Generally, reserves that are determined based on loan-by-loan analysis for corporate loans are preferable to those that are determined based on some mechanical method, assuming they are conservatively estimated. Unfortunately, it is also more difficult to judge how conservative such reserves are, although detailed discussions with management can help. From a credit rating viewpoint, the ideal is probably a situation in which the reserve on a given loan is the larger of (a) a minimum based on the number of days past due, or (b) the necessary amount estimated through detailed analysis.

For consumer and residential mortgage loans, typically the reserve amount will be determined through a formula either based on the aging of the portfolio or on the bank's experience with the particular type of loan.

Similarly, from a credit rating viewpoint, one needs to be very skeptical of taking collateral into account in determining the adequacy of reserves. There are difficulties in valuing the collateral, with banks often using valuations assuming "normal" markets when they are in the midst of a recession with markets falling sharply. There can be legal and other difficulties in foreclosing, and these difficulties intensify in bad economic times. Even if banks eventually can foreclose, substantial costs may be involved that may not have been fully taken into account in the valuations. Finally, in a bad market, even if the bank can foreclose, it may be difficult to sell the collateral.

Provisions taken against foreclosed assets, impaired securities, off-balance-sheet items, and the like also must be aggregated with the loan loss provisions in order to judge the bank's credit track record. These provisions frequently are included in securities losses or other expenses, and they may or may not be disclosed in the footnotes.

Write-backs of provisions are generally (but not always) disclosed separately for banks that emphasize specific reserves. Sometimes necessary reserves are added up and then compared to those of the previous period, with the difference being the loan loss provision, so there are no gross and write-back figures available. The more robust method calls for looking at each loan individually, recording new and increased reserves separately from decreased reserves. The total of the new reserves and the increases to the reserves is the gross new provision, and the total of the decreases in reserves is the write-back figure. These separate figures are usually disclosed in the footnotes. The loan loss provision shown on the income statement is normally the net figure, although it is sometimes the gross figure, with write-backs included in other income. Ideally, specific and general provisions are disclosed separately. When the information is available, Standard & Poor's will use net new provisions as the expense item, but it will analyze the separate components to help evaluate the conservatism of a bank's reserving policies.

Charge-Off Policies Charge-off policies are subject to most of the same considerations as reserving policies. This is true at banks such as those in the U.S., which are more likely to charge off quickly than they are to create a specific reserve. In most countries, however, the issue of when and how much of a loan is actually charged off is much less important. In these countries, loans are not charged off until: The borrower has completely gone through the bankruptcy process, or the bank is nearly certain it will not recover anything for other reasons; A time period prescribed by regulation has elapsed; The tax authorities allow them to; or Some combination of the above. Even in these cases, however, the analyst must be aware of the charge-off procedures to make more meaningful comparisons of bank loan loss records: if charge-offs are quick, NPAs will tend to be low compared to where charge-offs take longer. Loan loss reserves also tend to be lower at banks where charge-offs are quicker; if not, it is probably a sign of more conservative accounting.

Tax Treatment of Impaired Assets Finally, there is the question of tax treatment. In some countries, banks account for the tax benefits of a loan loss when the provision is made, even though the loss cannot be taken for tax purposes until the charge-off is made. Where there is a big delay between the two and loan loss provisions are increasing more rapidly than charge-offs, banks can build up large deferred tax assets, which can amount to a substantial proportion of reported equity. This was the case for both the Japanese and the Mexican banks in the 1990s. Analysts had to question when or even whether the banks would actually be able to realize these future tax benefits, taking into account both the difficulties in getting charge-offs accepted by tax authorities and whether profits would be sufficient to use the tax benefits, even if the charge-offs were allowed. On the other hand, if provisions or certain types of provisions are not deductible for tax purposes, and the bank does not immediately account for the deferred tax benefit, the bank will be able to realize and account for these benefits in the future. Thus, reserves created without booking the tax benefits can cover more than their face value of loan losses, if the future charge-off is tax deductible and the bank has taxable income at the time the charge-off is made.


Fair Value Exposure Draft
FAS 133 is arguably the most complex, controversial, and tentative standard ever issued by the FASB.  It is not tentative in terms of required implementation, but it may fade in prominence if and when the FASB issues its proposed fair value standard for all financial instruments.  The first exposure draft on this even more controversial proposal is given in Exposure Draft 204-B entitled Reporting Financial Instruments and Certain Related Assets and Liabilities at Fair Value. See updated information on this at http://www.fasb.org/project/fv_measurement.shtml 


Option Pricing : Modeling and Extracting State-Price Densities A New Methodology by Christian Perkner
ISBN 3-258-06101-7  http://www.haupt.ch/asp/titels.asp?o=f&objectId=3372 

The focus of this book is on the valuation of financial derivatives. A derivative (e.g. a financial option) can be defined as a contract promising a payoff that is contingent upon the unknown future state of a risky security. The goal of this book is to illustrate two different perspectives of modern option pricing:

Part I: The normative viewpoint: How does (how should) option pricing theory arrive at the fair value for such a contingent claim? What are crucial assumptions? What is the line of argument? How does this theory (e.g. Black-Scholes) perform in reality?

Part II: The descriptive viewpoint: How are options truly priced in the financial markets? What do option prices tell us about the expectations of market participants? Do investor preferences play a role in the valuation of a derivative?

To answer both questions, the author introduces an insightful valuation framework that consists of five elements. Its central component is the so called state-price density - a density that represents the market's valuation of $1 received in various states of the world. It turns out that the shape of this density is the crucial aspect when determining the price of an option.

The book illustrates several techniques allowing the flexible modeling of the state-price density. Implementation issues are discussed using real datasets and numerical examples, implications of the various modeling techniques are analyzed, and results are presented that significantly improve standard option pricing theory.

Accounting for Executory Contracts Such as Purchase/Sale Commitments and Loan Commitments ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/TheoryOnFirmCommitments.htm

Also see Option and Option Pricing Theory

Bob Jensen's threads on valuation of derivative financial instruments can be found at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm 

 

 

Fair Value Hedge =

a hedge that bases its periodic settlements on changes in value of an asset or liability. This type of hedge is most often used for forecasted purchases or sales. See FAS 133 Paragraphs 20-27,104-110, 111-120, 186, 191-193, 199, 362-370, 422-425, 431-457, and 489-491. The FASB intends to incrementally move towards fair value accounting for all financial instruments, but the FASB feels that it is too much of a shock for constituents to abruptly shift to fair value accounting for all such instruments.  See Paragraph 247 on Page 132, Paragraph 331 on Page 159, Paragraph 335 on Page 160, and Paragraph 321 on Page 156.  The IASC adopted the same definition of a fair value hedge except that the hedge has also to affect reported net income (See IAS 39 Paragraph 137a)

Flow Chart for Fair Value Hedge Accounting --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133flow.htm 

Held-to-maturity securities may not be hedged for fair value risk according to Paragraphs 426-431 beginning on Page 190 of FAS 133.  See held-to-maturity.

In FAS 133, derivative financial instruments come in three basic types that are listed in Paragraph 4 on Page 2 of FAS 133.  One of these types is described in Section a and Footnote 2 below:

Paragraph 4 on Page 2 of FAS 133.
This Statement standardizes the accounting for derivative instruments, including certain derivative instruments embedded in other contracts, by requiring that an entity recognize those items as assets or liabilities in the statement of financial position and measure them at fair value. If certain conditions are met, an entity may elect to designate a derivative instrument as follows:

a.
A hedge of the exposure to changes in the fair value of a recognized asset or liability, or of an unrecognized firm commitment, \2/ that are attributable to a particular risk (referred to as a fair value hedge)
==========================================================================
Footnote 2
\2/ An unrecognized firm commitment can be viewed as an executory contract that represents both a right and an obligation. When a previously unrecognized firm commitment that is designated as a hedged item is accounted for in accordance with this Statement, an asset or a liability is recognized and reported in the statement of financial position related to the recognition of the gain or loss on the firm commitment. Consequently, subsequent references to an asset or a liability in this Statement include a firm commitment.
==========================================================================

With respect to Section a above, a firm commitment cannot have a cash flow risk exposure because the gain or loss is already booked.  For example, a contract of 10,000 units per month at $200 per unit is unrecognized and has a cash flow risk exposure if the payments have not been made. If the payments have been prepaid, that prepayment is "recognized" and has no further cash flow risk exposure. The booked firm commitment, however, can have a fair value risk exposure.

Generally assets and liabilities must be carried on the books at cost (or not be carried at all as unrecognized firm commitments) in order to host fair value hedges.  The hedged item may not be revalued according to Paragraph 21c on Page 14 of SFAS 113.  However, since GAAP prescribes lower-of-cost-or market write downs (LCM) for certain types of assets such as inventories and receivables, it makes little sense if LCM assets cannot also host fair value hedges. Paragraph 336 on Page 160 does not discuss LCM.  It is worth noting, however, that Paragraph 336 on Page 160 does not support fair value adjustments of hedged items at the inception of a hedge.

The hedging instrument (e.g., a forecasted transaction or firm commitment) must meet the stringent criteria for being defined as a derivative financial instrument under FAS 133.   This includes the tests for being clearly-and-closely related.  It also includes strict tests of Paragraphs 21 beginning on Page 13 , 29 beginning on Page 20, and Paragraph 56 on Page 33 of FAS 133 with respect to the host contracts that are being hedged.  Those tests state that if the forecasted "transaction" is in reality a group or portfolio of individual transactions, all transactions in the group must bear the same risk exposure within a 10% range discussed in Paragraph 21.   Also see Footnote 9 on Page 13 of FAS 133.  The grouping tests are elaborated upon in the following Paragraphs:

  • Paragraph 21 on Page 13,

  • Paragraph 29 beginning on Page 20,

  • Paragraph 241 on Page 130,

  • Paragraph317 on Page 155,

  • Paragraphs 333-334 beginning on Page 159,

  • Paragraph 432 on Page 192,

  • Paragraph 435 on Page 193,

  • Paragraph 443-450 beginning on Page 196

  • Paragraph 462 on Page 202,

  • Paragraph 477 on Page 208.

For example, a group of variable rate notes indexed in the same way upon LIBOR might qualify, whereas having different indices such as LIBOR and U.S. Prime rate underlyings will not qualify.    Also, anticipated purchases cannot be combined with anticipated sales in the same grouping designated as a forecasted transaction even if they have the same underlying.   Paragraph 477 on Page 208 of FAS 133 makes an exception for a portfolio of differing risk exposures for financial instruments designated in foreign currencies so not to conflict with Paragraph 20 of SFAS 52.   For more detail see cash flow hedge and foreign currency hedge.

Those tests also state that a compound grouping of multiple derivatives (e.g., a portfolio of options or futures or forward contracts or any combination thereof) is prohibited from "separating a derivative into either separate proportions or separate portions and designating any component as a hedging instrument or designating different components as hedges of different exposures."   See Paragraphs 360-362 beginning on Page 167 of FAS 133.  Paragraphs dealing with compound derivative issues include the following:

  • Paragraph 18 beginning on Page 9,

  • Footnote 13 on Page 29,

  • Paragraphs 360-362 beginning on Page 167,

  • Paragraph 413 on Page 186,

  • Paragraphs 523-524 beginning on Page 225.

Paragraph 18 on Page 10 does allow a single derivative to be divided into components provided but never with partitioning of   "different risks and designating each component as a hedging instrument."   An example using Dutch guilders versus French francs is given under cash flow hedge.

One question that arises is whether a hedged item and its hedge may have different maturity dates.  Paragraph 18 beginning on Page 9 of FAS 133 rules out hedges such as interest rate swaps from having a longer maturity than the hedged item such as a variable rate loan or receivable.  On the other hand, having a shorter maturity is feasible according to KPMG's Example 13 beginning on Page 225 of the Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998) states the following.  A portion of that example reads as follows:

Although the criteria specified in paragraph 28(a) of the Standard do not address whether a portion of a single transaction may be identified as a hedged item, we believer that the proportion principles discussed in fair value hedging model also apply to forecasted transactions.

The difference between a forward exchange rate and a spot rate is not excluded from a fair value hedging relationship for firm commitments measured in forward rates.  However Footnote 22 on Page 68 of FAS 133 reads as follows:

If the hedged item were a foreign-currency-denominated available-for-sale security instead of a firm commitment, Statement 52 would have required its carrying value to be measured using the spot exchange rate. Therefore, the spot-forward difference would have been recognized immediately in earnings either because it represented ineffectiveness or because it was excluded from the assessment of effectiveness.

Paragraph 399 on Page 180 of FAS 133 does not allow covered call strategies that permit an entity to write an option on an asset that it owns.  See written option.

As an example of fair value hedges using interest rate swaps, consider the following excerpt from the 2002 Boeing Annual Report ---
http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/financial/finreports/annual/02annualreport/f_ncfs_18.html

Fair value hedges For derivatives designated as hedges of the exposure to changes in the fair value of a recognized asset or liability or a firm commitment (referred to as fair value hedges), the gain or loss is recognized in earnings in the period of change together with the offsetting loss or gain on the hedged item attributable to the risk being hedged. The effect of that accounting is to reflect in earnings the extent to which the hedge is not effective in achieving offsetting changes in fair value.

Interest rate swaps under which the Company agrees to pay variable rates of interest are designated as fair value hedges of fixed-rate debt. The Company also holds forward-starting interest rate swap agreements to fix the cost of funding a firmly committed lease for which payment terms are determined in advance of funding. This hedge relationship mitigates the changes in fair value of the hedged portion of the firm commitment caused by changes in interest rates. The net change in fair value of the derivatives and the hedged items is reported in earnings. For the year ended December 31, 2002, ineffectiveness losses of $8 were recorded in interest expense related to the forward-starting interest rate swaps. Ineffectiveness was insignificant for the year ended December 31, 2001.

For the years ended December 31, 2002 and 2001, $5 and $1 of gains related to the basis adjustment of certain terminated interest rate swaps were amortized to earnings. During 2003, the Company expects to amortize $8 of gains from the amount recorded in the basis adjustment of certain terminated fair value hedge relationships to earnings.

 

 

Accounting for Executory Contracts Such as Purchase/Sale Commitments and Loan Commitments ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/TheoryOnFirmCommitments.htm

Fair value hedges are accounted for in a similar manner in both FAS 133 and IAS 39.  Paul Pacter states the following at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm 

IAS 39 Fair Value Hedge Definition
a hedge of the exposure to changes in the fair value of a recognised asset or liability (such as a hedge of exposure to changes in the fair value of fixed rate debt as a result of changes in interest rates).

However, a hedge of an unrecognised firm commitment to buy or sell an asset at a fixed price in the enterprise’s reporting currency is accounted for as a cash flow hedge

IAS 39 Fair Value Hedge Accounting:
To the extent that the hedge is effective, the gain or loss from remeasuring the hedging instrument at fair value is recognised immediately in net profit or loss. At the same time, the corresponding gain or loss on the hedged item adjusts the carrying amount of the hedged item and is recognised immediately in net profit or loss.

 

FAS 133 Fair Value Hedge Definition:
Same as IAS 39

...except that a hedge of an unrecognised firm commitment to buy or sell an asset at a fixed price in the enterprise’s reporting currency is accounted for as a fair value hedge or a cash flow hedge.


SFAS Fair Value Hedge Accounting:
Same as IAS 39

 

a. The gain or loss from remeasuring the hedging instrument at fair value should be recognized immediately in earnings; and

b. The gain or loss on the hedged item attributable to the hedged risk should adjust the carrying amount of the hedged item and be recognized immediately in earnings.

c. This applies even if a hedged item is otherwise measured at fair value with changes in fair value recognized directly  in equity under paragraph 103b.  It also applies if the hedged item is otherwise measured at cost. 
(IAS 39 Paragraph 153)
See IAS 39 Paragraph 154 for example
.

Derivatives cannot hedge derivatives for accounting purposes -- now or under FASB 133," Bass said. "Does Dave [Duncan] think his accounting works even under FASB 133? No way."
Carl Bass, Andersen Auditor in 1999 who asked to be removed from Enron's audit review responsibilities --- 
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm#Bass
 
The main reasons are given in FAS Paragraph 405.  FAS 133 Paragraph 21(2)(c) disallows hedged items to be derivative financial instruments for accounting purposes, because derivative instruments are carried at fair value and cannot therefore be hedged items in fair value hedges.  Also see Paragraphs 405-407.  Paragraph 472 prohibits derivatives from be designated hedged items any type of hedge, including cash flow, fair value, and foreign exchange hedges.  The reason is that derivatives under FAS 133 must be adjusted to fair value with the offset going to current earnings.  This is tantamount to the "equity method" referred to in Paragraph 472.  More importantly from the standpoint of Enron transactions, Paragraphs 230 and 432  prohibit a firm's own equity shares from being hedged items for accounting purposes.  Whenever a firm hedges the value of its own shares, FAS 133 does not allow hedge accounting treatment.

Also see hedge and hedge accounting.

 

 

Cash Flow Hedges Create Fair Value Risk

Cash flow risk commonly arises in forecasted transactions with an unknown value of the underlying.  Interbank rates that banks charge each other is often used for benchmarking in hedge effectiveness testing.  For example, suppose the underlying is a benchmarked interest rate is the ever-popular London Inter-bank Offering Rate (LIBOR) where a firm borrows $1 million for two years at a  fixed rate of 6.41%.  This loan has fair value risk since the amount required to pay the loan off prematurely at the end of any quarter will vary with interest rate movements in the same manner as bond prices move up and down depending upon the spot market of interest rates such as LIBOR.    The loan does not have cash flow risk since the interest rate is locked in at 6.41% (divided by four) for each quarterly interest payment.

The firm can lock in fixed fair value by entering into some type of derivative such as an interest rate swap contract that will pay a variable benchmarked rate that moves up and down with interest rates.  For example, assume the receivable leg of the swap  is fixed at 6.65%.  Each quarter the difference between 6.65% and the current spot rate of LIBOR determines the net settlement of the interest rate swap payment that locks in a fixed return of 6.65% + 2%.  To read more about this particular cash flow hedge and the hedge accounting that is allowed under FAS 133, go to Example 5 in Appendix B of FAS 133 beginning with Paragraph 131.  Bob Jensen elaborates and extends this example with a video and Excel workbook at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm 

Financial instruments have a notional and an underlying.  For example, an underlying might be a commodity price and the notional is the quantity such as price of corn and the quantity of corn.  An underlying might be an interest rate such as the U.S. Treasury rate of the London Inter-bank Offering Rate and the notional might be the principal such as the $10 million face value of 10,000 bonds having a face value of $1,000 each.

The unhedged investment of $10 million has cash flow risk but no fair value risk.  The hedged investment has no cash flow risk but the subsequent combination of the hedge and the hedged item creates fair value risk.  The fair value of the interest rate swap used as the hedging instrument fluctuates up and down with the current spot rate of LIBOR used in determining the quarterly swap payments.  For example, in Example 5 mentioned above, the swap begins with a zero value but moves up to a fair value of $24,850 a the end of the first quarter, $73,800 at the end of the second quarter, and even drops to a negative ($42,820) after four quarters.

Companies do trillions of dollars worth of cash flow  hedging with interest rate swaps.  Two enormous examples are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  Both of these giant companies hedge millions of dollars of outstanding fixed-rate mortgage investments with interest rate swaps that lock in fair value.  You can read more about their cash flow hedging strategy in their annual reports for Years 2001, 2002, and 2003.  Both companies made headlines for not complying with FAS 133 hedge accounting years.  See http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

 

Fair Value Hedges Create Cash Flow Risk

Fair value risk commonly arises in fore firm commitments with a contracted value of the underlying.  For example, suppose the underlying is a benchmarked interest rate such as the London Inter-bank Offering Rate (LIBOR) where a firm invests $10 million for two years that pays a quarterly return of the spot rate for LIBOR plus 2.25%.  This investment has cash flow risk since the quarterly values of LIBOR are unknown.  The investment does not fair value risk since the value is locked in at $10 million due to the fact that the returns are variable rather than fixed.  

The firm can lock in a fixed return rate by entering into some type of derivative such as an interest rate swap contract that will lock in the current LIBOR forward rate.  For example, assume the payable leg of the swap  is fixed at 6.41%.  Each quarter the difference between 6.41% and the current spot rate of LIBOR determines the net settlement of the interest rate swap payment that will vary with interest rate movements.  To read more about this particular cash flow hedge and the hedge accounting that is allowed under FAS 133, go to Example 2 in Appendix B of FAS 133 beginning with Paragraph 111.  Bob Jensen elaborates and extends this example with a video and Excel workbook at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm 

The unhedged loan of $1 million has fair value risk but no fair value risk.  The hedged investment has no fair value risk but the subsequent combination of the hedge and the hedged item creates cash flow risk.  If the hedge is perfectly effective,  fair value of the interest rate swap used as the hedging instrument fluctuates exactly to offset any value change in the loan such that the combined value of the loan plus the swap is fixed at $1 million. For example, in Example 2 mentioned above, the swap begins with a zero value but down down to a fair value of a negative liability of )$16,025) when the value of the loan drops to ($998,851) such that the sum of the two values is the constant $1 million.  The swap costs the borrower an outflow of $16,025 at the end of the first quarter to offset the decline in the value of the loan.  

The point here is that a hedge for fair value risk creates cash flow risk.  

Why would a firm want to enter into a fair value hedge that causes cash flow risk?  There can be many reasons, but one is that the borrower may predict that interest rates are going to fall and it would be advantageous to prepay the fixed-rate loan at some point in time before maturity and borrow at anticipated lower rates.  In Example 2 mentioned above, LIBOR dropped to 6.31% in the fourth quarter such at the firm would have to pay $1,001,074 to prepay the loan (e.g., by buying it back in the market).  However, due to the hedge, the interest rate swap would pay $1,074 such that the net cost is only the $1 million locked in fair value fixed by the interest rate swap hedge.

Companies do a somewhat surprising amount of fair value hedging with interest rate swaps.  Two enormous examples are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  Both of these giant companies hedge millions of dollars of outstanding variable rate debt with interest rate swaps that lock in fair value.  Both companies thereby create cash flow risk.  Fannie Mae lost $24 billion in derivatives trading, and much of this was due to fair value hedging.  See "$25 Billion in Derivatives Losses at Fannie Mae" --- http://worldvisionportal.org/WVPforum/viewtopic.php?t=192 

An independent analysis of Fannie's accounts suggests it may have incurred losses on its derivatives trading of $24bn between 2000 and third-quarter 2003. That figure represents nearly all of the $25.1bn used to purchase or settle transactions in that period. Any net losses will eventually have to be recognised on Fannie Mae's balance sheet, depressing future profits.

You can read more about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac fair value hedging strategy in their annual reports for Years 2001, 2002, and 2003.  Both companies made headlines for not complying with FAS 133 hedge accounting years.  See http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm


 

Stress Tests: Market Risk, Operational Risk, Liquidity Risk

Stress Test
Risk Glossary Definition
http://www.riskglossary.com/link/stress_testing.htm

Stress testing is a simple form of scenario analysis. Rather than consider the evolution of risk factors over several time steps, stress testing considers changes in risk factors over a single time step. That horizon is usually a single trading day, but stress testing can be considered over longer horizons—a week, two weeks, a quarter or even a year. Usually, stress testing is used to assess market risk, and that is the application this article focuses on. However, any scenario analysis that employs a single time step may be referred to as a stress test.

Used for market risk, a single scenario consists of projected values for applicable risk factors at the end of the horizon. Based on these values, a portfolio is marked-to-market. The result is compared with the portfolio's current market value, and the portfolio loss is calculated as the difference between the two.

Scenarios can be constructed in an ad hoc manner. If management is concerned about the effect of an inverted yield curve or a breakdown in a specific correlation, a scenario can be constructed specifically to assess that eventuality.

Stress testing can also be systematized. A firm may specify certain fixed scenarios (defined in terms of percent changes in applicable risk factors) and then perform periodic stress testing with those scenarios. In this manner, a firm might present stress test results in its daily risk report. Such stress scenarios may be hypothetical, perhaps reflecting contingencies that are a recurring concern of management. They can also be historically based. With that approach, stress scenarios may reflect the percentage changes in risk factors experienced during selected historical periods of market turmoil—stock market crashes, currency devaluations, etc.

Stress testing has much in common with value-at-risk (VaR). Both assess market risk. Both consider the change in market risk over a fixed horizon due to changes in specific risk factors. Indeed, if stress testing is conducted with randomly generated scenarios, the analysis would not be called stress testing. It would be called a Monte Carlo VaR measure.

There is some misunderstanding about the purpose of stress testing. This can be traced to the early literature on VaR from the mid-1990s. Like any tool, VaR has limitations, and those limitations were significant with many of the crude VaR implementations of the day. In light of those limitations, it became customary to recommend stress testing as a supplement to VaR. The phrase "VaR should always be supplemented with stress testing" is familiar to practitioners who worked in financial risk management during that period. Actually, the advice was dubious. No one ever identified how stress testing addressed the limitations of VaR measures of the day. For the most part, it didn't.

There was a perception that stress testing allowed for the analysis of extreme events that VaR didn't address. For example, if a firms was using one-day 90% USD VaR, results would reflect losses that might be experienced one day out of ten. What about losses that might be experienced one day out of 100—or one day out of 1000? On the surface, stress testing, with its ability to assess arbitrarily extreme events, seemed well suited to answer such questions. It was not. Although, stress testing can be used to assess losses under any scenario, it associates no probabilities with those scenarios. If stress testing indicates that a firm will lose a billion dollars under one extreme scenario, it is difficult to make sense out of the result. Is that a scenario that will occur once every thousand days or once every thousand years? Given an extreme enough scenario, it is possible to predict ruin for any portfolio.

Used as a supplement to VaR, stress testing is primarily useful for offering an intuitive sense of what sorts of scenarios are causing the VaR to be what it is. In this way, it can be a nice supplement for VaR.

The one significant shortcoming of VaR that stress testing does address is sudden changes in historical correlations. If two currencies have been pegged to one another, they will exhibit a high historical correlation. A VaR analysis based on that historical correlation will not address the risk that one of the currencies may be devalued relative to the other. If this is a scenario that concerns management, a simple stress test will offer more insights than would, say, a VaR analysis performed with a modified correlation assumption.

In summary, stress testing can be a nice supplement for VaR analyses, and many firms use it for that purpose. For assessing the risk of a breakdown in historical correlations, stress testing can be valuable. Other than that, as a tool for addressing vaguely defined limitations of a VaR measure, stress testing is largely a placebo.

There are two categories:  Sensitivity Analysis and Scenario Analysis

Ira Kawaller pulished a paper that talks about liquidity stress testing in conjunction with FAS 157 valuation definitions
"Watching out for FAS 157: Fair Value Measurement," by Ira Kawaller, Bank Asset/Liability Management, April 2008 --- http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/BALMWatchingoutforFAS157.pdf
Also at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/FairValue/StressTestKawaller.pdf

Liquidity Risk Measurement Techniques and Stress Tests

In the first article in this series on the considerations to the formulation of a liquidity stress testing framework, the background to liquidity risk and liquidity stress testing was presented (see March 2008 BALM). This second article in the series investigates various stress-testing categories in order to gain a better understanding of stress testing and how it could be applied in liquidity risk measurement. The basic liquidity risk measurement techniques are explored to establish a framework of potential analytical techniques to apply in the formulation of a liquidity stress testing methodology.

Liquidity Stress Testing. The formulation of a liquidity stress testing framework requires a clear and decisive understanding of the stress testing technique applied, exactly what is stress tested, and the type of analyses conducted. This section will explore the methods of stress testing that can be applied in the liquidity risk management process. Furthermore, the types of analyses conducted in measuring liquidity risk and other considerations that should be incorporated in the stress testing framework will be discussed.

Categories of Stress Testing. Generally, stress testing falls in two main categories – sensitivity tests and scenario tests.

• Sensitivity tests specify financial parameters that are moved instantaneously by a unitary amount, for example, a 10 percent decline or a 10 basis point increase. This approach is a hypothetical perspective to potential future changes in the risk factor(s). Such sensitivity tests lack historical and economic content which limits its usefulness for longer-term risk management decisions. Sensitivity tests can also examine historical movements in a number of financial parameters. Historical movements in parameters can be based on worst case movements over a set historical period (e.g., the worst change in interest rates, equity prices and currencies over the past 10 years). Alternatively, actual market correlations between various factors may be analyzed over a set period of time to determine the movement in factors that would have resulted in the largest loss for the current portfolio. In sensitivity stress tests, the source of the shock is not identified and the time horizon for sensitivity tests is generally shorter, often instantaneous, unlike scenario tests.

Italian Banking --- http://www.c-ebs.org/documents/ABI_CP12.pdf

Stress Tests for Banks --- http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/FairValue/StressTestBanks01.htm

Stress Tests for Hedge Funds --- http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/FairValue/StressTestHedgeFunds.htm

Slide Show --- Click Here


"Credit Derivatives Survive a Series of Stress Tests As Demand for the Hedging Instruments Grows," by Michael Mackenzie, The Wall Street Journal, January 21, 2003, Page C13 

Having roughly doubled in size in each of the past five years, credit derivatives have lately survived a series of stress tests. Wall Street is hoping that this encourages even broader participation by new investors.

Last year was certainly the year for fallen credit angels, headlined by the default of Argentina and the bankruptcy of Enron Corp. -- the latter was an actively traded name in the credit derivatives market over the past three years. But Wall Street figures that successful negotiation of these credit craters has set the stage for further growth of credit derivatives, such as default swaps, total-return swaps and synthetic collateralized debt obligations.

Some fear that broader participation by inexperienced players raises the risk of big blowups in the credit-derivatives market. Indeed, a few analysts are predicting headlines from such an event this year.

Still, these instruments, once assigned to the fringes of risk management, encountered only a minimum of legal complications in the Enron and Argentine cases.

"Credit derivatives earned their stripes in the aftermath of Enron filing for bankruptcy," said John McEvoy, cofounder of Creditex, a trading platform for credit derivatives. "The market did what it was supposed to do and that has apprised many investors of the value credit derivatives hold for hedging credit risk."

And the continued expansion of the credit-derivatives market derives not just from the perspective of hedging credit risk, but also from investors on the other side of the trade seeking a source of synthetic liquidity.

A credit default swap acts like an insurance position that allows buyers to transfer the risk of defaults or other kinds of credit events, such as debt restructurings, to a selling counterparty, who is paid a premium that is derived from the notional amount of the contract.

In effect, the seller or underwriter of the default swap establishes a synthetic long position in the credit of the company without having to purchase the underlying cash bond.

Investors are increasingly using default swaps to "increase or reduce credit risk without the liquidity constraints of the cash market," said William Cunningham, director of credit strategy at J.P. Morgan Chase in New York.

Indeed, liquidity in credit derivatives has grown so much that two-way activity is often better than that of the notoriously illiquid cash bond market. "We are increasingly seeing the derivative dictate activity in the underlying cash bond," said Mr. McEvoy. "Credit derivatives act as a barometer for the underlying cash market as they concentrate solely upon credit risk."

The growth of credit derivatives has also created better liquidity for less-popular issues as derivatives trading has encouraged greater use of cash bonds for derivatives traders hedging their positions.

It "has created more demand for off-the-run paper," said John Cieslowski, vice president for credit derivatives at Goldman, Sachs & Co. in New York.

Hedge funds have been particularly active users of these instruments. Jeff Devers, president of Palladin Group LP in Maplewood N.J., a hedge fund that seeks to minimize risk and enhance returns from convertible bonds, uses credit derivatives to "isolate credit risk." This way his fund solely takes on the equity exposure of a convertible bond. Mr. Devers expects further growth of credit derivatives to add even more liquidity to the convertible bond market.

Another key development has been the use of synthetic collateralized debt obligation baskets, which are a series of default swaps upon a range of credits bundled together. These credits are divided into tranches that reflect different risk ratings, appealing to the divergent risk appetites of investors.

The two counterparties to a synthetic CDO are either offsetting the credit risk through such trades or are taking exposure to a diverse number of credits that can augment the performance of their underlying portfolios.

Exposure to synthetic CDOs also raises a money manager's level of assets under management and either lowers or raises the level of exposure to a particular credit.

Creditex, which brokers trading between counterparties in CDOs, has been a beneficiary of this growth. "The past year saw many traditional CDO players enter the synthetic CDO market in credit derivatives and this contributed to a substantial rise in market activity," noted Mr. McEvoy.


 

 

To see how banks use/misuse derivatives, see tranches

FAS 133 = See SFAS 133

FASB = See Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)

 

FIN 46
What's Right and What's Wrong With (SPEs), SPVs, and VIEs --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm 

Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) =

Financial Accounting Standards Board, P.O. Box 5116, Norwalk, CT 06856-5116. Phone: 203-847-0700 and Fax: 203-849-9714.  The web site is at http://www.fasb.org/ .  See FAS 133.

On December 14, 1999 the FASB issued Exposure Draft 204-B entitled Reporting Financial Instruments and Certain Related Assets and Liabilities at Fair Value.  This document can be downloaded from http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/  (Trinity University students can find the document at J:\courses\acct5341\fasb\pvfvalu1.doc ).

Also see International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and IAS 39

Financial Instrument =

cash, evidence of an ownership interest in an entity, or a contract that both:

Imposes on one entity a contractual obligation (1) to deliver cash or another financial instrument to a second entity or (2) to exchange other financial instruments on potentially unfavorable terms with the second entity

Conveys to that second entity a contractual right (1) to receive cash or another financial instrument from the first entity or (2) to exchange other financial instruments on potentially favorable terms with the first entity.

The definition of financial instrument includes commodity-based contracts that provide the holder with an option to receive from the issuer either a financial instrument or a nonfinancial commodity.  See derivative financial instrument.

Firm Commitment =

an agreement with an unrelated party, usually legally enforceable, under which performance is probable because of a sufficiently large disincentive for nonperformance.  For example, even though a company expects future dividends from an investment to continue at a fixed rate, future dividends are not firm commitments unless there are disincentives for failure to declare dividends.   There might be such disincentives in the case of preferred dividends, but there are no such disincentives for common stock dividends.  Disincentives for nonperformance may not be indirect opportunity gains or losses according to Paragraph 540 beginning on Page 243 of FAS 133.  Paragraph 540 on Page 244 defines a firm commitment as follows:

An agreement with an unrelated party, binding on both parties and usually legally enforceable, with the following characteristics:

a. The agreement specifies all significant terms, including the quantity to be exchanged, the fixed price, and the timing of the transaction. The fixed price may be expressed as a specified amount of an entity's functional currency or of a foreign currency. It may also be expressed as a specified interest rate or specified effective yield.

b. The agreement includes a disincentive for nonperformance that is sufficiently large to make performance probable.

Section b above is judgmental.  The best way to meet this condition is to spell out the penalties for nonperformance in the contract.  But there are many situations where legal recourse is implicit as a matter of statute or tradition.  Must the "agreement disincentives"  be spelled out in each contract?  Clearly there are many situations in which disincentives are implicit in the law.  There are many others in which it is not so much legal as it is economic disincentives requiring laying off of workers, closing down of plants, negative publicity, etc.  Economic disincentives, however, are far more difficult to use in distinguishing firm commitments from forecasted transactions.

To my students I like to relate firm commitments and forecasted transactions to purchase commitments or sales contracts that call for future delivery.  If the contract specifies an exact quantity at a fixed (firm) price, the commitment is deemed a "firm commitment."   Cash flow is never in doubt with a firm (fixed-price) commitments and, therefore, a firm commitment cannot be hedged by a cash flow hedge.  For example, suppose Company A enters into a purchase contract to purchase 10,000 tons of a commodity for $600 per ton in three months time.  This a firm commitment without any doubt about the cash flows.  However, if the price is contracted at "spot price" in three months, the commitment is no longer a "firm" commitment.  The clause "spot price" makes this a forecasted transaction for 10,000 at a future price that can can move up or down from its current level.  It is possible to enter into a cash flow hedge with a derivative instrument that will lock in price of a forecasted transaction.  In the case of a firm commitment there is no need for a cash flow hedge.

In the case of a firm commitment the cash flow is fixed but the value can vary with spot prices.  For example, in three months time the firm commitment cash flow may be ($600)($10,000) = $6,000,000.  If the spot price moves to $500, the cash flow is more than the value of the commodity at the time of purchase.  It is possible, however, to use a derivative financial instrument to hedge the value at a given level (called a fair value hedge) such that if the spot rate falls to $500, the hedge will pay ($600-$500)(10,000 tons) =  $1,000,000.

In the case of a forecasted transaction at spot rates, the value stays fixed at ($ spot rate)(10,000 tons).  However, the cash flow accordingly varies.  It is possible to enter into a cash flow hedge using a derivative financial instrument, however, such that the cash flow is fixed a desired level.  In summary either cash flows are fixed and values vary (i.e., a fixed commitment) or cash flows vary and values are fixed (forecasted transaction).  If hedging takes place, firm commitments are only hedged with respect to value, whereas forecasted transactions are only hedged as to cash flow.  

I think the FASB really intends that the disincentives or penalties must be legally specified for each firm commitment to a point where these specifications will invoke very serious damages after a court in case for any breach of contract.   Section b is probably best interpreted in terms of its main purpose.  The main purpose, I surmise, is to distinguish a firm commitment from both a forecasted transaction and a common form of purchase contract that is easily broken with few if any penalties.  For example, a newspaper's 80-year agreement to purchase newsprint from a paper manufacturer might be broken with relatively small damages if the trees needed for the newsprint have not even been planted.  That type of purchase agreement is not a firm commitment.  It would seem, however, that Section b must be a matter of judgment regarding degrees of "firmness." rather than the mere writing in of any form of penalty for breach of contract.

Accounting for Executory Contracts Such as Purchase/Sale Commitments and Loan Commitments ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/TheoryOnFirmCommitments.htm

See DIG Implementation Issue A5 under net settlement.

Differences between firm commitments versus forecasted transactions are elaborated upon in Paragraphs 320-326 beginning on Page 157 of FAS 133.  Respondents did not necessarily agree that the differences are important.   The FASB argues that they are important.  As a result,  firm commitments do not need cash flow hedges unless there is foreign currency risk.  They may   need fair value hedging since values may vary from committed prices.   According to Paragraph 325, forecasted transactions have fewer rights and obligations vis-a-vis firm commitments.  All significant terms of the exchange should be specified in the agreement, including the quantity to be exchanged and the fixed price.  A forecasted transaction has no contractual rights and obligations.  Firm commitments differ from long-term purchase commitments. Generally long-term purchase agreements such as agreements to purchase timber of trees not yet planted or oil not yet pumped from the ground can usually be broken with a relatively small amount of penalty equal to damages sustained in the breaking of a contract. A firm commitment usually entails damage awards equal to or more than the contractual commitment. Hence they are less likely to be broken than purchase commitments. Firm commitments are discussed at various points in FAS 133.  See Paragraphs 37, 362, 370, 437-442, and 458-462.

Firm commitments can have fair value hedges even though they cannot have cash flow hedges other than cash flow hedges of foreign currency risk exposures --- see Paragraph 20 on Page 11 and Paragraph 37 on Page 24 of FAS 133.  They can be contracted in terms of a currency other than the designated functinal currency.   Gains and losses on fair value hedges of firm commitments are accounted for in current earnings following guidance in Paragraph 39 on Page 25 of FAS 133.  If the firm commitment is recognized, it is by definition booked and its loss or gain is already accounted for. For example, a purchase contract for 10,000 units per month at 100DM Deutsche Marks per unit is unrecognized and has a foreign currency risk exposure if the payments have not been made. If the payments have been prepaid, that prepayment is "recognized" and has no further foreign currency risk exposure.  See derivative financial instrument.

With respect to Firm Commitments vs. Forward Contracts, the key distinction is Part b of Paragraph 540 of the original FAS 133 (I have an antique copy of the original FAS 133 Standard.)

Those of us into FAS 133’s finer points have generally assumed a definitional distinction between a “firm commitment” purchase contract to buy a commodity at a contract price versus a forward contract to purchase the commodity at a contracted forward price. The distinction is important, because FAS 133 requires booking a forward contract and adjusting it to fair value at reporting dates if actual physical delivery is not highly likely such that the NPNS exception under Paragraph 10(b) of FAS 133 cannot be assumed to avoid booking.

The distinction actually commences with forecasted transactions that include purchase contracts for a fixed notional (such as 100,000 gallons of fuel) at an uncertain underlying (such as the spot price of fuel on the actual future date of purchase). Such purchase contracts are typically not booked. These forecasted transactions become “firm commitments” if the future purchase price is contracted in advance (such $2.23 per gallon for a future purchase three months later). Firm commitments are typically not booked under FAS 133 rules, but they may be hedged with fair value hedges using derivative financial instruments. Forecasted transactions (with no contracted price) can be hedged with cash flow hedges using derivative contracts.

There is an obscure rule (not FAS 133) that says an allowance for firm commitment loss must be booked for an unhedged firm commitment if highly significant (material) loss is highly probable due to a nose dive in the spot market. But this obscure rule will be ignored here.

One distinction between a firm commitment contract and a forward contract is that a forward contract’s net settlement, if indeed it is net settled, is based on the difference between spot price and forward price at the time of settlement. Net settlement takes the place of penalties for non-delivery of the actual commodity (most traders never want pork bellies dumped in their front lawns). Oil companies typically take deliveries some of the time, but like electric companies these oil companies generally contract for far more product than will ever be physically delivered. Usually this is due to difficulties in predicting peak demand.

A firm commitment is gross settled at the settlement date if no other net settlement clause is contained in the contract. If an oil company does not want a particular shipment of contracted oil, the firm commitment contract is simply passed on to somebody needing oil or somebody willing to offset (book out) a purchase contract with a sales contract. Pipelines apparently have a clearing house for such firm commitment transferals of “paper gallons” that never flow through a pipeline. Interestingly, fuel purchase contracts are typically well in excess (upwards of 100 times) the capacities of the pipelines.  

The contentious FAS 133 booking out problem was settled for electricity companies in FAS 149. But it was not resolved in the same way for other companies. Hence for all other companies the distinction between a firm commitment contract and a forward price contract is crucial.

In some ways the distinction between a firm commitment versus a forward contract may be somewhat artificial. The formal distinction, in my mind, is the existence of a net settlement (spot price-forward price) clause in a forward contract that negates a “significant penalty” clause of a firm commitment contract.

The original FAS 133 (I still have this antique original version) had a glossary that reads as follows in Paragraph 540:

Firm commitment

An agreement with an unrelated party, binding on both parties and
usually legally enforceable, with the following characteristics:

a. The agreement specifies all significant terms, including the
quantity to be exchanged, the fixed price, and the timing of the
transaction. The fixed price may be expressed as a specified
amount of an entity's functional currency or of a foreign
currency. It may also be expressed as a specified interest rate
or specified effective yield.

b. The agreement includes a disincentive for nonperformance that is
sufficiently large to make performance probable.

The key distinction between a firm commitment and a forward contract seems to be Part b above that implies physical delivery backed by a “sufficiently large” penalty if physical delivery is defaulted.  The net settlement (spot-forward) provision of forward contracts generally void Part b penalties even when physical delivery was originally intended.

Firm commitments have greater Part b penalties for physical non-conformance than do forward contracts. But in the case of the pipeline industry, Part b technical provisions in purchase contracts generally are not worrisome because of a market clearing house for such contracts (the highly common practice of booking out such contracts by passing along purchase contracts to parties with sales contracts, or vice versa, that can be booked out) when physical delivery was never intended. For example, in the pipeline hub in question (in Oklahoma) all such “paper gallon” contracts are cleared against each other on the 25th of every month. By “clearing” I mean that “circles” of buyers and sellers are identified such that these parties themselves essentially net out deals. In most cases the deals are probably based upon spot prices, although the clearing house really does not get involved in negotiations between buyers and sellers of these “paper gallons.”

See Bookout and Forward Transaction  

In Paragraph 440 beginning on Page 195 of FAS 133, the definition of a firm commitment reads the same as is does in Paragraph 540:

An agreement with an unrelated party, binding on both parties and usually legally enforceable, with the following characteristics:

a. The agreement specifies all significant terms, including the quantity to be exchanged, the fixed price, and the timing of the transaction. The fixed price may be expressed as a specified amount of an entity's functional currency or of a foreign
currency. It also may be expressed as a specified interest rate or specified effective yield.

b. The agreement includes a disincentive for nonperformance that is
sufficiently large to make performance probable.

That definition is based on the definition of a firm commitment in
Statements 52 and 80
.

Paragraph 324 on Page 157 also declares that firm commitments must be fixed-price contracts. Also see Paragraphs 370, 416, and 432 of FAS 133.  Contracts not having fixed prices are generally not allowed to host fair value hedges.   An illustration of a fair value hedge of a firm commitment begins in Paragraph 121 on Page 67 of FAS 133.  Disincentives for nonperformance can be direct penalties, but they may not be indirect opportunity gains or losses according to Paragraph 540 beginning on Page 243 of FAS 133.

Some firm commitments are not booked at the time of the contract.  For example, purchase contracts for raw materials are not booked until title changes hands or prepayment takes place.  Unrecognized firm commitments, unlike recognized firm commitment, are not booked as assets or liabilities.  Footnote 2 on Page 2 of SFAS reads as follows:

An unrecognized firm commitment can be viewed as an executory contract that represents both a right and an obligation. When a previously unrecognized firm commitment that is designated as a hedged item is accounted for in accordance with this Statement, an asset or a liability is recognized and reported in the statement of financial position related to the recognition of the gain or loss on the firm commitment. Consequently, subsequent references to an asset or a liability in this Statement include a firm commitment

Footnote 8 on Page 13 of FAS 133 notes how commitments sometimes do and sometimes do not qualify for accounting as firm commitments for hedges:

A firm commitment that represents an asset or liability that a specific accounting standard prohibits recognizing (such as a noncancellable operating lease or an unrecognized mortgage servicing right) may nevertheless be designated as the hedged item in a fair value hedge. A mortgage banker's unrecognized "interest rate lock commitment" (IRLC) does not qualify as a firm commitment (because as an option it does not obligate both parties) and thus is not eligible for fair value hedge accounting as the hedged item.  (However, a mortgage banker's "forward sale commitments," which are derivatives that lock in the prices at which the mortgage loans will be sold to investors, may qualify as hedging instruments in cash flow hedges of the forecasted sales of mortgage loans.)

Sometimes even a firm commitment is not eligible for hedge accounting.  For example, a a firm commitment to acquire equity investment in a consolidated subsidiary is not eligible under Paragraph 456 on Page 201 of FAS 133.  Under international rules, a hedged item can be a recognized asset or liability, an unrecognized firm commitment, or a forecasted transaction (IAS 39 Paragraph 127).  Also see FAS 133 Paragraph 21a.

A firm commitment must meet the stringent criteria for being defined as a derivative financial instrument under FAS 133.  This includes the tests for being clearly-and-closely related.  It also includes strict tests of Paragraphs 21 beginning on Page 13 , 29 beginning on Page 20, and Paragraph 56 on Page 33 of FAS 133 with respect to the host contracts that are being hedged.  Those tests state that if the firm "commitment" is in reality a group or portfolio of individual transactions, all transactions in the group must bear the same risk exposure within a 10% range discussed in Paragraph 21.   Also see Footnote 9 on Page 13 of FAS 133.  The grouping tests are elaborated upon in the following Paragraphs:

  • Paragraph 21 on Page 13,

  • Paragraph 29 beginning on Page 20,

  • Paragraph 241 on Page 130,

  • Paragraph317 on Page 155,

  • Paragraphs 333-334 beginning on Page 159,

  • Paragraph 432 on Page 192,

  • Paragraph 435 on Page 193,

  • Paragraph 443-450 beginning on Page 196

  • Paragraph 462 on Page 202,

  • Paragraph 477 on Page 208.

For example, a group of variable rate notes indexed in the same way upon LIBOR might qualify, whereas having different indices such as LIBOR and U.S. Prime rate underlyings will not qualify.    Also, anticipated purchases cannot be combined with anticipated sales in the same grouping designated as a forecasted transaction even if they have the same underlying.   Paragraph 477 on Page 208 of FAS 133 makes an exception for a portfolio of differing risk exposures for financial instruments designated in foreign currencies so not to conflict with Paragraph 20 of SFAS 52.  It allows hedging under "net investment" criteria under Paragraph 20 of SFAS 52.  For more detail see foreign currency hedge.

Paul Pacter states the following at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm 

IAS 39
Fair value hedge definition
: a hedge of the exposure to changes in the fair value of a recognised asset or liability (such as a hedge of exposure to changes in the fair value of fixed rate debt as a result of changes in interest rates).

However, a hedge of an unrecognised firm commitment to buy or sell an asset at a fixed price in the enterprise’s reporting currency is accounted for as a cash flow hedge

FAS 133
Same...

...except that a hedge of an unrecognised firm commitment to buy or sell an asset at a fixed price in the enterprise’s reporting currency is accounted for as a fair value hedge or a cash flow hedge.

Also see forecasted transaction and hedge accounting.

 

Fixed-to-Floating = see floater.

Floater =

a variable coupon (nominal) rate that determines the interim cash flows on bond debt and bond investments.   Example 12 in FAS 133 Paragraph 178 illustrates an inverse floater where the coupon rate varies with changes in an interest rate index such as the prime rate or LIBOR.  Example 13 in Paragraph 179 illustrates a levered inverse floater that varies indirectly rather than directly with an index.  Example 14 in Paragraph 180 illustrates a delivered floater that has a lagged relation to an index.   Example 15 in Paragraph 15 illustrates a range floater with a cash payment based upon the number of days that the referent index stays with a a pre-established collar (range).  Example 16 illustrates a ratchet floater that has an adjustable cap and floor that move in relation to a referent index such as LIBOR.  Example 17 in Paragraph 183 illustrates a fixed-to-floating floater varies between fixed rate periods versus floating rate periods. 

Much of the concern in FAS 133 accounting focuses on whether a floater-based embedded option can be separated from its host.  For example suppose a bond receivable has a variable interest rate with an embedded range floater derivative that specifies a collar of 4% to 8% based upon LIBOR.  The bond holder receives no interest payments in any period where the average LIBOR is outside the collar.  In this case, the range floater embedded option cannot be isolated and accounted for apart from the host bond contract.  The reason is that the option is clearly and closely related to the interest payments under the host contract (i.e., it can adjust the interest rate).  See Paragraph 12 beginning on Page 7 of FAS 133.   An example of a range floater is provided beginning in Paragraph 181 on Page 95 of FAS 133.

A ratchet floater pays a floating interest rate with an adjustable cap and an adjustable floor.  The embedded derivatives must be accounted for separately under Paragraph 12.  An example is provided in Paragraph 182 beginning on Page 95 of FAS 133.

Some debt has a combination of fixed and floating components.  For example, a "fixed-to-floating" rate bond is one that starts out at a fixed rate and at some point (pre-determined or contingent) changes to a variable rate.   This type of bond has a embedded derivative (i.e., a forward component for the variable rate component that adjusts the interest rate in later periods.   Since the forward component is  "clearly-and-closely related"adjustment of interest of the host contract, it cannot be accounted for separately according to Paragraph 12a on Page 7 of FAS 133 (unless conditions in Paragraph 13 apply).  See also Paragraph 21a(2) on Page 14 of FAS 133.  An example of a fixed-to-floating rate debt is provided beginning in Paragraph 183 on Page 196 of FAS 133.

Floor = see cap.

Forecasted Transaction =

a transaction that is expected, with high probability, to occur but as to which there has been no firm commitment. Particularly important is the absence penalties for breach of contract.  Paragraph 540 on Page 245 of FAS 133 defines it as follows:

A transaction that is expected to occur for which there is no firm commitment. Because no transaction or event has yet occurred and the transaction or event when it occurs will be at the prevailing market price, a forecasted transaction does not give an entity any present rights to future benefits or a present obligation for future sacrifices

To my students I like to relate firm commitments and forecasted transactions to purchase commitments or sales contracts that call for future delivery.  If the contract specifies an exact quantity at a fixed (firm) price, the commitment is deemed a "firm commitment."   Cash flow is never in doubt with a firm (fixed-price) commitments and, therefore, a firm commitment cannot be hedged by a cash flow hedge.  For example, suppose Company A enters into a purchase contract to purchase 10,000 tons of a commodity for $600 per ton in three months time.  This a firm commitment without any doubt about the cash flows.  However, if the price is contracted at "spot price" in three months, the commitment is no longer a "firm" commitment.  The clause "spot price" makes this a forecasted transaction for 10,000 at a future price that can can move up or down from its current level.  It is possible to enter into a cash flow hedge with a derivative instrument that will lock in price of a forecasted transaction.  In the case of a firm commitment there is no need for a cash flow hedge.

In the case of a firm commitment the cash flow is fixed but the value can vary with spot prices.  For example, in three months time the firm commitment cash flow may be ($600)($10,000) = $6,000,000.  If the spot price moves to $500, the cash flow is more than the value of the commodity at the time of purchase.  It is possible, however, to use a derivative financial instrument to hedge the value at a given level (called a fair value hedge) such that if the spot rate falls to $500, the hedge will pay ($600-$500)(10,000 tons) =  $1,000,000.

In the case of a forecasted transaction at spot rates, the value stays fixed at ($ spot rate)(10,000 tons).  However, the cash flow accordingly varies.  It is possible to enter into a cash flow hedge using a derivative financial instrument, however, such that the cash flow is fixed a desired level.  In summary either cash flows are fixed and values vary (i.e., a fixed commitment) or cash flows vary and values are fixed (forecasted transaction).  If hedging takes place, firm commitments are only hedged with respect to value, whereas forecasted transactions are only hedged as to cash flow. 

 

Because no transaction or event has yet occurred and the transaction or event when it occurs will be at the prevailing market price, a forecasted transaction does not give an entity any present rights to future benefits or obligations for future sacrifices.  Firm commitments differ from forecasted transactions in terms of legal rights and obligations.  A forecasted transaction has no contractual rights and obligations. Forecasted transactions are referred to at various points in FAS 133. For example, see FAS 133 Paragraphs 29-35, 93, 358, 463-465, 472-473, and 482-487. A forecasted transaction, unlike a firm commitment, may need a cash flow hedge.  

Paragraph 29b on Page 20 of FAS 133 requires that the forecasted transaction be probable.  Important in this criterion would be past sales and purchases transactions.  An on-going baking company, for example, must purchase flour.  It does not have to purchase materials for a plant renovation, however, until management decisions to renovate are firmed up.

Paragraph 325 on Page 157 of FAS 133 states that even though forecasted transactions may be highly probable, they lack the rights and obligations of a firm commitment, including unrecognized firm commitments that are not booked as assets and liabilities. 

Forecasted transactions differ from firm commitments in terms of enforcement rights and obligations. They do not differ in terms of the need for a specific notional and a specific underlying under Paragraph 440a on Page 195 of FAS 133.  Section a of that paragraph reads as follows:

a. The agreement specifies all significant terms, including the quantity to be exchanged, the fixed price, and the timing of the transaction. The fixed price may be expressed as a specified amount of an entity's functional currency or of a foreign
currency. It also may be expressed as a specified interest rate or specified effective yield.

In Paragraph 29c on Page 20 of FAS 133, the forecasted transaction cannot be with a related party such as a subsidiary or parent company if it is to qualify as the hedged transaction of a cash flow hedging derivative.  An exception is made in Paragraph 40 on Page 25 for forecasted intercompany foreign currency-denominated transactions if the conditions on Page 26 are satisfied. Also see Paragraphs 471 and 487.  Paragraph 40 beginning on Page 25 allows such cash flow hedging if the parent becomes a party to the hedged item itself, which can be a contract between the parent and its subsidiary under Paragraph 36b on Page 24 of FAS 133.  However, a consolidated group may not apply cash flow hedge accounting as stated in Paragraph 40d on Page 26. 

Cash flow hedges must have the possibility of affecting net earnings.  For example, Paragraph 485 on Page 211 of FAS 133 bans foreign currency risk hedges of forecasted dividends of foreign subsidiary.  The reason is that these dividends are a wash item and do not affect consolidated earnings.  For reasons and references, see equity method.

Suppose a company expects dividend income to continue at a fixed rate over the two years in a foreign currency.  Suppose the investment is adjusted to fair market value on each reporting date.  Forecasted dividends may not be firm commitments since there are not sufficient disincentives for failure to declare a dividend.  A cash flow hedge of the foreign currency risk exposure can be entered into under Paragraph 4b on Page 2 of FAS 133.  Whether or not gains and losses are posted to other comprehensive income, however, depends upon whether the securities are classified under SFAS 115 as available-for-sale or as trading securities.   There is no held-to-maturity alternative for equity securities.

One question that arises is whether a hedged item and its hedge may have different maturity dates.  Paragraph 18 beginning on Page 9 of FAS 133 rules out hedges such as interest rate swaps from having a longer maturity than the hedged item such as a variable rate loan or receivable.  On the other hand, having a shorter maturity is feasible according to KPMG's Example 13 beginning on Page 225 of the Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998) states the following.  A portion of that example reads as follows:

Although the criteria specified in paragraph 28(a) of the Standard do not address whether a portion of a single transaction may be identified as a hedged item, we believer that the proportion principles discussed in fair value hedging model also apply to forecasted transactions.

Paragraph 29d precludes forecasted transactions from being the hedged items in cash flow hedges if those items, when the transaction is completed, will be remeasured on each reporting date at fair value with holding gains and losses taken directly into current earnings (as opposed to comprehensive income).  Also see Paragraph 36 on Page 23 of FAS 133.  Thus, a forecasted purchase of raw material inventory maintained at cost can be a hedged item, but the forecasted purchase of a trading security not subject to APB 15 equity method accounting and as defined in SFAS 115, cannot be a hedged item. That is because SFAS 115 requires that trading securities be revalued with unrealized holding gains and losses being booked to current earnings.  Conversely, the forecasted purchase of an available-for-sale security can be a hedged item, because available-for-sale securities revalued under SFAS 115 have holding gains and losses accounted for in comprehensive income rather than current earnings.

Even more confusing is Paragraph 29e that requires the cash flow hedge to be on prices rather than credit worthiness.  For example, a forecasted sale of a specific asset at a specific price can be hedged for spot price changes under Paragraph 29e.  The forecasted sale's cash flows may not be hedged for the credit worthiness of the intended buyer or buyers.  Example 24 in Paragraph 190 on Page 99 of FAS 133 discusses a credit-sensitive bond.  Because the bond's coupon payments were indexed to credit rating rather than interest rates, the embedded derivative could not be isolated and accounted for as a cash flow hedge.

A forecasted transaction must meet the stringent criteria for being defined as a derivative financial instrument under FAS 133.  This includes the tests for being clearly-and-closely related.  It also includes strict tests of Paragraphs 21 beginning on Page 13 , 29 beginning on Page 20, and Paragraph 56 on Page 33 of FAS 133 with respect to the host contracts that are being hedged.  Those tests state that if the forecasted "transaction" is in reality a group or portfolio of individual transactions, all transactions in the group must bear the same risk exposure within a 10% range discussed in Paragraph 21.    Also see Footnote 9 on Page 13 of FAS 133.  The grouping tests are elaborated upon in the following Paragraphs:

  • Paragraph 21 on Page 13,

  • Paragraph 29 beginning on Page 20,

  • Paragraph 241 on Page 130,

  • Paragraph317 on Page 155,

  • Paragraphs 333-334 beginning on Page 159,

  • Paragraph 432 on Page 192,

  • Paragraph 435 on Page 193,

  • Paragraph 443-450 beginning on Page 196

  • Paragraph 462 on Page 202,

  • Paragraph 477 on Page 208.

For example, a group of variable rate notes indexed in the same way upon LIBOR might qualify, whereas having different indices such as LIBOR and U.S. Prime rate underlyings will not qualify.    Also, anticipated purchases cannot be combined with anticipated sales in the same grouping designated as a forecasted transaction even if they have the same underlying.   Paragraph 477 on Page 208 of FAS 133 makes an exception for a portfolio of differing risk exposures for financial instruments designated in foreign currencies so not to conflict with Paragraph 20 of SFAS 52.  It allows hedging under "net investment" criteria under Paragraph 20 of SFAS 52.  For more detail see foreign currency hedge.

Merely meeting the tests of being a forecasted transaction or a firm commitment does not automatically qualify the item to be designated a hedge item in a hedging transaction.  For example, it cannot be a forecasted transaction cannot be hedged for cash flows if it is remeasured at fair value on reporting dates.  For example, trading securities under SFAS 115 are remeasured at fair value with unrealized gains and losses going directly into earnings. 

Paragraph 40 beginning on Page 25 bans a forecasted transaction of a subsidiary company from being a hedged item if the parent company wants to hedge the cash flow on the subsidiary's behalf.  However Paragraph 40a allows such cash flow hedging if the parent becomes a party to the hedged item itself, which can be a contract between the parent and its subsidiary under Paragraph 36b on Page 24 of FAS 133.  Also see Paragraphs 471 and 487.

Paragraph 21c on Page 14 and Paragraph 29f on Page 20 of FAS 133 prohibits forecasted cash flows from minority interests in a consolidated subsidiary from being designated as a hedged item in a cash flow hedge.   Reasons are given in Paragraph 472 beginning on Page 206 of FAS 133.  See minority interest.

Also see firm commitment

Foreign Currency Financial Statements =

financial statements that employ foreign currency as the unit of measure.

Foreign Currency Futures Options = see foreign currency hedge.

Foreign Currency Hedge =

a hedge that manages risks of variations in exchange rates for foreign currencies. For example, companies that have firm commitments to purchase or sell items priced in foreign currencies can hedge against exchange rate losses between the time of the commitment and the time of the transaction. Major sections of FAS 133 dealing with such hedges include Paragraphs 36-42, 121-126, 162-175, 194-197, and 474-487.  See currency swap, hedge, and hedge accountingThe IASC retained the definition in IAS 21 Paragraph 137c.  Held-to-maturity investments carried at amortized cost may be effective hedging instruments with respect to risks from changes in foreign currency exchange rates (IAS 39 Paragraph 125).  A financial asset or liability whose fair value cannot be reliably measured cannot be a hedging instrument except in the case of a nonderivative instrument (a) that is denominated in a foreign currency, (b) that is designated as a hedge of foreign currency risk, and (c) whose foreign currency component is reliably measurable (IAS 39 Paragraph 126).  A nonderivative financial asset or liability may be designated as a hedging instrument, for hedge accounting purposes, only for a hedge of a foreign currency risk according to IAS 39 Paragraph 122.

Under IAS 39, foreign currency hedge accounting is similar to accoutning for  cash flow hedges.

(a) the portion of the gain or loss on the hedging instrument that is determined to be an effective hedge (see IAS Paragraph 142) should be recognized directly in equity through the statement of changes in equity (see IAS 1, Paragraphs 86-88); and

(b) the ineffective portion should be reported:  (1) immediately in earnings if the hedging instrument is a derivative; or (2) in accordance with Paragraph 19 of IAS 21, in the limited circumstances in which the hedging instrument is not a derivative

The gain or loss on the hedging instrument relating to the effective portion of the hedge should be classified in the same manner as the foreign currency translation gain or loss
(IAS Paragraph 164)

Flow Chart for FX Hedge  Accounting --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133flow.htm 

A common type of economic hedge in practice cannot receive hedge accounting treatment under FAS 133 is called a cross-currency swap.  This is a variant on the standard currency or interest rate swap in which the interest rate in one currency is fixed, and the interest rate in the other is floating. The only difference between a traditional interest rate swap and a currency coupon swap is the combination of the currency and interest rate features. But the DIG has taken a hard position on cross-currency swaps that upsets corporations.  See http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/derivatives/issueh4.html.  Also listen to the audio file CERINO40.mp3 at http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/derivatives/issueh4.html. Also see circus.

FAS 133 Paragraph 40 reads as follows:

A nonderivative financial instrument shall not be designated as a hedging instrument in a foreign currency cash flow hedge. A derivative instrument designated as hedging the foreign currency exposure to variability in the functional-currency-equivalent cash flows associated with either a forecasted foreign-currency-denominated transaction (for example, a forecasted export sale to an unaffiliated entity with the price to be denominated in a foreign currency) or a forecasted intercompany foreign-currency-denominated transaction (for example, a forecasted sale to a foreign subsidiary or a forecasted royalty from a foreign subsidiary) qualifies for hedge accounting if all of the following criteria are met:

a. The operating unit that has the foreign currency exposure is a party to the hedging instrument (which can be an instrument between a parent company and its subsidiary -- refer to FAS 133 Paragraph 36).

b. The hedged transaction is denominated in a currency other than that unit's functional currency.

c. All of the criteria in FAS 133 Paragraphs 28 and 29 are met, except for the criterion in FAS 133 Paragraph 29c that requires that the forecasted transaction be with a party external to the reporting entity.

d. If the hedged transaction is a group of individual forecasted foreign currency denominated transactions, a forecasted inflow of a foreign currency and a forecasted outflow of the foreign currency cannot both be included in the same group.

In FAS 133, derivative financial instruments come in three basic types that are listed in Paragraph 4 on Page 2 of FAS 133.  One of the types is described in Section c below:

Paragraph 4 on Page 2 of FAS 133.
This Statement standardizes the accounting for derivative instruments, including certain derivative instruments embedded in other contracts, by requiring that an entity recognize those items as assets or liabilities in the statement of financial position and measure them at fair value. If certain conditions are met, an entity may elect to designate a derivative instrument as follows:

c.
A hedge of the foreign currency exposure of

(1) an unrecognized firm commitment (a foreign currency fair value hedge), (

(2) an available-for-sale security (a foreign currency fair value hedge),

(3) a forecasted transaction (a foreign currency cash flow hedge), or

(4) a net investment in a foreign operation.

With respect to Section c(1) above, firm commitments can have foreign currency risk exposures if the commitments are not already recognized.  See Paragraph 4 on Page 2 of FAS 133. If the firm commitment is recognized, it is by definition booked and its loss or gain is already accounted for. For example, a purchase contract for 10,000 units per month at 100DM Deutsche Marks per unit is unrecognized and has a foreign currency risk exposure if the payments have not been made. If the payments have been prepaid, that prepayment is "recognized" and has no further foreign currency risk exposure.  Similar reasoning applies to trading securities that are excluded in c(2) above since their gains and losses are already booked.  These gains have been deferred in comprehensive income for available-for-sale securities.

An example of a foreign currency hedge is a contract for foreign currency options on the Philadelphia Exchange.  On Page C23 of the Wall Street Journal on July 22, 1998, blocks of 62,500 Swiss franc European-style August call options required a payment of 3.58 or $0.0358 per franc plus a strike price of 63 or $0.6300 bringing the total price up to $0.6658 per franc.  Hence, spot price on July 22 was 66.23 or $0.6623 per franc.  Hence, the price need only rise by more than $0.0035 per franc to be in-the-money.  On the Philadelphia Exchange, options on Swiss francs can only be transacted in blocks of 62,500 francs.

It is also possible to buy options on foreign currency futures options.  A futures call option gives the owner the right (but not an obligation) to buy the underlying futures contract at the option contract's strike price.  The Chicago Board of Trade deals in foreign currency futures options.

If the hedged item is a specific portion of an asset/liability (or of a portfolio of similar assets/liabilities), the hedged item is one of the following:

(1) A percentage of the entire asset/liability

(2) One or more selected contractual cash flows

(3) A put option, a call option, an interest rate cap, or an interest rate floor embedded in an existing asset/liability that is not an embedded derivative accounted for separately pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Statement

(4) The residual value in a lessor's net investment in a direct financing or sales-type lease
If the entire asset/liability is an instrument with variable cash flows, the hedged item cannot be deemed to be an implicit fixed-to-variable swap perceived to be embedded in a host contract with fixed cash flows.  (FAS 133 Paragraph 21a(2))

The hedged item is not:

(1) an asset or liability that is remeasured with the changes in fair value attributable to the hedged risk reported currently in earnings (for example, if foreign exchange risk is hedged, a foreign-currency-denominated asset for which a foreign currency transaction gain or loss is recognized in earnings), (FAS 133 Paragraph 21c(1)).  Likewise, paragraph 29d prohibits the following transaction from being designated as the hedged forecasted transaction in a cash flow hedge: the acquisition of an asset or incurrence of a liability that will subsequently be remeasured with changes in fair value attributable to the hedged risk reported currently in earnings.  If the forecasted transaction relates to a recognized asset or liability, the asset or liability is not remeasured with changes in fair value attributable to the hedged risk reported currently in earnings.)

(2) an investment accounted for by the equity method in accordance with the requirements of APB Opinion No. 18.

(3) a minority interest in one or more consolidated subsidiaries.

(4) an equity instrument in a consolidated subsidiary.

(5) a firm commitment either to enter into a business combination or to acquire or dispose of a subsidiary, a minority interest or an equity method investee.

(6) an equity instrument issued by the entity and classified in stockholders' equity in the statement of financial position (FAS 133 Paragraph 21c).

The following cannot be designated as a hedged item in a foreign currency hedge:

(a) a recognized asset or liability that may give rise to a foreign currency transaction gain or loss under Statement 52 (such as a foreign-currency-denominated receivable or payable) either in a  fair value hedge or a cash flow hedge.

(b) the forecasted acquisition of an asset or the incurrence of a liability that may give rise to a foreign currency transaction gain or loss under Statement 52 in a cash flow hedge
(FAS 133 Paragraph 36).  An available-for-sale equity security can be hedged for changes in the fair value attributable to changes in foreign currency exchange rates if:

(a) the security is not traded on an exchange on which trades are denominated in the investor's functional currency.
(b) dividends or other cash flows to holders of the security are all denominated in the same foreign currency as the currency expected to be received upon sale of the security (FAS 133 Paragraph 38).

Under Paragraph 42 on Page 26, a financial instrument that may give rise to foreign currency transaction gains or losses under SFAS 52 can be designated as a hedge against a net investment in a foreign operation (e.g., a subsidiary, branch, or joint venture).  However, such hedges are subject to Paragraph 20 of SFAS 52 criteria rather than FAS 133 criteria.  SFAS 52 dictates that that the gain or loss on the hedging instrument recorded in the SFAS 52-defined currency translation adjustment (CTA) cannot be greater than the offsetting CTA that arose by translating the foreign entity's financial statements into the investor's reporting currency.  It allows hedging under "net investment" criteria under Paragraph 20 of SFAS 52.  For more detail see cash flow hedge.

FAS 133 does not provide guidance as to which currencies qualify for an effective hedge.  Tandem or cross-currency hedging is permitted for a fair value hedge.  For example, if the Canadian and Australian dollars can be shown to be highly correlated, a forward contract on one currency can be used as a fair value hedge against a forecasted transaction in the other currency.

With respect to Paragraph 29a on Page 20 of FAS 133, KPMG notes that if the hedged item is a portfolio of assets or liabilities based on an index, the hedging instrument cannot use another index even though the two indices are highly correlated.  See Example 7 on Page 222 of the Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998.

Cash flow hedges must have the possibility of affecting net earnings.  For example, Paragraph 485 on Page 211 of FAS 133 bans foreign currency risk hedges of forecasted dividends of foreign subsidiary.  The reason is that these dividends are a wash item and do not affect consolidated earnings.  For some complicating factors, however, see equity method.

Paragraph 399 on Page 180 of FAS 133 does not allow covered call strategies that permit an entity to write an option on an asset that it owns.   In a covered call the combined position of the hedged item and the derivative option is asymmetrical in that exposure to losses is always greater than potential gains.  The option premium, however, is set so that the option writer certainly does not expect those "remotely possible" losses to occur.  Only when the potential gains are at least equal to potential cash flow losses will Paragraph 28c on Page 19 of FAS 133 kick in to allow a cash flow hedge under FAS 133.  Also see Paragraph 20c on Page 12.  See written option.

Foreign currency hedges can be on the basis of after-tax risk.  See tax hedging.

In summary, a derivative instrument or a nonderivative financial instrument that may give rise to a foreign currency transaction gain or loss under SFAS 52 can be designated as hedging the foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation (FAS 133 Paragraph 42).  A derivative instrument or a nonderivative financial instrument that may give rise to a foreign currency transaction gain or loss under SFAS 52 can be designated as hedging changes in the fair value of an unrecognized firm commitment, or a specific portion thereof, attributable to foreign currency exchange rates (FAS 133 Paragraph 37).  However, such an instrument cannot be classified as available-for-sale.  A derivative instrument can be designated as hedging the changes in the fair value of an available-for-sale debt security attributable to changes in foreign currency exchange rates.  (See FAS 133 Paragraph 38).  Unlike originated loans and receivables, a held-to-maturity investment cannot be a hedged item with respect to interest-rate risk because designation of an investment as held-to-maturity involves not accounting for associated changes in interest rates.  However, a held-to-maturity investment can be a hedged item with respect to risks from changes in foreign currency exchange rates and credit risk (IAS 39 Paragraph 127).

Paul Pacter states the following at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm 

IAS 39
Use of noncash hedging instruments is restricted to exposure to hedges of any risk of gain or loss from changes in foreign currency exchange rates arising in fair value hedges, cash flow hedges, or hedges of a net investment in a foreign operation.

FAS 133
Use of noncash hedging instruments is restricted to exposure to hedges of risk of gain or loss from changes in foreign currency exchange rates arising in firm commitments or hedges of a net investment in a foreign operation.

 

Hi Kevin,

How is your talented wife doing these days? Is she still doing any distance education.

I provide an illustration related to your question at in the fx01s.xls Excel workbook at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/mfrFX/FX/ 

If the hedged item has no cash flow risk, it has fair value risk. For example, a fixed rate bond payable has no cash flow risk, but the market price fluctuates inversely with interest rates. Suppose a firm wants to take advantage of possible lowering of interest rates possibly buying back its bonds payable in the future. If the interest rates plunge, it becomes very expensive to buy back those bonds. The firm can initially, hedge against a rising buy-back price by hedging the fair value of the bonds payable. In doing so, however it creates cash flow risk of the combined hedged item and the hedging derivative (such as an interest rate swap).

Conversely, if the bonds are floating rate bonds, there is no market value risk, but there is cash flow risk. The firm can hedge cash flow risk, but that will create value risk. You must have one or the other types of risk.

The FASB took all sorts of flak when FAS 133 did not allow a single hedging derivative to hedge both interest rate risk and FX risk in the same derivative.  You can listen to one pro complain about the issue prior to FAS 133 at 

Audio of J.C. Mercier, BankBoston MERC30.mp3  

Other audio clips are available at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/000overview/mp3/133summ.htm 

I've not worked the BigWheels case, but you can read the following in "Implementation of SFAS 138, Amendments to SFAS 133," by Angela L. J. Hwang, Robert E. Jensen, and John S. Patouhas, The CPA Journal, November 2001, pp. 54-56 ---  http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2001/1100/dept/d115401.htm 

One important provision of SFAS 138 is that it allows joint hedging of interest rate risk and foreign exchange (FX) risk in one compound hedge. SFAS 138 widens the net of qualified FX hedges to include the following:

Foreign currency-denominated (FCD) assets or liabilities can be hedged in fair value or cash flow hedges. However, cash flow hedges of recognized FCD assets or liabilities are permitted only when all the variability in the hedged items’ functional currency equivalent cash flows is reduced to zero. Unrecognized FCD firm commitments can be hedged in fair value or cash flow hedges. Prior to SFAS 138, hedge accounting for foreign currency risk exposures was limited to fair value hedges of unrecognized FCD firm commitments, cash flow hedges of forecasted FCD transactions, and net investments in FCD foreign operations.

Example. FCD items (e.g., a fixed-rate bond in deutsche marks) are subject to two underlying risks: fair value risk in terms of changes in German interest rates, and changes in the FX rates (between the deutsche mark and the U.S. dollar). Before SFAS 138, the debtor would first hedge the interest rate risk by locking in the combined value of the bond and swap at a fixed amount in marks with a swap in which variable interest was received and fixed interest was paid. Then another derivative contract, such as a forward contract to hedge against the possible fall of the mark against the dollar, would hedge the combined FCD value for FX risk. Under SFAS 133, the FCD debt was remeasured (via the income statement) based on the prevailing spot rate of exchange and the derivative was marked to market (also via the income statement). However, these two adjustments rarely match, creating unintended earnings volatility.

Under the SFAS 138 amendments, it is now possible to acquire a single compound derivative to hedge the joint fair value risk of interest rate and FX movements. One such derivative is a cross-currency interest swap, which would receive a fixed interest rate in foreign currency and pay a variable interest rate in domestic currency. SFAS 138 permits these recognized FCD assets and liabilities to be designated as the hedged items in fair value or cash flow hedges.

I provide an illustration related to your question at in the fx01s.xls Excel workbook at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/mfrFX/FX/ 

The FASB issued a cross-currency hedging illustrations that I never have been able to figure out.  It is incomprehensible if you want to derive all of the numbers in the FX hedging illustrations at http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/fasb/derivatives/examplespg.html 

Thus far the FASB has not provided any help in comprehending the above incomprehensible examples.

Hope this helps a little.

Bob Jensen

-----Original Message----- 
From: Kevin Lightner [mailto:Kevin.Lightner@sdsu.edu]  
Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2002 3:56 PM  
To: rjensen@trinity.edu  
Subject: Derivatives

Bob

I'm trying to learn something about derivatives, but am not having a great deal of success. I was wondering if you could help me with a few items. Which accounting entries represent the proper accounting for the combined foreign currency and interest rate swap in the "BigWheels Case"? Is this swap a "fair-value hedge? Would the entries and the type of hedge be different if the interest exchange required BigWheels to exchange fixed dollar payments (at a rate higher than 10%) for the receipt of fixed payments in francs (for the amount needed to service the 10% franc bond interest payable)? Any help you can give me would be greatly appreciated. Thanks.

Kevin

Kevin M. Lightner, Ph.D. 
Professor of Accounting School of Accountancy 
San Diego State University 
Office: SS2427 Phone: 594-3736 
Email:
Kevin.Lightner@sdsu.edu 

 

Also see DIG Issue B4 under embedded derivatives.

 

DIG issues at http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
Section H: Foreign Currency Hedges

*Issue H1—Hedging at the Operating Unit Level
(Cleared 02/17/99)
*Issue H2—Requirement That the Operating Unit Must Be a Party to the Hedge
(Cleared 02/17/99)
*Issue H3—Hedging the Entire Fair Value of a Foreign-Currency-Denominated Asset or Liability
(Cleared 07/28/99)
*Issue H4—Hedging Foreign-Currency-Denominated Interest Payments
(Cleared 07/28/99)
*Issue H5—Hedging a Firm Commitment or Fixed-Price Agreement Denominated in a Foreign Currency
(Cleared 07/28/99)
*Issue H6—Accounting for Premium or Discount on a Forward Contract Used as the Hedging Instrument in a Net Investment Hedge
(Cleared 11/23/99)
*Issue H7—Frequency of Designation of Hedged Net Investment
(Cleared 11/23/99)
Issue H8—Measuring the Amount of Ineffectiveness in a Net Investment Hedge
(Released 11/99)
Issue H9—Hedging a Net Investment with a Compound Derivative That Incorporates Exposure to Multiple Risks
(Released 11/99)
Issue H10—Hedging Net Investment with the Combination of a Derivative and a Cash Instrument
(Released 11/99)

A Message from K Badrinath on January 25, 2002

Dear Mr. Jensen:

To cut a potentially long introduction short, I am associated with the leading vendor of treasury software in India, Synergy Log-In Systems Ltd. Shall be glad to share more on that with you should you be interested.

The reason for writing this is, while negotiating the minefield called FAS 133, courtesy your wonderful Glossary on the net, I came across apparantly contradictory statements under two different heads about whether held-to-maturity securities can be hedged items:

HELD-TO-MATURITY 
Unlike originated loans and receivables, a held-to-maturity investment cannot be a hedged item with respect to interest-rate risk because designation of an investment as held-to-maturity involves not accounting for associated changes in interest rates. However, a held-to-maturity investment can be a hedged item with respect to risks from changes in foreign currency exchange rates and credit risk

AVAILABLE-FOR-SALE 
Held-to-maturity securities can also be FAS 133-allowed hedge items.

Help!!

K. Badrinath

Hello K. Badrinath,

I think your confusion comes from the fact that FAS 138 amended Paragraph 21(d) as noted below.

Original Paragraph 21(d) .
If the hedged item is all or a portion of a debt security (or a portfolio of similar debt securities) that is classified as held-to-maturity in accordance with FASB Statement No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, the designated risk being hedged is the risk of changes in its fair value attributable to changes in the obligor's creditworthiness or if the hedged item is an option component of a held-to- maturity security that permits its prepayment, the designated risk being hedged is the risk of changes in the entire fair value of that option component. (The designated hedged risk for a held-to-maturity security may not be the risk of changes in its fair value attributable to changes in market interest rates or foreign exchange rates. If the hedged item is other than an option component that permits its prepayment, the designated hedged risk also may not be the risk of changes in its overall fair value.)

FAS 138 Amendment of Paragraph 21(d)"
[Hedged Item] If the hedged item is all or a portion of a debt security (or a portfolio of similar debt securities) that is classified as held-to-maturity in accordance with FASB Statement No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, the designated risk being hedged is the risk of changes in its fair value attributable to credit risk,
foreign exchange risk, or both.

Related paragraph changes are noted in Appendix B of FAS 138.

Hedge accounting for held-to-maturity securities under FAS 133 is especially troublesome for me.  You can get hedge accounting treatment for for creditworthiness risk and certain prepayment option fair value changes, but you cannot get hedge accounting for interest rate risk.  The FASB reasoning is spelled out in Paragraphs 426-431.  

Keep in mind, however, that the derivative used to hedge a held-to-maturity security must be adjusted to fair value at least every 90 days with changes it its value going to current earnings.  

Hedges of securities classified as available-for-sale do not take the same beating under FAS 133.  Without a hedge, FAS 115 rules require changes in value of AFS investments to be booked, but the offset is to OCI rather than current earnings.  Paragraph 23 of FAS 133 reads as follows:

Paragraph 23
If a hedged item is otherwise measured at fair value with changes in fair value reported in other comprehensive income (such as an available-for-sale security), the adjustment of the hedged item's carrying amount discussed in paragraph 22 shall be recognized in earnings rather than in other comprehensive income in order to offset the gain or loss on the hedging instrument

Foreign currency risk is somewhat different under Paragraph 38 for AFS securities.

 

Some key paragraphs from FAS 133 are as follows:

Paragraph 54
At the date of initial application, an entity may transfer any held-to-maturity security into the available-for-sale category or the trading category. An entity will then be able in the future to designate a security transferred into the available-for-sale category as the hedged item, or its variable interest payments as the cash flow hedged transactions, in a hedge of the exposure to changes in market interest rates, changes in foreign currency exchange rates, or changes in its overall fair value. (paragraph 21(d) precludes a held-to- maturity security from being designated as the hedged item in a fair value hedge of market interest rate risk or the risk of changes in its overall fair value. paragraph 29(e) similarly precludes the variable cash flows of a held-to-maturity security from being designated as the hedged transaction in a cash flow hedge of market interest rate risk.) The unrealized holding gain or loss on a held-to-maturity security transferred to another category at the date of initial application shall be reported in net income or accumulated other comprehensive income consistent with the requirements of paragraphs 15(b) and 15(c) of Statement 115 and reported with the other transition adjustments discussed in paragraph 52 of this Statement. Such transfers from the held-to-maturity category at the date of initial adoption shall not call into question an entity's intent to hold other debt securities to maturity in the future. 

Paragraphs 426-431

Prohibition against Hedge Accounting for Hedges of Interest Rate Risk of Debt Securities Classified as Held-to-Maturity

426. This Statement prohibits hedge accounting for a fair value or cash flow hedge of the interest rate risk associated with a debt security classified as held-to-maturity pursuant to Statement 115. During the deliberations that preceded issuance of Statement 115, the Board considered whether such a debt security could be designated as being hedged for hedge accounting purposes. Although the Board's view at that time was that hedging debt securities classified as held-to-maturity is inconsistent with the basis for that classification, Statement 115 did not restrict hedge accounting of those securities because constituents argued that the appropriateness of such restrictions should be considered in the Board's project on hedging.

427. The Exposure Draft proposed prohibiting a held-to-maturity debt security from being designated as a hedged item, regardless of the risk being hedged. The Exposure Draft explained the Board's belief that designating a derivative as a hedge of the changes in fair value, or variations in cash flow, of a debt security that is classified as held-to-maturity contradicts the notion of that classification. Respondents to the Exposure Draft objected to the proposed exclusion, asserting the following: (a) hedging a held-to-maturity security does not conflict with an asserted intent to hold that security to maturity, (b) a held-to-maturity security contributes to interest rate risk if it is funded with shorter term liabilities, and (c) prohibiting hedge accounting for a hedge of a held-to-maturity security is inconsistent with permitting hedge accounting for other fixed-rate assets and liabilities that are being held to maturity.

428. The Board continues to believe that providing hedge accounting for a held-to- maturity security conflicts with the notion underlying the held-to-maturity classification in Statement 115 if the risk being hedged is the risk of changes in the fair value of the entire hedged item or is otherwise related to interest rate risk. The Board believes an entity's decision to classify a security as held-to-maturity implies that future decisions about continuing to hold that security will not be affected by changes in market interest rates. The decision to classify a security as held-to-maturity is consistent with the view that a change in fair value or cash flow stemming from a change in market interest rates is not relevant for that security. In addition, fair value hedge accounting effectively alters the traditional income recognition pattern for that debt security by accelerating gains and losses on the security during the term of the hedge into earnings, with subsequent amortization of the related premium or discount over the period until maturity. That accounting changes the measurement attribute of the security away from amortized historical cost. The Board also notes that the rollover of a shorter term liability that funds a held-to-maturity security may be eligible for hedge accounting. The Board therefore decided to prohibit both a fixed-rate held-to- maturity debt security from being designated as a hedged item in a fair value hedge and the variable interest receipts on a variable-rate held-to-maturity security from being designated as hedged forecasted transactions in a cash flow hedge if the risk being hedged includes changes in market interest rates.

429. The Board does not consider it inconsistent to prohibit hedge accounting for a hedge of market interest rate risk in a held-to-maturity debt security while permitting it for hedges of other items that an entity may be holding to maturity. Only held-to-maturity debt securities receive special accounting (that is, being measured at amortized cost when they otherwise would be required to be measured at fair value) as a result of an asserted intent to hold them to maturity.

430. The Board modified the Exposure Draft to permit hedge accounting for hedges of credit risk on held-to-maturity debt securities. It decided that hedging the credit risk of a held-to-maturity debt security is not inconsistent with Statement 115 because that Statement allows a sale or transfer of a held-to-maturity debt security in response to a significant deterioration in credit quality.

431. Some respondents to the Task Force Draft said that a hedge of the prepayment risk in a held-to-maturity debt security should be permitted because it does not contradict the entity's stated intention to hold the instrument to maturity. The Board agreed that in designating a security as held-to-maturity, an entity declares its intention not to voluntarily sell the security as a result of changes in market interest rates, and "selling" a security in response to the exercise of a call option is not a voluntary sale. Accordingly, the Board decided to permit designating the embedded written prepayment option in a held-to-maturity security as the hedged item. Although prepayment risk is a subcomponent of market interest rate risk, the Board notes that prepayments, especially of mortgages, occur for reasons other than changes in interest rates. The Board therefore does not consider it inconsistent to permit hedging of prepayment risk but not interest rate risk in a held-to-maturity security.

Paragraph 533(2)(e)
For securities classified as available-for-sale, all reporting enterprises shall disclose the aggregate fair value, the total gains for securities with net gains in accumulated other comprehensive income, and the total losses for securities with net losses in accumulated other comprehensive income, by major security type as of each date for which a statement of financial position is presented. For securities classified as held-to-maturity, all reporting enterprises shall disclose the aggregate fair value, gross unrecognized holding gains, gross unrecognized holding losses, the net carrying amount, and the gross gains and losses in accumulated other comprehensive income for any derivatives that hedged the forecasted acquisition of the held-to-maturity securities, by major security type as of each date for which a statement of financial position is presented
.

 

Finance Tutorial (of sorts):  A Primer on Foreign Exchange Derivatives

"Of Knock-ins, Knock-outs & KIKOs," by Ranju Sarkar, Business Standard, April 2, 2008 --- Click Here
http://www.business-standard.com/common/news_article.php?leftnm=0&subLeft=1&chklogin=N&autono=318661&tab=r

OPTIONS
 
Option is a contract which gives a buyer a right, but not an obligation, to buy an underlying/ currency/ stock/ commodities at a pre-determined rate, known as strike price, for settlement at a future day. The right to buy is called a call option. The right to sell is called a put option. There are different types of options.
 
Knock-out option: An option which ceases to exist if the knock-out event occurs. A knock out happens when a particular level is hit (like the Swiss franc touching the level of 1.10 against the dollar), when the option ceases to exist.
 
Knock-in option: An option which comes into existence if the knock-in event happens. It works exactly the reverse of a knock-out. In a knock-in, an option comes into existence if a certain level is hit.
 
KIKO (knock-in, knock-out): This is an option with both a knock-in and knock-out. The option kicks in, or comes alive, if the knock-in is seen. The option ceases to exist if anytime, pre or post, the knock-in event happening, the knock-out happens.
 
