In 2017 my Website was migrated to the clouds and reduced in size.
Hence some links below are broken.
One thing to try if a “www” link is broken is to substitute “faculty” for “www”
For example a broken link
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Pictures.htm
can be changed to corrected link
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Pictures.htm
However in some cases files had to be removed to reduce the size of my Website
Contact me at 
rjensen@trinity.edu if you really need to file that is missing

 

Accounting Scandal Updates and Other Fraud Between January 1 and March 31, 2016
Bob Jensen at
Trinity University

Bob Jensen's Main Fraud Document --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm 

Bob Jensen's Enron Quiz (and answers) --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnronQuiz.htm

Bob Jensen's Enron Updates are at --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm#EnronUpdates 

Other Documents

Commercial Scholarly and Academic Journals and Oligopoly Textbook Publishers Are Ripping Off Libraries, Scholars, and Students ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm#ScholarlyJournals

Many of the scandals are documented at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm 

15 Most Corrupt Nations in the World ---
http://247wallst.com/special-report/2016/01/27/the-most-corrupt-countries-in-the-world-3/?utm_source=247WallStDailyNewsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_content=JAN282016A&utm_campaign=DailyNewsletter

Resources to prevent and discover fraud from the Association of Fraud Examiners --- http://www.cfenet.com/resources/resources.asp 

Self-study training for a career in fraud examination --- http://marketplace.cfenet.com/products/products.asp 

Source for United Kingdom reporting on financial scandals and other news --- http://www.financialdirector.co.uk 

Updates on the leading books on the business and accounting scandals --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm#Quotations 

I love Infectious Greed by Frank Partnoy ---  http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm#Quotations 

Bob Jensen's American History of Fraud ---  http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/415wp/AmericanHistoryOfFraud.htm

Future of Auditing --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm#FutureOfAuditing 

"What’s Your Fraud IQ?  Think you know enough about corruption to spot it in any of its myriad forms? Then rev up your fraud detection radar and take this (deceptively) simple test." by Joseph T. Wells, Journal of Accountancy, July 2006 --- http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/jul2006/wells.htm

What Accountants Need to Know --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm#AccountantsNeedToKnow

Global Corruption (in legal systems) Report 2007 --- http://www.transparency.org/content/download/19093/263155

Tax Fraud Alerts from the IRS --- http://www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcement/article/0,,id=121259,00.html

White Collar Fraud Site --- http://www.whitecollarfraud.com/
Note the column of links on the left.

Bob Jensen's essay on the financial crisis bailout's aftermath and an alphabet soup of appendices can be found at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on fraud are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm

From CNN:  Clark Howard's Informative Advice About Shopping, Financial Planning, and Warnings About Scams ---
http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/clark.howard/?iref=allsearch

Bob Jensen's warnings about scams ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm

Bob Jensen's shopping helpers ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbob3.htm

Accounting Scandals
The funny thing is that I never looked up this item before now. Jim Mahar noted that it is a good link.

Accounting Scandals --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accounting_scandals

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting scandals are in various documents:

Accounting Firms --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm

Fraud Conclusion --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm

Enron --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm

Rotten to the Core --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm

Fraud Updates --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm

American History of Fraud --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudAmericanHistory.htm

Fraud in General --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm

AICPA Fraud Resource Center --- Click Here
http://www.aicpa.org/INTERESTAREAS/FORENSICANDVALUATION/RESOURCES/FRAUDPREVENTIONDETECTIONRESPONSE/Pages/fraud-prevention-detection-response.aspx

"New Report Shows Changing Fraud Environment," by Curtis C. Verschoor, AccountingWeb, March 18, 2013 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/article/new-report-shows-changing-fraud-environment/221374

Today’s FBI: Facts and Figures 2013-2014—which provides an in-depth look at the FBI and its operations—is now available ---
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/todays-fbi-facts-figures/facts-and-figures-031413.pdf/view

Identity Theft Information and Tools from the AICPA and IRS ---
http://www.aicpa.org/interestareas/tax/resources/irspracticeprocedure/pages/idtheftinformationandtools.aspx

Tax practitioners and their clients are concerned about the growing epidemic of tax-related identity theft in America - both refund theft and employment theft. At the end of fiscal 2013, the IRS had almost 600,000 identity theft cases in its inventory, according tothe IRS National Taxpayer Advocate. 