One-touch option: When a certain level (of any currency pair) is hit, a company buying an option gets a pre-determined pay-off (it could be $10,000, $20,000, or $30,000). This is how companies made money through derivative deals last year.
 
Double-touch option: There are two levels. If either of the two levels is hit, the company buying an option will get a pay off. All options require a buyer to pay a premium. Conversely, sellers of options would receive a premium.
 
STRUCTURES
 
Banks, foreign exchange consultants work out zero-cost option structures/ strategies for companies so that they don’t have to pay any premium. To make a zero-cost structure, a company has to buy some option and sell some option so that the premium is zero (the premium paid for buying an option is set-off against the premium received for selling the option).
 
For instance, when the rupee-dollar parity is 40.10, an exporter buys a put option at the rate of 39.50, and sells a call option for 41.00 for delivery of exports at the end of June, July and August an export commitment of $1 million each month. By entering into this contract, the best rate the exporter can get is 41, and the worst rate it can get is 39.50.
 
If the rupee goes below 39.50, the exporter will be able to encash its receivables at the rate of 39.50. If the rupee is trading between 39.50 and 41, the exporter will be able to encash its receivables at the prevailing market rate.
 
However, if the rupee is ruling above 41, it will get its receivables at Rs 41 as he’s locked in that level. This kind of structure is popular with software companies, who can realise their receivables in a range (between the best and worst), unlike in a forward contract where they get locked in at a particular rate.
 
Banks also offer, what they call, a 1:2 leveraged option, wherein a company buys some calls, makes some puts and use a combination of these to create zero-cost strategy for the company. Companies that have big positions in derivative trades have been selling KIKOs, or a series of KIKOs and buying one-touch options and double-touch options. These structures helped companies make money last year.

Continued in article

Bob Jensen's links to accounting, finance, and business glossaries --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbus.htm

Bob Jensen's links to FAS 133 and IAS 39 Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments Glossary --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm

Bob Jensen's FAS 133 and IAS 39 Tutorials on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

 

 

IAS 138 Implementation Guidance
Examples Illustrating Application of FASB Statement No. 138, Accounting for Certain Derivative Instruments and Certain Hedging Activities-an amendment of FASB Statement No. 133 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/examplespg.shtml
or try clicking here.

"Implementation of SFAS 138, Amendments to SFAS 133," The CPA Journal, November 2001. (With Angela L.J. Huang and John S. Putoubas), pp. 54-56 --- http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2001/1100/dept/d115401.htm

Hedging of Foreign Currency– Denominated Items

One important provision of SFAS 138 is that it allows joint hedging of interest rate risk and foreign exchange (FX) risk in one compound hedge. SFAS 138 widens the net of qualified FX hedges to include the following:

Foreign currency-denominated (FCD) assets or liabilities can be hedged in fair value or cash flow hedges. However, cash flow hedges of recognized FCD assets or liabilities are permitted only when all the variability in the hedged items’ functional currency equivalent cash flows is reduced to zero. Unrecognized FCD firm commitments can be hedged in fair value or cash flow hedges. Prior to SFAS 138, hedge accounting for foreign currency risk exposures was limited to fair value hedges of unrecognized FCD firm commitments, cash flow hedges of forecasted FCD transactions, and net investments in FCD foreign operations.

Example. FCD items (e.g., a fixed-rate bond in deutsche marks) are subject to two underlying risks: fair value risk in terms of changes in German interest rates, and changes in the FX rates (between the deutsche mark and the U.S. dollar). Before SFAS 138, the debtor would first hedge the interest rate risk by locking in the combined value of the bond and swap at a fixed amount in marks with a swap in which variable interest was received and fixed interest was paid. Then another derivative contract, such as a forward contract to hedge against the possible fall of the mark against the dollar, would hedge the combined FCD value for FX risk. Under SFAS 133, the FCD debt was remeasured (via the income statement) based on the prevailing spot rate of exchange and the derivative was marked to market (also via the income statement). However, these two adjustments rarely match, creating unintended earnings volatility.

Under the SFAS 138 amendments, it is now possible to acquire a single compound derivative to hedge the joint fair value risk of interest rate and FX movements. One such derivative is a cross-currency interest swap, which would receive a fixed interest rate in foreign currency and pay a variable interest rate in domestic currency. SFAS 138 permits these recognized FCD assets and liabilities to be designated as the hedged items in fair value or cash flow hedges.

Intercompany Exposures

Multinational corporations enter into many transactions with FX risk exposure. A centralized treasury center that assesses corporate-wide FX exposure and hedges the net exposure with a single derivative offers significant cost savings over subsidiaries acquiring their own third-party hedges.

Example. A German subsidiary forecasts sales of DM 5 million from a Japanese purchaser in the next three months, and a Japanese subsidiary expects to purchase DM 3 million worth of inventory from a German supplier in the same period. The net exposure would be a long position of DM 2 million and the parent company could hedge its risk by selling a forward contract or buying a put option for DM 2 million.

SFAS 133 discouraged hedge accounting by treasury centers because it required individual members of a consolidated group to enter individual offsetting derivative contracts with third parties, which nullifies the cost savings benefits. The SFAS 138 amendments allow certain intercompany derivatives that are offset by unrelated third-party contracts to be designated as the hedging instrument in cash flow hedges of foreign currency risk in the consolidated financial statements.

Amendments to DIG Guidance

SFAS 138 also amends related interpretations issued by the Derivatives Implementation Group (DIG).

Issue G3: Discontinuation of a cash flow hedge. SFAS 138 amends the accounting for discontinued cash flow hedges by requiring that the net derivative gain or loss from a discontinued cash flow hedge be reported in accumulated other comprehensive income, unless it is probable that the forecasted transaction will not occur by the end of the originally specified time period or within an additional two months.

Issue H1: Hedging at the operating unit level. SFAS 138 extends the functional currency concept of SFAS 52 to foreign currency fair value hedges and to hedges of the net investment in a foreign operation, in addition to foreign currency cash flow hedges. It also requires that the hedged transaction be denominated in a currency other than the hedging unit’s functional currency.

Issue H2: Requirement that the unit with the exposure must be a party to the hedge. The SFAS 138 amendments ensure that the functional currency concept of SFAS 52 is applied to determine whether hedge accounting is appropriate for consolidated financial statements. One of two conditions must be satisfied in order to use hedge accounting:

The operating unit with the FX exposure must be party to the hedging instrument; or Another member of the consolidated group is party to the hedge; this party has the same functional currency as the operating unit, and there are no intervening subsidiaries with a different functional currency. Example. A second-tier subsidiary (B) whose functional currency is the U.S. dollar has a French franc exposure. A parent company could designate a dollar-franc derivative as a hedge of a first-tier subsidiary’s (A) exposure, provided that A’s functional currency is also the dollar.

However, if A’s functional currency is the Japanese yen, the consolidated parent company could not designate its dollar-franc derivative as a hedge of B’s exposure. In this case, the financial statements of B are first translated into yen before the yen-denominated financial statements of A are translated into dollars for consolidation. As a result, there is no direct FX exposure, because A has a different functional currency than B’s functional currency. Furthermore, there is no direct exposure to the consolidated parent company.

Issue H5: Hedging a firm commitment or a fixed-price agreement denominated in a foreign currency. Unrecognized FCD firm commitments can be designated as either a fair value or a cash flow hedge. A similar DIG position for payments due under an available-for-sale debt security is explicitly permitted by SFAS 138.

What SFAS 138 Did Not Amend

Except for the confusing and highly limited amendments on intercompany derivative contracts, SFAS 138 did not change FASB’s stand against portfolio (macro) hedging. In order to qualify as a SFAS 133/138 hedge, the hedge must, except in unrealistic circumstances, relate to a specific hedged item in a portfolio rather than a subset of items. The only exception applies to subsets of items with identical terms that are nearly fungible. Matching individual hedges against individual hedged items not only magnifies the accounting costs, but also contradicts the way many firms view economic hedges. Some have complained that SFAS 133/138 forces changes in hedging strategies and risk management practices for accounting reasons that defy economic sense.

FASB did not replace SFAS 52, which causes additional complexity when applying it simultaneously with SFAS 133 and 138. SFAS 138 reduces the differences between spot and forward rate adjustments, but difficult issues remain in reconciling the two standards.

Although FASB requires fair value statements, it provides very little measurement guidance for customized derivatives that are either not traded at all or not traded in sufficiently wide markets. Appendix B of SFAS 133 contains some errors and omissions that were not addressed by SFAS 138 or other FASB announcements. In particular, there is no FASB guidance on how swap values were derived in Examples 2 or 5. Corrections and derivation discussions are discussed in the following two documents:

“The Receive Fixed/Pay Variable Interest-Rate Swap in SFAS 133, Example 2, Needs An Explanation: Here It Is,” by Carl M. Hubbard and Robert E. Jensen, Derivatives Report, November 1999, pp. 6–11 (http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/ caseans/294wp.doc; the Excel workbook is at www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/ 133ex02a.xls). “An Explanation of Example 5, Cash Flow Hedge of Variable-Rate Interest Bearing Asset in SFAS 133,” by Carl M. Hubbard and Robert E. Jensen, Derivatives Report, April 2000, pp. 8–13 (www.trinity.edu/ rjensen/caseans/133ex05.htm; the Excel workbook is at www.cs.trinity.edu/ ~rjensen/133ex05a.xls). Derivative instruments cannot be designated as held-to-maturity items that are not subject to fair value adjustment. For certain derivatives, this can cause income volatility that is entirely artificial and will ultimately, at maturity, cause all previously recognized fair value gains to wash out against fair value losses. Economic hedges of hedged items (e.g., bond investments) designated as held-to-maturity items cannot receive hedge accounting under SFAS 133 even though the hedges must be booked at fair value. The reason given in Paragraph 29e is that this hedge is a credit hedge. Fair value hedging of fixed-rate debt makes little sense since the item will be held to maturity. Cash flow hedging of variable interest payments will wash out unless the contract is defaulted. The reasons for not allowing such hedges to receive SFAS 133 treatment are clear. It is unclear, however, why the hedges have to be booked to market value if they will be held to maturity.

Foreign Currency Transactions =

transactions (for example, sales or purchases of goods or services or loans payable or receivable) whose terms are stated in a currency other than the entity's functional currency. Foreign currency risks are discussed extensively in FAS 133. See for example, Paragraphs 71.

Also see DIG Issue B4 under embedded derivatives.

 

Foreign Currency Translation =

the process of expressing amounts denominated or measured in one currency in terms of another currency by use of the exchange rate between the two currencies.

Foreign Operation =

an operation whose financial statements are (1) combined or consolidated with or accounted for on an equity basis in the financial statements of the reporting enterprise and (2) prepared in a currency other than the reporting currency of the reporting enterprise.

Forward Contract or Forward Exchange Contract =

an agreement to exchange at a specified future date currencies of different countries at a specified rate (forward rate). An example of a forward contract appears in Example 3 Paragraphs 121-126 beginning on Page 67 of FAS 133. See forward transaction.

Forward Exchange Rate Agreement (FXA) =

a forward contract on exchange rates.  A FXA is a forward contract to buy/sell a notional amount of foreign currency forward at a contracted price.   See forward transaction and forward rate agreement (FRA).

Forward Rate = =

the rate quoted today for delivery of a specific currency amount at a specific exchange rate on a specific future date.

Forward Rate Agreement (FRA) =

a forward contract on interest rates.   Loan principals are not exchanged and are used only as notionals to establish forward contract settlements.  These are customized contracts that allow borrowers to hedge future borrowing rates on anticipated loans in the future.  FRA contracts can also be purchased in foreign currencies, thereby affecting currency exchange and interest rate risk management strategies.  See forward transaction and forward exchange rate agreement (FXA).

Forward Transaction or Forward Contract =

an agreement to deliver cash, foreign currency, or some other item at a contracted date in the future. The key distinction between futures versus forward contracts is that forward contracts are customized and are not traded in organized markets. Unlike with futures contracts, it is very simple to specify exact terms such as the exact notional amount and rate to be applied. In the case of a futures contract, it may be difficult or impossible to find the needed combinations traded in markets. However, since forward contracts are not traded in markets, their value is often very difficult to estimate.

Since forward contracts are individually contracted, often through third party investment banks or brokers, the transactions costs of a forward contract can be high relative to futures contracts. Matters of settlement assurances must be contracted since they do not carry the settlement guarantees of futures contracts.

See FAS 133 Paragraphs 59a, 93, and 100. An example of a forward contract in FAS 133 appears in Example 3 Paragraphs 121-126 and Example 10 Paragraphs 165-172.

By way of illustration, currency trading on July 22, 1998 showed the following exchange selling rates among banks in amounts of $1 million or more:

Wall Street Journal, 07/22/98, Page C23

U.S. $ Equivalent

Currency per U.S. $

Britain (Pound) Spot

1.6435

.6085

     1-month  forward

1.6408

.6095

    3-months forward

1.6352

.6115

    6-months forward

1.6271

.6146

Canada (Dollar) Spot

.6702

1.4921

     1-month  forward

.6706

1.4911

    3-months forward

.6712

1.4898

    6-months forward

.6720

1.4882

For example, the spot rate is such that in $1 million trades or higher, each British pound exchanges into $1.6435 U.S. dollars.  However, a forward exchange contract reduces that amount to $1.6271 if settled in six months.  In practice, forward contracts are tailor-made for the length or time and amounts to be exchanged.  The above rates serve only as guidelines for negotiation.  See futures contract.

FAS 133 leaves out the issue of trade date versus settlement date accounting and, thereby,  excluded forward contracts for regular-way security trades from the scope of FAS 133 (See Appendix C Paragraph 274).

See DIG Issue A1 under derivative financial instrument.
See DIG Issues A2 and A3 under net settlement.


With respect to Firm Commitments vs. Forward Contracts, the key distinction is Part b of Paragraph 540 of the original FAS 133 (I have an antique copy of the original FAS 133 Standard.)

Those of us into FAS 133’s finer points have generally assumed a definitional distinction between a “firm commitment” purchase contract to buy a commodity at a contract price versus a forward contract to purchase the commodity at a contracted forward price. The distinction is important, because FAS 133 requires booking a forward contract and adjusting it to fair value at reporting dates if actual physical delivery is not highly likely such that the NPNS exception under Paragraph 10(b) of FAS 133 cannot be assumed to avoid booking.

The distinction actually commences with forecasted transactions that include purchase contracts for a fixed notional (such as 100,000 gallons of fuel) at an uncertain underlying (such as the spot price of fuel on the actual future date of purchase). Such purchase contracts are typically not booked. These forecasted transactions become “firm commitments” if the future purchase price is contracted in advance (such $2.23 per gallon for a future purchase three months later). Firm commitments are typically not booked under FAS 133 rules, but they may be hedged with fair value hedges using derivative financial instruments. Forecasted transactions (with no contracted price) can be hedged with cash flow hedges using derivative contracts.

There is an obscure rule (not FAS 133) that says an allowance for firm commitment loss must be booked for an unhedged firm commitment if highly significant (material) loss is highly probable due to a nose dive in the spot market. But this obscure rule will be ignored here.

One distinction between a firm commitment contract and a forward contract is that a forward contract’s net settlement, if indeed it is net settled, is based on the difference between spot price and forward price at the time of settlement. Net settlement takes the place of penalties for non-delivery of the actual commodity (most traders never want pork bellies dumped in their front lawns). Oil companies typically take deliveries some of the time, but like electric companies these oil companies generally contract for far more product than will ever be physically delivered. Usually this is due to difficulties in predicting peak demand.

A firm commitment is gross settled at the settlement date if no other net settlement clause is contained in the contract. If an oil company does not want a particular shipment of contracted oil, the firm commitment contract is simply passed on to somebody needing oil or somebody willing to offset (book out) a purchase contract with a sales contract. Pipelines apparently have a clearing house for such firm commitment transferals of “paper gallons” that never flow through a pipeline. Interestingly, fuel purchase contracts are typically well in excess (upwards of 100 times) the capacities of the pipelines.  

The contentious FAS 133 booking out problem was settled for electricity companies in FAS 149. But it was not resolved in the same way for other companies. Hence for all other companies the distinction between a firm commitment contract and a forward price contract is crucial.

In some ways the distinction between a firm commitment versus a forward contract may be somewhat artificial. The formal distinction, in my mind, is the existence of a net settlement (spot price-forward price) clause in a forward contract that negates a “significant penalty” clause of a firm commitment contract.

The original FAS 133 (I still have this antique original version) had a glossary that reads as follows in Paragraph 540:

Firm commitment

An agreement with an unrelated party, binding on both parties and
usually legally enforceable, with the following characteristics:

a. The agreement specifies all significant terms, including the
quantity to be exchanged, the fixed price, and the timing of the
transaction. The fixed price may be expressed as a specified
amount of an entity's functional currency or of a foreign
currency. It may also be expressed as a specified interest rate
or specified effective yield.

b. The agreement includes a disincentive for nonperformance that is
sufficiently large to make performance probable.

The key distinction between a firm commitment and a forward contract seems to be Part b above that implies physical delivery backed by a “sufficiently large” penalty if physical delivery is defaulted.  The net settlement (spot-forward) provision of forward contracts generally void Part b penalties even when physical delivery was originally intended.

Firm commitments have greater Part b penalties for physical non-conformance than do forward contracts. But in the case of the pipeline industry, Part b technical provisions in purchase contracts generally are not worrisome because of a market clearing house for such contracts (the highly common practice of booking out such contracts by passing along purchase contracts to parties with sales contracts, or vice versa, that can be booked out) when physical delivery was never intended. For example, in the pipeline hub in question (in Oklahoma) all such “paper gallon” contracts are cleared against each other on the 25th of every month. By “clearing” I mean that “circles” of buyers and sellers are identified such that these parties themselves essentially net out deals. In most cases the deals are probably based upon spot prices, although the clearing house really does not get involved in negotiations between buyers and sellers of these “paper gallons.”

See Bookout and Firm Commitment


Teaching Case from The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on February 25, 2011

For Some, Currency Hedging Is No Gain
by: Dana Mattioli And Chan R. Shoenberger
Feb 19, 2011
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
 

TOPICS: Foreign Currency Exchange Rates, Hedging, International Accounting

SUMMARY: A number of companies are finding fees on options, forward and futures contracts too high-or reporting of hedging gains and losses too distracting-to justify the benefits of descreased risk expected in 2011. This assessment, based on recent reduction in worldwide currency volatility, is leading many to discontinue foreign exchange transaction and translation hedging activities.

CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article is useful to introduce foreign exchange transactions, foreign currency translation, and hedging activities.

QUESTIONS: 
1. (Advanced) What types of contracts to entities with foreign operations enter into in order to hedge against fluctuations in currency values? Specifically describe a contract that a company with foreign sales may enter into, then describe a contract for companies expecting to make purchases in foreign currencies.

2. (Introductory) Into which of the above categories do you place Progress Software Corp., the company described in this article?

3. (Advanced) What are the differences among an option contract, a forward contract, and a futures contract? Which of these types of contracts did Progress Software use? What situation led the company to use this contract?

4. (Introductory) What trade off is Mr. Rick Reidy, Chief Executive of Progress Software, considering in deciding that he will "hold off this year" on entering into foreign currency hedging contracts?

5. (Advanced) Explain your understanding of the term "natural hedges."

6. (Advanced) What is the difference between a foreign currency transaction gain or loss and a financial statement translation gain or loss? Why might companies want to stop hedging against translation gains and losses but continue hedging against transaction gains and losses?

7. (Advanced) What is speculation in foreign currencies? Identify a company cited in the article that you think is engaging in speculation. Support your assessment.
 

Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

 

"For Some, Currency Hedging Is No Gain," byDana Mattioli And Chan R. Shoenberger, The Wall Street Journal, February 19, 2011 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703803904576152442756363116.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC_domainid

Progress Software Corp. is walking away from currency hedging, bucking a corporate practice that became commonplace in the wake of the global financial crisis. "This year the price is just too high for us," says Chief Executive Rick Reidy.

The Bedford, Mass., business-software developer, which gets 60% of its $529 million in annual revenue outside the U.S., is joining a small minority of multinationals abandoning or lessening their use of hedging.

Although companies have hedged currency risks for decades, widespread use began after the recession stopped the dollar's downward run and unleashed a period of sharp swings in foreign exchange rates. Companies with global operations rushed to embrace hedging instruments such as forward contracts, which let them lock in an exchange rate in the future at a fixed amount, and options, or the right to buy or sell a currency for a specific price at some future date.

Progress Software bought a currency option in 2010 after exchange-rate fluctuations the prior year caused its reported revenue to decline by $30 million. But with such options, essentially year-long insurance contracts, getting more expensive and currencies becoming less volatile, Mr. Reidy says he'll hold off this year.

"We are considering doing quarterly [contracts] that tend to be more reasonable," he says.

Companies that have stopped hedging exchange rates say they avoid the costs of hedging, which can be steep for thinly traded currencies or contracts that lock in rates for long periods of time. Others, such as Nissan Motor Co., which has a longstanding no-hedge policy, say diversified global operations, create a natural hedge by matching revenue to expenses in local currencies.

Autoliv Inc., a Stockholm-based seatbelt and airbag maker, earlier this month said it would continue to rely on natural hedges, such as its factories in China. Although its fourth-quarter European sales were down 6%, to $717 million, primarily on unfavorable exchange rates, Autoliv doesn't plan on purchasing forward contacts, a practice it stopped in 2004, Chief Financial Officer Mats Wallinsays.

Medical-products maker Becton Dickinson & Co. stopped hedging its so-called translational exposures—incurred when the company brings foreign currencies back to the U.S. and converts to dollars—starting in October, although it still hedges transactions. The cost of options used for currency hedging became too expensive a few years ago, says Chief Financial Officer David Elkins, and it began using forward contracts instead.

In its last fiscal year, Becton reported a roughly $31 million hedging loss compared with a $100 million hedging gain the prior year. Executives were spending too much time explaining hedges to investors, Mr. Elkins says. "We want to do away with that distraction."

Hedging risks are a growing issue for pharmaceutical investors, says Tony Butler, a managing director at Barclays Capital, who notes investors have asked him to detail individual companies' foreign exchange sensitivity. "There was an increasing discussion of [foreign exchange], away from the fundamentals of the business," he says.

Going cold turkey on hedging can lead to wide revenue fluctuations as exchange rates change. That isn't a great idea, said Jiro Okochi, chief executive of Reval, which provides software to help companies manage foreign exchange, commodities and interest rate risks.

Some investors look for that exposure, says Jeffrey Wallace, managing partner of Greenwich Treasury Advisors in Boulder, Colo. "The very large companies sometimes say to their shareholders, 'You bought me because you wanted global risk, and I'm going to give it to you.'"

For some companies, a switch away from currency hedging is actually a bet that a currency will move in a certain direction. Moscow-based Mobile TeleSystems stopped its currency hedging this year and won't hedge unless the Russian ruble starts to depreciate, says Alexey Kornya, the company's chief financial officer.

This differs from the company's strategy in 2009 and 2010, when volatility in the markets led the company to hedge heavily. About 90% of MTS's revenue is derived in rubles, but it is also exposed to other currencies in Eastern Europe, especially Ukraine, Armenia and Uzbekistan.

In 2009, the telecommunications operator hedged about $1.4 billion of its debt portfolio, says Mr. Kornya. In 2010, it only hedged $200 million of its U.S. dollar exposure and the company moved toward financing in rubles rather than dollars, he says. This year, Mr. Kornya says he doesn't see the need to hedge yet, but is keeping a close eye on the ruble's value. If the trade surplus began to diminish and the ruble depreciated, the company would take hedging actions, he says.

Continued in article

Bob Jensen's tutorials and videos on accounting for hedging transactions ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

 

 


 

Frauds in Derivatives History

Derivative Financial Instruments Frauds --- 
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm

Functional Currency =

the primary currency in which an entity conducts its operation and generates and expends cash. It is usually the currency of the country in which the entity is located and the currency in which the books of record are maintained.  See translation adjustment.

Futures Contract =

an exchange-traded contract between a buyer or seller and the clearinghouse of a futures exchange to buy or sell a standard quantity and quality of a commodity, financial instrument, or index at a specified future date and price. Futures contracts commonly require daily settlement payments (known as the variation margin) for changes in the market price of the contract and often permit or require a final net cash settlement, rather than an actual purchase or sale of the underlying asset. Not all futures contracts are financial instruments derivatives. Futures on commodities, for example, are not necessarily financial instruments related unless qualifying as hedges of anticipated transactions.

By way of illustration, futures trading on July 29, 1998 showed the following exchange futures contract prices per stipulated contract amounts:

Wall Street Journal, 07/22/98, Page C20

U.S. $ Settlement

Contract Amounts

Britain (Pound) Spot

1.6435

     September 98 futures contract

1.6384

62,500 British Pounds

     December  98 futures contract

1.6308

62,500 British Pounds

     July 99 futures contract

1.6162

62,500 British Pounds

Canada (Dollar) Spot

.6702

     September 98 futures contract

.6710

100,000 Canadian Dollars

     December  98 futures contract

.6719

100,000 Canadian Dollars

     March 99 futures contract

.6728

100,000 Canadian Dollars

For example, each 62,500 British pound contract for July 99 will settle at $1.6162 per pound.   Unlike forward contracts, the futures contracts are not customized for maturities or amounts. 

Futures contracts are typically purchased through margin accounts at brokerage firms.   Margin accounts allow for high leveraging due to the fact that only a small percentage (e.g. 10%) of each contract need be held in cash in the account.  Price movements upward are settled daily and contract holders can cash out those gains each day in advance of the contract maturities.  Similarly, price movements downward are charged to the margin account daily such that at some point investors may be required to add more cash to bring the margin account balances up to minimum balances.  Example 7 in FAS 133 Paragraphs 144-152 simplifies the illustration of 20 futures contracts on corn by not illustrating margin account trading.  In my Excel tutorial of Example 7, however, I added margin account illustrations.  Example 11 in FAS 133 Paragraphs 173-177 illustrate hedging with pork belly futures contracts.

There are many types of futures contracts ranging from orange juice to cotton and interest rates.  For example, interest rate futures may be purchased to hedge future borrowing rates, interest rate strip contracts, and variable rate loans.  They may also be speculations.  Futures contracts are traded in block amounts such as $100,000 each for interest rate futures on U.S. Treasury notes. Trading markets may be very thin (in terms of numbers of traders and frequency of trades) for certain types of futures contracts.

Parties include the buyer, seller, and the clearinghouse of a futures exchange.   The contract is to  buy or sell a standard quantity and quality of a commodity, financial instrument, or index at a specified future date and price. Futures contracts commonly require daily settlement payments (known as the variation margin) for changes in the market price of the contract and often permit or require a final net cash settlement, rather than an actual purchase or sale of the underlying asset. Futures contracts are discussed at various points in FAS 133. See for example Paragraphs 73-77.  See forward transaction and foreign currency hedge.

Paragraph 64 on Page 45 of FAS 133 describes a futures contract "tailing strategy."  Such a strategy entails adjusting the size or contract amount of the hedge so that cash from reinvestment of daily settlements (recall that futures price changes are settled daily in margin accounts)  do not distort the hedge effectiveness with reinvestment gains and losses.

Yahoo Finance is Bob Jensen's Favorite Place to learn more about the mechanics and widespread use of futures contracts.  That web site, however, will not help much with respect ot accounting for such instruments under FAS 133.

FX = See Foreign Exchange Contract

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |

G-Terms

Gapping and Immunization

Gapping Risk
Bankers refer to the mismatch between assets and liabilities as "gapping."  The usual cause in banking is borrowing with short-term obligations and lending at long-term fixed interest rates.  Bank investments such as fixed rate loans tend to have market values that are negatively correlated with interest rate movements.  But the cash inflows are stable over longer periods of time while the value of money fluctuates.  Short-term obligations tend to have greater cash flow risk and less market value risk.  Banks tend to manage gapping risks in a variety of ways, but they are generally concerned with managing current value and earnings stability, and their fair value and earnings management hedging may put cash flows at risk.


Pension funds are different than banks in that the " gapping" risk may work in the other direction.   The usual cause in pension funds is borrowing with long-term obligations whose values rise and fall much more dramatically with interest rate movements than short-term obligations.  Many pension funds have been mismatched in terms of having debt with 15-year durations and investments with five-year durations.  In the past this arose from a "stupefying reason."  Consultants graded performance against shorter term bond investment indexes, which is the type of mismanagement that led General Motors and other corporate pension funds to lose ground in 1995 when their investments in stocks and bonds were having a banner year.  In 1995, interest rates also fell such that the value of the funds' long-term debt wiped out the gains on the asset side in terms of current value.  Cash increases from investments had to be set aside to pay off higher amounts of debt.  "Pension liabilities swing upward and downward with interest rates much more than assets swing upward and downward.  See Robert Lowenstein, "How Pension Funds Lost in Market Book," The Wall Street Journal, February 1, 1996.  

Immunization
Asset and liability duration "gapping" is a major reason why a newer type of derivative hedging instrument known as the interest rate swap became immensely popular.  Such swaps could be used to "immunize" pension funds from having huge losses in periods of interest rate decline.  They could also be used to help banks manage earnings.

See Earnings Management 

See interest rate swap and hedge 

 

Gearing = see leverage.

Gold-Linked Bull Note =

a note with interest rates indexed to upward movements in gold prices.  This is a leveraged form of investment in gold.  It can be viewed as an equivalent of a series of embedded options indexed on on gold price movements.  The derivatives are required to be accounted for separately under Paragraph 12a on Page 7 of FAS 133.  The underlying is the price of gold and the notional is the note's principal amount.  There is usually little or no premium and gold is actively traded in commodity markets such that conversion to cash is quick and easy.  The price of gold is not deemed to be clearly-and-closely related to any fixed-rate notes.  An example of a gold-linked bull note is provided beginning in Paragraph 188 on Page 98 of FAS 133.

Governmental Disclosure Rules for Derivative Financial Instruments = see Disclosure.

Group of Thirty =

a private and independent, nonprofit body that examines financial issues, In its July 1993 study Derivatives: Practices and Principles, the Group of Thirty called for disclosure of information about management's attitude toward financial risks, how derivatives are used and how risks are controlled, accounting policies, management's analysis of positions at the balance sheet date and the credit risk inherent in those positions, and, for dealers, additional information about the extent of activities in derivatives. Derivatives also were the subject of major studies prepared by several federal agencies, all of which cited the need for improvements in financial reporting for derivatives.

 

 

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |

 

H-Terms

Hard Currency

a currency actively traded and easily converted to other currencies on world markets.

Hedge =

a transaction entered into to manage (usually reduce) risk exposure to interest rate movements, foreign currency exchange rate variations, or most any other contractual exposure. The classic example is when a company has a contract to pay or receive foreign currency in the future. A foreign currency hedge can lock in the amount such that fluctuations in exchange rates will not give rise to exchange rate gains or losses. An effective hedge is one in which there is no gain or loss. An ineffective hedge may give rise to risk of some gain or loss. Effective and ineffective hedges are discussed at various points in FAS 133. See, for example, major sections in Paragraphs 17-28, 62-103, 351-383, and 374-383.  See dedesignation. and ineffectiveness.

"Why Hedge Interest Rate Exposures?" by Mary Brooikhart, Bank Asset/Liability Management, March 2012 ---
http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/BALM-WhyHedgeInterestRateExposures.pdf
Thank you Ira Kawaller for the heads up.

Bob Jensen's free tutorials on hedging and hedge accounting ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

Flow Chart for Hedge Accounting --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133flow.htm 

The subject of "clearly-and-closely related" is taken up in FAS 133, Pages 150-153, Paragraphs 304-311 and again in Paragraphs 443-450.. The closely-related criterion is illustrated in Paragraphs 176-177. Also the FASB reversed its position on compound derivatives.   Example 11 in Paragraphs 176-177 illustrate clearly-and-closely-related criteria in embedded hybrid derivative instruments.

See cash flow hedge, compound derivatives, derecognition, dedesignation., fair value hedge, hedge accounting, open position, tax hedging, and foreign currency hedge.

Also see Macro Hedge 

Click here to view Professor Linsmeier's commentary on hedging.


LIBOR --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libor

This is Crime, Not Capitalism
"Wall Street con trick," by Ellen Brown, Asia Times, March 24, 2012 ---
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/NC24Dj05.html

"Far from reducing risk, derivatives increase risk, often with catastrophic results." -
Derivatives expert Satyajit Das, Extreme Money (2011)

*****************
Jensen Comment
Derivatives are great contracts to manage risk if their markets are efficient, fair, and transparent.
They don't reduce risk in most instances because it's impossible in hedging to reduce risk in most instances. Rather hedging entails shifting risk. For example, a company that has cash flow risk due to variable interest rate debt can hedge that cash flow risk. However, elimination of cash flow risk creates fair value risk. The issue is not one of reducing risk. Rather it is a shift in risk preferences.
******************

The "toxic culture of greed" on Wall Street was highlighted again last week, when Greg Smith went public with his resignation from Goldman Sachs in a scathing oped published in the New York Times. In other recent eyebrow-raisers, London Interbank Offered Rates (or LIBOR) - the benchmark interest rates involved in interest rate swaps - were shown to be manipulated by the banks that would have to pay up; and the objectivity of the International

Swaps and Derivatives Association was called into question, when a 50% haircut for creditors was not declared a "default" requiring counterparties to pay on credit default swaps on Greek sovereign debt.

Interest rate swaps are less often in the news than credit default swaps, but they are far more important in terms of revenue, composing fully 82% of the derivatives trade. In February, JP Morgan Chase revealed that it had cleared US$1.4 billion in revenue on trading interest rate swaps in 2011, making them one of the bank's biggest sources of profit. According to the Bank for International Settlements:
[I]nterest rate swaps are the largest component of the global OTC derivative market. The notional amount outstanding as of June 2009 in OTC [over-the-counter] interest rate swaps was $342 trillion, up from $310 trillion in Dec 2007. The gross market value was $13.9 trillion in June 2009, up from $6.2 trillion in Dec 2007.
For more than a decade, banks and insurance companies convinced local governments, hospitals, universities and other non-profits that interest rate swaps would lower interest rates on bonds sold for public projects such as roads, bridges and schools. The swaps were entered into to insure against a rise in interest rates; but instead, interest rates fell to historically low levels.

This was not a flood, earthquake, or other insurable risk due to environmental unknowns or "acts of God". It was a deliberate, manipulated move by the Federal Reserve, acting to save the banks from their own folly in precipitating the credit crisis of 2008. The banks got into trouble, and the Federal Reserve and federal government rushed in to bail them out, rewarding them for their misdeeds at the expense of the taxpayers.

How the swaps were supposed to work was explained by Michael McDonald in a November 2010 Bloomberg article titled "Wall Street Collects $4 Billion From Taxpayers as Swaps Backfire":
In an interest-rate swap, two parties exchange payments on an agreed-upon amount of principal. Most of the swaps Wall Street sold in the municipal market required borrowers to issue long-term securities with interest rates that changed every week or month. The borrowers would then exchange payments, leaving them paying a fixed-rate to a bank or insurance company and receiving a variable rate in return. Sometimes borrowers got lump sums for entering agreements.
Banks and borrowers were supposed to be paying equal rates: the fat years would balance out the lean. But the Fed artificially manipulated the rates to the save the banks.

After the credit crisis broke out, borrowers had to continue selling adjustable-rate securities at auction under the deals. Auction interest rates soared when bond insurers' ratings were downgraded because of subprime mortgage losses; but the periodic payments that banks made to borrowers as part of the swaps plunged because they were linked to benchmarks such as Federal Reserve lending rates, which were slashed to almost zero.

Continued in article

Bob Jensen's fraud updates ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm

Bob Jensen's tutorials on derivative financial instruments ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

 

 


One of the things that the FASB has never properly addressed is how to account for hedges of interest rate risk in Available-for-Sale (AFS) securities where gains and losses of both the hedged item and the hedging derivative go to OCI. Based on an old idea from KPMG, I developed my own thoughts on this ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/CaseAmendment.htm
 

FAS 133 permits after-tax hedging of foreign currency risk and/or market price risk.  The hedge must be entered into to reduce taxes, and the item hedged must be ordinary assets or liabilities in the normal course of the taxpayer's business.  

March 25, 2002 message from Richard Newmark [richard.newmark@phduh.com

Bob,
I thought you might be interested in this.
Rick
-------------------------
Richard Newmark
Assistant Professor of Accounting
University of Northern Colorado
Kenneth W. Monfort College of Business
Campus Box 128
Greeley, CO  80639
(970) 351-1213 Office
(801) 858-9335 Fax (free e-mail fax at efax.com)
richard.newmark@PhDuh.com
http://PhDuh.com
 


IRS finalizes hedging regs with liberalizations
TD 8985; Reg. § 1.1221-2, Reg. § 1.1256(e)-1
IRS has issued final regs for determining the character of gain or loss from hedging transactions.
Background. As a result of a '99 law change, capital assets don't include any hedging transaction clearly identified as such before the close of the day on which it was acquired, originated, or entered into. (Code Sec. 1221(a)(7)) Before the change, IRS had issued final regs in '94 providing ordinary character treatment for most business hedges. Last year, IRS issued proposed changes to the hedging regs to reflect the '99 statutory change (see Weekly Alert ¶ 6 2/1/2001). IRS has now finalized the regs with various changes, many of which are pro-taxpayer. The regs apply to transactions entered into after Mar 19, 2002. However, the Preamble states that IRS won't challenge any transaction entered into after Dec. 16, '99, and before Mar. 20, 2002, that satisfies the provisions of either the proposed or final regs.

Hedging transactions. A hedging transaction is a transaction entered into by the taxpayer in the normal course of business primarily to manage risk of interest rate, price changes, or currency fluctuations with respect to ordinary property, ordinary obligations, or borrowings of the taxpayer. (Code Sec. 1221(b)(2)(A)(i); Code Sec. 1221(b)(2)(A)(ii)) A hedging transaction also includes a transaction to manage such other risks as IRS may prescribe in regs. (Code Sec. 1221(b)(2)(A)(iii)) IRS has the authority to provide regs to address nonidentified or improperly identified hedging transactions (Code Sec. 1221(b)(2)(B)), and hedging transactions involving related parties. (Code Sec. 1221(b)(3))

Key changes in final regs. The final regs include the following changes from the proposed regs.

    ... Both the final and the proposed regs provide that they do not apply to determine the character of gain or loss realized on a section 988 transaction as defined in Code Sec. 988(c)(1) or realized with respect to any qualified fund as defined in section Code Sec. 988(c)(1)(E)(iii). The proposed regs also provided that their definition of a hedging transaction would apply for purposes of certain other international provisions of the Code only to the extent provided in regs issued under those provisions. This is eliminated in the final regs because the other references were to proposed regs and to Code sections for which the relevant regs have not been issued in final form. The Preamble states that later regs will specify the extent to which the Reg. § 1.1221-2 hedging transaction rules will apply for purposes of those other regs and related Code sections.

    ... Several commentators noted that the proposed regs used risk reduction as the operating standard to implement the risk management definition of hedging. They found that risk reduction is too narrow a standard to encompass the intent of Congress, which defined hedges to include transactions that manage risk of interest rate, price changes or currency fluctuations. In response, IRS has restructured the final regs to implement the risk management standard. No definition of risk management is provided, but instead, the rules characterize a variety of classes of transactions as hedging transactions because they manage risk. (Reg. § 1.1221-2(c)(4); Reg. § 1.1221-2(d))

    ... The proposed regs provided that a taxpayer has risk of a particular type only if it is at risk when all of its operations are considered. Commentators pointed out that businesses often conduct risk management on a business unit by business unit basis. In response, the final regs permit the determination of whether a transaction manages risk to be made on a business-unit basis provided that the business unit is within a single entity or consolidated return group that adopts the single-entity approach. (Reg. § 1.1221-2(d)(1))

        RIA observation: As a result of the two foregoing changes made by the final regs, more transactions will qualify as hedging transactions. This is good for taxpayers because any losses from the additional transactions qualifying as hedges will be accorded ordinary treatment.

      ... In response to comments, the final regs have been restructured to separately address interest rate hedges and price hedges. (Reg. § 1.1221-2(d)(1)(iv); Reg. § 1.1221-2(d)(2))

      ... In response to comments, the final regs provide that a transaction that converts an interest rate from a fixed rate to a floating rate or from a floating rate to a fixed rate manages risk. (Reg. § 1.1221-2(d)(2))

      ... The final regs provide that IRS may identify by future published guidance specified transactions that are determined not to be entered into primarily to manage risk. (Reg. § 1.1221-2(d)(5))

      ... The proposed regs sought comments on expanding the definition of hedging transactions to include transactions that manage risks other than interest rate or price changes, or currency fluctuations with respect to ordinary property, ordinary obligations or borrowings of the taxpayer. While comments were received, the final regs did not make any changes in this area. However, IRS continues to invite comments on the types of risks that should be covered, including specific examples of derivative transactions that may be incorporated into future guidance, as well as the appropriate timing of inclusion of gains and losses with respect to such transactions.

      ... With respect to the identification requirement, a rule has been added specifying additional information that must be provided for a transaction that counteracts a hedging transaction. (Reg. § 1.1221-2(f)(3)(v))

RIA Research References: For hedging transactions, see FTC 2d/FIN ¶ I-6218.01 ; United States Tax Reporter ¶ 12,214.80

 

From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on June 16, 2004

TITLE: Calpine Raises Cash to Pay Debt, Turn Profit 
REPORTER: Steven D. Jones 
DATE: Jun 15, 2004 
PAGE: C3 
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108724453234036647,00.html  
TOPICS: Accounting, Cash Flow, Debt, Early Retirement of Debt, Asset Disposal

SUMMARY: Calpine Corp. has revealed a plan that will significantly change its balance sheet and statement of cash flows. Questions focus on evaluating the plan and the related accounting.

QUESTIONS: 
1.) Outline each economic event that is described in the article. For each event, briefly explain the economic significance of the event.

2.) Assume that Calpine Corp. continues with the plan that is described in the article. Explain how each component of the plan would impact the financial statements.

3.) Why would bondholders be concerned about disposing of assets?

4.) What is a hedge? Into what type of hedge transaction did Calpine Corp. enter? Why did Calpine Corp. enter into the hedge transaction? Is net income changed by changes in market value of the asset underlying the hedge transaction? Is net income changed by changes in market value of the electricity in Calpine's long-term sales contracts? Support your answers.

Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

"Outside Audit: Calpine Takes Basic Approach to Power Game," by Steven D. Jones, The Wall Street Journal, June 15, 2004, Page C3 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108724453234036647,00.html 

Calpine Corp., one of the main actors in California's long-running energy soap opera, is working from a script that sounds like it came right out of a business textbook: raising cash, reducing debt and aiming to put out a more profitable product.

As any soaps fan knows, however, plots can turn unexpectedly.

Calpine, based in San Jose, is raising nearly $1 billion in cash from asset sales, and in the bargain positioning itself to profit from more volatile electricity prices in the year ahead.

In a series of deals, including the sale of a large block of Canadian gas, Calpine will raise cash to finish power plants and meet obligations for maturing debt and hybrid securities that begin coming due this fall.

At the same time, the energy company is reducing how much electricity it has tied up in long-term supply contracts to 51% of output for the remainder of the year from 65% a year ago.

The change means that Calpine has more megawatts to sell on the open market this summer, when consumer demand is projected to grow 2.5% nationwide and swell as much as 6% in California

Combined, the moves mean Calpine is poised to boost cash from asset sales and increase cash flow if market prices for electricity move higher this summer. Calpine has 88 power plants generating 22,000 megawatts and another 10 plants nearing completion.

The strategy isn't foolproof: Those gas reserves are real assets, and thus are a comfort to bond holders, who may fret at their disposal. Also, if it is a cool summer, the market price for electricity would understandably suffer, and Calpine, which had a weak first quarter, would too.

The independent power generator burned through about $400 million in cash in the first quarter. It had $1.4 billion in liquidity at the end of the quarter, but it also plans about $900 million in capital spending and faces two maturing debt obligations totaling about $570 million in the next two years. In addition, the first $225 million of a type of hybrid convertible security that Calpine sold comes due this fall, and many investors are likely to want to cash out.

Calpine traded at nearly $50 a share when those hybrid securities were first sold five years ago. At 4 p.m. yesterday in New York Stock Exchange composite trading, it stood at $3.98, up five cents.

Wall Street and investors are acutely concerned with how Calpine manages its ready cash, as even the company notes. "The whole issue on Calpine has been liquidity," says Bob Kelly, the chief financial officer. "One way to get that off the table is to build our cash balance."

For Calpine, building cash is in large part about the difference between fuel costs and the price it receives for electricity it generates. For example, if it costs Calpine $35 for the gas to generate a megawatt of electricity that the company sells for $50, then it earns $15.

Five years ago, when prices and demand for electricity were high, Calpine prospered by selling long-term power contracts. To hedge those contracts, the company locked in fixed gas prices partly by purchasing Canadian gas fields.

Since then, gas prices have risen, but electricity demand and prices haven't kept pace. Sometimes Calpine customers, many of them utilities, could come out ahead by relying on Calpine's fixed-price power, shutting off their own generating plants and selling their gas for a profit on the open market.

Now Calpine is going back to customers with an offer to provide the generating capacity only. Or, as in the earlier example, the utility pays $15 for the generating capacity and provides the gas at its own expense. While that may appear to be a small change, it makes a big difference on the balance sheet, because Calpine no longer needs as much gas in the ground as a long-term hedge.

"Our profit margin doesn't change," says Mr. Kelly. "We get the capacity value of the megawatts just the same as we do now, but we have removed the energy side of the trade so we are long gas. That frees up the opportunity to sell the gas."

Calpine has 230 billion cubic feet of natural gas in Alberta on the block. Mr. Kelly estimates the company paid about $1.25 per thousand cubic feet for that gas and recent Canadian deals suggest the company could now get $2 per thousand cubic feet. At that price, Calpine's Alberta gas reserves represent a 60% return on a three-year investment.

But the deal looks even better from a balance-sheet perspective, since Calpine intends to pay off some bank debt and then use most of the proceeds to buy back bonds that are trading for about 60 cents on the dollar. Put it all together: Calpine bought gas for $1.25, will sell it for $2 and use the cash to repay nearly $3 of debt.

"We've doubled our money in 2½ to three years," says Mr. Kelly. "People ought to be happy."

Yet the enthusiasm on Wall Street has been restrained. Calpine shares have gained little since the plan was announced June 10, and its bonds have lost ground, trading down another 25 cents yesterday.

The tepid response is tied to the view that the gas on Calpine's balance sheet is a core asset, with some creditors seeing billions of cubic feet of gas as a cushion against a hard landing for their bonds.

"That's not the way to look at it," counters Mr. Kelly. "If anyone is looking at gas as security on the bonds, then they ought to sell the bonds."

The other key to Calpine's current restructuring is higher power prices that will spur cash flow, and for that Calpine could use a heat wave. Consumers weather cold with natural gas and other sources of energy, but most rely on electrically powered air conditioners to beat the heat. Too many cool and breezy days, however, and air conditioners get turned off.

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting for derivative financial instruments are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

Hedge Accounting =

accounting treatment that allows gains and losses on hedging instruments such as forward contracts and derivatives to be deferred and recognized when the offsetting gain or loss on the item being hedged is recognized. Criteria for qualifying as a hedge are discussed in FAS 133 Paragraphs 9-42, 70, 384-431, 432-457,, 458-473, and 488-494. Derivatives qualifying as hedges must continue to meet hedging criteria for the term of the contracts. Impairment tests are discussed in Paragraphs 27 on Page 17 and 31-35 on Page 22 of FAS 133.   A nonderivative instrument, such as a Treasury note, shall not be designated as a hedging instrument for a cash flow hedge (FAS 133 Paragraph 28d).  See cash flow hedge, compound derivatives, disclosure, fair value hedge, hedge,  ineffectiveness, and foreign currency hedge.  Especially note the term disclosure.

In a nutshell, hedge accounting might be viewed simply as the way changes in value of a booked derivative financial instrument might be offset against something other than current earnings.
Many firms are eager to have a hedge qualify for hedge accounting to reduce earnings fluctuations that arise from changes in derivative instrument values that do not qualify for hedge accounting.

Flow Chart for Hedge Accounting --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133flow.htm 

Cash flows from a derivative financial instrument such as a swap are debited or credited to current earnings.  However, the change in the value of a derivative financial instrument may receive special accounting treatment if that derivative qualifies as a hedge under FAS 133 accounting rules.  If the derivative is not scoped into FAS 133, there is not requirement under FAS 133 to book the derivative and change its value on the balance sheet over time (although the derivative such as an insurance contract) may be booked under other accounting standards).  Such non-scoped derivatives include derivatives having an underlying based upon sports scores or geological indices (such as rainfall amounts.  Other non-scoped derivatives include regular-way trades, normal purchases and sales, insurance contracts, financial guarantees, and other derivatives scoped out of FAS 133 under Paragraph 58,

Changes in value of derivatives that are scoped into FAS 133 (which includes most derivatives commonly used in business) must be charged to current earnings if they are speculations or economic hedges that do not qualify for special accounting treatment under FAS 133.  For example, an interest rate swap that is based upon some interest rate index other than the U.S. Treasury rate or LIBOR will not qualify changes in value of that swap to receive special hedge accounting treatment under FAS 138 benchmarking constraints.  (See benchmark.).  The swap must nevertheless be booked as a derivative financial instrument and changes in its value must be charged to current earnings.  

If its underlying of the interest rate swap is the U.S. Treasury rate or LIBOR it would qualify for benchmarked  hedge accounting, and changes in its value would then be charged to other comprehensive income (OCI) for a qualified cash flow hedge.  See cash flow hedge.

If the hedge qualified as a fair value hedge, hedge accounting becomes a bit more complex.  If the hedged item is a firm commitment for an unbooked hedged item, the changes in the derivative's value are charged to an account invented in FAS 133 called "Firm Commitment."  If the hedged item is a booked asset or liability maintained at historical cost, the accounting for the hedged item is changed from historical cost to fair value accounting during the hedge period.  If the asset (such as gold) or liability is carried normally at fair value, then no hedge accounting is allowed and all changes in derivative value are charged to current earnings.  For example, changes in the value of a derivative that hedges gold are charged to current earnings, whereas the changes in the value of a derivative hedging a firm commitment to purchase wheat are charged to an account called "Firm Commitment" and do not affect current earnings until the derivative is settled.  See fair value hedge.

Hedges of investment securities receive different treatment depending upon whether the hedged item under FAS 115 is classified as "trading," "available for sale," or "held to maturity."  Derivatives hedging investments to be held to maturity or classified as trading investments cannot receive hedge accounting treatment.  All changes in the the value  of derivatives hedging such securities are charged to current earnings.  Changes in the value of derivatives hedging available for sale (AFS) securities also get charged to current earnings, but the accounting for the changes in value of the hedged items get changed in that FAS 115 rules are suspended during the hedging period for AFS securities.  During the hedging period, the changes in value of AFS hedged items are charged to current earnings rather than Other Comprehensive Income (OCI).  The changes in the value of the derivative hedging an AFS security, thereby, offsets the changes in the value of the AFS security itself, and there is no net impact on net earnings to the extent that the hedge is effective.

Derivatives that are covered by FAS 133 accounting rules must remeasured to fair value on each balance sheet date.  Paragraph 18 on Page 10 of FAS 133 outlines how to account gains and losses on derivative financial instruments designated for FAS 133 accounting.  The FASB requires that an entity use that defined method consistently throughout the hedge period (a) to assess at inception of the hedge and on an ongoing basis whether it expects the hedging relationship to be highly effective in achieving offset and (b) to measure the ineffective part of the hedge (FAS 133 Paragraph 62).  If the entity identifies an improved method and wants to apply that method prospectively, it must discontinue the existing hedging relationship and designate the relationship anew
(FAS 133 Paragraph 62).

According to Paragraph 70 of FAS 133, differences in credit risk do not preclude hedges from being perfectly effective with respect to price or interest rate risk being hedged.

70. Comparable credit risk at inception is not a condition for assuming no ineffectiveness even though actually achieving perfect offset would require that the same discount rate be used to determine the fair value of the swap and of the hedged item or hedged transaction. To justify using the same discount rate, the credit risk related to both parties to the swap as well as to the debtor on the hedged interest-bearing asset (in a fair value hedge) or the variable-rate asset on which the interest payments are hedged (in a cash flow hedge) would have to be the same. However, because that complication is caused by the interaction of interest rate risk and credit risk, which are not easily separable, comparable creditworthiness is not considered a necessary condition to assume no ineffectiveness in a hedge of interest rate risk.

An individual item (specific identification) hedge is a hedge against a particular underlying, e.g, a foreign currency hedge or fair value hedge against a firm commitment to purchase a machine such as in Example 1 in FAS 133 Paragraphs 104-110, 432-435, 458, Example 3 in Paragraphs 121-126, and Example 4 in Paragraphs 127-129. Also see Paragraph 447 on Page 197. A  Macro Hedge  is one in which a group of items or transactions is hedged by one or multiple derivative contracts. There is a gray zone between an individual item versus a macro hedge. Although portfolio (macro) hedging is common in finance, FAS 133 and IAS 39 prohibit most macro hedges. Reasoning is given in Paragraphs 21a and 357-361 of FAS 133.  The hedge must relate to a specific identified and designated risk, and not merely to overall enterprise business risks, and must ultimately affect the enterprise's net profit or loss (IAS 39 Paragraph 149).  If similar assets or similar liabilities are aggregated and hedged as a group, the individual assets or individual liabilities in the group will share the risk exposure for which they are designated as being hedged.  Further, the change in fair value attributable to the hedged risk for each individual item in the group will be expected to be approximately proportional to the overall change in fair value attributable to the hedged risk of the group (IAS Paragraph 132).  Under international rules, the hedged item can be (a) a single asset, liability, firm commitment, or forecasted transaction or (b) a group of assets, liabilities, firm commitments, or forecasted transactions with similar risk characteristics (IAS 39 Paragraph 127).

Example:  Example: if the change in fair value of a hedged portfolio attributable to the hedged risk was 10% during a reporting period, the change in the fair values attributable to the hedged risk for each item constituting the portfolio should be expected to be within a range of 9-11%.  In contrast, an expectation that the change in fair value attributable to the hedged risk for individual items in the portfolio would range from 7-13% would be inconsistent with this provision (SFAS Paragraph 21a(1)).

If the hedged item is a financial asset or liability, a recognized loan servicing right, or a nonfinancial firm commitment with financial components, the designated risk being hedged is (1) the risk of changes in the overall fair value of the entire hedged item, (2) the risk of changes in its fair value attributable to changes in market interest rates, (3) the risk of changes in its fair value attributable to changes in the related foreign currency exchange rates (refer to FAS 133 Paragraphs 37 and 38), or (4) the risk of changes in its fair value attributable to changes in the obligor's creditworthiness.  One controversial issue of frustration to companies was the initial FAS 133 failure to give hedge accounting treatment to interest rate derivatives that only hedge against the risk-free interest rate portion of a note.  This type of hedge is sometimes called a "treasury lock."  Treasury lock hedges are popular because it is relatively easy to find a derivative instrument that is marketed for purposes of hedging interest free rates.  Hedging against "fair value of the entire hedged item" is much more difficult and often requires the acquisition of a custom derivative that is not traded on exchanges.  The Derivative Instrument Group hung tough on this controversy in E1 at http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/derivatives/issuee1.html 

Derivatives cannot hedge derivatives for accounting purposes -- now or under FASB 133," Bass said. "Does Dave [Duncan] think his accounting works even under FASB 133? No way."
Carl Bass, Andersen Auditor in 1999 who asked to be removed from Enron's audit review responsibilities --- 
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm#Bass
 
The main reasons are given in FAS Paragraph 405.  FAS 133 Paragraph 21(2)(c) disallows hedged items to be derivative financial instruments for accounting purposes, because derivative instruments are carried at fair value and cannot therefore be hedged items in fair value hedges.  Also see Paragraphs 405-407.  Paragraph 472 prohibits derivatives from be designated hedged items any type of hedge, including cash flow, fair value, and foreign exchange hedges.  The reason is that derivatives under FAS 133 must be adjusted to fair value with the offset going to current earnings.  This is tantamount to the "equity method" referred to in Paragraph 472.  More importantly from the standpoint of Enron transactions, Paragraphs 230 and 432  prohibit a firm's own equity shares from being hedged items for accounting purposes.  Whenever a firm hedges the value of its own shares, FAS 133 does not allow hedge accounting treatment.

 

QUESTION (In DIG Issue E1)

In a fair value hedge (or cash flow hedge) where the hedged risk is the change in the fair value (or variability in cash flows) attributable to market interest rates, may the changes in fair value (or variability in cash flows) attributable to changes in the risk-free interest rate be designated as the hedged risk and be the sole focus of the assessment of hedge effectiveness?

RESPONSE (of the DIG_

No. Changes in the fair value (or variability in cash flows) attributable to changes in only the risk-free rate cannot be designated as the hedged risk in a fair value hedge (or cash flow hedge). Paragraphs 21(f) and 29(h) of Statement 133 permit the designated risk in a fair value hedge (or cash flow hedge) to be one of the following: (1) risk of changes in the overall fair value (or cash flows) of the entire hedged item, (2) risk of changes in the fair value (or cash flows) attributable to changes in market interest rates, (3) risk of changes in the fair value (or functional-currency-equivalent cash flows) due to changes in foreign currency rates, or (4) risk of changes in the fair value (or cash flows) due to changes in the obligor’s creditworthiness. The term credit risk in paragraph 21(f) is used to refer only to the risk of changes in fair value attributable to changes in the obligor’s creditworthiness, which can be measured by changes in the individual company’s credit rating.

The risk of changes in fair value (or cash flows) due to changes in market interest rates encompasses the risk of changes in credit spreads over the base Treasury rate for different classes of credit ratings. Therefore, if market interest rate risk is designated as the risk being hedged in either a fair value hedge or a cash flow hedge, that hedge encompasses both changes in the risk-free rate of interest and changes in credit spreads over the base Treasury rate for the company’s particular credit sector (that is, the grouping of entities that share the same credit rating). The risk of changes in the fair value (or cash flows) attributable to changes in the risk-free rate of interest is a subcomponent of market interest rate risk. Statement 133 does not permit designation of a risk that is a subcomponent of any of the four risks identified in paragraphs 21(f) and 29(h) in Statement 133 as the risk being hedged. An entity may designate a contract based on the base Treasury rate (for example, a Treasury note futures contract) as a cross-hedge of the forecasted issuance of corporate debt. However, hedge ineffectiveness may occur to the extent that credit sector spreads change during the hedge period. As a result, in designing a hedging relationship using a contract based on the base Treasury rate as a cross-hedge, the risk of changes in credit sector spreads should be considered in designating the hedged risk.

In IAS 39 Paragraph 128, the IASC took a more conciliatory position.  If a hedged item is a financial asset or liability, it may be a hedged item with respect to the risks associated with only a portion of its cash flows or fair value, if effectiveness can be measured.  This conciliatory position does not hold for nonfinancial assets and liabilities according to IAS 39 Paragraph 129.

Eventually, the FASB also became more conciliatory.  The FASB subsequently issued the FAS 138 amendments to FAS 133 that introduced the concept of "benchmark" interest rate hedges.  Treasury lock hedges can now receive hedge accounting under FAS 138 even though such accounting was not allowed under the original version of FAS 133.

If the risk designated as being hedged is not the risk of changes in overall fair value of the entire hedged item, two or more of the other risks (market interest rate risk, foreign currency exchange risk, and credit risk) may simultaneously be designated as being hedged under FAS 133 Paragraph 21f.  In IAS 39 Paragraph 131, the IASC took a more conciliatory position when overall fair value risk is an issue.  A single hedging instrument may be designated as a hedge of more than one type of risk provided that: (a) the risks hedged can be clearly identified, (b) the effectiveness of the hedge can be demonstrated, and (c) it is possible to ensure that there is a specific designation of the hedging instrument and the different risk positions.

The subject of "clearly-and-closely related" is taken up in FAS 133, Pages 150-153, Paragraphs 304-311 and again in Paragraphs 443-450.. The closely-related criterion is illustrated in Paragraphs 176-177. Also the FASB reversed its position on compound derivatives.   Example 11 in Paragraphs 176-177 illustrate clearly-and-closely-related criteria in embedded hybrid derivative instruments.

If a hedged item is a nonfinancial asset or liability, it should be designated as a hedged item either (a) for foreign currency risks or (b) in its entirety for all risks according to IAS 39 Paragraph 129. If the hedged item is a nonfinancial asset or liability (other than a recognized loan servicing right or a nonfinancial firm commitment with financial components), the designated risk being hedged is the risk of changes in the fair value of the entire hedged asset or liability (reflecting its actual location if a physical asset).   The price risk of a similar asset in a different location or of a major ingredient may not be the hedged risk (FAS 133 Paragraph 21e).

If the hedged item is a specific portion of an asset/liability (or of a portfolio of similar assets/liabilities), the hedged item is one of the following:

(1) A percentage of the entire asset/liability

(2) One or more selected contractual cash flows

(3) A put option, a call option, an interest rate cap, or an interest rate floor embedded in an existing asset/liability that is not an embedded derivative accounted for separately pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Statement

(4) The residual value in a lessor's net investment in a direct financing or sales-type lease
If the entire asset/liability is an instrument with variable cash flows, the hedged item cannot be deemed to be an implicit fixed-to-variable swap perceived to be embedded in a host contract with fixed cash flows.  (FAS 133 Paragraph 21a(2))

The hedged item is not:

(1) an asset or liability that is remeasured with the changes in fair value attributable to the hedged risk reported currently in earnings (for example, if foreign exchange risk is hedged, a foreign-currency-denominated asset for which a foreign currency transaction gain or loss is recognized in earnings), (FAS 133 Paragraph 21c(1)).  Likewise, paragraph 29d prohibits the following transaction from being designated as the hedged forecasted transaction in a cash flow hedge: the acquisition of an asset or incurrence of a liability that will subsequently be remeasured with changes in fair value attributable to the hedged risk reported currently in earnings.  If the forecasted transaction relates to a recognized asset or liability, the asset or liability is not remeasured with changes in fair value attributable to the hedged risk reported currently in earnings.)

(2) an investment accounted for by the equity method in accordance with the requirements of APB Opinion No. 18.

(3) a minority interest in one or more consolidated subsidiaries.

(4) an equity instrument in a consolidated subsidiary.

(5) a firm commitment either to enter into a business combination or to acquire or dispose of a subsidiary, a minority interest or an equity method investee.

(6) an equity instrument issued by the entity and classified in stockholders' equity in the statement of financial position (FAS 133 Paragraph 21c).

Paragraph 20 of FAS 133 generally prohibits derivative financial instruments from being hedged items even though they are commonly used for hedging instruments.  

The following cannot be designated as a hedged item in a foreign currency hedge:

(a) a recognized asset or liability that may give rise to a foreign currency transaction gain or loss under Statement 52 (such as a foreign-currency-denominated receivable or payable) either in a  fair value hedge or a cash flow hedge.

(b) the forecasted acquisition of an asset or the incurrence of a liability that may give rise to a foreign currency transaction gain or loss under Statement 52 in a cash flow hedge
(FAS 133 Paragraph 36).  An available-for-sale equity security can be hedged for changes in the fair value attributable to changes in foreign currency exchange rates if:

(a) the security is not traded on an exchange on which trades are denominated in the investor's functional currency.
(b) dividends or other cash flows to holders of the security are all denominated in the same foreign currency as the currency expected to be received upon sale of the security (FAS 133 Paragraph 38).

A written option is not a hedging instrument unless it is designated as an offset to a purchased option, including one that is embedded in another financial instrument, for example, a written option used to hedge callable debt
(IAS 39 Paragraph 124).  A purchased option qualifies as a hedging instrument as it has potential gains equal to or greater than losses and, therefore, has the potential to reduce profit or loss exposure from changes in fair values or cash flows (IAS 39 Paragraph 124). 
Under FASB rules, if a written option is designated as hedging a recognized asset or liability / the variability in cash flows for a recognized asset or liability, the combination of the hedged item and the written option provides at least as much potential for favorable cash flows as exposure to unfavorable cash flows (see FAS 133 Paragraph 20c or 28c).

Whereas unrealized fair value hedge gains and losses are accounted for in current earnings, cash flow hedge gains and losses may be deferred in comprehensive income until derecognition, derecognition, or impairment arise.   Impairment in meeting hedge criteria are discussed in Paragraphs 27, 32, 34-35, 208, 144-152, 447-448, and 495-498.  

Related to impairment are dedesignation., derecognition, and ineffectiveness tests.  Impairment tests are discussed in Paragraphs 31-35 on beginning on Page 22 of FAS 133.  Paragraph 31 requires that, in the case of forecasted net losses of a combined hedged item and its hedging instrument, accumulated losses in comprehensive income be transferred to current earnings to the extent of the anticipated settlement loss.  

Paragraph 32 beginning on Page 22 of FAS 133 outlines conditions for discontinuance of hedge accounting and reclassification requirements.  Nothing is said about where reclassifications are to be shown in the income statement.  KPMG argues that these should appear in the operating income section.  See Example 1 on Page 344 of of the Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998.

Under international standards, IAS 39 has similar impairment provisions.  If there is objective evidence of impairment, and the loss on a financial asset carried at fair value has been recognized directly in equity in accordance with IAS 39 Paragraph 103b.  The cumulative net loss that had been recognized directly in equity should be removed from equity and recognized in earnings for the period even though the financial asset has not been derecognized (see IAS 39 Paragraph 117).  The amount of the loss that should be removed from equity and reported in earnings is the difference between its acquisition cost (net of any principal repayment and amortization) and current fair value (for equity instruments) or recoverable amount (for debt instruments), less any impairment loss on that asset previously recognized in earnings.  The recoverable amount of a debt instrument remeasured to fair value is the present value of expected future cash flows discounted at the current market rate of interest for a similar financial asset (See IAS 39 Paragraph 118).  If, in a subsequent period, the fair value or recoverable amount of the financial asset carried at fair value increases and the increase can be objectively related to an event occurring after the loss was recognized in earnings, the loss should be reversed, with the amount of the reversal included in earnings for the period (See IAS 39 Paragraph 119).

Fair value hedges are accounted for in a similar manner in both FAS 133 and IAS 39.  Paul Pacter states the following at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm (emphasis added):

IAS 39 Fair Value Hedge Definition
a hedge of the exposure to changes in the fair value of a recognised asset or liability (such as a hedge of exposure to changes in the fair value of fixed rate debt as a result of changes in interest rates).

However, a hedge of an unrecognised firm commitment to buy or sell an asset at a fixed price in the enterprise’s reporting currency is accounted for as a cash flow hedge

IAS 39 Fair Value Hedge Accounting:
To the extent that the hedge is effective, the gain or loss from remeasuring the hedging instrument at fair value is recognised immediately in net profit or loss. At the same time, the corresponding gain or loss on the hedged item adjusts the carrying amount of the hedged item and is recognised immediately in net profit or loss.

 

FAS 133 Fair Value Hedge Definition:
Same as IAS 39

...except that a hedge of an unrecognised firm commitment to buy or sell an asset at a fixed price in the enterprise’s reporting currency is accounted for as a fair value hedge or a cash flow hedge.


SFAS Fair Value Hedge Accounting:
Same as IAS 39

a. The gain or loss from remeasuring the hedging instrument at fair value should be recognized immediately in earnings; and

b. The gain or loss on the hedged item attributable to the hedged risk should adjust the carrying amount of the hedged item and be recognized immediately in earnings.

c. This applies even if a hedged item is otherwise measured at fair value with changes in fair value recognized directly  in equity under paragraph 103b.  It also applies if the hedged item is otherwise measured at cost. 
(IAS 39 Paragraph 153)
See IAS 39 Paragraph 154 for an example
.

Cash flow hedges are accounted for in a similar manner but not identical manner in both FAS 133 and IAS 39 (other than the fact that none of the IAS 39 standards define comprehensive income or require that changes in fair value not yet posted to current earnings be classified under comprehensive income in the equity section of a balance sheet):

To the extent that the cash flow hedge is effective, the portion of the gain or loss on the hedging instrument is recognized initially in equity. Subsequently, that amount is included in net profit or loss in the same period or periods during which the hedged item affects net profit or loss (for example, through cost of sales, depreciation, or amortization).

Paul Pacter states the following at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm (emphasis added):

IAS 39 Cash Flow Hedge Accounting
For a hedge of a forecasted asset and liability acquisition, the gain or loss on the hedging instrument will adjust the basis (carrying amount) of the acquired asset or liability. The gain or loss on the hedging instrument that is included in the initial measurement of the asset or liability is subsequently included in net profit or loss when the asset or liability affects net profit or loss (such as in the periods that depreciation expense, interest income or expense, or cost of sales is recognised).

FAS 133 Cash Flow Hedge Accounting
For a hedge of a forecasted asset and liability acquisition, the gain or loss on the hedging instrument will remain in equity when the asset or liability is acquired. That gain or loss will subsequently included in net profit or loss in the same period as the asset or liability affects net profit or loss (such as in the periods that depreciation expense, interest income or expense, or cost of sales is recognised). Thus, net profit or loss will be the same under IAS and FASB Standards, but the balance sheet presentation will be net under IAS and gross under FASB.

With respect to net investment un a foreign entity, Paul Pacter states the following at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm:

IAS 39 Hedge of a 
Net Investment in a Foreign Entity

accounted for same as a cash flow hedge.

FAS 133 Hedge of a 
Net Investment in a Foreign Entity
:  
Same as in IAS 39

 

IAS 39
For those financial assets and liabilities that are remeasured to fair value, an enterprise has a single, enterprise-wide option to either:

(a) recognise the entire adjustment in net profit or loss for the period; or

(b) recognise in net profit or loss for the period only those changes in fair value relating to financial assets and liabilities held for trading, with value changes in non-trading items reported in equity until the financial asset is sold, at which time the realised gain or loss is reported in net profit or loss.


FAS 133
FASB requires option (b) for all enterprises.

 

March 20 Message from Ira Kawaller

Hi Bob,
I just posted a recently published article on how to satisfy the FAS 133 disclosure requirements for interest rate hedges.  Although it was originally published by Bank Asset/Liablility Management (March 2000), the content is 
applicable to all firms with interest rate exposures -- not just banks.  
If you are interested, it is available at 
http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/BALMHedges.pdf 
You can also find additional information about derivatives, risk management, and FAS 133 in the various articles posted on the Kawaller & Company website:  
http://www.kawaller.com 
Please feel free to contact me with any questions, comments, or suggestions.
Ira Kawaller
Kawaller & Company, LLC
kawaller@kawaller.com 
(718) 694-6270

Bob Jensen's documents and threads on FAS 133 are linked at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

The Excel workbook solutions to examples and cases are on a different server at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/ 

 

One Feature of the Proposed 2009 Regulation of OTC Derivatives is Insane
OTC Derivatives Should Be Regulated in Some Respects, But They Should Never Be Standardized

PwC Notes one of the main reasons (shown in read) at Click Here

Why should the right balance be struck when it comes to regulating OTC derivatives?

Some OTC derivatives have been criticized for contributing to the financial crisis. But new proposals may affect how all derivatives are traded and designed.

Most financial derivatives have been safely and prudently used over the years by thousands of companies seeking to manage specific risks.

OTC derivatives are privately negotiated because they are often highly customized. They enable businesses to offset nearly any fi nancial risk exposure, including foreign exchange, interest rate, and commodity price risks.

Proposals to standardize terms for all OTC derivatives could inadvertently limit the ability of companies to fully manage their risks.

Jensen Comment
The reason that it would "limit the ability of companies to fully manage their risks" is that OTC derivatives are currently very popular hedging contracts because it is often possible over-the-counter to write customized hedging contracts that exactly match (in mirror form) the terms of a hedged item contract or forecasted transaction such that the hedge becomes perfectly effective over the life of the hedge.

If companies have to hedge with standardized contracts such as futures and options contracts traded on organized exchange markets it's either impossible or very difficult to obtain a perfectly matched and effective hedge. For example, corn futures are traded in contracts of 25,000 bushels for a given grade of corn. If Frito Lay wants to hedge a forecasted transaction to purchase 237,000 bushels of corn, it can only perfectly hedge 225,000 bu. with five futures contracts or 250,000 bu. with six futures contracts. Hence it's impossible to perfectly hedge 237,000 bu. with standardized contracts.

However, if Frito Lay wants to perfectly hedge 237,000 bu. of corn it can presently enter into one OTC forward contract for 237,000 bu. or an OTC options contract for 237,000 bu. If the hedged item is eventually purchased in the same geographic region as the hedging contract (such as Chicago), the hedge should be perfectly effective at all points in time during the contracted hedging period.

If the hedging contract is written in terms of a Chicago market and the corn is eventually purchased in a Minneapolis market, then their may be slight hedging ineffectiveness (due mainly to transportation cost differences between the two markets), but there is absolutely no mismatch due to quantity (notional) differences.

Why is customization so important from the standpoint of accounting and auditing?
Under FAS 133 and IAS 39, hedge accounting relief is available only to the extent hedges are deemed effective. The ineffective portion of value changes in the hedging contracts must be posted to current earnings, thereby increasing the volatility of earnings for unrealized value changes of the hedging contracts.

If new regulations requiring standardization of OTC derivatives, then the regulations themselves may dictate that many or most hedging contacts are, at least in part, ineffective. As a result reported earnings will needlessly fluctuate to a greater extent due to the regulations rather than because of economic substance. Dumb! Dumb! Dumb!

In particular, students may want to refer to the hedge accounting ineffectiveness testing Appendix B Example 7 beginning in Paragraph 144 of FAS 133 and Appendix A Example 7 beginning in Paragraph 93 of FAS 133. Bob Jensen's extensions and spreadsheet analysis of the Paragraph 144 illustration are available in Excel worksheet file 133ex07a.xls listed at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/
Sadly, the FASB left both of these examples, along with the other outstanding Appendix A and B examples out of its sparse handling of accounting for derivative financial instruments in its Codification Database.

In particular, Examples 1 thru 10 in Appendix B of FAS 133 are the best places that I know of to learn about hedge accounting and effectiveness testing. My extended analysis of each example can be found in the 133ex01a.xls thru 133ex10a.xls Excel workbooks at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/ 
My students focused heavily on those ten examples to learn about hedge accounting. They also learned from my videos 133ex05a.wmv and 133ex08a.wmv files listed at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/acct5341/

Teaching Cases:  Hedge Accounting Scenario 1 versus Scenario 2
Two Teaching Cases Involving Southwest Airlines, Hedging, and Hedge Accounting Controversies ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/SouthwestAirlinesQuestions.htm

Bob Jensen's free tutorials and videos for FAS 133 and IAS 39 are at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

 

See Illustrations  and Ineffectivness.

Hedge Fund (an oxymoron)

A pooled investment vehicle that is privately organised and is administered by professional investment managers. It is different from another pooled investment fund, the mutual fund, in that access is available only to wealthy individuals and institutional managers. Moreover, hedge funds are able to sell securities short and buy securities on leverage, which is consistent with their typically short-term and high risk oriented investment strategy, based primarily on the active use of derivatives and short positions.
OECD --- http://www1.oecd.org/error.htm 

Hedge Funds Are Growing: Is This Good or Bad?
When the ratings agencies downgraded General Motors debt to junk status in early May, a chill shot through the $1 trillion hedge fund industry. How many of these secretive investment pools for the rich and sophisticated would be caught on the wrong side of a GM bond bet? In the end, the GM bond bomb was a dud. Hedge funds were not as exposed as many had thought. But the scare did help fuel the growing debate about hedge funds. Are they a benefit to the financial markets, or a menace? Should they be allowed to continue operating in their free-wheeling style, or should they be reined in by new requirements, such as a move to make them register as investment advisors with the Securities and Exchange Commission?
"Hedge Funds Are Growing: Is This Good or Bad?" Knowledge@wharton,  June 2005 --- http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=1225     


Question
What are hedge funds, especially after Bernie Madoff made them so famous?

When people ask me this question, my initial response is that a hedge fund no longer necessarily has anything to do with financial risk hedging. Rather a hedge fund is merely a "private" investment "club" that does not offer shares to the general public largely because it would then subject itself to more SEC, stock exchange, and other regulators. Having said this, it's pretty darn easy for anybody with sufficient funds to get into such a "private" club. Minimum investments range from $10,000 to $1,000,000 or higher.

Since Bernie Madoff made hedge funds so famous, the public tends to think that a hedge fund is dangerous, fraudulent, and a back street operation that does not play be the rules. Certainly hedge funds emerged in part to avoid being regulated. Sometimes they are risky due to high leverage, but some funds skillfully hedge to manage risk and are much safer than mutual funds. For example, some hedge funds have shrewd hedging strategies to control risk in interest rate and/or foreign currency trading.

Most hedge funds are not fraudulent. In general, however, it's "buyer beware" for hedge fund investors.

I would never invest in a hedge fund that is not audited by a very reliable CPA auditing firm. Not all CPA auditing firms are reliable (Bernie Madoff proved you can engage a fraudulent auditor operating out of a one-room office). Hence, the first step in evaluating a hedge fund is to investigate its auditor. The first step in evaluating an auditor is to determine if the auditing firm is wealthy enough to be a serious third party in law suits if the hedge fund goes belly up.

But the recent multimillion losses of Carnegie Mellon, the University of Pittsburgh, and other university endowment funds that invested in a verry fraudulent hedge fund purportedly audited by Deloitte suggests that the size and reputation of the auditing firm is not, by itself, sufficient protection against a criminal hedge fund (that was supposedly given a clean opinion by Deloitte in financial reports circulated to the victims of the fraud).

When learning about hedge funds, you may want to begin at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hedge_Fund

"What is a hedge fund and how is it different from a mutual fund?" by Andy Samuels, Business and Finance 101 Examiner, June 10, 2009 --- Click Here
Jim Mahar pointed out this link.

Having migrated away from their namesake, hedge funds no longer  focus primarily on “hedging” (attempting to reduce risk) because hedge funds are now focused almost blindly on one thing: returns.

Having been referred to as “mutual funds for the super rich” by investopedia.com, hedge funds are very similar to mutual funds in that they pool money together from many investors. Hedge funds, like mutual funds, are also managed by a financial professionals, but differ because they are geared toward wealthier individuals.

Hedge funds, unlike mutual funds, employ a wider array of ivesting techniques, which are considered more aggresive. For example, hedge funds often use leverage to amplify their returns (or losses if things go wrong).

The other key difference between hedge funds and mutual funds is the amount of regulation involved. Hedge funds are relatively unregulated because investors in hedge funds are assumed to be more sophisticated investors, who can both afford and understand the potential losses. In fact, U.S. laws require that the majority of investors in the fund are accredited.

Most hedge funds draw in investors because of the trustworthy reputations of the executives of the fund. Word-of-mouth praise and affiliations are often the key to success. Bernie Madoff succeed in luring customers based on two leading factors:  (1) His esteemed reputation on Wall Street and (2) His highly regarded connections in the Jewish community where he drew in most of his victims.

Bob Jensen's threads on frauds are linked at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
In particular see http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm
And see http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm

 


German Chancellor's Call for Global Regulations to Curb Hedge Funds
Germany and the United States are parting company again, this time over Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's call for international regulations to govern hedge funds. Treasury Secretary John W. Snow, speaking here Thursday at the end of a five-country European tour, said the United States opposed "heavy-handed" curbs on markets. He said that he was not familiar with the German proposals, but left little doubt about how Washington would react. "I think we ought to be very careful about heavy-handed regulation of markets because it stymies financial innovation," Mr. Snow said after a news conference here to sum up his visit. Noting that the Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed that hedge funds be required to register themselves, he said he preferred the "light touch rather than the heavy regulatory burden."
Mark Landler, "U.S. Balks at German Chancellor's Call for Global Regulations to Curb Hedge Funds," The New York Times, June 17, 2005 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/17/business/worldbusiness/17hedge.html?

An investing balloon that will one day burst
The numbers are mind-boggling: 15 years ago, hedge funds managed less than $40 billion. Today, the figure is approaching $1 trillion. By contrast, assets in mutual funds grew at an impressive but much slower rate, to $8.1 trillion from $1 trillion, during the same period. The number of hedge fund firms has also grown - to 3,307 last year, up 74 percent from 1,903 in 1999. During the same period, the number of funds created - a manager can start more than one fund at a time - has surged 209 percent, with 1,406 funds introduced in 2004, according to Hedge Fund Research, based in Chicago.
Jenny Anderson and Riva D. Atlas, "If I Only Had a Hedge Fund," The New York Times, The New York Times, March 27, 2005 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/27/business/yourmoney/27hedge.html 
Jensen Comment:  The name "hedge fund" seems to imply that risk is hedged.  Nothing could be further from the case.  Hedge funds do not have to hedge risks,  Hedge funds should instead be called private investment clubs.  If structured in a certain way they can avoid SEC oversight.  

Remember how the Russian space program worked in the 1960s? The only flights that got publicized were the successful ones.  Hedge funds are like that. The ones asking for your money have terrific records. You don't hear about the ones that blew up. That fact should strongly color your view of hedge funds with terrific records.
Forbes, January 13, 2005 --- http://snipurl.com/ForbesJan_13 

US hedge funds prior to 2005 were exempted from Securities and Exchange Commission reporting requirements, as well as from regulatory restrictions concerning leverage or trading strategies. They now must register with the SEC except under an enormous loophole for funds that cannot liquidate in less than two years.

The Loophole:  Locked-up funds don't require oversight.  That means more risk for investors.
"Hedge Funds Find an Escape Hatch," Business Week, December 27, 2004, Page 51 --- 

Securities & Exchange Commission Chairman William H. Donaldson recently accomplished a major feat when he got the agency to pass a controversial rule forcing hedge fund advisers to register by 2006. Unfortunately, just weeks after the SEC announced the new rule on Dec. 2, many hedge fund managers have already figured out a simple way to bypass it.

The easy out is right on page 23 of the new SEC rule: Any fund that requires investors to commit their money for more than two years does not have to register with the SEC. The SEC created that escape hatch to benefit private-equity firms and venture capitalists, which typically make long-term investments and have been involved in few SEC enforcement actions. By contrast, hedge funds, some of which have recently been charged with defrauding investors, typically have allowed investors to remove their money at the end of every quarter. Now many are considering taking advantage of the loophole by locking up customers' money for years.


Question
Where can you find one of the best definitions of hedge funds and summaries of alternative hedge fund strategies?

Answer
Where else than Wikipedia --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hedge_fund


The primer below should have been entitled "The Mutual Fund Scandal for Dummies."  It is the best explanation of what really happened and how mutual funds versus index funds really work.

A Primer on the Mutual-Fund Scandal --- www.businessweek.com:/print/bwdaily/dnflash/sep2003/nf20030922_7646.htm?db
Stanford University  faculty member Eric Zitzewitz, "found evidence of market timing and late trading across many fund families he studied."
BusinessWeek Online, September 22, 2003

When it comes to financial scandal, the mutual-fund industry had always seemed above the fray. No longer. On Sept. 3, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer kicked off an industry wide probe with allegations that four prominent fund outfits allowed a hedge fund to trade in and out of mutual funds in ways that benefited the parent companies at the expense of their long-term shareholders.

By Sept. 16, Spitzer's office and the Securities & Exchange Commission had filed criminal and civil charges against a former Bank of America (BAC ) broker who allegedly facilitated illegal trading in mutual funds. More fund companies are being subpoenaed for information about their trading, and more state and federal regulators are joining the growing investigation. It's all but certain that more fund firms will be drawn into the deepening scandal.

Yet this major crisis for the fund industry has failed to inspire much fury from investors, and it has done little to halt a rising stock market. Maybe a partial explanation is that the fund companies allegedly did wrong, and why it hurt shareholders, is difficult to understand. For anyone who has read widespread coverage of the topic but wanted to scream, "Explain what the heck is going on," we provide the following discussion:

Let's start at the beginning. How is a mutual fund set up?
A mutual fund is like any other public company. It has a board of directors and shareholders. Its business is investing -- in stocks, bonds, real estate, or other assets -- using whatever strategy is set out in its prospectus, with money from individual investors. Its strategy could be to buy, say, small, fast-growing U.S. companies or to purchase the debt of firms across Europe.

A fund's board hires a portfolio manager as well as an outside firm to market and distribute the fund to investors. But funds can become big quickly, and the larger ones operate a bit differently. A fund-management company (think Fidelity or Vanguard) sets up dozens of funds, markets them to investors, hires the portfolio managers, and handles the administrative duties. It makes a profit collecting fees (usually a percentage of assets under management) from the funds it manages.

A fund company typically has in place the same board of directors (including some independent members) for its funds. The board of directors should be on the lookout for abusive practices by the fund company, but directors often have too many funds to oversee and may be too aligned with the company's portfolio managers to provide much oversight.

This case concerns mutual-fund trading. Does it involve the portfolio managers?
No, that's not what this case is about. Portfolio managers buy and sell securities for their funds. But the alleged improper trading has to do with outside investors buying and selling a fund's shares. Spitzer's complaint actually concerns the activity of one firm, Canary Capital Partners, but he alleges the same activity is far more widespread.

Portfolio managers, who are usually compensated based on their funds' performance and frequently have their own money invested in their funds, are usually shareholders' greatest defenders against trading practices that hurt long-term results.

How are mutual funds traded?
Funds can be bought and sold all day. However, unlike stocks, which are priced throughout the trading day, mutual funds are only priced once a day, usually at 4 p.m. Eastern Time. At that point the funds' price, or Net Asset Value (NAV), is determined by adding up the worth of the securities the fund owns, plus any cash it holds, and dividing that by the number of shares outstanding.

Buy a fund at 2 p.m. and you'll pay a NAV that is determined two hours later. Buy a fund at 5 p.m. and you'll pay a price that won't be set until 4 p.m. the following day. According to Spitzer's complaint, Canary Capital Partners, a hedge fund, took advantage of the way fund prices are set to effectively pick the pockets of long-term shareholders.

What's a hedge fund?
A hedge fund is like a mutual fund in that it buys and sells securities, is run by a portfolio manager, and tries to make money for its investors. But hedge funds have a very different structure (they are actually set up as partnerships) and are almost entirely unregulated, mostly because they manage money for sophisticated high net-worth individuals or companies, and have different rules governing when and how investors can liquidate their positions.

Hedge-fund managers are compensated based on a percentage of profits (often 20%), so they have a major incentive to take risks, which they often do. Selling stocks short (a way to bet they will fall in price), piling on complex financial security derivatives, and using borrowed money to leverage returns are common strategies.

So exactly what did Canary Capital allegedly do?
According to Spitzer's complaint, Canary (which settled charges, paid $40 million in fines, but didn't admit or deny guilt), had two strategies (Spitzer called them "schemes") for making money trading in mutual funds. The easiest to understand, the most serious, and clearly illegal is "late trading." The other strategy, "market timing" is far more common and not illegal, although clearly unethical.

How does late trading work?
The rule of "forward pricing" prohibits orders placed after 4 p.m. from receiving that day's price. But Canary allegedly established relationships with a few financial firms, including Bank of America, so that orders placed after 4 p.m. would still get that day's price. In return for getting to trade late, Canary placed large investments in other Bank of America funds, effectively compensating the company for the privilege of trading late.

The late-trading ability would have allowed Canary to take advantage of events that occurred after the market closed -- events that would affect the prices of securities held in a fund's portfolio when the market opened the next day.

I could use an example.
Here's a hypothetical, simplified one: Let's say the Imaginary Stock mutual fund has 5% of its assets invested in the stock of XYZ Co. After the close, XYZ announces earnings that exceed analysts' expectations. XYZ closed at 4 p.m. at $40 a share but most likely, its price will soar the next day.

The late trader buys the Imaginary Stock mutual fund at 6 p.m. after the news is announced, paying an NAV of $15 (that was calculated using the $40 share price of XYZ). The next day, when XYZ closes at $50, it helps push the fund's NAV to $15.50. The late trader sells the shares and pockets the gain. Spitzer says late trading is like "betting today on yesterday's horse races." You already know the outcome before you place your winning bet.

How do they turn this into real money? It sounds like small potatoes.
If you did this dozens of times a year in hundreds of funds investing millions of dollars at a time, it would add up.

What about market-timing? How does that work?
This strategy takes advantage of prices that are already outdated, or "stale," when a fund's NAV is set. Most often the strategy is carried out using international funds, in which prices are stale because the securities closed earlier in a different time zone.

Could you give an example?
Well, let's take the Imaginary International Stock mutual fund. One day, U.S. markets get a huge boost thanks to positive economic news and the benchmark Standard & Poor's 500 rises 5%. The market-timer steps in and buys shares of the international fund at an NAV of $15 at 4 p.m., knowing that about 75% of the time, international markets will follow what happened in the U.S. the previous trading day. Predictably, most of the time, the international fund rises in price the next day and closes at an NAV of $15.05. The market-timer then sells the shares, pocketing the gain.

If market timing isn't illegal, why would Spitzer investigate the industry for it?
Market timing (and late trading, for that matter) add to a fund's costs, which are paid by shareholders. This kind of trading activity also either dilutes long-term profits or magnifies losses depending on whether the trader is betting the fund will go up or go down. (For a more detailed example of how market-timing works, see BW Online, 12/11/02, "How Arbs Can Burn Fund Investors").