The AICPA shares members' concerns about the impact of identity theft and offers the resources below to help them learn more about this issue and advise clients. We have provided recommendations to Congress and the IRS Oversight Board on ways to further protect taxpayers and preparers.

IRS Identity Protection Specialized Unit at 800-908-4490

Identity Theft Resource Center --- http://www.idtheftcenter.org/
Note the tab for State and Local Resources

The IRS has an Identity Theft Web Page at
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Identity-Protection

FTC Identity Theft Center --- http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/

"IRS is overwhelmed by identity theft fraud:   Billions wrongly paid out as scammers find agency an easy target," by Michael Kranish, Boston Globe, February 16, 2014 ---
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2014/02/16/identity-theft-taxpayer-information-major-problem-for-irs/7SC0BarZMDvy07bbhDXwvN/story.html

Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates are at
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm

The decision maker should review all charges from vendors. Time and time again vendors fail to give credit for returns or special price adjustments and the ever too present false charges to business credit cards cost companies.
Deadra Mayhew, CPA A CPA Secret to a Better Business
http://www.smartbrief.com/quote/01/10/14/better-bread-happy-heart-wealth-vexation#.VP2f5OFkZLc

 




Wounded Warrior Project reportedly accused of wasting donor money (for the brass and fund raisers in luxury hotels, boozing parties, low payout percentage to victims, and you know the rest) ---
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2016/01/26/wounded-warrior-project-reportedly-accused-wasting-donor-money.html
Jensen Comment
I saw this on CBS News and wanted to throw up.

Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/bookurl.htm


Medicare Fraud is Rampant ---
 http://townhall.com/columnists/stevesherman/2016/02/05/medicare-fraud-is-rampant-n2115375?utm_source=thdaily&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=nl&newsletterad=


From the CFO Journal's Morning Ledger on March 22, 2016

Former Lehman CFO tells her side of the firm’s collapse
Erin Montella’s new memoir offers a unique perspective on the events that led to the financial crisis. “Full Circle,” which was released Sunday on Amazon.com, tells the story of how Ms. Montella rose to become the highest-ranking woman on Wall Street in 2008, only to resign from the firm six months after being named CFO. She accepted the position only after becoming convinced she could make the role more important, “something close to the CEO heir apparent.”

Bob Jensen's threads on the 2008 bailouts and non-bailouts (as in the case of Lehman) in the Greatest Swindle in the History of the World ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm 


"Washington State Prof Charged With $8M Research Fraud," Inside Higher Ed, February 26, 2016 ---
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2016/02/26/washington-state-prof-charged-8m-research-fraud?utm_source=Inside+Higher+Ed&utm_campaign=8ef91c166e-DNU20160226&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1fcbc04421-8ef91c166e-197565045

The U.S. Justice Department on Wednesday charged a professor at Washington State University and two family members with defrauding federal agencies of $8 million in research funds for their personal use.

Haifang Wen, the Colf Distinguished Professor in Civil Engineering at Washington State, was arrested Wednesday on charges that he and his brother and sister-in-law had set up false businesses and conspired to defraud the government of grants designed to help small firms develop asphalt composition technologies. Wen and the others face up to 30 years in prison and a $1 million fine

Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm


Accountant Who Cooked Wholesaler's Books Gets 27 Months ---
http://www.law360.com/articles/775230/accountant-who-cooked-wholesaler-s-books-gets-27-months

Law360, New York (March 23, 2016, 7:09 PM ET) -- A Manhattan federal judge on Wednesday hit a Long Island accountant who helped a Florida-based beauty products wholesaler overstate its financial position with a 27-month prison sentence after the fraud cost a bank lender $4.9 million.

U.S. District Judge Lewis A. Kaplan also hit Marc Wieselthier, 57, with $161,000 in forfeiture and $4.9 million in restitution for the fraud, which was revealed when the company, DIT Inc., fell into bankruptcy.

The judge said prison was the only way to send the message to CPAs and lawyers...


"IRS Employee Pleads Guilty to $1 Million ID Theft Tax Fraud Scheme
United States Department of Justice, February 9, 2016
http://www.justice.gov/usao-ndal/pr/irs-employee-pleads-guilty-1-million-id-theft-tax-fraud-scheme


"Gordon and Bud Did It. Did You? Insider Trading Gets a Rethink," by Neil Weinberg and Patricia Hurtado, Bloomberg, February 16, 2016 ---
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-16/gordon-and-bud-did-it-did-you-insider-trading-gets-a-rethink?cmpid=BBD021616_BIZ 

Insider trading used to seem so simple.

Pass a tip: “Blue Horseshoe loves Anacott Steel.”

Make a killing: “It’s all about the bucks, kid.”

And, just maybe, get busted: “At that moment, man finds his character.”

That, anyway, is the Hollywood version, circa 1987, in “Wall Street.”

On the real Wall Street, insider trading has rarely been that clear. And now, the prickly legal questions around it -- questions that have been around since the days of Gordon and Bud -- could get even thornier.

Almost three decades after the film, and seven years after the start of another dragnet that ensnared dozens, the U.S. Supreme Court is poised to take up the issue in a case involving brothers-in-law.

But before that happens, Judge Jed S. Rakoff -- who wrote the opinion headed to the Supreme Court -- is getting another chance to weigh in.

Simple Answer?

This week, Rakoff, a Manhattan federal court judge, is set to preside over a case that highlights a question that has many traders on edge: Just what is insider trading anyway? The answer might seem simple, but it’s not and never has been.

Part of insider trading requires that tippers, or people who pass inside information, get a “benefit.” After a pair of appeals court rulings since December 2014, it’s now unclear what counts as a benefit. Cash? Yes. Career advice. No. But say the tipper and the trader are just brothers-in-law and no money is exchanged. Or roommates who occasionally share secrets. Is that insider trading?

That’s what this trial is about.

Tuesday’s case was brought by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission against two brokers, and it centers on a merger tip passed from one roommate to another. The tip was about a billion dollar deal that made its way to the two brokers now on trial.

Lawyer’s Tip

According to the SEC, a lawyer who worked at Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP told his friend, a stock trader, about International Business Machine’s acquisition of SPSS Inc. in 2009. The friend in turn bought shares in SPSS and told his roommate, who then tipped broker Daryl Payton and two colleagues. One of those brokers told another colleague, Benjamin Durant.

Rakoff said in rulings last year that the SEC may have a case against Payton and Durant, who are on trial. The evidence may well show that the tips were swapped in exchange for “past and prospective services rendered” by one roommate to the other. If the jury agrees, that would be enough to establish the benefit required under insider-trading law, he said.

“They together ate dinner, drank beers, played video games, watched TV, used drugs and discussed their respective days, current events and personal details of their lives,” Rakoff said, summarizing the SEC’s claims. One roommate “took the lead in organizing and paying shared expenses, and resolving problems at the apartment.”

Nine Months

Lawyers for Payton and Durant are expected to argue that the tip to the roommate didn’t include a benefit -- so neither that, nor anything that followed, was insider trading. The lawyers say the roommates didn’t have a close relationship; they lived together for only nine months, didn’t share details about one another’s work, and hadn’t met one another’s families or friends. Payton and Durant knew even less about the roommates’ relationship, their lawyers say.

Hoary legal definitions -- in fact, no single U.S. statute covers insider trading -- have complicated the issue for years, as have different views from different global jurisdictions. Pretty much everyone is confused, from traders, to prosecutors to corporate executives.

“It’s a scary world when nobody knows how to conduct themselves,” said Jeffrey Robertson, a Washington-based lawyer who represents clients in securities litigation. “Obviously, it’s a state of flux.”

It’s so confusing, in fact, that Payton and