Most funds have a stated policy in place (included in the prospectus) of prohibiting market-timing. They impose redemption fees on investors that hold a fund less than 180 days. And many prospectuses give fund companies the right to kick market-timers out of the fund.

Yet Spitzer alleges that fund companies such as Janus (JNS ) and Strong got to reap extra management fees by allowing Canary to do market-timing trades in return for Canary placing large deposits of "sticky" assets (funds that are going to stay in one place for a while) in other funds. That would put it in violation of its fiduciary duty to act in its shareholders' best interests and mean it has not conformed to policies laid out in its prospectus.

Spitzer offers this analogy: "Allowing timing is like a casino saying that it prohibits loaded dice, but then allowing favored gamblers to use loaded dice, in return for a piece of the action." Janus, Strong, and the other companies named in Spitzer's complaint have promised to cooperate with him and are conducting their own internal investigations of trading practices. Several firms have promised to make restitution to shareholders if they find such deals cost shareholders money.

But wouldn't this amount to tiny losses for the shareholders in the fund?
That depends on how many traders might have used these strategies. Spitzer believes these practices are widespread and his investigation is widening to include many more fund companies.

Eric Zitzewitz, an assistant professor of economics at Stanford, has found evidence of market timing and late trading across many fund families he studied. His research shows that an investor with $10,000 in an international fund would have lost an average of $110 to market timers in 2001 and $5 a year to after-market traders. Average losses in 2003 appear to be at roughly the same level, he says. That may not sound like much, but in a three-year bear market, when the average investor was losing hundreds if not thousands of dollars on investments, it's adding the insult of abused trust to the injury of heavy losses.

What's likely to happen next?
Spitzer and other securities regulators are likely to announce the alleged involvement of more fund companies. If individual investors believe fund companies abused their trust, they are likely to call for more regulation and stiff penalties. Potentially they could pull their money out of funds en masse, forcing portfolio managers to liquidate stocks to fund redemptions. That could be very disruptive to financial markets.

Another possibility is that the stock market continues to rise on the back of a stronger economy and a jump in corporate profits. Fund investors might be willing to ignore past losses due to illegal and unethical trading practices because they're pleased with the current gains their funds are providing. For now, that's clearly what the embattled mutual-fund industry hopes will happen.


Invest in Hedge Funds at Your Own Peril

"Hedge Fund Hoopla Be unafraid; be very unafraid," The Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2006 --- http://www.opinionjournal.com/weekend/hottopic/?id=110008598

Politicians are drawn to piles of unregulated money like, well, politicians to TV cameras. So it was only a matter of time before Congress took aim at the $2.4 trillion hedge fund industry.

The Senate Judiciary Committee held a hedge fund hearing this week, with its star witness one Gary Aguirre, a former SEC investigator who said superiors quashed a probe into insider trading at Pequot Capital. Pequot has vigorously denied the claims, and insider trading is already illegal. But the ubiquitous Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal was nonetheless on hand, in range of TV cameras, to claim that hedge funds are a "regulatory black hole." The Senators were also very concerned, no doubt prepping for the day when a few of these pools of private investment capital go belly up.

So maybe it's time to step back and recall that we've all been at this cab stand before. In 1999, a year after Long Term Capital Management blew up, the President's Working Group on Financial Markets released the results of its top-to-bottom probe of hedge funds. This was no lightweight body, containing as it did Alan Greenspan, Robert Rubin and former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt. Its findings argued so strongly against meddling in this source of market liquidity and efficiency that even the Clinton Administration gave regulation a pass.

The working group focused on a concern that is often heard today, which is that too much hedge fund borrowing could lead to systemic market risk. Highly leveraged investors are always more vulnerable to market shocks. And if forced to liquidate their often-huge positions, their losses could cascade throughout the financial system.

But the working group found that Long Term Capital was unique. The best way to guard against hedge fund meltdowns is a system in which the counterparties (bankers, broker-dealers) that lend to or borrow from hedge funds impose due diligence. In Long Term Capital's case, many counterparties were so impressed by that giant fund's reputation that they "did not ask sufficiently tough questions," as Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke put it in a speech this May.

Such laxity is a problem, but the answer isn't necessarily more direct regulation. The working group recognized that, in the complicated and fast-moving world of financial derivatives, the best way to guard against future blowups is to ensure the market itself imposes more discipline. It recommended that hedge funds provide better disclosure to their counterparties, and that regulators ensure that counterparties have systems and policies that identify warning signs and restrain excessive leverage.

The regulators have since complied, issuing risk-management guidance so bank supervisors now consider it a primary duty to monitor hedge-fund dealings. The SEC also stepped up its inspection of broker-dealers. Many counterparties now require hedge funds to post more collateral to cover potential exposure. And institutions and regulators are all trying to improve weak areas--say, understanding the risks in such new financial products as credit derivatives. For a "black hole," this sure has a lot of foot traffic.

Hedge funds offer high returns, but they also take big risks, and some failures are inevitable. That's especially true when the Fed is raising rates and credit is getting tighter. But while hedge funds have multiplied since 1999, the funds that have failed have done so with barely a market ripple. This suggests the Clinton working group's strategy is working.

The Clintonians also argued that direct hedge fund regulation would have significant costs, such as reducing the liquidity crucial to robust financial markets. And in his recent speech, Mr. Bernanke noted how difficult it would be for any regulator to monitor hedge fund trading strategies that change rapidly and are enormously complex.

A more recent complaint about hedge funds is that they are becoming ever more available to Mom and Pop investors, not merely to the superrich. But a 2003 SEC report found that funds are still dominated by big institutional investors--pension funds, endowments, and the like. Rich individuals and families supplied 42% of hedge fund assets, although that share is declining.

Pension funds do contain Mom and Pop retirement assets. But the focus of regulators should be on the pension fund managers for taking a flyer on hedge funds, not on the funds for taking the money. As for those who claim hedge funds are run by rogues, the SEC report noted that it could find "no evidence indicating that hedge funds or their advisers engage disproportionately in fraudulent activity."

Alas, none of this common sense stopped the SEC from plunging ahead in 2004 in an attempt to begin regulating hedge funds. But that attempt was overruled this month as an illegal power grab by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which throws the matter once more into the tender arms of Congress.

Hedge funds are easy political targets because they aren't sold to the general public and aren't well understood. But the regulators at the Fed and Treasury who are paid to watch the financial system understand that they provide far more benefits than risks. Congress should tread carefully, if it treads at all.

You can read about the Long Term Capital (Trillion Dollar Bet) scandal at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#LTCM


Questions
Do your students know the difference between mutual funds and hedge funds?
Do your students really understand how Ponzi schemes work?
Start with (gasp) Wikipedia.

The Worst Sack Ever on John Elway (former All-Pro Quarterback in the Mile-High City)
Elway Got Schemered!
Stanford Graduates Should Know Better
"John Elway Invested $15 MILLION With Alleged Ponzi Schemer," Huffington Post, October 14, 2010 ---
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/14/john-elway-invested-15-mi_n_762663.html

John Elway Invested $15 MILLION With Alleged Ponzi Schemer

diggfacebook Twitter stumble reddit del.ico.us What's Your Reaction? .Amazing Inspiring Funny Scary Hot Crazy Important Weird Read More: Elway 15 Million, John Elway, Mitchell Pierce, Ponzi Scheme, Sean Michael Mueller, Sean Mueller, Denver News 10 views Get Denver Alerts Email Comments 17 DENVER — Former Denver Broncos quarterback John Elway and his business partner gave $15 million to a hedge-fund manager now accused of running a Ponzi scheme.

The Denver Post reported Thursday that Elway and Mitchell Pierce filed a motion saying they wired the money to Sean Michael Mueller in March. They said Mueller agreed to hold the money in trust until they agreed on where it would be invested.

A state investigator says 65 people invested $71 million with Mueller's company over 10 years and it only had $9.5 million in assets in April and $45 million in liabilities.

Elway's filing asks that the court put their claims ahead of others so they can collect their money first. His lawyer declined to comment.

Jensen Comment
It's hard to feel sorry for rich people who play in games without rules (hedge funds)
Better to play in games with rules and stand behind 325 lb linemen with missing teeth, BO, and noses that look like corkscrews.

Bob Jensen's fraud updates ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on Hedge Funds are under the H-term at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm
Note that hedge funds may have nothing to do with hedging.

Bob Jensen's threads on Ponzi schemes are at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#Ponzi

 


From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on September 9, 2005

TITLE: Lifting the Curtains on Hedge-Fund Window Dressing
REPORTER: Jesse Eisinger
DATE: Jul 09, 2005
PAGE: C1
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB112605873549333575,00.html 
TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Investments, Auditing

SUMMARY: Eisinger analyzes stock price jumps on August 31 and argues that the phenomena may be indicative of window-dressing at one particular hedge fund.

QUESTIONS:
1.) What are the three types of investment portfolios identified in the accounting literature? What type of investment portfolio is discussed in this article?

2.) Describe the accounting for the three types of investment portfolios. What is the biggest difference in the accounting practices' effect on reported profits?

3.) Define the term "window dressing." How does that issue relate to using market values for financial reporting and to their impact on performance shown in the income statement?

4.) Suppose you are an auditor for the hedge-fund identified in this article. How would you assess the potential impact of these issues on your audit procedures? Would you react to the information published? Identify all steps you might take both in your audit steps within the hedge-fund and any external steps you might consider.

Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

 

Hedged Item --- See Hedge Accounting 

Held-to-Maturity (HTM) =

is one of three classifications of securities investments under SFAS 115.  Securities designated as "held-to-maturity" need not be revalued for changes in market value and are maintained at historical cost-based book value.  Securities not deemed as being held-to-maturity securities are adjusted for changes in fair value.  Whether or not the unrealized holding gains or losses affect net income depends upon whether these are classified as trading securities versus available-for-sale securities.   Holding gains and losses on available-for-sale securities are deferred in comprehensive income instead of being posted to current earnings.  The three classifications are of vital importance to cash flow hedge accounting under FAS 133.

Flow Chart for HTM Hedge Accounting --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133flow.htm 

The distinction is important under FAS 133, because held-to-maturity securities need not be revalued in interim periods with unrealized gains and losses going to current earnings (for trading investments) or comprehensive income (for available-for-sale investments).   The FASB clung to its disallowance of either cash flow or fair value hedge accounting under FAS 133 for held-to-maturity investments.

Held-to-maturity securities may not be hedged for cash flow risk according to Paragraphs 426-431 beginning on Page 190 of FAS 133.  Suppose a firm has a forecasted transaction to purchase a held-to-maturity bond investment denominated in a foreign currency. Under SFAS 115, the bond will eventually, after the bond purchase, be adjusted to fair value on each reporting date. As a result, any hedge of the foreign currency risk exposure to cash flows cannot receive favorable cash flow hedge accounting under FAS 133 rules (as is illustrated in Example 6 beginning on Page 265 of the Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998. Before the bond is purchased, its forecasted transaction is not allowed to be a cash flow hedged item under Paragraph 29d on Page 20 of FAS 133 since, upon execution of the transaction, the bond "will subsequently be remeasured with changes in fair value. Also see Paragraph 36 on Page 23 of FAS 133.  Similar international rulings apply under IAS 39.  Unlike originated loans and receivables, a held-to-maturity investment cannot be a hedged item with respect to interest-rate risk because designation of an investment as held-to-maturity involves not accounting for associated changes in interest rates.  However, a held-to-maturity investment can be a hedged item with respect to risks from changes in foreign currency exchange rates and credit risk (IAS 39 Paragraph 127).

FAS 133 Paragraph 21d reads as follows:

If the hedged item is all or a portion of a debt security (or a portfolio of similar debt securities) that is classified as held-to-maturity in accordance with FASB Statement No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, the designated risk being hedged is the risk of changes in its fair value attributable to changes in the obligor's creditworthiness or if the hedged item is an option component of a held-to- maturity security that permits its prepayment, the designated risk being hedged is the risk of changes in the entire fair value of that option component. (The designated hedged risk for a held-to-maturity security may not be the risk of changes in its fair value attributable to changes in market interest rates or foreign exchange rates. If the hedged item is other than an option component that permits its prepayment, the designated hedged risk also may not be the risk of changes in its overall fair value.)

Paragraph 428 beginning on Page 190 of FAS 133 reads as follows (where the "Board" is the FASB):

The Board continues to believe that providing hedge accounting for a held-to- maturity security conflicts with the notion underlying the held-to-maturity classification in Statement 115 if the risk being hedged is the risk of changes in the fair value of the entire hedged item or is otherwise related to interest rate risk. The Board believes an entity's decision to classify a security as held-to-maturity implies that future decisions about continuing to hold that security will not be affected by changes in market interest rates. The decision to classify a security as held-to-maturity is consistent with the view that a change in fair value or cash flow stemming from a change in market interest rates is not relevant for that security. In addition, fair value hedge accounting effectively alters the traditional income recognition pattern for that debt security by accelerating gains and losses on the security during the term of the hedge into earnings, with subsequent amortization of the related premium or discount over the period until maturity. That accounting changes the measurement attribute of the security away from amortized historical cost. The Board also notes that the rollover of a shorter term liability that funds a held-to-maturity security may be eligible for hedge accounting. The Board therefore decided to prohibit both a fixed-rate held-to- maturity debt security from being designated as a hedged item in a fair value hedge and the variable interest receipts on a variable-rate held-to-maturity security from being designated as hedged forecasted transactions in a cash flow hedge if the risk being hedged includes changes in market interest rates.

 

 

Paul Pacter states the following at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm 

IAS 39
If an enterprise is prohibited from classifying financial assets as held-to-maturity because it has actually sold some such assets before maturity, that prohibition expires at the end of the second financial year following the premature sales.

FAS 133
FASB standard is silent as to whether or when such "tainting" is ever cured.

A Message from K Badrinath on January 25, 2002

Dear Mr. Jensen:

To cut a potentially long introduction short, I am associated with the leading vendor of treasury software in India, Synergy Log-In Systems Ltd. Shall be glad to share more on that with you should you be interested.

The reason for writing this is, while negotiating the minefield called FAS 133, courtesy your wonderful Glossary on the net, I came across apparantly contradictory statements under two different heads about whether held-to-maturity securities can be hedged items:

HELD-TO-MATURITY 
Unlike originated loans and receivables, a held-to-maturity investment cannot be a hedged item with respect to interest-rate risk because designation of an investment as held-to-maturity involves not accounting for associated changes in interest rates. However, a held-to-maturity investment can be a hedged item with respect to risks from changes in foreign currency exchange rates and credit risk

AVAILABLE-FOR-SALE 
Held-to-maturity securities can also be FAS 133-allowed hedge items.

Help!!

K. Badrinath

Hello K. Badrinath,

I think your confusion comes from the fact that FAS 138 amended Paragraph 21(d) as noted below.

Original Paragraph 21(d) .
If the hedged item is all or a portion of a debt security (or a portfolio of similar debt securities) that is classified as held-to-maturity in accordance with FASB Statement No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, the designated risk being hedged is the risk of changes in its fair value attributable to changes in the obligor's creditworthiness or if the hedged item is an option component of a held-to- maturity security that permits its prepayment, the designated risk being hedged is the risk of changes in the entire fair value of that option component. (The designated hedged risk for a held-to-maturity security may not be the risk of changes in its fair value attributable to changes in market interest rates or foreign exchange rates. If the hedged item is other than an option component that permits its prepayment, the designated hedged risk also may not be the risk of changes in its overall fair value.)

FAS 138 Amendment of Paragraph 21(d)"
[Hedged Item] If the hedged item is all or a portion of a debt security (or a portfolio of similar debt securities) that is classified as held-to-maturity in accordance with FASB Statement No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, the designated risk being hedged is the risk of changes in its fair value attributable to credit risk,
foreign exchange risk, or both.

Related paragraph changes are noted in Appendix B of FAS 138.

Hedge accounting for held-to-maturity securities under FAS 133 is especially troublesome for me.  You can get hedge accounting treatment for for creditworthiness risk and certain prepayment option fair value changes, but you cannot get hedge accounting for interest rate risk.  The FASB reasoning is spelled out in Paragraphs 426-431.  

Keep in mind, however, that the derivative used to hedge a held-to-maturity security must be adjusted to fair value at least every 90 days with changes it its value going to current earnings.  

Hedges of securities classified as available-for-sale do not take the same beating under FAS 133.  Without a hedge, FAS 115 rules require changes in value of AFS investments to be booked, but the offset is to OCI rather than current earnings.  Paragraph 23 of FAS 133 reads as follows:

Paragraph 23
If a hedged item is otherwise measured at fair value with changes in fair value reported in other comprehensive income (such as an available-for-sale security), the adjustment of the hedged item's carrying amount discussed in paragraph 22 shall be recognized in earnings rather than in other comprehensive income in order to offset the gain or loss on the hedging instrument

Foreign currency risk is somewhat different under Paragraph 38 for AFS securities.

 

Some key paragraphs from FAS 133 are as follows:

Paragraph 54
At the date of initial application, an entity may transfer any held-to-maturity security into the available-for-sale category or the trading category. An entity will then be able in the future to designate a security transferred into the available-for-sale category as the hedged item, or its variable interest payments as the cash flow hedged transactions, in a hedge of the exposure to changes in market interest rates, changes in foreign currency exchange rates, or changes in its overall fair value. (paragraph 21(d) precludes a held-to- maturity security from being designated as the hedged item in a fair value hedge of market interest rate risk or the risk of changes in its overall fair value. paragraph 29(e) similarly precludes the variable cash flows of a held-to-maturity security from being designated as the hedged transaction in a cash flow hedge of market interest rate risk.) The unrealized holding gain or loss on a held-to-maturity security transferred to another category at the date of initial application shall be reported in net income or accumulated other comprehensive income consistent with the requirements of paragraphs 15(b) and 15(c) of Statement 115 and reported with the other transition adjustments discussed in paragraph 52 of this Statement. Such transfers from the held-to-maturity category at the date of initial adoption shall not call into question an entity's intent to hold other debt securities to maturity in the future. 

Paragraphs 426-431

Prohibition against Hedge Accounting for Hedges of Interest Rate Risk of Debt Securities Classified as Held-to-Maturity

426. This Statement prohibits hedge accounting for a fair value or cash flow hedge of the interest rate risk associated with a debt security classified as held-to-maturity pursuant to Statement 115. During the deliberations that preceded issuance of Statement 115, the Board considered whether such a debt security could be designated as being hedged for hedge accounting purposes. Although the Board's view at that time was that hedging debt securities classified as held-to-maturity is inconsistent with the basis for that classification, Statement 115 did not restrict hedge accounting of those securities because constituents argued that the appropriateness of such restrictions should be considered in the Board's project on hedging.

427. The Exposure Draft proposed prohibiting a held-to-maturity debt security from being designated as a hedged item, regardless of the risk being hedged. The Exposure Draft explained the Board's belief that designating a derivative as a hedge of the changes in fair value, or variations in cash flow, of a debt security that is classified as held-to-maturity contradicts the notion of that classification. Respondents to the Exposure Draft objected to the proposed exclusion, asserting the following: (a) hedging a held-to-maturity security does not conflict with an asserted intent to hold that security to maturity, (b) a held-to-maturity security contributes to interest rate risk if it is funded with shorter term liabilities, and (c) prohibiting hedge accounting for a hedge of a held-to-maturity security is inconsistent with permitting hedge accounting for other fixed-rate assets and liabilities that are being held to maturity.

428. The Board continues to believe that providing hedge accounting for a held-to- maturity security conflicts with the notion underlying the held-to-maturity classification in Statement 115 if the risk being hedged is the risk of changes in the fair value of the entire hedged item or is otherwise related to interest rate risk. The Board believes an entity's decision to classify a security as held-to-maturity implies that future decisions about continuing to hold that security will not be affected by changes in market interest rates. The decision to classify a security as held-to-maturity is consistent with the view that a change in fair value or cash flow stemming from a change in market interest rates is not relevant for that security. In addition, fair value hedge accounting effectively alters the traditional income recognition pattern for that debt security by accelerating gains and losses on the security during the term of the hedge into earnings, with subsequent amortization of the related premium or discount over the period until maturity. That accounting changes the measurement attribute of the security away from amortized historical cost. The Board also notes that the rollover of a shorter term liability that funds a held-to-maturity security may be eligible for hedge accounting. The Board therefore decided to prohibit both a fixed-rate held-to- maturity debt security from being designated as a hedged item in a fair value hedge and the variable interest receipts on a variable-rate held-to-maturity security from being designated as hedged forecasted transactions in a cash flow hedge if the risk being hedged includes changes in market interest rates.

429. The Board does not consider it inconsistent to prohibit hedge accounting for a hedge of market interest rate risk in a held-to-maturity debt security while permitting it for hedges of other items that an entity may be holding to maturity. Only held-to-maturity debt securities receive special accounting (that is, being measured at amortized cost when they otherwise would be required to be measured at fair value) as a result of an asserted intent to hold them to maturity.

430. The Board modified the Exposure Draft to permit hedge accounting for hedges of credit risk on held-to-maturity debt securities. It decided that hedging the credit risk of a held-to-maturity debt security is not inconsistent with Statement 115 because that Statement allows a sale or transfer of a held-to-maturity debt security in response to a significant deterioration in credit quality.

431. Some respondents to the Task Force Draft said that a hedge of the prepayment risk in a held-to-maturity debt security should be permitted because it does not contradict the entity's stated intention to hold the instrument to maturity. The Board agreed that in designating a security as held-to-maturity, an entity declares its intention not to voluntarily sell the security as a result of changes in market interest rates, and "selling" a security in response to the exercise of a call option is not a voluntary sale. Accordingly, the Board decided to permit designating the embedded written prepayment option in a held-to-maturity security as the hedged item. Although prepayment risk is a subcomponent of market interest rate risk, the Board notes that prepayments, especially of mortgages, occur for reasons other than changes in interest rates. The Board therefore does not consider it inconsistent to permit hedging of prepayment risk but not interest rate risk in a held-to-maturity security.

Paragraph 533(2)(e)
For securities classified as available-for-sale, all reporting enterprises shall disclose the aggregate fair value, the total gains for securities with net gains in accumulated other comprehensive income, and the total losses for securities with net losses in accumulated other comprehensive income, by major security type as of each date for which a statement of financial position is presented. For securities classified as held-to-maturity, all reporting enterprises shall disclose the aggregate fair value, gross unrecognized holding gains, gross unrecognized holding losses, the net carrying amount, and the gross gains and losses in accumulated other comprehensive income for any derivatives that hedged the forecasted acquisition of the held-to-maturity securities, by major security type as of each date for which a statement of financial position is presented


Held-to-maturity investments as defined in March 2003 by the FASB in an exposure draft entitled "Financial Instruments --- Recognition and Measurement," March 2003 --- http://www.cica.ca/multimedia/Download_Library/Standards/Accounting/English/e_FIRec_Mea.pdf 

.20 
An entity does not have a positive intention to hold to maturity a financial asset with a fixed maturity when any one of the following conditions is met: (a) the entity intends to hold the financial asset for an undefined period; (b) the entity stands ready to sell the financial asset (other than when a situation arises that is non-recurring and could not have been reasonably anticipated by the entity) in response to changes in market interest rates or risks, liquidity needs, changes in the availability of, and the yield on, alternative investments, changes in financing sources and terms, or changes in foreign currency risk; or (c) the issuer has a right to settle the financial asset at an amount significantly below its amortized cost. 

.21 
A debt security with a variable interest rate can satisfy the criteria for a held-to-maturity investment. Most equity securities cannot be held-to-maturity investments either because they have an indefinite life (such as common shares) or because the amounts the holder may receive can vary in a manner that is not predetermined (such as for share options, warrants, and rights). With respect to the definition of held-to-maturity investments, fixed or determinable payments and fixed maturity means a contractual arrangement that defines the amounts and dates of payments to the holder, such as interest and principal payments. A significant risk of non-payment does not preclude classification of a financial asset as held to maturity as long as its contractual payments are fixed or determinable and the other criteria for that classification are met. When the terms of a perpetual debt instrument provide for interest payments for an indefinite period, the instrument cannot be classified as held to maturity because there is no maturity date. 

.22 
The criteria for classification as a held-to-maturity investment are met for a financial instrument that is callable by the issuer when the holder intends and is able to hold it until it is called or until maturity and the holder would recover substantially all of its carrying amount. The call option of the issuer, if exercised, simply accelerates the asset’s maturity. However, when the financial asset is callable on a basis that would result in the holder not recovering substantially all of its carrying amount, the financial asset is not classified as held to maturity. The entity considers any premium paid and any capitalized transaction costs in determining whether the carrying amount would be substantially recovered. 

.23 
A financial asset that is puttable (the holder has the right to require that the issuer repay or redeem the financial asset before maturity) is classified as a held-to-maturity investment only when the holder has the positive intention and ability to hold it until maturity. 

.24 
An entity does not classify any financial assets as held to maturity when the entity has, during the current financial year or during the two preceding financial years, sold or reclassified more than an insignificant amount of held-to-maturity investments before maturity (more than insignificant in relation to the total amount of held-to-maturity investments), other than sales or reclassifications that: (a) are so close to maturity or the financial asset’s call date (for example, less than three months before maturity) that changes in the market rate of interest would not have had a significant effect on the financial asset’s fair value; (b) occur after the entity has already collected substantially all of the financial asset’s principal outstanding at acquisition (at least 85 percent) through scheduled payments or prepayments; or (c) are due to an isolated event that is beyond the entity’s control, is non-recurring and could not have been reasonably anticipated by the entity. Whenever sales or reclassifications of more than an insignificant amount of held-to-maturity investments do not meet any of the conditions in (a)-(c), any remaining held-to-maturity investments should be reclassified as available for sale. 

.25 Fair value is a more appropriate measure for most financial assets than amortized cost. The held-to-maturity classification is an exception, but only when the entity has a positive intention and the ability to hold the investment to maturity. When an entity’s actions have cast doubt on its intention and ability to hold such investments to maturity, paragraph 3855.24 precludes the use of the exception for a reasonable period of time. 

.26 
A “disaster scenario” that is extremely remote, such as a run on a bank or a similar situation affecting an insurance company, is not something that is assessed by an entity in deciding whether it has the positive intention and ability to hold an investment to maturity. 

.27 
Sales before maturity could satisfy the condition in paragraph 3855.24 — and therefore not raise a question about the entity’s intention to hold other investments to maturity — when they are due to any of the following: 

(a) A significant deterioration in the issuer’s creditworthiness. For example, a sale following a downgrade in a credit rating by an external rating agency would not necessarily raise a question about the entity’s intention to hold other investments to maturity when the downgrade provides evidence of a significant deterioration in the issuer’s creditworthiness judged by reference to the credit rating at initial recognition. Similarly, when an enterprise uses internal ratings for assessing exposures, changes in those internal ratings may help to identify issuers for which there has been a significant deterioration in creditworthiness, provided the entity’s approach to assigning internal ratings and changes in those ratings give a consistent, reliable, and objective measure of the credit quality of the issuers. When there is evidence that a financial asset is impaired (see paragraph 3855.A44), the deterioration in creditworthiness often is regarded as significant. 

(b) A change in tax law that eliminates or significantly reduces the tax exempt status of interest on the held-to-maturity investment (but not a change in tax law that revises the marginal tax rates applicable to interest income). 

(c) A major business combination or major disposal (such as sale of a segment) that necessitates the sale or transfer of held-to-maturity investments to maintain the entity’s existing interest rate risk position or credit risk policy (although the business combination itself is an event within the entity’s control, the changes to its investment portfolio to maintain an interest rate risk position or credit risk policy may be consequential rather than anticipated). 

(d) A change in statutory or regulatory requirements significantly modifying either what constitutes a permissible investment or the maximum level of particular types of investments, thereby causing an entity to dispose of a held-to-maturity investment. 

(e) A significant increase in the industry’s regulatory capital requirements that requires the entity to downsize by selling held-to-maturity investments. 

(f) A significant increase in the risk weights of held-to-maturity investments used for regulatory risk-based capital purposes that requires the entity to sell held-to-maturity investments. 

.28 An entity does not have a demonstrated ability to hold to maturity an investment in a financial asset with a fixed maturity when either of the following conditions is met: (a) it does not have the financial resources available to continue to finance the investment until maturity; or (b) it is subject to an existing legal or other constraint that could frustrate its intention to hold the financial asset to maturity (however, an issuer’s call option does not necessarily frustrate an entity’s intention to hold a financial asset to maturity — see paragraph 3855.22). 

.29 Circumstances other than those described in paragraphs 3855.20-.28 can indicate that an entity does not have a positive intention or the ability to hold an investment to maturity. 

.30 An entity assesses its intention and ability to hold its held-to-maturity investments to maturity not only when those financial assets are initially recognized but also at each subsequent balance sheet date.

 

Historical Rate =

the foreign-exchange rate that prevailed when a foreign-currency asset or liability was first acquired or incurred.

Hybrid Contract

financial instrument that possesses, in varying combinations, characteristics of forward contracts, futures contracts, option contracts, debt instruments, bank depository interests, and other interests.  See embedded derivatives.

Nothing the FASB has issued with respect to derivatives makes much sense unless you go outside the FASB literature for basic terminology, most of which is borrowed from finance. A hybrid instrument is financial instrument that possesses, in varying combinations, characteristics of forward contracts, futures contracts, option contracts, debt instruments, bank depository interests, and other interests. The host contract may not be a derivative contract but may have embedded derivatives. See the definition of embedded derivative at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#EmbeddedDerivatives 

The problem is that the value of the hybrid (which may be a market price or transaction price) is often difficult to bifurcate into component values when the components themselves are not traded on the market on their own. An excellent paper on how to value some bifurcated components is provided in "Implementation of an Option Pricing-Based Bond Valuation Model for Corporate Debt and Its Components," by M.E. Barth, W.R. Landsman, and R.J. Rendleman, Jr., Accounting Horizons, December 2000, pp. 455-480.

Some firms contend that the major problem they are having in implementing FAS 133 or IAS 39 lies in having to review virtually every financial instrument in search of embedded derivatives and then trying to resolve whether bifurcation is required or not required. Many of the embedded derivatives are so "closely related" that bifurcation is not required. See "closely related" in http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm 

Also listen to executives and analysts discuss the bifurcation problem in http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/000overview/mp3/133summ.htm 

Detecting derivatives and embedded derivatives to account for worldwide (bifurcation)

Bob Jensen

May 6, 2002 message from George Lan

I am trying to read the FASB draft (Questions and Answers Related to Derivative Financial Instruments Held or Entered into by a Qualifying Special-Purpose Entity (SPE))  and got stumped right at the beginning. Perhaps someone on the list can clarify these sentences for me: "Under FASB 133, hybrid instruments that must be bifurcated contain two components for accounting purpose-- a derivative financial instrument and a nonderivative host contract....Hybrid instruments that are not bifurcated ... are not considered to be derivative instruments." I am familiar with split accounting (methods of splitting the financial instrument into its bond and equity components, e.g) and with most of the common derivative contracts such as futures, forwards, options, swaps but am ignorant about hybrid instruments and why they must be or do not have to be bifurcated and would certainly appreciate some examples and assistance from AECMers.

I am also a little familiar with much of the derivative jargon, but expressions like "the floor purchased..." could perhaps be clarified to make the draft easier to read and understand by a wider audience.

Just a couple of thoughts,

George Lan 
University of Windsor

 

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |

I-Terms

IAS 39 = see International Accounting Standards Committee

IASB/IASC = see International Accounting Standards Committee

IFAC = see International Federation of Accountants Committee.

Illustrations (Selected) 

Bob Jensen's illustrations --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

FAS 133 trips up Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

FAS 133 trips up Reliant Resources --- See Comprehensive Income 

Ineffective Hedges at Wells Fargo --- See Ineffectiveness 

Horizon --- see Risk Metrics 

Disclosure illustrations --- See Disclosure 

Impairment = see hedge accounting.

Index (Indices) =

is a term used in FAS 133 to usually refer to the underlying (e.g a commodity price, LIBOR, or a foreign currency exchange rate) of a derivative contract.  By "indexed" it is meant that an uncertain economic event that is measured by an economic index (e.g., a credit rating index, commodity price index, convertible debt, equity index, or inflation index) defined in the contract.  An equity index might be defined as a particular index derived from common stock price movements such as the Dow Industrial Index or the Standard and Poors 500 Index.   FAS 133 explicitly does not allow some indices such as natural indices (e.g., average rainfall) and contingency consideration indices (e.g., lawsuit outcomes, sales levels, and contingent rentals) under Paragraphs 11c and 61)

Paragraph 252 on Page 134 of FAS 133 mentions that the FASB considered expanding the underlying to include all derivatives based on physical variables such as rainfall levels, sports scores, physical condition of an asset, etc., but this was rejected unless the derivative itself is exchange traded.  For example, a swap payment based upon a football score is not subject to FAS 133 rules.  An option that pays damages based upon the bushels of corn damaged by hail is subject to insurance accounting rules (SFAS 60) rather than FAS 133.  A option or swap payment based upon market prices or interest rates must be accounted for by FAS 133 rules.  However, if derivative itself is exchange traded, then it is covered by FAS 133 even if it is based on a physical variable that becomes exchange traded.   See  derivative, inflation indexed, LIBOR,  and underlyingUnlike FAS 133, IAS 39 makes explicit reference also to an insurance index or catastrophe loss index and a climatic or geological condition.

The following Section c in Paragraph 65 on Page 45 of FAS 133 is of interest with respect to a premium paid for a forward or futures contract:

c. Either the change in the discount or premium on the forward contract is excluded from the assessment of effectiveness and included directly in earnings pursuant to Paragraph 63 or the change in expected cash flows on the forecasted transaction is based on the forward price for the commodity.

KPMG notes that if the hedged item is a portfolio of assets or liabilities based on an index, the hedging instrument cannot use another index even though the two indices are highly correlated.  See Example 7 on Page 222 of the Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998.

See DIG Issue B10 under embedded derivatives.

See equity-indexed and index amortizing.

Index-Amortizing =

a changing interest rate based upon some index such as LIBOR.  For example, an index-amortizing interest rate swap cannot usually be accounted for as a derivative instrument (pursuant to FAS 133 under Paragraph 12 on Page 7 of FAS 133) when it is a derivative embedded in another derivative.  Suppose a company swaps a variable rate for a fixed rate on a notional of $10 million.  If an embedded derivative in the contract changes the notional to $8 million if LIBOR falls below 6% and $12 million if LIBOR rises above 8%, this index-amortizing embedded derivative cannot be separated under Paragraph 12 rules.  KPMG states that Paragraph 12 applies only "when a derivative is embedded in a nonderivative instrument and illustrates this with an index-amortizing Example 29 beginning on Page 75 of the Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998.    The prior Example 28 and the subsequent Example 30 illustrate index-amortizing embedded derivatives that qualifies since, in each example, the derivative is embedded in a nonderivative instrument.  See equity-indexed.

   

Ineffectiveness =

degree ex ante to which a hedge fails to meet its goals in protecting against risk (i.e., degree to which the hedge fails to correlate perfectly with the underlying value changes or forecasted transaction prices.  According to Paragraphs 20 on Page 11 and 30 on Page 21 of FAS 133, ineffectiveness is to be defined ex ante at the time the hedge is undertaken.  Hedging strategy and ineffectiveness definition with respect to a given hedge defines the extent to which interim adjustments affect interim earnings.   Hedge effectiveness requirements and accounting are summarized in Paragraphs 62-103 beginning on Page 44 of FAS 133.  An illustration of intrinsic value versus time value accounting is given in Example 9 of  FAS 133, Pages 84-86, Paragraphs 162-164.  In Example 9, the definition of ineffectiveness in terms of changes in intrinsic value of a call option results in changes in intrinsic value each period being posted to other comprehensive income rather than earnings.  In Examples 1-8 in Paragraphs 104-161, designations as to fair value versus cash flow hedging affects the journal entries.  See hedge and hedge accounting.

One means of documenting hedge effectiveness is to compare the cumulative dollar offset defined as the cumulative value over a succession of periods (e.g., quarters) in which the cumulative gains and losses of the derivative instrument are compared with the cumulative gains and losses in value of the hedged item.  n assessing the effectiveness of a hedge, an enterprise will generally need to consider the time value of money according to FAS 133 Paragraph 64 and IAS 39 Paragraph 152.

"Hedge Effectiveness Testing Revisited," by Ira Kawaller and Paul Koch, Journal of Derivatives, September 2013 ---
http://kawaller.com/hedge-effectiveness-testing-revisited/?utm_source=September+20%2C+2013&utm_campaign=9%2F10%2F13&utm_medium=email

Jensen Comment
One of the areas where the IASB and FASB have diverged is in the area of hedge effectiveness testing. The IASB plays loosey-goosey on this one with the so-called principles-based standard that will roll along when IAS 9 comes into play. To me this means that one company's effective hedge is ineffective in another company.

The IASB is tougher on the shortcut method and does not allow the shortcut method for interest rate swap hedge effectiveness testing.

The FASB still has a rules-based effectiveness testing standard, but there is more looseness allowed in such tests than I would like. Kawaller and Koch have renewed our focus on hedge effectiveness testing that that can greatly affect partitioning huge amounts of derivatives instruments gains and losses between OCI and current earnings.


Teaching Case
Cost Accounting and Inventory Valuation
by Bob Jensen: 
Differences Between Mark-to-Market Accounting for Derivative Contracts Versus Commodity Inventories
---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Mark-to-MarketCorn.htm


"FASB Proposed Modifications to Hedge Accounting: Good Thing, Bad Thing, or Just a Thing?* by Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, August 22, 2016 ---
http://accountingonion.com/2016/08/fasb-proposed-modifications-to-hedge-accounting-good-thing-bad-thing-or-just-a-thing.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+typepad%2Ftheaccountingonion+%28The+Accounting+Onion%29

If we don’t destroy ourselves first, we will someday discover intelligent life on another planet.  But when we do, the chances are about one in a billion that we’ll find hedge accounting standards more complex than our own.

Now would also be as good a time as any to peel the onion on hedge accounting since the FASB has recently reached a consensus on a revisions to rules that have been in place since the issuance of SFAS 133 in 1998.

The Basics

At the risk of oversimplifying, the FASB addressed three problems in SFAS 133:

First, there was the problem of accounting for derivatives, which without additional guidance would be measured at historic cost. Historic cost accounting is always suboptimal, but it is especially problematic when it comes to derivatives.  Consider, for example, a financial institution with $9 billion in liabilities covered by $10 billion of assets. Next, assume that said financial institution enters into a (near) cashless interest rate swap with a notional amount of $10 billion — or a credit default swap, or a commodities future contract.  Basically, it enters into  any kind of financial derivative contract, I don’t care which.

All accounting measurement conventions applied to this derivative would produce a net value of (near) zero at inception because the present value of the contract’s receivable leg would be (nearly) equal to its payable leg.  But, should the “underlying” of the contract (e.g., an interest rate, a commodity price, a credit rating) change even a tiny bit, there will be a large change in the fair value of the derivative contract —  owing to its relatively large national amount .

You don’t need to be a derivatives expert to figure out what’s going on here: derivative contracts are the soft underbelly of historic cost accounting.  Failure to recognize the economic effects of the market risks from being a party to a derivative contract renders the entire endeavor of accounting for entities like this hypothetical financial institution an utter sham.  Consequently, the FASB correctly decided that interests in derivative contracts must be, without exception, measured at fair value.

First problem solved.  But, it creates two additional and related problems, which I will call Problems 2a and 2b:

Problem 2a is how to deal with the irony that if a company were to enter into a derivative contract reduce a source of risk — i.e., reducing the volatility of future enterprise value — then marking a derivative to market through net income could be expected to increase the volatility of future net income.  This could be the case if GAAP requires that the item creating the risk in the first place (e.g., a commodity held as inventory or a fixed-rate mortgage loan) is measured at historic cost.

Problem 2a was addressed in SFAS 133 by the so-called “fair value hedge accounting” treatment if the source of the risk is the change in the fair value of a recognized asset, liability, or “firm commitment.” The issuer may elect to offset the gain/loss recognized in income on the derivative with an offsetting change to the hedged item.

Fair value hedging might seem like a reasonable accounting treatment, but there are a number questionable aspects to it.  Two of these are:

Inconsistencies in measurement — Assets, liabilities and firm commitments that happen to be linked with a derivative in fair value hedge accounting are measured one way, and unlinked items are measured another way.  Moreover, an added source of inconsistency exists since “special” hedge accounting is optional. For example, both Kellogg and General Mills report that they hedge their commodities positions with derivatives.  But Kellogg uses hedge accounting and General Mills doesn’t.  Obviously, this is not helpful when trying to analyze the differences in their gross margins.

Arbitrary measurement — The measurement of the assets and liabilities in the hedging relationship are neither historic cost nor fair value.  They are something in between — what former FASB member Tom Linsmeier dubbed “mutt accounting.”  This is not much different than the insane numbers generated by the FASB’s treatment of foreign subsidiaries set forth in SFAS 52, and which I described in a recent post as one of the worst and most divisive accounting standards ever written.  One of the reasons I was particularly harsh in my assessment of SFAS 52 is because I don’t think that the SFAS 133 fair value hedge accounting provisions would have been at all palatable (or even considered) if SFAS 52 had not opened up a Pandora’s box of arbitrary accounting measurements.  (And, as we will see later in this post, it also legitimized the concept of dirty surplus — euphemistically termed “other comprehensive income).

Problem 2b is that if a company were to enter into a derivative contract for the purposes of risk reduction, but the risk was not a recognized asset, liability or firm commitment, then marking the derivative to market through net income would again increase the volatility of future net income.  However, fair value hedging would not be an effective solution since there is no recognized hedged item on which the offsetting changes could be lumped into.

The solution to Problem 2b that the FASB came up with is known as “cash flow hedging.” It temporarily parks the portions of the gains/losses on marking the derivative to market that are actually “effective” (more on that term later) as a hedge in Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income (AOCI). When the risk being hedged actually hits the income statement, the appropriate offsetting amounts in AOCI are transferred to net income.

Are you with me so far?  These are just the first layers of the onion.  I still have to tell you about additional provisions that can make hedge accounting very difficult to pull off in practice.  Many of these details

Continued in article

August 22, 2016 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Tom,

In the past your alternatives for derivatives contract accounting did not distinguish between speculation and hedging with those contracts. Until you show me an a derivatives contract accounting alternative that does so I will prefer FAS 133 or IFRS 9. Simply appealing to "full disclosure" is a cop out since annual reports with over a million footnotes are not practical.

 

Your statement that General Mills hedges with derivatives without applying FAS 133 is misleading. General Mills applies FAS 133 in a backhanded way. I do not think that any company can  simply ignore FAS 133 for derivative contracts scoped into FAS 133. Here's what General Mills says about using hedge accounting ---
http://sec.edgar-online.com/general-mills-inc/8-k-current-report-filing/2008/09/17/section10.aspx

 

Regardless of designation for accounting purposes, we (at General Mills)   believe all of our commodity hedges are economic hedges of our risk exposures, and as a result we consider these derivatives to be hedges for purposes of measuring segment operating performance. Thus, these gains and losses are reported in unallocated corporate expenses outside of segment operating results until such time that the exposure we are hedging affects earnings. At that time we reclassify the hedge gain or loss from unallocated corporate expenses to segment operating profit, allowing our operating segments to realize the economic effects of the hedge without experiencing any resulting mark-to-market volatility, which remains in unallocated corporate expenses. We no longer have any open commodity derivatives previously accounted for as cash flow hedges.

Continued in article

 

Note that General Mills is trying to exclude those mark-to-market earning fictions I've talked about in our past debates.

 

From what I can tell I pretty much go along with the proposed 2016 revisions in FAS 133 even though I hate some of the previous revisions in IFRS 9. You seem to think that commodity prices in Chicago can be used satisfactorily for all commodity inventories. The fact of the matter is that for most commodities there's a huge difference between commodities held as local inventory hundreds or thousands of miles from Chicago and the CBOT, CBT, CBOT, or CME prices in Chicago. Having grown up on an Iowa farm I'm well aware that the commodities we stored on the farm should not have been valued at Chicago exchange prices. Firstly, our inventories on the farm differed greatly in quality from the Chicago exchange standards.

 

We (on our Iowa farm) held these inventories sometimes because the local elevator did not want our lower quality inventories. Instead we either fed our crops to our own livestock or sold them to nearby feeders who would buy these inventories at serious price discounts. Today's corn farmers are often selling corn to nearby livestock containment feeding operations for the same reasons.



Secondly the Chicago exchange prices were quite different from local prices due to future shipping costs. If you look at the original FAS 133 Appendix illustrations of hedge ineffectiveness you will find that almost all those illustrations for commodities focused on hedge ineffectiveness due to shipping cost ---
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/rjensen/000overview/mp3/000ineff.htm
(Note that the FASB Codification does not include the Appendix illustrations that were in the original FAS 133 hard copy standard.)

 

 

Teaching Case
Cost Accounting and Inventory Valuation
by Bob Jensen: 
Differences Between Mark-to-Market Accounting for Derivative Contracts Versus Commodity Inventories ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Mark-to-MarketCorn.htm

 August 22, 2016 reply from Tom Selling

Bob,

My responses to your concerns are indented, below:

You wrote: In the past your alternatives for derivatives contract accounting did not distinguish between speculation and hedging with those contracts. Until you show me an a derivatives contract accounting alternative that does so I will prefer FAS 133 or IFRS 9.

Under extant GAAP, you can: (1) hold a freestanding derivative; (2) “hedge" and apply hedge accounting, or (3) “hedge" and not apply hedge accounting. I put “hedge” in quotes, because the FASB has not defined “hedge.” You say you are happy with SFAS 133 even though it does not, as you demand of me, distinguish between (1) and (3). That’s because the FASB no longer defines a “hedge.” Indeed, the whole purpose of SFAS 133 was to supply a hedge accounting solution without having to actually consider the difference between hedging and speculation.

You wrote: Simply appealing to "full disclosure" is a cop out since annual reports with over a million footnotes are not practical.

I did nothing of the sort. I would prefer disclosures that allow an analyst to unwind hedge accounting if they think it is a stupidity (as I do), but it is not a necessary condition. I want all commodities and financial instruments to be measured the same way. After that, feel free to screw up the income statement as much as you please.

You wrote: Your statement that General Mills hedges with derivatives without applying FAS 133 is misleading. General Mills applies FAS 133 in a backhanded way. I do not think that any company can simply ignore FAS 133 for derivative contracts scoped into FAS 133. Here's what General Mills says about using hedge accounting —

Bob, please be careful when you use the term misleading. I regard your use of the term very much like the way you took offense when you thought Zafar called you a liar. Surely, you can think of a more respectful and appropriate term than “misleading" … perhaps, “inaccurate”?

That said, I provided a link to a 10-K. It reads in relevant part as follows:

“We use derivatives to manage our exposure to changes in commodity prices. We do not perform the assessments required to achieve hedge accounting for commodity derivative positions. Accordingly, the changes in the values of these derivatives are recorded currently in cost of sales in our Consolidated Statements of Earnings.”

It appear that you provide a link to an 8-K, which I have not read. As best as I can tell, you describe GM’s presentation of segment disclosures (where departures from GAAP are permitted). That’s a far cry from the consolidated financial statements.

You wrote: From what I can tell I pretty much go along with the proposed 2016 revisions in FAS 133 even though I hate some of the previous revisions in IFRS 9. You seem to think that commodity prices in Chicago can be used satisfactorily for all commodity inventories. The fact of the matter is that for most commodities there's a huge difference between commodities held as local inventory hundreds or thousands of miles from Chicago and the CBOT, CBT, CBOT, or CME prices in Chicago. Having grown up on an Iowa farm I'm well aware that the commodities we stored on the farm should not have been valued at Chicago exchange prices. Firstly, our inventories on the farm differed greatly in quality from the Chicago exchange standards.

Again, “perfection is the enemy of the good,” even for your family farm. Do you mean to tell me that your parent’s actually gave a hoot about the historic cost of your corn after it was harvested? When they asked themselves, “how did we do?” is that what they talked about?

If you are going to provide examples of practical barriers, I suggest you use public companies. And, don’t try to tell me that Kellogg and GM don’t know the current values of their commodity inventories on a daily basis.

Best,

Tom

August 23, 2016 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Tom,

You miss the point when you say that our farm's distant (from Chicago) less than top quality corn would not be valued at Chicago exchange prices. That's my whole point. When you hedge most often it will be done with net settlement derivative contracts priced at Chicago exchange prices. This is what gives rise to hedging ineffectiveness because your local inventory valuation differs from the Chicago exchange pricing in your hedging contracts. See the definition of "ineffectiveness" under the "I" letter at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm

Therefore,  the extent your hedges are ineffective you are speculating and not hedging due to those differences in prices between your inventory valuation and Chicago exchange price valuation of your hedging contracts. To the extent hedges are effective then you are hedging and should choose to not show earnings fluctuations to the extent the hedges are effective (ala General Mills). To the extent hedges are ineffective you are speculating and should post the ineffective portion to retained earnings.

The FASB does have a definition of a derivative contract, and I elaborate on it at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm
Click on "D" and then scroll down.
For the definition of a hedging contract click on "H" and scroll down.

The IASB's definition differs somewhat from the FASB's definition of a derivative. Where it gets even messier is in the definitions of derivatives for macro hedges. A "macro" contract hedges a portfolio with multiple types of risks with a hedging instrument that only hedges one of those risks. An exception now allowed under FAS 138 (that amended FAS 133)  is a cross-currency hedge that hedges both FX risk and interest rate (price) risk simultaneously using one hedging instrument. The IASB and FASB departed when it comes to accounting for some (very limited) types of macro hedges.

Any USA company that has derivative contracts under the FASB's definition had better consult its attorneys and auditors before deciding to depart from FAS 133 and its amendments.

Are you trying to tell us that, unlike in its 8K discussion of derivative contracts, that General Mills has what the FASB calls derivatives contracts in its 10K that it elects not to account for under FAS 133 rules? I really, really doubt that!

One piece of information in the 8K is that General Mills does not hedge cash flows. If it did so it would abide by FAS 133 rules or worry about lawsuits.

To the extent that General Mills does have fair value hedging contracts meeting the FASB definition it does have to resort to FAS 133 for accounting purposes. An to the extent it acquires other types of hedging contracts (like cash flow hedges) meeting the FAS 133 definition it will resort to FAS 133 accounting whether in an 8K or a 10K.

If you find an exception in the General Mills 10K please let us and the auditors and the SEC know about it.

And my parents cared about the historic cost of corn. For one thing this affected taxes. Secondly when the great scorer comes to write against your aggregate lifetime profit the aggregate "cash in" versus the aggregate "cash out" is what determined how good you were as a farmer (adjusted of course when you butchered your own livestock to eat). All the unrealized commodity value ups and downs were fictions --- like it says in the General Mills 8K that you conveniently selected only part of to quote from my longer quotation.

Of course my parents looked at current fair values of their inventories. They even made decisions based on changes in values. But they did that in a two-column set of financial statements rather than confine themselves to one fair value column containing fiction accounting

August 23. 2016 reply from Tom Selling

Bob,

We are talking past each other. I don’t even think you read what I write, even though I specifically address each of your points. Just for one example, I did not state that the FASB doesn’t have a definition of a derivative; I stated that it does not have a definition of “hedge” apart from what “hedge accounting” is.

This is my last word on this subject.

Best,

Tom

August 23, 2016 reply from Bob Jensen

FAS 133 does not scope in weather derivatives mostly because the underlying (e.g., cumulative rainfall for the months of July and August) are not exchange traded like commodity price underlyings.

ASC 815-45 provides guidance on the financial accounting and reporting for weather derivatives

ASC 815-45 provides guidance on the financial accounting and reporting for weather derivatives.


Teaching Cases:  Hedge Accounting Scenario 1 versus Scenario 2
Two Teaching Cases Involving Southwest Airlines, Hedging, and Hedge Accounting Controversies ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/SouthwestAirlinesQuestions.htm

 

Short Summary
"Hedge Effectiveness:  The Wild Card in Accounting for Derivatives," by Ira C. Kawaller --- http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/AFP-Hedge Effectiveness.pdf
Also see http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/HedgeEffectiveness.pdf

Neither the FASB nor the IASC specify a single method for either assessing whether a hedge is expected to be highly effective or measuring hedge ineffectiveness.   Tests of hedge effectiveness should be conducted at least quarterly and on financial statement dates.  The appropriateness of a given method can depend on the nature of the risk being hedged and the type of hedging instrument used.  See FAS 133 Appendix A, Paragraph 62 and IAS 39 Paragraph 151.  

Wells Fargo: The Sunny Side of Hedge Ineffectiveness
By Ed Rombach
Link --- http://www.fas133.com/search/search_article.cfm?page=61&areaid=439 

How Wells Fargo's hedge selection benefits from current climate.

Recent media coverage of deflationary indicators like the recent CPI announcement of -.3% in October has prompted some analysts to differentiate between "bad" deflation caused by monetary policy mistakes and "good" deflation attributable to increases in labor productivity. Similarly, when it comes to risk management as practiced in accordance with FAS 133, a case can be made for differentiating between "bad" and "good" hedge ineffectiveness. Since the beginning of the year, with the most aggressive Federal Reserve rate cutting in memory, financial institutions involved in mortgage originations, securitization and retention of mortgage servicing rights (MRS) have been consistently the most prone to reporting significant hedge ineffectiveness. As the Fed cut the over night funds rate another 100 basis points during the third quarter, Wells Fargo & Co, which is included in the Portfolio of '33' took the prize for hedge ineffectiveness - the good kind.

A windfall
Specifically, Wells Fargo recognized a gain of $320 million for the third quarter in non-interest income, representing the ineffective portion of fair value hedges of mortgage servicing rights. This excess hedging gain boosted quarterly EPS by $.19 to $.68, accounting for over 23% of third quarter earnings. If only hedge ineffectiveness was always so kind.

How did Wells Fargo manage to rack up such robust fair value hedging gains relative to their mortgage servicing rights? Did they over hedge, or did the actual prepayment speed of home mortgage re-financing turn out to be less than anticipated? Perhaps it was a little bit of both.

Wells Fargos's third quarter 10Q provides some insights about their hedging methodology, indicating that the ineffectiveness windfall was primarily related to yield curve and basis spread changes that impacted favorably on the derivative hedges relative to the hedged exposures in the volatile interest rate environment.

Divergent spread movement
Subsequent, to June 30 and especially after the September 11 attacks, swap spreads were volatile but generally tended to narrow in the falling interest rate environment, as ten-year swap spreads narrowed from 90 basis points on 7/2/01 to 63 basis points on 9/28/01. If the bank had used Treasury instruments to hedge the prepayment risk on its MRS assets instead of LIBOR based products, the hedges would have under performed. However, Wells Fargo's third quarter 10Q discloses that the company uses a variety of derivatives to hedge the fair value of their MSR portfolio including futures, floors, forwards, swaps and options indexed to LIBOR.

The yield curve steepens
Moreover, the yield curve continued to steepen during the third quarter with the yield spread between ten and thirty year Treasuries widening from 33 basis points out to 88 basis points while the spread between 10yr and 30yr LIBOR swap rates widened from 28 basis points to 65 basis points. Since the ten-year maturity is the duration of choice for mortgage hedgers, it follows that these hedges would have out performed hedges with longer durations.

In connection with this, the company reported that all the components of each derivative instrument's gain or loss used for hedging mortgage servicing rights were included in the measurement of hedge ineffectiveness and was reflected in the statement of income. However, time decay (theta) and the volatility components (vega) pertaining to changes in time value of options were excluded in the assessment of hedge effectiveness. As of September 30, 2001, all designated hedges continued to qualify as fair value hedges. In addition, all components of each derivative instrument's gain or loss used to convert long term fixed rate debt into floating rate debt were also included in the assessment of hedge effectiveness.

Ineffectiveness cuts both ways
There was also some of the bad kind of hedge ineffectiveness which showed up in Wells Fargo's cash flow hedges which include futures contracts and mandatory forward contracts, including options on futures and forward contracts, all of which are used to hedge the forecasted sale of its mortgage loans. During the third quarter the company recognized a net loss of $54 million (-$.03 per share), accounting for ineffectiveness of these hedges, all component gains and losses of which were included in the assessment of hedge effectiveness.

It would appear that this hedge ineffectiveness was the flip side of the coin of the ineffectiveness on the fair value hedges because the futures contracts most commonly used to hedge this kind of pipeline risk are ten year Treasury note futures which would have tended to under-performed relative to the value of the mortgage loans, given the steepening of the yield curve and the general spread widening of mortgage rates relative to treasuries.

For example, ten year constant maturity treasury yields fell 86 basis points, from 5.44% on 7/5/01 to 4.58% on 9/27/01 in contrast to the Freddie Mac weekly survey of mortgage rates reports average 30-year fixed rate mortgages at 7.19% on 7/05/01 or a spread of 1.75% over the ten-year constant maturity treasury rates, vs. average fixed mortgage rates of 6.72% on 9/27/01 or a spread of 2.14% over ten-year treasury rates.

The net impact of the $320 million of excess gains in the fair value hedges vs. net losses of $54 million in the cash value hedges weighs in at a net hedge ineffectiveness of $271 million or almost $.16 (16 cents) per share courtesy of a Federal Reserve policy cutting interest rates with a vengeance. However, the unprecedented interest rate volatility of this period could well turn this quarter's ineffectiveness windfall into next quarter's shortfall. Risk managers should at least be able to take some comfort though from the fact that the fed can't lower interest rates below zero percent.

A Great Article!
"A Consistent Approach to Measuring Hedge Effectiveness," by Bernard Lee, Financial Engineering News --- http://www.fenews.com/fen14/hedge.html

Another Great Article With Formulas
"Complying with FAS 133 Accounting Solutions in Finance KIT," Trema, http://www.trema.com/finance_online/7/2/FAS133_FK.html?7 

During the past year Trema has worked with clients, partners and consulting firms to ensure that all Finance KIT users will be FAS 133 compliant by Summer 2000, when the new U.S. accounting standards come into effect. In Finance Line 3/99, Ms. Mona Henriksson, Director of Trema (EMEA), addressed the widespread implications the FAS 133 accounting procedures will have on the financial industry (see ‘Living Up to FAS 133’ in Finance Line 3/99). Now, in this issue, Ms. Marjon van den Broek, Vice President, Knowledge Center – Trema (Americas), addresses specific FAS 133 requirements and their corresponding functionality in Finance KIT.

See software 


One Feature of the Proposed Regulation of OTC Derivatives is Insane
OTC Derivatives Should Be Regulated in Some Respects, But They Should Never Be Standardized

PwC Notes one of the main reasons (shown in read) at Click Here

Why should the right balance be struck when it comes to regulating OTC derivatives?

Some OTC derivatives have been criticized for contributing to the financial crisis. But new proposals may affect how all derivatives are traded and designed.

Most financial derivatives have been safely and prudently used over the years by thousands of companies seeking to manage specific risks.

OTC derivatives are privately negotiated because they are often highly customized. They enable businesses to offset nearly any fi nancial risk exposure, including foreign exchange, interest rate, and commodity price risks.

Proposals to standardize terms for all OTC derivatives could inadvertently limit the ability of companies to fully manage their risks.

Jensen Comment
The reason that it would "limit the ability of companies to fully manage their risks" is that OTC derivatives are currently very popular hedging contracts because it is often possible over-the-counter to write customized hedging contracts that exactly match (in mirror form) the terms of a hedged item contract or forecasted transaction such that the hedge becomes perfectly effective over the life of the hedge.

If companies have to hedge with standardized contracts such as futures and options contracts traded on organized exchange markets it's either impossible or very difficult to obtain a perfectly matched and effective hedge. For example, corn futures are traded in contracts of 25,000 bushels for a given grade of corn. If Frito Lay wants to hedge a forecasted transaction to purchase 237,000 bushels of corn, it can only perfectly hedge 225,000 bu. with five futures contracts or 250,000 bu. with six futures contracts. Hence it's impossible to perfectly hedge 237,000 bu. with standardized contracts.

However, if Frito Lay wants to perfectly hedge 237,000 bu. of corn it can presently enter into one OTC forward contract for 237,000 bu. or an OTC options contract for 237,000 bu. If the hedged item is eventually purchased in the same geographic region as the hedging contract (such as Chicago), the hedge should be perfectly effective at all points in time during the contracted hedging period.

If the hedging contract is written in terms of a Chicago market and the corn is eventually purchased in a Minneapolis market, then their may be slight hedging ineffectiveness (due mainly to transportation cost differences between the two markets), but there is absolutely no mismatch due to quantity (notional) differences.

Why is customization so important from the standpoint of accounting and auditing?
Under FAS 133 and IAS 39, hedge accounting relief is available only to the extent hedges are deemed effective. The ineffective portion of value changes in the hedging contracts must be posted to current earnings, thereby increasing the volatility of earnings for unrealized value changes of the hedging contracts.

If new regulations requiring standardization of OTC derivatives, then the regulations themselves may dictate that many or most hedging contacts are, at least in part, ineffective. As a result reported earnings will needlessly fluctuate to a greater extent due to the regulations rather than because of economic substance. Dumb! Dumb! Dumb!

In particular, students may want to refer to the hedge accounting ineffectiveness testing Appendix B Example 7 beginning in Paragraph 144 of FAS 133 and Appendix A Example 7 beginning in Paragraph 93 of FAS 133. Bob Jensen's extensions and spreadsheet analysis of the Paragraph 144 illustration are available in Excel worksheet file 133ex07a.xls listed at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/
Sadly, the FASB left both of these examples, along with the other outstanding Appendix A and B examples out of its sparse handling of accounting for derivative financial instruments in its Codification Database.

In particular, Examples 1 thru 10 in Appendix B of FAS 133 are the best places that I know of to learn about hedge accounting and effectiveness testing. My extended analysis of each example can be found in the 133ex01a.xls thru 133ex10a.xls Excel workbooks at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/ 
My students focused heavily on those ten examples to learn about hedge accounting. They also learned from my videos 133ex05a.wmv and 133ex08a.wmv files listed at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/acct5341/

Teaching Cases:  Hedge Accounting Scenario 1 versus Scenario 2
Two Teaching Cases Involving Southwest Airlines, Hedging, and Hedge Accounting Controversies ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/SouthwestAirlinesQuestions.htm

Bob Jensen's free tutorials and videos for FAS 133 and IAS 39 are at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

 


A number of common effectiveness testing criteria used when implementing FAS 133 include the following from Quantitative Risk Management, Inc. --- http://www.qrm.com/products/mb/Rmbupdate.htm

 

FAS Effectiveness Testing --- http://www.qrm.com/products/mb/Rmbupdate.htm

To provide the maximum flexibility in testing hedge effectiveness, we now offer the following methods:

     

  • Dollar Offset (DO) calculates the ratio of dollar change in profit/loss for hedge and hedged item

     

  • Relative Dollar Offset (RDO) calculates the ratio of dollar change in net position to the initial MTM value of hedged item

     

  • Variability Reduction Measure (VarRM) calculates the ratio of the squared dollar changes in net position to the squared dollar changes in hedged item

     

  • Ordinary Least Square (OLS) measures the linear relationship between the dollar changes in hedged item and hedge. OLS calculates the coefficient of determination (R2) and the slope coefficient (ß) for effectiveness measure and accounts for the historical performance

     

  • Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) is similar to OLS, but employs median regression analysis to calculate R2 and ß.

"Hedging with Swaps: When Shortcut Accounting Can’t be Applied," by Ira G. Kawaller, Bank Asset/Liability Management, June 2003 --- http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/BALM_Hedging_with_Swaps.pdf 

For bank asset/liability management, when using derivatives, “hedge accounting” treatment is an imperative. It assures that gains or losses associated with hedging instruments will contribute to earnings simultaneously with the risks being hedged. Otherwise – i.e., without hedge accounting – these two effects will likely impact earnings in different accounting periods, resulting in an elevated level of income volatility that obscures the risk management objectives of the hedging entity. 

For most managers with interest rate exposures, the desired treatment can be assured if appropriately tailored swaps contracts serve as the hedging instrument. Under these conditions, entities may apply the “Shortcut” treatment, which essentially guarantees that the accounting results will reflect the intended economics of the hedge and that no unintended income effects will occur. For example, synthetic fixed rate debt (created by issuing variable rate debt and swapping to fixed), would generate interest expenses on the income statement that would be indistinguishable from that which would arise from traditional fixed rate funding. Synthetic instrument accounting is persevered with the shortcut treatment. Qualifying for the shortcut treatment also has another benefit of obviating the need for any effectiveness testing, thereby eliminating an administrative burden and reducing some measure of the associated hedge documentation obligation.

See Shortcut Method


Great Document
"HEAT Technical Document:  A Consistent Framework for Assessing Hedge Effectiveness Under IAS 39 and FAS 133," JPMorgan, April 24, 2003  --- http://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/BlobServer?blobtable=Document&blobcol=urlblob&blobkey=name&blobheader=application/pdf&blobwhere=jpmorgan/investbk/heat_techdoc_2Apr03.pdf 
I shortened the above URL to http://snipurl.com/JPMorganIAS39 

Chapter 1. Introduction
  
1.1 The accounting background
    1.2 Implications for corporate hedging
    1.3 What is HEAT?
    1.4 How this document is organised
    1.5 Terminology

Chapter 2. Intuition behind hedge effectiveness
   
2.1 Defining hedge effectiveness
    2.2 The concept of the 'perfect hedge'
    2.3 Evaluating effectiveness
    2.4 Calculating hedge effectiveness in economic terms
    2.5 Summary

Chapter 3. Principles of hedge effectiveness under IAS 39 and FAS 133
  
3.1 Effectiveness principles and the concept of the 'perfect hedge'
    3.2 Assessing hedge effectiveness
    3.3 Methods for testing effectiveness
    3.4 Ineffectiveness measurement and recognition
    3.5 Summary

Chapter 4. Practical issues surrounding hedge effectiveness testing
 
4.1 Example 1: The 'perfect' fair value interest-rate hedge for a bond
    4.2 Example 2: The 'perfect' fair value interest-rate hedge with payment frequency mismatches
    4.3 Example 3: The 'perfect' fair value interest-rate hedge with issuer credit spread
    4.4 Results of different types of effectiveness tests
    4.5 Discussion: Lessons for effectiveness tests

Chapter 5. HEAT: A consistent framework for hedge effectiveness testing
  
5.1 Overview of the HEAT framework
    5.2 Methodologies for hedge effectiveness
    5.3 The Ideal Designated Risk Hedge (IDRH)
    5.4 Alternative 'types' of effectiveness tests
    5.5 Example: Hedging currency risk
    5.6 Impact of hedges without hedge accounting
    5.7 Summary

References

Appendix
Glossary of working definitions

Also see Software 


Minimum value and Paragraph 63 of FAS 133
The minimum value of an American option is zero or its intrinsic value since it can be exercised at any time.  The same cannot be said for a European option that has to be held to maturity.  If the underlying is the price of corn, then the minimum value of an option on corn is either zero or the current spot price of corn minus the discounted risk-free present value of the strike price.  In other words if the option cannot be exercised early, discount the present value of the strike price from the date of expiration and compare it with the current spot price.  If the difference is positive, this is the minimum value.  It can hypothetically be the minimum value of an American option, but in an efficient market the current price of an American option will not sell below its risk free present value.

Of course the value may actually be greater due to volatility that adds value above the risk-free discount rate.  In other words, it is risk or volatility that adds value over and above a risk free alternative to investing.  However, it is possible but not all that common to exclude volatility from risk assessment as explained in Sub-paragraph b of Paragraph 63 of FAS 133 quoted below.

a. If the effectiveness of a hedge with an option contract is assessed based on changes in the option's intrinsic value, the change in the time value of the contract would be excluded from the assessment of hedge effectiveness.

b. If the effectiveness of a hedge with an option contract is assessed based on changes in the option's minimum value, that is, its intrinsic value plus the effect of discounting, the change in the volatility value of the contract would be excluded from the assessment of hedge effectiveness.

c. If the effectiveness of a hedge with a forward or futures contract is assessed based on changes in fair value attributable to changes in spot prices, the change in the fair value of the contract related to the changes in the difference between the spot price and the forward or futures price would be excluded from the assessment of hedge effectiveness.

 

TIME VALUE / VOLATILITY VALUE

Time value is the option premium less intrinsic value

Intrinsic value is the beneficial difference between the strike price and the price of the underlying

Volatility value is the option premium less the minimum value

Minimum value is present value of the beneficial difference between the strike price and the price of the underlying

FEATURES OF OPTIONS

Intrinsic Value: Difference between the strike price and the underlying price, if beneficial; otherwise zero

Time Value: Sensitive to time and volatility; equals zero at expiration

Sub-paragraph b(c) of Paragraph 63 of FAS 133

c. If the effectiveness of a hedge with a forward or futures contract is assessed based on changes in fair value attributable to changes in spot prices, the change in the fair value of the contract related to the changes in the difference between the spot price and the forward or futures price would be excluded from the assessment of hedge effectiveness.

Sub-paragraph b(a) of Paragraph 63 of FAS 133

a. If the effectiveness of a hedge with an option contract is assessed based on changes in the option's intrinsic value, the change in the time value of the contract would be excluded from the assessment of hedge effectiveness.

Sub-paragraph b(b) of Paragraph 63 of FAS 133

b. If the effectiveness of a hedge with an option contract is assessed based on changes in the option's minimum value, that is, its intrinsic value plus the effect of discounting, the change in the volatility value of the contract would be excluded from the assessment of hedge effectiveness.

 

Minimum Value

If the underlying is the price of corn, then the minimum value of an option on corn is either zero or the current spot price of corn minus the discounted risk-free present value of the strike price.  In other words if the option cannot be exercised early, discount the present value of the strike price from the date of expiration and compare it with the current spot price.  If the difference is positive, this is the minimum value.  It can hypothetically be the minimum value of an American option, but in an efficient market the current price of an American option will not sell below its risk free present value.

Minimum (Risk Free) Versus Intrinsic Value
European Call Option
X = Exercise (Strike) Price in n periods after current time 
P = Current Price (Underlying) of Commodity

I = P-X>0 is the intrinsic value using the current spot price if the option is in the money

M = is the minimum value at the current time

M>I if the option if the intrinsic value I is greater than zero.


X = $20 Exercise (Strike) Price and Minimum Value M = $10.741 
n = 1 year with risk-free rate r = 0.08 
P (Low) = $10 with PV(Low) = $9.259 
P = $20 such that the intrinsic value now is I = P-X = $10. 
Borrow P(Low), and Buy at $20 = $9.259+10.741 = PV(Low)+M 

If the ultimate price is low at $10 after one year, pay off loan at P(Low)=$10 by selling at the commodity at $10. If we also sold a option for M=$10.741, ultimately our profit would be zero from the stock purchase and option sale. If the actual option value is anything other than M=$10.741, it would be possible to arbitrage a risk free gain or loss.


 

 

 

Minimum Versus Intrinsic Value
American Call Option
X = Exercise (Strike) Price in n periods after current time 
P = Current Price (Underlying) of Commodity 

I = P-X>0 is the intrinsic value using the current spot price if the option is in the money

M = 0 is the minimum value since option can be exercised at any  time if the option’s value is less than intrinsic value I.

Value of option exceeds M and I due to volatility value

 

 

The point here is that options are certain to be effective in hedging intrinsic value, but are uncertain in terms of hedging time value at all interim points of time prior to expiration.  As a result, accounting standards require that effectiveness for hedge accounting be tested at each point in time when options are adjusted to fair value carrying amounts in the books even though ultimate effectiveness is certain.  Potential gains from options are uncertain prior to expiration.  Potential gains or losses from other types of derivative contracts are uncertain both before expiration and on the date of expiration.

Paragraph 69 of FAS 133 reads as follows [also see (IAS 39 Paragraph 152)]:

The fixed rate on a hedged item need not exactly match the fixed rate on a swap designated as a fair value hedge. Nor does the variable rate on an interest-bearing asset or liability need to be the same as the variable rate on a swap designated as a cash flow hedge. A swap's fair value comes from its net settlements. The fixed and variable rates on a swap can be changed without affecting the net settlement if both are changed by the same amount. That is, a swap with a payment based on LIBOR and a receipt based on a fixed rate of 5 percent has the same net settlements and fair value as a swap with a payment based on LIBOR plus 1 percent and a receipt based on a fixed rate of 6 percent.

Paragraph 10c of IAS 39 also addresses net settlement.  IASC does not require a net settlement provision in the definition of a derivative.  To meet the criteria for being a derivative under FAS 133, there must be a net settlement provision.  

The following Section c in Paragraph 65 of FAS 133 is of interest with respect to a premium paid for a forward or futures contract:

c. Either the change in the discount or premium on the forward contract is excluded from the assessment of effectiveness and included directly in earnings pursuant to Paragraph 63 or the change in expected cash flows on the forecasted transaction is based on the forward price for the commodity.

Paragraph 146 of IAS 39 reads as follows:

146. A hedge is normally regarded as highly effective if, at inception and throughout the life of the hedge, the enterprise can expect changes in the fair value or cash flows of the hedged item to be almost fully offset by the changes in the fair value or cash flows of the hedging instrument, and actual results are within a range of 80 per cent to 125 per cent. For example, if the loss on the hedging instrument is 120 and the gain on the cash instrument is 100, offset can be measured by 120/100, which is 120 per cent, or by 100/120, which is 83 per cent. The enterprise will conclude that the hedge is highly effective. 

Delta ratio D = (D option value)/ D hedged item value)
range [.80 < D < 1.25] or [80% < D% < 125%]     
(FAS 133 Paragraph 85)
Delta-neutral strategies are discussed at various points (e.g., FAS 133 Paragraphs 85, 86, 87, and 89)

A hedge is normally regarded as highly effective if, at inception and throughout the life of the hedge, the enterprise can expect changes in the fair value or cash flows of the hedged item to be almost fully offset by the changes in the fair value or cash flows of the hedging instrument, and actual results are within a range of 80-125% (IAS 39 Paragraph 146).  The FASB requires that an entity define at the time it designates a hedging relationship the method it will use to assess the hedge's effectiveness in achieving offsetting changes in fair value or offsetting cash flows attributable to the risk being hedged (FAS 133 Paragraph 62).  In defining how hedge effectiveness will be assessed, an entity must specify whether it will include in that assessment all of the gain or loss on a hedging instrument.  The Statement permits (but does not require) an entity to exclude all or a part of the hedging instrument's time value from the assessment of hedge effectiveness. (FAS 133 Paragraph 63).

Hedge ineffectiveness would result from the following circumstances, among others:

a) difference between the basis of the hedging instrument and the hedged item or hedged transaction, to the extent that those bases do not move in tandem.

b) differences in critical terms of the hedging instrument and hedged item or hedged transaction, such as differences in notional amounts, maturities, quantity, location, or delivery dates.

c) part of the change in the fair value of a derivative is attributable to a change in the counterparty's creditworthiness (FAS 133 Paragraph 66).

"A New Twist To Dollar Offset," by Louis Schleifer Senior Product Manager, SunGard Treasury Systems --- http://www.fas133.com/search/search_article.cfm?page=11&areaid=392 

The dollar-offset method of assessing FAS 133 effectiveness is inarguably the simplest approach available. By all accounts, it is also the one most commonly offered by system vendors and, as anecdotal evidence suggests, most commonly used by corporate hedgers. However, the basic dollar offset method has one serious drawback, namely its sensitivity to small price changes. Lou Schleifer, of SunGard Treasury Systems, argues that this flaw should not necessarily force companies to turn to alternative, statistical methods. Rather, he has developed an algorithm that modifies the dollar-offset method so as to filter-out the noise associated with small price changes.

Introduction The dollar offset is inarguably the most straightforward way to approach the assessment of retrospective and prospective effectiveness under FAS 133. But this simplicity does not come “free of charge.”

In particular, the original dollar offset approach reacts aggressively to small changes in prices, creating the potential for unwarranted noise and potential ineffectiveness. Apparently some companies and vendors are using this as a reason to abandon dollar offset entirely, in favor of statistical measures. But, it may be worthwhile to modify the dollar offset instead, and thereby retain some of its advantages (e.g., simplicity and its reliance on existing pricing data), while at the same time eliminating the possibility that immaterial price moves will trigger an ineffective result.

This sort of approach, when discussed and determined with senior management and the company’s auditors, could be used to illustrate the hedging company’s risk management approach, and could be codified into its assessment of effectiveness, in a manner consistent with FAS 133.

Simple, but… The simplicity of the dollar offset method is immediately evident in its definition (Equation 1):

Dollar Offset = [Change in Fair Value of Hedge] / [Change in Fair Value of Hedged Item]

In addition to its simplicity, the dollar-offset method has some other key advantages, including the following:

It relies upon calculations—namely change in fair value calculations—that are already a required part of FAS133 Accounting. It relies upon data—namely Fair Values of the Hedge and of the Hedged Item—that must already be captured for FAS 133 accounting; it does not rely upon externally supplied, historical data series, as many statistical methods do. It is similar to a hedge ratio calculation., but one based on observed-market values instead of projected-future-market values (for retrospective effectiveness, that is), It is sensitive to mismatches in size between the hedge and the hedged item, unlike most statistical methods. It can be easily duplicated. Unfortunately, though, there is one serious flaw with this algorithm: It exhibits unwarranted behavior when market rates stay relatively static, and therefore prices change very little over the period in question.

In this situation, intuition tells us that the price changes observed are financially immaterial—because of their relatively small size—and represent nothing more than statistical noise from an otherwise-perfect hedging relationship. As a result, one would certainly expect to have the effectiveness algorithm—whatever form it might take—return a result very close to 100 percent, as this represents a perfect value of retrospective/prospective effectiveness.

But this is not the case for dollar offset. As both the numerator and denominator in equation 1 (see above) approach zero, it is not too hard to see that their ratio can vary widely unless they coincidentally happen to approach zero in lockstep (a very unlikely occurrence indeed).

Rebuilding dollar offset from the ground up It seems that the standard reaction to this state of affairs has been to abandon the dollar-offset approach altogether, and find a different calculation (e.g., regression-analysis, or another statistical method). But there is an alternative, with some mathematical care (and flair), it is possible to fix the dollar offset algorithm to ensure that it behaves properly all of the time—even when the observed price changes are miniscule.

To this end, consider the concept of allowing the hedger to mathematically quantify his/her definition of financial immateriality (or “noise”) via a noise-threshold parameter. In other words, hedgers could determine, mathematically, the level at which price changes constitute a material change in fair value. Once this is done, the new-and-improved dollar-offset algorithm (see below) can compare the actual changes in fair value to the hedger’s noise-threshold in order to see how relevant these price changes really are in computing FAS 133 retrospective/prospective effectiveness. Depending upon the result of this comparison, the new algorithm’s behavior can be split into one of three possible regimes:

· Regime #1—Small Changes: The observed price changes are small compared to the user-defined noise-threshold, so the new algorithm should return a result very close to 100 percent (i.e., perfect effectiveness).

· Regime #2—Transition Period: The observed price changes are on the order of the user-defined noise-threshold, so the new algorithm should give a result somewhere between what it would give for Regimes #1 and #3.

· Regime #3—Large Changes: The observed price changes are large compared to the user-defined noise-threshold, and so the new algorithm should return a result very close to the dollar-offset algorithm (see equation 1, above).

To better quantify the concepts just introduced, the following definitions are made:

DFV {Financial Instrument} = Change in Fair Value of the specified Financial Instrument over the accounting period in question. NTN = user-defined value of Noise Threshold (Normalized value), quoted in basis points. This can be any positive, integral value. This variable lets the user quantitatively define his level of financial materiality. MP = Magnitude of the Prices of the financial instruments being considered. We will define this in greater detail below. NTA = Noise Threshold (Absolute value), computed as follows (Equation 2): NTA = MP * (NTN / 10,000)

Defining MP

As one can see from equation 2, above, MP measures the size of the financial instruments included in a hedging relationship. As a first approximation, one would probably think to define this size as the notional amount of the hedges (or the hedged item). But this is too primitive since it misses the impact that instrument tenor/characteristics and market rates have on defining the fair value. So, as a better approximation to measuring size, one might rather think to take the fair value of the hedges.

Unfortunately, this alternative is even worse. To see why, consider that each leg of an at-market $10 million notional Interest-Rate Swap will probably have a fair value somewhere in the ballpark range of $1 million to $5 million, but these values perfectly offset each other to result in a net fair value of zero. This exact—or almost-exact—offsetting of two large fair values is typical of many derivatives, including IR Swaps, CCIR Swaps, and FX Forwards.

The ideal approximation to measuring “size” could well be the present-value of one leg of the derivative. However, consider the complications that this definition would entail should a hedging relationship chance to have many derivatives moving into and out of it over time: This measure of size would have to be computed on one leg of each one of these derivatives, and then be prorated for the time that the respective derivative actually resided in the hedging relationship.

The best compromise is to look to the hedged item. More specifically, consider using the present-value of only that portion of the hedged item’s cash flows that are being hedged with the derivative. This should serve as a good first-order approximation to the present-value of one leg of the hedging instrument, without too much computational aggravation. Here is how to do this:

For an IR Swap: MP = Present-Value of the coupons only on the hedged item For CCIR Swap: MP = Present-Value of all cash flows on the hedged item For FX Forward or FX Option: MP = Present-Value of the foreign-currency leg only of the hedged item Looking Good With these definitions in place, the stage is now set for the “first take” on a new dollar offset algorithm. For purposes of comparison, the reader should recall the definition of the standard dollar offset algorithm, reiterated here with the new nomenclature introduced above (Equation 3):

Dollar Offset = DFV {Hedge} / DFV {Hedged-Item}

Contrast the above with the new, single-variable, dollar-offset algorithm, presented below (and developed by William Lipp [w.b.lipp@ieee.org], an independent consultant hired by SunGard):

Lipp Modulated Dollar Offset (Equation 4)=

[DFV{Hedge} + NTA] / [DFV{Hedged-Item} + NTA]

Technical Note: An implicit assumption inherent in equation (4) is that all three variables involved are nonnegative. We can assure this by taking the absolute value of each variable prior to invoking the equation. Of course, even before taking this step we must check to ensure that DFV{Hedge} and DFV{Hedged-Item} have opposite signs. If they don’t, then there’s no point to even calculating effectiveness, as we have added to our risk, not hedged it. In this case, we would simply return with an error condition (e.g., Effectiveness = 0). Note that in the “Small Changes” regime, the ratio in equation approaches

NTA / NTA = 1 = 100%

Moreover, in the “Large Changes” regime, the ratio approaches

DFV {Hedge} / DFV {Hedged-Item}

…which is nothing more than the standard dollar offset, as given in equation 3. [Equation 4 is currently supported in STS’s GTM DAS module (“GTM”=“Global Treasury Management”, and “DAS”=“Derivative Accounting System”).]

During the Transition Period, meanwhile, equation 4 exhibits a smooth transition between these two regimes. To get a better feel for the behavior of Lipp’s method, consider Figure 1: The graph therein illustrates the case of a hypothetical hedging relationship that satisfies the following criteria across a large range of possible changes in fair value (from miniscule to gargantuan):

DFV{Hedge}= 2 *DFV {Hedged-Item},

From the above, it is easy to see that:

Dollar Offset = 2 = 200%

In other words, the hypothetical hedger, in this case inexplicably used exactly twice as much hedging vehicle as was required to properly hedge the underlying risk. Although this would be an egregious mistake were it actually to occur, nevertheless, it represents an excellent test for Lipp’s method, since it poses this question: At what range of price changes should the algorithm first begin to notice this over-hedging?

Figure 1 plots three examples of equation 4, each with a distinct value of NTN. Viewing these graphs from left-to-right, the corresponding values of NTN are 10, 500, and 15,000.

The first important observation is that each of these curves makes a very smooth transition between the Small Changes regime (where effectiveness is close to 100 percent) and the Large Changes regime (where effectiveness is close to 200 percent).

But the second observation is that the user now has a “degree-of-freedom” to play with when defining this curve: The parameter NTN allows the hedger to define at what level of price changes he wants the transition to take place. [We note that the X-Axis in Figure 1 gives a new measure of the size of the observed price changes; this measure is defined below in equation 5.]

And Looking Even Better If one had to find fault with the Lipp method (equation 4), it might be the following: Although it does give the user control over defining the onset of the transition between the two regimes, it doesn’t give him any control over how fast the transition occurs. The solution is to introduce a second user-controlled variable into equation 4, as well as an additional variable that is required by the calculation:

· ST: The speed of the transition, as defined by the user. Must be a decimal value that is strictly greater than -1.

· MDP: The Magnitude of the observed Price Changes. This is defined as follows (Equation 5):

MDP = [DFV {Hedge} ^ 2 + DFV {Hedged-Item} ^ 2 ] ^ (1/2)

Make sure not to confuse MP with MDP: The former is a measure of the size of the instruments contained in our hedging relationship, whereas the latter is a measure of the size of the price changes of these same instruments over a period of time. With these new variables in place, it is now posble to transform Lipp’s algorithm into a full-fledged, two-variable modification to the standard dollar offset algorithm. The result (a modification to Lipp’s algorithm discovered by the author) is:

Schleifer-Lipp Modulated Dollar Offset (Equation 6)=

[DFV {Hedge} * (MDP/ NTA) ^ ST + NTA ] / [DFV {Hedged-Item} * (MDP/ NTA) ^ ST + NTA ]

The only qualification to be made on this result is the following (Equation 7):

ST > -1

Note: Equation 6 is currently supported in STS’s GTM DAS module.

Technical Note: 
The same proviso that was made on equation (4) is equally applicable here: namely, we must take the absolute value of the same three variables that appeared in equation (4), prior to invoking equation (6). But, once again, we wouldn’t even bother to use equation (6) if we first saw that DFV{Hedge} and DFV{Hedged-Item} had the same sign. In this case, we would simply return with an error condition (e.g., Effectiveness = 0).

If one sets ST = 0 in equation 6, the algorithm obviously degenerates to equation (4), the first approach at modifying dollar offset. Given this relationship between the equations, it should come as no surprise that equation 6 also allows the user to “place” the transition via the parameter NTN--just as was possible in equation 4—for any permissible value of ST.

However, should the user choose to start trying non-zero values of ST in equation 6, he will quickly see that doing so gives him a new, surprising measure of control over the shape of the transition period.

As a first observation, if one starts with a value of ST = 0 and begins increasing it, the transition period will start to shrink—i.e., it will be compressed into continually smaller intervals along the X-axis. This is the same as saying that the Small Changes regime and the Large Changes regime begin to converge on each other. In fact, as ST continues to increase without bound, the Transition period starts to disappear completely, as equation (6) mathematically approaches the discontinuous curve that satisfies these constraints:

If MDP < NTA, Then Effectiveness = 100%

If MDP > NTA, Then Effectiveness = Dollar Offset, as computed via equation 1

For the second observation, note that if one starts with a value of ST = 0 and begins to decrease it towards the value of –1, the transition period will start to lengthen. This is equivalent to saying that the Small Changes and Large Changes regimes start receding from each other. But there is no value to actually setting ST = -1, as doing so in equation 6 results in an expression that is independent of NTA. This means the graph would be independent of the size of the price changes observed, and would therefore be perfectly flat!

Figure 2 aptly illustrates these effects by starting with a graph of equation 6 that has NTN = 500 and ST = 0. Next, it varies the values of ST while keeping NTN fixed. As ST is successively increased to 0.6 and 4.0, the reader can see that the transition period becomes successively shorter/steeper. Then, as ST is successively decreased to –0.55 and –0.75, it is clear that the transition period become successively longer/flatter. In essence, the parameter ST represents a second “degree-of-freedom” that is available to the user in equation 6.

Mission Accomplished

The Schleifer-Lipp Modulated Dollar Offset represents the culmination of the present research effort to enhance the simple dollar-offset algorithm. Although it is not as simple as dollar offset, it should be considerably easier to understand than most statistical methods.

Moreover, as noted in the introduction, it relies upon the fair values and change-in-fair-values that must already be captured for performing FAS 133 earnings calculations. Perhaps best of all, though, is the ease with which one can duplicate equation 6 in a spreadsheet and test it out on real financial instruments, to get a feel for what it would predict in real-life situations.

With equation 6 and the two user-definable parameters—NTN and ST —a hedging corporation should be able to get just about any type of transition-behavior desired. Of course, just because one can physically set the noise threshold--NTN--at astronomical levels and thereby guarantee perpetual effectiveness doesn't entitle anyone to actually get away with it!

Moreover, it is quite clear that doing so would never even be in the corporation's best interest, as it is tantamount to denying that any economic ineffectiveness exists--a serious impediment to dealing with such ineffectiveness when it actually occurs (and it will occur!).

The benefit provided by the algorithm is simply this: Instead of looking far-and-wide at the myriad approaches to measuring effectiveness—each with its advantages and disadvantages, and many of which are computationally intensive and mathematically esoteric—the hedging corporation should be able to convince both its management and auditors of the reasonableness and practicality of the approach discussed herein.

This means that the only remaining issue is to hammer out—with the approval of both management and auditors—the actual values of the parameters NTN and ST that will be used in equation 6. Once this is done, these values can be hardwired in the system. And at that point, the system will be relying upon an effectiveness algorithm that the hedger, his management, and his auditors can all understand and defend.

A bit of a review is provided at http://www.cfoeurope.com/displayStory.cfm/1736487

Alternative approaches to testing hedge effectiveness under SFAS No. 133 --- http://www.allbusiness.com/accounting/methods-standards/209328-1.html

A Listing of Some Hedge Accounting Restatements for 2005 (see Page 3 of the online version)
"Lost in the Maze Problems with hedge accounting caused a wave of restatements in 2005:  Are FASB's rules too hard to follow, or are companies simply too lax?" by Linda Corman, CFO Magazine, May 2005 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/6874855/1/c_8435337

Alternative approaches to testing hedge effectiveness under SFAS No. 133 --- http://www.allbusiness.com/accounting/methods-standards/209328-1.html

 

Selected IAS 39 Paragraphs on Valuation and Testing for Hedge Effectiveness
144. There is normally a single fair value measure for a hedging instrument in its entirety, and the factors that cause changes in fair value are co-dependent. Thus a hedging relationship is designated by an enterprise for a hedging instrument in its entirety. The only exceptions permitted are (a) splitting the intrinsic value and the time value of an option and designating only the change in the intrinsic value of an option as the hedging instrument, while the remaining component of the option (its time value) is excluded and (b) splitting the interest element and the spot price on a forward. Those exceptions recognize that the intrinsic value of the option and the premium on the forward generally can be measured separately. A dynamic hedging strategy that assesses both the intrinsic and the time value of an option can qualify for hedge accounting. 

145. A proportion of the entire hedging instrument, such as 50 per cent of the notional amount, may be designated in a hedging relationship. However, a hedging relationship may not be designated for only a portion of the time period in which a hedging instrument is outstanding. 

Assessing Hedge Effectiveness

146. A hedge is normally regarded as highly effective if, at inception and throughout the life of the hedge, the enterprise can expect changes in the fair value or cash flows of the hedged item to be almost fully offset by the changes in the fair value or cash flows of the hedging instrument, and actual results are within a range of 80 per cent to 125 per cent. For example, if the loss on the hedging instrument is 120 and the gain on the cash instrument is 100, offset can be measured by 120/100, which is 120 per cent, or by 100/120, which is 83 per cent. The enterprise will conclude that the hedge is highly effective. 

147. The method an enterprise adopts for assessing hedge effectiveness will depend on its risk management strategy. In some cases, an enterprise will adopt different methods for different types of hedges. If the principal terms of the hedging instrument and of the entire hedged asset or liability or hedged forecasted transaction are the same, the changes in fair value and cash flows attributable to the risk being hedged offset fully, both when the hedge is entered into and thereafter until completion. For instance, an interest rate swap is likely to be an effective hedge if the notional and principal amounts, term, repricing dates, dates of interest and principal receipts and payments, and basis for measuring interest rates are the same for the hedging instrument and the hedged item. 

148. On the other hand, sometimes the hedging instrument will offset the hedged risk only partially. For instance, a hedge would not be fully effective if the hedging instrument and hedged item are denominated in different currencies and the two do not move in tandem. Also, a hedge of interest rate risk using a derivative would not be fully effective if part of the change in the fair value of the derivative is due to the counterparty's credit risk. 

149. To qualify for special hedge accounting, the hedge must relate to a specific identified and designated risk, and not merely to overall enterprise business risks, and must ultimately affect the enterprise's net profit or loss. A hedge of the risk of obsolescence of a physical asset or the risk of expropriation of property by a government would not be eligible for hedge accounting; effectiveness cannot be measured since those risks are not measurable reliably.

150. An equity method investment cannot be a hedged item in a fair value hedge because the equity method recognizes the investor's share of the associate's accrued net profit or loss, rather than fair value changes, in net profit or loss. If it were a hedged item, it would be adjusted for both fair value changes and profit and loss accruals - which would result in double counting because the fair value changes include the profit and loss accruals. For a similar reason, an investment in a consolidated subsidiary cannot be a hedged item in a fair value hedge because consolidation recognizes the parent's share of the subsidiary's accrued net profit or loss, rather than fair value changes, in net profit or loss. A hedge of a net investment in a foreign subsidiary is different. There is no double counting because it is a hedge of the foreign currency exposure, not a fair value hedge of the change in the value of the investment.

151. This Standard does not specify a single method for assessing hedge effectiveness. An enterprise's documentation of its hedging strategy will include its procedures for assessing effectiveness. Those procedures will state whether the assessment will include all of the gain or loss on a hedging instrument or whether the instrument's time value will be excluded. Effectiveness is assessed, at a minimum, at the time an enterprise prepares its annual or interim financial report. If the critical terms of the hedging instrument and the entire hedged asset or liability (as opposed to selected cash flows) or hedged forecasted transaction are the same, an enterprise could conclude that changes in fair value or cash flows attributable to the risk being hedged are expected to completely offset at inception and on an ongoing basis. For example, an entity may assume that a hedge of a forecasted purchase of a commodity with a forward contract will be highly effective and that there will be no ineffectiveness to be recognized in net profit or loss if:
(a) the forward contract is for purchase of the same quantity of the same commodity at the same time and location as the hedged forecasted purchase;
(b) the fair value of the forward contract at inception is zero; and
(c) either the change in the discount or premium on the forward contract is excluded from the assessment of effectiveness and included directly in net profit or loss or the change in expected cash flows on the forecasted transaction is based on the forward price for the commodity.

152. In assessing the effectiveness of a hedge, an enterprise will generally need to consider the time value of money. The fixed rate on a hedged item need not exactly match the fixed rate on a swap designated as a fair value hedge. Nor does the variable rate on an interest-bearing asset or liability need to be the same as the variable rate on a swap designated as a cash flow hedge. A swap's fair value comes from its net settlements. The fixed and variable rates on a swap can be changed without affecting the net settlement if both are changed by the same amount. 

Update in 2012

"IASB Previews New Hedge Accounting Rules," by Emily Chason, CFO Report, September 7, 2012 ---
http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2012/09/07/iasb-previews-new-hedge-accounting-rules/?mod=wsjpro_hps_cforeport

The draft is available from the IASB --- Click Here
http://www.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/Financial-Instruments-A-Replacement-of-IAS-39-Financial-Instruments-Recognitio/Phase-III-Hedge-accounting/Pages/Draft-of-IFRS-General-Hedge-Accounting.aspx 

Jensen Comment
Today I must leave early in the morning to take Erika to Concord for a medical treatment. I've not yet had time to read the above draft in detail. It appears, however, that this draft for IFRS 9 retains changes in IAS 39 that are objectionable to me relative to what I think is better in FAS 33 as amended.

Firstly, the thrust of the IFRS 9 changes will be to add more subjectivity (relative to FAS 133), especially in the area of hedge effectiveness testing. For example, if a farmer has hedges a growing crop of corn, he is likely to do so on the basis of standardized corn quality of corn futures and options trading on the CBOT or CME. It is unlikely that the corn that he ultimately takes to market will have the identical quality moisture content. In addition he will have trucking costs of getting his corn from say South Dakota to the trading market in Chicago. As a result of all this, his hedging contract acquired in June on the CBOT or CME exchange is not likely to be perfectly effective relative to the corn he brings to market in October. Thus there will be hedging ineffectiveness.

The original IAS 39, like FAS 133, had some bright line tests for the degree to which hedge accounting was allowed when there is hedge ineffectiveness. See the slide show illustrations at
www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/JensenPowerPoint/06effectiveness.ppt   

There is greater likelihood that in a particular instance of hedge ineffectiveness, the original IAS 39 would result in Client A having identical accounting for the hedge ineffectiveness as Client B. Under the new IFRS 9 this becomes less assured since clients are given considerable subjective judgment in deciding how to deal with hedge ineffectiveness.

Also under FAS 133, embedded derivatives in financial contracts must be evaluated and if the embedded derivative's underlying is not "clearly and closely related" to the underlying in the host contract, the embedded derivatives must be bifurcated and accounted for separately. This leads to a lot of work finding and accounting for embedded derivatives. IFRS 9 will eliminate all that work by not making clients look for embedded derivatives. Hence, the risk that comes from having embedded derivative underlyings not clearly and clossely associated with the underlyings of the host contract can simply be ignored. I don't by into this IFRS 9 bad accounting for the sake of simplification.

I think there are other areas of difference expected differences between IFRS 9 and FAS 133 as amended. Most of the differences lie in the subjectivity allowed in accounting for hedging contracts under IFRS 9 that is not allowed in FAS 133.

September 10, 2012 reply from Bob Jensen

This afternoon received a message from PwC about the IASB's proposed changes to hedge accounting. The PwC reply is consistent with, albeit somewhat more extensive, then my reply that I sent to the AECM early this morning.

The PwC response is at --- Click Here
http://cfodirect.pwc.com/CFODirectWeb/Controller.jpf?ContentCode=MSRA-8Y2HHH&SecNavCode=MSRA-84YH44&ContentType=Content 

Note that the IASB is not really opening up these proposed hedge accounting amendments to comments. Wonder why?

Also note that the proposed IASB's amendments diverge from rather than converge toward U.S. GAAP under FAS 133 as amended. At this point in time I don't think the IASB really cares about convergence of hedge accounting rules.

My quick and dirty response is that the revised hedge accounting standards under IFRS 9 is carte blanche for having two different clients and their auditors account differently for identical hedge accounting transactions because so much subjectivity will be allowed under IFRS 9. We may even have subsidiaries of the same client accounting for identical transactions differently.

Such is the myth of comparability one is supposed to get under principles-based global standards.

Further more, it may challenge auditing Firm X that has one client claiming a hedge is effective when another client would claim the hedge is ineffective. Will auditing Firm X certify divergent accounting for the same hedge. The answer is probably yes these days if both clients are too big to lose.

Bob Jensen

So Much for the Myth That Accounting Standards Are Neutral in Terms of Business Strategy (of course it did not take IFRS 9 to reveal this to us)
"Under New Accounting Standard, CFOs Could Change Hedging Strategies:
Will finance chiefs come under more pressure to adopt hedge accounting — even though it remains entirely optional under the new standard?
"
by Andrew Sawyers
CFO.com, September 12, 2012
http://www3.cfo.com/article/2012/9/gaap-ifrs_hedge-accounting-ias-39-iasb-ifrs-derivatives-80-125-test-hedge-effectiveness 

A new international financial reporting standard (IFRS) on hedge accounting could prompt finance chiefs to change their companies’ hedging strategies under a more accommodating, principles-based regime that requires less testing.

The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has been pondering hedge accounting for several years in an effort to find a way to replace the unloved standard IAS 39: so unloved that it’s not part of the package of accounting standards endorsed by the European Commission for listed companies. The standard has made it tough to employ hedge accounting, which can be favorable to companies in certain circumstances.

In a recent podcast, Kush Patel, director in Deloitte’s U.K. IFRS Centre of Excellence, summarized the impact of the new rules: “More hedge-accounting opportunities, less profit and loss volatility — so as you’d expect, this has been well received.”

Under IAS 39, he said, “we saw a lot of companies change the way they manage risk: we saw them reduce the amount of complex, structured derivatives that were being used to hedge and they went for more vanilla instruments that could [qualify for] hedge accounting more easily. Now that IFRS 9 will remove some of these restrictions, I think it’s fair to say risk management could change.”

Andrew Vials, a technical-accounting partner at KPMG, said in a statement, “A company will be able to reflect in its financial statements an outcome that is more consistent with how management assesses and mitigates risks for key inputs into its core business.”

Will CFOs come under more pressure to adopt hedge accounting — even though it remains entirely optional under the new standard? “If hedge accounting becomes easier, there may be more emphasis on them to achieve hedge accounting — so although it’s voluntary, there is an element that they may feel more compelled to do hedge accounting” says Andrew Spooner, lead global IFRS financial-instruments partner at Deloitte.

The final draft of the new hedge-accounting rules was published on September 7 and will be incorporated into the existing IFRS 9 Financial Instruments at the end of the year. The IASB says it’s not seeking comments on this final draft, but is making it available “for information purposes” to allow people to familiarize themselves with it. The new rules will take effect from January 1, 2015, but companies will be allowed to adopt them sooner if they wish.

Spooner and Patel note three main areas in which the new rules are different from the old:

Changes to the instruments that qualify. It’s now easier, for example, to use option contracts without increasing income-statement volatility.

Changes in hedged items. It may not be possible, for example, for a company to hedge the particular type of coffee beans a food company buys. But it could hedge a benchmark coffee price, because it is closely related to the item it would like to hedge. Another change for the better: companies in the euro zone that want to hedge dollar purchases of oil can now more easily hedge the dollar price of the oil, then later hedge the foreign-exchange exposure without the oil-price hedge being deemed ineffective. There are also more favorable rules for hedging against credit risk and inflation.

Changes to the hedge-effectiveness requirements. Under IAS 39, a company could use hedge accounting only if a hedge is “highly effective,” meaning it must be capable of offsetting the risk by a range of 80%–125%. But the 80–125 test has been scrapped to be replaced by a principle-based test that is based on economic relationship: “You have to prove that there is a relationship between the thing you are hedging and the thing you are using,” says Patel. Having gotten rid of the quantitative threshold, there are “more opportunities for companies to reduce the amount of testing they do,” he says. “It’s a welcome change.”

Continued in article

"IASB Previews New Hedge Accounting Rules," by Emily Chason, CFO Report, September 7, 2012 ---
http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2012/09/07/iasb-previews-new-hedge-accounting-rules/?mod=wsjpro_hps_cforeport

The PwC response is at --- Click Here
http://cfodirect.pwc.com/CFODirectWeb/Controller.jpf?ContentCode=MSRA-8Y2HHH&SecNavCode=MSRA-84YH44&ContentType=Content 

The draft is available from the IASB --- Click Here
http://www.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/Financial-Instruments-A-Replacement-of-IAS-39-Financial-Instruments-Recognitio/Phase-III-Hedge-accounting/Pages/Draft-of-IFRS-General-Hedge-Accounting.aspx 

Bob Jensen's free tutorials on accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedging activities ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

 

 

Hedge Accounting
Ira has a new posting for those of you into hedge scholarship, research, and hedge accounting ---
http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/AFP_ExpectTheUnexpected.pdf

Bob Jensen's 06Effectiveness.ppt PowerPoint file on effectiveness accounting for hedging instruments is included in the dog and pony show listing at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/JensenPowerPoint/
It saddens me that the IASB appears to be watering down effectiveness testing as IAS 39 is folded into IAS 9. It's just more and more principled-based mush.

 

Ineffectiveness Vs. EPS Analyzing Q1 Results
June 29, 2001

By Ed Rombach and Nilly Essaides
Link --- http://www.fas133.com/search/search_article.cfm?page=81&areaid=404 

The biggest question mark of FAS 133 remains its impact on EPS and stock price. While it’s still early days on FAS 133 reporting (see FAS 133’s Impact on Earnings), there are some clues in Q1/10Q as to what FAS 133 reveals (or does not; see Earnings Analysis: What FAS 133 Does Not Show).

In a recent exchange of information between two fund managers on an internet chat room, one responded quite viscerally to published derivatives losses at GE and AIG. “You were right to shed yourself from GE, AIG etc.,” he wrote. “GE is highly questionable and overvalued and their derivatives book has significant exposure, took a $1.2 billion loss recently, probably more to come [sic]. AIG loves ‘toxic waste’ as well.”

This reaction came despite GE’s explanation that its first quarter, $1.2bn loss will be mainly offset by changes in floating-rate interest costs.

Stock price effects? Zilch

Perhaps more telling, however, is the fact that this fund manager appears to be in the minority. Overall, the market shrugged off the reported loss. On the day of the 10Q release (4/19/01), GE’s stock closed at $48.51. It weakened slightly for the next few days, before resuming its uptrend and peaking at $53.40 on 5/21/01.

Further drilling into GE’s headline derivatives losses reveals that the overall loss was comprised of smaller charges, with the biggest component being a one-time transition charge at adoption. Further, the effects of FAS 133’s reporting on GE’s financials can be separated into two:

(1) FAS 133 impact on income:

· Fair-value hedge losses of $503 million in the quarter ending March 31.

· An additional $53 million in losses net of taxes reclassified to earnings from shareholders equity (OCI).

· A $68 million gain in hedges of net investment that did not qualify for effectiveness (most likely derivative or cash positions that do not qualify for hedge accounting under FAS 133, and recorded in “interest and other financial charges).

(2) FAS 133 impact on Equity/OCI:

· A transition adjustment loss of $827 million.

· A $64 million derivative gain attributable to hedges of net foreign investments that met the effectiveness measure (in a separate equity component related to currency translation adjustments).

 
Impact on EPS

Importantly, GE’s first quarter derivative returns contained an insignificant $3 million negative charge for ineffective hedges of future cash flow (i.e., cash flow hedges). Also, it included a $1 million negative charge for “amounts excluded from the measure of effectiveness,” or derivatives that do not qualify as hedges under FAS 133. The combined amount is less than three one hundredths of one cent per share net effect on earnings.

The bottom line: Of the reported $1.2 billion in losses, the largest portion was related to the one-time transition adjustment. Another $503 million was a loss offset by gains on the underling I/R position. The actual losses attributable to ineffectiveness or derivatives that must be marked to market in income – the sort of hit to income analysts and treasurers have feared—totaled $4 million, and are immaterial at best.

Why is GE disclosing this information? It may be that GE wants to make sure that it is meticulous in its presentation, leaving no stone unturned. It may also be making a point with regard to the efficacy of its hedging. Further, and perhaps most important, GE is laying out the “base line” for future analysis of its FAS 133 reports. Of course, if future quarters produce massive swings in these numbers, analysts would surely take notice.

 

 


FEDERATION BANCAIRE DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE Provides a great free document on macro hedging with references to IAS 39.  The article also discusses prospective and retrospective effectiveness testing.

"MACRO HEDGING OF INTEREST RATE RISK," April 4, 2003 --- http://www.fbe.be/pdf/Macro%20Hedging%20of%20Interest%20Rate%20Risk.pdf 
Trinity Students may access this article at J:\courses\acct5341\ResearchFiles\00macroHedging.pdf

Macro hedging is the hedging of a portfolio of assets and liabilities for the same type of risk. This differs from hedging a single instrument or a number of the same type of assets (or liabilities) as there is risk offsetting between the assets and liabilities within the portfolio. 

This form of hedging occurs not at a theoretical ‘consolidated Group’ level, but at an operational level, where individual assets and liabilities in the portfolio can be clearly identified. Within one banking group, several macro hedge portfolios for different activities may be separately managed at an operational level.

. . .

I.C Hedging the ‘Net Position’ 
Building a portfolio requires aggregating the necessary information (data) of all assets and liabilities that share the same risk to be hedged. Although systems differ, there is general agreement that the hedging process involves identification of notional amounts and repricing dates. As the economic risks of some financial instruments differ from their contractual terms, they have to be modelled to reflect their true economic effect on interest rate risk management. They are therefore included based on their behaviouralized repricing dates (statistical observations of customer behaviour) rather than their contractual repricing dates. These types of contracts include for example demand deposits, some (often regulated) saving accounts and prepayable loans. 

The notional amounts of these assets and liabilities in the portfolio are then allocated to defined repricing buckets. Based on this allocation, the mismatch between assets and liabilities in each repricing bucket is derived, which is the net position. 

For each net position, the company can decide whether it wants to hedge it fully or a portion of it. The extent of hedging to be undertaken is determined by the interest rate risk management strategy and is therefore a management decision as mentioned earlier in Section I.A.

See macro hedge.

 


Ira Kawaller explains that the common 80/25 rule described above is not statistically correct.  See "The 80/125 Problem," Derivatives Strategy, March 2001

Flow Chart for FAS 133 and IAS 39 Accounting --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133flow.htm

Differences between FAS 133 and IAS 39 --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/canada.htm

Intrinsic Value Versus Full Value Hedge Accounting --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/IntrinsicValue.htm
The above document discusses Delta hedging

Vendors of Effectiveness Tests

The table below summarizes what some different software vendors say their systems can do for effectiveness analysis. It is based on the responses to our FAS133.com Show-Me survey and Addendum section.

 

Vendor/Product

Does the System support actual and prospective testing?

What methodologies are supported?

Alterna Technologies Group Inc.

Auros

 

Yes

Dollar offset/ratio for both prospective and actual effectives.

Additional effectiveness testing methods are being added. The sequence of implementing additional calculation methods is determined along with our customers.

Selkirk Financial Technologies, Inc.

Treasury Manager™

Yes

Dollar offset/ratio for both prospective and actual.

Additional methods are available with results calculated externally.

FXpress Corp.

FXpress™

Yes

Dollar offset/ratio for both prospective and actual (cumulative or period by period). Projected rate scenarios can be saved and used for prospective effectiveness testing. Additional statistical methods for prospective effectiveness will be supported in a future update

INNSINC

Futrak 2000

Yes 

Dollar offset/ratio for both. (Futrak® 2000 uses the Change in Variable Cash Flow Method (see Method 1 - Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. G7)

SunGard Treasury Systems

GTM

Yes

At present, users have the choice of six different methodologies. The first two are periodic and cumulative dollar offset. The other four are proprietary and meant to address the shortcomings of dollar offset.

Integrity Treasury Solutions

integra-T

Yes

Index correlation and regression: verifying that coefficient of correlation is greater than 0.9 or a user specified value and/or verifying that the R-square of a linear regression is greater than 0.8 or user specified value.

Ratio Test: verifying that the gain/loss on derivative and the hedged risk are offsetting and the ratio of their magnitudes are within the 80-125% range or other user specified range.

Short Cut Method: Validation of terms prescribed by the standard.

Critical Terms Matching: Validation of terms that verify an assumption of "No Ineffectiveness" for hedges that don't qualify for the Shortcut Method (e.g. FX hedges)

Open Link Financial

Endur/Findur

Yes

Endur and Findur are fully integrated trading and risk management systems. Accordingly, we support rolling VaR (monte carlo and/or parametric), Duration, Simulation and Scenario Shock (what-if), Delta Value, etc. for the calculation oustomize effectiveness calculations. All necessary data is stored in the database and can be used with the FAS Analyzer to determine effectiveness

FinancialCAD® Corporation

The Perfect Hedge (formerly fincad.com)

Yes

Prospective method supported is a variance reduction method.

Retrospective method supported is dollar offset/ratio.

SunGard Treasury Systems

Quantum

Yes

The System supports dollar offset and regression. 

SAP

CFM

Only actual (no prospective).

Dollar offset/raio, based on spot values, cash flow differences forward, cash flow differences forward discounted/ all either using clean values (i.e. taking interest accruals into account) or not, FX option intrinsic value based on spot rates, option intrinsic value based on forward rates, option intrinsic value based on forward discounted rates, present value (clean price or nonclean), benchmark (again, clean or not).

Principia Partners

Principia Analytic Systems (PAS)

Yes

Method is dependent on the needs of the client; the system can handle a wide variety of methods including retrospective hedge analysis, dollar offset, etc.

XRT

Treasury Workstation (TWS) and Globe$

Yes

Dollar offset/ratio for both. (System supports ability select effectiveness testing and valuation using spot-spot or forward-forward methods.)

Trema Treasury Management

Finance Kit

Yes

Dollar offset. Or, for prospective effectiveness, the system can run reports to show that the critical terms match (for relevant cases, e.g. FX risk hedge with forward), or we can take a hedge relationship and run it through simulation. For example, for a FX risk hedge, we can simulate the effect of FX rate change +/-5% (or any user-defined range) and the system returns the calculated values for both the hedge and the hedged item at selected intervals (...-1%, -0.5%, +0.5%, +1%...), allowing us to prove that the values will offset each other. Similarly, we can simulate the effect of e.g. Libor change on the future values of IRS hedge and hedged debt instrument.

Reval.com

Yes

Dollar offset method, on the basis of: Spot, Forward, Intrinsic Value, Minimum Value and Full Fair Market Value Method. Can support effectiveness testing using user defined and performed regression methodologies.

Wall Street Systems

Wall Street Systems®

Yes

The dollar offset method for prospective and actual effectives. For prospective, the application calculates the present value (PV) of all future cash flows as well as maintains the historical change in actual values. For retrospective assessment, the user has the chose to elect to compare the actual change in values, actual change in floating leg cash flow values, and even the actual change in the fixed leg cash flows. For prospective assessment the application uses the PV of the future cash flows.

 

Also see risk metrics and software.


JOURNAL OF DERIVATIVES ACCOUNTING 

Hedge Effectiveness Analysis Toolkit
Vol. 1, No. 2 (September 2004) out now!! In this issue issue of JDA, Guy Coughlan, Simon Emery and Johannes Kolb discuss the Hedge Effectiveness Analysis Toolkit, which is JPMorgan’s latest addition to a long list of innovative and cutting-edge risk management solutions. View the Table of Contents @ http://www.worldscinet.com/jda/01/0102/S02198681040102.html

 


October 11, 2002 message from Ira [kawaller@lb.bcentral.com

If you, your colleagues, or your customers have hedge effectiveness testing requirements under FAS 133, and you're having difficulty designing regression tests for this purpose, this article (co-authored with my friend and client, Reva Steinberg of BDO Seidman, and originally published in "AFPExchage")should be of interest:

http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/AFP_Regression.pdf

Otherwise... never mind.

In either case, visit the Kawaller & Company website to find other articles/information dealing with a host of issues relating to derivatives.

I hope you'll find this material to be useful and would welcome your questions, comments, or suggestions.

Ira Kawaller
Kawaller & Company, LLC
http://www.kawaller.com
kawaller@kawaller.com 
(718)694-6270


For interest rate swaps, especially note the section of Short-Cut Method for Interest Rate Swaps.

See further paragraphs 73-103 for illustrations of assessing effectiveness and measuring ineffectiveness:

Example 1: Fair Value Hedge of Natural Gas Inventory with Futures Contracts (FAS 133 Paragraphs 73-77)

Example 2: Fair Value Hedge of Tire Inventory with a Forward Contract
(FAS 133 Paragraphs 78-80)

Example 3: Fair Value Hedge of Growing Wheat with Futures Contracts
(FAS 133 Paragraphs 81-84)

Example 4: Fair Value Hedge of Equity Securities with Option Contracts
(FAS 133 Paragraphs 85-87)

Example 5: Fair Value Hedge of a Treasury Bond with a Put Option Contract
(FAS 133 Paragraphs 88-90)

Example 6: Fair Value Hedge of an Embedded Purchased Option with a Written Option
(FAS 133 Paragraphs 91-92)

Example 7: Cash Flow Hedge of a Forecasted Purchase of Inventory with a Forward Contract
(FAS 133 Paragraphs 93-97)

Example 8: Cash Flow Hedge with a Basis Swap
(FAS 133 Paragraphs 98-99)

Example 9: Cash Flow Hedge of Forecasted Sale with a Forward Contract
(FAS 133 Paragraphs 100-101)

Example 10: Attempted Hedge of a Forecasted Sale with a Written Call Option
(FAS 133 Paragraphs 102-103)


My understanding is that the “long haul” method is any situation where the stringent tests for shortcut method do not hold. Thus tests for ineffectiveness must be conducted at each reset date. This is problematic for swaps and options especially since the market for the hedged item entails a different set of buyers than the market for the hedging instrument, thereby increasing the likelihood of ineffectiveness.

I do not have a spreadsheet illustration of ineffectiveness testing for interest rate swaps, but the tests I assume are the same as those tests used for other hedges. Some analysts assume that the “long haul” method applies to regression tests (as opposed to dollar offset), and regression tests (unlike dollar offset tests) cannot be applied retrospectively.  See “Shortcut Method” at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#S-Terms

Also see
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=101227&d=815&h=817&f=816&dateformat=%25o%20%25B%20%25Y

 

 

 

DIG Issue E7 at http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 

Title: Hedging—General: Methodologies to Assess Effectiveness of Fair Value and Cash Flow Hedges

Paragraph references:  20(b), 22, 28(b), 62, 86, 87

Date released: November 1999

QUESTION

Since Statement 133 provides an entity with flexibility in choosing the method it will use in assessing hedge effectiveness, must an entity use a dollar-offset approach in assessing effectiveness?

BACKGROUND

Paragraph 20(b) of Statement 133 states, in part:

Both at inception of the [fair value] hedge and on an ongoing basis, the hedging relationship is expected to be highly effective in achieving offsetting changes in fair value attributable to the hedged risk during the period that the hedge is designated. An assessment of effectiveness is required whenever financial statements or earnings are reported, and at least every three months. Paragraph 28(b) indicates a similar requirement that the hedging relationship be expected to be highly effective in achieving offsetting changes in cash flows attributable to the hedged risk during the period that the hedge is designated.

Paragraph 22 of Statement 133 states, in part:

The measurement of hedge ineffectiveness for a particular hedging relationship shall be consistent with the entity’s risk management strategy and the method of assessing hedge effectiveness that was documented at the inception of the hedging relationship, as discussed in paragraph 20(a). Nevertheless, the amount of hedge ineffectiveness recognized in earnings is based on the extent to which exact offset is not achieved. Paragraph 62 emphasizes that each entity must "define at the time it designates a hedging relationship the method it will use to assess the hedge’s effectiveness in achieving offsetting changes in fair value or offsetting cash flows attributable to the risk being hedged." It also states, "This Statement does not specify a single method for either assessing whether a hedge is expected to be highly effective or measuring hedge ineffectiveness."

RESPONSE

No. Statement 133 requires an entity to consider hedge effectiveness in two different ways-in prospective considerations and in retrospective evaluations.

Prospective considerations. Upon designation of a hedging relationship (as well as on an ongoing basis), the entity must be able to justify an expectation that the relationship will be highly effective over future periods in achieving offsetting changes in fair value or cash flows. That expectation, which is forward-looking, can be based upon regression or other statistical analysis of past changes in fair values or cash flows as well as on other relevant information.

Retrospective evaluations. At least quarterly, the hedging entity must determine whether the hedging relationship has been highly effective in having achieved offsetting changes in fair value or cash flows through the date of the periodic assessment. That assessment can be based upon regression or other statistical analysis of past changes in fair values or cash flows as well as on other relevant information. If an entity elects at the inception of a hedging relationship to utilize the same regression analysis approach for both prospective considerations and retrospective evaluations of assessing effectiveness, then during the term of that hedging relationship those regression analysis calculations should generally incorporate the same number of data points. Electing to utilize a regression or other statistical analysis approach instead of a dollar-offset approach to perform retrospective evaluations of assessing hedge effectiveness may affect whether an entity can apply hedge accounting for the current assessment period as discussed below.

Paragraph 62 requires that at the time an entity designates a hedging relationship, it must define and document the method it will use to assess the hedge’s effectiveness. That paragraph also states that ordinarily "an entity should assess effectiveness for similar hedges in a similar manner; use of different methods for similar hedges should be justified." Furthermore, it requires that an entity use that defined and documented methodology consistently throughout the period of the hedge. If an entity elects at the inception of a hedging relationship to utilize a regression analysis approach for prospective considerations of assessing effectiveness and the dollar-offset method to perform retrospective evaluations of assessing effectiveness, then that entity must abide by the results of that methodology as long as that hedging relationship remains designated. Thus, in its retrospective evaluation, an entity might conclude that, under a dollar-offset approach, a designated hedging relationship does not qualify for hedge accounting for the period just ended, but that the hedging relationship may continue because, under a regression analysis approach, there is an expectation that the relationship will be highly effective in achieving offsetting changes in fair value or cash flows in future periods. In its retrospective evaluation, if that entity concludes that, under a dollar-offset approach, the hedging relationship has not been highly effective in having achieved offsetting changes in fair value or cash flows, hedge accounting may not be applied in the current period. Whenever a hedging relationship fails to qualify for hedge accounting in a certain assessment period, the overall change in fair value of the derivative for that current period is recognized in earnings (not reported in other comprehensive income for a cash flow hedge) and the change in fair value of the hedged item would not be recognized in earnings for that period (for a fair value hedge).

If an entity elects at the inception of a hedging relationship to utilize a regression analysis (or other statistical analysis) approach for either prospective considerations or retrospective evaluations of assessing effectiveness, then that entity must periodically update its regression analysis (or other statistical analysis). For example, if there is significant ineffectiveness measured and recognized in earnings for a hedging relationship, which is calculated each assessment period, the regression analysis should be rerun to determine whether the expectation of high effectiveness is still valid. As long as an entity reruns its regression analysis and determines that the hedging relationship is still expected to be highly effective, then it can continue to apply hedge accounting without interruption.

In all instances, the actual measurement of hedge ineffectiveness to be recognized in earnings each reporting period is based on the extent to which exact offset is not achieved as specified in paragraph 22 of Statement 133 (for fair value hedges) or paragraph 30 (for cash flow hedges). That requirement applies even if a regression or other statistical analysis approach for both prospective considerations and retrospective evaluations of assessing effectiveness supports an expectation that the hedging relationship will be highly effective and demonstrates that it has been highly effective, respectively.

The application of a regression or other statistical analysis approach to assessing effectiveness is complex. Those methodologies require appropriate interpretation and understanding of the statistical inferences.

DIG Issue F5 at http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/derivatives/issuef5.html 
Basing the Expectation of Highly Effective Offset on a Shorter Period Than the Life of the Derivative 
(Cleared 11/23/99)

 

Inflation Indexed Embedded Derivative =

an embedded derivative that alters payments on the basis of an inflation index.  Paragraph 61b on Page 41 of FAS 133 defines these payments as clearly-and-closely related such that the embedded derivative cannot be accounted for separately under Paragraph 12 on Page 7.  This makes embedded inflation indexed derivative accounting different than commodity indexed and equity indexed embedded derivative accounting rules that require separation from the host contract such as commodity indexed, equity indexed, and inflation indexed embedded derivatives.  In this regard, credit indexed embedded derivative accounting is more like credit indexed derivative accounting.  See derivative financial instrument and embedded derivatives.

Initial Investment =  see premium.

Insurance Contracts =

a complex set of contracts to manage future casualty risks.  Contracts manage financial instrument risks are not insurance contracts under FAS 133.  In general, insurance contracts are covered by prior FASB standards rather than FAS 133.  However, the FASB did take steps to discourage the interpretation of derivative contracts as insurance contracts just to avoid FAS 133. Important sections of FAS 133 dealing with insurance include Paragraphs 10 and 277-283.

Note the exception in DIG C1.

Bob Jensen's July 2, 2009 message to Tom Selling

Hi Tom,

I define insurance as risk management via actuary science. Actuaries only deal with data that has persistent and reliable linkage of the past with the future --- historical data that can be objectively extrapolated to future loss risks. Before using the term "insurance," think of whether there are actuary tables for the item you are calling insurance. Insurance companies then offer contracts that will spread actuary-determined risk among buyers subjected to such risks.

Hedging with derivative financial instruments scoped into FAS 133 never, at least virtually never, entails contracts for which there are actuarial tables that estimate risks. There is a huge gray zone between insurance and derivatives such as weather derivatives for which there are actuary tables. But these gray zone derivatives are not scoped into FAS 133 or IAS 39. There is also a gray zone of derivatives in wagering such as wagers on sporting events. These are not scoped into FAS 133.

Another indirect difference between insurance and derivatives entails how risk is managed and spread. With derivatives risk is managed between two parties --- the party and the counterparty to a derivative contract. The contracts can be, and often are, over-the-counter derivatives that are not traded on any exchange. With insurance risk is managed by spreading the risk among all buyers of a virtually identical contracts such as home and auto insurance sold by a particular company that is spreading the potential loss coverage among all buyers of the insurance.

If a Farmer A  contracts with his Neighbor B such that the Neighbor B agrees to reimburse Farmer A for weather-related damage to crops, this is not insurance as I define insurance. I think the term "insurance" should be restricted to instances where there are many buyers of protection who are spreading the risk with the actuarially-determined risk to the entire set of buyers. There are no actuarial tables for just Farmer A's plot of land. There are actuarial tables for hail, wind, fire, and flood damage for the entire state of Iowa.

 

June 30 and July 31, 2009 replies by Tom Selling and BOB JENSEN

Hi, Bob:

All of my responses you will be in italics, below.

Tom Selling


Bob Jensen
What you are really arguing is that accounting for most derivatives should not distinguish “asymmetric-booking” hedging derivative contracts from speculation derivative contracts. I argue that failure to distinguish between hedging and speculation is very, very, very, very misleading to investors. I do not think FAS 133 is an “abject failure.” Quite to the contrary (except in the case of credit derivatives).

Tom Selling
What is your evidence that failure to distinguish between hedging and speculation is misleading to investors?  My own anecdotal evidence is that investors reverse engineer the effect of hedge accounting, to the extent they can, on reported income by transferring hedging gains and losses from OCI to net income. That's because investors believe that management is hedging its bonuses and not shareholder value.

Bob Jensen  
My evidence is that millions of sole proprietorships extensively hedge prices and interest rates, including a huge proportion of farmers in the United States. Sole proprietors constitute the depth of derivatives markets.

a sole proprietor has no disconnect between shareholder value and his/her compensation. and yet sole proprietors hedge all the time. many often speculate as well, but there is a huge difference in the financial risk between hedging and speculating (USING THE FINANCE DEFINITION OF HEDGING RATHER THAN TOM SELLING'S AMBIGUOUS DEFINITION).

a sole proprietor has access to all accounting records of the business. investors do not have access and rely on accountants and auditors to keep them informed according to gaap.

and what’s to say that there’s always a disconnect between matching compensation versus shareholder value? sure there are lots of instances where managers have taken advantage of agency powers, but if this were true of virtually all corporations there would no longer be outside passive investors in corporations. you can fool some of the people some of the time, but not all the investors all of the time.

a subset of the evidence on executive compensation and shareholder value is given at http://snipurl.com/execcomp01

if managers are willing to cheat on hedging AT THE EXPENSE OF SHAREHOLDERS, they’re most likely WANTING to cheat on every other opportunity, thereby making accounting standard setting as futile for many other standards other than hedge accounting in fas 133.

I AM NOT SO CYNICAL ABOUT MOST MANAGERS. IF YOU’RE CORRECT, FINANCIAL MARKETS WILL COLLAPSE.

Fas 133 is wonderful in that it allows the balance sheet to carry derivatives and current fair value and keeps the changes in value out of current earnings if changes in hedged item booked value cannot be used to offset the one-sided, ASYMMETRICAL changes in derivative value caused by not booking the hedged items.

YOU SEEM TO AVOID THE FOLLOWING WEAKNESS IN YOUR ARGUMENT:
your argument has a huge inconsistency. there is no change in current earnings for effective hedges of booked items MAINTAINED AT FAIR VALUE. but if the hedged items are not booked, the change in current earnings can be enormous simply because the perfectly offsetting change in value of the hedged item is not booked. somehow this inconsistency does not seem to bother you.

IN FACT, WHEN ACCOUNTING FOR HISTORICAL COST INVENTORIES THAT HAVE A FAIR VALUE HEDGE, FAS 133 REQUIRES THAT, DURING THE HEDGING PERIOD, WE DEPART FROM HISTORICAL COST ACCOUNTING SO THAT FAIR VALUE CHANGES OF THE INVENTORY CAN OFFSET FAIR VALUE CHANGES IN THE HEDGING DERIVATIVE. THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, WHEN THE HEDGED ITEMS ARE NOT BOOKED SUCH AS IN THE CASE OF FORECASTED TRANSACTIONS THAT ARE HEDGED ITEMS.

some of your claims that hedging is speculation would make finance professors shake their heads BECAUSE THEY HAVE A MORE PRECISE DEFINITION OF SPECULATION VERSUS HEDGING. Please examine the spreadsheet that i use in my hedge accounting workshops. the spreadsheet is called “hedges” in the graphing.xls workbook at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/

Tom Selling
As for symmetric versus asymmetric booking, the FAS 133 solution (fair value hedging) is to completely screw up the balance sheet by recording inconsistent amounts based on ridiculous hypotheticals.  I am a balance sheet guy: get the balance sheet as right as possible at a reasonable cost; derive accounting income from selected changes in assets and liabilities. 

bob jensen
i don’t understand your argument. all derivatives scoped into fas 133 are carried on the balance sheet at fair value whether or not the hedged items are booked.

nOTHING IS being “screwed up” on the balance sheet!

the debate between us concerns the income statement impacts of hedging versus speculating.


Bob Jensen
I have to say I disagree entirely about “derivatives” being the cause of misleading financial reporting. The current economic crisis was heavily caused by AIG’s credit derivatives that were essentially undercapitalized insurance contracts. Credit derivatives should’ve been regulated like insurance contracts and not FAS 133 derivatives. Credit derivatives should never have been scoped into FAS 133.

Tom Selling
You will never end up with a coherent set of accounting rules that are based on distinctions such as hedging versus speculation, or even hedging versus insurance.  Getting back to the example of Southwest Airlines, the fact that they used options to manage their future fuel costs when they thought that options were "cheap" enough just reinforces my view that they were speculating, and they happened to end up being a winner.  Perhaps, in contrast to other airlines, Southwest had some free cash flow that they could use to speculate because they were able to engineer for themselves a lower cost structure than their competitor.  But, that doesn't change my view they were speculating. Try this example: if I were to incessantly fiddle with the amount of flood insurance on my house based on long-range weather forecasts, that, too, would be speculating-- notwithstanding the fact that the contract I am doing it with is nominally an 'insurance contract.'

Bob Jensen
i would not accept this argument from a sophomore tom. the issue of hedging is often to lock in a price today rather than speculate on what the price will be in the future. that’s “hedging” of cash flow! IT IS NOT SPECULATION as defined in finance textbooks
(USING THE FINANCE DEFINITION OF HEDGING RATHER THAN TOM SELLING'S AMBIGUOUS DEFINITION).

you are trying to CONFUSE the definition of cash flow “speculation.” cash flow speculation in derivatives means that by definition you have unknown cash flows due to FUTURE price or rate changes.

in contrast, cash flow hedging means locking in a price or rate. you are not distinguishing between locking in a contracted price versus speculating on a future priceS.

if you have no cash flow risk you MUST have value risk. such is life!
fas 133 makes it very clear that if you have no cash flow risk, you MUST LIVE WITH value risk. and if you have no value risk, you have cash flow risk. rules for hedge accounting exist for both types of hedging in fas 133.

I KNOW YOU LIKE TO THINK THAT A LOCKED IN PRICE DUE TO A HEDGE IS A TYPE OF "SPECULATION," BUT THIS IS NOT HOW "SPECULATION" IS DEFINED IN FINANCE. I DOUBT THAT HAVING DEFINITIONS FOR "LOCKED-IN PRICE SPECULATION" VERSUS "FUTURES PRICE SPECULATION" WILL ADD MUCH TO THE EFFICIENCY OF OUR ARGUMENT BASED IN THE FINANCE DEFINITIONS OF A CASH FLOW "HEDGE" VERSUS "SPECULATION,"

i think what you are really confusing in your argument is the distinction between cash flow risk and value risk. These two financial risks are more certain than love and marriage. you must have one (type of risk) without the other (type of risk). and the fas 133 rules are different for hedges of value versus hedges of cash flow.

Tom Selling
In short, where you see derivatives and insurance contracts, I only see contracts whose ultimate consequences are contingent on uncertain future events.   They should all be fair value with changes going to earnings.   

Bob Jensen
there’s a huge difference between hedging and insurance.
insurance companies charge to spread risk. for example, SUPPOSE an insurance company sells hail insurance in iowa, it’s ACTUARILY "certain" that all crops in iowa will not be destRoyed by hail in one summer. but we can’t be certain what small pockets of iowa farmers will have their crops destroyed BY HAIL. hence most iowa farmers buy hail insurance, thereby spreading the risk among those who will and those who won’t have hail damage TO CROPS IN IOWA. insurance companies are required by law to have sufficient capital to pay all claims under actuarial probabilities OF HAIL LOSSES.

however, when an iowa farmer buys an option in april that locks in the price of his corn crop in THE october HARVEST, this is not spreading the risk among all iowa farmers. perhaps he buys the option directly from his neighbor who decides to speculate on the price of october corn and get an option premium to boot. this is a cash flow risk transfer but is not the same as spreading the risk of hail damage among all iowa farmers

there’s a huge difference between insurance and hedging contracts in that virtually all insurance contracts rely on actuarial science. life expectancy, hail, fire, wind, floods can be estimated with much greater scientific precision than the price of oil 18 months into the future. actuarial estimation is not without error, but actuaries won’t touch commodity pricing  and interest rate pricing where historical extrapolations are virtually impossible.

One reason private insurance companies CAN sell hail insurance and not flood insurance to iowa farmers is that highland farmers are almost assured of not having floods but no farmer in iowa is assured of not having hail damage.

 without forcing all iowa farmers to buy flood insurance. the government had to put taxpayer money into flood coverage of lowlanders. this was not the case of FOR hail, FIRE, AND WIND DAMAGE risk.

one reason private insurance companies would not sell earthquake insurance is that actuary science for earthquakes is lousy. we can predict where earthquakes are likely to hit, but science is extremely unreliable when it comes to predicting what century.

fas 133 does recognize that there are many similarities between insurance and hedging in some context. these are discussed in paragraph 283 of fas 133. BUT THE DEFINITIONS OF INSURANCE VERSUS HEDGING ARE QUITE different IN FAS 133.

ONE PLACE THE FASB SCREWED UP in fas 133 IS IN NOT RECOGNIZING THAT CREDIT DERIVATIVES ARE MORE LIKE INSURANCE THAN commodity HEDGING. not making aig have capital reserves for credit derivatives was a huge, huge mistake. those cash reserves most likely would not have covered the subprime mortgage implosion that destroyed value of almost all cdo bonds, but at least there would have been some capital backing and some regulation of wild west credit derivatives of aig.


Bob Jensen
The issue in your post concerns derivatives apart from credit derivatives, derivatives that are so very popular in managing financial risk, especially commodity price risk and interest rate fluctuation risk. Before FAS 119 and FAS 133 it was the wild west of off-balance sheet financing with undisclosed swaps and forward contracts, although we did have better accounting for futures contracts because they clear for cash each day. Scandals were soaring, in large measure, due to failure of the FASB to monitor the explosion in derivatives frauds. Arthur Levitt once told the Chairman of the FASB that the FASB’s three biggest problems, before FAS 133, were 1-derivatives, 2-derivatives, and 3-derivatives --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds

Tom Selling
The way I see the basic problem that FAS 133 did fix was to require fair value for all contracts within its scope.   Prior to that, a $10 billion interest rate swap could stay off the balance sheet no matter how far interest rates strayed.  As you pointed out in a previous e-mail, the hedge accounting provisions in FAS 133 were a concession to special interests.  I could be wrong, but I don't recall a single investor group pounding the table and insisting that there be 2000 pages of rules to permit managers to smooth their income. 

Bob Jensen
ACTUALLY THE FASB INITIALLY DID NOT WANT TO MAKE ANY EARNINGS IMPACT CONCESSIONS FOR HEDGE ACCOUNTING. THE ORIGINAL FASB THOUGHT WAS TO DO JUST AS YOU SAY AND BOOK ALL DERIVATIVES AT FAIR VALUE WITHOUT 2,000 PAGES OF ADDED HEDGE ACCOUNTING RULES.

THE HEDGE ACCOUNTING RULES CAME ABOUT BECAUSE COMPANIES JUMPED ON THE FASB FOR “PUNISHING” HEDGING COMPANIES BY CREATING ENORMOUS UNREALIZED EARNINGS VOLATILITY IN INTERIM PERIODS THAT WOULD NEVER BE REALIZED WHEN HEDGES WERE SETTLED AT MATURITY DATES.

WITHOUT HEDGE ACCOUNTING, COMPANIES GO PUNISHED FOR HEDGING AS IF THEY WERE SPECULATING WHEN THEY ARE HEDGING (USING THE FINANCE DEFINITION OF HEDGING RATHER THAN TOM SELLING'S AMBIGUOUS DEFINITION). I KNOW YOU LIKE TO THINK THAT A LOCKED IN PRICE DUE TO A HEDGE IS A TYPE OF "SPECULATION," BUT THIS IS NOT HOW "SPECULATION" IS DEFINED IN FINANCE. I DOUBT THAT HAVING DEFINITIONS FOR "LOCKED-IN PRICE SPECULATION" VERSUS "FUTURES PRICE SPECULATION" WILL ADD MUCH TO THE EFFICIENCY OF OUR ARGUMENT BASED IN THE FINANCE DEFINITIONS OF A CASH FLOW "HEDGE" VERSUS "SPECULATION,"

IT’S UNFAIR TO EQUATE CONCESSIONS TO SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS TO HEDGE ACCOUNTING RULES IN FAS 133. I FIND THE ARGUMENTS FOR HEDGE ACCOUNTING VERY COMPELLING SINCE IN MOST INSTANCES OF HEDGING THE FLUCTUATIONS IN UNREALIZED VALUE CHANGES WASH OUT FOR HEDGE CONTRACTS THAT ARE SETTLED AT MATURITY DATES. IT WAS THE ARGUMENTS THAT WERE COMPELLING RATHER THAN POLITICAL CONCESSIONS TO SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS. THE SIMPLE ARGUMENT WAS THAT BY LOCKING IN PRICES OR PROFITS COMPANIES WERE BEING PUNISHED AS IF THEY WERE SPECULATING (I DISCUSS YOUR CONFUSED DEFINITION OF “SPECULATION” ELSEWHERE IN THIS MESSAGE.)

prior to fas 133, companies were learning that it was very easy to keep debt off the balance sheet with interest rate swaps. there is ample evidence of the explosion of this as companies shifted from managing risk with treasury bills to managing risk with swaps.

there were many scandals due, in large measure, to bad accounting for derivatives prior to fas 133 --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds
of course lack of regulation of the derivatives markets themselves was an even bigger problem.


Bob Jensen
When you respond to my post please take up the issue of purchase contracts and non-contracted forecasted transactions since these account for the overwhelming majority of “asymmetric-booking” derivatives contracts hedges being reported today. Then show me how booking changes in value of a hedging contract as current earnings makes sense when the changes in value of the hedged item are not, and should not, be booked.

Tom Selling
I already took up that question.  One of the points I was trying to make in the OilCo case is that hedge accounting, while designed to reduce the volatility of reported earnings, often increases the volatility of economic earnings.  That's why OilCo's stock price went down as oil prices went up.  Let me try state it in terms of a manufacturer of a commodity product that contains a significant amount of copper.   Changes in market prices of the end product can be expected to be highly correlated with changes in the price of copper.  Therefore, a natural hedge is already in place for the risk that copper prices will rise in the future.  If you add a forward contract to purchase copper to the firm's investment portfolio, then you are actually adding to economic volatility instead of subtracting from it.  (I trust you don't need a numerical example, but I could provide one if you want it.)  If you add an at-the-money option to purchase copper, you are destroying value by paying a premium for what is essentially an insurance contract on a long run risk that doesn't exist.

I think the fundamental difference between our positions, Bob, is that you believe that management is acting to maximize (long-run) shareholder value, and I (and perhaps the like Leslie Kren), more cynically believe that management is acting to lock-in their short-run, earnings-based compensation.  The 'special hedge accounting' provisions of FAS 133 is just one tool that they have for doing so.  And as icing on the cake because of its incredible complexity, it lines the pockets of 'advisors', financial intermediaries, auditors, and even educators like you and me. 

Bob Jensen
OPTION VALUE = INTRINSIC VALUE + TIME VALUE
YOU ARE INSULTING THE INTELLIGENCE OF FINANCE PROFESSORS WHO WOULD SHAKE THEIR HEADS WHEN READING:   “ If you add an at-the-money option to purchase copper, you are destroying value by paying a premium for what is essentially an insurance contract on a long run risk that doesn't exist.”

THERE IS LONG RUN RISK THAT THE FUTURE PRICE WILL GO UP OR DOWN. WHEN YOU BUY AN OPTION AT THE MONEY, THERE IS NO INTRINSIC VALUE BY DEFINITION. BUT THE REASON THE PRICE(PREMIUM) OF THE OPTION IS NOT ZERO IS THAT IT HAS TIME VALUE DUE TO THAT CONTRACTED INTERVAL OF TIME IT HAS TO GO INTO THE MONEY. CASH FLOW HEDGING WITH AN OPTION IS NOT “INSURANCE CONTRACTING” AS DEFINED IN FAS 133. THIS IS A HEDGE THAT LOCKS IN A PURCHASE OR SALES PRICE AT THE STRIKE PRICE SUCH THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY IN THE FUTURE TO GAMBLE ON AN UNKNOWN FUTURE PRICE.

a subset of the evidence on executive compensation and shareholder value is given at http://snipurl.com/execcomp01

if managers are willing to cheat on hedging AT THE EXPENSE OF SHAREHOLDERS, they’re most likely WILLING to cheat on every other opportunity, thereby making accounting standard setting as futile for many other standards other than hedge accounting in fas 133.


Bob Jensen
Then show me how this asymmetric-booking reporting of changes in value of a hedging contract not offset in current earnings by changes in the value of the item it hedges provides meaningful information to investors, especially since the majority of such hedging contracts are carried to maturity and all the interim changes in their value are never realized in cash.

Tom Selling
Just because it may not be recognized in cash, that doesn't mean changes in value are not relevant to investors.  I suppose that's an empirical question.  But I should also add that by your comment, may I infer that you are also in favor of maintaining a held-to-maturity category for marketable debt securities?  If so, then we have a lot more important things to talk about than just hedge accounting!  Him him him him him him him

Bob Jensen
I AM A STRONG ADVOCATE OF HTM ACCOUNTING SIMPLY TO KEEP PERFORMANCE FICTION OUT OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS. THIS IS ESPECIALLY THE CASE WHERE THERE ARE PROHIBITIVE TRANSACTIONS COSTS FROM EARLY SETTLEMENTS. MY ARGUMENTS HERE ARE MY CRITICISMS OF EXIT VALUE AT http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#FairValue

THE IASB IMPOSES GREATER PENALTIES FOR VIOLATORS OF HTM DECLARATIONS THAN DOES THE FASB, BUT AUDITORS ARE WARNED TO HOLD CLIENTS TO HTM DECLARATIONS.


Bob Jensen
Show me why this asymmetric-booking of changes in value of hedging contracts versus non-reporting of offsetting changes in the value of the unbooked hedged item benefits investors. Show me how the failure to distinguish earnings changes from derivative contract speculations from earnings changes from derivative hedging benefits investors.

Tom Selling
Hedging and speculation is a question of intent, and I don't believe they can be reliably separated.  To this I would add that transaction hedging in FAS 133 is really not economic hedging. In order to make the distinction between hedging and speculation auditable, FAS 133 prohibits macro hedges.  Thus, managers claim that the hedges that actually enter into in order to get the income smoothing they need are actually less efficient (i.e., riskier) than if they were permitted to have hedge accounting for macro hedges.

Bob Jensen
once again you are confusing cash flow hedging from value hedging. i covered this above.


Bob Jensen
What you are really arguing is that accounting for such derivatives should not distinguish hedging derivative contracts from speculation derivative contracts. I argue that failure to distinguish between hedging and speculation is very, very, very, very misleading to investors.

Derivative contracts are now the most popular vehicles for managing risk. They are extremely important for managing risk. I think FAS 133 and IAS 39 can be improved, but failure to distinguish hedging derivative contracts from speculations in terms of the booking of value changes of these derivatives will be an enormous loss to users of financial statements.

Tom Selling
Empirical question.  See above.


Bob Jensen
The biggest complaint I get from academe is that professors mostly just don’t understand FAS 133 and IAS 39. I think this says more about professors than it does about the accounting. In fairness, to understand these two standards accounting professors have to learn a lot more about finance than they ever wanted to know. For example, they have to learn about contango swaps and other forms of relatively complex hedging contracts used in financial risk management.

Tom Selling
I can't speak for other accounting professors who may choose to remain ignorant of the details of FAS 133.  I think it's a question of incentives.  But, I think I know FAS 133 pretty well (although surely not as well as you), and certainly well enough to have an informed opinion. I don't think FAS 133 stinks because it is too difficult to learn.  It stinks because, contrary to what you believe, I think that managers game the system and in the process are destroying shareholder value, and even our economy.



Bob Jensen
Finance professors, in turn, have to learn a whole lot more about accounting than they ever wanted to know. For example, they have to learn the rationale behind not booking purchase contracts and the issue of damage settlements that may run close to 100% of notionals for executed contracts and less than 1% of notionals for executory purchase contracts. And hedged forecasted transactions that are not even written into contracts are other unbooked balls of wax that can be hedged.

Tom Selling
I can't speak for finance professors either, but my very loose impression is that they will make the simplifying assumption that accounting doesn't matter.  In other words, the contract between shareholders and management is efficient in the sense that managers cannot gain by gaming the accounting rules.  Ha Ha Ha.

Bob Jensen
IF WHAT YOU SAY IS TRUE THAT VIRTUALLY ALL MANAGERS OUR OUT TO SCREW INVESTORS, THEN CAPITALISM AS WE KNOW IT IS DOOMED. IT IS SERIOUSLY CHALLENGED AT THE MOMENT, AND MAYBE WE WILL TURN ALL OF OUR LARGE CORPORATIONS OVER TO THE GOVERNMENT THAT NEVER SCREWS ANYBODY. WHY DIDN’T WE THINK OF THIS BEFORE. THE SOVIET UNION HAD IT RIGHT ALL ALONG.

a subset of the evidence on executive compensation and shareholder value is given at http://snipurl.com/execcomp01

if managers are willing to cheat on hedging AT THE EXPENSE OF SHAREHOLDERS, they’re most likely WantING to cheat on every other opportunity, thereby making accounting standard setting as futile for many other standards other than hedge accounting in fas 133. I AM NOT SO CYNICAL ABOUT MOST MANAGERS. IF YOU’RE CORRECT, FINANCIAL MARKETS WILL COLLAPSE.

“Accounting Doesn’t Matter”
once again this is a sophomore statement. although i’m often critical that individual financial reporting events studies are not replicated, the thousands of such studies combined point to the importance of events, especially earnings announcements, on investor behavior. only sophomores in finance would make a claim that “accounting does not matter.”

There may be a better way to distinguish earnings changes arising from speculation derivative contracts versus hedging derivative contracts, but the FAS 133 approach at the moment is the best I can think of until you have that “aha” moment that will render FAS 133 hedge accounting meaningless.


Bob Jensen
I anxiously await your “aha” moment Tom as long as you distinguish booked from unbooked hedged items.

Tom Selling
I like FAS 159 as a temporary measure, despite the inconsistencies it creates—they are no worse than FAS 133’s inconsistencies. 

 Offsetting changes in the value of unbooked hedged items are to the totality of our grossly inadequate accounting standards as a flea is to Seabiscuit's rear end.  Here's the best I can do: change the name of the balance sheet to "statement of recognized assets and liabilities"; change the name of the income statement to "statement of recognized revenues, expenses, gains and losses."  At least that way, readers will have a better idea of what accountants are feeding them.

Bob Jensen
fas 159 says absolutely nothing about a fair value option for unbooked contracts and forecasted transactions other than it does not allow fair value booking for these anticipated (often contracted) transactions

And I certainly would not make fair value accounting for derivatives an option under fasb standards.

hence fas 159 is of no help at all in accounting for hedging contracts of hedged items that are not booked.


Thanks,
Bob Jensen

 

Interest Only Strip =

a contract that calls for cash settlement based upon the interest but not the principal of a note. Except in certain conditions, interest-only and principal only strips are not covered in FAS 133. See Paragraphs 14 and 310.  See futures contract.

Interest Rate Swap =

a transaction in which two parties exchange interest payment streams of differing character based on an underlying principal amount. This is the most common form of hedging risk using financial instruments derivatives. The most typical interest rate swaps entail swapping fixed rates for variable rates and vice versa. A basis swap is the swapping of one variable rate for another variable rate for purposes of changing the net interest rate. Basis swaps are discussed in Paragraph 28d on Page 19 and Paragraphs 391-395 on Pages 178-179 of FAS 133.   A basis swap arises when one variable rate index (e.g., LIBOR) is swapped for another index (e.g., a U.S Prime rate).  Basis risk arises when the hedging index differs from the index of the exposed risk.  Interest rate swaps are illustrated in Example 2 paragraphs 111-120, Example 5 Paragraphs 131-139, Example 8 Paragraphs 153-161, and other examples in Paragraphs 178-186.  See FAS 133 Paragraph 68 for the exact conditions that have to be met if an entity is to assume no ineffectiveness in a hedging relationship of interest rate risk involving an interest-bearing asset/liability and an interest rate swap.   See yield curve, swaption, currency swap, notional, underlying, swap, legal settlement rate, and [Loan + Swap] rate.  Also see basis adjustment and short-cut method for interest rate swaps

Interest Rate Swaps were invented in 2001 --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interest_rate_swap

These derivative financial instruments are essentially portfolios of forward contracts swapping interest payments (usually fixed versus variable rate payments) were not even required to be disclosed in financial statements of banks and other corporations since there were no accounting rules for forward contracts. In a few years interest rate swaps became popular worldwide for both managing cash and for achieving off-balance-sheet financing --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-balance-sheet

Valuation and Pricing of Interest Rate Swaps

From Risk News on November 14, 2003

A surge in interest rate swaps transactions helped the global over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market to grow by 20% during the first half of this year, according to figures released this week by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The BIS said the total notional amount of all OTC contracts outstanding at the end of June was $169.7 trillion, up from $141.7 trillion at the end of December. Gross market values for these contracts rose by 24% to $7.9 trillion. There was growth in all risk categories except gold, according to the BIS’s semi-annual report into OTC market activity. The report highlighted the continued growth in interest rate swaps, by far the largest single group of OTC products with $95 trillion in notional amounts outstanding. Interest rate contracts represented 56% of all market risk categories. Foreign exchange derivatives also grew strongly, with notionals up 20% on the previous six months. Currency options rose by 42%. The BIS said the forex derivatives market had never before shown more than single-figure growth in the time it has been collecting statistics. But the growth in OTC contracts failed to match the pace set in the regulated market. Exchange-traded derivatives grew by 61% in notional amounts outstanding during the first half of 2003, the report said.

An excellent summary about why interest rate swaps have become so popular is provided by Green Interest Rate Swap Management at http://home.earthlink.net/~green/whatisan.htm 

One question that arises is whether a hedged item and its hedge may have different maturity dates.  Paragraph 18 beginning on Page 9 of FAS 133 rules out hedges such as interest rate swaps from having a longer maturity than the hedged item such as a variable rate loan or receivable.  On the other hand, having a shorter maturity is feasible according to KPMG's Example 13 beginning on Page 225 of the Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998) states the following.  A portion of that example reads as follows:

Although the criteria specified in paragraph 28(a) of the Standard do not address whether a portion of a single transaction may be identified as a hedged item, we believer that the proportion principles discussed in fair value hedging model also apply to forecasted transactions.


LIBOR --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LIBOR
Note that LIBOR is a global index used in hundreds of millions of contracts around the world as an underlying for interest rate movements. Nobody ever argued that LIBOR was as risk free as the U.S. Treasury Rate, but globally the U.S. Treasury rate paled relative to LIBOR as a market index for interest rates, especially hundreds of trillions of dollars in interest rate swaps.

Hence when LIBOR becomes manipulated by traders it affects worldwide settlements. This is why pension funds of small U.S. towns, labor unions, and banks of all sizes are now suing Barclays and the other U.K banks that allegedly manipulated the LIBOR market rates for their own personal agenda.

"Lies, Damn Lies and Libor:  Call it one more improvisation in 'too big to fail' crisis management," by Holman W. Jenkins Jr., The Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2012 ---
http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304141204577510490732163260.html?mod=djemEditorialPage_t&mg=reno64-wsj

Ignore the man behind the curtain, said the Wizard of Oz. That advice doesn't pay in the latest scandal of the century, over manipulation of Libor, or the London Interbank Offered Rate. The mess is one more proof of the failing wizardry of the First World's monetary-cum-banking arrangements.

Libor is a reference point for interest rates on everything from auto loans and mortgages to commercial credit and complex derivatives. Major world banks are accused of artificially suppressing their claimed Libor rates during the 2007-08 financial crisis to hide an erosion of trust in each other.

Did the Bank of England or other regulators encourage and abet this manipulation of a global financial indicator?

We are talking about TBTF banks—too big to fail banks. Banks that, by definition, become suspect only when creditors begin to wonder if regulators might seize them and impose losses selectively on creditors. Their overseers could not have failed to notice that interbank liquidity was drying up and the banks nevertheless were reporting Libor rates that suggested all was well. The now-famous nudging phone call from the Bank of England's Paul Tucker to Barclays's Bob Diamond came many months after Libor manipulation had already been aired in the press and in meetings on both sides of the Atlantic. That call was meant to convey the British establishment's concern about Barclays's too-high Libor submissions.

Let's not kid ourselves about something else: Central banks everywhere at the time were fighting collapsing confidence by cutting rates to stimulate retail lending. Their efforts would have been thwarted if Libor flew up on panic about the solvency of the major banks.

Of all the questionably legal improvisations regulators resorted to during the crisis, then, the Libor fudge appears to be just one more. Regulators everywhere gamed their own capital standards to keep banks afloat. The Fed's bailout of AIG, an insurance company, hardly bears close examination. And who can forget J.P. Morgan's last-minute decision to pay Bear Stearns shareholders $10 a share, rather than the $2 mandated by Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, to avoid a legal test of the Fed-orchestrated takeover? Even today, the European Central Bank continues to extend its mandate in dubious ways to fight the euro crisis.

There has been little legal blowback from any of this, but apparently there will be a great deal of blowback from the Libor fudge. Barclays has paid $453 million in fines. Half its top management has resigned. A dozen banks—including Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Citigroup and J.P. Morgan Chase—remain under investigation. Private litigants are lining up even as officialdom seemingly intends to wash its hands of its own role.

Yet the larger lesson isn't that bankers are moral scum, badder than the rest of us. The Libor scandal is another testimony (as if more were needed) of just how lacking in rational design most human institutions inevitably are.

Libor was flawed by the assumption that the banks setting it would always be seen as top-drawer credit risks. The Basel capital-adequacy rules were flawed because they incentivized banks to overproduce "safe" assets, like Greek bonds and U.S. mortgages. The ratings process was flawed eight ways from Sunday, including the fact that many fiduciaries, under law, were required to invest in securities blessed by the rating agencies.

Some Barclays emails imply that traders, even before the crisis, sought to influence the bank's Libor submissions for profit-seeking reasons. This is puzzling and may amount to empty chest thumping. Barclays's "submitters" wouldn't seem in a position to move Libor in ways of great use to traders. Sixteen banks are polled to set Libor and any outlying results are thrown out. Plus each bank's name and submission are published daily. But let's ask: Instead of trying to manipulate Libor in a crisis, what would have been a more straightforward way of dealing with its exposed flaws, considering the many trillions in outstanding credit tied to Libor?

Continued in article

Bob Jensen's threads on interest rate swaps and LIBOR ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm
Search for LIBOR or swap.

 

 


"Why Hedge Interest Rate Exposures?" by Mary Brooikhart, Bank Asset/Liability Management, March 2012 ---
http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/BALM-WhyHedgeInterestRateExposures.pdf
Thank you Ira Kawaller for the heads up.

Bob Jensen's free tutorials on hedging and hedge accounting ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

 


LIBOR --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libor

This is Crime, Not Capitalism
"Wall Street con trick," by Ellen Brown, Asia Times, March 24, 2012 ---
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/NC24Dj05.html

"Far from reducing risk, derivatives increase risk, often with catastrophic results." -
Derivatives expert Satyajit Das, Extreme Money (2011)

*****************
Jensen Comment
Derivatives are great contracts to manage risk if their markets are efficient, fair, and transparent.
They don't reduce risk in most instances because it's impossible in hedging to reduce risk in most instances. Rather hedging entails shifting risk. For example, a company that has cash flow risk due to variable interest rate debt can hedge that cash flow risk. However, elimination of cash flow risk creates fair value risk. The issue is not one of reducing risk. Rather it is a shift in risk preferences.
******************

The "toxic culture of greed" on Wall Street was highlighted again last week, when Greg Smith went public with his resignation from Goldman Sachs in a scathing oped published in the New York Times. In other recent eyebrow-raisers, London Interbank Offered Rates (or LIBOR) - the benchmark interest rates involved in interest rate swaps - were shown to be manipulated by the banks that would have to pay up; and the objectivity of the International

Swaps and Derivatives Association was called into question, when a 50% haircut for creditors was not declared a "default" requiring counterparties to pay on credit default swaps on Greek sovereign debt.

Interest rate swaps are less often in the news than credit default swaps, but they are far more important in terms of revenue, composing fully 82% of the derivatives trade. In February, JP Morgan Chase revealed that it had cleared US$1.4 billion in revenue on trading interest rate swaps in 2011, making them one of the bank's biggest sources of profit. According to the Bank for International Settlements:
[I]nterest rate swaps are the largest component of the global OTC derivative market. The notional amount outstanding as of June 2009 in OTC [over-the-counter] interest rate swaps was $342 trillion, up from $310 trillion in Dec 2007. The gross market value was $13.9 trillion in June 2009, up from $6.2 trillion in Dec 2007.
For more than a decade, banks and insurance companies convinced local governments, hospitals, universities and other non-profits that interest rate swaps would lower interest rates on bonds sold for public projects such as roads, bridges and schools. The swaps were entered into to insure against a rise in interest rates; but instead, interest rates fell to historically low levels.

This was not a flood, earthquake, or other insurable risk due to environmental unknowns or "acts of God". It was a deliberate, manipulated move by the Federal Reserve, acting to save the banks from their own folly in precipitating the credit crisis of 2008. The banks got into trouble, and the Federal Reserve and federal government rushed in to bail them out, rewarding them for their misdeeds at the expense of the taxpayers.

How the swaps were supposed to work was explained by Michael McDonald in a November 2010 Bloomberg article titled "Wall Street Collects $4 Billion From Taxpayers as Swaps Backfire":
In an interest-rate swap, two parties exchange payments on an agreed-upon amount of principal. Most of the swaps Wall Street sold in the municipal market required borrowers to issue long-term securities with interest rates that changed every week or month. The borrowers would then exchange payments, leaving them paying a fixed-rate to a bank or insurance company and receiving a variable rate in return. Sometimes borrowers got lump sums for entering agreements.
Banks and borrowers were supposed to be paying equal rates: the fat years would balance out the lean. But the Fed artificially manipulated the rates to the save the banks.

After the credit crisis broke out, borrowers had to continue selling adjustable-rate securities at auction under the deals. Auction interest rates soared when bond insurers' ratings were downgraded because of subprime mortgage losses; but the periodic payments that banks made to borrowers as part of the swaps plunged because they were linked to benchmarks such as Federal Reserve lending rates, which were slashed to almost zero.

Continued in article

Bob Jensen's fraud updates ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm

Bob Jensen's tutorials on derivative financial instruments ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

 

 


Hi Ray

About all I have on file for this old Sears interest rate swap example is the really old document at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/231wp/231wp.htm 

As I recall, my sources for the Sears swap were personal messages. I don't recall any published sources.

A current Google search disclosed the following links:

http://my.dreamwiz.com/stoneq/articles/orgloss.htm 

http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/1995/OCT95/f341095.htm 

Hope this helps!

Bob Jensen

-----Original Message----- 
From: Ray Eason [mailto:rayeason2@hotmail.com]  
Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2004 6:41 AM 
To: Jensen, Robert Subject: <<student request>>

Hi, Bob...

I am an MBA candidate in Boston working on a one page summary of the Sears Roebuck $257MM swap loss in 1994. I came across your name from Working Paper 231 on the web. I wondered if you might be able to suggest a reference or two in regards to swap losses at Sears in the 1994 timeframe. What tool do you use to query historical information on derivative debacles in your research?

Warmest Regards -Ray

:Ray Eason :: 
Harvard MBA 2004 :: www.geocities.com/oxford96 


Interest rate swap derivative instruments are widely used to manage interest rate risk, which is viewed as a perfectly legitimate use of these hedging instruments.  I stumbled on to a rather interesting doctoral dissertation which finds that firms, especially banks, use such swaps to manage earnings.  The dissertation from Michigan State University is by Chang Joon Song under the direction of Professor Thomas Linsmeier.

"Are Interest Rate Swaps Used to Manage Banks' Earnings," by Chang Joon Song, January 2004 --- http://accounting-net.actg.uic.edu/Department/Songpaper.pdf 

This dissertation is quite clever and very well written.  

Previous research has shown that loan loss provisions and security gains and losses are used to manage banks’ net income. However, these income components are reported below banks largest operating component, net interest income (NII). This study extends the literature by examining whether banks exploit the accounting permitted under past and current hedge accounting standards to manage NII by entering into interest rate swaps. Specifically, I investigate whether banks enter into receive-fixed/pay-variable swaps to increase earnings when unmanaged NII is below management’s target for NII. In addition, I investigate whether banks enter into receive-variable/pay-fixed swaps to decrease earnings when unmanaged NII is above management’s target for NII. Swaps-based earnings management is possible because past and current hedge accounting standards allow receive-fixed/pay-variable swaps (receivevariable/ pay-fixed) to have known positive (negative) income effects in the first period of the swap contract. However, entering into swaps for NII management is not costless, because such swaps change the interest rate risk position throughout the swap period. Thus, I also examine whether banks find it cost-beneficial to enter into offsetting swap positions in the next period to mitigate interest rate risk caused by entering into earnings management swaps in the current period. Using 546 bank-year observations from 1995 to 2002, I find that swaps are used to manage NII. However, I do not find evidence that banks immediately enter into offsetting swap positions in the next period. In sum, this research demonstrates that banks exploit the accounting provided under past and current hedge accounting rules to manage NII. This NII management opportunity will disappear if the FASB implements full fair value accounting for financial instruments, as foreshadowed by FAS No. 133.

What is especially interesting is how Song demonstrates that such earnings management took place before FAS 133 and is still taking place after FAS 133 required the booking of swaps and adjustment to fair value on each reporting date.  It is also interesting how earnings management comes at the price of added risk.  Other derivative positions can be used to reduce the risk, but risks arising from such earnings management cannot be eliminated.


Avoiding derivative accounting.
In an example of the legalistic nature of the accounting rules, Manufacturing could have avoided derivative accounting entirely if the loan and interest rate cap were structured differently. SFAS 133 excludes from its scope certain interest rate caps, floors, and collars that cannot be classified as either a derivative or an embedded derivative. Manufacturing could have embedded the interest rate cap in the loan while failing to meet the criteria of an embedded derivative. Robert A. Dyson, "Accounting for Interest-Bearing Instruments as Derivatives and Hedges," The CPA Journal, http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2002/0102/features/f014202.htm


To my accounting theory students:  I probably won't examine you on this one, but you might find it of interest.

Karen Richardson, "Swapping Rates to Save on Debt ... Maybe:  Rice Financial Products Offers Cities, States Deal Rife With Benefits, Risks," The Wall Street Journal,  March 15, 2005; Page C3 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111083206224878924,00.html?mod=todays_us_money_and_investing 

Officials in Durham, N.C., hope that a financial transaction with a private New York firm will save the city millions of dollars on its municipal debt.

But some say the deal -- an interest-rate swap with a formula that multiplies the city's potential savings as well as its potential losses -- may contain costly risk.

"They're entering into a gamble where they believe they're going to win more money than they're going to lose," says Robert Whaley, professor of finance and a derivatives expert at Duke University in Durham. "It's just speculation."

The Synthetic Fixed-Rate Refinancing Swap, as it is known, was created by Rice Financial Products Co., which has sold such deals in at least five states. It would work like this in Durham: On existing debt of $103 million, Durham would pay Rice Financial a still-to-be negotiated fixed interest rate over 15 years while Rice Financial would pay Durham a rate that is about 0.9 percentage point greater, plus a so-called adjustment factor. Rice Financial has said the deal could save the city $8 million.

"This proposal is so complex ... that I don't know that there are 30 or 40 people in this entire state who can fully comprehend it," says Eugene Brown, a Durham city councilman who has been lobbying against the swap.

"What you really want to focus on is the all-in cost of funds," says Donald Rice, founder and chief executive of Rice Financial.

The adjustment factor is based on a combination of the Bond Market Association (BMA) benchmark index rate for tax-exempt bonds and the taxable London interbank offered rate, or Libor. Supply and demand, credit risk, tax policy, interest rates and different maturities can result in unpredictable swings in that relationship. "Understanding the dynamics of how these two rates behave in relationship to one another is not an easy task," says Prof. Whaley

The formula effectively "magnifies both potential benefits and risks" by 1.54 times, according to an analysis of the swap structure by Public Financial Management in Philadelphia, Durham's financial adviser. The firm approved the deal but recommended that the city budget the expected savings conservatively.

Rice Financial made an "unsolicited proposal" to Durham City in August after it sold a similar swap to Durham County, says Kenneth Pennoyer, the city's director of finance. Prior to meeting with Rice Financial, he says, the city hadn't been contemplating any sort of swap because most of its bonds outstanding pay a fixed interest rate.

"There's a potential savings for the city, and I think that's a worthwhile goal in itself," Mr. Pennoyer says. He is confident that a final city-council vote April 18 will approve the deal since a commission of the state treasurer has approved it and Standard & Poor's Ratings Services recently gave it its highest rating for this type of transaction.

Mr. Rice is a Harvard Business School graduate who started structuring municipal interest-rate swaps at Merrill Lynch & Co. nearly 20 years ago. He says his company has executed more than $20 billion in swaps since its establishment in 1994. "There may be a circumstance where our transaction causes dis-savings, but it requires a substantial market move ... one that's unparalleled," says Mr. Rice.

Interest-rate swaps aren't new to the municipal-bond markets, but their use has grown over the past three years. As interest rates fell to record lows, municipal issuers were looking for ways to trim costs without issuing more bonds. But with interest rates rising, fixed-rate issuers betting on a formula involving two floating rates and a multiplier effect seems imprudent to some.

"Often the political pressures are such that ... when [potential benefits] are couched in terms of 'savings,' the risk is that people are doing things they don't understand," says Mike Marz, vice chairman of First Southwest Co. in Dallas. First Southwest has advised North Carolina finance officials against using the Rice Financial swap.

Mr. Rice declined to discuss his company's compensation from the swaps, except to say that issuers' financial advisers were responsible for negotiating rates that were "fair value" in the market. On average, municipal-swap deals generate fees of 0.05% to 0.10% of the deal for bankers. Durham City's Mr. Pennoyer said Rice Financial's compensation on the $103 million swap was in the ballpark of about $800,000, or 0.8%.

In 2003 the West Basin Municipal Water District in California sued its financial adviser, P.G. Corbin & Co., in California state court, alleging it gave faulty advice in deeming a Rice Financial swap in 2001 a "fair market transaction."

A spokesman for West Basin said he didn't know the status of the case. Lawyers representing P.G. Corbin didn't return phone calls seeking comment.

Separately, this month a West Basin official was sentenced in U.S. court in California to two years in prison for extorting $25,000 from a consultant at M.R. Beal & Co., then a partner of Rice Financial, to steer the water district's debt-refinancing contract in Rice Financial's favor.

"The well-publicized events among certain of West Basin's board members are unfortunate," Mr. Rice said. "Nonetheless, we are pleased with the products and services we have provided West Basin over the years and value them as a customer."

From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on March 18, 2005

TITLE: Swapping Rates to Save on Debt...Maybe 
REPORTER: Karen Richardson 
DATE: Mar 14, 2005 
PAGE: C3 
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111083206224878924,00.html  
TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Derivatives, Governmental Accounting

SUMMARY: The city of Durham, NC., has entered into an unusual interest rate swap created by Rice Financial Products, Co. A Duke university finance professor, Robert Whaley, describes the transaction as speculative.

QUESTIONS: 
1.) What are the features of a standard interest rate swap? What is unusual about the interest rate swap discussed in this article?

2.) Why might a governmental entity want to engage in an interest rate swap transaction? Answer this question with reference to the current state of interest rates and the terms of the Durham, N.C. debt described in the article.

3.) Why does Duke University Professor of Finance Robert Whaley call this transaction "just speculation"?

4.) How does the assessment that this interest rate swap is speculative potentially affect the accounting for the swap?

Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

The practice of selling high risk derivative instruments products just goes on and on in spite of the enormous scandals of the past --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudrotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds 

Particularly important is understanding Examples 2 and 5 of Appendix B of FAS 133 and how to value interest rate swaps --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm 

See Gapping and Immunization 

See Earnings Management 

Bob Jensen's threads on FAS 133 and IAS 39 are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 


 

 


DIG Issue A9 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 

QUESTION

How does Statement 133 affect the accounting for a prepaid interest rate swap contract, that is, an interest rate swap contract for which the fixed leg has been prepaid (at a discounted amount)?

BACKGROUND AND DESCRIPTION OF TRANSACTION

In lieu of obtaining a pay-fixed, receive-variable interest rate swap that is settled net each quarter, an entity may choose to enter into a "prepaid interest rate swap" contract that obligates the counterparty to make quarterly payments to the entity for the variable leg and for which the entity pays the present value of the fixed leg of the swap at the inception of the contract. Different structures can be used for a prepaid interest rate swap contract, although the amount and timing of the cash flows under the different structures are the same, which makes the different structures of contract terms identical economically. For example, rather than entering into a 2-year pay-fixed, receive-variable swap with a $10,000,000 notional amount, a fixed interest rate of 6.65 percent, and a variable interest rate of 3-month US$ LIBOR (that is, the swap terms in Example 5 of Statement 133), an entity can effectively accomplish a prepaid swap by entering into a contract under either of the following structures.

Structure 1
The entity pays $1,228,179 to enter into a prepaid interest rate swap contract that requires the counterparty to make quarterly payments based on a $10,000,000 notional amount and an annual interest rate equal to 3-month US$ LIBOR. The amount of $1,228,179 is the present value of the 8 quarterly payments of $166,250, based on the implied spot rate for each of the 8 payment dates under the assumed initial yield curve in that example.

Structure 2
The entity pays $1,228,179 to enter into a structured note ("contract") with a principal amount of $1,228,179 and loan payments based on a formula equal to 8.142 times 3-month US$ LIBOR. (Note that 8.142 = 10,000,000 / 1,228,179.) Under the structured note, there is no repayment of the principal amount at the end of the two-year term. Rather, repayment of the $1,228,179 principal amount is incorporated into the 8quarterly payments and, thus, is dependent on interest rates.

RESPONSE

The prepaid interest rate swap contract (accomplished under either structure) is a derivative instrument because it meets the criteria in paragraph 6 and related paragraphs of Statement 133. Accordingly, the prepaid interest rate swap (accomplished under either structure) must be accounted for as a derivative instrument and reported at fair value. Even though both structures involve a lending activity related to the prepayment of the fixed leg, the prepaid interest rate swap cannot be separated into a debt host contract and an embedded derivative because Statement 133 does not permit such bifurcation of a contract that, in its entirety, meets the definition of a derivative.

Discussion of Structure 1
The prepaid interest rate swap in Structure 1 has an underlying (three-month US$ LIBOR) and a notional amount (refer to paragraph 6(a)). The prepaid interest rate swap requires an initial investment ($1,228,179) that is smaller than would be required for other types of contracts that would be expected to have a similar response to changes in market factors, such as an 8-times impact for changes in LIBOR when applied to the initial investment (refer to paragraph 6(b)). (Note that the reference to "8 times" is based on the ratio of the notional amount to the initial investment: 10,000,000 / 1,228,179 = 8.142.) In this example, the initial investment of $1,228,179 is smaller than an investment of $10,000,000 to purchase a note with a $10,000,000 notional amount and a variable interest rate of 3-month US$LIBOR-an instrument that provides the same cash flow response to changes in LIBOR as the prepaid interest rate swap.

Under the prepaid swap in Structure 1, neither party is required to deliver an asset that is associated with the underlying or that has a principal amount, stated amount, face value, number of shares, or other denomination that is equal to the notional amount (or the notional amount plus a premium or minus a discount) (refer to paragraphs 6(c) and 9(a)).

Discussion of Structure 2
The contract in Structure 2 has an underlying (three-month US$ LIBOR) and a notional amount (refer to paragraph 6(a)). The contract requires an initial investment that is smaller than would be required for other types of contracts that would be expected to have a similar response to changes in market factors, such as an eight-times impact for changes in US$ LIBOR (refer to paragraph 6(b)). The fact that the contract under Structure 2 involves an initial investment equal to the stated notional of $1,228,179 is not an impediment to satisfying the criterion in paragraph 6(b), even though paragraph 8 states, "A derivative instrument does not require an initial net investment in the contract that is equal to the notional amount (or the notional amount plus a premium or minus a discount) or that is determined by applying the notional amount to the underlying." The observation in paragraph 8 focuses on those contracts that do not involve leverage. When a contract involves leverage, its notional amount is effectively the stated notional times the multiplication factor that represents the leverage. The contract in Structure 2 is highly leveraged, resulting in an impact that is over eight times as great as simply applying the stated notional amount to the underlying. Thus, its initial investment is smaller than would be required for other types of contracts that would be expected to have a similar response to changes in market factors-the criterion in paragraph 6(b). (Note that even a contract with a much lower leverage factor than that illustrated in the above example would meet the criterion in paragraph 6(b).) The guidance in this issue is considered to be consistent with Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. A1, "Initial Net Investment," in which a required initial investment of $105 (to prepay a 1-year forward contract with a $110 strike price) is considered not to meet the criterion in paragraph 6(b).

Under the contract in Structure 2, neither party is required to deliver an asset that is associated with the underlying or that has a principal amount, stated amount, face value, number of shares, or other denomination that is equal to the notional amount (or the notional amount plus a premium or minus a discount) (refer to paragraphs 6(c) and 9(a)). Although the investor may surrender (deliver) the evidence of indebtedness (the structured note) to the issuer at maturity, the stated amount of the note ($1,228,179) is not equal to the actual notional amount ($10,000,000).

March 20, 2002 Message from Ira Kawaller

Hi Bob,
I just posted a recently published article on how to satisfy the FAS 133 disclosure requirements for interest rate hedges.  Although it was originally published by Bank Asset/Liablility Management (March 2000), the content is 
applicable to all firms with interest rate exposures -- not just banks.  
If you are interested, it is available at 
http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/BALMHedges.pdf 
You can also find additional information about derivatives, risk management, and FAS 133 in the various articles posted on the Kawaller & Company website:  
http://www.kawaller.com 
Please feel free to contact me with any questions, comments, or suggestions.
Ira Kawaller
Kawaller & Company, LLC
kawaller@kawaller.com 
(718) 694-6270

 

 

 

International Accounting Standards Board (Committee) (IASB) =

An organization headquartered in London that has be charged with developing international accounting standards.  The charge is given by 140 public accounting bodies (such as the AICPA in the United States) in 101 countries seeking harmonization of accounting standards.  In recent years, IASC standards have more clout due to widespread requiring of IASC standards by worldwide stock exchanges for cross-border listings of securities.  For a discussion of the IASC's history and struggles to develop its own IAS 39 "Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement" standard that is somewhat like, but much less complex, than  FAS 133, see my pacter.htm file.  Initially, the IASC was going to adopt FAS 133.  Later it commenced work on developing its own standard.  In reality, however, the IASC requirements are very close to FAS 133.  Also see IFAC.  The web site of the IASC is at http://www.iasc.org.uk .

You can read about the history of the IASB at http://www.iasb.org/About+Us/About+the+Foundation/History.htm

Also see the Timeline at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds

Click here to view Paul Pacter's commentary on the IASC.  --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/pacter.htm

Note that the differences between IAS 39 and FAS 133 are highlighted at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/pacter.htm#SFAS133diffs1 .

The for-free IASC comparison study of IAS 39 versus FAS 133 (by Paul Pacter) at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm

The non-free FASB comparison study of all standards entitled The IASC-U.S. Comparison Project: A Report on the Similarities and Differences between IASC Standards and U.S. GAAP
SECOND EDITION, (October 1999) at http://stores.yahoo.com/fasbpubs/publications.html 

In 1999 the Joint Working Group of the Banking Associations sharply rebuffed the IAS 39 fair value accounting in two white papers that can be downloaded from http://www.iasc.org.uk/frame/cen3_112.htm.

Also see the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Federation of Accountants Committee (IFAC).

Side by Side: IAS 39 Compared with FASB Standards (FAS 133), by Paul Pacter, as published in Accountancy International Magazine, June 1999 --- http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm 
Also note "Comparisons of International IAS Versus FASB Standards" --- http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/pocketiasus.pdf

IAS 39 Implementation Guidance

Supplement to the Publication
Accounting for Financial Instruments - Standards, Interpretations, and Implementation Guidance
http://www.iasc.org.uk/docs/ias39igc/batch6/39batch6f.pdf

PowerPoint Show Highlighting Some Complaints About IAS 39 and IAS 32 --- http://www.atel.lu/atel/fr/publications/Publications/030524_EACT%20mtg_Milan.ppt 


Fair value accounting politics in the revised IAS 39

From Paul Pacter's IAS Plus on July 13, 2005 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

 
The European Commission has published Frequently Asked Questions – IAS 39 Fair Value Option (FVO) (PDF 94k), providing the Commission's views on the following questions:
  • Why did the Commission carve out the full fair value option in the original IAS 39 standard?
  • Do prudential supervisors support IAS 39 FVO as published by the IASB?
  • When will the Commission to adopt the amended standard for the IAS 39 FVO?
  • Will companies be able to apply the amended standard for their 2005 financial statements?
  • Does the amended standard for IAS 39 FVO meet the EU endorsement criteria?
  • What about the relationship between the fair valuation of own liabilities under the amended IAS 39 FVO standard and under Article 42(a) of the Fourth Company Law Directive?
  • Will the Commission now propose amending Article 42(a) of the Fourth Company Directive?
  • What about the remaining IAS 39 carve-out relating to certain hedge accounting provisions?

 


It's a Shame:  Europeans follow rather than learn from Enron's lead on how to hide risk with unbooked derivatives
"Europe Closer to Adopting Uniform Accounting Rules," by Floyd Norris, The New York Times, November 22, 2004

The European Commission has formally adopted an emasculated accounting standard for derivatives, leaving it up to banks to decide whether they will fully comply with international rules aimed at preventing financial institutions from hiding losses.

The vote on Friday was a victory for banks, mostly but not all from France. They had opposed the accounting rule, voicing concerns that it would lead to volatility in reported profits and balance sheet values.

Even with the decision to change the rule, the European Union moved closer to a system of having all companies follow similar accounting standards beginning in 2005. Until now, each country has had its own rules, which have varied both in details and in how well they were enforced. Many companies are expected to report significant changes in profits under the rules.

The derivatives rule, known as International Accounting Standard 39, is similar to, but less restrictive than, an American rule that has been in force for several years. In an attempt to win European Commission approval, the International Accounting Standards Board watered down the rule in ways that would let companies keep most of the volatility away from their income statement. But that was not enough to satisfy some banks, which complained that the standard would still lead to lower or more volatile valuations that could alarm investors.

. . .

In announcing the decision, the commission rejected what it said were criticisms "that the relaxation of the hedge accounting provisions make the standard 'seriously deficient' and 'not credible.' " It said that the rule, even with the changes, was "a significant step forward" because no current European accounting rule "contains any hedge accounting provisions" at all.

Continued in the article


Differences (Comparisons) between FAS 133 and IAS 39/IFRS 9 --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/canada.htm

2011 Update

"IFRS and US GAAP: Similarities and Differences" according to PwC (2011 Edition)
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/issues/ifrs-reporting/publications/ifrs-and-us-gaap-similarities-and-differences.jhtml
Note the Download button!
Note that warnings are given throughout the document that the similarities and differences mentioned in the booklet are not comprehensive of all similarities and differences. The document is, however, a valuable addition to students of FASB versus IASB standard differences and similarities.

It's not easy keeping track of what's changing and how, but this publication can help. Changes for 2011 include:

  • Revised introduction reflecting the current status, likely next steps, and what companies should be doing now
    (see page 2);
  • Updated convergence timeline, including current proposed timing of exposure drafts, deliberations, comment periods, and final standards
    (see page 7)
    ;
  • More current analysis of the differences between IFRS and US GAAP -- including an assessment of the impact embodied within the differences
    (starting on page 17)
    ; and
  • Details incorporating authoritative standards and interpretive guidance issued through July 31, 2011
    (throughout)
    .

This continues to be one of PwC's most-read publications, and we are confident the 2011 edition will further your understanding of these issues and potential next steps.

For further exploration of the similarities and differences between IFRS and US GAAP, please also visit our IFRS Video Learning Center.

To request a hard copy of this publication, please contact your PwC engagement team or contact us.

Jensen Comment
My favorite comparison topics (Derivatives and Hedging) begin on Page 158
The booklet does a good job listing differences but, in my opinion, overly downplays the importance of these differences. It may well be that IFRS is more restrictive in some areas and less restrictive in other areas to a fault. This is one topical area where IFRS becomes much too subjective such that comparisons of derivatives and hedging activities under IFRS can defeat the main purpose of "standards." The main purpose of an "accounting standard" is to lead to greater comparability of inter-company financial statements. Boo on IFRS in this topical area, especially when it comes to testing hedge effectiveness!

One key quotation is on Page 165

IFRS does not specifically discuss the methodology of applying a critical-terms match in the level of detail included within U.S. GAAP.
Then it goes yatta, yatta, yatta.

Jensen Comment
This is so typical of when IFRS fails to present the "same level of detail" and more importantly fails to provide "implementation guidance" comparable with the FASB's DIG implementation topics and illustrations.

I have a huge beef with the lack of illustrations in IFRS versus the many illustrations in U.S. GAAP.

I have a huge beef with the lack of illustrations in IFRS versus the many illustrations in U.S. GAAP.

I have a huge beef with the lack of illustrations in IFRS versus the many illustrations in U.S. GAAP.

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting standards setting controversies ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting

 

2014 Update
 

Accounting Standard Convergence Dreams Turning Into Divergence Reality in IFRS 9

From the CPA Newsletter on April 3, 2014

Convergence efforts flounder on IFRS 9
The International Accounting Standards Board and the Financial Accounting Standards Board have not been able to come to an agreement on a common financial-instruments accounting standard (that includes accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedging actictivities). Hans Hoogervorst, IASB chairman, said regulators could impose additional disclosures to bridge the gap, but one IASB member opined that the failure to achieve convergence on IFRS 9 was a "terrible disappointment" for global investors. Financial Director (U.K.) (3/5)
http://r.smartbrief.com/resp/fHeJBYbWhBCCfUknCidmwjCicNRoKW?format=standard

Jensen Comment
I blame a lot of this divergence on the unwillingness of the IASB to standup to the EU lawmakers who in turn are unwilling to resist the lobbying efforts of thousands on European banks who want weaker standards for financial instruments and less costly accounting standards to implement, e.g., wanting to avoid the costs of discovering and bifurcating embedded derivative clauses in financial instrument contracts. Aside from ignoring embedded financial instruments risk the milk toast accounting of hedging effectiveness is a real softening of IAS 39 that will soon move into IFRS 9.

The IASB is sets global accounting standards but is still heavily dependent upon EU lawmakers for funding
From the CPA Newsletter on April 3, 2014

EU approves funding for accounting bodies with strings attached
The European Parliament approved funding for the International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation and other accounting standards groups, but imposed conditions requiring regular updates on recommended reforms. Compliance Week/Global Glimpses blog (3/19), The Telegraph (London) (tiered subscription model) (3/15)
http://r.smartbrief.com/resp/fHeJBYbWhBCCfUkxCidmwjCicNRZjj?format=standard

Bob Jensen's threads on hedge accounting are at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

"IAS 32 and IAS 39 Revised:  An Overview," Ernst & Young, February 2004 --- http://www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/International/IAS32-39_Overview_Febr04/$file/IAS32-39_Overview_Febr04.pdf 
I shortened the above URL to http://snipurl.com/RevisedIAS32and39 


Also see Bob Jensen's Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation,  and Yield Curves
for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm 

Differences between FAS 133 and IAS 39 --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/canada.htm 

 Also see Macro Hedge 

 



This is old news, but it does provide some questions for students to ponder.  The main problem of fair value adjustment is that many ((most?) of the adjustments cause enormous fluctuations in earnings, assets, and liabilities that are washed out over time and never realized.  The main advantage is that interim impacts that “might be” realized are booked.  It’s a war between “might be” versus “might never.”  The war has been waging for over a century with respect to booked assets and two decades with respect to unbooked derivative instruments, contingencies, and intangibles.

As you can see below, the war is not over yet.  In fact it has intensified between corporations (especially banks) versus standard setters versus members of the academy.

From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on April 2, 2004

TITLE: As IASB Unveils New Rules, Dispute With EU Continues 
REPORTER: David Reilly 
DATE: Mar 31, 2004 
PAGE: A2 LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108067939682469331,00.html  
TOPICS: Generally accepted accounting principles, Fair Value Accounting, Insider trading, International Accounting, International Accounting Standards Board

SUMMARY: Despite controversy with the European Union (EU), the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is expected to release a final set of international accounting standards. Questions focus on the role of the IASB, controversy with the EU, and harmonization of the accounting standards.

QUESTIONS: 
1.) What is the role of the IASB? What authority does the IASB have to enforce standards?

2.) List three reasons that a country would choose to follow IASB accounting standards. Why has the U.S. not adopted IASB accounting standards?

3.) Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of harmonization of accounting standards throughout the world. Why is it important the IASB reach a resolution with the EU over the disputed accounting standards?

4.) What is fair value accounting? Why would fair value accounting make financial statements more volatile? Is increased volatility a valid argument for not adopting fair value accounting? Does GAAP in the United States require fair value accounting? Support your answers.

Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

Bob Jensen's threads on these controversial standards are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm 

Those threads dealing with fair value are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm

 


June 7, 2004 Update

"EU Body Fails to Bar Bank Accounting Rule," The Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2004, Page A18

A European Commission advisory group failed Friday to block an accounting rule proposed by the International Accounting Standards Board governing how banks treat complex accounting instruments on their balance sheets.

The European Financial Reporting Advisory Council's 11 members voted 6-5 against recommending the new accounitng standard to the commission but the vote fell short of the two-thirds margin required to recommend rejections of the new rule.

European banks have opposed portions of the disputed accounting standard known as FAS 39, because they say requirements to used market prices to value certain financial instruments will cause unnecessary volatility in their financial statements.  

Continued in the article


 

 

GAAP Differences in Your Pocket:  IAS and US GAAP
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/pocketiasus.pdf
 
Topic IAS 39 from the IASB FAS 133 from the FASB
Change in value of non-trading investment Recognize either in net profit or loss or in equity (with recycling). 
May be changed in IAS 39 Amendments.
Recognize in equity (with recycling).
Accounting for hedges of a firm commitment Cash flow hedge. 
May be changed in IAS 39 Amendments.
Fair value hedge.
Use of partial-term hedges Allowed.  Prohibited.
Effect of selling investments classified as held-to-maturity Prohibited from using held-to- maturity classification for the next two years. Prohibited from using held-to- maturity classification (no two year limit).
Use of "basis adjustment" Gain/loss on hedging instrument that had been reported in equity becomes an adjustment of the carrying amount of the asset.
May be changed in IAS 39 Amendments.
Gain/loss on hedging instrument that had been reported in equity remains in equity and is amortized over the same period as the asset.
 Derecognition of financial assets No "isolation in bankruptcy" test.
May be changed in IAS 39 Amendments.
May be changed in IAS 39 Amendments.
Derecognition prohibited unless the transferred asset is beyond the reach of the transferor even in bankruptcy.
Subsequent reversal of an impairment loss Required, if certain criteria are met
May be changed in IAS 39 Amendments.
Prohibited.
Use of "Qualifying SPEs" Prohibited. Allowed.

Differences between FAS 133 and IAS 39 --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/canada.htm 

There are also some major differences in between FAS 133 versus IAS 39 with respect to macro hedging.  
See  Macro Hedge 

IAS 39 history --- http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?s=6941204&sc={CB32B469-886C-4486-86B7-36E49358DDE5}&sd=617116004&n=3306 

Limited Revisions to IAS 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement (E66) --- http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?s=6941204&sc={CB32B469-886C-4486-86B7-36E49358DDE5}&sd=268256258&n=3222

Recognition and Measurement (E66)

E66, Proposed Limited Revisions to IAS 39 and Other Related Standards, proposed the following limited revisions to IAS 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, and other related Standards:
  • changes to require consistent accounting for purchases and sales of financial assets using either trade date accounting or settlement date accounting. IAS 39 currently requires settlement date accounting for sales of financial assets, but permits both trade date and settlement date accounting for purchases;
  • elimination of the requirement in IAS 39 for a lender to recognise certain collateral received from a borrower in its balance sheet;
  • improvement of the wording on impairment recognition;
  • changes to require consistent accounting for temporary investments in equity securities between IAS 39 and other International Accounting Standards; and
  • elimination of redundant disclosure requirements for hedges in IAS 32, Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation.
None of the proposed revisions represents a change to a fundamental principle in IAS 39. Instead, the purpose of the proposed changes is primarily to address technical application issues that have been identified following the approval of IAS 39 in December 1998. The IASC Board’s assessment is that the proposed changes will assist enterprises preparing to implement IAS 39 for the first time in 2001 and help ensure a consistent application of the Standard. No further changes to IAS 39 are contemplated.

 

Hi Patrick,

The term "better" is a loaded term. One of the main criticisms leveled at IASC standards is that they were too broad, too permissive, and too toothless to provide comparability between different corporate annual reports. The IASC (now called IASB) standards only began ot get respect at IOSCO after they started becoming more like FASB standards in the sense of having more teeth and specificity.

I think FAS 133 is better than IAS 39 in the sense that FAS 133 gives more guidance on specific types of contracts. IAS 39 is so vague in places that most users of IAS 39 have to turn to FAS 133 to both understand a type of contract and to find a method of dealing with that contract. IAS 39 was very limited in terms of examples, but this has been recitified somewhat (i.e., by a small amount) in a recent publication by the IASB: Supplement to the Publication Accounting for Financial Instruments - Standards, Interpretations, and Implementation Guidance http://www.iasc.org.uk/docs/ias39igc/batch6/39batch6f.pdf

In theory, there are very few differences between IAS 39 and FAS 133. But this is like saying that there is very little difference between the Bible and the U.S. Commercial Code. Many deals may be against what you find in the Bible, but lawyers will find it of less help in court than the U.S. Commercial Code. I admit saying this with tongue in cheek, because the IAS 39 is much closer to FAS 133 than the Bible is to the USCC.

Paul Pacter wrote a nice paper about differences between IAS 39 and FAS 133. However, such a short paper cannot cover all differences that arise in practice. One of the differences that I have to repeatedly warn my students about is the fact that OCI is generally converted to current earnings when the derivative hedging contract is settled on a cash flow hedge (this conversion is usually called basis adjustment). For example, if I hedge a forecasted purchase of inventory, I will use OCI during the cash flow hedging period, but when I buy the inventory, IAS 39 says to covert the OCI to current earnings. (Actually, IAS standards do not admit to an "Other Comprehensive Income" (OCI) account, but they recommend what is tantamount to using OCI in the equity section of the balance sheet.)

Under FAS 133, basis adjustment is not permitted under many circumstances when derivatives are settled. In the example above, FAS 133 requires that OCI be carried forward after the inventory is purchased and the derivative is settled. OCI is subsequently converted to earnings in a piecemeal fashion. For example, if 20% of the inventory is sold, 20% of the OCI balance at the time the derivative is settled is then converted to current earnings. I call this deferred basis adjustment under FAS 133. This is also true of a cash flow hedge of AFS investment. OCI is carried forward until the investment is sold.

Although there are differences between FAS 133 and IAS 39, I would not make too big a deal out of such differences. IAS 39 was written with one eye upon FAS 133, and the differences are relatively minor. Paul Pacter's summary of these differences can be downloaded from http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?s=490603&sc={65834A68-1562-4CF2-9C09-D1D6BF887A00}&sd=860888892&n=3288 

Hope this helps,

Bob (Robert E.) Jensen Jesse H. Jones Distinguished Professor of Business Trinity University, San Antonio, TX 78212 Voice: (210) 999-7347 Fax: (210) 999-8134 Email: rjensen@trinity.edu http://faculty.Trinity.edu/rjensen 

-----Original Message----- 
From: Patrick Charles [mailto:charlesp@CWDOM.DM]  
Sent: Tuesday, February 26, 2002 11:54 AM 
To: CPAS-L@LISTSERV.LOYOLA.EDU 
Subject: US GAAP Vs IASB

Greetings Everyone

Mr Bolkestein said the rigid approach of US GAAP could make it easier to hide companies' true financial situation. "You tick the boxes and out come the answer," he said. "Having rules is a good thing, but having rigid rules is not the best thing.

http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=FT3AHWRLXXC&live=true&tagid=FTDCZE6JFEC&subheading=accountancy

Finally had a chance to read the US GAAP issue. Robert you mentioned IAS 39, do you have other examples where US GAAP is a better alternative to IASB, or is this an European ploy to get the US to adopt IASB?

Cheers

Mr. Patrick Charles charlesp@cwdom.dm ICQ#6354999

"Education is an admirable thing, but it is well to remember from time to time that nothing that is worth knowing can be taught."

International Federation of Accountants Committee (IFAC) =

An organization charged with dealing with matters of concern in 140 public accounting bodies in 110 countries.  Relations with the IASC are briefly discussed by Paul Pacter in my pacter.htm file.  Although the IFAC appoints some members to the IASC, standard setting responsibilities are now the responsibility of the IASC rather than the IFAC.  The IFAC deals more directly with international auditing standards and education/training requirements of public accountants around the world.  Also see IASC.   The IFAC web site is at http://www.ifac.org/

Click here to view Paul Pacter's commentary on the IFAC.

In-the-Money = see option and intrinsic value.

Intrinsic Value =

the difference between the spot price and the forward strike price of the underlying in an option contract.   Intrinsic value is an expected future value.  Intrinsic (future) value minus current (present) value of the option is called time value.  Hence, intrinsic value has two components.  One is the known current value.  The other component is time value that is generally unknown ex ante.   For example, the suppose the value of an option having no credit risk is $10 on the exchange market.  If a commodity's price is $93 and the forward (strike) price of a call option is $90, the intrinsic value of the option is $3.  The difference between the total option's current price ($10)  and intrinsic value is a time value of $7 = $10 -$3.  One way to think about time value is to think about opportunities for an option to increase its intrinsic value.  If an option is about to expire, there is very little time left for the spot price of the underlying (e.g., commodity price)  to increase.  Time value of an option declines as the option approaches its expiration date.  In other words, intrinsic value converges toward total value as the option matures.  If there is a great deal of time left before the option expires, there is more opportunity for the underlying to increase in value.  Hence time value is higher for options having longer-term expiration dates.   Also see basis.

An illustration of intrinsic value versus time value accounting is given in Example 9 of  FAS 133, Pages 84-86, Paragraphs 162-164.  I found the FASB presentation in Paragraph 162 somewhat confusing.  You may want to look at my Example 9 tutorial on this illustration.  You may obtain the link and password by contacting me at rjensen@trinity.edu. Call options are illustrated in Example 9 of FAS 133 in Paragraphs 162-164.  An option is "in-the-money" if the holder would benefit from exercising it now. A call option is in-the-money if the strike price (the exercise price) is below the current market price of the underlying asset; a put option is in-the-money if the strike price is above the market price. Intrinsic value is equal to the difference between the strike price and the market price.   An option is "out-of-the-money" if the holder would not benefit from exercising it now. A call option is out-of-the-money if the strike price is above the current market price of the underlying asset; a put option is out-of-the-money if the strike price is below the market price. The key distinction between contracts versus futures/forward contracts is that an option is purchased up front and the buyer has a right but not an obligation to execute the option in the future, In other words, the most the option buyer can lose is the option price. In the case of forwards and futures, there is an obligation to perform in the future. The writer (seller) of an option, however, has an obligation to perform if the option is exercised by the buyer. FAS 133 rules for purchased options are much different than for written options.  For rules regarding written options see Paragraphs 396-401 on Pages 179-181 of FAS 133.  Exposure Draft 162-B would not allow hedge accounting for written options.  FAS 133 relaxed the rules for written options under certain circumstances explained in Paragraphs 396-401. 

The partitioning of an option's value between intrinsic and time value partitions is important subsequent to the purchase of an option.  On the acquisition date, the option is recorded at the premium (purchase price) the paid.  Subsequent to the purchase date, the option is marked to fair value equal to subsequent changes in quoted premiums.  If the option qualifies as a cash flow hedge of a forecasted transaction, changes in the time value of the option are debited or credited to current earnings.  Changes in the intrinsic value, however, are posted to comprehensive income (OCI)See the CapIT Corporation and FloorIT Corporation cases at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/133cases/000index.htm.

 

Google gave me the following definitions on February 1, 2004
Definitions of Intrinsic Value on the Web:

A measure of the value of an option or a warrant if immediately exercised. The amount by which the current price for the underlying commodity or futures contract is above the strike price of a call option or below the strike price of a put option for the commodity or futures contract.
www.cftc.gov/opa/brochures/opaglossary.htm

 

The amount by which an option is in-the-money. The intrinsic value is the difference between the exercise/strike price and the price of the underlying security.
www.exchange-handbook.co.uk/glossary.cfm

 

That portion of a warrant, right or call option's price that represents the amount by which the market price of the underlying security exceeds the price at which the warrant, right or call option may be exercised. The intrinsic value of a put is calculated as the amount by which the underlying security's market value is below the price at which the put option can be exercised.
www.bmoinvestorline.com/EducationCentre/i.html

 

If the option is in-the-money (see above), the intrinsic value of the option is the difference between the current price of the underlying stock and the option strike price.
www.optiondigest.com/stock-option-glossary.htm

 

The value of an option if it were to expire immediately with the underlying stock at its current price; the amount by which an option is in-the-money. For call options, this is the difference between the stock price and the striking price, if that difference is a positive number, or zero otherwise. For put options it is the difference between the striking price and the stock price, if that difference is positive, and zero otherwise. See also In-the-Money, Time Value Premium and Parity.
www.cboe.com/LearnCenter/glossary_g-l.asp

 

The amount by which an option is in-the-money. An option which is not in-the-money has no intrinsic value. For calls, intrinsic value equals the difference between the underlying futures price and the option s strike price. For puts, intrinsic value equals the option s strike price minus the underlying futures price. Intrinsic value is never less than zero.
www.energybuyer.org/glossraryGK.htm

 

For in-the-money call and put options, the difference between the strike price and the underlying futures price.
futures.tradingcharts.com/glossary/d-i.html

 

The underlying value of a business separate from its market value or stock price. In fundamental analysis, the analyst will take into account both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of a company's performance. The quantitative aspect is the use of financial ratios such as earnings, revenue, etc., while the qualitative perspective involves consideration of the company's management strength. Based on such analysis, the fundamental analyst will make a forecast of future earnings and prospects for the company to arrive at an intrinsic value of its shares. The intrinsic value of a share can be at odds with its stock market price, indicating that the company is either overvalued or undervalued by the market. BACK TO TOP
university.smartmoney.com/glossary/index.cfm

 

The difference between an in the money option strike price and the current market price of a share of the underlying security.
www.schaeffersresearch.com/option/glossary.asp

 

The absolute value of the in-the-money amount; that is, the amount that would be realized if an in-the-money option were exercised.
www.nfa.futures.org/basic/glossary.asp

 

For call options: The amount the market price of the underlying security is above the option’s strike price. Eg, an IBM call option with a strike price of 100 with IBM stock at 110, has an intrinsic value of 10 & is “in-the-money.” If IBM were at 95, the call option would have no intrinsic value & would be “out-of-the-money.” If IBM were at 100, there would still be no intrinsic value, but the option would be “at-the-money.” For put options: The amount the market price of the underlying security is below the option’s strike price. Eg, a Xerox put with a strike price of 35 with Xerox at 30, has an intrinsic value of 5. If Xerox were at 35 or higher, the put option would have no intrinsic value. See also Premium, Strike Price & Time Value.
www.hsletter.com/Tutorial_GlossaryB.html

 

the value of an option measured by the difference between the strike price and the market price of the underlying futures contract when the option is "in-the-money."
www.cigtrading.com/glossary.htm

 

The amount by which an option is in the money.
www.ndmarketmanager.org/education/glossary.html

 

Value of the option if it were exercised and in the money.
www.agr.gc.ca/policy/risk/course/english/gls1e.html

 

exists when the exercise price of a call option is below (or of a put option is above) the current market price of the underlying security.
www.asset-analysis.com/glossary/glo_026.html

 

The excess of the market value of the underlying stock over the striking price of the option for a call, or the excess of the striking price of the option over the market value of the underlying stock for a put.
www.yourinvestmentclub.com/dictionary.htm

 

Historic or other value of an item that means it must be retained and preserved in its original form - the value that the item has beyond the recorded information contained in it.
www.alia.org.au/~wsmith/glossary.htm

 

The amount by which an option is in-the-money. See In-the-Money Option.
www.goldseek.com/101/glossary.shtml

 

The amount by which an option is in-the-money. See In-the-Money Option
www.thepitmaster.com/otherresources/glossary.htm

 

A call option's intrinsic value is equal to the number of points the underlying contract exceeds the strike price of the option.. An option premium will never be less than the option's intrinsic value.
www.gtfutures.com/glossary.htm

 

The dollar amount of the difference between the exercise price of an option and the current cash value of the underlying security. Intrinsic value and time value are the two components of an option premium, or price.
www.calton.com/definiti.htm

 

This refers to the difference between an in-the-money call/put and the strike price.
www.forexdirectory.net/opgloss.html

 

A form of judgement that takes into account all the values present in the system, an holistic valuation or fitness measurement of the whole.
www.calresco.org/glossary.htm

 

The value of an option were it to be exercised. Only in-the-money options have intrinsic value.
www.fdic.gov/regulations/trust/trust/glos.html

 

The amount by which an option is in-the-money. An option having intrinsic value. A call option is in-the-money if its strike price is below the current price of the underlying futures contract. A put option is in-the-money if its strike price is above the current price of the underlying futures contract.
www.ag-tradingfloor.com/education/glossary.asp

Minimum value and Paragraph 63 of FAS 133
The minimum value of an American option is zero or its intrinsic value since it can be exercised at any time.  The same cannot be said for a European option that has to be held to maturity.  If the underlying is the price of corn, then the minimum value of an option on corn is either zero or the current spot price of corn minus the discounted risk-free present value of the strike price.  In other words if the option cannot be exercised early, discount the present value of the strike price from the date of expiration and compare it with the current spot price.  If the difference is positive, this is the minimum value.  It can hypothetically be the minimum value of an American option, but in an efficient market the current price of an American option will not sell below its risk free present value.

Of course the value may actually be greater due to volatility that adds value above the risk-free discount rate.  In other words, it is risk or volatility that adds value over and above a risk free alternative to investing.  However, it is possible but not all that common to exclude volatility from risk assessment as explained in Sub-paragraph b of Paragraph 63 of FAS 133 quoted below.

a. If the effectiveness of a hedge with an option contract is assessed based on changes in the option's intrinsic value, the change in the time value of the contract would be excluded from the assessment of hedge effectiveness.

b. If the effectiveness of a hedge with an option contract is assessed based on changes in the option's minimum value, that is, its intrinsic value plus the effect of discounting, the change in the volatility value of the contract would be excluded from the assessment of hedge effectiveness.

c. If the effectiveness of a hedge with a forward or futures contract is assessed based on changes in fair value attributable to changes in spot prices, the change in the fair value of the contract related to the changes in the difference between the spot price and the forward or futures price would be excluded from the assessment of hedge effectiveness.

The point here is that options are certain to be effective in hedging intrinsic value, but are uncertain in terms of hedging time value at all interim points of time prior to expiration.  As a result, accounting standards require that effectiveness for hedge accounting be tested at each point in time when options are adjusted to fair value carrying amounts in the books even though ultimate effectiveness is certain.  Potential gains from options are uncertain prior to expiration.  Potential gains or losses from other types of derivative contracts are uncertain both before expiration and on the date of expiration.

 

Flow Chart for FAS 133 and IAS 39 Accounting --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133flow.htm

Differences between FAS 133 and IAS 39 --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/canada.htm

Intrinsic Value Versus Full Value Hedge Accounting --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/IntrinsicValue.htm

 

 

Inverse Floater = see floater.

 

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |

J-Terms

 

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |

K-Terms

 

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |

L-Terms

Leaps =

long term derivatives, usually long term options

Legal Settlement Rate =

the internal rate of return that discounts estimated future interest rate swap cash flows back down to a time t value equal to future swap receipts discounted at the swap receivable rate minus the swap payables discounted at the swap payable rate. This is a term invented by Bob Jensen in Working Paper 231 at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/231wp/231wp.htm .

Leverage =

an investment position subject to a multiplier impact on returns.  For example, for a relatively low price, say $500, an investor can purchase a call option on 100 shares of stock that in effect accrues all the benefits of rising prices on those share as if the investor owned those shares at a price of , say, $5,000.  Similarly, a leveraged position can be obtained on a put option that benefits the option holder in the case of falling prices.  In England and some other nations, the term "gearing" means the same thing as leverage.

Another example is a leveraged gold note that pays no interest and has the amount of principal vary with the price of gold.  This is discussed under the term embedded derivative.

Leveraged Gold Note = see embedded derivative.

Levered Inverse Floater = see floater.

LIBOR =

the London InterBank Offering Rate interest rate at which banks borrow in London. The rate is commonly used as an index in floating rate contracts, interest rate swaps, and other contracts based upon interest rate fluctuations.

LIBOR --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libor

Note that LIBOR is a global index used in hundreds of millions of contracts around the world as an underlying for interest rate movements. Nobody ever argued that LIBOR was as risk free as the U.S. Treasury Rate, but globally the U.S. Treasury rate paled relative to LIBOR as a market index for interest rates, especially hundreds of trillions of dollars in interest rate swaps.

Hence when LIBOR becomes manipulated by traders it affects worldwide settlements. This is why pension funds of small U.S. towns, labor unions, and banks of all sizes are now suing Barclays and the other U.K banks that allegedly manipulated the LIBOR market rates for their own personal agenda.

 

"Why LIBOR Manipulation Poses an Ongoing Risk:  A finance professor explains what it will take to fix the problem," by Darrell Duffie, Stanford University Graduate School of Business, September 2014 --- Click Here
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/headlines/darrell-duffie-why-libor-manipulation-poses-ongoing-risk?utm_source=Stanford+Business+Re%3AThink&utm_campaign=154e75cce1-Stanford_Business_Re_Think_Issue_46_9_21_2014&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_0b5214e34b-154e75cce1-70265733&ct=t%28Stanford_Business_Re_Think_Issue_46_9_21_2014%29

 

"Lies, Damn Lies and Libor:  Call it one more improvisation in 'too big to fail' crisis management," by Holman W. Jenkins Jr., The Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2012 ---
http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304141204577510490732163260.html?mod=djemEditorialPage_t&mg=reno64-wsj

Ignore the man behind the curtain, said the Wizard of Oz. That advice doesn't pay in the latest scandal of the century, over manipulation of Libor, or the London Interbank Offered Rate. The mess is one more proof of the failing wizardry of the First World's monetary-cum-banking arrangements.

Libor is a reference point for interest rates on everything from auto loans and mortgages to commercial credit and complex derivatives. Major world banks are accused of artificially suppressing their claimed Libor rates during the 2007-08 financial crisis to hide an erosion of trust in each other.

Did the Bank of England or other regulators encourage and abet this manipulation of a global financial indicator?

We are talking about TBTF banks—too big to fail banks. Banks that, by definition, become suspect only when creditors begin to wonder if regulators might seize them and impose losses selectively on creditors. Their overseers could not have failed to notice that interbank liquidity was drying up and the banks nevertheless were reporting Libor rates that suggested all was well. The now-famous nudging phone call from the Bank of England's Paul Tucker to Barclays's Bob Diamond came many months after Libor manipulation had already been aired in the press and in meetings on both sides of the Atlantic. That call was meant to convey the British establishment's concern about Barclays's too-high Libor submissions.

Let's not kid ourselves about something else: Central banks everywhere at the time were fighting collapsing confidence by cutting rates to stimulate retail lending. Their efforts would have been thwarted if Libor flew up on panic about the solvency of the major banks.

Of all the questionably legal improvisations regulators resorted to during the crisis, then, the Libor fudge appears to be just one more. Regulators everywhere gamed their own capital standards to keep banks afloat. The Fed's bailout of AIG, an insurance company, hardly bears close examination. And who can forget J.P. Morgan's last-minute decision to pay Bear Stearns shareholders $10 a share, rather than the $2 mandated by Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, to avoid a legal test of the Fed-orchestrated takeover? Even today, the European Central Bank continues to extend its mandate in dubious ways to fight the euro crisis.

There has been little legal blowback from any of this, but apparently there will be a great deal of blowback from the Libor fudge. Barclays has paid $453 million in fines. Half its top management has resigned. A dozen banks—including Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Citigroup and J.P. Morgan Chase—remain under investigation. Private litigants are lining up even as officialdom seemingly intends to wash its hands of its own role.

Yet the larger lesson isn't that bankers are moral scum, badder than the rest of us. The Libor scandal is another testimony (as if more were needed) of just how lacking in rational design most human institutions inevitably are.

Libor was flawed by the assumption that the banks setting it would always be seen as top-drawer credit risks. The Basel capital-adequacy rules were flawed because they incentivized banks to overproduce "safe" assets, like Greek bonds and U.S. mortgages. The ratings process was flawed eight ways from Sunday, including the fact that many fiduciaries, under law, were required to invest in securities blessed by the rating agencies.

Some Barclays emails imply that traders, even before the crisis, sought to influence the bank's Libor submissions for profit-seeking reasons. This is puzzling and may amount to empty chest thumping. Barclays's "submitters" wouldn't seem in a position to move Libor in ways of great use to traders. Sixteen banks are polled to set Libor and any outlying results are thrown out. Plus each bank's name and submission are published daily. But let's ask: Instead of trying to manipulate Libor in a crisis, what would have been a more straightforward way of dealing with its exposed flaws, considering the many trillions in outstanding credit tied to Libor?

Continued in article

Bob Jensen's threads on interest rate swaps and LIBOR ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm
Search for LIBOR or swap.

 

 

Liquidity Stress Test

See Stress Test

LME =

London Mercantile Exchange.  See spot rate.

Loan Commitments 

Accounting for Executory Contracts Such as Purchase/Sale Commitments and Loan Commitments ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/TheoryOnFirmCommitments.htm

          Also ee Fair Value

Loan + Swap Rate =

an underlying notional loan rate (e.g., the interest rate on bonds payable) plus the difference between the swap receivable rate minus the swap payable rate.  This is a term invented by Bob Jensen in Working Paper 231 at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/231wp/231wp.htm .

Loan Obligation

A loan obligation is a contract to make a loan in the future. If it is a firm commitment in the sense of a specified rate of interest, its accounting depends a great deal whether or not the loan commitment will net settle due to changes in market rates of interest. FAS 133 is very clear that loan commitments that do not net settle are not required to be booked as derivative financial instruments, although certain problems of conflict between FAS 133 versus FAS 65.had to be resolved in Paragraphs A26-A33 if FAS 149.

Loan commitments that net settle were more of a problem in IAS 39 since net settlement is not required in the IAS 39 definition of a derivative. However, IAS 39 added a net settlement condition for loan commitments as follows:

BC15       Loan commitments are firm commitments to provide credit under pre-specified terms and conditions. In the IAS 39 implementation guidance process, the question was raised whether a bank's loan commitments are derivatives accounted for at fair value under IAS 39. This question arises because a commitment to make a loan at a specified rate of interest during a fixed period of time meets the definition of a derivative. In effect, it is a written option for the potential borrower to obtain a loan at a specified rate.

 

BC16       To simplify the accounting for holders and issuers of loan commitments, the Board decided to exclude particular loan commitments from the scope of IAS 39. The effect of the exclusion is that an entity will not recognise and measure changes in fair value of these loan commitments that result from changes in market interest rates or credit spreads. This is consistent with the measurement of the loan that results if the holder of the loan commitment exercises its right to obtain financing, because changes in market interest rates do not affect the measurement of an asset measured at amortised cost (assuming it is not designated in a category other than loans and receivables).

 

BC17       However, the Board decided that an entity should be permitted to measure a loan commitment at fair value with changes in fair value recognised in profit or loss on the basis of designation at inception of the loan commitment as a financial liability through profit or loss. This may be appropriate, for example, if the entity manages risk exposures related to loan commitments on a fair value basis.

 

BC18       The Board further decided that a loan commitment should be excluded from the scope of IAS 39 only if it cannot be settled net.  If the value of a loan commitment can be settled net in cash or another financial instrument, including when the entity has a past practice of selling the resulting loan assets shortly after origination, it is difficult to justify its exclusion from the requirement in IAS 39 to measure at fair value similar instruments that meet the definition of a derivative.

 

BC19       Some comments received on the Exposure Draft disagreed with the Board's proposal that an entity that has a past practice of selling the assets resulting from its loan commitments shortly after origination should apply IAS 39 to all of its loan commitments. The Board considered this concern and agreed that the words in the Exposure Draft did not reflect the Board's intention. Thus, the Board clarified that if an entity has a past practice of selling the assets resulting from its loan commitments shortly after origination, it applies IAS 39 only to its loan commitments in the same class.

 

BC20       Finally, the Board decided that commitments to provide a loan at a below-market interest rate should be initially measured at fair value, and subsequently measured at the higher of (a) the amount that would be recognised under IAS 37 and (b) the amount initially recognised less, where appropriate, cumulative amortisation recognised in accordance with IAS 18 Revenue. It noted that without such a requirement, liabilities that result from such commitments might not be recognised in the balance sheet, because in many cases no cash consideration is received.

 

BC20A   As discussed in paragraphs BC21–BC23E, the Board amended IAS 39 in 2005 to address financial guarantee contracts. In making those amendments, the Board moved the material on loan commitments from the scope section of the Standard to the section on subsequent measurement (Paragraph 47(d)). The purpose of this change was to rationalise the presentation of this material without making substantive changes.

 

 

Paragraph BC18 above especially brings IAS 39 closer to FAS 133 with respect to the net settlement criterion for loan commitments to be derivatives.

If a loan commitment net settles and is booked as a derivative financial instrument, a hedge of this loan commitment cannot get hedge accounting. However, if the loan commitment does not net settle and is not booked, then the question of hedge accounting depends upon how the loan eventually will be carried when it is transacted and booked. If it will be carried at fair value, then hedge accounting is not allowed for any derivative that hedges this unbooked loan commitment. If the loan will be carried at amortized cost, however, hedge accounting is available for the hedging derivative just as it is for a purchase commitment of inventory and fixed assets.

In matters of valuing loan commitments at fair value if they meet the net settlement condition of a derivative and are booked at fair value, a question arises as to fair value measurement when future servicing rights are embedded in the value of the loan, as is the case for most mortgage loans. A key paragraph of the SEC’s SAB 105 reads as follows:

Facts: Bank A enters into a loan commitment with a customer to originate a mortgage loan at a specified rate. As part of this written loan commitment, Bank A expects to receive future net cash flows related to servicing rights from servicing fees (included in the loan's interest rate or otherwise), late charges, and other ancillary sources, or from selling the servicing rights to a third party. If Bank A intends to sell the mortgage loan after it is funded, pursuant to paragraph 6 of FASB Statement No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, as amended by FASB Statement No. 149, Amendment of Statement 133 on Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities ("Statement 133"), the written loan commitment is accounted for as a derivative instrument and recorded at fair value through earnings (referred to hereafter as a "derivative loan commitment"). If Bank A does not intend to sell the mortgage loan after it is funded, the written loan commitment is not accounted for as a derivative under Statement 133. However, paragraph 7(c) of FASB Statement No. 159, The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities ("Statement 159"), permits Bank A to record the written loan commitment at fair value through earnings (referred to hereafter as a "written loan commitment"). Pursuant to Statement 159, the fair value measurement for a written loan commitment would include the expected net future cash flows related to the associated servicing of the loan.

In summary, the loan commitment must in some instances be booked at fair value and in other instances it may be booked at fair value under the Fair Value Option (FVO) in FAS 159. However, FAS 159 makes fair value booking optional when it is not required under SAB 105, FAS 133, and FAS 149.If the loan commitment is not booked, the accounting for it would be much like the accounting for unbooked purchase/sale contracts illustrated by Bob Jensen at --- ttp://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/ExamMaterial/answers/WeeklyAssignments/quiz0107a.xls 

Additional Considerations

PwC in Comperio makes the following observation:

SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 105, Application of Accounting Principles to Loan Commitments (SAB 105), specifies that in estimating the fair value of loan commitments that are subject to FAS 133, an entity should exclude from its calculation the expected future cash flows related to the associated servicing of the loan. It is unclear whether the guidance in SAB 105 would also apply to loan commitments that are not subject to FAS 133 but are eligible for the FVO under FAS 159. The SEC Staff has requested that an industry group led by the Mortgage Bankers Association assist in resolving this issue

 

Also consider DIG Issue No. C-13 as amended by FAS 149. Pursuant to FAS 156, a mortgage banking enterprise may elect to subsequently measure (BOOKED) servicing assets and servicing liabilities at fair value with changes in fair value reported in the period in which they occur. By electing the Fair Value Measurement Method, the mortgage banking enterprise may simplify its objective for hedge accounting because the Fair Value Measurement Method requires income statement recognition of the changes in fair value of those servicing assets and servicing liabilities, which will potentially offset the changes in fair value of the derivative instruments in the same accounting period without designating formal FAS 133 hedging relationships. The FASB’s Accounting Standards Codification online database provides useful information regarding recognition of derivatives. Derecognition of derivatives is also discussed 

FASB Accounting  Standards Codification online database  --- http://asc.fasb.org/home . Section 815-10 provides an introductory summary of accounting for derivative financial instruments. Recognition of derivatives for booking purposes is discussed in Section 815-25. Derecognition is discussed in Section 815-40.

Also see Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) accounting described at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#CDO

Local Currency =

currency of a particular country being referred to; the reporting currency of a domestic or foreign operation being referred to in context.

Long =

Ownership of an investment position, security, or instrument such that rising market prices will benefit the owner.  This is also known as a long position.  For example, the purchase of a call option is a long position because the owner of the call option goes in the money with rising prices.  See also short.

Long-Haul Method --- see Shortcut Method under the S-Terms at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#S-Terms

Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) Fund =

the best known of the investment funds that failed using scientific formulas for hedging with derivatives.  The firm was run by 25 scholars who received Ph.Ds in economics and were heavily influenced by the options pricing theories of Nobel Prize winning economists Robert C. Merton and Myron S. Scholes.    In November of 1998, the largest and best known investment banking and brokerage houses in New York had to dig deep into their own pockets to keep the fund from a failure that would have shaken financial markets around the world.  See Options Pricing Theory and Black-Scholes Model.

 

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |

M-Terms

Macro Hedge = the hedging of a portfolio of items such as loans rather than the hedging of each item within the portfolio.  In some cases, the hedge is a net hedge of the value of the portfolio's asset items less the value of the portfolio's liability items.  

     In general, FAS 133 does not allow a macro hedge accounting of a non-homogeneous portfolio.  Net hedging also does not qualify for hedge accounting.    

.  The FASB’s blanket refusal to allow hedge accounting for macro hedges of non-homogeneous portfolios and hedges of more than one type of risk runs counter to both theory and practice.  For example, it is extremely common for financial instruments such as loans to have combined interest rate risk and prepayment risk that arises from embedded options to settle before a maturity date.  If multiple-risk items are being hedged for only one type of risk, usually price or interest rate risk, changes in the market value of the hedging derivative that hedges only one type of risk may not match changes in the market value of the hedged item whose value changes are impacted by multiple risks.  The hedge of the price risk may be perfectly effective when in fact the FAS 133 mandated comparisons of the changes in hedged item and hedging instrument values make it appear to be an ineffective hedge that does not qualify for hedge accounting. 

Put in another way, suppose the hedged item is an apple whose value is impacted by both the market price of apples and a significant likelihood that the apple will rot before being sold.  The hedging derivative (say an apple price swap contract) is only impacted by changes in apple prices and is not subject to rotting before a contracted maturity date.  Changes in the swap’s value may be highly ineffective in hedging the value change of any apple that becomes prematurely rotten.  The same can be said about the hedge of a loan investment if the loan is paid off prematurely.  Varying prepayment risks on loans held by banks typically prevent loan portfolios from being sufficiently homogeneous for purposes of macro hedging of interest rate risks under FAS 133 and IAS 39.

FAS 133 and IAS 39 rules require, except in rare instances, a separate hedging contract for each investment loan in a portfolio of hundreds or thousands of loans.  Obtaining favorable hedge accounting under the rules becomes extremely impractical for firms holding large portfolios. The way that banks hedge loan interest rates in practice is to macro hedge an entire portfolio of loans grouped into time periods based upon expected repayment dates rather than contracted maturities.  This is analogous to hedging a warehouse full of apples grouped according to expected sales dates rather than expected dates of being too rotten to sell.  In the U.S. , banks and other business firms tried unsuccessfully allow for greater flexibility in FAS 133 macro hedging rules that do not require individual item hedging contracts.

Individual item hedges that seldom take place for many types of transactions where financial risk is managed on a macro basis for portfolios of transactions.  Banks just do not hedge each individual loan just as grocers do not hedge individual apples.  The major macro hedging controversy boils down to the following controversies:

1.       Individual item hedging is sometimes as absurdly impractical as writing a forward contract for each apple held in a grocery chain’s inventory.

2.       Not allowing multiple types of risk to be hedged with one hedging instrument fails to take into account that the two or more risks may be highly correlated.  The market value of a fixed-rate loan is greatly impacted by both risk of interest rate movements and risk of prepayment which, in turn, is also correlated with interest rate movements.  The two risks are neither independent nor additive.

3.       Businesses badly want accounting rules changed to allow macro hedge accounting for portfolios of assets and liabilities rather than individual items.  The also want hedge accounting for “netting” hedges in portfolios contain both assets and liabilities.  Managers often hedge net values even though netting is not allowed in the current hedge accounting standards.

It may be possible for firms to provide online supplementary pivot tables for investor dynamic analyses of hedges much like Microsoft provides online “What if” pivot tables to supplement

Macro hedging problem --- using a single hedge of a portfolio of securities having multiple financial risks

"IASB seeks improvement for macro hedging accounting," by Ken Tysiac, Journal of Accountancy, April 17, 2014 ---
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/News/20149975.htm

Jensen Comment
FAS 133 denied hedge accounting for portfolios or securities having more than one type of financial risk. For example, a portfolio of mortgage investments or liabilities might have securities with differing maturity dates, different interest rates, different currencies, different embedded payoff options, etc.

FAS 138 became somewhat of an exception after the FASB learned that it was common to hedge a given security called a "cross currency" security having both interest rate risk and foreign currency risk. FAS 133 overturned the FAS 133 ban on simultaneous hedging of a given security's simultaneous risk of interest rate fluctuation and FX fluctuation. However, the cross currency hedging instrument itself must simultaneously hedge both risks. There are cross currency hedging instruments in the financial world that do so.

The FASB, however, has never allowed hedge accounting for portfolios of securities unless all components of the portfolio have the same risks such as the same fixed or variable interest rates, the same maturity dates, the same foreign exchange risk, etc. Such portfolios almost never exist in the financial world.

Now the IASB is somehow miraculously trying to provide hedge accounting for heterogeneous portfolios. All I can say is good luck!

Although there has been considerable convergence of IASB and FASB standards, the accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedge accounting has been marked by increased divergence as the IASB tries to make marshmallows out of complicated hedge accounting rules that once existed in IAS 39.

One thing is set in stone. If a portfolio has more than one type of financial risk, a hedging instrument that does not hedge all those risks simultaneiously is not a hedging instrument in the financial world. It may one day be one in the fantasyland of the IASB obsessed with principles-based standards having no bright lines.


Macro hedging problem --- using a single hedge of a portfolio of securities having multiple financial risks

"IASB seeks improvement for macro hedging accounting," by Ken Tysiac, Journal of Accountancy, April 17, 2014 ---
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/News/20149975.htm

Jensen Comment
FAS 133 denied hedge accounting for portfolios or securities having more than one type of financial risk. For example, a portfolio of mortgage investments or liabilities might have securities with differing maturity dates, different interest rates, different currencies, different embedded payoff options, etc.

FAS 138 became somewhat of an exception after the FASB learned that it was common to hedge a given security called a "cross currency" security having both interest rate risk and foreign currency risk. FAS 133 overturned the FAS 133 ban on simultaneous hedging of a given security's simultaneous risk of interest rate fluctuation and FX fluctuation. However, the cross currency hedging instrument itself must simultaneously hedge both risks. There are cross currency hedging instruments in the financial world that do so.

The FASB, however, has never allowed hedge accounting for portfolios of securities unless all components of the portfolio have the same risks such as the same fixed or variable interest rates, the same maturity dates, the same foreign exchange risk, etc. Such portfolios almost never exist in the financial world.

Now the IASB is somehow miraculously trying to provide hedge accounting for heterogeneous portfolios. All I can say is good luck!

Although there has been considerable convergence of IASB and FASB standards, the accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedge accounting has been marked by increased divergence as the IASB tries to make marshmallows out of complicated hedge accounting rules that once existed in IAS 39.

One thing is set in stone. If a portfolio has more than one type of financial risk, a hedging instrument that does not hedge all those risks simultaneiously is not a hedging instrument in the financial world. It may one day be one in the fantasyland of the IASB obsessed with principles-based standards having no bright lines.

Volcker Rule Won't Allow Banks to Use 'Portfolio Hedging' ---
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303722104579238622934171230?mod=djemCFO_h

Bob Jensen's helpers for learning about accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedge accounting ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

 


 

Jensen Comment
FAS 133 has never allowed macro hedge accounting relief for hedged portfolios except when all financial risks of components in the portfolio are identical (read that as almost never). For example, if mortgage loans in a hedged portfolio have different interest rates and maturity dates the risks are heterogeneous.  In fact the risks differ fundamentally since the collateral of any one mortgage differs from the collateral of any other mortgage.

Put in another way, suppose the hedged item is an apple whose value is impacted by both the market price of apples and a significant likelihood that the apple will rot before being sold.  The hedging derivative (say an apple price swap contract) is only impacted by changes in apple prices and is not subject to rotting before a contracted maturity date.  Changes in the swap's value may be highly ineffective in hedging the value change of any apple that becomes prematurely rotten.  The same can be said about the hedge of a loan investment if the loan is paid off prematurely.  Varying prepayment risks on loans held by banks typically prevent loan portfolios from being sufficiently homogeneous for purposes of macro hedging of interest rate risks under FAS 133 and IAS 39.

Note that KPMG was fired from the firm's biggest audit in history (Fannie Mae) largely because KPMG allowed hedge accounting of some portfolios in the largest earnings management fraud in history engineered by Fannie Mae's CEO Franklin Raines who wanted his earnings-based bonus.

"Fannie Mae Enron?" Editorial in The Wall Street Journal
October 4, 2004; Page A16

For years, mortgage giant Fannie Mae has produced smoothly growing earnings. And for years, observers have wondered how Fannie could manage its inherently risky portfolio without a whiff of volatility. Now, thanks to Fannie's regulator, we know the answer. The company was cooking the books. Big time.

We've looked closely at the 211-page report issued by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (Ofheo), and the details are more troubling than even the recent headlines. The magnitude of Fannie's machinations is stunning, and in two key areas in particular they deserve to be better understood. By improperly delaying the recognition of income, it created a cookie jar of reserves. And by improperly classifying certain derivatives, it was able to spread out losses over many years instead of recognizing them immediately.

In the cookie-jar ploy, Fannie set aside an artificially large cash reserve. And -- presto -- in any quarter its managers could reach into that jar to compensate for poor results or add to it to dampen good ones. This ploy, according to Ofheo, gave Fannie "inordinate flexibility" in reporting the amount of income or expenses over reporting periods.

This flexibility also gave Fannie the ability to manipulate earnings to hit -- within pennies -- target numbers for executive bonuses. Ofheo details an example from 1998, the year the Russian financial crisis sent interest rates tumbling. Lower rates caused a lot of mortgage holders to prepay their existing home mortgages. And Fannie was suddenly facing an estimated expense of $400 million.

Well, in its wisdom, Fannie decided to recognize only $200 million, deferring the other half. That allowed Fannie's executives -- whose bonus plan is linked to earnings-per-share -- to meet the target for maximum bonus payouts. The target EPS for maximum payout was $3.23 and Fannie reported exactly . . . $3.2309. This bull's-eye was worth $1.932 million to then-CEO James Johnson, $1.19 million to then-CEO-designate Franklin Raines, and $779,625 to then-Vice Chairman Jamie Gorelick.

That same year Fannie installed software that allowed management to produce multiple scenarios under different assumptions that, according to a Fannie executive, "strengthens the earnings management that is necessary when dealing with a volatile book of business." Over the years, Fannie designed and added software that allowed it to assess the impact of recognizing income or expense on securities and loans. This practice fits with a Fannie corporate culture that the report says considered volatility "artificial" and measures of precision "spurious."

This disturbing culture was apparent in Fannie's manipulation of its derivative accounting. Fannie runs a giant derivative book in an attempt to hedge its massive exposure to interest-rate risk. Derivatives must be marked-to-market, carried on the balance sheet at fair value. The problem is that changes in fair-value can cause some nasty volatility in earnings.

So, Fannie decided to classify a huge amount of its derivatives as hedging transactions, thereby avoiding any impact on earnings. (And we mean huge: In December 2003, Fan's derivatives had a notional value of $1.04 trillion of which only a notional $43 million was not classified in hedging relationships.) This misapplication continued when Fannie closed out positions. The company did not record the fair-value changes in earnings, but only in Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income (AOCI) where losses can be amortized over a long period.

Fannie had some $12.2 billion in deferred losses in the AOCI balance at year-end 2003. If this amount must be reclassified into retained earnings, it might punish Fannie's earnings for various periods over the past three years, leaving its capital well below what is required by regulators.

In all, the Ofheo report notes, "The misapplications of GAAP are not limited occurrences, but appear to be pervasive . . . [and] raise serious doubts as to the validity of previously reported financial results, as well as adequacy of regulatory capital, management supervision and overall safety and soundness. . . ." In an agreement reached with Ofheo last week, Fannie promised to change the methods involved in both the cookie-jar and derivative accounting and to change its compensation "to avoid any inappropriate incentives."

But we don't think this goes nearly far enough for a company whose executives have for years derided anyone who raised a doubt about either its accounting or its growing risk profile. At a minimum these executives are not the sort anyone would want running the U.S. Treasury under John Kerry. With the Justice Department already starting a criminal probe, we find it hard to comprehend that the Fannie board still believes that investors can trust its management team.

Fannie Mae isn't an ordinary company and this isn't a run-of-the-mill accounting scandal. The U.S. government had no financial stake in the failure of Enron or WorldCom. But because of Fannie's implicit subsidy from the federal government, taxpayers are on the hook if its capital cushion is insufficient to absorb big losses. Private profit, public risk. That's quite a confidence game -- and it's time to call it.

 

Also note that FAS 133 and IAS 39 do not prevent portfolio hedging --- only the ability to get hedge accounting relief for portfolio hedges.  The Volker Rule is much more restrictive regarding permission of the banks to hedge portfolios.

Revisions to IAS 39 allow portfolio hedging under limited circumstances.

"Volcker Rule Won't Allow Banks to Use 'Portfolio Hedging'," by Scott Patterson and Justin Baer, The Wall Street Journal, December 4, 2013 ---
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303722104579238622934171230?mod=djemCFO_h 

In a defeat for Wall Street, the "Volcker rule" won't allow banks to enter trades designed to protect against losses held in a broad portfolio of assets, according to people familiar with the rule.

The practice, known as portfolio hedging, has become a focal point of regulators drafting the rule, a controversial plank of the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial law that seeks to prevent banks from putting their own capital at risk in pursuit of trading profits.

The rule, named after former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, is expected to be approved next week, ending a three-year period of regulatory uncertainty for some of the securities industry's most-profitable businesses.

But it won't contain language permitting portfolio hedging, which has been "expunged" from earlier drafts of the rule, according to a person familiar with the matter. Regulators decided to remove portfolio hedging from the rule after J.P. Morgan Chase JPM +0.58% & Co. disclosed billions of dollars in losses from its so-called London whale trades in 2012.

The bank initially described the trades as a portfolio hedge. Now, it is likely other Wall Street firms also will end up paying for J.P. Morgan's slip-up. Regulators, in response to the J.P. Morgan disclosure, pushed to write a rule that would ensure banks couldn't engage in such trades.

The move will come as a blow to banks, which lobbied regulators to keep language allowing portfolio hedging in the rule. Banks often hedge to offset the risks that accompany trading with clients. Sometimes, though, there is no perfect counterweight to those clients' trades. Banks look to portfolio hedging to manage a broader array of risks.

A recent version of the Volcker rule, reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, defined hedging activity as "designed to reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate…one or more identifiable risks."

What hedges don't do, regulators wrote, is "give rise…to any significant new or additional risk that is not itself hedged contemporaneously." The excerpt reviewed by the Journal didn't mention portfolio hedging.

Continued in article


Macro Hedging is Probably the Main Weakness of FAS 133, and Fannie Mae is Taking it in the Fanny

The bottom line is that both the FASB and the IASB must someday soon take another look at how the real world hedges portfolios rather than individual securities.  The problem is complex, but the problem has come to roost in Fannie Mae's $1 trillion in hedging contracts.  How the SEC acts may well override the FASB.  How the SEC acts may be a vindication or a damnation for Fannie Mae and Fannie's auditor KPMG who let Fannie violate the rules of IAS 133.

You can read more about macro hedges at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#M-Terms 

On October 4, 2004 the main editorial in The Wall Street Journal presented a scathing attack on Fannie Mae (and outside auditor KPMG by implication) for simply ignoring FAS 133 explicit rules for testing hedging effectiveness and improperly keeping over $1 billion in hedging gains and losses in AOCI (accumulated other comprehensive income) rather than current earnings.

"Fannie Mae Enron?" Editorial in The Wall Street Journal
October 4, 2004; Page A16

For years, mortgage giant Fannie Mae has produced smoothly growing earnings. And for years, observers have wondered how Fannie could manage its inherently risky portfolio without a whiff of volatility. Now, thanks to Fannie's regulator, we know the answer. The company was cooking the books. Big time.

We've looked closely at the 211-page report issued by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (Ofheo), and the details are more troubling than even the recent headlines. The magnitude of Fannie's machinations is stunning, and in two key areas in particular they deserve to be better understood. By improperly delaying the recognition of income, it created a cookie jar of reserves. And by improperly classifying certain derivatives, it was able to spread out losses over many years instead of recognizing them immediately.

In the cookie-jar ploy, Fannie set aside an artificially large cash reserve. And -- presto -- in any quarter its managers could reach into that jar to compensate for poor results or add to it to dampen good ones. This ploy, according to Ofheo, gave Fannie "inordinate flexibility" in reporting the amount of income or expenses over reporting periods.

This flexibility also gave Fannie the ability to manipulate earnings to hit -- within pennies -- target numbers for executive bonuses. Ofheo details an example from 1998, the year the Russian financial crisis sent interest rates tumbling. Lower rates caused a lot of mortgage holders to prepay their existing home mortgages. And Fannie was suddenly facing an estimated expense of $400 million.

Well, in its wisdom, Fannie decided to recognize only $200 million, deferring the other half. That allowed Fannie's executives -- whose bonus plan is linked to earnings-per-share -- to meet the target for maximum bonus payouts. The target EPS for maximum payout was $3.23 and Fannie reported exactly . . . $3.2309. This bull's-eye was worth $1.932 million to then-CEO James Johnson, $1.19 million to then-CEO-designate Franklin Raines, and $779,625 to then-Vice Chairman Jamie Gorelick.

That same year Fannie installed software that allowed management to produce multiple scenarios under different assumptions that, according to a Fannie executive, "strengthens the earnings management that is necessary when dealing with a volatile book of business." Over the years, Fannie designed and added software that allowed it to assess the impact of recognizing income or expense on securities and loans. This practice fits with a Fannie corporate culture that the report says considered volatility "artificial" and measures of precision "spurious."

This disturbing culture was apparent in Fannie's manipulation of its derivative accounting. Fannie runs a giant derivative book in an attempt to hedge its massive exposure to interest-rate risk. Derivatives must be marked-to-market, carried on the balance sheet at fair value. The problem is that changes in fair-value can cause some nasty volatility in earnings.

So, Fannie decided to classify a huge amount of its derivatives as hedging transactions, thereby avoiding any impact on earnings. (And we mean huge: In December 2003, Fan's derivatives had a notional value of $1.04 trillion of which only a notional $43 million was not classified in hedging relationships.) This misapplication continued when Fannie closed out positions. The company did not record the fair-value changes in earnings, but only in Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income (AOCI) where losses can be amortized over a long period.

Fannie had some $12.2 billion in deferred losses in the AOCI balance at year-end 2003. If this amount must be reclassified into retained earnings, it might punish Fannie's earnings for various periods over the past three years, leaving its capital well below what is required by regulators.

In all, the Ofheo report notes, "The misapplications of GAAP are not limited occurrences, but appear to be pervasive . . . [and] raise serious doubts as to the validity of previously reported financial results, as well as adequacy of regulatory capital, management supervision and overall safety and soundness. . . ." In an agreement reached with Ofheo last week, Fannie promised to change the methods involved in both the cookie-jar and derivative accounting and to change its compensation "to avoid any inappropriate incentives."

But we don't think this goes nearly far enough for a company whose executives have for years derided anyone who raised a doubt about either its accounting or its growing risk profile. At a minimum these executives are not the sort anyone would want running the U.S. Treasury under John Kerry. With the Justice Department already starting a criminal probe, we find it hard to comprehend that the Fannie board still believes that investors can trust its management team.

Fannie Mae isn't an ordinary company and this isn't a run-of-the-mill accounting scandal. The U.S. government had no financial stake in the failure of Enron or WorldCom. But because of Fannie's implicit subsidy from the federal government, taxpayers are on the hook if its capital cushion is insufficient to absorb big losses. Private profit, public risk. That's quite a confidence game -- and it's time to call it.

 

FAS 133 (and IAS 39) do not deal well with macro (portfolio) hedges in that hedge accounting is denied unless all of the securities in a portfolio are identical in terms of the risk being hedged.  IAS 39 was recently amended (largely for political rather than theory reasons) to allow for macro hedges of interest rate risk when the maturity dates or possible early payoff dates are not identical.  But the IAS 39 amendment  is only a very small step toward solving a very large problem.  Companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac find it impractical (actually impossible) to hedge individual securities (or homogeneous portfolios) as required under FAS 133.

The large problem is that when non-homogeneous portfolios are being hedged for only one of several risks, there can be a huge mismatch in terms of value changes of the portfolio versus value change of the hedging derivatives.  When writing the hedge accounting standards, standard setters took a conservative approach that virtually denies hedge accounting for non-homogeneous portfolios.  This long been known as the "macro hedging" problem of FAS 133.  By denying hedge accounting to financial institutions with large non-homogeneous portfolios, those institutions are going to show huge fluctuations in net earnings by having to mark-to-market all macro hedging derivatives with offsetting value changes being charged to current earnings rather than some offset such as AOIC for cash flow hedges or the macro portfolio itself for fair value hedges.

One of the better media articles about this controversial problem is the following article by Michael MacKenzie.  What MacKenzie does is explain just how Fannie Mae covers her fanny with macro hedging strategy that really is not eligible for hedge accounting under FAS 133.  However, the problem is with FAS 133.

:"Sometimes the Wrong 'Notion':   Lender Fannie Mae Used A Too-Simple Standard For Its Complex Portfolio," by Michael MacKenzie, The Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2004, Page C3 

Lender Fannie Mae Used A Too-Simple Standard For Its Complex Portfolio

What exactly did Fannie Mae do wrong?

Much has been made of the accounting improprieties alleged by Fannie's regulator, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight.

Some investors may even be aware the matter centers on the mortgage giant's $1 trillion "notional" portfolio of derivatives -- notional being the Wall Street way of saying that that is how much those options and other derivatives are worth on paper.

But understanding exactly what is supposed to be wrong with Fannie's handling of these instruments takes some doing. Herewith, an effort to touch on what's what -- a notion of the problems with that notional amount, if you will.

Ofheo alleges that, in order to keep its earnings steady, Fannie used the wrong accounting standards for these derivatives, classifying them under complex (to put it mildly) requirements laid out by the Financial Accounting Standards Board's rule 133, or FAS 133.

For most companies using derivatives, FAS 133 has clear advantages, helping to smooth out reported income. However, accounting experts say FAS 133 works best for companies that follow relatively simple hedging programs, whereas Fannie Mae's huge cash needs and giant portfolio requires constant fine-tuning as market rates change.

A Fannie spokesman last week declined to comment on the issue of hedge accounting for derivatives, but Fannie Mae has maintained that it uses derivatives to manage its balance sheet of debt and mortgage assets and doesn't take outright speculative positions. It also uses swaps -- derivatives that generally are agreements to exchange fixed- and floating-rate payments -- to protect its mortgage assets against large swings in rates.

Under FAS 133, if a swap is being used to hedge risk against another item on the balance sheet, special hedge accounting is applied to any gains and losses that result from the use of the swap. Within the application of this accounting there are two separate classifications: fair-value hedges and cash-flow hedges.

Fannie's fair-value hedges generally aim to get fixed-rate payments by agreeing to pay a counterparty floating interest rates, the idea being to offset the risk of homeowners refinancing their mortgages for lower rates. Any gain or loss, along with that of the asset or liability being hedged, is supposed to go straight into earnings as income. In other words, if the swap loses money but is being applied against a mortgage that has risen in value, the gain and loss cancel each other out, which actually smoothes the company's income.

Cash-flow hedges, on the other hand, generally involve Fannie entering an agreement to pay fixed rates in order to get floating-rates. The profit or loss on these hedges don't immediately flow to earnings. Instead, they go into the balance sheet under a line called accumulated other comprehensive income, or AOCI, and are allocated into earnings over time, a process known as amortization.

Ofheo claims that instead of terminating swaps and amortizing gains and losses over the life of the original asset or liability that the swap was used to hedge, Fannie Mae had been entering swap transactions that offset each other and keeping both the swaps under the hedge classifications. That was a no-go, the regulator says.

"The major risk facing Fannie is that by tainting a certain portion of the portfolio with redesignations and improper documentation, it may well lose hedge accounting for the whole derivatives portfolio," said Gerald Lucas, a bond strategist at Banc of America Securities in New York.

The bottom line is that both the FASB and the IASB must someday soon take another look at how the real world hedges portfolios rather than individual securities.  The problem is complex, but the problem has come to roost in Fannie Mae's $1 trillion in hedging contracts.  How the SEC acts may well override the FASB.  How the SEC acts may be a vindication or a damnation for Fannie Mae and Fannie's auditor KPMG who let Fannie violate the rules of IAS 133.

Bob Jensen's threads on macro hedging are at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#M-Terms 

Bob Jensen's threads on the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac scandals are at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

Bob Jensen's threads on KPMG scandals are at 
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#KPMG
 


The vexing problem of macro hedging in FAS 133 is still a vexing problem
It was a huge problem for Fannie Mae

"Hedging Portfolios," by Ira Kawaller, Bank Asset/Liability Management, May 2003 --- http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/BALM_Hedging_Portfolios.pdf

So what’s the problem? In all likelihood, the intended hedged items would be either a collection of assets or a group of interest expenses, which means that FAS133’s requirements pertaining to portfolio hedges would have to be satisfied. And these requirements happen to be especially restrictive. Here’s what the standard says, in paragraph 21.a.(1):

“The changes in fair value attributable to the hedged risk for each individual item in a hedged portfolio must be expected to respond in a generally proportionate manner to the overall change in fair value of the aggregate portfolio attributable to the hedged risk. That is, if the change in fair value of a hedged portfolio attributable to the hedged risk was 10 per cent during a reporting period, the change in the fair values attributable to the hedged risk for each item constituting the portfolio should be expected to be within a fairly narrow range, such as 9 percent to 11 percent. In contrast, an expectation that the change in fair value attributable to the hedged risk for individual items in the portfolio would range from 7 percent to 13 percent would be inconsistent with this provision.”

It should be clear that the components making up the hedged item would have to be quite homogeneous to satisfy this threshold. There may be an “out,” however, in that FAS 133 allows for hedging relationships to be defined where a portion of the derivative serves as the hedging instrument. Thus, instead of hedging a portfolio of assets, the institution might be better served by hedging selected components of the portfolio individually (i.e., mini-portfolios), and devising an allocation algorithm to determine the appropriate portion of the derivative to be assigned to each component hedged item.

This work-around may still be problematic in that the various hedging relationships may not all be satisfied using the same hedge effectiveness test, so the solution may end up being quite cumbersome. Moreover, with a portfolio considered to be the hedged item, one might ordinarily expect to realize some benefit of diversification – where the effect of the hedge “over-performing” with respect to some portion of the portfolio would be balanced by some “underperforming” with respect to other portions. If hedging mini-portfolios, however, the effectiveness assessment must still be carried out for each designated hedge, individually. That is, even if the hedges perform well in the aggregate, if individual hedges fail the effectiveness assessment criteria, hedge accounting would not be permitted for those failing hedge relationships.

It should be understood that, assuming the aggregate portfolio can be broken down to a workable set of mini-portfolios, each qualifying for hedge accounting, there’s nothing that requires separate derivatives for each hedging relationship. Rather, portions of a single derivative might be applicable for all of the hedging relationships.

Admittedly, the above solution would likely be less than satisfying for hedgers with large, very diverse portfolios. Thankfully, though, those banks still have the option to hedge the other side of the balance sheet. That is, instead of seeking to address their net interest margin exposure by reducing the duration of the bank’s assets, the bank could seek to increase the duration of its liabilities. Attacking the problem from this perspective may require change in mind-set, but at least by doing so, the bank gets to apply cash flow hedge accounting, thereby avoiding the income volatility that would otherwise occur – either because the bank chose not to hedge at all, or because it did hedge its assets, but failed to qualify for fair value hedge accounting.

Continued in article


FEDERATION BANCAIRE DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE Provides a great free document on macro hedging with references to IAS 39.  The article also discusses prospective and retrospective effectiveness testing.  See Ineffectiveness.

"MACRO HEDGING OF INTEREST RATE RISK," April 4, 2003 --- http://www.fbe.be/pdf/Macro%20Hedging%20of%20Interest%20Rate%20Risk.pdf 
Trinity Students may access this article at
J:\courses\acct5341\ResearchFiles\00macroHedging.pdf

Macro hedging is the hedging of a portfolio of assets and liabilities for the same type of risk. This differs from hedging a single instrument or a number of the same type of assets (or liabilities) as there is risk offsetting between the assets and liabilities within the portfolio. 

This form of hedging occurs not at a theoretical ‘consolidated Group’ level, but at an operational level, where individual assets and liabilities in the portfolio can be clearly identified. Within one banking group, several macro hedge portfolios for different activities may be separately managed at an operational level.

. . .

I.C Hedging the ‘Net Position’ 
Building a portfolio requires aggregating the necessary information (data) of all assets and liabilities that share the same risk to be hedged. Although systems differ, there is general agreement that the hedging process involves identification of notional amounts and repricing dates. As the economic risks of some financial instruments differ from their contractual terms, they have to be modelled to reflect their true economic effect on interest rate risk management. They are therefore included based on their behaviouralized repricing dates (statistical observations of customer behaviour) rather than their contractual repricing dates. These types of contracts include for example demand deposits, some (often regulated) saving accounts and prepayable loans. 

The notional amounts of these assets and liabilities in the portfolio are then allocated to defined repricing buckets. Based on this allocation, the mismatch between assets and liabilities in each repricing bucket is derived, which is the net position. 

For each net position, the company can decide whether it wants to hedge it fully or a portion of it. The extent of hedging to be undertaken is determined by the interest rate risk management strategy and is therefore a management decision as mentioned earlier in Section I.A.


 

The FAS133 Compliance Module Wall Street Systems --- http://www.wallstreetsystems.com/fas133/news-compl.htm 

"FAS 133’s bias against macro hedging, its focus on individual hedges, and its demanding detailed disclosure will generate a quarterly calculation nightmare for many companies."

--Jeff Wallace, Greenwich Treasury Advisors, LLC

In June of 1998, The Financial Accounting Standards Board released Statement Number 133. This statement revised accounting and reporting standards for derivative instruments. It requires that banks and corporations classify derivatives as either assets or liabilities and that these instruments be measured at "fair value".

The accounting steps necessary to bring a bank or a corporation into compliance with Statement 133 are substantial. Exposures must be linked to hedges, instruments must be fairly valued, and the results must be appropriately posted. Following this inventory and accounting process, firms must report hedge effectiveness. The reporting requirements under this statement require full documentation of objectives and policies and require a variety of reporting summaries in various formats.

The process of identifying derivatives in itself presents substantial complexities. The definition of a derivative is broad and includes instruments such as insurance policies, production contracts, procurement contracts and other "non-financial" obligations.

Because of the complexities of inventory, accounting, and reporting associated with compliance to Statement 133, the Financial Accounting Standards Board delayed implementation of this standard believing that neither system developers nor treasuries would be ready to handle these new requirements.

Wall Street Systems is in the business of creating enterprise-wide client/server front to back treasury solutions for the largest banks and corporations in the world. This product, The Wall Street System, integrates all geographies, all financial products, all credit and market risk controls, and all accounting, confirmation, and cash management processes into a single, global, real-time, 24/7 system.

Because of the strength of this straight-through processing system, and because The Wall Street System has long offered the capability to capture exposures and perform fair market valuations of derivative transactions, Wall Street Systems was able to offer a fully functioning FAS133 Module to its customers in advance of the original FAS 133 implementation date.

The Wall Street Systems FAS 133 Module reports hedge gains and losses at fair market value each day. The hedge tracking and linking feature packages exposures and hedge transactions together and automatically adjusts earnings and Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) accounts. The module also creates all reports and documentation required by FAS 133.

The key features of The Wall Street System FAS 133 Module are:

Fair Market Valuation Exposures and derivatives are marked-to-market and compared through hedge effectiveness ratios Hedge Profile Database and Query Each hedge package is stored by date. Closing values, changes in value, and effectiveness ratios are preserved in the database. Automatic Linking and Tracking Trades and the underlying exposures are linked to a hedge profile. The profile categorizes the hedge by type and includes hedge objectives, valuation method, risk management policy and transaction details. The hedge profile is linked to the documentation. The combination forms a hedge "package" that drives all FAS 133 events. Cash Flow OCI Adjusting Automatic examination of the P&L status of each hedge package at the close of business each day. Automatic adjustment of OCI and P&L accounts. Automatic posting of derivatives fair market values to earnings with the effective portion of the hedge reclassified into OCI Audit Capability Time series database keeps copies of each hedge package status at the close of each day. There is a full audit query capability imbedded in the database. Forecasting The System can generate a P&L forecast from the OCI account that covers the next 12 months.

The comprehensive functionality of the Wall Street System FAS 133 Module is achieved through the application of straight through processing on a global scale with a system that covers the front, middle and back office.

Treasurers will have difficulty with FAS 133 compliance if the treasury runs on a "best of breed" model rather than a global STP model. In the best of breed model, trading, risk management and accounting functions are distributed across a mix of systems that share information with varying degrees of efficiency. For this model to work, each resident system must capture relevant FAS 133 information to its database and have the capacity to share that information with all other member systems. This requires a high degree of flawless data exchange and systems integration, features not normally associated with the best of breed solution. A fragmented treasury desktop makes it extraordinarily difficult to manage hedge relationships from front to back.

The Wall Street System, being a single global system for 24/7 treasury operations faces none of these data exchange obstacles. Hedge package information is shared easily, stored safely, and posted correctly.

The Wall Street System is ready now with a 100% compliant FAS 133 Module

 

 

 

IASB Finalises Macro Hedging Amendments to IAS 39 March 31, 2004 --- http://www.iasb.org/news/index.asp?showPageContent=no&xml=10_120_25_31032004_31032005.htm 

The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued an Amendment to IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement on Fair Value Hedge Accounting for a Portfolio Hedge of Interest Rate Risk. The amendments simplify the implementation of IAS 39 by enabling fair value hedge accounting to be used more readily for a portfolio hedge of interest rate risk (sometimes referred to as a macro hedge) than under previous versions of IAS 39.

The publication of this amendment is a direct response to concerns expressed by the banking community about the potential difficulty of implementing the requirements of IAS 39. Many constituents had sought fair value hedge accounting treatment for portfolio hedging strategies, which was not previously permitted under IAS 39. In the light of these concerns, the IASB launched intensive discussions with representatives of the banking industry to determine whether a way could be found within the existing principles of IAS 39 to allow fair value hedge accounting treatment to be applied to a macro hedge.

The publication of this amendment means that macro hedging will be part of the IASB’s set of standards to be adopted in 2005. The IASB notes that discussions will continue on another aspect of IAS 39, namely an additional hedging methodology and the balance sheet presentation of certain hedges—issues of particular concern to some banking institutions. Furthermore, in April, the IASB will publish a proposed limited amendment to restrict the existing fair value option in response to concerns raised by banking supervisory authorities.

With today’s publication of the macro-hedging amendment, the IASB announced its intention to set up an international working party to examine the fundamentals of IAS 39 with a view to replacing the standard in due course. (A similar working party will be established on the IASB’s long-term insurance project.) The financial instruments working party will assist in improving, simplifying and ultimately replacing IAS 39 and examine broader questions regarding the application and extent of fair-value accounting—a topic on which the IASB has not reached any conclusion. Although any major revision of IAS 39 may take several years to complete, the IASB is willing to revise IAS 39 and IFRS 4 Insurance Contracts in the short term in the light of any immediate solutions arising from the working parties’ discussions. The IASB plans to announce details of these two working parties in the coming weeks.

Introducing the amendment to IAS 39, Sir David Tweedie, IASB Chairman, commented:

This amendment is a further step in our project to ease the implementation of IAS 39 for the thousands of companies required to implement international standards in 2005 and those companies already using IFRSs. The IASB has made it clear that any amendments must be within the basic principles of hedge accounting contained in IAS 39, but that we will work within those principles to simplify the application of the standard. This amendment does not mark the end of the Board’s work on the subject of financial instruments. The Board remains open to all suggestions for improvement of the standard and is taking active steps in both the immediate future and in the medium term to that end.
The primary means of publishing International Financial Reporting Standards is by electronic format through the IASB’s subscriber Website. Subscribers are able to access the amendment published today through “online services”. Those wishing to subscribe should contact:

    IASCF Publications Department, 30 Cannon Street, London EC4M 6XH, United Kingdom.
    Tel: +44 (0)20 7332 2730, Fax: +44 (0)20 7332 2749,
    email: publications@iasb.org Web: www.iasb.org.

Printed copies of Amendment to IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement: Fair Value Hedge Accounting for a Portfolio Hedge of Interest Rate Risk (ISBN 1-904230-58-X) will be available shortly, at £15 each including postage, from IASCF Publications Department.

To the IASB’s dismay in the summer of 2004, certain key aspects of FAS 133 incorporated in the international IAS 39 standard have riled European banks and other EU businesses to a point where, for the first time, there was a serious political movement underway in Europe to veto acceptance of a portion of an IASB standard in the EU.  A news article in the August 21, 2003 edition of The Wall Street Journal on Page C5 reads as follows:

This accounting battle centers on the IASB's insistence that derivatives should be valued at their fair value, rather than at cost, which is generally immaterial or even zero and is often how European companies treat them. Banks have argued that the outcome of the IASB's plan would be unnecessary volatility in their earnings and net worth, a point echoed by Mr. Chirac.

IASB Vice Chairman Tom Jones argued that the current system merely pretends that the earnings volatility doesn't exist. Trying to smooth earnings is what got Freddie Mac into trouble in the U.S., he said.

"Bank results in Europe are a fiction: No volatility, and derivatives are nonexistent (at least appearing to be nonexistent in financial statements)," he said.

The new IASB proposal (compromise) would now make it easier for banks to lump bundles of securities or loans together and hedge a fraction of the overall risk, a process known in the industry as macro hedging. This isn't allowed in the U.S., which requires (in FAS 133) companies to show the individual items being hedged. The original IASB draft had taken a similar stance.

But the body didn't give in on two other bones of contention: when banks should take a charge to earnings because hedge strategies are ineffective and whether banks can include money deposited in bank accounts that is available on demand in accounting for their hedges. The IASB argues that the money has to be treated for accounting purposes as if it could all be withdrawn the next day, although that doesn't happen in practice. It also argues that its concessions on macro hedging should help the banks accomplish similar results, and its board members have shown little willingness to budge.

 

The IASB’s Exposure Draft of the macro hedging compromise is entitled “Amendments to IAS 39:  Recognition and Measurement Fair Value Hedge Accounting for a Portfolio Hedge of Interest Rate” and for a short time can be downloaded free from http://www.iasc.org.uk/docs/ed-ias39mh/ed-ias39mh.pdf

It should be noted that this compromise does not apply to cash flow hedging or other types of hedging other than interest rate hedges.

 

It’s highly unfortunate that the proposed macro hedging compromise of IAS 39 mentioned above puts the IASB international standard on a somewhat non-divergent course with the FASB/SEC in the United States .   The FASB currently shows no interest to date in compromising FAS 133 with respect to macro hedging, although the complaints of the European companies apply to U.S. firms as well.  Two paragraphs from FAS 133 from the FASB are quoted below:

Paragraph 448.
The Board (FASB) considered alternative approaches that would require amortizing the hedge accounting adjustments to earnings based on the average holding period, average maturity or duration of the items in the hedged portfolio, or in some other manner that would not allocate adjustments to the individual items in the hedged portfolio. The Board rejected those approaches because determining the carrying amount for an individual item when it is (a) impaired or (b) sold, settled, or otherwise removed from the hedged portfolio would ignore its related hedge accounting adjustment, if any. Additionally, it was not clear how those approaches would work for certain portfolios, such as a portfolio of equity securities.


Paragraph 449.
Advocates of macro hedging generally believe that it is a more effective and efficient way of managing an entity's risk than hedging on an individual-item basis. Macro hedging seems to imply a notion of entity-wide risk reduction. The Board also believes that permitting hedge accounting for a portfolio of dissimilar items would be appropriate only if risk were required to be assessed on an entity-wide basis. As discussed in paragraph 357, the Board decided not to
include entity-wide risk reduction as a criterion for hedge accounting.

Paragraph 21(a)(1)
1) If similar assets or similar liabilities are aggregated and hedged as a portfolio, the individual assets or individual liabilities must share the risk exposure for which they are designated as being hedged. The change in fair value attributable to the hedged risk for each individual item in a hedged portfolio must be expected to respond in a generally proportionate manner to the overall change in fair value of the aggregate portfolio attributable to the hedged risk. That is, if the change in fair value of a hedged portfolio attributable to the hedged risk was 10 percent during a reporting period, the change in the fair values attributable to the hedged risk for each item constituting the portfolio should be expected to be within a fairly narrow range, such as 9 percent to 11 percent. In contrast, an expectation that the change in fair value attributable to the hedged risk for individual items in the portfolio would range from 7 percent to 13 percent would be inconsistent with this provision. In aggregating loans in a portfolio to be hedged, an entity may choose to consider some of the following characteristics, as appropriate: loan type, loan size, nature and location of collateral, interest rate type (fixed or variable) and the coupon interest rate (if fixed), scheduled maturity, prepayment history of the loans (if seasoned), and expected prepayment performance in varying interest rate scenarios. See Footnote 9

==========================================================================

Footnote 9
 Mortgage bankers and other servicers of financial assets that designate a hedged portfolio by aggregating servicing rights within one or more risk strata used under paragraph 37(g) of Statement 125 would not necessarily comply with the requirement in this paragraph for portfolios of similar assets. The risk stratum under paragraph 37(g) of Statement 125 can be based on any predominant risk characteristic, including date of origination or geographic location.


Improper Use of Hedge Accounting for Portfolios In a Manner Not Allowed in FAS 133:  The Case Study of Freddie Mac --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm#FreddieMac 

Also see see hedge and compound derivatives.

Bob Jensen's Year 2004 leave proposal --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/leave2004.htm

Earnings Management

Interest rate swap derivative instruments are widely used to manage interest rate risk, which is viewed as a perfectly legitimate use of these hedging instruments.  I stumbled on to a rather interesting doctoral dissertation which finds that firms, especially banks, use such swaps to manage earnings.  The dissertation from Michigan State University is by Chang Joon Song under Professor Thomas Linsmeier.

"Are Interest Rate Swaps Used to Manage Banks' Earnings," by Chang Joon Song, January 2004 --- http://accounting-net.actg.uic.edu/Department/Songpaper.pdf 

This dissertation is quite clever and very well written.  

Previous research has shown that loan loss provisions and security gains and losses are used to manage banks’ net income. However, these income components are reported below banks largest operating component, net interest income (NII). This study extends the literature by examining whether banks exploit the accounting permitted under past and current hedge accounting standards to manage NII by entering into interest rate swaps. Specifically, I investigate whether banks enter into receive-fixed/pay-variable swaps to increase earnings when unmanaged NII is below management’s target for NII. In addition, I investigate whether banks enter into receive-variable/pay-fixed swaps to decrease earnings when unmanaged NII is above management’s target for NII. Swaps-based earnings management is possible because past and current hedge accounting standards allow receive-fixed/pay-variable swaps (receivevariable/ pay-fixed) to have known positive (negative) income effects in the first period of the swap contract. However, entering into swaps for NII management is not costless, because such swaps change the interest rate risk position throughout the swap period. Thus, I also examine whether banks find it cost-beneficial to enter into offsetting swap positions in the next period to mitigate interest rate risk caused by entering into earnings management swaps in the current period. Using 546 bank-year observations from 1995 to 2002, I find that swaps are used to manage NII. However, I do not find evidence that banks immediately enter into offsetting swap positions in the next period. In sum, this research demonstrates that banks exploit the accounting provided under past and current hedge accounting rules to manage NII. This NII management opportunity will disappear if the FASB implements full fair value accounting for financial instruments, as foreshadowed by FAS No. 133.

What is especially interesting is how Song demonstrates that such earnings management took place before FAS 133 and is still taking place after FAS 133 required the booking of swaps and adjustment to fair value on each reporting date.  It is also interesting how earnings management comes at the price of added risk.  Other derivative positions can be used to reduce the risk, but risks arising from such earnings management cannot be eliminated.

See Gapping and Immunization 

See interest rate swap and hedge 

Bob Jensen's threads on FAS 133 and IAS 39 are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

 

Macro Macro Hedge of Enterprise Risk

"KPMG Strategists Describe Benefits of Effective Risk Management," SmartPros, February 9, 2004 --- http://www.smartpros.com/x42423.xml 

Two senior executives of KPMG LLP have authored a new business guide to help corporate leaders and boards of directors develop and implement effective risk-management strategies.

Risk: From the CEO and Board Perspective, Mary Pat McCarthy and Tim Flynn, offers insights on how to confront and control risk. The book describes how to best shape an organization's structure to assess and manage risk in ways that will maximize shareholder value, and determine how closely risk management should be integrated into business, operational and financial planning.

According to McCarthy, risk management is no longer just a defensive measure. "There are positive rewards to risk management," she said. "Implemented properly, sound risk assessments and responses can have a significant impact on a company's reputation and bottom line, and enhance shareholder value and transparency."

The book advocates taking a holistic view on risk. According to Flynn, risk management must now extend well beyond traditional financial and insurable hazards to encompass a wide variety of strategic, operational, reputation, regulatory and information risks. "Businesses who take a holistic view of risks and their interdependencies, can be more agile and adept at responding to them," Flynn said.

In addition to the thought leadership of McCarthy, Flynn and other KPMG professionals, the book draws on the experiences of top executives from Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard, Viacom, Sprint and Motorola.

Chief among the strategies suggested for developing sound risk management is the separate and independent management of the process of reporting, measuring and controlling risks from those who generate them. "Just as an independent board, audit committee and auditor are critical to effective corporate governance, an independent risk-management function is essential to effective operations," said McCarthy.

Risk: From the CEO and Board Perspective is available in hardcover, priced at $27.95.

Mark To Market =

to revalue securities at prevailing market prices or, in the case of some exotic derivatives, estimated fair value.  See fair value.

Minimum Value

Intrinsic value adjusted by time value of money to exercise date.  See Intrinsic Value and Valuation of Options

Minority Interest =

the part-owner of a subsidiary corporation that is controlled by another parent company.  Paragraph 21c on Page 14 and Paragraph 29f on Page 20 of FAS 133 prohibits forecasted cash flows from minority interests in a consolidated subsidiary from being designated as a hedged item in a cash flow hedge.   Reasons are given in Paragraph 472 beginning on Page 206 of FAS 133.

Monetary Items =

obligations to pay or rights to receive a fixed number of currency units in the future.

Monoline Insurance = See Credit Derivatives

MTM = Mark-To-Market   See fair value

 

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |

N-Terms

Net Investment =

Derivatives Implementation Group --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/

Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. A1

Title: Definition of a Derivative: Initial Net Investment
Paragraph references: 6(b), 8, 12, 57(b), 255–258
Date cleared by Board: June 23, 1999
Date latest revision posted to website: March 14, 2006
Affected by: FASB Statements No. 149, Amendment of Statement 133 on Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, and No. 155, Accounting for Certain Hybrid Financial Instruments
(Revised February 16, 2006)

QUESTION

If an entity enters into a forward contract that requires the purchase of 1 share of an unrelated company's common stock in 1 year for $110 (the market forward price) and at inception the entity elects to prepay the contract pursuant to its terms for $105 (the current price of the share of common stock), does the contract meet the criterion in paragraph 6(b) related to initial net investment and therefore meet the definition of a derivative for that entity? If not, is there an embedded derivative that warrants separate accounting?

RESPONSE

Paragraph 6(b) of Statement 133 specifies that a derivative requires either no initial net investment or a smaller initial net investment than would be required for other types of contracts that would be expected to have a similar response to changes in market factors. If no prepayment is made at inception, the contract would meet the criterion in paragraph 6(b) because it does not require an initial net investment but, rather, contains an unexercised election to prepay the contract at inception. Paragraph 8 further clarifies paragraph 6(b) and states that a derivative instrument does not require an initial net investment in the contract that is equal to the notional amount or that is determined by applying the notional amount to the underlying. If the contract gives the entity the option to "prepay" the contract at a later date during its 1-year term (at $105 or some other specified amount), exercise of that option would be accounted for as a loan that is repayable at $110 at the end of the forward contract's one-year term.

If, instead, the entity elects to prepay the contract at inception for $105, the contract does not meet the definition of a freestanding derivative. Paragraph 8, as amended, indicates that if the initial net investment of the contract (after adjustment for the time value of money) is less, by more than a nominal amount, than the initial net investment that would be commensurate with the amount that would be exchanged to acquire the asset related to the underlying, the characteristic in paragraph 6(b) is met. The initial net investment of $105 is equal to the initial price of the 1 share of stock being purchased under the contract and therefore is equal to the investment that would be required for other types of contracts that would be expected to have a similar response to changes in market factors. That is, the initial net investment is equal to the amount that would be exchanged to acquire the asset related to the underlying.

However, the entity must assess whether that nonderivative instrument contains an embedded derivative that, pursuant to paragraph 12, requires separate accounting as a derivative unless a fair value election is made pursuant to Statement 155. (Note that Statement 155 was issued in February 2006 and allows for a fair value election for hybrid financial instruments that otherwise would require bifurcation. Hybrid financial instruments that are elected to be accounted for in their entirety at fair value cannot be used as a hedging instrument in a Statement 133 hedging relationship.) In this example, the prepaid contract is a hybrid instrument that is composed of a debt instrument as the host contract (that is, a loan that is repayable at $110 at the end of the forward contract’s 1-year term) and an embedded derivative based on equity prices. The host contract is a debt instrument because the holder has none of the rights of a shareholder, such as the ability to vote the shares and receive distributions to shareholders. (Refer to paragraph 60 of Statement 133.) Unless the hybrid instrument is remeasured at fair value with changes in value recorded in earnings as they occur, the embedded derivative must be separated from the host contract because the economic characteristics and risks of a derivative based on equity prices are not clearly and closely related to a debt host contract, and a separate instrument with the same terms as the embedded derivative would be a derivative subject to the requirements of Statement 133.

The above response has been authored by the FASB staff and represents the staff's views, although the Board has discussed the above response at a public meeting and chosen not to object to dissemination of that response. Official positions of the FASB are determined only after extensive due process and deliberation.

 

January 2008 Summary of the International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee
IASPlus --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
March 6, 2008
At the January 2008 IFRIC meeting, the IFRIC discussed the comments received on its Draft Interpretation D22 Hedges of a Net Investment in a Foreign Operation. As a result of the deliberations, the staff was asked to provide a comprehensive example to confirm some of the principles underlying the draft Interpretation.

The principles the staff tried to demonstrate were:

  • The same risk can be hedged only once in the group
  • The amount of net investment to be hedged cannot be duplicated
  • A parent entity can hedge a net investment it holds indirectly
  • Where the hedging instrument is held has no effect on hedge effectiveness
  • The consolidation method (direct vs. indirect) does not affect hedge effectiveness
  • The nature of the hedging instrument (cash instrument or derivative) has no effect on hedge effectiveness

The staff presented various scenarios of net investment hedges involving cash instruments or derivatives to illustrate the principles. The examples contained the necessary calculations and journal entries in detail.

One IFRIC member noted that the examples are meant to prove the principles, as the spreadsheets were set up using those principles.

The IFRIC discussed some points using the spreadsheets in depth.

Method of consolidation

Some IFRIC members were particularly concerned with the assumption that the direct method of consolidation is the correct one and other methods must be adjusted to result in the same figures as the direct method. The chairman told IFRIC members that the Interpretation does not prescribe any method of consolidation but reflects the standards as currently applicable. The staff noted that the question does not deal with the consolidation procedure itself but with effectiveness testing.

Overhedging and hedging the same risk twice

It was also confirmed that an entity cannot hedge the same risk twice, and some designations/designated amounts would not be valid as they would result in overhedging. One member noted that this would normally not occur in practice as it would also make no sense to overhedge from an economic perspective.

Location of the hedging instrument

Some IFRIC members highlighted that the method of consolidation could affect the amounts recognised if the hedging instrument is not held within the (sub-)group containing the hedged item (that is, the net investment).

Recycling

The discussion then switched to the issue of recycling once the net investment or the entity containing the hedging instrument is disposed of. It was noted that this could lead to practical implications and complications, as the amounts in the respective foreign currency translation reserve must be identifiable to allow the correct timing of recycling that results from assuming IAS 39 overrides IAS 21 when it comes to hedge accounting. Some members expressed concerns over the theoretical foundation and the practical application of this approach. The chairman noted that it would not be in the scope of this Interpretation to provide guidance on this issue as this would be a general hedge accounting issue. Some members still did not seem to be convinced.

The IFRIC continued its debate on the issues of the method of consolidation and recycling. While there seemed to be agreement that the Interpretation should not prescribe the method of consolidation, some members asked the staff to include words as a caveat to remind entities that they would have to track the amounts in the foreign currency translation reserve relating to hedge accounting, which could be challenging in large and complex group structures. One member also cited possible transitional issues. Another IFRIC member believed implementing the IFRIC approach correctly could be a huge task for some entities.

The IFRIC also discussed which examples should go into the final Interpretation as illustrative examples, but did not make a final decision. The staff was also asked to align the example that currently is contained in the draft Interpretation.

Other issues raised by commentators

The staff also asked the Board to confirm its preliminary conclusions on certain issues raised by commentators to the draft Interpretation.

Could a parent entity apply hedge accounting in its separate financial statements? How should the hedged amounts be accounted for?

Yes, but that would be a different type of hedge (for example, a fair value hedge). No further clarification is required.

The IFRIC agreed.

How should an entity account for the ineffectiveness resulting from a decrease in a net investment value during the term of hedge?

All ineffectiveness will be recognised in profit or loss. No exception exists for net investment hedges. Such an ex post overhedge would result in ineffectiveness. No further clarification is required.

The IFRIC agreed.

Should the transitional requirements be clarified?

Some commentators asked for clarification on the transitional provision with regard to applying the Interpretation prospectively. The staff proposed to amend the transitional paragraph as follows:

 

"...when first applying the Interpretation. If an entity had designated a transaction as a hedge of a net investment but the hedge does not meet the conditions for hedge accounting in this Interpretation, the entity shall apply IAS 39 to discontinue prospectively that hedge accounting."

 

The IFRIC agreed.

Is an intra-group loan defined by IAS 21 paragraph 15 in the scope of this interpretation? Could such an intra-group loan be a part of the net investment?

Yes, this is obvious from the Standard. No further clarification is required.

The IFRIC agreed, however one member questioned if this really was the question the commentator asked as it was so obvious.

Does a hedge relationship designated at a lower group level require hedge documentation also at the higher group levels in order for the lower level hedge to qualify for hedge accounting at any higher level?

The IFRIC had a lengthy discussion on this issue, notably if an entity would be required at a higher level to 'unhedge', that is, explicitly state that it does not want to continue hedge accounting coming from a lower level in the group.

The IFRIC finally agreed that this is out of the scope of this interpretation as it would be general guidance on how to document hedging relationships. Accordingly, the IFRIC agreed with the staff recommendation not to provide further clarification.

Should the interpretation include the reason the hedging instruments may not be held by the foreign operation that is being hedged?

No, as this is would allow the net investment to hedge itself as the instrument is part of the net investment.

The IFRIC agreed.

Then the staff asked the IFRIC whether it agreed with the staff view that the following questions are addressed by the examples presented. One member expressed concerns as the examples would not be contained in the final Interpretation.

  • How should an entity account for various fact patterns such as:
    • a foreign operation is held jointly by two intermediate parents with different currencies
    • a combination of instruments is held by one or several entities within the group to hedge one exposure
    • Parent A holds subsidiaries B (100%) and C (70%) and B holds 30% of C, could B's 30% interest qualify as part of the hedged item in A's consolidated financial statements?
  • Should the interpretation indicate that the location of hedging instrument should have no effect on the amounts actually deferred in equity as an effective hedge?
  • Should the interpretation further clarify possible differences in the amounts of the foreign currency translation reserve caused by the method of the consolidation?

The IFRIC agreed not to address these issues in the final Interpretation.

Way forward

The staff was asked to amend the draft Interpretation in the light of this meeting's discussions and integrate selected examples. The staff will return at the May IFRIC meeting with a new draft of the Interpretation for clearance by IFRIC.

 

 

Also see derivative financial instrument and cash flow hedge.

Net Settlement =

a contract provision that allows for netting out payables and receivables in terms of cash or items that can be readily converted to cash in an established market.  Net settlement criteria for FAS 133 are not satisfied if an asset such as land or a liability such as a personal note can be delivered to satisfy the contractual obligation.  In swaps where items are swapped, it must be possible to net out the swap obligations and transfer only the net difference in cash.  Details of net settlements are discussed in SFAS 13 Paragraphs 6c, 9, and 57c. According to Paragraphs 10 and 275-276, "regular-way security trades" are contracts with no net settlement provisions and not market mechanism to facilitate net settlements.  Paragraph 10c of IAS 39 also addresses net settlement.  IASC does not require a net settlement provision in the definition of a derivative.  

Paul Pacter states the following at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm 

IAS 39
A derivative is a financial instrument—

(a) - whose value changes in response to the change in a specified interest rate, security price, commodity price, foreign exchange rate, index of prices or rates, a credit rating or credit index, or similar variable (sometimes called the ‘underlying’);

(b) - that requires no initial net investment or little initial net investment relative to other types of contracts that have a similar response to changes in market conditions; and

(c) - that is settled at a future date.

FAS 133
(a) – same as IAS 39

(b) – same as IAS 39

(c) – FASB definition requires that the terms of the derivative contract require or permit net settlement.

To meet the criteria for being a derivative under FAS 133, there must be a net settlement provision.  

The issue in a regular-way trade arises because of differences between trading dates and settlement dates.  Paragraph 294 on Page 141 of FAS 133 states the following:

Requiring that all forward contracts for purchases and sales of financial instruments that are readily convertible to cash be accounted for as derivatives would effectively require settlement date accounting for all such transactions. Resolving the issue of trade date versus settlement date accounting was not an objective of the project that led to this Statement. Therefore, the Board decided to explicitly exclude forward contracts for "regular-way" trades from the scope of this Statement.

For example, the forward sale requiring delivery of a  mortgaged-backed security is a regular-way trade if delivery of these types of securities normally take 30 days or 60 days.  Paragraph 10 excudes regular-way, normal purchases, and normal sales.  Also see Paragraphs 57c, 274, and 259-266. See also dollar offset method and  transition settlements.

FAS 133 leaves out the issue of trade date versus settlement date accounting and, thereby, excluded forward contracts for regular-way security trades from the scope of FAS 133 (See Appendix C Paragraph 274).

Paul Pacter states the following at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm 

 

IAS 39
If an enterprise has a contractual obligation that it can settle either by paying out a financial assets or its own equity securities, and if the number of equity securities required to settle the obligation varies with changes in their fair value so that the total fair value of the equity securities paid always equals the amount of the contractual obligation, the obligation should be accounted for as a financial liability, not as equity.

FAS 133
FASB standards do not require that such an obligation be classified as a liability.

 

DIG Implementation Issue A3 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/  
QUESTION

Does the liquidity of the market for a group of contract affect the determination of whether under paragraph 9(b) there is a market mechanism that facilitates net settlement under paragraph 9(b)? For example, assume a company contemporaneously enters into 500 futures contracts, each of which requires delivery of 100 shares of an exchange-traded equity security on the same date. The contracts fail to meet the criterion in paragraph 9(a) because delivery of an asset related to the underlying is required. The futures contracts trade on an exchange, which constitutes a market mechanism under which the company can be relieved of its rights and obligations under the futures contracts. However, the quantity of futures contracts held by the company cannot be rapidly absorbed in their entirety without significantly affecting the quoted price of the contracts.

RESPONSE

No. The lack of a liquid market for the group of contracts does not affect the determination of whether under paragraph 9(b) there is a market mechanism that facilitates net settlement because the test in paragraph 9(b) focuses on a singular contract. The exchange offers a ready opportunity to sell each contract, thereby providing relief of the rights and obligations under each contract.

Paragraph 57(c)(2) elaborates on the phrase market mechanism that facilitate net settlement and states that "any institutional arrangement or other agreement that enables either party to be relieved of all rights and obligations under the contract and to liquidate its net position without incurring a significant transaction cost is considered net settlement." The possible reduction in price due to selling a large futures position is not considered to be a transaction cost under that paragraph.

Whether the number of shares deliverable under the group of futures contracts exceeds the amount of shares that could rapidly be absorbed by the market without significantly affecting the price is not relevant to applying the criterion in paragraph 9(b).

DIG Implementation Issue A5 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
QUESTION

Does a contract contain a net settlement provision under paragraphs 9(a) and 57(c)(1) if it contains both (a) a variable penalty for nonperformance based on changes in the price of the items that are the subject of the contract and (b) a fixed incremental penalty for nonperformance that is sufficiently large to make the possibility of net settlement remote?

BACKGROUND

Certain contracts may require payment of (a) a variable penalty for nonperformance based on changes in the price of the items that are the subject of the contract and (b) an incremental penalty for nonperformance stated as a fixed amount or fixed amount per unit. The contract may or may not characterize the incremental payment upon nonperformance as a penalty.

Paragraph 57(c)(1) elaborates on the criterion in paragraph 6(c) regarding whether the terms of a contract require or permit net settlement which is discussed in paragraph 9(a). Paragraph 57(c)(1) states:

Its terms implicitly or explicitly require or permit net settlement. For example, a penalty for nonperformance in a purchase order is a net settlement provision if the amount of the penalty is based on changes in the price of the items that are the subject of the contract. Net settlement may be made in cash or by delivery of any other asset, whether or not it is readily convertible to cash. A fixed penalty for nonperformance is not a net settlement provision. RESPONSE

No. A contract that contains a variable penalty for nonperformance based on changes in the price of the items that are the subject of the contract does not contain a net settlement provision under paragraphs 9(a) and 57(c)(1) if it also contains an incremental penalty of a fixed amount (or fixed amount per unit) that would be expected to be significant enough at all dates during the remaining term of the contract to make the possibility of nonperformance remote. If a contract includes such a provision, it effectively requires performance, that is, requires the party to deliver an asset that is associated with the underlying. Thus, the contract does not meet the criterion for net settlement under paragraphs 9(a) and 57(c)(1) of Statement 133. The assessment of the fixed incremental penalty in the manner described above should be performed only at the contract's inception.

The magnitude of the fixed incremental penalty should be assessed on a standalone basis as a disincentive for nonperformance, not in relation to the overall penalty.

DIG Implementation Issue A7 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
QUESTION

Does the existence of a contractual requirement that one party obtain the other's permission to assign rights or obligations to a third party under a contract, in and of itself, preclude a contract from meeting the definition of a derivative because it would not possess the net settlement characteristic described in paragraph 9(b) of Statement 133 as a market mechanism?

For the purposes of this question, assume that (1) if the contract did not contain an assignment clause, an established market mechanism that facilitates net settlement outside the contract exists, (2) the contract does not satisfy the criteria for net settlement under the provisions of paragraph 9(a), (3) the asset that is required to be delivered under the contract is readily convertible to cash as described under paragraph 9(c), and (4) the contract would qualify for the normal purchases and sales exception under paragraph 10(b) if it is considered not to possess the net settlement characteristic described in paragraph 9(b).

BACKGROUND

Some commodity contracts contain a provision that allows one or both parties to a contract to assign its rights or obligations to a third party only after obtaining permission from the counterparty. Under the assignment clause addressed in this issue, permission shall not be unreasonably withheld. The primary purpose of an assignment clause is to ensure that the non-assigning counterparty is not unduly exposed to credit or performance risk if the assigning counterparty is relieved of all of its rights and obligations under the contract. Accordingly, a counterparty could withhold consent only in limited circumstances, such as when the contract would be assigned to a third party assignee that has a history of defaulting on its obligations or has a lower credit rating than the assignor.

Paragraph 9(b) of Statement 133 indicates that the net settlement characteristic of the definition of a derivative may be satisfied if "One of the parties is required to deliver an asset of the type described in paragraph 9(a), but there is a market mechanism that facilitates net settlement, for example, an exchange that offers a ready opportunity to sell the contract or to enter into an offsetting contract." Paragraph 57(c) of Statement 133 elaborates on that notion. It states:

...a contract that meets any one of the following criteria has the characteristic described as net settlement [in paragraph 9(b)]….(2) There is an established market mechanism that facilitates net settlement outside the contract. The term market mechanism is to be interpreted broadly. Any institutional arrangement or other agreement that enables either party to be relieved of all rights and obligations under the contract and to liquidate its net position without incurring a significant transaction cost is considered net settlement. [Emphasis added.]

RESPONSE

No. The existence of an assignment clause does not, in and of itself, preclude the contract from possessing the net settlement characteristic described in paragraph 9(b) as a market mechanism. Once the determination is made that a market mechanism that facilitates net settlement outside of the contract exists, then an assessment of the substance of the assignment clause is required in order to determine whether that assignment clause precludes a party from being relieved of all rights and obligations under the contract through that existing market mechanism. Although permission to assign the contract shall not be unreasonably withheld by the counterparty in accordance with the terms of the contract, the assignment feature cannot be viewed simply as a formality because it may be invoked at any time to prevent the non-assigning party from being exposed to unacceptable credit or performance risk. Accordingly, the existence of the assignment clause may or may not permit a party from being relieved of its rights and obligations under the contract.

If it is remote that the counterparty will withhold permission to assign the contract, the mere existence of the clause should not preclude the contract from possessing the net settlement characteristic described in paragraph 9(b) as a market mechanism. Such a determination requires assessing whether a sufficient number of acceptable potential assignees exist in the marketplace such that assignment of the contract would not result in imposing unacceptable credit risk or performance risk on the non-assigning party. Consideration should be given to past counterparty and industry practices regarding whether permission to be relieved of all rights and obligations under similar contracts has previously been withheld. However, if it is reasonably possible or probable that the counterparty will withhold permission to assign the contract, the contract is precluded from possessing the net settlement characteristic described in paragraph 9(b) as a market mechanism. In that circumstance, even if the asset under the contract were readily convertible to cash as described under paragraph 9(c), the contract could qualify for the normal purchases and normal sales exception under paragraph 10(b) because there is no net settlement provision in the contract and no market mechanism that facilitates net settlement exists (as described in paragraphs 9(a) and 9(b)).

DIG Implementation Issue A8 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/  
QUESTION

Does an asymmetrical default provision, which provides the defaulting party only the obligation to compensate its counterparty's loss but not the right to demand any gain from its counterparty, give a commodity forward contract the characteristic of net settlement under paragraph 9(a) of Statement 133?

BACKGROUND

Paragraph 6(c) of Statement 133 describes the following derivative characteristic:

Its terms require or permit net settlement, it can readily be settled net by a means outside the contract, or it provides for delivery of an asset that puts the recipient in a position not substantially different from net settlement.

Paragraph 9(a) provides the following additional guidance regarding the derivative characteristic in paragraph 6(c):

Neither party is required to deliver an asset that is associated with the underlying or that has a principal amount, stated amount, face value, number of shares, or other denomination that is equal to the notional amount (or the notional amount plus a premium or minus a discount).

Paragraph 57(c) and related subparagraph (1) provide the following additional guidance regarding the derivative characteristic in paragraphs 6(c) and 9(a):

A contract that meets any one of the following criteria has the characteristic described as net settlement:

  1. Its terms implicitly or explicitly require or permit net settlement. For example, a penalty for nonperformance in a purchase order is a net settlement provision if the amount of the penalty is based on changes in the price of the items that are the subject of the contract. Net settlement may be made in cash or by delivery of any other asset, whether or not it is readily convertible to cash. A fixed penalty for nonperformance is not a net settlement provision.

     

Many commodity forward contracts contain default provisions that require the defaulting party (the party that fails to make or take physical delivery of the commodity) to reimburse the nondefaulting party for any loss incurred as illustrated in the following examples:

  • If the buyer under the forward contract (Buyer) defaults (that is, does not take physical delivery of the commodity), the seller under that contract (Seller) will have to find another buyer in the market to take delivery. If the price received by Seller in the market is less than the contract price, Seller incurs a loss equal to the quantity of the commodity that would have been delivered under the forward contract multiplied by the difference between the contract price and the current market price. Buyer must pay Seller a penalty for nonperformance equal to that loss.

     

  • If Seller defaults (that is, does not deliver the commodity physically), Buyer will have to find another seller in the market. If the price paid by Buyer in the market is more than the contract price, Seller must pay Buyer a penalty for nonperformance equal to the quantity of the commodity that would have been delivered under the forward contract multiplied by the difference between the contract price and the current market price.

     

For example, Buyer agreed to purchase 100 units of a commodity from Seller at $1.00 per unit:

  • Assume Buyer defaults on the forward contract by not taking delivery and Seller must sell the 100 units in the market at the prevailing market price of $.75 per unit. To compensate Seller for the loss incurred due to Buyer's default, Buyer must pay Seller a penalty of $25.00 (that is, 100 units × ($1.00 – $.75)).

     

  • Similarly, assume that Seller defaults and Buyer must buy the 100 units it needs in the market at the prevailing market price of $1.30 per unit. To compensate Buyer for the loss incurred due to Seller's default, Seller must pay Buyer a penalty of $30.00 (that is, 100 units × ($1.30 – $1.00)).

     

Note that an asymmetrical default provision is designed to compensate the nondefaulting party for a loss incurred. The defaulting party cannot demand payment from the nondefaulting party to realize the changes in market price that would be favorable to the defaulting party if the contract were honored. Under the forward contract in the example, if Buyer defaults when the market price is $1.10, Seller will be able to sell the units of the commodity into the market at $1.10 and realize a $10.00 greater gain than it would have under the contract. In that circumstance, the defaulting Buyer is not required to pay a penalty for nonperformance to Seller, nor is Seller required to pass the $10.00 extra gain to the defaulting Buyer. Similarly, if Seller defaults when the market price is $0.80, Buyer will be able to buy the units of the commodity in the market and pay $20.00 less than under the contract. In that circumstance, the defaulting Seller is not required to pay a penalty for nonperformance to Buyer, nor is Buyer required to pass the $20.00 savings on to the defaulting Seller.

RESPONSE

No. A nonperformance penalty provision that requires the defaulting party to compensate the nondefaulting party for any loss incurred but does not allow the defaulting party to receive the effect of favorable price changes (herein referred to as an asymmetrical default provision) does not give a commodity forward contract the characteristic described as net settlement under paragraph 9(a) of Statement 133.

A derivative instrument can be described, in part, as allowing the holder to participate in the changes in an underlying without actually making or taking delivery of the asset related to that underlying. In a forward contract with only an asymmetrical default provision, neither Buyer nor Seller can realize the benefits of changes in the price of the commodity through default on the contract. That is, Buyer cannot realize favorable changes in the intrinsic value of the forward contract except (a) by taking delivery of the physical commodity or (b) in the event of default by Seller, which is an event beyond the control of Buyer. Similarly, Seller cannot realize favorable changes in the intrinsic value of the forward contract except (a) by making delivery of the physical commodity or (b) in the event of default by Buyer, which is an event beyond the control of Seller. However, if there was a pattern of using the asymmetrical default provisions as a means to net settle certain kinds of an entity's commodity purchase or sales contracts, that behavior would indicate that the asymmetrical default provision would give those kinds of commodity contracts the characteristic described as net settlement under paragraph 9(a).

In contrast, a contract that permits only one party to elect net settlement of the contract (by default or otherwise), and thus participate in either favorable changes only or both favorable and unfavorable price changes in the underlying, meets the derivative characteristic described in paragraph 6(c) and discussed in paragraph 9(a) for all parties to that contract. Such a default provision allows one party to elect net settlement of the contract under any pricing circumstance and consequently does not require delivery of an asset that is associated with the underlying. That default provision differs from the asymmetrical default provision in the above example contract since it is not limited to compensating only the nondefaulting party for a loss incurred and is not solely within the control of the defaulting party.

If the commodity forward contract does not have the characteristic of net settlement under paragraphs 9(a) and 9(b) but has the characteristic of net settlement under paragraph 9(c) because it requires delivery of a commodity that is readily convertible to cash, the commodity forward contract may nevertheless be eligible to qualify for the normal purchases and normal sales exception in paragraph 10(b) and if so, would not be subject to the accounting requirements of Statement 133 for the party to whom it is a normal purchase or normal sale.

DIG Implementation Issue A10 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 

Title: Definition of a Derivative: Assets That Are Readily Convertible to Cash

Paragraph references: 6(c), 9(c), Footnote 5 (to paragraph 9), 265

Date released: November 1999

QUESTION

Is an asset considered readily convertible to cash, as that phrase is used in paragraph 9(c), if the net amount of cash that would be received from a sale in an active market is not the equivalent amount of cash that an entity would typically have received under a net settlement provision? The net amount of cash that would be received from a sale in an active market may be impacted by various factors, such as sales commissions and costs to transport the asset (such as a commodity) to the delivery location specified for that active market.

BACKGROUND

Paragraph 9(c) of Statement 133 provides that a contract that requires delivery of the assets associated with the underlying has the characteristic of net settlement if those assets are readily convertible to cash. Footnote 5 to that paragraph makes explicit reference to the use of the phrase readily convertible to cash in paragraph 83(a) of FASB Concepts Statement No. 5, Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements of Business Enterprises.

This issue addresses whether a contract has the net settlement characteristic described in paragraph 9(c). This issue presumes there is no net settlement provision in the contract and no market mechanism that facilitates net settlement that would cause the contract to meet the criteria in paragraphs 9(a) and 9(b). A contract that is a derivative solely because it has the net settlement characteristic described in paragraph 9(c) (since the asset to be delivered under the contract is readily convertible to cash) may yet qualify for the normal purchases and normal sales exception under paragraph 10(b) or the other exclusions provided in paragraph 10.

RESPONSE

It depends. An asset can be considered to be readily convertible to cash, as that phrase is used in paragraph 9(c), only if the net amount of cash that would be received from a sale in an active market is not significantly less than the amount an entity would typically have received under a net settlement provision. The net amount that would be received upon sale need not be equal to the amount typically received under a net settlement provision.

Paragraph 6(c) of Statement 133 defines net settlement, in part, as “…or it provides for delivery of an asset that puts the recipient in a position not substantially different from net settlement” (emphasis added). The basis for conclusions also comments in paragraph 265 that “…the parties generally should be indifferent as to whether they exchange cash or the assets associated with the underlying,” although the term indifferent was not intended to imply an approximate equivalence between net settlement and proceeds from sale in an active market. Based on the foregoing Statement 133 references, if an entity determines that the estimated costs that would be incurred to immediately convert the asset to cash are not significant, then receipt of that asset puts the entity in a position not substantially different from net settlement. Therefore, an entity must evaluate, in part, the significance of the estimated costs of converting the asset to cash in determining whether those assets are considered to be readily convertible to cash. For purposes of assessing significance of such costs, an entity should consider those estimated conversion costs to be significant only if they are 10 percent or more of the gross sales proceeds (based on the spot price at the inception of the contract) that would be received from the sale of those assets in the closest or most economical active market. The assessment of the significance of those conversion costs should be performed only at inception of the contract.

See also DIG Issue A9 under interest rate swap



Normal Purchases and Normal Sales (NPNS)

A portion of Paragraph 8 in FAS 133 reads as follows:

b. Normal purchases and normal sales. Normal purchases and normal sales are contracts with no net settlement provision and no market mechanism to facilitate net settlement (as described in paragraphs 9(a) and 9(b)). They provide for the purchase or sale of something other than a financial instrument or derivative instrument that will be delivered in quantities expected to be used or sold by the reporting entity over a reasonable period in the normal course of business.

A portion of Paragraph 58 of FAS 133 reads as follows:

b. Normal purchases and normal sales. 
The exception in paragraph 10(b) applies only to a contract that requires future delivery of assets (other than financial instruments or derivative instruments) that are readily convertible to cash and only if there is no market mechanism to facilitate net settlement outside the contract. To qualify for the exception, a contract's terms also must be consistent with the terms of an entity's normal purchases or normal sales, that is, the quantity purchased or sold must be reasonable in relation to the entity's business needs. Determining whether or not the terms are consistent will require judgment. In making those judgments, an entity should consider all relevant factors, such as 

(1) the quantities provided under the contract and the entity's need for the related assets, 
(2) the locations to which delivery of the items will be made, 
(3) the period of time between entering into the contract and delivery, and 
(4) the entity's prior practices with regard to such contracts. 

Evidence such as past trends, expected future demand, other contracts for delivery of similar items, an entity's and industry's customs for acquiring and storing the related commodities, and an entity's operating locations should help in identifying contracts that qualify as normal purchases or normal sales.

Paragraphs 271 and 272 of FAS 133 read as follows:

271. The Board decided that contracts that require delivery of nonfinancial assets that are readily convertible to cash need not be accounted for as derivative instruments under this Statement if the assets constitute normal purchases or normal sales of the reporting entity unless those contracts can readily be settled net. The Board believes contracts for the acquisition of assets in quantities that the entity expects to use or sell over a reasonable period in the normal course of business are not unlike binding purchase orders or other similar contracts to which this Statement does not apply. The Board notes that the normal purchases and normal sales exemption is necessary only for contracts based on assets that are readily convertible to cash.

272. The Board understands that the normal purchases and normal sales provision sometimes will result in different parties to a contract reaching different conclusions about whether the contract is required to be accounted for as a derivative instrument. For example, the contract may be for ordinary sales by one party (and therefore not a derivative instrument) but not for ordinary purchases by the counterparty (and therefore a derivative instrument). The Board considered requiring both parties to account for a contract as a derivative instrument if the purchases or sales by either party were other than ordinary in the normal course of business. However, that approach would have required that one party to the contract determine the circumstances of the other party to that same contract. Although the Board believes that the accounting by both parties to a contract generally should be symmetrical, it decided that symmetry would be impractical in this instance and that a potential asymmetrical result is acceptable.



IAS 138 Implementation Guidance

"Implementation of SFAS 138, Amendments to SFAS 133," The CPA Journal, November 2001. (With Angela L.J. Huang and John S. Putoubas), pp. 54-56 --- http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2001/1100/dept/d115401.htm

The normal purchases and normal sales exception is expanded to certain commodity contracts. The risk that can be hedged in an interest rate hedge is redefined. Recognized foreign currency-denominated assets and liabilities may be hedged with a single cross-currency compound hedge. Net hedging of certain intercompany derivatives may be designated as cash flow hedges of foreign currency risk. Normal Purchases and Normal Sales Exception

In their normal course of business, companies that consume or produce commodities often enter contracts to physically deliver nonfinancial assets, such as electricity, natural gas, oil, aluminum, wheat, or corn. Although these physical contracts are typically settled by the delivery of the commodity, they often include cash settlement provisions in case one party does not deliver or accept delivery of the goods, although these provisions are not intended as derivatives. Historically, the accounting principles for executory contracts applied to physical contracts.

FASB decided contracts that permit but do not require settlement by delivery of a commodity are often used interchangeably with other derivatives and present similar risks; therefore, they should be considered derivatives. As a result, the “normal purchases and normal sales” exception in paragraph 10(b) of SFAS 133 did not apply to these commodities contracts because they could be settled at net or liquidated through a market mechanism that would facilitate net settlement. Normal purchases and sales provide commodities that the reporting entity would use or sell in a reasonable period of time during the normal course of business.

In response to concerns that SFAS 133 inappropriately classified such physical contracts as derivatives, SFAS 138 amends paragraph 10(b) by expanding the normal purchases and normal sales exception to contracts that contain net settlement provisions if it is probable (at inception and throughout the term of the individual contract) that the contract will not settle at net and will result in physical delivery. The entity must document this conclusion. While this amendment will affect many forward contracts, exchange-traded futures that require periodic cash settlements do not qualify for the exception.

A portion of Paragraph 4 of FAS 138 reads as follows:

4. Statement 133 is amended as follows:

Amendment Related to Normal Purchases and Normal Sales

a. Paragraph 10(b) of FAS 133 is replaced by the following:

Normal purchases and normal sales. Normal purchases and normal sales are contracts that provide for the purchase or sale of something other than a financial instrument or derivative instrument that will be delivered in quantities expected to be used or sold by the reporting entity over a reasonable period in the normal course of business. However, contracts that have a price based on an underlying that is not clearly and closely related to the asset being sold or purchased (such as a price in a contract for the sale of a grain commodity based in part on changes in the S&P index) or that are denominated in a foreign currency that meets neither of the criteria in paragraphs 15(a) and 15(b) shall not be considered normal purchases and normal sales. Contracts that contain net settlement provisions as described in paragraphs 9(a) and 9(b) may qualify for the normal purchases and normal sales exception if it is probable at inception and throughout the term of the individual contract that the contract will not settle net and will result in physical delivery. Net settlement (as described in paragraphs 9(a) and 9(b)) of contracts in a group of contracts similarly designated as normal purchases and normal sales would call into question the classification of all such contracts as normal purchases or normal sales. Contracts that require cash settlements of gains or losses or are otherwise settled net on a periodic basis, including individual contracts that are part of a series of sequential contracts intended to accomplish ultimate acquisition or sale of a commodity, do not qualify for this exception. For contracts that qualify for the normal purchases and normal sales exception, the entity shall document the basis for concluding that it is probable that the contract will result in physical delivery. The documentation requirements can be applied either to groups of similarly designated contracts or to each individual contract.

 

 

DIG Implementation Issue A2 --- http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/  

Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. A2, "Existence of a Market Mechanism That Facilitates Net Settlement," was rescinded upon the clearance of Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. A21, "Existence of an Established Market Mechanism That Facilitates Net Settlement under Paragraph 9(b)," which was posted on April 10, 2002

QUESTION

Two entities enter into a commodity forward contract that requires delivery and is not exchange-traded; however, there are brokers who stand ready to buy and sell the commodity contracts. Either entity can be relieved of its obligation to make (or right to accept) delivery of the commodity and its right to receive (or obligation to make) payment under the contract by arranging for a broker to make or accept delivery and paying the broker a commission plus any difference between the contract price and the current market price of the commodity. The commission paid to the broker is not significant. Based on those facts, is the criterion for net settlement in paragraph 6(c) satisfied because of the existence of a market mechanism that facilitates net settlement as described in paragraph 9(b)?

RESPONSE

Yes. The criterion for net settlement would be satisfied because the entity can be relieved of its rights and obligations under the contract without incurring a substantial fee due to its arrangement with a broker. Paragraph 57(c)(2) states that the term market mechanism is to be interpreted broadly, and any institutional arrangement or side agreement that enables either party to be relieved of all rights and obligations under the contract and to liquidate its net position without incurring a significant transaction cost is considered net settlement. The fact that brokers stand ready to relieve entities of their rights and obligations under a particular type of contract indicates that a market mechanism that facilitates net settlement exists for that type of contract.

In contrast, if the arrangement between the entity and the broker (a) is simply an agreement whereby the broker will make (or accept) delivery on behalf of an entity and (b) does not relieve the entity of its rights and obligations under the contract, the arrangement does not constitute a market mechanism that facilitates net settlement under paragraph 9(b) and the criterion for net settlement in paragraph 6(c) is not satisfied.

 

 

 

 

 

A message concerning  Normal Purchases and Normal Sales (NPNS)

I received a very long message and received permission to quote the message below regarding the Normal Purchases and Normal Sales (NPNS) amendment in FAS 138::

Hello Professor Jensen,

Great website! However, I have to disagree with your comment regarding the issue of NPNS.

I work for the Bonneville Power Administration (Bonneville), a federal based Electric Wholesale Power Marketer, we sell the output from the 29 federally owned dams on the Columbia and Snake River system in the Pacific Northwest.  I am the project manager for Bonneville responsible for implementing FAS 133.  More on Bonneville at the end of this email - postscript.

 

 Regarding the NPNS issue:    This issue is of big concern to the Energy industry as it relates to our normal sales and purchases activities.  I am most familiar with the Electric Utility  industry and the sales and delivery practices that are prevalent throughout the industry.  I would argue that Bonneville was much better off under the original statement para 10 (b) because the statement was silent on the practice I describe below referred to as "Bookouts".

 

Specifically, in the electric utility industry it is necessary and is considered best utility and business practice to perform a type of transaction called a "Bookout" whereby several transactions with the same Counterparty in the same month - a purchase and a sale - are offset and not scheduled for physical delivery.  For example, Bonneville may sell forward 200 MWs for the month of August 2000 in January 2000 based on our most current hydro forecasts and subsequently in May 2000 our most current forecasts now show a deficit and we have to purchase 200 MWs for the same month to cover our obligations.  We may from time to time find ourselves with both purchases and sales with the same counterparty in the same month at the same delivery location.  Just prior to delivery, we look at our schedule and try and match up transactions --- the "Bookout" procedure.

 

This "Bookout" procedure is common in the electric utility industry as a scheduling convenience when two utilities happen to have offsetting transactions. If this procedure is not used, both counterparties incur transmission costs in order to make deliveries to each other. The Bookout procedure avoids the energy scheduling process (an administrative burden as well) which would trigger payment of transmission costs.  We do not plan for this event or know in advance what we will bookout and we do not "Bookout" to capture a margin.  Rather, we find ourselves in this situation because of our inventory management constraints, maintenance schedules, and dependency on factors outside our control such as the weather and streamflows or environmental constraints placed upon us by other federal agencies or federal courts. 

 

We  lobbied the FASB and the DIG to clarify and revise the NPNS language to allow for this practice, but the FASB position was very restrictive -- if you do not deliver then it is considered net settled.   It seems to me and other industry participants that bookouts do not fit into the net settlement definition as it was described and intended in FAS 133. Rather it is a utility best practice that results in no physical delivery.  In addition, when we bookout the cash settling is done at the agreed upon contract prices - not at the market pricing.  We would argue that the Board's original intent was to capture net settlement mechanisms that require "market" settlement.   Unfortunately, the FASB made their decision about a practice without doing more homework on the nature of the transaction.  I understand the pressures the FASB was under to get the statement amended and implemented.  Unfortunately, the industry participants and practitioners are left to deal with the Board's end product.   The final 138 was not clear in its guidance either as it relates to these types of transactions and what this meant to our "similar" contracts that we want to qualify for NPNS.  I continue, along with our auditors, to hold discussions with FASB staff. 

 

What I am afraid may happen is that because of the "One size fits all approach by the FASB",  Bonneville and other regulated utilities will be forced into adopting a FV accounting approach on transactions that are simple sales and purchases.  Applying mark to market treatment to these transactions is more misleading to the financial statement reader not clearer - the original intent of 133.  I believe the interpretation of the final written words by individuals unfamiliar with the Energy industry is driving us into misleading and confusing presentation.

 

Any advice or encouragement you can provide would be appreciated.  We adopt October 1 and I have a deadline to meet and I still do not have final clear and convincing guidance.  I am ahead of most folks on this issue since we do have an earlier adoption date than most utilities.  Thanks for your time.  This is a complex issue and I apologize for the length of this email and I imagine I still have not described the issues in the most succinct and clear fashion.

 

Regards,

Sanford Menashe
Project Manager, FAS 133
Bonneville Power Administration
phone:  503-230-3570
email:  smmenashe@bpa.gov

 

Postscript:

 

About Bonneville Power Administration:

 

Bonneville is a federal agency under the Department of Energy, which was established over 60 years ago to market power from 29 federal dams and one non-federal nuclear plant in the Pacific Northwest. BPA’s energy sales are governed by federal legislation (e.g. the Northwest Power Act) and other regional mandates to maintain the benefits of power sales for the Pacific Northwest region and to manage its environmental and safety obligations relative to operating the federal hydroelectric system. Its primary objective is to provide low-cost electricity to the region by offering cost-based rates for its power and transmission services to eligible publicly owned and investor-owned utilities in the Pacific Northwest (including Oregon, Washington, Idaho, western Montana and small parts of Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, California and eastern Montana).

Sanford Menashe, Manager, FAS 133 Project.
Project Manager, FAS 133
Bonneville Power Administration
phone:  503-230-3570
email:  smmenashe@bpa.gov

Email: smmenashe@bpa.gov

Updates in September 2001 and March 2003:
The DIG addressed Mr. Menasche's concerns, especially in Dig Issue C16.    But this did not go far enough to satisfy energy firms with respect to bookouts.

Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. C16 

Title: Scope Exceptions: Applying the Normal Purchases and Normal Sales Exception to Contracts That Combine a Forward Contract and a Purchased Option Contract 

May 1, 2003 
Affected by: FASB Statement No. 149, 
Amendment of Statement 133 on Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities 
(Revised March 26, 2003)

QUESTION

If a purchased option that would, if exercised, require delivery of the related asset at an established price under the contract is combined with a forward contract in a single supply contract and that single supply contract meets the definition of a derivative, is that single supply contract eligible to qualify for the normal purchases and normal sales exception in paragraph 10(b)?

BACKGROUND

Some utilities and independent power producers (also called IPPs) have fuel supply contracts that require delivery of a contractual minimum quantity of fuel at a fixed price and have an option that permits the holder to take specified additional amounts of fuel at the same fixed price at various times. Essentially, that option to take more fuel is a purchased option that is combined with the forward contract in a single supply contract. Typically, the option to take additional fuel is built into the contract to ensure that the buyer has a supply of fuel in order to produce the electricity during peak demands; however, the buyer may have the ability to sell to third parties the additional fuel purchased through exercise of the purchased option. Due to the difficulty in estimating peak electricity load and thus the amount of fuel needed to generate the required electricity, those fuel supply contracts are common in the electric utility industry (though similar supply contracts may exist in other industries). Those fuel supply contracts are not requirements contracts that are addressed in Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. A6, "Notional Amounts of Commodity Contracts."

Many of those contracts meet the definition of a derivative because they have a notional amount and an underlying, require no or a smaller initial net investment, and provide for net settlement (for example, through their default provisions or by requiring delivery of an asset that is readily convertible to cash). For purposes of applying Statement 133 to contracts that meet the definition of a derivative, it is necessary to determine whether the fuel supply contract qualifies for the normal purchases and normal sales exception, whether bifurcation of the option is permitted if it does not qualify for the normal purchases and normal sales exception, or whether the entire contract is accounted for as a derivative.

Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. C15, "Normal Purchases and Normal Sales Exception for Certain Option-Type Contracts and Forward Contracts in Electricity," indicates that power purchase or sales agreements (including combinations of a forward contract and an option contract) that meet the criteria in that Implementation Issue qualify for the normal purchases and normal sales exception in paragraph 10(b).

Although the above background information discusses utilities and independent power producers, this Implementation Issue applies to all entities that enter into contracts that combine a forward contract and a purchased option contract, not just to utilities and independent power producers.

RESPONSE

The inclusion of a purchased option that would, if exercised, require delivery of the related asset at an established price under the contract within the single supply contract that meets the definition of a derivative disqualifies the entire derivative fuel supply contract from being eligible to qualify for the normal purchases and normal sales exception in paragraph 10(b) except as provided in paragraph 10(b)(4) of Statement 133, as amended, and Implementation Issue C15 with respect to certain power purchase or sales agreements. Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. C10, “Can Option Contracts and Forward Contracts with Optionality Features Qualify for the Normal Purchases and Normal Sales Exception,” states? “Option contracts only contingently provide for such purchase or sale since exercise of the option contract is not assured. Thus, in accordance with paragraph 10(b)(2) of Statement 133, as amended, freestanding option contracts (including in-the-money options contracts) are not eligible to qualify for the normal purchases and normal sales exception.” Paragraph 10(b)(3) of Statement 133, as amended, and Implementation Issue C10 further indicate that forward contracts with embedded optionality can qualify for the normal purchases and normal sales exception only if the embedded optionality (such as price caps) does not affect the quantity to be delivered. The fuel supply contract cannot qualify for the normal purchases and normal sales exception because of the optionality regarding the quantity of fuel to be delivered under the contract.

An entity is not permitted to bifurcate the forward contract component and the option contract component of a fuel supply contract that in its entirety meets the definition of a derivative and then assert that the forward contract component is eligible to qualify for the normal purchases and normal sales exception. Paragraph 18 indicates that an entity is prohibited from separating a compound derivative in components representing different risks. (The provisions of paragraph 12 require that certain derivatives that are embedded in non-derivative hybrid instruments must be split out from the host contract and accounted for separately as a derivative; however, paragraph 12 does not apply to a contract that meets the definition of a derivative in its entirety.)

An entity may wish to enter into two separate contracts—a forward contract and an option contract—that economically achieve the same results as the single derivative contract described in the background section and determine whether the exception in paragraph 10(b) applies to the separate forward contract.

Similar to the option contracts discussed in Implementation Issue C10, this Issue addresses option components that would require delivery of the related asset at an established price under the contract. If the option component does not provide any benefit to the holder beyond the assurance of a guaranteed supply of the underlying commodity for use in the normal course of business and that option component only permits the holder to purchase additional quantities at the market price at the date of delivery (that is, that option component will always have a fair value of zero), that option component would not require delivery of the related asset at an established price under the contract.

If an entity’s single supply contract included at its inception both a forward contract and an option contract and, in subsequent renegotiations, that contract is negated and replaced by two separate contracts (a forward contract for a specific quantity that will be purchased and an option contract for additional quantities whose purchase is conditional upon exercise of the option), the new forward contract would be eligible to qualify for the normal purchases and normal sales exception under paragraph 10(b), whereas the new option contract would not be eligible for that exception. From the inception of that new separate option contract, it would be accounted for under Statement 133. However, the guidance in this Implementation Issue would not retroactively affect the accounting for the combination derivative contract that was negated prior to the effective date of this Implementation Issue.

If on the effective date of this Implementation Issue, an entity was party to a combination derivative contract that included both a forward contract and an option contract but the entity had not been accounting for that derivative contract under Statement 133 because it had documented an asserted compliance with paragraph 10(b), that combination derivative contract would be reported at its fair value on the effective date of this Implementation Issue, with the offsetting entry recorded in current period earnings. The combination derivative contract cannot be bifurcated into a forward contract that would have been eligible to qualify for the normal purchases and normal sales exception and an option contract.

EFFECTIVE DATE

The effective date of the implementation guidance in this Issue for each reporting entity is the first day of its second fiscal quarter beginning after October 10, 2001, the date that the Board-cleared guidance was posted on the FASB website. The revisions made on March 26, 2003, do not affect the effective date.

 


"FASB Clears DIG Issues But Refuses Electricity Exception," March 23, 2001 --- http://www.fas133.com/search/search_article.cfm?areaid=369&page=111 

FASB Clears DIG Issues But Refuses Electricity Exception The FASB Board cleared 22 DIG issues and discussed one electricity-related item at its March 21, 2001 meeting.

Electricity options. The only other FAS 133-related issue discussed at the FASB’s meeting relates to electricity option contracts (DIG Agenda Item 14-3, (Normal Purchases and Sales Exception in the Electric Industry for Capacity Contracts Including Contracts that May Have Some Characteristics of Purchased and Written Options).

In general, notes Kevin Stoklosa, project manager with the FASB Staff, Issue C10 says that options do not qualify for the normal purchases and sales exemption of FAS 133.

However, because of the uniqueness of electricity contracts (they are regulated, the “goods” cannot be stored, etc.) the Board has received a request to make an exception for electricity option contracts. However, he says, the Board declined to offer such a special exception.

 

Book outs. Item 14-12, regarding book out contracts and their normal purchases and sales exception implications was not discussed; however, Mr. Stoklosa says he expects that the Staff’s tentative guidance will be posted shortly. In essence, he says, as long as a contract is subject to “being booked out,” it does not qualify for the exception. That’s because the book out option precludes the company from making the presumption at inception that it will most likely take delivery. “That’s particularly true when they don’t have control over the book out,” he notes.


See Bookout  

 

Not-for-Profit =

a reporting entity that does not compute net income as a separate caption.  This includes most governmental, educational, and charitable organizations.  Many health care entities are also nonprofit, although in recent years many of those have become profit enterprises.  Gains and losses on a hedging or nonhedging derivative instrument is to be accounted for as a change in net assets of not-for-profit entities according to Paragraph 43 on Pages 26-27 of FAS 133.   These entities may not use cash flow hedges.  Similar accounting rules apply to a defined benefit pension plan. 

Notional =

the  quantity that, when multiplied by the underlying index (e.g., price or interest rate), is used to determine the net settlement of a derivative financial instrument..  For example, on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), futures contracts for corn are defined in terms of 25,000-bushel contracts.  Four contracts on corn would, therefore, have a notional of 100,000 bushels.  

A notional cannot be a contingent amount except under the DIG issue A6 conditons noted below.  For example, the notional cannot be specified as the Year 2004 corn production amount on the Ralph Jones Family Farm.  The notional must be defined in terms of something other than a sports or geological condition such a an amount of crop dependent upon rainfall over the growing season.  See Derivative Financial Instrument.

The notional may be the principal on a loan (e.g. bonds payable) whose interest rate is swapped in an interest rate swap contract.  For example, the notional on 10,000 bonds having a face value of $1,000 is $10,000,000. The "notional rate" is the current interest rate on the notional loan. FAS 133 on Page 3, Paragraph 6 defines a notional as "a number of currency units, shares, bushels, pounds, or other units specified in the contract." The settlement of a derivative instrument with a notional amount is determined by the interaction of that notional amount with the underlying. ." Also see Paragraphs 250-258. Go to the term underlying.

Fixed payment is required as a result of some future event unrelated to a notional amount.  Paragraphs 10a and 13 of IAS 39.  Payment provision specifies a fixed or determinable settlement to be made if the underlying behaves in a specified manner. (FAS 133 Paragraphs 6a, 7 & 5 of FAS 133.)

There were some very sticky questions raised in DIG Issue A6 about commodity contracts where the number of items are not specified.  See http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/derivatives/issuea6.html 

One of my students, Erin Welch, wrote the following based upon DIG Issue A6
Question:  How does the lack of specification of a fixed number of units of a commodity to be bought or sold affect whether a commodity contract has a notional amount?  Specifically, does each of the illustrative contracts below have a notional amount as discussed in paragraph 6(a) to meet Statement 133’s definition of a derivative instrument?”

 

 

NOTIONAL SPECIFICATION

DOES IT QUALIFY AS A NOTIONAL UNDER FAS 133?

WHY OR WHY NOT?

As many units as required to satisfy the buyer’s actual needs during the contract period.

It depends.

Yes, if the contract contains explicit provisions that support the calculation of a determinable amount reflecting the buyer’s needs.

Only as many units as needed to satisfy its needs up to a maximum of 100 units.

It depends.

Same as previous provision except that the notional cannot exceed 100 units

A minimum of 60 units and as many units needed to satisfy its actual needs in excess of 60 units.

Yes.

A contract that specifies a minimum number of units always as a notional amount at least equal to that minimum amount.  Only that portion of the contract with a determinable notional amount would be accounted for as a derivative instrument.   

A minimum of 60 units and as many units needed to satisfy its actual needs in excess of 60 units up to a maximum of 100 units.

Yes.

Same as previous provision except that the notional cannot exceed 100 units.

 

  NYMEX = New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) for Energy and Metals ---  http://www.nymex.com/jsp/index.jsp

 

 

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |

O-Terms

OCI = see comprehensive income.

Open Interest

The total number of futures or options contracts of a given commodity that have not yet been offset by an opposite futures or option transaction nor fulfilled by delivery of the commodity or option exercise. Each open transaction has a buyer and a seller, but for calculation of open interest, only one side of the contract is counted.  See futures contract.

Open Position

a financial risk that is not hedged.  See hedge.

Option =

a contract that gives the purchaser the right to buy or sell an asset (such as a unit of foreign currency) at a specified price within a specified time period. A call option gives the holder the right to buy the underlying asset; a put option gives the holder the right to sell it.  The price of the option is called a premium.  Singular options or a combination of options can be designated as hedges according to Paragraph 20c on Page 12 of FAS 133.   For example, an interest rate collar combination of a put and call options or circus combinations may qualify as hedges unless a net premium is received giving rise to written option complications.

Call options are illustrated in Example 9 of FAS 133 in Paragraphs 162-164.  An option is "in-the-money" if the holder would benefit from exercising it now. A call option is in-the-money if the strike price (the exercise price) is below the current market price of the underlying asset; a put option is in-the-money if the strike price is above the market price. Intrinsic value is equal to the difference between the strike price and the market price.   An option is "out-of-the-money" if the holder would not benefit from exercising it now. A call option is out-of-the-money if the strike price is above the current market price of the underlying asset; a put option is out-of-the-money if the strike price is below the market price. The key distinction between contracts versus futures/forward contracts is that an option is purchased up front and the buyer has a right but not an obligation to execute the option in the future, In other words, the most the option buyer can lose is the option price. In the case of forwards and futures, there is an obligation to perform in the future. The writer (seller) of an option, however, has an obligation to perform if the option is exercised by the buyer. FAS 133 rules for purchased options are much different than for written options.  For rules regarding written options see Paragraphs 396-401 on Pages 179-181 of FAS 133.  Exposure Draft 162-B would not allow hedge accounting for written options.  FAS 133 relaxed the rules for written options under certain circumstances explained in Paragraphs 396-401.  

The partitioning of an option's value between intrinsic and time value partitions is important subsequent to the purchase of an option.  On the acquisition date, the option is recorded at the premium (purchase price) the paid.  Subsequent to the purchase date, the option is marked to fair value equal to subsequent changes in quoted premiums.  If the option qualifies as a cash flow hedge of a forecasted transaction, changes in the time value of the option are debited or credited to current earnings.  Changes in the intrinsic value, however, are posted to comprehensive income (OCI)See the CapIT Corporation and FloorIT Corporation cases at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/133cases/000index.htm.

Paragraph 399 on Page 180 of FAS 133 does not allow covered call strategies that permit an entity to write an option on an asset that it owns.   In a covered call the combined position of the hedged item and the derivative option is asymmetrical in that exposure to losses is always greater than potential gains.  The option premium, however, is set so that the option writer certainly does not expect those "remotely possible" losses to occur.  Only when the potential gains are at least equal to potential cash flow losses will Paragraph 28c on Page 19 of FAS 133 kick in to allow a cash flow hedge under FAS 133.  Also see Paragraph 20c on Page 12.

Options are referred to extensively in FAS 133. See for example Paragraphs 60-61, 85-88, 102, 188., and 284.  For a discussion of combination options, see compound derivatives.   Also see intrinsic value, swaptionrange forward, covered call, and written option.

By way of illustration of interest rate options, suppose a September Eurodollar call option has a strike price of 9550 basis points (95.50%) that nets out an option interest rate strike price of 100% -  95.50% = 4.50%.   Adding a 0.10 option premium to this nets out to 100% - 95.50% - 0.10% = 4.40%.    Interest rate call options are used to hedge against falling interest rates.   The cost of each basis point is $25 such that with a 0.10 option premium, the cost of the September call option is (10 basis points)($25) = $250.  Settlements are in cash and no actual transfer of securities take place if the purchaser of the option chooses to exercise the call option.  Suppose that the call option had been used to hedge a Eurodollar futures contract that settled in September for 9500.  The fall in interest rates by 50 basis points is hedged by the rise in the call option by an equivalent amount.   

A written option is not a hedging instrument unless it is designated as an offset to a purchased option, including one that is embedded in another financial instrument, for example, a written option used to hedge callable debt
(FAS 133 Paragraph 124).  A purchased option qualifies as a hedging instrument as it has potential gains equal to or greater than losses and, therefore, has the potential to reduce profit or loss exposure from changes in fair values or cash flows (IAS 39 Paragraph 124).  Under FASB rules, if a written option is designated as hedging a recognized asset or liability / the variability in cash flows for a recognized asset or liability, the combination of the hedged item and the written option provides at least as much potential for favorable cash flows as exposure to unfavorable cash flows (see FAS 133 Paragraph 20c or 28c).

For a discussion of option valuation, go to Valuation of Options 

Yahoo Finance is Bob Jensen's Favorite Place to learn more about the mechanics and widespread use of options.  That web site, however, will not help much with respect to accounting for such instruments under FAS 133.  Also see CBOE, CBOT, and CME for some great tutorials on options investing and hedging.

Question
What is the main advantage and main disadvantage of speculating or hedging with purchased options?

Main Advantage
The main advantage of purchased options is that the total loss is bounded by the premium paid initially. In the case of other derivatives like forwards, futures, swaps, and written options, the risks are generally not bounded unless they are bounded by other hedging contracts. Strategies thereby become more complicated.

Main Disadvantage
The main disadvantage is the cost (premium) that must be paid initially for purchased options. Most other alternatives have no up front premiums although premiums can be written into more complex OTC alternatives.

Question
What are reverse convertible securities?

"Simple options thrive in risky world - SuperDerivatives," by Toni Vorobyova, Reuters, February 8, 2012 ---
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/02/08/uk-superderivatives-idUKLNE81701V20120208

Investors want simple derivative products to cushion the pain of stock market losses and have turned their back on complex, custom-built products which were earning a fortune for investment banks, the head of equities at a leading derivatives pricing firm said.

The collapse of Lehman Brothers - the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history which left the bank facing billions of dollars in derivatives claims - has burnt many investors, choking off demand for more complex options, according to Mikael Benguigui, head of equities at SuperDerivatives.

Such trends were last week acknowledged by Deutsche Bank (DBKGn.DE), which noted lower revenue for equity derivatives sales and trading compared with 2010 as a result of what it said was a more challenging environment and lower client activity.

"The market has changed completely. Banks are not willing to take on risk. There is a general consensus in the market now to avoid going into too-complex, too-exotic options," Benguigui said.

"What we see is that people are pricing fairly simple structured products, fairly commoditised products. It's not what we saw five or six years ago when every month banks were inventing a new product."

The pace of growth in the equity derivatives market has slumped from the 33 percent seen in 2007 - before the 2008 collapse of Lehman - to 9 percent in 2011, according to data from the World Federation of Exchanges. Within that, stock index options are the most popular category and are enjoying the strongest growth.

The timeframe on such products has also shrunk: five-year options are popular, but banks are reluctant to take on the risk of offering products for seven years or longer. This is in contrast to pre-crisis days, when they would quote for 12 years or more, Benguigui, a derivatives veteran who also worked at Citi (C.N) and JPMorgan (JPM.N), said.

"The feedback from the investment banking side is that a lot of them are struggling. We are coming back to less complicated options and less complicated strategy, so it's more plain vanilla. And plain vanilla means less room for margin - it's more liquid, it's easy to put banks into competition," he said.

NO BIG UPSIDE

SuperDerivatives offers equity derivatives pricing tools - from a live platform to a one-off portfolio valuation service - to banks, hedge funds, asset managers, custodians and hedge fund administrators in more than 60 countries.

Among the most popular are so-called reverse convertible securities, which are linked to an underlying stock or index and offer a high coupon.

Upon maturity, if the value of the stock or index is above a certain level, the holder gets back the full investment. Otherwise, they get a pre-agreed number of shares.

Such a product ensures a steady relatively high return, in exchange for which investors give up their right to benefit from any unexpected surge in a share price.

"The big upside - no one really believes in it. There might be moderate upside, but they are happy to have a fixed coupon. Moderate downside can happen and they don't want to suffer on that, so they are happy to have the investment back. If they are completely wrong and something really bad happens, it's no worse than being long the stock from day one," Benguigui said.

"This sort of super-easy product has big, big flows in the UK and also in Switzerland."

Regulation is key to regaining investor confidence in a market where many found themselves unable to exit positions as the global financial crisis unfurled.

"Right now, every regulatory body is pushing for more transparency, better liquidity. They are asking the buy side to be more independent by using a platform where you can price everything independently," Benguigui said.

"When the market changes like this, the volume is going to come back. But ... investment banks are not going to be allowed to do what they did before in terms of taking risk or playing with the capital. I don't think we are going to see huge volumes again on complex instruments where banks were making fortunes."

 

Links to my tutorials on derivative financial instruments, including a long history of multimedia, can be found at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

 

"Of Knock-ins, Knock-outs & KIKOs," by Ranju Sarkar, Business Standard, April 2, 2008 --- Click Here
http://www.business-standard.com/common/news_article.php?leftnm=0&subLeft=1&chklogin=N&autono=318661&tab=r

OPTIONS
 
Option is a contract which gives a buyer a right, but not an obligation, to buy an underlying/ currency/ stock/ commodities at a pre-determined rate, known as strike price, for settlement at a future day. The right to buy is called a call option. The right to sell is called a put option. There are different types of options.
 
Knock-out option: An option which ceases to exist if the knock-out event occurs. A knock out happens when a particular level is hit (like the Swiss franc touching the level of 1.10 against the dollar), when the option ceases to exist.
 
Knock-in option: An option which comes into existence if the knock-in event happens. It works exactly the reverse of a knock-out. In a knock-in, an option comes into existence if a certain level is hit.
 
KIKO (knock-in, knock-out): This is an option with both a knock-in and knock-out. The option kicks in, or comes alive, if the knock-in is seen. The option ceases to exist if anytime, pre or post, the knock-in event happening, the knock-out happens.
 
One-touch option: When a certain level (of any currency pair) is hit, a company buying an option gets a pre-determined pay-off (it could be $10,000, $20,000, or $30,000). This is how companies made money through derivative deals last year.
 
Double-touch option: There are two levels. If either of the two levels is hit, the company buying an option will get a pay off. All options require a buyer to pay a premium. Conversely, sellers of options would receive a premium.
 
STRUCTURES
 
Banks, foreign exchange consultants work out zero-cost option structures/ strategies for companies so that they don’t have to pay any premium. To make a zero-cost structure, a company has to buy some option and sell some option so that the premium is zero (the premium paid for buying an option is set-off against the premium received for selling the option).
 
For instance, when the rupee-dollar parity is 40.10, an exporter buys a put option at the rate of 39.50, and sells a call option for 41.00 for delivery of exports at the end of June, July and August an export commitment of $1 million each month. By entering into this contract, the best rate the exporter can get is 41, and the worst rate it can get is 39.50.
 
If the rupee goes below 39.50, the exporter will be able to encash its receivables at the rate of 39.50. If the rupee is trading between 39.50 and 41, the exporter will be able to encash its receivables at the prevailing market rate.
 
However, if the rupee is ruling above 41, it will get its receivables at Rs 41 as he’s locked in that level. This kind of structure is popular with software companies, who can realise their receivables in a range (between the best and worst), unlike in a forward contract where they get locked in at a particular rate.
 
Banks also offer, what they call, a 1:2 leveraged option, wherein a company buys some calls, makes some puts and use a combination of these to create zero-cost strategy for the company. Companies that have big positions in derivative trades have been selling KIKOs, or a series of KIKOs and buying one-touch options and double-touch options. These structures helped companies make money last year.

Continued in article

Bob Jensen's links to accounting, finance, and business glossaries --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbus.htm

Bob Jensen's links to FAS 133 and IAS 39 Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments Glossary --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm

Bob Jensen's FAS 133 and IAS 39 Tutorials on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm


"IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation — Put options written over non-controlling interests," IAS Plus, January 17, 2012 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/ifric/1201.htm#ias32

Throughout 2010 and 2011, the Committee considered a request for guidance on how an entity should account for changes in the carrying amount of a financial liability for a put option, written over shares held by a non-controlling interest shareholder (NCI put), in the consolidated financial statements of a parent entity. The request is the result of perceived diversity in accounting for the subsequent measurement of the financial liability that is recognised for those NCI puts. The issue arises because of potential inconsistencies between the requirements for measuring financial liabilities and the requirements for accounting for transactions with owners in their capacity as owners, whereby some believe that subsequent changes in the liability that is recognised for the NCI put should be recognised in profit or loss while others believe the change in the liability should be recognised in equity.

Given that the IASB rejected the Committee's initial recommendation for a possible scope exclusion to IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation for put options written over the non-controlling interest in the consolidated financial statements of a group, the Committee considered possible paths forward on this project.

The Committee was directed by the IASB to specifically consider whether changes in the measurement of the NCI put should be recognised in profit or loss or equity and whether the scope of the recognition decision should be applied only to NCI puts or extended to include both NCI puts and NCI forwards. While the Committee was asked to consider these two focused questions, they quickly expanded the scope of the discussion by considering broader concerns surrounding the project including the counterintuitive result of recognising a 'gross' liability when reflecting subsequent changes in the liability in profit or loss (as opposed to reflection on a 'net' basis), the treatment of the purchase of a NCI put with variable consideration and the timing of transaction recognition; acknowledging that these were the same concerns expressed when they made their initial recommendation to the IASB to exclude from the scope of IAS 32 put options written over the non-controlling interest in the consolidated financial statements of a group.

One Committee member expressed a preference that application guidance be drafted which specifies that paragraph 30 of IAS 27 Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements does not apply to NCI puts because the change in ownership interest has not yet occurred. Put another way, only transactions with owners are recognised in equity, and remeasuring an NCI put is not a transaction with an owner (thus should be reflected in profit or loss). Paragraph 30 in IAS 27 is describing a circumstance in which the controlling shareholder's and the non-controlling interest shareholder's relative ownership of the subsidiary changes, and this is not the case when the NCI put is remeasured. This was seen as a clarification of the literature for subsequent measurement (to avoid diversity), albeit without addressing some of the larger issues in the Committee's minds.

Many Committee members supported the view expressed by this Committee member. However, other Committee members continued to express concerns over the scope of this decision in resolving underlying concerns previously discussed by the Committee.

When put to a vote, the Committee elected to move forward with the application guidance proposal. However, the Committee asked the staff to consider certain issues offline including any potential knock-on implication to the consolidation analysis, specific principle concerns raised by Committee members (including accounting for the premium on warrants, accounting for the debit side of the transaction in IAS 32 and when to derecognise the non-controlling interest) and whether the above application guidance recommendation should be included in the body of IAS 27 as an amendment or interpretation or as application guidance.

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting for derivative financial instruments ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

 

 

 


Option Pricing Theory =

a theory that is too complex to define in this glossary.  Options pricing theory (OPT) is sometimes called an options pricing model (OPM).  The general idea is that an investment at any level of risk, including an investment that is not traded on the open market, can be valued by a portfolio of investments that are traded on exchanges.   A good review is provided by Robert Merton in "Applications of Option-Pricing Theory:  Twenty Five Years Later,"  American Economic Review, June 1998, 323-349.  Closely related is Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT).  OPT and APT in theory overcome many of the limitations of CAPM.  However, they have problems of their own that I attempted to touch upon in http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/149wp/149wp.htm    See Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) Fund.

Option Pricing : Modeling and Extracting State-Price Densities A New Methodology by Christian Perkner
ISBN 3-258-06101-7  http://www.haupt.ch/asp/titels.asp?o=f&objectId=3372 

The focus of this book is on the valuation of financial derivatives. A derivative (e.g. a financial option) can be defined as a contract promising a payoff that is contingent upon the unknown future state of a risky security. The goal of this book is to illustrate two different perspectives of modern option pricing:

Part I: The normative viewpoint: How does (how should) option pricing theory arrive at the fair value for such a contingent claim? What are crucial assumptions? What is the line of argument? How does this theory (e.g. Black-Scholes) perform in reality?

Part II: The descriptive viewpoint: How are options truly priced in the financial markets? What do option prices tell us about the expectations of market participants? Do investor preferences play a role in the valuation of a derivative?

To answer both questions, the author introduces an insightful valuation framework that consists of five elements. Its central component is the so called state-price density - a density that represents the market's valuation of $1 received in various states of the world. It turns out that the shape of this density is the crucial aspect when determining the price of an option.

The book illustrates several techniques allowing the flexible modeling of the state-price density. Implementation issues are discussed using real datasets and numerical examples, implications of the various modeling techniques are analyzed, and results are presented that significantly improve standard option pricing theory.

DOES A ROSS ECONOMY LUNCH REALLY COST AS MUCH AS
HIRSHLEIFER CUISINE COMPLETE WITH
sm2 DESSERT?  
Bob Jensen's unpublished Working Paper 149 --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/149wp/149wp.htm 

Bob Jensen's threads on valuation of derivative financial instruments can be found at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm 

 

Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) = (see Comprehensive Income)

Out-of-the-Money = see option and intrinsic value.

Overlay Program =

a program designed to reduce the currency risk in an international asset portfolio.

 

 

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |

P-Terms

Participating Strategy =

a combination of a purchased option and a written option, with the written option on a smaller foreign currency amount.

Portfolio Hedging = see Macro Hedge and Dynamic Portfolio management.  

Also see my summary of key paragraphs in FAS 133 on portfolio/macro hedging.

Premium =

the price paid/received to enter into certain types of derivative contracts.  For example, the price paid to enter into a futures contract, forward contract, interest rate swap, warrant, or option is called the premium.  In the case of exchange-traded contracts (e.g., options, futures, and futures options), there is generally a premium.  In custom-contract derivatives (e.g., forward contracts, forward rate agreements, swaps and some embedded options), however, it is common to not have any premium paid by one party to the other party.  There may be legal fees and brokerage costs, but these are not part of the premium and are accounted for separately.  If they are very small relative to both the underlying and the premium, they are often posted to current earnings.  However, in theory the brokerage fees, legal fees, and  premium should be amortized against future settlements of the derivative instrument. 

Paragraphs 6b on Page 3 and 57b on Page 35 of FAS 133 require that the for any FAS 133 derivative instrument, the premium itself must be "smaller than would be required for other types of contracts that would be expected to have a similar response to changes in market factors."  This condition is ambiguous.  However, this rules out short sale contracts that carry an implicit requirement to own or purchase and resell an entire asset rather than having a cash settlement.

For a derivative not designated as a hedging instrument, the gain or loss is recognized in earnings in the period of change.  Section 4(c) of Paragraph 4 of FAS 133 amends SFAS 52 on Foreign Currency Translation, to permit special accounting for a hedge of a foreign currency forecasted transaction with a derivative

Paragraph 42 on Page 26 of FAS 133 reads as follows:

.A derivative instrument or a nonderivative financial instrument that may give rise to a foreign currency transaction gain or loss under Statement 52 can be designated as hedging the foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation. The gain or loss on a hedging derivative instrument (or the foreign currency transaction gain or loss on the nonderivative hedging instrument) that is designated as, and is effective as, an economic hedge of the net investment in a foreign operation shall be reported in the same manner as a translation adjustment to the extent it is effective as a hedge. The hedged net investment shall be accounted for consistent with Statement 52; the provisions of this Statement for recognizing the gain or loss on assets designated as being hedged in a fair value hedge do not apply to the hedge of a net investment in a foreign operation.  nonderivative financial instrument that may give rise to a foreign currency transaction gain or loss under Statement 52 can be designated as hedging the foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation. The gain or loss on a hedging derivative instrument (or the foreign currency transaction gain or loss on the nonderivative hedging instrument) that is designated as, and is effective as, an economic hedge of the net investment in a foreign operation shall be reported in the same manner as a translation adjustment to the extent it is effective as a hedge. The hedged net investment shall be accounted for consistent with Statement 52; the provisions of this Statement for recognizing the gain or loss on assets designated as being hedged in a fair value hedge do not apply to the hedge of a net investment in a foreign operation. 

These Section c(4) confusions in Paragraph 4 are illustrated in Examples 11-13 beginning on Page 270 of the Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998.

Paul Pacter states the following at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm  

IAS 39
Transaction costs are included in the initial measurement of all financial instruments.

FAS 133
FASB does not address transaction costs. Such costs can be included in or excluded in initial measurement of financial instruments.

 

Principal Only Strip = =

a contract that calls for cash settlement for the principal but not the interest of a note. See embedded derivatives. Except in certain conditions, interest-only and principal only strips are not covered in FAS 133. See Paragraphs 14 and 310.

Put = see option.

 

 

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |

Q-Terms

 

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |

R-Terms

Range Floater = see floater.

Range Forward =

a combination of a purchased option and a written option on equal amounts of currency with a "range" between the strike prices. The premium on the written option offsets the premium on the purchased option.  See option.

Ratchet Floater = see floater.

Regular-Way Security Trade = see net settlement.

References

Introductory References --- See Introductory References 

Note the book entitled PRICING DERIVATIVE SECURITIES, by T W Epps (University of Virginia, USA)  The book is published by World Scientific --- http://www.worldscibooks.com/economics/4415.html 

Contents:

  • Preliminaries:
  • Introduction and Overview
  • Mathematical Preparation
  • Tools for Continuous-Time Models
  • Pricing Theory:
  • Dynamics-Free Pricing
  • Pricing Under Bernoulli Dynamics
  • Black-Scholes Dynamics
  • American Options and 'Exotics'
  • Models with Uncertain Volatility
  • Discontinuous Processes
  • Interest-Rate Dynamics
  • Computational Methods:
  • Simulation
  • Solving PDEs Numerically
  • Programs
  • Computer Programs
  • Errata

Essentials of Energy Risk Management --- http://www.rigzone.com/store/product.asp?p_id=1048&c_id=46 
Publisher: Paradigm Strategy 
Group Item Number: 100-1048
Also see http://snipurl.com/EnergyGlossary 

March 5, 2004 message from editor jda [editor.jda@gmx.de

Journal of Derivatives Accounting (JDA)

First Issue on "Stock Options: Development in Share-Based Compensation" You can downloand Papers online (http://www.worldscinet.com/jda/jda.shtml)

The second issue deals with Hedging Theory and Practice in Risk Management and Trading (Financial instruments and strategies, Impact of accounting rules and taxation). The titles of forthcoming papers for the second issue are also shown.

For subscription information follow the following link

(http://www.worldscinet.com/jda/mkt/order_information.shtml)

Mamouda Mbemap Ph.D

Editor In Chief

Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 2004)

LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

Articles

ACCOUNTING FOR EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO HANDLING THE VALUATION ISSUES
JOHN HULL and ALAN WHITE

RISK-AVERSE EXECUTIVES, MULTIPLE COMMON RISKS, AND THE EFFICIENCY AND INCENTIVES OF INDEXED EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTIONS
SHANE A. JOHNSON and YISONG S. TIAN

STOCK OPTIONS AND MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES TO INVEST
TOM NOHEL and STEVEN TODD

CEO COMPENSATION, INCENTIVES, AND GOVERNANCE IN NEW ENTERPRISE FIRMS
LERONG HE and MARTIN J. CONYON

EVIDENCE ON VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES OF DERIVATIVES USAGE BY LARGE US COMPANIES
RAJ AGGARWAL and BETTY J. SIMKINS

THE EFFECT OF TAXES ON THE TIMING OF STOCK OPTION EXERCISE
STEVEN BALSAM and RICHARD GIFFORD

THE VALUE AND INCENTIVES OF OPTION-BASED COMPENSATION IN DANISH LISTED COMPANIES
KEN L. BECHMANN and PETER LØCHTE JØRGENSEN

Industry Perspective

AN INTRODUCTION TO US TAX ASPECTS OF EXECUTIVE/EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION WITH A STOCK OPTION FOCUS
STEWART KARLINSKY and JAMES KROCHKA

Book Review

Book Review: AN INTRODUCTION TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Steve Balsam

Forthcoming Papers
Vol. 1 No. 2
  • Does Allowing Alternative Hedge Designation Affect Financial Statement Comparability?
    Arlette C. Wilson and Ronald L. Clark
  • Alternative Hedge Accounting Treatments for Foreign Exchange Forwards
    Ira G. Kawaller and Walter R. Teets
  • Divergent FAS-133 and IAS 39 Interest Rate Risk Hedge Effectiveness: Problem and Remedies
    Jim Bodurtha
  • Interest Rate Swap Prices, Fair Values, and FAS 133
    Donald Smith
  • Optimal Hedging with Cumulative Prospect Theory
    Darren Frechette and Jon Tuthill
  • Hedging, Operating Leverage, and Abandonment Options
    Keith Wong
  • Hedging Against Neutral and Non-Neutral Shock: Theory and Evidence
    Marcello Spano
  • Pricing S&P 500 Index Options under Stochastic Volatility with the Indirect Inference Method
    Jinghong Shu and Jin E. Zhang
  • Structural Relationships between Semiannual and Annual Swaps Rates
    D.K. Malhotra, Mukesh Chaudhry and Vivek Bhargava
  • Valuing and Hedging American Options under Time-Varying Volatility
    In Joon Kim
  • The Introduction of Derivatives Reporting in the UK: A Content Analysis of FRS 13 Disclosures
    T. Dunne, C. Helliar, D. Power, C. Mallin, K. Ow-Yong and L. Moir

March 23, 2004 message from Heather MacMaster [southwestern.email@thomsonlearning.com

The second edition of Derivatives: An Introduction by Robert Strong will be available in July for your fall classes.

One of the briefest texts on the market, Robert Strong's ability to explain the intuition behind the math and show students how derivatives are actually used has made this course much more tangible and easier to understand.

The second edition has expanded its coverage of Real Options, with more discussion of option strategies than the typical survey course text. Also integrated throughout the text are rich examples to show how it may be appropriate to use several types of Derivative Options at once, or both futures and options at the same time.

This text illustrates real-world uses of derivatives. Distinctive features of this applied approach include:

"Derivatives Today" Boxes: Real-life, derivative situations provide students with an opportunity to consider issues they may encounter in the marketplace. "Trading Strategy" Boxes: These stimulating trading scenarios illustrate various methods in which speculators or investors use options in ways that most existing texts do not cover. Finally, in clear and concise prose, Strong focuses on the practical. Since the text includes more institutional detail than competing texts, users can connect theory to practice! Also to maintain student interest and applicablity, Strong sparks interest by using many institutional anecdotes, including trading mechanics, market folklore, and contemporary examples of derivatives use and misuse.

Be sure to click below to reserve your complimentary copy when the book publishes in July…

[Link Deleted]

Sincerely,

Heather MacMaster 
Marketing Manager 
Thomson South-Western

 

Bob Jensen's threads on derivatives accounting are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

 

Related Party Transaction =

a transaction between related entities that may not act independently of one another.   For example, a forecasted transaction between a parent company and its subsidiary or between subsidiaries having a common parent is a related party transaction.  Related party forecasted transactions cannot be designated for cash flow hedges according to Paragraph 29c on Page 20 of FAS 133.  The one exception is for a foreign currency risk exposure in a currency other than than the functional currency and other criteria listed in Paragraph 40 on Pages 25-26.  Also see Paragraphs 471 and 487.

Cash flow hedges must have the possibility of affecting net earnings.  For example, Paragraph 485 on Page 211 of FAS 133 bans foreign currency risk hedges of forecasted dividends of foreign subsidiary.  The reason is that these dividends are a wash item and do not affect consolidated earnings.  For reasons and references, see equity method.

.

Reporting Currency =

the currency in which an enterprise prepares its financial statements.

Risk =

the various types of financial risks, including market price risk, market interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, and credit risk. These are discussed in FAS 133, Pages 184-186. FAS 133 does not take up such things as tax rate swaps and credit swaps. Mention is given to nonfinancial assets and liabilities in Paragraphs 416-421.  Other risks are mentioned in Paragraph 408.  Only three types of risks can receive hedge accounting treatment under FAS 133.  For details see derivative financial instruments.

Some industries have their own types of risk.  For example, the energy industry has location basis risk and transportation capacity risk.  Location basis risk is the differences in prices between two locations such as the supply terminal and the demand terminal.  Transportation capacity risk is the risk of having too much or too little hauling or distribution capacity between to terminals.

Execution risk is the time delay between one transaction (such as closure of a purchase contract) and another transaction (such as closure of a sales contract).

Held-to-maturity securities may not be hedged for cash flow risk according to Paragraphs 426-431 beginning on Page 190 of FAS 133.  See held-to-maturity.

Firm commitments can have foreign currency risk exposures if the commitments are not already recognized.  See Paragraph 4 on Page 2 of FAS 133. If the firm commitment is recognized, it is by definition booked and its loss or gain is already accounted for. For example, a purchase contract for 10,000 units per month at 100DM Deutsche Marks per unit is unrecognized and has a foreign currency risk exposure if the payments have not been made. If the payments have been prepaid, that prepayment is "recognized" and has no further foreign currency risk exposure.  See derivative financial instrument.

A good site dealing with credit risk is at http://www.numa.com/ref/volatili.htm

For more on the topic of risk measurement and disclosure, see disclosure.

Risk Glossary --- http://www.riskglossary.com/

Assessment of Risk:  Peeling Apart the Data on Derivatives --- http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/Am_Banker_Assessing_Risk.pdf 

Risk Metrics and Risk Stress Testing

Risk metrics are quantitative measures of risk of some sort or another.  For example Value-at-Risk (VAR) metrics are designed to measure outcomes in worst case scenarios --- see Value-at-Risk.

VAR is related to risk "stress testing."  Freddie Mac was an innovator in risk stress testing --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm#FreddieMac 

There are a number of software vendors of FAS 133 risk analysis software.

One of the major companies is FinancialCAD --- http://www.financialcad.com/ 

FinancialCAD provides software and services that support the valuation and risk management of financial securities and derivatives that is essential for banks, corporate treasuries and asset management firms. FinancialCAD’s industry standard financial analytics are a key component in FinancialCAD solutions that are used by over 25,000 professionals in 60 countries.

Also see Risk, Software, and Ineffectiveness.

"A Web-Based Risk Tool," August 12, 2003 --- http://www.fas133.com/search/search_article.cfm?page=1&areaid=1353 

The experiences (and resulting systems/processes) that banks have developed, in order to deal with Basel I and Basel II are of relevance to corporate treasurers today, as they attempt to manage the new, compliance/control requirement of Sarbanes-Oxley as well as broader scruitiny of earnings/results.

With this in mind, its useful to review how banks have handled the challenge, and are planning to utilize their know-how in the area of system and process management.

Case in point: Horizon

JPMorgan was in the right place at the right time with RiskMetrics (since spun off) to help firms deal with derivatives-related rules for disclosure and controls (value at risk).

Now as the disclosure and control focus has broadened, the bank wants to be there again with Horizon, its web-based tool for internal risk control and self-assessment.

Horizon appears tailor-made for the internal control rules mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley, especially if firms go beyond basic compliance to implement enterprise risk management frameworks, such as those suggested by the new COSO draft.

It is also in line with Basel II’s qualitative measurement prescriptions for operational risk management, which suggests corporates seeking internal control guidance have another source of best practice recommendations to draw upon.

Indeed, compliance is all about risk management. “If you look at Basel II or Sarbanes-Oxley, the point of the regulations is for firms to better manage risk,” notes Craig Spielmann, VP and Executive in charge of Horizon for JPMorgan Treasury Services. He notes, the aim is to create transparency for shareholders that senior people are identifying the firm’s key risks, showing what they are doing to mitigate these, and when these mitigation efforts are to be in place. “It’s about how effective you are at risk management, as much as about how you are managing risk.” Self-assessment is an important measure of risk management effectiveness.

Operational risk process automation

Horizon, like RiskMetrics, was born out of an internal bank tool to help JP Morgan assess operational risk across its businesses. It is also one of many operational risk tools out there oriented toward banks, or internally developed by banks, seeking to comply with Basel II’s internal ratings based approach (IRB)-- in particular the Advanced Measurement Approaches-- in order to reduce their regulatory capital requirements.

Control and risk self-assessment is a key component of the qualitative measurement requirements for operational risk under Basel II. These involve among other things:

(1) a review of risk management process goals;

(2) a review of the controls/procedures to meet these goals; and

(3) specification of corrective actions required and follow-up on implementation of such actions. This is the area of focus for Horizon.

Horizon uses the traffic light approach to self-assessment, common with internal control cum operational risk/enterprise risk applications offered by audit firms and consultancies, calling upon users to select their risk concern according to red (most dangerous), yellow, green, blue (not applicable).

However, where it seeks to differentiate itself from traditional internal audit tools is its orientation toward risk management ideals: effective, on-going risk mitigation in support of business goals. Clearly, though, traditional internal audit tools are moving in the same direction, guided by the new COSO draft, following the banks’ lead in their approaches to operational risk management.

According to Barry Macklin, head of Operational Risk Analytics/Financial Risk for JPMorgan’s Treasury & Securities Services (T&SS) business, Horizon helps to not only automate the operational risk and control self-assessment process but also provides opportunities to share risk expertise and best practices across T&SS’ global operations (with locations in 39 countries globally, with 14,500 employees).

Mr. Macklin was an early Horizon adopter outside JP Morgan: his group within Chase was in negotiation to purchase the product when the merger with JP Morgan was announced.

Part of its appeal from his initial customer perspective was that it provided an automated solution taking a paper-based process and putting it on the bank’s intranet. It also has built-in algorithms to calculate a “score” for comparative purposes, based on how each risk is weighed (with the traffic light).

By automating the data-collection and “scoring” process, Mr. Macklin notes, senior risk and business managers have much more time to focus on analysis: “We are spending more time analyzing risks than compiling data”.

The automation facilitates continuous self-improvement of control processes, and sharing of best practices and improves the ability to monitor and resolve action items. For example, for a particular risk, he may see that one unit indicates that a process has good controls while another unit with a similar process in another location needs to enhance controls. Risk and business managers can now delve into how to ensure the procedures are effectively applied globally.

According to Mr. Macklin, the first step for his group was to sit down with the internal and external auditors, business managers, operational risk managers, and identify key processes.

“We then made sure we had the right operational process, with all the key risks and control procedures identified and then populated the risk and control procedures on the Horizon application. Business Managers were integral in the development of the Horizon templates. They know how their business processes work, and clearly take ownership. This team effort creates a great process,” Mr. Macklin notes. General Audit also leverages the risk assessment templates and utilizes Horizon to record their recommendations.

These risk assessment and compliance process items are reviewed formally twice each year, along with continuous assessment of review triggers such as an acquisition or business relocation, which prompt immediate review of the templates. The self-assessment process also supports Management’s annual affirmation of the control environment as required by FDICIA.

The content for these self-assessment templates is key to this or any such application. A fact that highlights how adaptable bank operational risk applications like Horizon can be to any number of situations, including non-bank risks.

Mr. Spielmann cites an example related to a business acquisition as follows: For any new business acquired, a customized template can be developed on Horizon, identifying key business risks and control procedures. An assessment can be performed to determine opportunities for improvement and develop action plans with accountable parties and resolution time frames in the early stages of integrating the acquired business. The results can then be evaluated on a continuing basis to ensure timely remediation.

A corporation looking to manage risks specific to its business, notes Mr. Spielmann, could go through a similar process with senior management and the Board to construct a template for Horizon to conduct this sort of self-assessment. The latest version of Horizon has been optimized for Sarbanes-Oxley internal control compliance with this in mind.

RiskMetrics, a different approach

This, however, is corporate use of RiskMetrics in reverse. What made JPMorgan’s RiskMetrics so popular for corporates seeking to follow bank practice on value at risk disclosures for derivatives was that JPMorgan provided easily accessible, name brand data sets. These they could download and plug into their own spreadsheets or internal applications, creating a quick fix to comply with new SEC rules.

Here corporates are getting an application, but limited content. Indeed, they have to develop the templates to collect the data on their own. There is no quick fix for Sarbanes-Oxley.

Horizon competes not only with other bank and non-bank operational risk management applications, but also countless internally developed self-assessment/scorecard spreadsheets (e-mailed) or web-based database applications which provide less elegant solutions. Corporates should consider the cost/benefit of applications such as Horizon before they build their own web applications.

With the stakes so much higher, name brand off-the-shelf solutions might provide more comfort than internally developed applications, especially for Corporate Boards and shareholders. In today’s environment controls to prevent reputational risk and ensuring effective Corporate Governance standards are applied is certainly something Corporate Boards would be interested in. This clearly presents new opportunities to market the Horizon application.

Looking forward JPMorgan Chase is developing a process that will integrate the key Operational Risk Management tools they currently utilize, such as: Horizon self-assessment, operational loss data collection, capital allocation and key risk indicators. Says Macklin, “Integrating these tools will further enhance and link the firm’s operational risk analysis, monitoring and reporting capabilities, which we believe will positively impact results.”

"Risk Systems, Integrate! July 15, 2002 --- http://www.fas133.com/search/search_article.cfm?page=1&areaid=467 

FAS 133 and other factors spark a flurry of “asset expansion” among risk management software vendors.

Treasurers are increasingly adamant that they want a single, integrated system to handle all of their risks. The impetus for this change is multifold (see here). However, both system vendors and treasurers agree that FAS 133 has a lot to do with convincing risk managers and accountants that they need to handle risk management and its accounting-entry consequences in a single platform.

In recent weeks, FXpress, Reval and Kiodex announced plans to expand their asset classes and offer a soup-to-nuts system for risk management. This is great news for treasurers looking for a solution that allows them to view risk, manage it, and account for it centrally, yet one which comes with a less-than-a-million-dollar price tag. “Right now,” notes Dino Ewing, CFO of Reval, “there’s not that much in between that and spreadsheets.”

What’s new and what’s not?

FXpress launched the integration flurry with its unveiling of a commodity module, as well as plans for interest rate, investment and ultimately, an equity-risk module in 2003.

Reval, which has handled FX and interest rates as well as related FAS 133 accounting via its newly named HedgeRX™ hedge-management solution, now covers metals, energy and commodities as part of its most recent release.

Kiodex, a web-services energy risk management/accounting platform (see IT, 2/25/02), is expanding to cover FX first. “We plan to introduce more asset classes aggressively in 2003,” reports Co-Founder and President, Raj Mahajan.

These recent converts to the integration mantra follow in the footsteps of others such as Open Link on the high end, and INSSINC on the affordable side. “We have always chosen the integrated route,” explains Elie Zabal, president and CEO of INSSINC. Yet Mr. Zabal and others agree that this flare-up in asset-class expansion signals a change: The market is coming around to understanding that handling risk in one system is key, whether or not execution continues to occur in separate functions.

Says Kiodex’s Mr. Mahajan: “Our vision has been to generate a report for chief financial officers that breaks down the corporation’s exposure to price risk by asset class.” Such a holistic view is critical, if companies want to avoid “nasty” surprises (e.g., Ford’s $1 billion write down). “The first step is identifying the exposure across asset classes” he says. “Next, treasury should be able to quantify/analyze the risk and produce a single report which makes risk transparent while allowing treasury to mitigate exposures, taking into account correlations among asset classes.”

Granted, many companies handle financial and non-financial risks in separate departments. Yet an integrated system makes sense precisely because of this ongoing separation of duties, as companies come under increased pressure to comply with regulatory requirements, and ensure internal compliance with hedging/trading policies. “FAS 133 brought this issue front and center,” notes Mr. Zabal. “Whether you are hedging corn or electricity, the policies, controls and accounting trail should be the same.”

Remote access, centralized data

Reval and Kiodex offer an added twist—an ASP model (available from INSSINC as well). The upshot is quicker implementation and an ideal platform for capturing live data dynamically, and allowing multiple, remote access points. Certainly, client/server systems can accommodate this, but implementation can takes months, compared to days with the newer technologies.

Such rapid implementation and lower price tags have a “price” too—less control over the IT environment. Interestingly, Reval reports that clients who have been offered the intranet option have opted for the outsourced solution 100 percent of the time. The reason, says Mr. Ewing, is cost and maintenance.

ASP or not, the integrated model opens doors. Customers want a single solution and vendors need to be able to offer one, Mr. Zabal says, if they are to make sales. FXpress, Reval and Kiodex all report that existing users have asked them to round out their offerings. The key is to offer an integrated solution at an affordable price that can be quickly implemented. Often, the latter is more important. “Would technology save us some time and money?” comments one treasurer, “Yes, but in the immediate term,” he says, “I cannot afford to lose staff time to lengthy and painful implementations.”

Which end is first?

One issue for treasurers to consider is whether the system’s origins matter. Both Reval (originally financial) and Kiodex (originally commodity) agree it’s fair to say that moving from commodity to financial risk is an easier route, since commodity markets and instruments are typically more complex. Does this give systems with commodity origins an edge?

Other issues treasurers may wish to consider as they evaluate newly integrated solutions include: (1) Can one system truly handle all asset classes effectively (and affordably)? (2) Does the underlying platform (ASP vs. client server) matter, and if so, how? (3) How about the global support structure of smaller or newer vendors?


There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. There’s the United States and there’s Moody’s Bond Rating Service. The United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody’s can destroy you by down grading your bonds. And believe me, it’s not clear sometimes who’s more powerful.  The most that we can safely assert about the evolutionary process underlying market equilibrium is that harmful heuristics, like harmful mutations in nature, will die out.
Martin Miller, Debt and Taxes as quoted by Frank Partnoy, "The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Matters:  Two Thumbs Down for Credit Reporting Agencies," Washington University Law Quarterly, Volume 77, No. 3, 1999 --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRottenPartnoyWULawReview.htm 

Related to risk metrics are the ratings given firms and securities by rating agencies.  These agencies were especially criticized in the accounting and finance scandals for their close ties and less than objective ratings of firms like Enron.  Frank Partnoy is especially critical of the lack of integrity of rating agencies.  Several references written by Partnoy are shown below:

Senate Testimony by Frank Partnoy --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm#FrankPartnoyTestimony 

Article by Frank Partnoy
"The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Matters: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Reporting Agencies" (Washington University Law Quarterly, Volume 77, No. 3, 1999) --- http://ls.wustl.edu/WULQ/ 
Also see  http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRottenPartnoyWULawReview.htm

Books by Frank Partnoy

  • FIASCO: The Inside Story of a Wall Street Trader
  • FIASCO: Blood in the Water on Wall Street
  • FIASCO:  Blut an den weißen Westen der Wall Street Broker.
  • FIASCO: Guns, Booze and Bloodlust: the Truth About High Finance
  • Infectious Greed : How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets
  • Codicia Contagiosa

 

 

"An End to the Exclusive Rating Franchise? June 16, 2003, by Joseph Neu --- http://www.fas133.com/search/search_article.cfm?page=1&areaid=1318 

Treasurers’ love-hate relationship with credit rating agencies is something we have followed with interest of late (see 3/24/03). In part, this is because it is easy to be sympathetic with the treasurers’ argument that the rating process is way too subjective relative to its potential impact on a corporation’s financial wellbeing. But this begs the question: What is the more objective alternative?

Defining treasury’s interests ahead of change. We aren’t the only ones who have taken an increasing interest in the role of rating agencies of late. In the wake of the corporate scandals in the US, and the “lagging” nature of credit rating indications, the SEC has been mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley to revisit the role of rating agencies, the state of regulatory scrutiny over them and, most especially, the special status that it grants a few rating agencies (i.e., NRSROs) to provide regulatory benchmarks.

In its latest effort, the SEC has issued a concept letter, asking for public comments on related questions (see here).

All this makes now an opportune time for treasurers to consider the current rating processes, as executed by the rating agencies, and weigh the potential alternatives to determine what sort of process they might like to see, and who other than the current NRSROs they would like to rate them. Given the potential for change at hand, now is the time to make your voices heard.

And by no means should this call to action be limited to treasurers in the US. As we’ve noted, the Americanization of capital markets globally have made obtaining a rating (and managing a rating agency relationship) increasingly critical abroad. Indeed, the Association for Corporate Treasurers (ACT) in the UK held a recent conference on the subject, aptly titled Rating Agencies: Prophet’s, Judges or Mere Mortals? There, as elsewhere, treasurers expressed the desire for greater transparency in the rating process. They also want more reliance on replicable quantitative analysis that could be used to help them manage their rating.

Ideally, were there a standard analytical model, it could be embedded into a risk management application to help treasury track a shadow rating. This, in turn, could help treasurers determine how different actions might impact that rating.

An opportunity for broker-dealers. That the ACT conference was sponsored by Merrill Lynch may be telling as well. Could broker-dealers find a way to break into the seemingly lucrative franchise enjoyed by Moody’s and S&P? If not in the US, then perhaps they can abroad, where the concept of NRSRO is not as well established.

One scenario treasurers (and the SEC) should consider, therefore, is what if broker-dealers offered credit “rating” services?

At first, this might appear to make the rating management game more like that played with equity analysts. This used to mean talking analysts into the right quarterly earnings (or non-earnings) targets (with influence from the investment banking business offered), and managing EPS (or proforma results) accordingly. But, given the current scrutiny of broker-dealer analysts’ objectivity, it is hard to see how they would be allowed to expand the business of using their analysts on the credit side to assign buy/sell signals on debt.

Their opening to this market, however, could come in the form of their own internal risk models, which the SEC is considering allowing broker-dealers to use as an alternative to NRSRO ratings to help determine capital charges on debt securities.

If a broker-dealer is holding your paper for whatever reason, wouldn’t you want to know how their model “rating” compared to the rating agencies’ (and why shouldn’t you know)?

Risk analytics vs. rating analyst. To some extent, this information will find its way to the market. After all, the models broker-dealers employ to determine internal capital charges are not all that different from those they use to price credit risk for external use (e.g., for credit derivatives). The models could also be used to help fund managers optimize portfolios from a risk management perspective and sell them paper with the right risk profile to fill the gaps.

At some point, the markets must be allowed to determine how best to utilize traditional credit ratings in conjunction with emerging credit risk-assessment provided by analytical models, without regulatory favoritism. Risk modeling and analytics have advanced quite a bit in the last decade, which is why the rating agencies themselves have developed (or acquired) model-based risk analytics capabilities in parallel to traditional rating services. Both approaches should be considered by treasurers—and both should held to objective standards by regulators.

 


Also see software.

 

 

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S-Terms

SAS 92

Auditing Requirements for Derivative Financial Securities
Auditing Derivative Instruments, Hedging Activities, and Investments in Securities

http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/auditstd/riasai/sas92.htm 

A Nice Summary of SAS 92 is Available Online (Auditing, Derivative Financial Instruments, Hedging)

SAS 92-New Guidance on Auditing Derivatives and Securities
by Joe Sanders, Ph.D., CPA and Stan Clark, Ph.D., CPA 
http://www.ohioscpa.com/member/publications/Journal/1st2001/page10.asp
  

Auditors face many challenges in auditing derivatives and securities. These instruments have become more complex, their use more common and the accounting requirements to provide fair value information are expanding. There is also an increasing tendency for entities to use service organizations to help manage activities involving financial instruments. To assist auditors with these challenges, the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) issued SAS 92, Auditing Derivative Instruments, Hedging Activities and Investments in Securities. The ASB is also currently developing a companion Audit Guide. SAS 92 supersedes SAS 81, Auditing Investments.

SAS 92 provides a framework for auditors to use in planning and performing auditing procedures for assertions about all financial instruments and hedging activities. The Audit Guide will show how to use the framework provided by the SAS for a variety of practice issues. The purpose of this article is to summarize and explain some of the more significant aspects of SAS 92.

Scope SAS 92 applies to:

Derivative instruments, as defined in SFAS 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activity. Hedging activities which also fall under SFAS 133. Debt and equity securities, as defined in SFAS 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities. The auditor should also refer to APB 18, The Equity Method of Accounting for Investments in Common Stock. Special Skill or Knowledge

SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, in his speech on renewing the covenant with investors stated, "I recognize that new financial instruments, new technologies and even new markets demand more specialized know-how to effectively audit many of today's companies".1 One of the first items noted in SAS 92 is that the auditor may need to seek assistance in planning and performing audit procedures for financial instruments. This advice is based primarily on the complexity of SFAS 133. Understanding an entities' information system for derivatives, including work provided by a service organization, may require the auditor to seek assistance from within the firm or from an outside expert. SAS 73 provides guidance on using the work of a specialist.

Inherent Risk Assessment

The inherent risk related to financial instruments is the susceptibility to a material misstatement, assuming there are no related controls. Assessing inherent risk for financial instruments, particularly complex derivatives, can be difficult. To assess inherent risk for financial instruments, auditors should understand both the economics and business purpose of the entity's financial activities. Auditors will need to make inquiries of management to understand how the entity uses financial instruments and the risks associated with them. SAS 92 provides several examples of considerations that might affect the auditor's assessment of the inherent risk for assertions about financial instruments:2

The complexity of the features of the derivative or security. Whether the transaction that gave rise to the derivative or security involved the exchange of cash. The entity's experience with derivatives or securities. Whether the derivative is freestanding or an embedded feature of an agreement. The evolving nature of derivatives and the applicable generally accepted accounting principles. Significant reliance on outside parties. Control Risk Assessment

SAS 92 includes a section on control risk assessment. Control risk is the risk that a material misstatement could occur and would not be prevented or detected in a timely manner by an entity's internal control. Management is responsible for providing direction to financial activities through clearly stated policies. These policies should be documented and might include:

Policies regarding the types of instruments and transactions that may be entered into and for what purposes. Limits for the maximum allowable exposure to each type of risk, including a list of approved securities broker-dealers and counterparties to derivative transactions. Methods for monitoring the financial risks of financial instruments, particularly derivatives, and the related control procedures. Internal reporting of exposures, risks and the results of actions taken by management. Auditors should understand the contents of financial reports received by management and how they are used. For example, "stop loss" limits are used to protect against sudden drops in the market value of financial instruments. These limits require all speculative positions to be closed out immediately if the unrealized loss on those positions reaches a certain level. Management reports may include comparisons of stop loss positions and actual trading positions to the policies set by the board of directors.

The entity's use of a service organization will require the auditor to gain an understanding of the nature of the service organization's services, the materiality of the transactions it processes, and the degree of interaction between its activities and those of the entity. It may also require the auditor to gain an understanding of the service organization's controls over the transactions the service organization processes for it.

Designing Substantive Procedures Based on Risk Assessments

The auditor should use the assessed levels of inherent and control risk to determine the acceptable level of detection risk for assertions about financial instruments and to determine the nature, timing, and extent of the substantive tests to be performed to detect material misstatements of the assertions. Substantive procedures should address the following five categories of assertions included in SAS 31, Evidential Matter:

1. Existence or occurrence. Existence assertions address whether the derivatives and securities reported in the financial statements through recognition or disclosure exist at the balance sheet date. Occurrence assertions address whether changes in derivatives or securities reported as part of earnings, other comprehensive income, cash flows or through disclosure occurred. Examples of substantive procedures for existence or occurrence assertions include:3

Confirmation with the holder of the security, including securities in electronic form or with the counterparty to the derivative. Confirmation of settled or unsettled transactions with the broker-dealer counterparty. Physical inspection of the security or derivative contract. Inspecting supporting documentation for subsequent realization or settlement after the end of the reporting period. Performing analytical procedures. 2. Completeness. Completeness assertions address whether all of the entity's derivatives and securities are reported in the financial statements through recognition or disclosure. Since derivatives may involve only a commitment to perform under a contract and not an initial exchange of tangible consideration, auditors should not focus exclusively on evidence relating to cash receipts and disbursements.

3. Rights and obligations. These assertions address whether the entity has rights and obligations associated with derivatives and securities reported in the financial statements. For example, are assets pledged or do side agreements exist that allow the purchaser of a security to return the security after a specified period of time? Confirming significant terms with the counterparty to a derivative or the holder of a security would be a substantive procedure testing assertions about rights and obligations.

4. Valuation. Under SFAS 115 and SFAS 133 many financial instruments must now be measured at fair value, and fair value information must be disclosed for most derivatives and securities that are measured at some other amount.

The auditor should obtain evidence corroborating the fair value of financial instruments measured or disclosed at fair value. The method for determining fair value may be specified by generally accepted accounting principles and may vary depending on the industry in which the entity operates or the nature of the entity. Such differences may relate to the consideration of price quotations from inactive markets and significant liquidity discounts, control premiums, commissions and other costs that would be incurred to dispose of the financial instrument.

If the derivative or security is valued by the entity using a valuation model (for example, the Black-Scholes option pricing model), the auditor should assess the reasonableness and appropriateness of the model. The auditor should also determine whether the market variables and assumptions used are reasonable and appropriately supported. Estimates of expected future cash flows, for example, to determine the fair value of long-term obligations should be based on reasonable and supportable assumptions.

The method for determining fair value also may vary depending on the type of asset or liability. For example, the fair value of an obligation may be determined by discounting expected future cash flows, while the fair value of an equity security may be its quoted market price. SAS 92 provides guidance on audit evidence that may be used to corroborate these assertions about fair value.

5. Presentation and disclosure. These assertions address whether the classification, description and disclosure of derivatives and securities are in conformity with GAAP. For some derivatives and securities, GAAP may prescribe presentation and disclosure requirements, for example:

Certain securities are required to be classified into categories based on management's intent and ability such as trading, available-for-sale or held-to-maturity. Changes in the fair value of derivatives used to hedge depend on whether the derivative is a fair-value hedge or an expected cash flow hedge, and on the degree of effectiveness of the hedge. Hedging Transactions

Hedging will require large amounts of documentation by the client. For starters, the auditor will need to examine the companies' established policy for risk management. For each derivative, management should document what risk it is hedging, how it is expected to hedge that risk and how the effectiveness will be tested. Without documentation, the client will not be allowed hedge accounting. Auditors will need to gather evidence to support the initial designation of an instrument as a hedge, the continued application of hedge accounting and the effectiveness of the hedge.

To satisfy these accounting requirements, management's policy for financial instrument transactions might also include the following elements whenever the entity engages in hedging activities:

An assessment of the risks that need to be hedged The objectives of hedging and the strategy for achieving those objectives. The methods management will use to measure the effectiveness of the strategy. Reporting requirements for the monitoring and review of the hedge program. Impairment Losses

Management's responsibility to determine whether a decline in fair value is other than temporary is explicitly recognized in SAS 92. The auditor will need to evaluate whether management has considered relevant information in determining whether other-than-temporary impairment exists. SAS 92 provides examples of circumstances that indicate an other-than-temporary impairment condition may exist:4

Management Representations

The auditor must obtain written representations from management confirming their intent and ability assertions related to derivatives and securities. For example, the intent and ability to hold a debt security until it matures or to enter into a forecasted transaction for which hedge accounting is applied. Appendix B of SAS 85 (AU Sec. 333.17) includes illustrative representations about derivative and security transactions.

Summary

SAS 92 provides guidance for auditing derivatives and securities. Accounting requirements related to these instruments, SFAS 115 and SFAS 133, are very complex and because of their extensive use of fair value measures require significant use of judgment by the accountant. SAS 92 establishes a framework for auditors to assess whether the entity has complied with the provisions of SFAS 115 and SFAS 133. However, because of the subjective nature of many of the requirements of these two standards, considerable auditor judgment will be required to comply with SAS 92.

Effective Date

This SAS is effective for audits of financial statements for fiscal years ending on or after June 30, 2001. Early adoption is permitted.

 

Settlement Date =

the date at which a payable is paid or a receivable is collected.

Paul Pacter notes the following at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm 

IAS 39
An enterprise will recognise normal purchases of securities in the market place either at trade date or settlement date. If settlement date accounting is used, IAS 39 requires recognition of certain value changes between trade and settlement dates so that the income statement effects are the same for all enterprises
.

FAS 133
FASB does not address trade date vs. settlement date. Value change between trade and settlements dates may be included in or excluded from measurement of net income.

 

SFAS 133

a standard issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in June 1998.  You can read more about FAS 133 and other FASB standards at http://www.fasb.org lNote that the FASB's FAS 133 becomes required for calendar-year companies on January 1, 2001.  Early adopters can apply the standard prior to the required date, but they cannot apply it retroactively.   The January 1, 2001 effective date follows  postponements from the original starting date of June 15, 1999 stated in Paragraph 48 on Page 29 of FAS 133.   For fiscal-year companies, the effective date is June 15, 2000The international counterpart known as the IASC's IAS 39 becomes effective for financial statements for financial years beginning on the same January 1, 2001.  Earlier application permitted for financial years ending after March 15, 1999 

The FASB staff has prepared a new updated edition of Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities. This essential aid to implementation presents Statement 133 as amended by Statements 137 and 138. Also, it includes the results of the Derivatives Implementation Group (DIG), as cleared by the FASB through December 10, 2001, with cross-references between the issues and the paragraphs of the Statement.

“The staff at the FASB has prepared this publication to bring together in one document the current guidance on accounting for derivatives,” said Kevin Stoklosa, FASB project manager. “To put it simply, it’s a ‘one-stop-shop’ approach that we hope our readers will find easier to use.”

Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities—DC133-2

Prices: $30.00 each copy for Members of the Financial Accounting Foundation, the Accounting Research Association (ARA) of the AICPA, and academics; $37.50 each copy for others.

International Orders: A 50% surcharge will be applied to orders that are shipped overseas, except for shipments made to U.S. possessions, Canada, and Mexico. Please remit in local currency at the current exchange rate.

To order:

In May of 2003, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Statement No. 149, Amendment of Statement 133 on Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities. The Statement amends and clarifies accounting for derivative instruments, including certain derivative instruments embedded in other contracts, and for hedging activities under Statement 133 --- http://www.fasb.org/news/nr043003.shtml 

Norwalk, CT, April 30, 2003—Today the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Statement No. 149, Amendment of Statement 133 on Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities. The Statement amends and clarifies accounting for derivative instruments, including certain derivative instruments embedded in other contracts, and for hedging activities under Statement 133.

The new guidance amends Statement 133 for decisions made:

  • as part of the Derivatives Implementation Group process that effectively required amendments to Statement 133,
  • in connection with other Board projects dealing with financial instruments, and
  • regarding implementation issues raised in relation to the application of the definition of a derivative, particularly regarding the meaning of an “underlying” and the characteristics of a derivative that contains financing components.

The amendments set forth in Statement 149 improve financial reporting by requiring that contracts with comparable characteristics be accounted for similarly. In particular, this Statement clarifies under what circumstances a contract with an initial net investment meets the characteristic of a derivative as discussed in Statement 133. In addition, it clarifies when a derivative contains a financing component that warrants special reporting in the statement of cash flows. Statement 149 amends certain other existing pronouncements. Those changes will result in more consistent reporting of contracts that are derivatives in their entirety or that contain embedded derivatives that warrant separate accounting.

Effective Dates and Order Information

This Statement is effective for contracts entered into or modified after June 30, 2003, except as stated below and for hedging relationships designated after June 30, 2003. The guidance should be applied prospectively.

The provisions of this Statement that relate to Statement 133 Implementation Issues that have been effective for fiscal quarters that began prior to June 15, 2003, should continue to be applied in accordance with their respective effective dates. In addition, certain provisions relating to forward purchases or sales of when-issued securities or other securities that do not yet exist, should be applied to existing contracts as well as new contracts entered into after June 30, 2003.

Copies of Statement 149 may be obtained through the FASB Order Department at 800-748-0659 or by placing an order on-line at the FASB website.

The FASB created a special Derivatives Implementation Group (DIG).  Some general DIG exceptions to the scope of FAS 133 are listed in the "C" category at http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/derivatives/issuindex.html 

The FASB has a CD-ROM course at http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/ 

The FASB's Derivatives Implementation Group website is at http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/digsum.html

FAS 133 replaces the Exposure Draft publication Number 162-B, June 1996 .

The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) later came out with IAS 39 which is similar to but less detailed than FAS 133. 

Differences (Comparisons) between FAS 133 and IAS 39/IFRS 9 --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/canada.htm

2011 Update

"IFRS and US GAAP: Similarities and Differences" according to PwC (2011 Edition)
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/issues/ifrs-reporting/publications/ifrs-and-us-gaap-similarities-and-differences.jhtml
Note the Download button!
Note that warnings are given throughout the document that the similarities and differences mentioned in the booklet are not comprehensive of all similarities and differences. The document is, however, a valuable addition to students of FASB versus IASB standard differences and similarities.

It's not easy keeping track of what's changing and how, but this publication can help. Changes for 2011 include:

  • Revised introduction reflecting the current status, likely next steps, and what companies should be doing now
    (see page 2);
  • Updated convergence timeline, including current proposed timing of exposure drafts, deliberations, comment periods, and final standards
    (see page 7)
    ;
  • More current analysis of the differences between IFRS and US GAAP -- including an assessment of the impact embodied within the differences
    (starting on page 17)
    ; and
  • Details incorporating authoritative standards and interpretive guidance issued through July 31, 2011
    (throughout)
    .

This continues to be one of PwC's most-read publications, and we are confident the 2011 edition will further your understanding of these issues and potential next steps.

For further exploration of the similarities and differences between IFRS and US GAAP, please also visit our IFRS Video Learning Center.

To request a hard copy of this publication, please contact your PwC engagement team or contact us.

Jensen Comment
My favorite comparison topics (Derivatives and Hedging) begin on Page 158
The booklet does a good job listing differences but, in my opinion, overly downplays the importance of these differences. It may well be that IFRS is more restrictive in some areas and less restrictive in other areas to a fault. This is one topical area where IFRS becomes much too subjective such that comparisons of derivatives and hedging activities under IFRS can defeat the main purpose of "standards." The main purpose of an "accounting standard" is to lead to greater comparability of inter-company financial statements. Boo on IFRS in this topical area, especially when it comes to testing hedge effectiveness!

One key quotation is on Page 165

IFRS does not specifically discuss the methodology of applying a critical-terms match in the level of detail included within U.S. GAAP.
Then it goes yatta, yatta, yatta.

Jensen Comment
This is so typical of when IFRS fails to present the "same level of detail" and more importantly fails to provide "implementation guidance" comparable with the FASB's DIG implementation topics and illustrations.

I have a huge beef with the lack of illustrations in IFRS versus the many illustrations in U.S. GAAP.

I have a huge beef with the lack of illustrations in IFRS versus the many illustrations in U.S. GAAP.

I have a huge beef with the lack of illustrations in IFRS versus the many illustrations in U.S. GAAP.

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting standards setting controversies ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting

 

 

The FASB address is Financial Accounting Standards Board, P.O. Box 5116, Norwalk, CT 06856-5116. Phone: 203-847-0700 and Fax: 203-849-9714.  The web site is at http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/

The for-free IASC comparison study of IAS 39 versus FAS 133 (by Paul Pacter) at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm

The non-free FASB comparison study of all standards entitled The IASC-U.S. Comparison Project: A Report on the Similarities and Differences between IASC Standards and U.S. GAAP
SECOND EDITION, (October 1999) at http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/IASC/iascus2d.html

You can read more about the FAS 133 history in my transcriptions listed in the Table of Contents of this document.  Also see disclosure.

For a FAS 133 flow chart, go to http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133flow.htm 

FAS 138 Implementation Issues
"Implementation of SFAS 138, Amendments to SFAS 133," The CPA Journal, November 2001. (With Angela L.J. Huang and John S. Putoubas), pp. 54-56 --- http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2001/1100/dept/d115401.htm 

Why There Are New Rules for 
Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments

What is the thinking behind the need for FAS 133? 
What was the problem with hedge accounting prior to FAS 133?

The new FAS 133 standard entitled Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments and Hedging Activities was released in 1998 after an Exposure Draft 162-B circulated for two years around the U.S. and a temporary FAS 119 standard required disclosures in footnotes while FAS 133 was being written.  It was followed soon thereafter by IAS 39 that imposed similar requirements for international reporting and CICA 39 for Canadian reporting of the same types of derivative instruments.  These and the similar new standards in some other nations differ only in minor ways.  

What was new in all of these standards was that derivative financial instruments have to be booked initially at fair value and then adjusted to fair value on all reporting dates, especially for quarterly and annual audited financial statements released to the public.  Most derivatives, other than options and futures contracts covered by FAS 80, were not booked or even disclosed in financial reports prior to these newer standards.  The really problematic derivatives were forward contracts and swaps.  Swaps were not even invented until the early 1980s, and firms were not reporting enormous risks and off-balance-sheet-financing as swaps and forward contracts exploded in popularity in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  For example, companies that formerly managed cash with Treasury Bills, shifted to interest rate swaps for managing interest rate risk on trillions of dollars.  

Futures contracts were accounted for pretty well under FAS 80 since these contracts settle in cash frequently (usually daily) prior to expiration.  Options contracts were not accounted for well at all since only the initial cost (premium) was booked and amortized over the life of each option.  The problem was that the booked value of the option was generally small and irrelevant relative to the much larger fair value of the option.

In the early 1990s, enormous frauds using derivative financial instruments were coming to light.  Both governmental (e.g., Orange County) and corporate (e.g., Proctor and Gamble) scandals revealed how investment banks were writing misleading and immensely complicated derivative contracts to dupe organizations out of billions of dollars.  Many of the scandals are in derivative financial instruments are documented at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds 
In particular, note Frank Partnoy's truly sickening revelations of intentional frauds perpetrated by virtually all the world's leading investment banks.

Paragraphs 212 and 213 of FAS 133 read as follows at http://www.fasb.org/st/index.shtml#fas150

212. Concern has grown about the accounting and disclosure requirements for derivatives and hedging activities as the extent of use and the complexity of derivatives and hedging activities have rapidly increased in recent years. Changes in global financial markets and related financial innovations have led to the development of new derivatives used to manage exposures to risk, including interest rate, foreign exchange, price, and credit risks. Many believe that accounting standards have not kept pace with those changes. Derivatives can be useful risk management tools, and some believe that the inadequacy of financial reporting may have discouraged their use by contributing to an atmosphere of uncertainty. Concern about inadequate financial reporting also was heightened by the publicity surrounding large derivative losses at a few companies. As a result, the Securities and Exchange Commission, members of Congress, and others urged the Board to deal expeditiously with reporting problems in this area. For example, a report of the General Accounting Office prepared for Congress in 1994 recommended, among other things, that the FASB "proceed expeditiously to develop and issue an exposure draft that provides comprehensive, consistent accounting rules for derivative products. . . ." \30/ In addition, some users of financial statements asked for improved disclosures and accounting for derivatives and hedging. For example, one of the recommendations in the December 1994 report published by the AICPA Special Committee on Financial Reporting, Improving Business Reporting-A Customer Focus, was to address the disclosures and accounting for innovative financial instruments.


213. Because of the urgency of improved financial information about derivatives and related activities, the Board decided, in December 1993, to redirect some of its efforts toward enhanced disclosures
and, in October 1994, issued FASB Statement No. 119, Disclosure about Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments. This Statement supersedes Statement 119.

Even when the derivative contracts are used for economic hedges, the risk exposures prior to expiration of the hedge can be huge since many hedges are highly ineffective prior to expiration of the derivative contracts.  What makes derivative financial instruments unique relative to other financial instruments is that derivatives customarily have either zero initial cost (e.g., for forwards, futures and swap contracts) or exceedingly small initial premiums for options.  Hence the traditional historical cost accounting standards were meaningless for derivative instruments.  For FAS 133, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) decided to require continuous fair market value booking and adjustments (commonly called Mark-To-Market (MTM) adjustments.  

What the FASB wanted was to simply adjust derivatives to fair value as assets or liabilities and to charge current earnings with the incremental unrealized gains or losses.  All hell broke loose, however, when this was proposed to the business community, because such adjustments sometimes resulted in enormous fluctuations of reported earnings.  These fluctuations were especially troublesome in theory and in practice for firms who were only using derivatives to hedge risk.  Unless there was some way to adjust hedging derivatives to fair value without impacting current earnings, firms who hedged were actually going to look more risky than if they were not hedging risk.

This forced the FASB, the IASB, and other standard setters to adopt hedge accounting relief in the newer standards that require that derivative financial instruments be carried at fair value.  What might have been a relatively simple FAS 133 thus exploded to way over 500 paragraphs of technical jargon and complex accounting rules like the world as ever known.  At the time I am writing this in February 2004, most European nations have agreed to implement all IAS standards in January of 2005 except for IAS 39 which business firms in Europe refuse to accept at this juncture.  FAS 133 has been in effect in the U.S. since Year 2000 and has caused enormous confusion and reporting errors, most notable of which is Freddie Mac --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm#FreddieMac 

The new standards also create immense problems for auditors, some of which are dealt with in SAS 92.

Auditing Derivative Instruments, Hedging Activities, and Investments in Securities
http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/auditstd/riasai/sas92.htm 

 

Hedge accounting affords companies opportunities to book and adjust derivative financial instruments to fair value at all times.  However, many business firms are upset because the required hedge effectiveness tests cause them to lose part or all their hedge accounting.

 

Short =

Ownership of an investment position, security, or instrument such that falling market prices will benefit the owner.  This is also known as a short position.  For example, the purchase of a put option is a short position because the owner of the put option goes in the money with falling prices.   A short position may also arise when investor incurs rights and obligations that mirror the risk-return characteristics of another investor's asset position such that a change in value in opposite directions to that asset position.  See also long.

Short sales do not meet Paragraph 6b, Page 3, definition of a FAS 133 derivative instrument if they require a significant initial investment premium.   Footnote 18 on Page 39 and Paragraph 290 on Page 145 leave the door partly ajar for declaring short sales to be derivative instruments and qualify as fair value hedges.   Paragraph 20, however, does not allow nonderivative instruments to be fair value hedges.  Short sales of borrowed security hedges do not meet the Paragraphs 6b and 8 criteria to qualify as derivative hedging instruments.  Short sales of borrowed securities are defined, in Paragraph 59d on Page 39 of FAS 133, in terms of having at least one of the following activities: 

(1) Selling a security (by the short seller to the purchaser)

(2) Borrowing a security (by the short seller from the lender)

(3) Delivering the borrowed security (by the short seller to the purchaser)

(4) Purchasing a security (by the short seller from the market)

(5) Delivering the purchased security (by the short seller to the lender).

Those five activities involve three separate contracts. A contract
that distinguishes a short sale involves activities (2) and (5), borrowing a security and replacing it by delivering an identical security. Such a contract has two of the three characteristics of a derivative instrument.  The settlement is based on an underlying (the price of the security) and a notional amount (the face amount of the security or the number of shares),and the settlement is made by delivery of a security that is readily convertible to cash. However, the other characteristic, little or no initial net investment, is not present. The borrowed security is the lender's initial net investment in the contract. Consequently, the contract relating to activities (2) and (5) is not a derivative instrument.  The other two contracts (one for activities (1) and (3) and the other for activity (4)) are routine and do not generally involve derivative instruments. However, if a forward purchase or sale is involved, and the contract does not qualify for the exception in paragraph 10(a), it is subject to the requirements of this Statement.

In Paragraph 290 on Page 145 of FAS 133, the FASB wavered on certain types of contracts as follows:

Several respondents to the Exposure Draft asked the Board for specific guidance about whether some contracts meet the definition of a derivative instrument, including sales of securities not yet owned ("short sales"), take-or-pay contracts, and contracts with liquidating damages or other termination clauses. The Board cannot definitively state whether those types of contracts will always (or never) meet the definition because their terms and related customary practices vary.

Gradient Analytics Forensic Accounting Firm --- http://www.gradientanalytics.com/
Gradient Analytics, Inc., founded in 1996 by Don Vickrey and Carr Bettis as Camelback Research Alliance, Inc. in Scottsdale, Arizona. Gradient Analytics is an independent equity research company ---
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=11517448

"There is no question these transactions should be a red flag for investors," says Carr Bettis, the co-founder of forensic accounting firm Gradient Analytics and co-author of a recent study on hedging. "The evidence is pretty compelling that hedges tend to be used before bad news hits the market." Bettis' research found that in the year after executives and directors had engaged in hedging, their company's stock often dropped markedly. He also found evidence of an increase in financial restatements and shareholder lawsuits during the same period. Executives at MCI, Enron, ImClone (IMCL), Krispy Kreme—companies that suffered some of the great stock melt-downs of the last decade—hedged their shares.
"Some CEOs Are Selling Their Companies Short," by Jane Saseen, Business Week, February 25, 2010 ---
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_10/b4169044647894.htm?campaign_id=magazine_related
Thanks to Jim Mahar for the heads up.

For investors in Switch & Data Facilities (SDXC), a telecom services startup, 2008 was a wild year. From a low of 8.60 in mid-March, shares more than doubled, to 18.17 three months later. Further gains seemed likely in late July when CEO Keith Olsen boosted the guidance he had given Wall Street analysts. But with revenue growth slowing even as debt payments and other costs jumped, Switch & Data was in the red by yearend. By November 2008, the shares had fallen to 4.21.

One shareholder avoided much of that drop: the CEO. On June 19, the day the stock peaked, Olsen contracted with an investment bank to hedge 150,000 shares—a quarter of his stock in the company—against losses if the price fell below 18. As part of the complex maneuver, he agreed to sell his shares to the bank one year later and got an advance of $2.2 million. Olsen, who disclosed his hedging in public filings, declined to comment for this story.

Hedges are ways to contain losses if a stock declines, while still keeping some upside potential if the price keeps rising (see table for a full explanation). It's a strategy anyone in the market can employ. But the way hedging is done by CEOs, directors, and other senior executives may deprive investors of clues about impending problems at companies. Many grant executives stock as compensation largely because they want them to have a stake in the company's success or failure. Investors routinely follow insiders' sales and purchases of company stock as a gauge of a corporation's prospects. Hedging, though, reduces an executive's exposure to stock price drops in a way that investors have a hard time detecting. The complex transactions are structured so that executives still technically own the shares. And though some really big hedges get noticed at the time they are made, disclosures of hedging are often vague or buried deep in the footnotes of obscure public filings.

"There is no question these transactions should be a red flag for investors," says Carr Bettis, the co-founder of forensic accounting firm Gradient Analytics and co-author of a recent study on hedging. "The evidence is pretty compelling that hedges tend to be used before bad news hits the market." Bettis' research found that in the year after executives and directors had engaged in hedging, their company's stock often dropped markedly. He also found evidence of an increase in financial restatements and shareholder lawsuits during the same period. Executives at MCI, Enron, ImClone (IMCL), Krispy Kreme—companies that suffered some of the great stock melt-downs of the last decade—hedged their shares.

Some 107 instances of executive hedging were reported to the Securities & Exchange Commission in 2009, up from a decade low of 48 in 2007, according to Bettis, and regulators are beginning to scrutinize the transactions. Kenneth Feinberg, the U.S. Treasury pay czar, has banned executives from hedging at the banks and automakers that received government bailouts. "We wanted to make sure they couldn't undercut the links we created between compensation and long-term performance," says Feinberg. If executives at the companies could hedge their stock, he adds, "they wouldn't have to worry about how [the stock] does."

In 2000 and 2001, billionaire Philip Anschutz hedged shares of two companies in which he held major stakes, Union Pacific (UNP) and Anadarko Petroleum (APC). Shorting stock is typically done as part of a hedging strategy. In Anschutz's case, the bank that arranged the deal, Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette (now part of Credit Suisse Group), shorted Anschutz's own shares rather than borrowing shares in the market to short. That was a common technique until tax authorities cracked down on it in 2006. In a case pending before U.S. Tax Court in Washington, the IRS is arguing that Anschutz's deals were effectively stock sales rather than hedges, and is seeking $143.6 million in capital gains taxes. Tax lawyers are watching the case because they say many other executives who early in the decade allowed their own shares to be shorted the way Anschutz did are now being audited. If the IRS wins its case, these hedgers could face big tax bills earlier than expected. Anschutz disputes the IRS's argument and would not comment for this story.

There are plenty of reasons a senior executive would hedge if he thought his company's stock was going to slide. In one type of hedge, called a prepaid variable forward contract, he can get a cash advance of up to 85% for shares he agrees to sell eventually to an investment bank. Because he still technically owns the shares, the IRS doesn't consider a hedge a sale so long as the bank doesn't short the executive's own shares. So the executive need not pay capital gains taxes until the hedge expires. Meanwhile, he can still vote the shares and collect dividends.

U.S. executive hedging first took off in Silicon Valley during the dot-com era, when transactions averaged around 290 a year. Investment banks—Morgan Stanley (MS), Goldman Sachs (GS), JPMorgan Chase (JPM), and Citigroup (C)—rushed to provide hedge services. "I don't know of a bank that doesn't have a department doing this," says Mark Leeds, a tax lawyer with Greenberg Traurig. By mid-decade, he adds, transactions worth several billion had likely been sold. The hedge business helps the banks cement ties with top executives, which comes in handy when a bank is pitching other services. And the banks reap rich fees.

SUSPECT CORRELATIONS
Bettis and his co-authors examined 2,010 hedging transactions reported in filings by 1,181 executives at 911 firms between 1996 and 2006. In the year preceding executives' hedges, their companies' shares outpaced the market anywhere from 17% to 31% on average, depending on the type of hedge used, according to Bettis' analysis, which was completed last year. After the executives hedged, it's a different story. Shares in companies where the CEOs, directors, and other top executives had hedged using a variable forward sale lagged the market by 16.2%, on average. Those where a collar, another popular hedging transaction, had been used fell behind by 25%.

Roughly 11% of the companies where an executive used a collar had to restate financials within two years of the hedge transaction; comparable companies where no hedging occurred had half as many restatements, Bettis says. Some 11% of the firms that let their executives buy a variable forward contract faced securities-related suits within a year, double the number at companies that didn't hedge. "The poor performance following hedging suggests a number of these trades are potentially based on privileged information," argues Bettis. The trades "appear to be tied to events that were known or could reasonably have been anticipated by the executives," he adds.

SEC officials say executives who hedge fall under the same rules as those who sell their stock. If an executive were to use a hedge to protect himself against losses at a time when he possessed specific material information that the company's performance had stumbled or was about to, that could potentially bring an insider trading charge. But SEC spokesman John Heine says the agency has never pursued an insider trading case against an executive following a hedge.

Missed earnings in the wake of a hedge appear common, Bettis' research shows. Chattem Chairman and CEO Alexander Guerry placed a hedge on 60,000 shares of the Chattanooga (Tenn.)-based maker of Gold Bond foot powder,

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
Note that FAS 133 does not scope in accounting for short sales.

Bob Jensen's tutorials on accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedge accounting ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

 

Short-Cut Method for Interest Rate Swaps =

steps to computing interest accruals and amortization adjustments for interest rate swaps that have no ineffectiveness.   The main attractiveness of the shortcut it that for interest rate swaps, quarterly testing for hedge ineffectiveness is not required.  Whenever possible, firms seek to use the shortcut method.  For interest rate swap cash flow hedges the short-cut method steps are listed in Paragraph 132 on Pages 72-73 of FAS 133.  For fair value hedges, see Paragraph 114 on Page 62 of FAS 133.  See FAS 133 Paragraph 68 for the exact conditions that have to be met if an entity is to assume no ineffectiveness in a hedging relationship of interest rate risk involving an interest-bearing asset/liability and an interest rate swap.  Also see interest rate swaps, transition accounting, and basis adjustment.

My understanding is that the “long haul” method is any situation where the stringent tests for shortcut method do not hold. Thus tests for ineffectiveness must be conducted at each reset date. This is problematic for swaps and options especially since the market for the hedged item entails a different set of buyers than the market for the hedging instrument, thereby increasing the likelihood of ineffectiveness.

I do not have a spreadsheet illustration of ineffectiveness testing for interest rate swaps, but the tests I assume are the same as those tests used for other hedges. Some analysts assume that the “long haul” method applies to regression tests (as opposed to dollar offset), and regression tests (unlike dollar offset tests) cannot be applied retrospectively.  See “Ineffectiveness” at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#I-Terms

"Proposed Guidance on Applying the “Shortcut Method” of Hedge Accounting," KPMG's Defining Issues, July 2007 ---
http://www.kpmg.com/aci/docs/DI 07_24 Shortcut Method.pdf
Also see http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/fasb/ShortcutMethodFromKPMG.pdf

Also see
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=101227&d=815&h=817&f=816&dateformat=%25o%20%25B%20%25Y

The Financial Accounting Standards Board has issued proposed Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. E23, "Issues Involving the Application of the Shortcut Method under Paragraph 68." This proposal provides guidance on certain practices involved in the application of one technique for determining hedge accounting, commonly referred to as the shortcut method. Designed to promote consistency in the practice of determining when an entity qualifies for the shortcut method, the proposal also provides investors and others with better information about how the shortcut method affects a company's financial statements.
FASB News Release, July 24, 2007 --- http://www.fasb.org/news/nr072407.shtml

If the critical terms of the hedging instrument and the entire hedged asset/liability or hedged forecasted transaction are the same, an enterprise could conclude that changes in fair value or cash flows attributable to the risk being hedged are expected to completely offset at inception and on an ongoing basis.  For example, an entity may assume that a hedge of a forecasted purchase of a commodity with a forward contract will be highly effective and that there will be no ineffectiveness to be recognized in net profit or loss if:

(a) the forward contract is for purchase of the same quantity of the same commodity at the same time and location as the hedged forecasted purchase.

(b) the fair value of the forward contract at inception is zero.

(c) either the change in the discount or premium on the forward contract is excluded from the assessment of effectiveness and included directly in net profit or loss or the change in expected cash flows on the forecasted transaction is based on the forward price for the commodity 
(IAS 39 Paragraph 151)
(FAS 133 Paragraph 65)

 

DIG Issue E4 at http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/ 
QUESTIONS

Can the shortcut method be applied if most but not all of the applicable conditions in paragraph 68 are met?

Can that shortcut method be applied to hedging relationships that involve hedging instruments other than interest rate swaps or that involve hedged risks other than market interest rate risk?

Can the shortcut method be applied to a fair value hedge of a callable interest-bearing debt instrument if the hedging interest rate swap has matching call provisions?

BACKGROUND

The conditions for assuming no ineffectiveness and thus being able to apply the shortcut method are listed in paragraph 68, which states in part:

An entity may assume no ineffectiveness in a hedging relationship of interest rate risk involving an interest-bearing asset or liability and an interest rate swap if all of the applicable conditions in the following list are met.... Paragraphs 114 and 132 discuss the steps to be used in applying the shortcut method to Examples 2 and 5, respectively.

RESPONSE

Question 1 No. The shortcut method can be applied only if all of the applicable conditions in paragraph 68 are met. That is, all the conditions applicable to fair value hedges must be met to apply the shortcut method to a fair value hedge and all the conditions applicable to cash flow hedges must be met to apply the shortcut method to a cash flow hedge. A hedging relationship cannot qualify for application of the shortcut method based on an assumption of no ineffectiveness justified by applying other criteria.

Given the potential for not recognizing hedge ineffectiveness in earnings under the shortcut method, Statement 133 intentionally limits its application only to hedging relationships that meet each and every applicable condition in paragraph 68. Thus, if the interest rate swap at the inception of the hedging relationship has a positive or negative fair value, the shortcut method cannot be used even if all the other conditions are met. (See condition 68(b).) Similarly, because a callable financial instrument is prepayable, the shortcut method cannot be applied to a debt instrument that contains an embedded call option (unless the hedging interest rate swap in a fair value hedge contains a mirror-image call option, as discussed in Question 3). (See condition 68(d).) The verb match is used in the specified conditions in paragraph 68 to mean be exactly the same or correspond exactly.

Question 2 No. Because paragraph 68 specifies only a hedging relationship that involves only an interest rate swap as the hedging instrument, the shortcut method cannot be applied to relationships hedging interest rate risk that involve hedging instruments other than interest rate swaps. Similarly, the shortcut method described in paragraphs 114 and 132 cannot be applied to hedging relationships that involve hedged risks other than the risk of changes in fair value (or cash flows) attributable to changes in market interest rates. However, the inability to apply the shortcut method to a hedging relationship does not suggest that that relationship must result in some ineffectiveness. Paragraph 65 points out a situation in which a hedging relationship involving a commodities forward contract would be considered to result in no ineffectiveness.

Question 3 An entity is not precluded from applying the shortcut method to a fair value hedging relationship of interest rate risk involving an interest-bearing asset or liability that is prepayable due to an embedded call option provided that the hedging interest rate swap contains an embedded mirror-image call option. The call option embedded in the swap is considered a mirror image of the call option embedded in the hedged item if (a) the terms of the two call options match exactly (including matching maturities, related notional amounts, timing and frequency of payments, and dates on which the instruments may be called) and (b) the entity is the writer of one call option and the holder (or purchaser) of the other call option.

Similarly, an entity is not precluded from applying the shortcut method to a fair value hedging relationship of interest rate risk involving an interest-bearing asset or liability that is prepayable due to an embedded put option provided the hedging interest rate swap contains an embedded mirror-image put option.

General Comments Statement 133 acknowledges in paragraph 70 that a hedging relationship that meets all of the applicable conditions in paragraph 68 may nevertheless involve some ineffectiveness (notwithstanding the supposed “assumption of no ineffectiveness”). Yet Statement 133 permits application of the shortcut method, which does not recognize such ineffectiveness currently in earnings. For example, the change in the fair value of an interest rate swap may not offset the change in the fair value of a fixed-rate receivable attributable to the hedged risk (resulting in hedge ineffectiveness) due to either (a) a change in the creditworthiness of the counterparty on the swap or (b) a change in the credit spread over the base Treasury rate for the debtor’s particular credit sector (sometimes referred to as a change in the sector spread). Although an expectation of such hedge ineffectiveness potentially could either (a) preclude fair value hedge accounting at inception or (b) trigger current recognition in earnings under regular fair value hedge accounting, the shortcut method masks that ineffectiveness and does not require its current recognition in earnings. In fact, the shortcut method does not even require that the change in the fair value of the hedged fixed-rate receivable attributable to the hedged risk be calculated.

Although a hedging relationship may not qualify for the shortcut method, the application of regular fair value hedge accounting may nevertheless result in recognizing no ineffectiveness. For example, an analysis of the characteristics of the hedged item and the hedging derivative may, in some circumstances, cause an entity’s calculation of the change in the hedged item’s fair value attributable to the hedged risk to be an amount that is equal and offsetting to the change in the derivative’s fair value. In those circumstances, because there is no ineffectiveness that needs to be reported, the result of the fair value hedge accounting would be the same as under the shortcut method.

At its July 28, 1999 meeting, the Board reached the above answer to Question 3. Absent that, the staff would have been able to provide only the answer that because a callable financial instrument is prepayable, the shortcut method cannot be applied to a callable debt instrument even if the hedging interest rate swap has a matching call provision. The Board noted that, in developing the provisions in paragraph 68(d), it had not focused on situations in which the hedging interest rate swap contains a mirror-image call provision and, had it focused on the situation described above, it would have arrived at the above guidance.

 

 

Derivatives Implementation Group

Title: Transition Provisions: Use of the Shortcut Method in the Transition Adjustment and Upon Initial Adoption

Paragraph references: 48, 52, 68

Date released: November 1999

QUESTIONS

For a hedging relationship that existed prior to the initial adoption of Statement 133 and that would have met the requirements for the shortcut method in paragraph 68 at the inception of that pre-existing hedging relationship, may the transition adjustment upon initial adoption be calculated as though the shortcut method had been applied since the inception of that hedging relationship?

In deciding whether the shortcut method can be applied prospectively from the initial adoption of Statement 133 to a designated hedging relationship that is the continuation of a pre-existing hedging relationship, should the requirements of paragraph 68(b) (that the derivative has a zero fair value) be based on the swap's fair value at the inception of the pre-existing hedging relationship rather than at the inception of the hedging relationship newly designated under Statement 133 upon its initial adoption?

RESPONSES

Question 1 Yes. For a hedging relationship that involves an interest rate swap designated as the hedging instrument, that existed prior to the initial adoption of Statement 133, and that would have met the requirements for the shortcut method in paragraph 68 at the inception of that pre-existing hedging relationship, an entity may choose to calculate the transition adjustment upon initial adoption either (a) pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 52, as discussed in Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. J8, "Adjusting the Hedged Item's Carrying Amount for the Transition Adjustment related to a Fair-Value-Type Hedging Relationship," or (b) as though the shortcut method had been applied since the inception of that hedging relationship, as discussed below. Under either approach, the interest rate swap would be recognized in the statement of financial position as either an asset or liability measured at fair value.

If the previous hedging relationship was a fair-value-type hedge, the difference between the swap's previous carrying amount and its fair value would be included in the transition adjustment and recorded as a cumulative-effect-type adjustment of net income. The hedged item's carrying amount would be adjusted to the amount that it would have been had the shortcut method for a fair value hedge of interest rate risk been applied from the inception of that pre-existing hedging relationship; that adjustment would be recorded as a cumulative-effect-type adjustment of net income.

If the previous hedging relationship was a cash-flow-type hedge, the difference between the swap's previous carrying amount and its fair value would be included in the transition adjustment and allocated between a cumulative-effect-type adjustment of other comprehensive income and a cumulative-effect-type adjustment of net income, as follows. The cumulative-effect-type adjustment of other comprehensive income would be the amount necessary to adjust the balance of other comprehensive income to the amount that it would have been related to that swap on the date of initial adoption had the shortcut method been applied from the inception of the pre-existing hedging relationship. The remainder, if any, of the transition adjustment would be recorded as a cumulative-effect-type adjustment of net income.

Question 2 Yes. In deciding whether the shortcut method can be applied prospectively from the initial adoption of Statement 133 to a designated hedging relationship that is the continuation of a pre-existing hedging relationship, the requirements of paragraph 68(b) (requiring that the derivative has a zero fair value) should be based on the swap's fair value at the inception of the pre-existing hedging relationship rather than at the inception of the hedging relationship newly designated under Statement 133 upon its initial adoption. However, if the hedging relationship that is designated upon adoption of Statement 133 is not the continuation of a pre-existing hedging relationship (that is, not the same hedging instrument and same hedged item or transaction), then the decision regarding whether the shortcut method can be applied prospectively from the initial adoption of Statement 133 should be based on the fair value of the swap at the date of initial adoption.

Question
What's your opinion regarding the Shortcut Method allowed in FAS 133 but not in IAS 39?
If companies meet the strict tests for the Shortcut Method in FAS 133, they can avoid period-to-period hedge effectiveness testing for interest rate swaps. The FASB is now considering changing these tests. I would prefer that the FASB eliminate the Shortcut Method entirely.

October 4, 2007 message from Attorney XXXXX

Bob Jensen:

As your website(s) keep coming up as an "authority" in the subject area of FAS 133, you might want to pre-date (September 21, 2007) and submit to FASB any comment letter of substance on DIG Implementation Issue E23 - revising the cash-flows short-cut method per website invitation:

http://www.fasb.org/ 

New—FASB Issues Proposal to Clarify the "Shortcut Method" of Hedge Accounting (Posted: 07/24/07) News Release

Although I submitted "late," mine was still "accepted" and posted as #35 on the list - http://www.fasb.org/ocl/fasb-getletters.php?project=ISSUE-E23

I'm also hoping Ira Kawaller of www.kawaller.com  also submits something as both his and your names keep coming up on Google-searches on the subject.

I'm only an independent consultant working on a project, and as such, I submitted a single-issue item snafu I've been experiencing in the general area - perhaps yours could be more extensive.

Second message on October 5, 2007

Ira, Bob, et. al.:

In addition to potential late submissions on the FASB website (below original e-mail), do either of you know of, or can suggest any, commercial software to set-in-place and track a plain vanilla Cash-Flows Macro Interest Rate Swap showing the long-haul method?

I'm consulting at a sub-prime mortgage management firm and they want to roll-up $1/2 Billion of their variable debt to a single fixed-interest cash-flow hedge - as a Macro Interest Rate Swap. While they already have a counter-party whose software they might be using, but I'm sort-of shopping-around for them as well.

Due to the uncertainties surrounding the short-cut method, we're going long-haul (at this point!). As the verdict is pending on the short-cut method (see Morgan Stanley's E23 Comment - http://www.fasb.org/ocl/ISSUE-E23/51580.pdf  where they "ceased" all their short cut hedge programs, as well as KPMG's, where even-if short-cut is used, long-haul would still be needed to track ineffectiveness - http://www.fasb.org/ocl/ISSUE-E23/51585.pdf  ), and since it's only a "basic" cash-flows interest-rate swap, we figure on moving ahead and using the long-haul method to track the entirety of it.

I know we can't have our cake and eat it too - i.e. once a "fixed" rate is established by the hedge, it too can "sink" in the market, where we can't simultaneously hedge the cash-flows risk and the fair-value risk of the completed hedge - but I'll leave that to the macro-economists to figure-out.

Suggestions or comments welcome - please feel free to forward to others who might be able to help, even commercial vendors, so I know what prices the long-haul tracking will cost (I know! I know! - it'll probably be more costly than the ineffectiveness that's being tracked anyway - but we're just trying to play-by-the-rules in an uncertain regulatory environment!).

 

Regards,

XXXXX

October 7, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Albert,

 

I’m not sure I can add much more to the Shortcut method that the FASB has not already considered. Actually, I would like to do away with the Shortcut method since it applied only to interest rate swaps and does not conform to IAS 39.

 

 

 

Your request for information about software inspired me to update my somewhat neglected module on software under the S-terms at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#S-Terms
(Scroll down to “Software.”

I discuss ineffectiveness testing under the I-terms at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#I-Terms

A bit of a review is provided at http://www.cfoeurope.com/displayStory.cfm/1736487

Alternative approaches to testing hedge effectiveness under SFAS No. 133 --- http://www.allbusiness.com/accounting/methods-standards/209328-1.html

A Listing of Some Hedge Accounting Restatements for 2005 (see Page 3 of the online version)
"Lost in the Maze Problems with hedge accounting caused a wave of restatements in 2005:  Are FASB's rules too hard to follow, or are companies simply too lax?" by Linda Corman, CFO Magazine, May 2005 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/6874855/1/c_8435337

Alternative approaches to testing hedge effectiveness under SFAS No. 133 --- http://www.allbusiness.com/accounting/methods-standards/209328-1.html


Derivatives One has some basic free tools --- http://www.derivativesone.com/kb/hedge_effectiveness.aspx


There are a number of commercial vendors of FAS 133 and IAS 39 compliance software. A sampling is shown below:

FinancialCAD --- http://www.financialcad.com/ 

FinancialCAD provides software and services that support the valuation and risk management of financial securities and derivatives that is essential for banks, corporate treasuries and asset management firms. FinancialCAD’s industry standard financial analytics are a key component in FinancialCAD solutions that are used by over 25,000 professionals in 60 countries.

Also see http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3002428/c_3046496

COMSOL --- http://www.comsol-online.com/content.php?si=317&id=134

INNSINC --- http://www.inssinc.com/?issadsrc=google&gclid=CO38pY7f_I4CFTaoGgodgyqT2w

FUTRAK workstation offers all of the features necessary to significantly reduce the time required to manage your hedging activities, provide management with all the control tools necessary to comply with SarbOx 404, satisfy auditors with documentary evidence needed to justify your company's use of derivative hedge accounting, and eliminate earnings volatility.

Also see http://www.bobsguide.com/guide/news/21544.html

Hedge Trackers ---  http://www.hedgetrackers.com/whatweoffer/toolsandsoftware.htm

TPG Software --- http://www.tpgsoftware.com/CustServiceCenter/Docs/Windows/DerivativeGenius_files/DerivativeGenius.htm

MBRM --- http://www.mbrm.com/

Allegro (especially good for energy companies) --- http://www.allegrodev.com/solutions_app_riskMgmt.asp?c=positions

Sunguard Bancware --- http://www.sungard.com/bancware/menus/brochures/bancwarealmbrochure.pdf

Treasury Compliance --- http://www.fas133.com/search/search_article.cfm?page=11&areaid=362

October 8, 2007 reply from IRA KAWALLER [kawaller@kawaller.com]
Jensen Note:  Ira has been a member of the FASB's Derivative Implementation Group (DIG) since its inception.

Bob -

I’m a bit surprised that you favor disallowing shortcut.

I don’t have a problem with that perspective for cash flow hedges, but I do for fair value hedges.

The problem for FV hedges is that long haul doesn’t work. Over the life of fixed rate debt – typically issued at par and being redeemed at par, the change in FV over the life of the debt is zero. The results of a swap, on the other hand will be whatever the sum of the cash flows happens to be – but certainly not zero. The only way FV hedges can work is if you ignore swap settlements, but that’s crazy. The fact is, swaps don’t offset the changes in the FV of the debt they’re used to hedge unless the swaps are sized on a duration basis. That’s what bond portfolio managers do, but it’s not what corporate treasurers do. For hedges that are designed to synthesize variable rate debt, a one-to-one sizing is appropriate, but unless you use shortcut, there’s little chance that you’ll be able to pass retrospective effectiveness tests.

Hope all is well.

Ira Kawaller

718-694-6270

www.kawaller.com 

Bob Jensen's threads on the Shortcut Method are under the S-terms at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#S-Terms
(Scroll down to "Shortcut Method")

Bob Jensen's FAS 133 and IAS 39 tutorials are at the following two sites:

http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/

I still say do away with the Shortcut Method until the IASB allows it in IAS 39.
Of course banks and other corporations in the U.S. would hit the ceiling

 

 

May 6, 2005 message from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@terry.uga.edu]

Bob,

I just finished listening to the GE web cast and it is fascinating. It's interesting to listen to the company's explanations of what happened and to the analysts' questions. The web cast is available at: http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=118676&p=irol-eventdetails&EventId=1062945&WebCastId=443224&StreamId=533758  although these things usually get removed after a month or so. They also said that they would post a transcript of the web cast later today.

Denny

May 6, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Denny,

I enjoyed part of the Webcast and appreciated the fact that the analysis of why GE is restating its financial statements came near the beginning of the Webcast.  I thought the explanation was direct and very clear.  The restatement tends to make a FAS 133 mountain out of an economic mole hill.

Scholars interested in the Shortcut Method for Interest Rate Swaps will find this GE Webcast interesting. FAS 133 makes a huge exception for having to test for hedge effectiveness of interest rate swaps. This is important, because typical tests of effectiveness such as the dollar offset test will often fail quarter to quarter for such swaps. Not having to test for effectiveness helps to avoid having to declare swap hedges ineffective when, in my viewpoint, they are perfectly effective over the life of the swap.

GE executives decided after the fact that they thought they were eligible for the Short Cut Method on some swaps that technically violated one SCM test. The impact is rather small and not a big deal even though GE is going to restate its financial statements to the tune of about $300 million.

The important point for academics and practitioners is to learn why GE decided they did not meet the SCM tests outlined under "Short Cut Method for Interest Rate Swaps" in my glossary at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#S-Terms 

The important point for standard setters is to learn that this is yet another technicality in an accounting rule that has absolutely no impact on the actual economic performance or cash flows of a company. I think standard setters have to become more creative in distinguishing cash/economic outcomes versus fluctuations in financial performance that are transitory and have no ultimate impact on cash/economic performance.

This earnings restatement by GE due to derivatives is much less complex than the macro hedging complications of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm#FannieMae

Bob Jensen

"Hedging with Swaps: When Shortcut Accounting Can’t be Applied," by Ira G. Kawaller, Bank Asset/Liability Management, June 2003 --- http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/BALM_Hedging_with_Swaps.pdf 

For bank asset/liability management, when using derivatives, “hedge accounting” treatment is an imperative. It assures that gains or losses associated with hedging instruments will contribute to earnings simultaneously with the risks being hedged. Otherwise – i.e., without hedge accounting – these two effects will likely impact earnings in different accounting periods, resulting in an elevated level of income volatility that obscures the risk management objectives of the hedging entity. 

For most managers with interest rate exposures, the desired treatment can be assured if appropriately tailored swaps contracts serve as the hedging instrument. Under these conditions, entities may apply the “Shortcut” treatment, which essentially guarantees that the accounting results will reflect the intended economics of the hedge and that no unintended income effects will occur. For example, synthetic fixed rate debt (created by issuing variable rate debt and swapping to fixed), would generate interest expenses on the income statement that would be indistinguishable from that which would arise from traditional fixed rate funding. Synthetic instrument accounting is persevered with the shortcut treatment. Qualifying for the shortcut treatment also has another benefit of obviating the need for any effectiveness testing, thereby eliminating an administrative burden and reducing some measure of the associated hedge documentation obligation.

See Ineffectiveness and Software  

Hi Donna,

If your client uses variable rate debt as the hedged item, there is cash flow risk and you can hedge this with an interest rate swap. If the hedge and the hedged item are both based on LIBOR, you have eliminated interest rate risk of the combined cash flows and should qualify for the shortcut method as explained in Paragraph 132 of FAS 133. In fact, your example is a lot like Example 5 of Appendix B that begins in Paragraph 131. You can read my discussion of Example 5 at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/133ex05.htm 

The Example 5 Excel workbook solution is at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/133ex05.xls 

Note in my Excel workbook above how complicated the derivation of fair values of interest rate swaps can become. You have to go to Bloomberg terminals and derive swap (yield) curves. One advantage of the shortcut method is that it allows you to assume that the value of the hedge exactly offsets the value of the hedged item. If the hedged item is easier to value (e.g., if there is a daily market price on the bonds), then you have saved yourself a lot of time and expense of valuing the swap and testing for hedge ineffectiveness.

Whenever possible, interest rate hedges are designed to qualify for the shortcut method.

You can read more about this under my definition of "Yield Curve" at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm 

For a better understanding about how FAS 138 impacts upon FAS 133 in this regard, go to the definitions of "benchmarking" at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#B-Terms 

Hope this helps!

Bob (Robert E.) Jensen Jesse H. Jones Distinguished Professor of Business Trinity University, San Antonio, TX 78212 Voice: (210) 999-7347 Fax: (210) 999-8134 Email: rjensen@trinity.edu http://faculty.Trinity.edu/rjensen

-----Original Message----- 
From: Donna Jones [mailto:djones@tssllp.com]  
Sent: Friday, February 15, 2002 12:46 PM 
To: rjensen@trinity.edu Subject: FAS133

I am wrestling with the requirements of FAS133 as it relates to a client of mine. It is probably a simple case, if there is such a thing, and deals with an interest rate swap. The client has debt through industrial development bonds with a variable rate based on LIBOR. They entered into a swap agreement to fix the interest rate though final maturity of the bonds. This would qualify as a cash flow hedge, I think. The counter party to the agreement has valued the agreement (a market to market value) at year end. I assume I will set this up as a liability (who knew 2 1/2 years ago rates would fall this low) through accumulated other comprehensive income.

My confusion is related to assessing the hedge effectiveness. It appears that this is imperative to qualify for hedge accounting and determine the ineffective portion of the hedge. I am not sure how to document this assessment. If the hedge meets the requirements for the shortcut method of accounting, does this ease the assessment documentation requirements? Would this mean that there would never be an ineffective portion and all changes in the FMV of the hedge would be posted through accumulated other comprehensive income? Basically, they have posted interest paid on the swap agreement through interest expense.

I would appreciate your advice on this case. The information I found on your website was extensive but the requirements are extremely confusing to me. Unfortunately, I am the first partner in my firm to tackle this issue. Please let me know if you need more details of the agreement.

Thank you,

Donna Jones

Thomas, Stout & Stuart LLP 
PO Box 2220 Burlington, NC 27216 
Phone: (336)226-7343 Fax: (336)229-4204 http://tssllp.com/ 


Hi Again Donna,

In this added message to you, I am going to feature a quote from a fascinating book by Frank Partnoy.  I also want to point you to an important paper by Ira Kawaller.  But before doing so, I am going to give you more background that you ever hoped for or perhaps even want.

My purpose is to give your more background on the Shortcut Method and to demonstrate why it is so important for your clients to qualify for the Shortcut Method whenever possible. You can read the following definition in my glossary at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#S-Terms 

Shortcut Method = steps to computing interest accruals and amortization adjustments for interest rate swaps that have no ineffectiveness.  The main attractiveness of the shortcut it that for interest rate swaps, quarterly testing for hedge ineffectiveness is not required.  Whenever possible, firms seek to use the shortcut method.  For interest rate swap cash flow hedges the short-cut method steps are listed in Paragraph 132 on Pages 72-73 of FAS 133.  For fair value hedges, see Paragraph 114 on Page 62 of FAS 133.  See FAS 133 Paragraph 68 for the exact conditions that have to be met if an entity is to assume no ineffectiveness in a hedging relationship of interest rate risk involving an interest-bearing asset/liability and an interest rate swap.

I will digress now and explain the background of FAS 133.  FAS 133 arose because of the spectacular increase in the popularity of certain types of derivative instruments, particularly interest rate swaps (that hedge fair values or cash flows) and cross-currency swaps for interest rates and foreign exchange (FX) risk.  In the case of both interest rate swaps and cross-currency swaps of interest rate risk, the FASB goofed in the original FAS 133.  In the case of interest rates, the goof was to assume that firms hedge sector spreads rather than benchmarked rates.  In the case of cross-currency swaps, the goof was to not allow for simultaneous hedging of both interest rate risk and FX risk in the same swap derivative contract.  This was rectified in FAS 138 that you can read about at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/000overview/mp3/138intro.htm 

Except for futures contracts (that settle for cash daily), there was no fair value accounting for financial instruments derivatives prior to FAS 133 in the U.S. and IAS 39 internationally.  Most derivatives like forward contracts and swaps were not booked at all until maturity when cash settlements took place.  FAS 133/138 requires booking of most derivatives and subsequent  adjustment of the carrying values of the derivatives to fair value at least every 90 days.  

Originally, the FASB wanted to book changes in derivative value to current earnings even though such changes are not realized until cash settlements take place.  If that became the required accounting treatment, FAS 133 would have been about 20 simple paragraphs, and there would have been no need for the FAS 138 amendments of FAS 133.  However, corporate America complained loudly that this simplistic treatment of changes in derivative instrument fair value would lead to reporting asymmetries for hedging contracts that are highly misleading.  Their point was well taken in theory.  If the hedged item (such as bonds payable) remained at historical cost and the hedging contract (such as an interest rate swap) was carried at current fair value, the changes in the hedge's fair value would create extreme volatility in earnings.  Furthermore, such changes in earnings are unrealized and might be perfectly offset by unbooked changes in value of the hedged item.  Accounting reality would, thereby, be far removed from economic reality in the case of effective hedges.

The FASB listened to its constituencies and decided to lessen the impact of unrealized changes in hedging contract values on current earnings per share.  Doing so added over 500 paragraphs to FAS 133 plus the added paragraphs in the FAS 138 amendments to FAS 133.  It left us with the most complex and convoluted standard in the history of accountancy.

Now I will outline at the key issues of hedging ineffectiveness in FAS 133:

1.
Hedge accounting is primarily of interest to your clients because it allows changes in the fair value of a derivative hedge to be offset by something other than current earnings.  In the case of cash flow hedges and FX hedges, the offset is usually to Other Comprehensive Income (OCI).  In the case of fair value hedges, the offset is either to an account called "Firm Commitment" for unbooked purchase commitments or the hedged item itself for booked assets or liabilities.  In the latter case, the historical cost rule of accounting for the hedged item is suspended in favor of fair value accounting for the booked hedged item during the hedging period, after which the accounting reverts back to historical cost.  You can read more about this by looking up such terms as "cash flow hedge," "fair value hedge," and "foreign currency hedge" in my glossary at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/000overview/mp3/138intro.htm 

2.
Not all economic hedges qualify for hedge accounting, in which case the changes in value of the hedge contract impact directly upon current earnings.  Your clients will nearly always want to have their hedges qualify for hedge accounting under FAS 133/138.  They will, thereby, avoid the volatility of current earnings caused by fair value adjustments of derivative contracts (other than futures contracts).

3.
FAS 133 requires, except in the case of the Shortcut Method, testing of hedge effectiveness at the time the derivative instruments are adjusted for changes in fair value.  To the extent that a hedge is deemed ineffective, the ineffective portion must be charged to current earnings rather than to the permitted offsets such as OCI, Firm Commitment, or the fair value offset debit or credit to the hedged item itself.  Testing for effectiveness can be a very complicated process and is highly inaccurate (as you will see in Partnoy's passage quoted below).  The importance of qualifying for the Shortcut Method is stressed in a paper by Ira Kawaller cited below. 

4.
Testing for hedge effectiveness of interest rate swaps is perhaps the most complicated aspect of any hedge accounting under FAS 133.  Appendix A of FAS 133 is devoted to issues of effectiveness testing (although that appendix does not delve into the more complex issues of hedge effectiveness testing of interest rate swaps).  Testing for interest rate swap hedge effectiveness requires an understanding of yield curves known as swap curves and an understanding of how to derive forward prices from spot prices on such curves.  You can read (and possibly weep)  more about how this process works at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm 

5.
Testing for hedge effectiveness of interest rate swaps is a highly inaccurate process that may give rise to hedge ineffectiveness simply due to the inaccuracy of valuing the interest rate swap (at least every 90 days) relative to the valuing of the hedged item itself (say a bond) that may be valued with great accuracy because it is traded on the open market.  In other words, the hedged item (e.g., a bond) can be valued with great accuracy whereas its hedge (the interest rate swap) is a customized derivative contract that is not traded in the open market and can only be valued with great inaccuracy.

6.
The importance of the Shortcut Method (which only applies to qualified interest rate swap hedges) is that hedge effectiveness does not have to be tested when the swap is adjusted to fair value.  This avoids the tedium of having to go to Bloomberg terminals and derive the swaps curves.  More importantly, it avoids the inaccuracy of these swaps curves in valuing the swap.  This, in turn, avoids having to book hedge ineffectiveness to current earnings when, in fact, the ineffectiveness is fiction arising only from inaccuracies in estimation of swap (yield curves).

Now let me quote from a truly fascinating book that I am reading at the moment (perhaps one of the most valued books that I have ever read in my life).

Passage from Fiasco:  The Inside Story of a Wall Street Trader
by Frank Partnoy (New York:  Penguin Books, 1999, ISBN 0 14 02.7879 6, pp. 56-58)
In a clever but somewhat dubious marketing pitch for PERLS, DPG salemen often bragged that the investor's "downside risk was limited to the initial investment."  These words appeared as boilerplate throughout Morgan Stnley's marketing documents and almost always generated snickers from the salesmen.  One of the ironic selling points of PERLS --- and many other derivatives my group later sold --- was that the most a buyer could lose was everything 

(Note from Jensen:  The buyer would not lose everything in the case of a hedge rather than a speculation).

. . . 

Some PERLS buyers had no idea that the bet they were making by buying PERLS typically was a bet against a set of "forward yield curves."  (Note from Jensen:  In the case of an interest rate swap, these are called swap curves.)  Forward yield curves are a basic, but crucial, concept in selling derivatives.  The most simple "yield curve" is the curve that describes government bond yields for various maturities.  Usually the curve slopes upward because as the maturity of a government bond increases, its yield also increases.  You can think about this curve in terms of a bank Certificate of Deposit.  Your are likely to get a higher rate with a five-year CD than with a one-year CD.  A yield curve is simply a graph of interest rates of different maturities.

There are many different kinds of yield curves.  The "coupon curve" plots the yields of government coupon bonds of varying maturities.  The "zero curve" plots the yields of zero coupon government bonds of varying maturities (more about zero coupon bonds, also known as Strips later in the book).  The coupon and zero curves are elementary, and you can find the quotes that make up these curves every day in the business section of most newspapers.  The Wall Street Journal also includes a summary of daily trading activity in such bonds in its Credit Markets column.

Note from Bob Jensen:  The most important part of this passage begins now:

But the most important yield curve to derivatives salesmen is one you won't find in the financial pages --- the forward yield curve, or "forward curve,"  Actually, there are many forward curves, but all are based on the same idea.  A forward curve is like a time machine:  it tells you what the market is "predicting" the current yield curve will look like at the same forward in time.  Embedded in the current yield curve are forward curves for various forward times.  For example, the "one-year forward curve" tells you what the current yield curve is predicting the same curve will look like in one year.  The "two-year forward curve" tells you what the current yield curve is predicting the same curve will look like in two years.

The yield curve isn't really predicting changes in the way an astrologer or palm reader might, and as a time machine, a forward curve is not very accurate.  If it were, derivatives traders would be even richer than they already are.  Instead, the yield curve's predictions arise almost like magic but not quite, out of arbitrage --- so called riskless trades to capture price differences between bonds --- in an active, liquid bond market.

Continued on Page 58 of the book.

 

The important point is that the value of the interest rate swap derivative contract (the hedge) is usually an "inaccurate" estimate, whereas the value of the hedged item (e.g., a bond) may be highly accurate.  If the hedge qualifies for the Shortcut Method under FAS 133, then the need to use such inaccurate value estimates in hedge effectiveness testing is avoided.  The value change in the hedge can be assumed to be perfectly correlated (that is negatively correlated) with the value change in the hedged item.  Changes in value of the hedge thereby are assumed to perfectly offset changes in the value of the hedged item in the case of a fair value hedge.

For students seeking to learn more about derivatives and hedges, there are some important free papers by Ira Kawaller at http://www.kawaller.com/articles.htm .  Several of the more important papers related to the topic at hand are noted below:

 

Differences between tax and FAS 133 accounting are discussed in the following paper by Ira Kawaller and John Ensminger:

"The Fallout from FAS 133," (With John Ensminger), Regulation (The CATO Review of Business and Government), Vol. 23, No. 4, 2000.

With respect to the Shortcut Method, I want to call your attention to the following December 2000 message from Ira: 

Hi Bob,

I wanted to alert you to the fact that I've added a new article to my site, " The Impact of FAS 133 Accounting Rules on the Market for Swaps, " which just came out in the latest issue of AFP Express. It deals with the consequences of not qualifying for the shortcut treatment when interest rate swaps are used in fair value hedges. (It's not pretty.)

,

I'd be happy to hear from you.

Ira
Kawaller & Company, LLC
(718) 694-6270
kawaller@idt.net
www.kawaller.com
 

 

A Passage From "Impact of Accounting Rules on the Market for Swaps,"  
by Ira Kawaller, Derivatives Quarterly, Spring 2001
HEDGING WITH INTEREST RATE SWAPS

Applying these rules to interest rate risks requires an understanding that both fair value hedge accounting and cash flow hedging will be used, depending on the nature of the interest rate exposure. Specifically, if the intention is to manage the risk of uncertain interest expenses or revenues associated with a variable-rate debt security, then cash flow treatment is appropriate. If the intention is to manage the risk associated with a fixed-rate security, on the other hand, fair value hedge treatment is required.

Consider two examples. In a case where an investor holds the fixed-rate security as an asset, the fair value hedge treatment may be reasonable and intuitive. After all, the hedger’s objective is to safeguard its value. Locking in some value for this security is perfectly consistent with the fair value hedge approach.

In contrast, however, the hedger who issues fixed-rate debt and decides to swap from fixed to floating reflects a different kind of thinking. The objective of this hedge is not to offset present value effects, but to generate prospective cash flows that, when consolidated with the debt’s coupon payments, will result in a total interest expense that replicates the outcome of a variable-rate loan.

It is well known that interest rate swaps generate precisely this set of cash flows, which suggests that cash flow hedging rules should be followed. But this is not the case.  When the hedged item is a fixed-rate security, the FASB has mandated that fair value accounting is the only applicable accounting treatment. Unfortunately, in many cases, this requirement will foster an accounting result that is at odds with the economics of the transactions. This seeming ineffectiveness is a consequence of the requirement to use fair value hedge accounting. It does not result from the hedge being inappropriate or badly designed.

The shortcut method will circumvent this problem.  Qualifying to use shortcut treatment, however, requires that the features of the swap (i.e., the notional amount, payment and reset dates, and rate conventions) match precisely to those of the debt being hedged. If they do, the change in the carrying amount of the hedged item is set equal to the gains or losses on the swap, net of swap accruals, rather than to the change in the value of the bond due to the risk being hedged. Thus, the resulting accounting under the shortcut method replicates the current "synthetic instrument" accounting. Without the shortcut, you get something else.

MEASURING HEDGE INEFFECTIVENESS

To get a better idea of how serious failing to qualify for the shortcut treatment can be, consider the FASB’s own example,* in which a hedger issues five-year, fixed-rate debt. The debt has a par value of $100,000 and a coupon rate of 10%. The hedging instrument is a five-year swap, receiving 7% fixed and paying LIBOR. The risk being hedged is the benchmark LIBOR-based swap rate.  The example assumes a flat yield curve, which simplifies the calculations.

According to the FASB’s calculations, a 50-basis point change in the LIBOR-based swap rate will foster a change in the fair value of the swap of $1,675. If the hedger elects, and qualifies for, the shortcut method, the $1,675 would be used for both the swap and the adjustment to the carrying amount of the debt. These two contributions to earnings would be exactly offsetting, so that the ultimate effect on earnings would distill to interest accruals of the debt and the swap, respectively. The synthetic instrument outcome would be realized, where the effective interest rate would be LIBOR plus 3%. (The 3% spread over LIBOR comes from the difference between the 10% fixed rate on the debt versus the 7% fixed rate on the swap.) Without the election of the shortcut method, the swap would generate the same income consequences as above, but the adjustment to earnings from the hedged item’s response to the change in the LIBOR-based swap rate would be different—$1,568 instead of $1,675. This seemingly small difference of $107 is misleading, however.  On a yield basis, this discrepancy translates to an interest rate effect of 43 basis points, i.e.

0 43% =  [107/100 000] X [360/90]

So the question is: If a company is considering swapping from fixed- to floating-rate debt, and the result could end up being 43 basis points—or more—away from the intended outcome, will that company still go ahead with the hedge? For the many (possibly the vast majority of ) potential swappers, this magnitude of uncertainty will be unacceptable and the answer will be no. The recourse will be to take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that the prospective hedge will qualify for the shortcut method.

GOOD NEWS

The good news is that if entities do qualify for the shortcut treatment, the requirement to document that the hedge will be highly effective becomes moot. The act of qualifying ensures effectiveness. The bad news is that the criteria for qualifying are restrictive. The underlying debt securities have to be "typical," presumably lacking bells and whistles that may have served to reduce costs for issuers in the past.

Thus, for those firms with "atypical" debt on their balance sheet, either as assets or liabilities, for which the shortcut method is prohibited, the perfectly functioning interest rate swap will no longer work. And for those cases where the debt security qualifies but the terms of the associated swap do not match up properly, firms will likely want to trade out of their existing swap positions and enter into swaps that do qualify for shortcut treatment. In the longer run, the appetite for anything but plain vanilla swaps may all but disappear if concerns about potential income volatility come to dominate in the decision about which hedging strategy or tool to employ.

Continued at http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/Impact.pdf 

 

 

Short Sale = see short.

Soft Currency =

a currency that depreciates rapidly because-use of the country's high inflation rate. Soft currencies are less actively traded on world markets than hard currencies and are often subject to strict controls by the country's central bank.

Software  

A bit of a review is provided at http://www.cfoeurope.com/displayStory.cfm/1736487

Alternative approaches to testing hedge effectiveness under SFAS No. 133 --- http://www.allbusiness.com/accounting/methods-standards/209328-1.html

A Listing of Some Hedge Accounting Restatements for 2005 (see Page 3 of the online version)
"Lost in the Maze Problems with hedge accounting caused a wave of restatements in 2005:  Are FASB's rules too hard to follow, or are companies simply too lax?" by Linda Corman, CFO Magazine, May 2005 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/6874855/1/c_8435337

Alternative approaches to testing hedge effectiveness under SFAS No. 133 --- http://www.allbusiness.com/accounting/methods-standards/209328-1.html


Derivatives One has some basic free tools --- http://www.derivativesone.com/kb/hedge_effectiveness.aspx


There are a number of commercial vendors of FAS 133 and IAS 39 compliance software. A sampling is shown below:

FinancialCAD --- http://www.financialcad.com/ 

FinancialCAD provides software and services that support the valuation and risk management of financial securities and derivatives that is essential for banks, corporate treasuries and asset management firms. FinancialCAD’s industry standard financial analytics are a key component in FinancialCAD solutions that are used by over 25,000 professionals in 60 countries.

Also see http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3002428/c_3046496

COMSOL --- http://www.comsol-online.com/content.php?si=317&id=134

INNSINC --- http://www.inssinc.com/?issadsrc=google&gclid=CO38pY7f_I4CFTaoGgodgyqT2w

FUTRAK workstation offers all of the features necessary to significantly reduce the time required to manage your hedging activities, provide management with all the control tools necessary to comply with SarbOx 404, satisfy auditors with documentary evidence needed to justify your company's use of derivative hedge accounting, and eliminate earnings volatility.

Also see http://www.bobsguide.com/guide/news/21544.html

Hedge Trackers ---  http://www.hedgetrackers.com/whatweoffer/toolsandsoftware.htm

TPG Software --- http://www.tpgsoftware.com/CustServiceCenter/Docs/Windows/DerivativeGenius_files/DerivativeGenius.htm

MBRM --- http://www.mbrm.com/

Allegro (especially good for energy companies) --- http://www.allegrodev.com/solutions_app_riskMgmt.asp?c=positions

Sunguard Bancware --- http://www.sungard.com/bancware/menus/brochures/bancwarealmbrochure.pdf

Treasury Compliance --- http://www.fas133.com/search/search_article.cfm?page=11&areaid=362

 


 

"What’s a “big” system? February 20, 2001, by Nilly Essaides --- http://www.fas133.com/search/search_article.cfm?page=11&areaid=362 

Looking for a “big” system to solve your FAS 133 and risk management needs? You may be looking in the wrong place, depending on your definition of “big.”

The term “big” and “small” have been commonly used in describing software applications. But what does it really mean? Does big mean complex or fully integrated? Does small mean cheap or simple?

It used to be that “big” meant expensive systems requiring an army of on site consultants to help implement and configure. The bigger the price tag, it seemed, the bigger the system. But is price tag still the determining factor? With new web technologies and risk management accounting requirements, the definition of size may be irrelevant or at least in a state of flux.

As the dust settles on the vendor universe in our FAS 133 System Survey it appears that some expensive systems, and some very inexpensive ones may both fall into the “big” category. The key: Being able to track the hedge through the FAS 133 hedge accounting process, dynamically and with a clear audit trail.

The compliance process

Compliance with FAS 133 is an ongoing process, with four distinct elements:

(1) Calculating fair value. Step one in the compliance process is valuation of hedges and underlying exposures. While some companies have had their own pricing capability for some time, many others have relied on banks and other providers for that information. With FAS 133 now a reality, companies with anything more than a handful of derivatives are better off having their own fair value (hence system and pricing feed) capacity. (Although the FASB has not prescribed a particular fair-value model—leaving that up to the market and auditors’ discretion. That means that some companies may be able to continue relying on the values provided by the banks’ monthly swap ticket, for example.)

(2) Performing effectiveness testing. For companies deciding to go for special accounting, the core of FAS 133 is the effectiveness test. It’s important to remember hedge accounting is an option that some companies may choose to forego. “Quite a few of our large European clients have opted not to do hedge accounting,” reports Ritta Kuusela, accounting product manager with software vendor Trema. “They just decided that it’s too much hassle.” The same is true with some large US MNCs as well.

However, that said, companies that want special accounting will need to run the hedge and underlying through some rigorous testing. FAS 133 not prescribe exactly what sort of test companies must use. The standard (and consequent DIG/FASB guidance) requires two types of tests: One for measuring prospective effectiveness or the likelihood of highly effective offset of fair value, and the other, an ongoing measure of actual, dollar offset. Our survey shows a certain common threat among the various tests offered by compliant systems, but the jury is still out on the “best” test. Some outsiders, like fixed income specialist Andrew Kalotay of Andrew Kalotay Associates Inc., maintain that it’s critical that companies identify a test that works for risk management and accounting purposes. Some of the accounting-focused testing, he cautions, may result in non-effective hedges and hits to the income statement.

(3) Making the accounting entries – Finally, there’s the need to make the actual G/L entries that correspond to the results of the effectiveness test and fair value models. These entries are tedious and confusing and a challenge that perhaps can be only alleviated using an integrated system approach. We’ve addressed these issues at length with our FAS 133 System Readiness Survey.

(4) Documentation, documentation, documentation. However, underlying all three compliance process elements is the constant need for documentation. Companies need to document compliance from day 1 of the hedge, through effectiveness testing as well as any changes in the risk management activity.

“Documentation does not mean a long and verbose document about your hedge policy,” explains Elie Zabal, CEO of software vendor Inssinc, whose product Futrak 2000 provided perhaps the most extensive “documentation” back up among our early-bird respondents to the FAS 133 system survey. Rather, he says, “it’s the ability to dynamically track your hedges.”

For example, what happens when treasury decides to terminate a hedge, unexpectedly? The system needs to know to generate a memo, noting the hedge was terminated, while keeping OCI gain/loss in OCI until the underlying exposure is recognized, which could be months later. “The real issue is being able to prove what you did, that what you are doing is correct and that you are not manipulating earnings.”

While FAS 133 has no restrictions on terminating hedges, it is sensitive to any attempts to manipulate income numbers. In addition, notes Brian Ferguson of Open Link Financial, systems must be able to track component hedges or components of a hedged portfolio and make the necessary entries to OCI and income, and produce the reports.

Indeed, this latter phase of the compliance process may be the most taxing. “Effectiveness and mark-to-market are the simplest components,” argues Mr. Zabal. He notes that mark-to-market values for hedgers need only be derived once a quarter under FAS 133. Plus, there are no precise requirements as to the “quality” of that number and its precision (i.e., the type of fair value methodology/model hedgers should use).

“Fair value for traders operating with razor-thin margins is one thing; fair value for periodic accounting evaluations is another. Companies with a handful of hedges may simply rely on their banks for this quarterly valuation,” he says. “I would not trade on this value, but it’s sufficient for fair valuing..” However, you would still need a system to track and document effectiveness, generate journal entries and recognize AOCI at the right time. “That,” says Mr. Zabal, “no bank can do for you.” As to more active hedgers – they probably already have ways to price their instruments, and if they don’t they should.

Meeting the process challenges So how can you tell a big system from a small one? As far as FAS 133 is concerned, big systems are the ones that truly allow you to continue your hedging business undisturbethe system creates the audit trail that the auditors and the SEC will need to see. That means being able to terminate hedges, hedge portfolios, etc., while the system keeps track of OCI values and entries, and generates the necessary memos regarding hedge activity.

In addition, look for a system that gives you more than just compliance, but allows you to improve the risk management culture, for example one that includes an effectiveness test that offers real insight into the chances that your hedge will remain effective throughout its life.

 

The FAS133 Compliance Module Wall Street Systems --- http://www.wallstreetsystems.com/fas133/news-compl.htm 

"FAS 133’s bias against macro hedging, its focus on individual hedges, and its demanding detailed disclosure will generate a quarterly calculation nightmare for many companies."

--Jeff Wallace, Greenwich Treasury Advisors, LLC

In June of 1998, The Financial Accounting Standards Board released Statement Number 133. This statement revised accounting and reporting standards for derivative instruments. It requires that banks and corporations classify derivatives as either assets or liabilities and that these instruments be measured at "fair value".

The accounting steps necessary to bring a bank or a corporation into compliance with Statement 133 are substantial. Exposures must be linked to hedges, instruments must be fairly valued, and the results must be appropriately posted. Following this inventory and accounting process, firms must report hedge effectiveness. The reporting requirements under this statement require full documentation of objectives and policies and require a variety of reporting summaries in various formats.

The process of identifying derivatives in itself presents substantial complexities. The definition of a derivative is broad and includes instruments such as insurance policies, production contracts, procurement contracts and other "non-financial" obligations.

Because of the complexities of inventory, accounting, and reporting associated with compliance to Statement 133, the Financial Accounting Standards Board delayed implementation of this standard believing that neither system developers nor treasuries would be ready to handle these new requirements.

Wall Street Systems is in the business of creating enterprise-wide client/server front to back treasury solutions for the largest banks and corporations in the world. This product, The Wall Street System, integrates all geographies, all financial products, all credit and market risk controls, and all accounting, confirmation, and cash management processes into a single, global, real-time, 24/7 system.

Because of the strength of this straight-through processing system, and because The Wall Street System has long offered the capability to capture exposures and perform fair market valuations of derivative transactions, Wall Street Systems was able to offer a fully functioning FAS133 Module to its customers in advance of the original FAS 133 implementation date.

The Wall Street Systems FAS 133 Module reports hedge gains and losses at fair market value each day. The hedge tracking and linking feature packages exposures and hedge transactions together and automatically adjusts earnings and Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) accounts. The module also creates all reports and documentation required by FAS 133.

The key features of The Wall Street System FAS 133 Module are:

Fair Market Valuation Exposures and derivatives are marked-to-market and compared through hedge effectiveness ratios Hedge Profile Database and Query Each hedge package is stored by date. Closing values, changes in value, and effectiveness ratios are preserved in the database. Automatic Linking and Tracking Trades and the underlying exposures are linked to a hedge profile. The profile categorizes the hedge by type and includes hedge objectives, valuation method, risk management policy and transaction details. The hedge profile is linked to the documentation. The combination forms a hedge "package" that drives all FAS 133 events. Cash Flow OCI Adjusting Automatic examination of the P&L status of each hedge package at the close of business each day. Automatic adjustment of OCI and P&L accounts. Automatic posting of derivatives fair market values to earnings with the effective portion of the hedge reclassified into OCI Audit Capability Time series database keeps copies of each hedge package status at the close of each day. There is a full audit query capability imbedded in the database. Forecasting The System can generate a P&L forecast from the OCI account that covers the next 12 months.

The comprehensive functionality of the Wall Street System FAS 133 Module is achieved through the application of straight through processing on a global scale with a system that covers the front, middle and back office.

Treasurers will have difficulty with FAS 133 compliance if the treasury runs on a "best of breed" model rather than a global STP model. In the best of breed model, trading, risk management and accounting functions are distributed across a mix of systems that share information with varying degrees of efficiency. For this model to work, each resident system must capture relevant FAS 133 information to its database and have the capacity to share that information with all other member systems. This requires a high degree of flawless data exchange and systems integration, features not normally associated with the best of breed solution. A fragmented treasury desktop makes it extraordinarily difficult to manage hedge relationships from front to back.

The Wall Street System, being a single global system for 24/7 treasury operations faces none of these data exchange obstacles. Hedge package information is shared easily, stored safely, and posted correctly.

The Wall Street System is ready now with a 100% compliant FAS 133 Module


FAS 133, IAS 39 and the importance of integrated treasury systems as discussed by Keith Bergman Of Wall Street Systems  --- http://www.wallstreetsystems.com/fas133/news-risk-mag.htm 

The long awaited Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 133 (FAS 133) takes effect for all publically traded companies beginning with the first fiscal period after June 15th, 2000. This requires all derivatives to be fair valued with the change in value recorded on the balance sheet and in earnings. The statement also requires disclosure and documentation for all hedging activities.

In the past companies have done little to recognize the fair value of derivative contracts. Premiums were amortized, discounts were accreted, and interest was accrued. Now both exposures and hedging instruments must be fair valued and measured against each other to assure hedge validity. This assessment and proof of effectiveness must be provided quarterly at a minimum.

The board's objective is to disclose the market risk potential of derivative contracts. The Security Exchange Commission has supported this change ever since Procter & Gamble and American Greetings incurred substantial losses as a result of derivatives trading activity.

Marking derivatives to market provides investors with a more accurate picture of a company's current financial position. The result of this approach is that company earnings are subjected to market volatility. FAS 133 moves the board closer to their final objective of fair valuing the entire balance sheet.

Best-of-Breed solutions are no longer feasible. Some firms are at a disadvantage because they have installed individual systems that provide specific functionality for specific purposes. These best of breed solutions individually focus on activities like cash management, debt issuance, and trading of foreign exchange, options, and swap contracts. These systems, by their nature, do not share information.

However, these best of breed solutions create an onerous FAS 133 compliance burden. The statement requires integration between exposures and hedging instruments in order to properly generate the appropriate accounting entries.

For example, cash management systems will have to fair value foreign currency cash forecasts on a forward rate NPV basis similar to a foreign exchange contract. Foreign exchange systems that deferred forward points in the past will have to mark-to-markets the foreign exchange contract and record the full value and change in value in both the balance sheet and in earnings. Then, in order to reduce the resulting income statement volatility, the effective portion of the hedge, the lesser of the absolute value maintained within the two separate systems, must be recorded in Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) leaving the ineffective portion in Earnings. This requires integration. Otherwise, the FAS 133 requirements will not be met.

Integrated systems such as the Wall Street System are filling the void. Treasurers are looking for straight-forward deal capture and position tracking systems that provide real time p&l and can also determine how much is at risk and how much to hedge in order to comply with FAS 133. Integrated treasury management systems such as the Wall Street System do not have the gaps that exist in best-of-breed solutions. They also provide the only possible way of continuing to hedge portfolios in a macro sense under the restricted and limited scope of "Portfolio Hedging".

Macro Hedging under FAS 133 In the past and even today, treasurers and risk managers have managed to establish macro-hedging strategies designed to reduce risk. These strategies involve hedging overall net positions or partial positions and are performed for an economic reason.

FAS 133 completely eliminate the macro hedging approach.

The statement is the accountants attempt to record economic reality within an accounting framework.

As a result, the statement requires tracking of earnings volatility. The offsetting effects of macro hedges are no longer recognized. The board has decided that hedge accounting will only apply if the hedge proves to be effective. Otherwise, only the change in value of the derivative gets recorded in earnings with little or no offset. The board had defined effectiveness to be similar to FAS 80's definition of "highly correlated" ratio of 80% - 120%. Managers are required to provide proof that prospectively the hedge is going to remain valid and retrospectively that the hedge was valid. Recently, the board allowed managers to used regression analysis and statistical correlation as proof instead of using the "Dollar Offset Ratio Method".

Macro hedging interest risk under the FAS 133 can only be performed within the limited framework of "Portfolio Hedging". "Portfolio Hedging" allows like positions, not netted positions, to be hedged with an offsetting hedging instrument, usually a derivative. The concept is that the change in value of each individual exposure component in the portfolio cannot change by less than or greater than 90% - 110% of the overall change in value of the portfolio. If any one component falls outside of the range, then the entire portfolio does not comply.

Portfolio Hedging Illustration

Exposure Hedging Instrument Total value = 150 Total value = 160

Dollar Offset Ratio (150/160) = 93.75%

Individual Exposure Values Last Period This Period % Change 1. 45 50 90.00% 2. 72 75 96.00% 3. 23 25 92.00% ______ ______ ______ 140 150 93.33%

Note: the combination of the dollar offset ratio being within the required range and the individual components being within the required range qualifies the hedge for hedge accounting.

Without an integrated system it is nearly impossible to hedge using the "Portfolio Hedging" concept because isolated systems cannot keep track of the packaged transactions.

Special accounting and documentation FAS 133 requires additional accounting for all three types of hedges. For Cash Flow hedges, since fair value of the forecasted cash flow or variable rate instrument is not recorded, the effective portion of the hedge can be removed from earnings and placed within the equity section of the balance sheet. In order to determine the effective portion, the system must calculate the change in value for both the exposure and hedging instrument. The lesser of the absolute values is placed in Other Comprehensive Income (OCI). The system must determine the exact amount to be removed from earnings. Fair Value hedges require the recording of the exposures change in value in order to offset the earnings effect from the hedging instrument. Net Investment hedges require the effective portion to be recorded within Cumulative Translation Adjustment account instead of earnings. Here again, full system integration is required.

Other Comprehensive Income Calculation and Posting Illustration Derivative Hedged Item Lesser Earnings Period Cum Period Cum Absolute OCI Period Change Change Change Change Cum Chg Change Balence Change Balence 1. 100 100 (96) (96) 96 194 32 96 96 4 4 2. 94 194 (101) (197) 198 194 (4) 0 3. (162) 32 160 (37) (162) 32 0 0

Documentation also poses a challenge if data is distributed among isolated systems. The statement requires that information be documented on a per hedge basis. Information regarding the details of the individual transactions must be disclosed. For those without an integrated treasury, documentation will be an onerous manual task.

International Accounting Standard 39 The technology issues raised by FAS 133 will not remain exclusive to the United States for long. International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, Europe's version of FAS 133, 125, 115, and 114, is on its way with the effective date on or after 1 January 2001. Early evaluation of that standard suggests that it will be at least as rigorous as FAS 133. IAS 39 goes beyond the issue of hedge accounting to require that all financial assets and liabilities must be initially measured at cost. For derivatives and traded assets and liabilities, an additional adjustment is required to record the instrument's fair market value. IAS 39 provides the choice of placing the change in value entirely within earnings or within the equity section of the balance sheet. However, the statement only allows the non-traded portion of the financial instrument to be placed within the equity section of the balance sheet. Since all derivatives are considered trading instruments, the entire change in value must be placed within earnings. Unlike FAS 133, IAS 39 allows financial assets and liabilities to be used as valid hedging instruments for hedging of foreign currency risk. FAS 133 only allows this for hedging a net investment in a foreign currency. Like FAS 133, hedge accounting is permitted under IAS 39 as long as the hedge is clearly defined, measurable, and effective.

Wall Street System's Approach At Wall Street Systems, we have kept both FAS 133 and IAS 39 in mind when developing our compliance product. As a provider of a fully integrated treasury solution, we have been able to leverage the advantage of complete integration into a product that totally complies with both the FAS 133 and IAS 39 standards. With a system that, by its very nature, posts changes in derivative values for traders and management across the entire treasury operation, we have the necessary system architecture in place to allow us to develop a product that would meet the standards. The regulatory and operational environment will grow more complex over time. Technology planning must incorporate this assumption and turn toward effective integration strategies to meet the challenges ahead.

 

 

For other software see fair value, Ineffectiveness, and Risk Metrics )

 

Special Purpose Entities (SPE Accounting and FIN 46)
What's Right and What's Wrong With (SPEs), SPVs, and VIEs --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm 

Spot Price or Spot Rate =

the current market price of a commodity or the current market rate for interest or foreign exchange conversions.  Importance of spot prices or spot rates appears in nearly every SFAS example.  For instance see  Example 10 Paragraphs 165-172..   Also see intrinsic value, Tom/Next and yield curve.

Stock Appreciation Right = =

a form of employee compensation that gives cash or stock to employees based upon a contractual formula pegged to the change in common stock price.

Stop-loss/Take-profit =

a strategy under which a company asks a dealer to buy or sell a currency if and when a particular rate is reached. Assuming the willingness and reliability of the dealer, it can be an inexpensive alternative to an option.

Stress Test

See Stress Test

Strike Price =

the exercise price of an option.   This is a key component in measuring an option's intrinsic value.  See option .

Strip =

see interest-only strip, principal-only strip, and embedded derivatives.

Structure

The term "structure" is ambiguous until placed in a particular context. In one context a "structured note" is a derivative financial instrument or combination of such instruments whose value is based on an "underlying" index. It may also refer to using a swap to change the cash flows of a financial instrument. It can be a synthetic substitute for a financial instrument that is not a derivative. In another context, "structured" may mean something else entirely. Structured financing may, in one context, refer to financing based upon anticipated cash flows rather than current value of an asset or collateral.  See Compound Derivatives and Synthetic.

With the credit markets convulsing and merger activity slowing, what, pray tell, is the fate of law-firm associates who serve the titans of Wall Street? For sure, the most vulnerable are lawyers in so-called structured-finance practices. These are attorneys involved in the process of packaging assets such as mortgages, auto loans or credit-card debt into securities. But will layoffs creep into other practice areas as well?
Peter Lattman, "Structured Finance Proves To Be a Vulnerable Area," The Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2008; Page B17 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120045941678994161.html?mod=todays_us_marketplace

For technical details see the following book:
Structured Finance and Collateralized Debt Obligations: New Developments in Cash and Synthetic Securitization (Wiley Finance) by Janet M. Tavakoli (2008)

Finance Tutorial (of sorts):  A Primer on Foreign Exchange Derivatives

"Of Knock-ins, Knock-outs & KIKOs," by Ranju Sarkar, Business Standard, April 2, 2008 --- Click Here
http://www.business-standard.com/common/news_article.php?leftnm=0&subLeft=1&chklogin=N&autono=318661&tab=r

OPTIONS
 
Option is a contract which gives a buyer a right, but not an obligation, to buy an underlying/ currency/ stock/ commodities at a pre-determined rate, known as strike price, for settlement at a future day. The right to buy is called a call option. The right to sell is called a put option. There are different types of options.
 
Knock-out option: An option which ceases to exist if the knock-out event occurs. A knock out happens when a particular level is hit (like the Swiss franc touching the level of 1.10 against the dollar), when the option ceases to exist.
 
Knock-in option: An option which comes into existence if the knock-in event happens. It works exactly the reverse of a knock-out. In a knock-in, an option comes into existence if a certain level is hit.
 
KIKO (knock-in, knock-out): This is an option with both a knock-in and knock-out. The option kicks in, or comes alive, if the knock-in is seen. The option ceases to exist if anytime, pre or post, the knock-in event happening, the knock-out happens.
 
One-touch option: When a certain level (of any currency pair) is hit, a company buying an option gets a pre-determined pay-off (it could be $10,000, $20,000, or $30,000). This is how companies made money through derivative deals last year.
 
Double-touch option: There are two levels. If either of the two levels is hit, the company buying an option will get a pay off. All options require a buyer to pay a premium. Conversely, sellers of options would receive a premium.
 
STRUCTURES
 
Banks, foreign exchange consultants work out zero-cost option structures/ strategies for companies so that they don’t have to pay any premium. To make a zero-cost structure, a company has to buy some option and sell some option so that the premium is zero (the premium paid for buying an option is set-off against the premium received for selling the option).
 
For instance, when the rupee-dollar parity is 40.10, an exporter buys a put option at the rate of 39.50, and sells a call option for 41.00 for delivery of exports at the end of June, July and August an export commitment of $1 million each month. By entering into this contract, the best rate the exporter can get is 41, and the worst rate it can get is 39.50.
 
If the rupee goes below 39.50, the exporter will be able to encash its receivables at the rate of 39.50. If the rupee is trading between 39.50 and 41, the exporter will be able to encash its receivables at the prevailing market rate.
 
However, if the rupee is ruling above 41, it will get its receivables at Rs 41 as he’s locked in that level. This kind of structure is popular with software companies, who can realise their receivables in a range (between the best and worst), unlike in a forward contract where they get locked in at a particular rate.
 
Banks also offer, what they call, a 1:2 leveraged option, wherein a company buys some calls, makes some puts and use a combination of these to create zero-cost strategy for the company. Companies that have big positions in derivative trades have been selling KIKOs, or a series of KIKOs and buying one-touch options and double-touch options. These structures helped companies make money last year.

Continued in article

Bob Jensen's links to accounting, finance, and business glossaries --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbus.htm

Bob Jensen's links to FAS 133 and IAS 39 Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments Glossary --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm

Bob Jensen's FAS 133 and IAS 39 Tutorials on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

 

Struggle Statement =

a statement of unrecognized gains and losses that do not impact upon the derivation of net income.  The term is used in England where struggle statements are used in place of disclosing unrecognized gains and losses in equity statements or comprehensive income disclosures pursuant with SFAS 130.  The IASC permits struggle statement disclosures of unrecognized cash flow hedge gains and losses, whereas the FASB in the United States requires the use of comprehensive income accounting.  Paul Pacter briefly refers to the struggle statement in my pacter.htm file.  See comprehensive income.

Click here to view Paul Pacter's commentary on the struggle statement.

Swap =

an agreement in which two parties exchange payments over a period of time. The purpose is normally to transform debt payments from one interest rate base to another, for example, from fixed to floating or from one currency to another. See swaption, currency swap, contango swap, earnings management,  and interest rate swap .

Swaption =

an option on a swap.  Swaptions are usually interest rate options used to hedge long-term debt.  When a company has an interest rate swap, a swaption can be used to close out the swap.  A swaption can also be used to enter into an interest rate swap.   The majority are European options in terms of settlements.  Swaptions may be cash flow hedges, including written swaptions (i.e. a written option on a swap).  Paragraph 20c on Page 12 makes it possible for a swaption to qualify as a fair value hedge under the following circumstances:

If a written option is designated as hedging a recognized asset or liability, the combination of the hedged item and the written option provides at least as much potential for gains as a result of a favorable change in the fair value of the combined instruments as exposure to losses from an unfavorable change in their combined fair value. That test is met if all possible percentage favorable changes in the underlying (from zero percent to 100 percent) would provide at least as much gain as the loss that would be incurred from an unfavorable change in the underlying of the same percentage.

One of my students defines the following types of swaptions: 

call swaption - type of swaption giving the owner the right to enter into a swap where he receives fixed and pays floating

callable swap - type of swaption in which the fixed payer has the right, but not the obligation, to terminate the swap on or
before a scheduled maturity date

expiration date - date by which the option must be exercised

extendible swap - type of swaption in which the counterparties have the right to extend the swap beyond its stated maturity date as per an agreed upon schedule

put swaption - type of swaption giving the owner the right to enter into a swap where he receives floating and pays fixed

putable swap - type of swaption in which the variable payer has the right, but not the obligation, to terminate the swap on or before a scheduled maturity date

Her entire project is linked below:

Suzanne M. Winegar For her case and case solution entitled Understanding swaptions: A case study click on http://www.resnet.trinity.edu/users/swinegar/swaption.htm .  She writes as follows:

The objective of this case is to provide an example of a company that purchases an interest rate swaption in order to hedge the variability of its interest payments. Swaptions are a type of derivative financial instrument for which there are no accounting standards or guidelines. This case explains one method that could be used to account for swaptions and mark them to market. In order to mark the swaptions to market, this case uses the Black-Scholes Model to determine the fair value of the swaption. The case presents a series of questions dealing with valuation and accounting issues, and ends with a discussion of the risk involved in using swaption derivatives.

Swaption Valuation

 Start here --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swaption#Valuation

 Especially note the link at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volatility_smile#Implied_volatility_surface

More details are provided at http://helecon3.hkkk.fi/pdf/diss/a238.pdf

Some books and papers by Ira Kawaller may be of interest:

http://www.amazon.com/Fixed-Income-Synthetic-Assets-Strategies-Professionals/dp/product-description/0471551627

http://www.sheshunoff.com/ideanet/index.php?itemid=237

 

Also see
http://search.barnesandnoble.com/The-Complete-Guide-to-Option-Pricing-Formulas/Espen-Gaarder-Haug/e/9780071389976

And
http://books.google.com/books?id=IRW7uu0flG0C&pg=PA202&lpg=PA202&dq=Swaptions+"Kawaller"&source=bl&ots=Nw1ws8w_16&sig=vPAYQ8LguC8mGEH_fsN02p7rJlA&hl=en&ei=kK-OSrDpG4jLlAeNruW1DA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=10#v=onepage&q=Swaptions "Kawaller"&f=false

 

Synthetic Instrument =

the artificial creation of an asset using combinations of other assets. For example, call option or a put option (which amounts to a synthetic long stock), or a long put option and a short call option (a synthetic short stock).  In the area of futures contracts, a synthetic long futures position is created by combining a long call option and a short put option for the same expiration date and the same strike price. A synthetic short futures is created by combining a long put and a short call with the same expiration date and the same strike price.   See Compound Derivatives and "Structure."

For technical details see the following book:
Structured Finance and Collateralized Debt Obligations: New Developments in Cash and Synthetic Securitization (Wiley Finance) by Janet M. Tavakoli (2008)

 

 

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |

T-Terms

Tailing Strategy = see futures contract.

Take-or-Pay

A form of contracting commonly used for off-balance sheet financing.   Three or more credit-worthy companies form a joint venture in which no single company has voting control and does not have to bring the joint venture into its consolidated financial statements.  The joint venture is able to borrow enormous amounts of capital because of purchase contracts with its owners to "take the product" such as crude oil produced or "pay" for the product whether it is taken or not.  When the "product" is a pipeline distribution service rather than a physical product per se, the contracts are generally called "through put" contracts.  The FASB wavered on taking specific action on such contracts in FAS 133.  For details see short.

Tandem Hedge = see foreign currency hedge.

Tax Accounting for Derivatives

Accounting Tax Rules for Derivatives --- http://www.investmentbooks.com/tek9.asp?pg=products&specific=joongngrm 
by Mark J.P. Anson
Publisher's Price: $150
ISBN#: 1883249694
Catalog #: B14982W

Convergence of Tax and Book Accounting for Derivatives --- http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/HedgeWorld.pdf 

Tax Goal of Derivatives

From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on July 27, 2007

IRS Probes Tax Goal of Derivatives
by Anita Raghavan
The Wall Street Journal
Jul 19, 2007
Page: C1
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118480967033571172.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
 

TOPICS: Tax Evasion, Tax Havens, Tax Regulations, Taxation, Accounting, Advanced Financial Accounting, Derivatives, Personal Taxation, Tax Avoidance

SUMMARY: "The IRS has sent requests to Citigroup and Lehman Brothers asking for information about derivatives trades made with hedge-fund clients." Offshore investors, including U.S. hedge funds with offshore locations, will undertake derivative transactions with names such as "Yield Enhancement," "Dividend Arbitrage," and "Tax Efficiency." The transactions allow a non-holder of a stock to purchase a derivative through which the investor will receive appreciation on an underlying stock, much as a call option will generate, plus a cash payment equal to a dividend distribution on that stock. As in a call option, the purchaser pays a fee, but potentially may avoid significant taxation. In order to provide the U.S. tax rules in this area, the article quotes a KPMG memorandum to its professionals alerting them to the IRS scrutiny."'The United States generally imposes U.S. withholding taxes on dividends paid by U.S. corporations to foreign taxpayers...but it does not impose U.S. withholding tax on foreign source income paid to foreign persons...KPMG say net income paid to a foreign person is 'generally treated as foreign source income and, thus, exempt from U.S. withholding tax." On the other hand, another IRS guideline, Notice 97-66, would indicate taxation of a foreign person is required if the derivative transaction is deemed to merely substitute for a securities lending transaction.

QUESTIONS: 
1.) Define the term derivative. Explain how the transactions described in this article meet the definition of a derivative security.

2.) The IRS is questioning the business purpose of these derivative securities other than tax motivations. How could these transactions provide a valid business purpose or financial interest for each party to the transaction? (Hint: think of a call option as an analogy, identifying the value to the buyer and the seller of the option.)

3.) How are these derivatives possibly used to reduce tax liabilities? In your answer, comment on the worldwide location of the recipient of payouts from these derivative securities.

4.) What are the tax rules precluding use of these derivatives merely to avoid paying taxes? How do these rules rely on establishing the intent of undertaking transactions in these derivative securities? (You may refer solely to descriptions in the article to answer this question.)

5.) How do the names of these derivative securities indicate that they may be undertaken merely to avoid paying taxes?
 

Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
 

Bob Jensen's free FAS 133 and IAS 39 tutorials (including videos) are linked at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

 

Tax Hedging =

 

FAS 133 permits after-tax hedging of foreign currency risk and/or market price risk.  The hedge must be entered into to reduce taxes, and the item hedged must be ordinary assets or liabilities in the normal course of the taxpayer's business.  

March 25, 2002 message from Richard Newmark [richard.newmark@phduh.com

Bob,
I thought you might be interested in this.
Rick
-------------------------
Richard Newmark
Assistant Professor of Accounting
University of Northern Colorado
Kenneth W. Monfort College of Business
Campus Box 128
Greeley, CO  80639
(970) 351-1213 Office
(801) 858-9335 Fax (free e-mail fax at efax.com)
richard.newmark@PhDuh.com
http://PhDuh.com
 


IRS finalizes hedging regs with liberalizations
TD 8985; Reg. § 1.1221-2, Reg. § 1.1256(e)-1
IRS has issued final regs for determining the character of gain or loss from hedging transactions.
Background. As a result of a '99 law change, capital assets don't include any hedging transaction clearly identified as such before the close of the day on which it was acquired, originated, or entered into. (Code Sec. 1221(a)(7)) Before the change, IRS had issued final regs in '94 providing ordinary character treatment for most business hedges. Last year, IRS issued proposed changes to the hedging regs to reflect the '99 statutory change (see Weekly Alert ¶ 6 2/1/2001). IRS has now finalized the regs with various changes, many of which are pro-taxpayer. The regs apply to transactions entered into after Mar 19, 2002. However, the Preamble states that IRS won't challenge any transaction entered into after Dec. 16, '99, and before Mar. 20, 2002, that satisfies the provisions of either the proposed or final regs.

Hedging transactions. A hedging transaction is a transaction entered into by the taxpayer in the normal course of business primarily to manage risk of interest rate, price changes, or currency fluctuations with respect to ordinary property, ordinary obligations, or borrowings of the taxpayer. (Code Sec. 1221(b)(2)(A)(i); Code Sec. 1221(b)(2)(A)(ii)) A hedging transaction also includes a transaction to manage such other risks as IRS may prescribe in regs. (Code Sec. 1221(b)(2)(A)(iii)) IRS has the authority to provide regs to address nonidentified or improperly identified hedging transactions (Code Sec. 1221(b)(2)(B)), and hedging transactions involving related parties. (Code Sec. 1221(b)(3))

Key changes in final regs. The final regs include the following changes from the proposed regs.

    ... Both the final and the proposed regs provide that they do not apply to determine the character of gain or loss realized on a section 988 transaction as defined in Code Sec. 988(c)(1) or realized with respect to any qualified fund as defined in section Code Sec. 988(c)(1)(E)(iii). The proposed regs also provided that their definition of a hedging transaction would apply for purposes of certain other international provisions of the Code only to the extent provided in regs issued under those provisions. This is eliminated in the final regs because the other references were to proposed regs and to Code sections for which the relevant regs have not been issued in final form. The Preamble states that later regs will specify the extent to which the Reg. § 1.1221-2 hedging transaction rules will apply for purposes of those other regs and related Code sections.

    ... Several commentators noted that the proposed regs used risk reduction as the operating standard to implement the risk management definition of hedging. They found that risk reduction is too narrow a standard to encompass the intent of Congress, which defined hedges to include transactions that manage risk of interest rate, price changes or currency fluctuations. In response, IRS has restructured the final regs to implement the risk management standard. No definition of risk management is provided, but instead, the rules characterize a variety of classes of transactions as hedging transactions because they manage risk. (Reg. § 1.1221-2(c)(4); Reg. § 1.1221-2(d))

    ... The proposed regs provided that a taxpayer has risk of a particular type only if it is at risk when all of its operations are considered. Commentators pointed out that businesses often conduct risk management on a business unit by business unit basis. In response, the final regs permit the determination of whether a transaction manages risk to be made on a business-unit basis provided that the business unit is within a single entity or consolidated return group that adopts the single-entity approach. (Reg. § 1.1221-2(d)(1))

        RIA observation: As a result of the two foregoing changes made by the final regs, more transactions will qualify as hedging transactions. This is good for taxpayers because any losses from the additional transactions qualifying as hedges will be accorded ordinary treatment.

      ... In response to comments, the final regs have been restructured to separately address interest rate hedges and price hedges. (Reg. § 1.1221-2(d)(1)(iv); Reg. § 1.1221-2(d)(2))

      ... In response to comments, the final regs provide that a transaction that converts an interest rate from a fixed rate to a floating rate or from a floating rate to a fixed rate manages risk. (Reg. § 1.1221-2(d)(2))

      ... The final regs provide that IRS may identify by future published guidance specified transactions that are determined not to be entered into primarily to manage risk. (Reg. § 1.1221-2(d)(5))

      ... The proposed regs sought comments on expanding the definition of hedging transactions to include transactions that manage risks other than interest rate or price changes, or currency fluctuations with respect to ordinary property, ordinary obligations or borrowings of the taxpayer. While comments were received, the final regs did not make any changes in this area. However, IRS continues to invite comments on the types of risks that should be covered, including specific examples of derivative transactions that may be incorporated into future guidance, as well as the appropriate timing of inclusion of gains and losses with respect to such transactions.

      ... With respect to the identification requirement, a rule has been added specifying additional information that must be provided for a transaction that counteracts a hedging transaction. (Reg. § 1.1221-2(f)(3)(v))

RIA Research References: For hedging transactions, see FTC 2d/FIN ¶ I-6218.01 ; United States Tax Reporter ¶ 12,214.80

See hedge.

Tax Rate Swap =

a swap of tax rates. One of my students wrote the following case just prior to the issuance of FAS 133:

Jennifer K. Robinson   For her case and case solution entitled TAX RATE SWAPS click on http://www.resnet.trinity.edu/users/jrobinso/Jensen.html .  She states the following:

This case examines an unusual type of derivative called a tax rate swap and its accounting treatment.  Tax rate swaps are rare due to the relatively stable nature of tax rates in most nations. In certain circumstances, however, they can provide an effective means for one company to "lock-in" its current tax rate while another company speculates that that rate will change in its favor. Examination of this case should provide an introduction to the workings of a tax rate swap, as well as the suggested accounting treatment for such a transaction. (Note: It is important to know that tax rate swaps, described in this paper, and tax swaps are very different.)

Term Structure = =

yield patterns in which returns of future cash flows are not necessarily discounted at the same interest rates.  Yield curves may have increasing or decreasing yield rates over time.  However, it much more common for the rates yields to increase over time.  Theories vary as to why.  One theory known as expectations theory based on the assumption that borrowers form long-term expectations and then choose a rollover strategy if short-term rates are less than long-term expectations and vice versa.  Lenders form their own expectations.   Expectations theory postulates that long-term interest rates are a geometric average of expected short term interest rates.   Liquidity preference theory postulates that investors add a liquidity preference premium on longer-term investments that gives rise to an upward sloping yield curve.  Liquidity preference theory is not consistent with the averaging process assumed in expectations theory.  Market segmentation theory is yet another theory used to explain term structures.  That theory postulates that the supply and demand for money is affected by market segments' demands for short term money that in turn affects the cost of coaxing short term lenders into making longer commitments.  Whatever the reasons, yield vary with the time to maturity, and this relationship of yield to time is known as term structure of interest rates.  See yield curve.

Time Value of an Option = see intrinsic value.

Tom/Next =

tomorrow next, a spot foreign exchange quotation for settlement the next business day rather than in the usual two business days. Rates for "tom/next" quotations are adjusted on a present-value basis.

 

Tranches

Tricks with Derivatives to Hide Rather Than Manage Risk:  What is a tranche?

"DEBT TRICKS:  Covering Their Assets," Fortune Magazine, March 4, 2002, by Julie Creswell --- http://www.fortune.com/indexw.jhtml?channel=artcol.jhtml&doc_id=206542 
So you think you escaped Global Crossing and Enron? Surprise! Banking's dastardly debt trick may leave you vulnerable. 

For all the talk of what banks have done wrong lately (huge write-downs! swelling bad debt!), they've also done something right: passed the buck.

Turns out it's not just lenders like J.P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup that are on the line for billions in loans to now-bankrupt entities such as Enron and Global Crossing; it's a host of hedge funds, insurance companies, and even retirement plans that bought slickly repackaged debt from them. While these complicated "credit derivatives" helped banks sidestep even bigger losses and possibly prevented systemic stress on the banking system by diffusing liabilities, unwitting investors may soon be in for a rude awakening. "One way or the other, somebody is sitting on a huge amount of risk," says Doug Noland, financial market strategist at David W. Tice & Associates. Indeed, federal banking regulators are increasing scrutiny of moves that push risky transactions off bank balance sheets, while the SEC is looking into PNC Financial for its debt-repackaging dealings. Though only the first repercussions of the credit-derivative fallout have been felt, "there's going to be a huge problem," predicts Noland. "Something's going to blow up."

Here's why: One of the more common hedges banks used is called a collateralized-debt obligation, or CDO, a bundle of around 50 corporate loans that is sliced and diced into pieces called tranches. In theory, the resulting product is akin to a mutual fund--one or two defaults don't taint the whole batch. Each tranche carries a degree of risk, from investment grade to--in trader's parlance--"toxic waste." That's why safety-conscious insurance companies and pension funds snapped up the higher-rated, lower-yielding tranches, while hedge funds and investors seeking higher returns bought the riskier tiers.

Banks love transforming loans into these derivatives because they don't have to reserve as much capital on their balance sheets, which frees up more money for new loans. CDOs are fairly new, but they're the fastest-growing fixed-income sector. In the past five years the market has swelled from a few billion dollars to more than $500 billion. When all goes as planned, investors love CDOs too--they get a steady stream of interest payments.

But this time around everything didn't go as planned. Banks started ramping up CDO sales in the late 1990s when default and bankruptcy rates were at historic lows; that persuaded less experienced investors to bite. Banks "became very good at using financial engineering to make credit risk more palatable to the end buyer," says Charles Peabody, a banking analyst at brokerage firm Ventana Capital. "But that risk just doesn't disappear." The sharp increase in defaults--from telecom startups to Kmart--caught buyers off guard, thus throwing CDOs into downgrades and losses. American Express' financial advisors group learned that lesson the hard way: It bought a batch of CDOs in 1997 to juice returns and last summer was forced to take an $860 million charge related to that ill-fated purchase. Furthermore, "there is a certain lack of transparency" in some types of CDOs, explains Mitchell Lench, senior director of European CDOs for Fitch Ratings. Investors "know the ratings, the industries, and the amount of exposure they have to the industries, but after that, it's kind of a guessing game."

As the aftermath of the credit-derivatives game unfolds, expect to see some angry players.

Bob Jensen's threads on derivatives financial instruments frauds are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#DerivativesFraud 

 

Trading Security = see available-for-sale security and held-to-maturity.

     Flow Chart for Trading Hedge Accounting --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133flow.htm 

Transaction =

a particular kind of external event, namely, an external event involving transfer of something of value (future economic benefit) between two (or more) entities. The transaction may be an exchange in which each participant both receives and sacrifices value, such as purchases or sales of goods or services; or the transaction may be a nonreciprocal transfer in which an entity incurs a liability or transfers an asset to another entity (or receives an asset or cancellation of a liability) without directly receiving (or giving) value in exchange (FASB Concepts Statement 6, paragraph 137).

Internal cost allocations or events within a consolidated reporting entity are not transactions. Internal cost allocations include depreciation and cost of sales. Events within a consolidated reporting entity include intercompany dividends and sales.

Transaction Date =

the date at which a transaction (for example, a sale or purchase of merchandise or services) is recorded in a reporting entity's accounting records.

Transaction Exposure =

exposure of a transaction denominated in a foreign currency to changes in the exchange rate between when it is agreed to and when it is settled.

Transition Adjustments = see transition settlements.

Transition Accounting

accounting rules in the transition period prior full adoption of FAS 133 or IAS 39.  FAS 133 Paragraph 48 dictates that FAS 133 accounting shall not be applied retroactively to financial statements of prior periods.  The accounting for any gains and losses on derivative instruments that arose prior to the initial application of the Statement and that were previously added to the carrying amount of recognized hedged assets or liabilities is not affected by this Statement.  Those gains and losses shall not be included in the transition adjustment (FAS 133 Paragraph 49).  

At the date of initial application, an entity shall recognize all freestanding derivative instruments (as opposed to embedded derivatives) in the statement of financial position as either assets or liabilities and measure them at fair value pursuant to FAS 133 Paragraph 17.  The difference between a derivative's previous carrying amount and its fair value shall be reported as a transition adjustment, as discussed in FAS 133 Paragraph 52.  The entity also shall recognize offsetting gains and losses on hedged assets, liabilities, and firm commitments by adjusting their carrying amounts at that date, as discussed in FAS 133 Paragraph 52b.  See FAS 133 Paragraphs 49, 
 50 and 51 for adjustments relating to separating an embedded derivative instrument separated from its host contract in conjunction with the initial application of this FAS 133.  Any gains or losses on derivative instruments reported in other comprehensive income at the date of initial application because the derivative instruments were hedging the fair value exposure of available-for-sale securities also shall be reported as transition adjustments; the offsetting losses and gains on the securities shall be accounted pursuant to FAS 133 Paragraph 5. See FAS 133 Paragraph 49.  

In contrast, the derivative instrument hedging the variable cash flow exposure of a forecasted transaction related to an available-for-sale security shall remain in accumulated other comprehensive income and shall not be reported as a transition adjustment (FAS 133 Paragraph 49).  If a derivative instrument had been hedging the variable cash flow exposure of a forecasted transaction related to an available-for-sale security that is transferred into the trading category at the date of initial application and the entity had reported a gain or loss on that derivative instrument in other comprehensive income (consistent with Paragraph 115 of Statement 115), the entity also shall reclassify those derivative gains and losses into earnings (but not report them as part of the cumulative-effect-type adjustment for the transition adjustments (FAS 133 Paragraph 55).

Any gains or losses on derivative instruments that are reported independently as deferred gains or losses in the statement of financial position at the date of initial application shall be derecognized from that statement; that derecognition also shall be reported as transition adjustment as indicated in SFAS Paragraph 52 (FAS 133 Paragraph 49).  The transition adjustment for the derivative instrument that had been designated in a hedging relationship that addressed the fair value exposure of an asset, a liability, or a firm commitment shall be reported as a cumulative-effect-type adjustment of net income.  Concurrently, any difference between the hedged item's fair value and its carrying amount shall be recognized as an adjustment of the hedged item's carrying amount at the date of initial application, but only to the extent of an offsetting transition adjustment for the derivative.
The adjustment of the hedged item's carrying amount shall also be reported as a cumulative-effect-type adjustment of net income  The transition adjustment related to the gain or loss reported in accumulated other comprehensive income on a derivative instrument that hedged an available-for-sale security, together with the loss or gain on the related security (to the extent of an offsetting transition adjustment for the derivative instrument), shall be reclassified to earnings as a cumulative-effect-type adjustment of both net income and accumulated other comprehensive income (FAS 133 Paragraph 52b).

See FAS 133 Paragraphs 52a and 52c for how the transition adjustment relating to (1) a derivative instrument that had been designated in a hedging relationship that addressed the variable cash flow exposure of a forecasted transaction and (2) a derivative instrument that had been designated in multiple hedging relationships that addressed both the fair value exposure of an asset or a liability and the variable cash flow exposure of a forecasted transaction respectively should be reported.  Other transition adjustments not encompassed by FAS 133 Paragraphs 52(a), 52(b) and 52(c) shall be reported as part of the cumulative-effect-type adjustment of net income (FAS 133 Paragraph 52d.  Note that any transition adjustment reported as a cumulative-effect-type adjustment of accumulated other comprehensive income shall be subsequently reclassified into earnings in a manner consistent with FAS 133 Paragraph 31.  (FAS 133 Paragraph 53)

In November 1999, the DIG gave in on this dispute in terms of DIG Issue No. J9 entitled "Transition Provisions: Use of the Shortcut Method in the Transition Adjustment and Upon Initial Adoption."  Now the shortcut method is available without having zero value at the transition date.

 

Derivatives Implementation Group

Title: Transition Provisions: Use of the Shortcut Method in the Transition Adjustment and Upon Initial Adoption

Paragraph references: 48, 52, 68

Date released: November 1999

QUESTIONS

For a hedging relationship that existed prior to the initial adoption of Statement 133 and that would have met the requirements for the shortcut method in paragraph 68 at the inception of that pre-existing hedging relationship, may the transition adjustment upon initial adoption be calculated as though the shortcut method had been applied since the inception of that hedging relationship?

In deciding whether the shortcut method can be applied prospectively from the initial adoption of Statement 133 to a designated hedging relationship that is the continuation of a pre-existing hedging relationship, should the requirements of paragraph 68(b) (that the derivative has a zero fair value) be based on the swap's fair value at the inception of the pre-existing hedging relationship rather than at the inception of the hedging relationship newly designated under Statement 133 upon its initial adoption?

RESPONSES

Question 1 Yes. For a hedging relationship that involves an interest rate swap designated as the hedging instrument, that existed prior to the initial adoption of Statement 133, and that would have met the requirements for the shortcut method in paragraph 68 at the inception of that pre-existing hedging relationship, an entity may choose to calculate the transition adjustment upon initial adoption either (a) pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 52, as discussed in Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. J8, "Adjusting the Hedged Item's Carrying Amount for the Transition Adjustment related to a Fair-Value-Type Hedging Relationship," or (b) as though the shortcut method had been applied since the inception of that hedging relationship, as discussed below. Under either approach, the interest rate swap would be recognized in the statement of financial position as either an asset or liability measured at fair value.

If the previous hedging relationship was a fair-value-type hedge, the difference between the swap's previous carrying amount and its fair value would be included in the transition adjustment and recorded as a cumulative-effect-type adjustment of net income. The hedged item's carrying amount would be adjusted to the amount that it would have been had the shortcut method for a fair value hedge of interest rate risk been applied from the inception of that pre-existing hedging relationship; that adjustment would be recorded as a cumulative-effect-type adjustment of net income.

If the previous hedging relationship was a cash-flow-type hedge, the difference between the swap's previous carrying amount and its fair value would be included in the transition adjustment and allocated between a cumulative-effect-type adjustment of other comprehensive income and a cumulative-effect-type adjustment of net income, as follows. The cumulative-effect-type adjustment of other comprehensive income would be the amount necessary to adjust the balance of other comprehensive income to the amount that it would have been related to that swap on the date of initial adoption had the shortcut method been applied from the inception of the pre-existing hedging relationship. The remainder, if any, of the transition adjustment would be recorded as a cumulative-effect-type adjustment of net income.

Question 2 Yes. In deciding whether the shortcut method can be applied prospectively from the initial adoption of Statement 133 to a designated hedging relationship that is the continuation of a pre-existing hedging relationship, the requirements of paragraph 68(b) (requiring that the derivative has a zero fair value) should be based on the swap's fair value at the inception of the pre-existing hedging relationship rather than at the inception of the hedging relationship newly designated under Statement 133 upon its initial adoption. However, if the hedging relationship that is designated upon adoption of Statement 133 is not the continuation of a pre-existing hedging relationship (that is, not the same hedging instrument and same hedged item or transaction), then the decision regarding whether the shortcut method can be applied prospectively from the initial adoption of Statement 133 should be based on the fair value of the swap at the date of initial adoption.

*Issue J1—Embedded Derivatives Exercised or Expired Prior to Initial Application
(Cleared 02/17/99)
*Issue J2—Hedging with Intercompany Derivatives
(Cleared 07/28/99)
*Issue J3—Requirements for Hedge Designation and Documentation on the First Day of Initial Application
(Cleared 07/28/99)
*Issue J4—Transition Adjustment for Option Contracts Used in a Cash-Flow-Type Hedge
(Cleared 07/28/99)
*Issue J5—Floating-Rate Currency Swaps
(Cleared 11/23/99)
*Issue J6—Fixed-Rate Currency Swaps
(Cleared 11/23/99)
*Issue J7—Transfer of Financial Assets Accounted for Like Available-for-Sale Securities into Trading
(Cleared 11/23/99)
Issue J8—Adjusting the Hedged Item's Carrying Amount for the Transition Adjustment related to a Fair-Value-Type Hedging Relationship
(Released 11/99)
Issue J9—Use of the Shortcut Method in the Transition Adjustment and Upon Initial Adoption
(Released 11/99)

 

The international rules of the IASC for derecognition, measurement and hedge accounting policies followed in financial statements for periods prior to the effective date of this Standard should not be reversed and, therefore, those financial statements should not be restated (IAS 39 Paragraph 172a).  Transactions entered into before the beginning of the financial year in which this Standard is initially applied should not be retrospectively designated as hedges (IAS 39 Paragraph 172g).  If a securitization, transfer, or other derecognition transaction was entered into prior to the beginning of the financial year in which this Standard is initially applied, the accounting for that transaction should not be retrospectively changed to conform to the requirements of IAS 39 (Paragraph 172h).  At the beginning of the financial year in which this Standard is initially applied, an enterprise should recognize all derivatives in its balance sheet as either assets or liabilities and should measure them at fair value (except for a derivative that is linked to and that must be settled by delivery of an unquoted entity instrument whose fair value cannot be measured reliably)
(IAS 39 Paragraph 172c).

At the beginning of the financial year in which IAS 39 is initially applied, any balance sheet positions in fair value hedges of existing assets and liabilities should be accounted for by adjusting their carrying amounts to reflect the fair value of the hedging instrument (IAS 39 Paragraph 172e).  At the beginning of the financial year in which this Standard is initially applied, an enterprise should classify a financial instrument as equity or as a liability in accordance with Paragraph 11 of IAS 39.  (See IAS 39 Paragraph 172i).

 

 

 

 

Transition Settlements =

settlements between certain transition dates such as the examples given in Paragraphs 51-53 in Pages 30-32 of FAS 133. See also net settlement.

Translation Adjustments =

adjustments that result from the process of translating financial statements from the entity's functional currency into the reporting currency.

Translation Exposure =

exposure that occurs when the financial statements of subsidiaries with foreign functional currencies are translated into the home currency of the parent for the purpose of consolidation.

 

Tutorials

                   See http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#Tutorials

 

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U-Terms

Underlying =

that which "underlies a settlement transaction formula."   FAS 133 on Page 3, Paragraph 6 defines it as a "specified interest rate, security price, commodity price, foreign exchange rate, index of prices or rate, or other variable.  An underlying may be a price or rate of an asset or liability but is not the asset or liability itself."  An underlying component by itself does not determine the net settlement.  According to Paragraph 252 on Page 133, settlement is to be based upon the interaction between movements of underlying and notional values.  See  Paragraphs 57a and Paragraphs 250-258 of FAS 133. Also see the the terms premiumunderlying, and notional.

The underlying may not be the index (e.g., price or interest rate) of a unique asset whose value may be determined by negotiation.  For example, even though though used car prices have "Blue Book" suggested price ranges, each used car is too unique to have its value determined by any market-wide price index.  No used car is sufficiently like another used car, and each used car is a unique asset.  Similarly, a quality grade of a given grain such as corn must fit the quality grade of that grain  traded on futures markets in order for the futures commodity price to be an underlying.  If the grain has a unique quality, then its price cannot be an underlying under FAS 133 the definition of a derivative instrument.

The underlying man may not be a price that any particular buyer or seller or small group of buyers and sellers can influence.  For example, if the Hunt brothers from Ft. Worth, Texas had succeeded (as they once tried) in cornering the market on high grade silver, that silver could no longer be an underlying in terms a derivative financial instrument under FAS 133.  Underlying prices must be established in competitive markets that are wide and deep.  For example, FAS 133 frequently mentions a "unique metal."  By this it is meant that the metal's price cannot be an underlying.

Paragraph 252 on Page 134 of FAS 133 mentions that the FASB considered expanding the underlying to include all derivatives based on physical variables such as rainfall levels, sports scores, physical condition of an asset, etc., but this was rejected unless the derivative itself is exchange traded.  For example, a swap payment based upon a football score is not subject to FAS 133 rules.  An option that pays damages based upon the bushels of corn damaged by hail is subject to insurance accounting rules (SFAS 60) rather than FAS 133.  A option or swap payment based upon market prices or interest rates must be accounted for by FAS 133 rules.  However, if derivative itself is exchange traded, then it is covered by FAS 133 even if it is based on a physical variable that becomes exchange traded.

For examples see cap and floater.

Most derivatives like forward, futures, and swap contracts are acquired at zero cost such that historical cost accounting is meaningless.  The exception is a purchased/written option where a small premium is paid/received to buy/sell the option.  Thus if the derivative financial instrument contract is defaulted a few minutes after being transacted there are generally zero or very small damages.  Such is not the case with traditional non-derivative financial instruments like bonds where the entire notional amounts (thousands or millions of dollars) change hands initially such that enormous damages are possible immediately after the notional amounts change hands.  In the case of of a derivative contract, the notional does not change hands.  It is only used to compute a contracted payment such as a swap payment.

For example, in the year 2004 Wells Fargo Bank sold $63 million in bonds with an interest rate "derived" from the price of a casino's common stock price.  The interest payments are "derivatives" in one sense, but the bonds are not derivative financial instruments scoped into FAS 133 due to Condition b in Paragraph 6 quoted above.  In the case of bonds, the bond holders made a $63 million initial investment of the entire notional amount.  If Wells Fargo also entered into an interest rate swap to lock in a fixed interest rate, the swap contract would be a derivative financial instrument subject to FAS 133.  However, the bonds are not derivative financial instruments under FAS 133 definitions.

For elaboration on the above example, see Derivative Financial Instruments.

 

 

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |

V-Terms


Valuation

IVSC = International Valuation Standards Council --- http://www.ivsc.org/

The IVSC is now addressing the very, very difficult problem of valuing certain types of derivative financial instruments ---
http://www.ivsc.org/news/nr/2012/nr120227.html
One of the major problems is that many derivatives instruments contracts are customized unique contracts that are not exchange traded, including forward contracts and most swaps contracts (portfolios of forward contracts).

Bob Jensen's threads on how to value interest rate swaps ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm

Note the book entitled PRICING DERIVATIVE SECURITIES, by T W Epps (University of Virginia, USA)  The book is published by World Scientific --- http://www.worldscibooks.com/economics/4415.html 

Contents:

  • Preliminaries:
  • Introduction and Overview
  • Mathematical Preparation
  • Tools for Continuous-Time Models
  • Pricing Theory:
  • Dynamics-Free Pricing
  • Pricing Under Bernoulli Dynamics
  • Black-Scholes Dynamics
  • American Options and 'Exotics'
  • Models with Uncertain Volatility
  • Discontinuous Processes
  • Interest-Rate Dynamics
  • Computational Methods:
  • Simulation
  • Solving PDEs Numerically
  • Programs
  • Computer Programs
  • Errata

Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory02.htm#FairValue


PwC Dataline: Accounting for centrally cleared derivatives Understanding the accounting implications of Dodd-Frank Title VII (No. 2013-30) --- Click Here 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/cfodirect/publications/dataline/2013-30-centrally-cleared-derivatives.jhtml?display=/us/en/cfodirect/publications/dataline&j=346566&e=rjensen@trinity.edu&l=621246_HTML&u=15025430&mid=7002454&jb=0

Dodd-Frank Title VII (Dodd-Frank) significantly changed the trading requirements for derivative instruments, such as mandating that certain derivatives be centrally cleared.

A number of financial reporting implementation questions have arisen as companies consider the Dodd-Frank requirements. These include determining fair value of centrally cleared derivatives, accounting for collateral, assessing the impact on hedge accounting, and determining the appropriate presentation (gross versus net).

This Dataline discusses the financial reporting implications of the new requirements, primarily focusing on end-users that trade in the affected derivatives and who do not qualify for the end-user exception.

Continued in article

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedging activities ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

 


 

 

Valuation of Options

Valuation calculators are provided at http://www.numa.com/derivs/ref/calculat/calculat.htm 

Most discussions of option valuation focus on the Black-Scholes model.  Jerry Marlowe provides a nice tutorial at http://www.optionanimation.com/   

 

Options are valued in a variety of ways.  At the web URL http://207.87.27.10/forbes/97/0616/5912218a.htm , Forbes Magazine provides an interesting overview on valuing options.   If options are purchased on organized exchanges then there are market values.  However, trading in certain kinds of options may be thin such that market prices are not solid indicators of value.   Many options are custom contracts that are not traded on exchanges.  These can be valued in various models, the best known of which are variations of the binomial option pricing model and the Black-Scholes model.  Variations arise regarding such factors as type of option (e.g., European versus American) and degree to which underlying assumptions (e.g., normal distribution) are deemed reasonable.  More troublesome are such assumptions as transactions costs, no taxes, a constant risk free interest rate, a continuous market for the underlying with no jumps in prices, and other assumptions such as the distribution of asset returns being log-normal.   Fortunately these models are quite robust in terms of departures from the assumptions.   Online and downloading calculators for the Black-Scholes model are linked below:

Various free versions http://www.numa.com/links/online-c.htm

Enter "Option Value Calculator" in the exact phrase box at http://www.google.com/advanced_search?hl=en 

Premium = f (IV, time, vol , r)

Intrinsic value (IV) 
Time to expiration (time) 
Expected volatility (vol ) 
Interest rates (r)

Miniumum Value = Intrinsic value adjusted by time value of money to expiration date.

  • Minimum value and Paragraph 63 of FAS 133
    The minimum value of an American option is zero or its intrinsic value since it can be exercised at any time.  The same cannot be said for a European option that has to be held to maturity.  If the underlying is the price of corn, then the minimum value of an option on corn is either zero or the current spot price of corn minus the discounted risk-free present value of the strike price.  In other words if the option cannot be exercised early, discount the present value of the strike price from the date of expiration and compare it with the current spot price.  If the difference is positive, this is the minimum value.  It can hypothetically be the minimum value of an American option, but in an efficient market the current price of an American option will not sell below its risk free present value.

    Of course the value may actually be greater due to volatility that adds value above the risk-free discount rate.  In other words, it is risk or volatility that adds value over and above a risk free alternative to investing.  However, it is possible but not all that common to exclude volatility from risk assessment as explained in Sub-paragraph b of Paragraph 63 of FAS 133 quoted below.

a. If the effectiveness of a hedge with an option contract is assessed based on changes in the option's intrinsic value, the change in the time value of the contract would be excluded from the assessment of hedge effectiveness.

b. If the effectiveness of a hedge with an option contract is assessed based on changes in the option's minimum value, that is, its intrinsic value plus the effect of discounting, the change in the volatility value of the contract would be excluded from the assessment of hedge effectiveness.

c. If the effectiveness of a hedge with a forward or futures contract is assessed based on changes in fair value attributable to changes in spot prices, the change in the fair value of the contract related to the changes in the difference between the spot price and the forward or futures price would be excluded from the assessment of hedge effectiveness.

The point here is that options are certain to be effective in hedging intrinsic value, but are uncertain in terms of hedging time value at all interim points of time prior to expiration.  As a result, accounting standards require that effectiveness for hedge accounting be tested at each point in time when options are adjusted to fair value carrying amounts in the books even though ultimate effectiveness is certain.  Potential gains from options are uncertain prior to expiration.  Potential gains or losses from other types of derivative contracts are uncertain both before expiration and on the date of expiration.

Minimum Value (Shout Option Condition) --- http://quantlib.org/html/a01285.html  

A shout option is an option where the holder has the right to lock in a minimum value for the payoff at one (shout) time during the option's life. The minimum value is the option's intrinsic value at the shout time.

Paragraph 63(b) allows for effectiveness testing based upon minimum value where appropriate.  When the derivative hedging instrument is an option and hedge effectiveness is stated initially to be based upon changes in an option's minimum value (intrinsic value adjusted for discounting), the volatility of the option may be excluded from effectiveness tests.  The minimum value model, as opposed to other valuation models like the Black-Scholes model, is based on one’s willingness to buy an at-the-money shout option on a share of stock with the right to defer payment of the exercise price until the end of the option’s term. The model has the advantage of simplicity but does not capture the effect of share price volatility.  A shout option is an option where the holder has the right to lock in a minimum value for the payoff at one (shout) time during the option's life. The minimum value is the option's intrinsic value at the shout time.

Delta-neutral strategies are discussed at various points in FAS 133 (e.g., ¶85, ¶86, ¶87, and ¶89). Delta-neutral implies that the option value does not change for relatively small changes in hedged item value. Many hedge strategies are delta-neutral such that ineffectiveness arises only for relative large changes in the value of the hedged item itself.

Illustration of Option Valuation

I like the discussion of option valuation quoted below from Professor Brad DeLong --- http://econ161.berkeley.edu/Teaching_Folder/BA_130_F96/BAonethirty20.html 

Options:

  • Chicago Board of Trade Options Exchange was founded in 1973; an immediate success.
  • Buy options (if you are a firm) to offset idiosyncratic risk that may lead to financial distress.
  • Buy options (if you are an individual) if you need psychiatric help.
  • Options pricing theory also helps value growth opportunities. "Disguised" options.

 


 

Calls, Puts, and Shares:

  • A call option gives its owner the right to buy stock at a specified exercise or strike price on or before a specified exercise date. European options--only on the particular date; American options--on or before that date.
  • A put option gives its owner the right to sell stock at a specified exercise or strike price on or before a specified exercise date. European options--only on the particular date; American options--on or before that date.

Intel Options Prices in July 1995; Stock Trading at $65 a Share

 

 Exercise Date

Exercise Price

Price of Put

Price of Call

 10/95

$65

$6.25

$4.625

1/96

$65

$8

$5.875

1/96

$70

$5.875

$8.5

Value of call at expiration = max(price of share - exercise price, 0)

Value of put at expiration = max(exercise price - price of share, 0)

Bachelier diagrams//payoffs to owners/payoffs to writers

[buy call, invest PV of exercise price in safe asset] has the same payoff as [buy put, buy share]

V[call] + PV[exercise price] = V[put]+[share price]

[buy call, sell put] has the same payoff as [buy share, borrow PV of exercise price]

Synthetic Option:

Buy put = buy call + sell share + invest PV of exercise price

Bankruptcy as shareholders' exercise of a put option

 


 

What determines option values?

Value of call is less than share price; value of call is greater than payoff if exercised immediately

  • When the stock is worthless, the option is worthless
  • When the stock price is very large, option price approaches stock price minus PV of exercise price. [thus the value of an option increases with the rate of interest and the time to maturity]--buying on credit
  • The option price exceeds its minimum value--higher by an amount that depends on the variance

 


 

Why DCF Doesn't Work for Options:

Because the riskiness of an option changes every time the stock price moves.

 


 

Valuing Options:

Price options by constructing a synthetic option.

Suppose we have our $65 Intel stock, and buy a call option with a strike price of $65 and an expiration date six months from now. r of 5% per year. If Intel stock can only (a) fall by 20% to $52 or rise by 25% to $81.25, then

Option value = 0 in bad case; $16.25 in good case. Spread=5/9 spread of stock price. Suppose you bought 5/9 of a share and borrowed the PV of 5/9 of a share in the bad case from the bank--borrow $28.18, the PV of $28.89.

Then you have the same payoffs as the option. Value of 5/9 of a share today is $36.11, minus $28.18 = $7.93. We have just valued our option. The number of shares to replicate the spread from an option is the hedge ratio or option delta. (If the option sells for more than $7.93, you have a money machine by selling options and covering.

Value of put option--option delta = -4/9; payoff = +$13 in low state; = 0 in high state; sell 4/9 of a share and lend out $35.23 (collect $36.11 in six months). $35.23 - 4/9 x $65 = $6.34.

V[call] + PV[exercise price] = V[put]+[share price]

$7.93 +$65/1.025 = $6.34 + $65

 

Selected IAS 39 Paragraphs on Valuation and Testing for Hedge Effectiveness
144. There is normally a single fair value measure for a hedging instrument in its entirety, and the factors that cause changes in fair value are co-dependent. Thus a hedging relationship is designated by an enterprise for a hedging instrument in its entirety. The only exceptions permitted are (a) splitting the intrinsic value and the time value of an option and designating only the change in the intrinsic value of an option as the hedging instrument, while the remaining component of the option (its time value) is excluded and (b) splitting the interest element and the spot price on a forward. Those exceptions recognize that the intrinsic value of the option and the premium on the forward generally can be measured separately. A dynamic hedging strategy that assesses both the intrinsic and the time value of an option can qualify for hedge accounting. 

145. A proportion of the entire hedging instrument, such as 50 per cent of the notional amount, may be designated in a hedging relationship. However, a hedging relationship may not be designated for only a portion of the time period in which a hedging instrument is outstanding. 

Assessing Hedge Effectiveness

146. A hedge is normally regarded as highly effective if, at inception and throughout the life of the hedge, the enterprise can expect changes in the fair value or cash flows of the hedged item to be almost fully offset by the changes in the fair value or cash flows of the hedging instrument, and actual results are within a range of 80 per cent to 125 per cent. For example, if the loss on the hedging instrument is 120 and the gain on the cash instrument is 100, offset can be measured by 120/100, which is 120 per cent, or by 100/120, which is 83 per cent. The enterprise will conclude that the hedge is highly effective. 

147. The method an enterprise adopts for assessing hedge effectiveness will depend on its risk management strategy. In some cases, an enterprise will adopt different methods for different types of hedges. If the principal terms of the hedging instrument and of the entire hedged asset or liability or hedged forecasted transaction are the same, the changes in fair value and cash flows attributable to the risk being hedged offset fully, both when the hedge is entered into and thereafter until completion. For instance, an interest rate swap is likely to be an effective hedge if the notional and principal amounts, term, repricing dates, dates of interest and principal receipts and payments, and basis for measuring interest rates are the same for the hedging instrument and the hedged item. 

148. On the other hand, sometimes the hedging instrument will offset the hedged risk only partially. For instance, a hedge would not be fully effective if the hedging instrument and hedged item are denominated in different currencies and the two do not move in tandem. Also, a hedge of interest rate risk using a derivative would not be fully effective if part of the change in the fair value of the derivative is due to the counterparty's credit risk. 

149. To qualify for special hedge accounting, the hedge must relate to a specific identified and designated risk, and not merely to overall enterprise business risks, and must ultimately affect the enterprise's net profit or loss. A hedge of the risk of obsolescence of a physical asset or the risk of expropriation of property by a government would not be eligible for hedge accounting; effectiveness cannot be measured since those risks are not measurable reliably.

150. An equity method investment cannot be a hedged item in a fair value hedge because the equity method recognizes the investor's share of the associate's accrued net profit or loss, rather than fair value changes, in net profit or loss. If it were a hedged item, it would be adjusted for both fair value changes and profit and loss accruals - which would result in double counting because the fair value changes include the profit and loss accruals. For a similar reason, an investment in a consolidated subsidiary cannot be a hedged item in a fair value hedge because consolidation recognizes the parent's share of the subsidiary's accrued net profit or loss, rather than fair value changes, in net profit or loss. A hedge of a net investment in a foreign subsidiary is different. There is no double counting because it is a hedge of the foreign currency exposure, not a fair value hedge of the change in the value of the investment.

151. This Standard does not specify a single method for assessing hedge effectiveness. An enterprise's documentation of its hedging strategy will include its procedures for assessing effectiveness. Those procedures will state whether the assessment will include all of the gain or loss on a hedging instrument or whether the instrument's time value will be excluded. Effectiveness is assessed, at a minimum, at the time an enterprise prepares its annual or interim financial report. If the critical terms of the hedging instrument and the entire hedged asset or liability (as opposed to selected cash flows) or hedged forecasted transaction are the same, an enterprise could conclude that changes in fair value or cash flows attributable to the risk being hedged are expected to completely offset at inception and on an ongoing basis. For example, an entity may assume that a hedge of a forecasted purchase of a commodity with a forward contract will be highly effective and that there will be no ineffectiveness to be recognized in net profit or loss if:
(a) the forward contract is for purchase of the same quantity of the same commodity at the same time and location as the hedged forecasted purchase;
(b) the fair value of the forward contract at inception is zero; and
(c) either the change in the discount or premium on the forward contract is excluded from the assessment of effectiveness and included directly in net profit or loss or the change in expected cash flows on the forecasted transaction is based on the forward price for the commodity.

152. In assessing the effectiveness of a hedge, an enterprise will generally need to consider the time value of money. The fixed rate on a hedged item need not exactly match the fixed rate on a swap designated as a fair value hedge. Nor does the variable rate on an interest-bearing asset or liability need to be the same as the variable rate on a swap designated as a cash flow hedge. A swap's fair value comes from its net settlements. The fixed and variable rates on a swap can be changed without affecting the net settlement if both are changed by the same amount. 

 


Valuation of Swaps
---  http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm  

Value at Risk (VaR) =

various mathematical models for performing probability analysis of market risk.  See dynamic portfolio Management.   VAR references include the following: 

VAR disclosures are one of the alternatives allows under SEC Rule 4-08.  See Disclosure.

Click here to view a commentary on VAR by Walter Teets.

There are some VAR working papers at http://www.gloriamundi.org/var/wps.html 

This is an excellent Value at Risk document ---> http://www.gloriamundi.org/ 

All About VaR http://www.gloriamundi.org/ 
Financial risk managers can find value-at-risk book reviews, discussion groups, answers to frequently asked questions, news and presentations here, as well as articles such as “An Irreverent Guide to Value-at-Risk” and “Stress Testing by Large Financial Institutions: Current Practice and Aggregation Issues.”

See Risk Metrics 

VAR is related to risk "stress testing."  Freddie Mac was an innovator in risk stress testing --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm#FreddieMac 


The Value at Risk (VaR) Model of Investment Risk --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VaR

Too-Fat Tails Lead to All Sorts of Troubles in Life
The Value at Risk (VaR) Model of Investment Risk --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VaR

"In Plato's cave," The Economist, January 24, 2009, pp. 10-14 --- http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12957753

...

Almost as damaging is the hash that banks have made of “value-at-risk” (VAR) calculations, a measure of the potential losses of a portfolio. This is supposed to show whether banks and other financial outfits are being safely run. Regulators use VAR calculations to work out how much capital banks need to put aside for a rainy day. But the calculations are flawed.

The mistake was to turn a blind eye to what is known as “tail risk”. Think of the banks’ range of possible daily losses and gains as a distribution. Most of the time you gain a little or lose a little. Occasionally you gain or lose a lot. Very rarely you win or lose a fortune. If you plot these daily movements on a graph, you get the familiar bell-shaped curve of a normal distribution (see chart 4). Typically, a VAR calculation cuts the line at, say, 98% or 99%, and takes that as its measure of extreme losses.

Tail spin However, although the normal distribution closely matches the real world in the middle of the curve, where most of the gains or losses lie, it does not work well at the extreme edges, or “tails”. In markets extreme events are surprisingly common—their tails are “fat”. Benoît Mandelbrot, the mathematician who invented fractal theory, calculated that if the Dow Jones Industrial Average followed a normal distribution, it should have moved by more than 3.4% on 58 days between 1916 and 2003; in fact it did so 1,001 times. It should have moved by more than 4.5% on six days; it did so on 366. It should have moved by more than 7% only once in every 300,000 years; in the 20th century it did so 48 times.

In Mr Mandelbrot’s terms the market should have been “mildly” unstable. Instead it was “wildly” unstable. Financial markets are plagued not by “black swans”—seemingly inconceivable events that come up very occasionally—but by vicious snow-white swans that come along a lot more often than expected.

This puts VAR in a quandary. On the one hand, you cannot observe the tails of the VAR curve by studying extreme events, because extreme events are rare by definition. On the other you cannot deduce very much about the frequency of rare extreme events from the shape of the curve in the middle. Mathematically, the two are almost decoupled.

The drawback of failing to measure the tail beyond 99% is that it could leave out some reasonably common but devastating losses. VAR, in other words, is good at predicting small day-to-day losses in the heart of the distribution, but hopeless at predicting severe losses that are much rarer—arguably those that should worry you most.

When David Viniar, chief financial officer of Goldman Sachs, told the Financial Times in 2007 that the bank had seen “25-standard-deviation moves several days in a row”, he was saying that the markets were at the extreme tail of their distribution. The centre of their models did not begin to predict that the tails would move so violently. He meant to show how unstable the markets were. But he also showed how wrong the models were.

Modern finance may well be making the tails fatter, says Daron Acemoglu, an economist at MIT. When you trade away all sorts of specific risk, in foreign exchange, interest rates and so forth, you make your portfolio seem safer. But you are in fact swapping everyday risk for the exceptional risk that the worst will happen and your insurer will fail—as AIG did. Even as the predictable centre of the distribution appears less risky, the unobserved tail risk has grown. Your traders and managers will look as if they are earning good returns on lower risk when part of the true risk is hidden. They will want to be paid for their skill when in fact their risk-weighted returns may have fallen.

Edmund Phelps, who won the Nobel prize for economics in 2006, is highly critical of today’s financial services. “Risk-assessment and risk-management models were never well founded,” he says. “There was a mystique to the idea that market participants knew the price to put on this or that risk. But it is impossible to imagine that such a complex system could be understood in such detail and with such amazing correctness…the requirements for information…have gone beyond our abilities to gather it.”

Every trading strategy draws upon a model, even if it is not expressed in mathematical symbols. But Mr Phelps believes that mathematics can take you only so far. There is a big role for judgment and intuition, things that managers are supposed to provide. Why have they failed?

"In Defense Of Value At Risk (VaR) And Other Risk Management Methods," by Suna Reyent, Seeking Alpha, January 19, 2009 --- http://seekingalpha.com/article/115339-defending-var-but-you-still-need-common-sense

In the beginning of the month, New York Times Magazine published an article by Joe Nocera called “Risk Mismanagement” that created quite a stir in the blogosphere and beyond. Despite the watering-down of certain aspects related to risk management tools, as well as the diversity with which these tools are applied practice, the article was a success because of the buzz it created as well as the ensuing debate.

The article portrays a debate over value at risk methodology between well-known practitioners of VAR and the critics of the methodology led by Nassim Taleb. It is hard not to get carried away with Mr. Taleb’s tabloid-like descriptions of VAR as a “fraud” and its practitioners as “intellectual charlatans.”

I love how the debate is construed. The premise is that value at risk and other valuation models (such as Black-Scholes) assume normal distribution of asset returns. Okay, they do that in their most primitive forms, but let’s just accept the oversimplification as a fact for a moment because the debate would hardly exist in this simplistic form if we didn’t go along with the show here.

This is where our hero Mr. Taleb, an experienced options trader no less, emerges to the public mainstream to inform all of us ignorant folks that asset returns do not follow a normal distribution! The horror! The painful realization that this stuff continues to be taught in business schools! All that wasted class time learning statistics!

It is fair to say that this assumption will mislead naïve market participants about the nature of their risk exposures as “Black Swan” events happen a lot more frequently than suggested by Gaussian distributions. The problem is, almost anyone in finance already knows that asset prices are not normally distributed, and many practitioners build models or apply extensions to existing ones in order to take this into consideration.

I decided to give a little background on value at risk in order to get the points across that I feel strongly about. Since I teach VAR in the classroom as part of a risk management curriculum, I feel it is best to give some preliminary information.

A Primer On Value At Risk

Depending on the confidence interval chosen, value at risk, in its simplest form, exists of applying a one-sided test to figure out the loss that a portfolio may weather in a given time period. For instance, a 95% daily VAR of ten million dollars indicates that a portfolio is likely to lose at most that amount of money 95% of the time, or once a month assuming 20 trading days in a given month. At the same time, it displays the LEAST amount of money that the portfolio can lose 5% of the time. I appreciated it when Mr. Nocera mentioned this in his article prepared for general readership. As VAR is unable to tell us about what kind of a loss we should expect in that tail of 5%, the limitation of this metric if taken as gospel becomes apparent even to the untrained eye.

More on the tail risk later. But first, I would like to talk about three established ways of calculating value at risk for one asset and analyze the current risk management crisis within this framework:

Analytical VAR – “Misunderestimating” Risks

Otherwise known as variance-covariance method of calculating the value at risk, this is the well-known method of calculating VAR and the easiest one to apply. It assumes a normal distribution of returns. All it takes to calculate VAR is a standard deviation, which represents the “volatility” of the asset as well as a mean, which is the expected return on the same asset.

This is the VAR that Mr. Taleb seems to conveniently focus on, because it will indeed underestimate the risk at the tails of a negatively skewed or a leptokurtic distribution.

Stock markets in general exhibit negative skewness, which means that the distribution of returns will exhibit a long tail (a few extreme losses) to the left side. They also exhibit leptokurtosis, which means that both tails of the distribution are fatter than implied by normal distribution.

So we could go nuts over how wrong the normal distribution assumption is, and apparently people do. But we should also be very concerned over how sensitive this measure is to the standard deviation as well the mean, both of which are subject to change as markets change especially in the light of the current crisis.

Historical VAR – Good As Long As Future Resembles Past

This method does not need any assumptions about the distribution of returns and is certainly superior to analytical VAR because it is not parametric. The more data there is, the better the measurement. Historical data will exhibit characteristics such as skewness or kurtosis as long as the asset itself exhibits these qualities as well.

Assuming 250 trading days in a given year, in order to measure the 95% daily VAR you need to rank the returns from worst to best and pick the greatest return among those that correspond to the bottom 5% of returns. So the worst 12th return (or you could interpolate between the 12th and13th worst return, since 250 divided by 20 is 12.5, but since VAR itself is an approximation, why bother?) will tell you the maximum percentage loss 95% percent of the time, or the minimum percentage loss 5% of the time. Multiply the loss by your portfolio value and you get the neat VAR value in terms of dollars.

Moreover, the majority of investment houses use historical VAR as the basis for measurement as it is a clear improvement over the analytical VAR. You do not need return assumptions or standard deviation values to come up with this value.

Historical VAR calculations replace parametric assumptions with historical data. This means that if you had positions in mortgage derivative securities and started the year 2007 with models that were built around data of the previous two years encompassing the “peaceful” periods of 2005 and 2006, you would soon be awakened to a world where your VAR measures no longer reflected the reality of the marketplace. Note that such limitations of VAR as an all-encompassing risk measure were visible to any professional who understood risk management models as well as the limitations of historical data that went into them.

As Mr. Nocera’s article conveys, this is precisely what Goldman Sachs (GS) did. When it became obvious that the mortgage markets had changed in fundamental ways and aggressive positions in these securities started bringing in gigantic losses (as opposed to reaping the usual gigantic profits on the back of the ever-rising housing market), the team decided to limit its risk exposure by “getting closer to home.”

I don’t think the article conveys what “getting closer to home” really means. Let me use day trading as an example here. In day trading terms, this means that when your positions start showing huge losses at the end of the day, you accept “defeat” and take your losses as opposed to trying to ride them in the hope that the market will come around. So instead of wishing for market to make a comeback to recoup losses, you close out your open positions, take your losses and go home. Then you go back to the drawing board to strategize for the next day given the new reality of the marketplace.

Of course, looking retrospectively, the decision to limit exposure and take losses as opposed to trying to ride them in the expectation of a housing market turnaround has been the right decision to make. However, as we have seen with many other bubbles, managers do not have the incentive to make the sound trading decisions, nor do they have the incentive to listen to their risk managers as long as they get a huge piece of profits made during the ride and the taxpayer ends up holding the bag when the market finally blows up.

We have seen this movie over and over again. What surprises me is the heavy blame put on models for not reflecting “reality,” whereas those in charge knew that the mortgage bubble was collapsing, they had many opportunities to get rid of their huge exposures to the derivatives securities, but they chose not to do it most likely because of expectations of a market turn around. This is trading 101. If you try to ride your losses, you may make comebacks, but you will eventually blow up.

Now the next episode features critics who tell us that the “models” have been faulty and wrong. Hence the conclusion that value at risk is an erroneous and misleading measure, not to mention a “fraud.”

Ladies and gentleman, we found the “fraud” haunting the trading floor on the street, and it is not a human being: Shame on you, VAR and other risk management tools! Of course, we can blame the car manufacturers for the accident: the car’s faulty speedometer, or its lack of an apparatus to show us the bumps on the road ahead. But why is the culture that is reticent to blame the drunk driver who was clearly intoxicated with the thrill of making green?

These “models” are as guilty as the “accounting” that was used with a sleight of hand to conceal what was really going on behind the curtains during the Enron debacle and others. Of course, given the mathematical complexities of models, the quantitative brainpower needed to understand some of them, and the assumptions required in creating a map of your territory, there is more of an opportunity to either blame the models or to pretend that you didn’t understand them when things turned sour.

As I ventured with this essay, hoping to make my points within the value at risk framework featured in textbooks, I will move on to the third methodology used in calculating the measure.

Monte Carlo Simulation – Anything Goes, But More Of An Art Than Science

Monte Carlo Simulation is especially useful in calculating risk exposures of assets that have either little historical data or whose historical data is rendered irrelevant due to changing economic conditions that affect both the price of securities and the way these securities interact with each other in a portfolio. Also, historical returns of assets with asymmetric payoffs or returns of derivative securities that interact with variables such as interest rates, housing prices, and the like will not reflect the future when factors that influence the return of the security change as the economic climate shifts.

Continued in article

Bob Jensen's threads on VaR are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#VaR

Bob Jensen's threads on the banking crisis --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm


Question
What is cookie jar accounting and why is it generally a bad thing in financial reporting?

Answer
Cookie jar is more formally known as earnings reserve accounting where management manipulates the timings of earnings and expenses usually to smooth reported earnings and prevent shocks up and down in the perceived stability of the company. European companies in the past notoriously put deferred earnings in "cookie jars" so as to picture themselves as solid by covering bad times with deferrals out of the cookie jar that mitigate the bad news and vice versa for good times. The problem with too much in the way of a good time (in terms of financial reporting) is that accelerated growth rates in one year cannot generally be maintained every year and it may be a bad thing, in the eyes of management, to have investors expecting high rates of growth in revenues and earnings every year.

What's wrong with cookie jar reporting is that it allows management wide latitude in discretionary reporting that is a major concern to both investors and standard setters. Accounting reports become obsolete when they mix stale cookies from the cookie jar with fresh sweets and lemon balls of the current period.

Also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cookie_jar_accounting

You can read more about FAS 106 at http://www.fasb.org/st/index.shtml
Scroll down to FAS 106 on "Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions"
 


"On the Impossibility of Measuring Model Risk," Sandrew, February 18, 2010 ---
http://sandrew.tumblr.com/post/397168410/on-the-impossibility-of-measuring-model-risk
Thank you Francine for the heads up.

This week The Economist poked a little fun at the quants:

JPMorgan Chase holds $3 billion of “model-uncertainty reserves” to cover mishaps caused by quants who have been too clever by half. If you can make provisions for bad loans, why not bad maths too?

And in response to this revelation, Francine McKenna wondered how the auditors could have signed-off on the models:

If you need $3 billion of “model reserves” how [does] PwC attest to [the] models underlying valuations, estimates and reserves?

It’s worth noting that these model-uncertainty reserves not only comply with GAAP, but are mandated by it.   So in response to Ms. McKenna’s concern, there is in fact a “GAAP for that.”

FAS 157 Par. C16: This Statement clarifies that the measurements should be adjusted for risk, that is, the amount market participants would demand because of the risk (uncertainty) inherent in a particular valuation technique used to measure fair value (such as a pricing model) and/or the risk inherent in the inputs to the valuation technique (a risk premium notion). Accordingly, a measurement (for example, a “mark-to-model” measurement) that does not include an adjustment for risk would not represent a fair value measurement if market participants would include one in pricing the related asset or liability. [Emphasis mine.]

OK, so now we understand why banks have to measure model risk, but how do you do it?  Well, if you’re being honest, you don’t.  Model risk is impossible to measure.  Here’s why.

Pricing Models as Interpolation

First, it’s important to understand what a pricing model is and why they are used.  Pricing models are used for two purposes: valuation (that is, to come up with fair values for instruments that do not have directly observed prices—e.g. OTC derivatives) and risk management (that is, to measure the sensitivities of instruments to particular risks for the purpose of managing an overall book).  Let’s put aside for now the risk management purpose and focus on the valuation.

The majority of OTC positions are not “marked-to-model” in any meaningful sense of that term.   Yes, there are pricing models used to value them, but they’re not the scary kind of marks that skeptics rightly call “mark-to-make-believe.”   Most of the time, the pricing model is simply a fancy (and sometimes expensive) tool to interpolate between observed market prices.

Let’s say I have an interest rate swap.  I can observe the market prices (rates of various maturities) and as long as my swap is within the range of my observations, then my pricing model is calibrated to market.  The only modeling I’ve done is to build a rate curve based on observed inputs and used this curve to discount the contractual cash flows of the swap.  This is simply a robust way to interpolate the value of my swap from observed quotes on similar instruments (i.e. other swaps).  Now this is obviously a very simple example, but this model-as-interpolation view can also be said of more complicated, but traded, instruments like synthetic index CDOs.

What’s this have to do with model risk? When models are calibrated to observed market prices, and hence where the model is used an interpolation tool, the model risk is (pretty much) already captured by the model.  This is true even if the model is “wrong”.  If the model calibrates to market, it already reflects the market’s view of the model risk—at least with respect to the observed instruments to which it’s calibrated.  I should add that even if you’re interpolating between observed prices, you might have residual model risk—how much residual risk (which could be significant) depends on the granularity of observed data, among other things.

True Mark-to-Model Positions and Why Model Risk is Immeasurable

But wait.  If most positions are marked to prices interpolated between observed quotes, what about the rest?  Here’s where we get into the true mark-to-model issues, and where model risk is most prevalent.  Thankfully, these are easy enough to identify on a balance sheet.  They are anything noted as a “level 3” fair value measure—i.e. instruments where the value significantly depends on the model itself and on the unobservable inputs or parameters thereto.  Think of a CDO-squared or a bespoke synthetic CDO.

I promised I’d get to the point about the impossibility of measuring model risk, so here it is:

  1. <!--[if !supportLists]-->Model risk is the risk that you’re using the wrong model.
  2. <!--[if !supportLists]--><!--[endif]-->The space of possible models is infinite.  That is, there are an infinite number of models to choose from, including those not yet discovered.
  3. <!--[if !supportLists]-->No one knows what the right model is.  If you knew which model was the right one, you’d already be using it.  Even if most market participants agree on a model today, they might discover a better model tomorrow, or simply decide that no model is sufficient to assess the risks (this has happened).
  4. <!--[if !supportLists]-->Judgments about the amount of model risk are necessarily qualitative.  The best I could hope for would be to say that this model feels more certain than that one.
  5. <!--[if !supportLists]--><!--[endif]-->Model risk is recursive.  Even if I could quantify the level of model risk, what model would I use to measure the impact of that model risk on fair value?  Where are the models of model risk?  Even if they existed, those model risk models have model risk, no?

That $3B Model-Uncertainty Reserve

If model risk is immeasurable, where did JPMorgan’s $3B come from and what does it mean?  As to where it came from, I don’t know the specifics, but I suspect they’ve either: (a) shocked the unobservable model inputs by some arbitrary amount and taken the worst of the lot or (b) run some “shadow models” (i.e. run the same positions through multiple known models) and taken the worst of the lot.  Either way, the result is arbitrary.  So as to what it means: not much.  At best, it gives us some insight into the subjective judgments of JPMorgan management with respect to the quality of their models.  So yeah, not much at all.

Bob Jensen's threads on cookie jar accounting are at
See below

February 19, 2010 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Francine,

The Sandrew article is really terrific (thanks for the heads up) ---
http://sandrew.tumblr.com/post/397168410/on-the-impossibility-of-measuring-model-risk

As to the cookie jar question, I think it reduces to an issue of whether the bad quant reserves are used primarily to smooth income in the same sense as cookie jar reserves are traditionally used to smooth income. Or are the bad quant reserves more like bad debt reserves that are used for better matching under the matching concept where timing of cost write offs better matches revenues with expenses incurred to generate those revenues.

To me, the Allowance for Bad Quants seems to me to be a bit more like the Allowance for Bad Debts, but I’ve not really taken time to study this question in detail.

A great example of cookie jar accounting, aside from the classic examples allowed in Switzerland, is Tom Selling’s General Motors example ---
See below

Bob Jensen

 

 


How to use VaR, ETL in Excel

Estimating Risk Measures

I wish I could retroactively require an article to be read! If I could, this would be it for my Portfolio class (Fin422).

Writing in Financial Engineering News, Kevin Dowd explains how to use Excel to calculate VAR and other risk measures. This will be VERY HELPFUL in class!!!

For instance: "To estimate the daily VaR at, say, the 99 percent confidence level, we can use Excel’s Large command, which gives the kth largest value in an array. Thus, if our data are an array called “losses,” we can take the VaR to be the eleventh largest loss out of 1,000. (We choose the eleventh largest loss as our VaR because the confidence level implies that one percent of losses – 10 losses – should exceed the VaR.) The estimated VaR is given by the Excel command “=Large(losses,11)”."

good stuff! Read it!!!

From Jim Mahar's blog on May 23, 2005 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

Bob Jensen's threads on VAR are under the V-terms at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#V-Terms

VAR disclosures are one of the alternatives allows under SEC Rule 4-08

Here is a Good Summary of Various Forms of Business Risk  --- http://www.erisk.com/portal/Resources/resources_archive.asp 
 


 

Variable Interest Entities (VIE Accounting and FIN 46)
What's Right and What's Wrong With (SPEs), SPVs, and VIEs --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm 

Variable Rate =

a rate that varies over time as opposed to a fixed rate.  The term is commonly used in FAS 133 to refer to debt contracts with interest that vary from period to period rather than stay fixed at a contractual rate.  Firms sometimes issue notes and bonds at variable rates in order to get a lower rate than fixed rates available to them in the capital market.  The variable rate is usually based upon some index such as the U.S. prime rate or the English LIBOR

Some debt has a combination of fixed and floating components.  For example, a "fixed-to-floating" rate bond is one that starts out at a fixed rate and at some point (pre-determined or contingent) changes to a variable rate.  This type of bond has a embedded derivative (i.e., a forward component for the variable rate component that adjusts the interest rate in later periods.   Since the forward component is clearly-and-closely related adjustment of interest of the host contract, it cannot be accounted for separately according to Paragraphs 12a and 13 of FAS 133 (unless conditions listed in Paragraph 13 apply).

 

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W-Terms

Warrants =

options that typically are attached to other financial instruments such as bonds.  Warrants, like options, give the holders' rights into the future but not obligations.  There are a wide variety of warrant types including the following:

Cross-Currency Warrants
Currency Exchange Warrants (CEWs)
Debt with Springing Warrants
Detachable Warrants
Emerging Market Warrants
Equity Index Warrants
Eurowarrants
Ex-Warrants
Foreign Stock Index Options, Warrants, and Futures
Income Warrants
Index Warrants
Long Bond Yield Decrease Warrants (Turbos)
Money Back Options or Warrants
nonDetachable Warrants
Samurai Warrants
Secondary Warrants
Springing Warrants
Synthetic Warrants
Third Party Warrants
Window Warrants
Yield Curve Flattening Warrants

Weather = See Derivative Financial Instruments

Written Option =

an option written by an "option writer" who sells options collateralized by a portfolio of securities or other performance bonds. Typically a written option is more than a mere "right" in that it requires contractual performance based upon another party's right to force performance. The issue with most written options is not whether they are covered by FAS 133 rules.  The issue is whether they will be allowed to be designated as cash flow hedges.  Written options are referred to at various points in FAS 133. For example, see Paragraphs 20c, 28c, 91-92 (Example 6), 199, and 396-401.. For rules regarding written options see Paragraphs 396-401 on Pages 179-181 of FAS 133.  Exposure Draft 162-B would not allow hedge accounting for written options.  FAS 133 relaxed the rules for written options under certain circumstances explained in Paragraphs 396-401.  Note that written options may only hedge recorded assets and liabilities.  They may not be used to hedge forecasted purchase and sales transactions.

Paragraph 399 on Page 180 of FAS 133 does not allow covered call strategies that permit an entity to write an option on an asset that it owns.

A written option is not a hedging instrument unless it is designated as an offset to a purchased option, including one that is embedded in another financial instrument, for example, a written option used to hedge callable debt
(FAS 133 Paragraph 124).  A purchased option qualifies as a hedging instrument as it has potential gains equal to or greater than losses and, therefore, has the potential to reduce profit or loss exposure from changes in fair values or cash flows (FAS 133 Paragraph 124).  Under FASB rules, if a written option is designated as hedging a recognized asset or liability / the variability in cash flows for a recognized asset or liability, the combination of the hedged item and the written option provides at least as much potential for favorable cash flows as exposure to unfavorable cash flows (see FAS 133 Paragraph 20c or 28c).

A Case for Writing (rather than purchasing) Options
The Money Tree by Ronald Groenke and Wade Keller. Now I must confess, the reason I started this is because the authors are subscribers to the newsletter, but it has turned out to be a interesting look at selling calls on stocks that you already own. It is written as a novel, yet is full of financial strategies and terms. I am still not 100% convinced that opportunity costs are completely considered but definitely worth the time! I will let you know more when I finish it.
From TheFinanceProfessor on March 24, 2002.  See http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0967412811/finpapers/104-9378365-5272442 

See option, swaption, and covered call.

 

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X-Terms

 

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Y-Terms

Yield Curve =

Go to http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm 

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Z-Terms

Zero Coupon Method =  See yield curve.

 

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For a FAS 133 flow chart, go to http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133flow.htm 

 

Recommended Reading and Internet Links for FAS 133 and IAS 39

Go to the readings and links at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133links.htm 

Internet Links of Possible Interest

Go to the readings and links at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133links.htm 

Derivative Financial Instruments Frauds --- 
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm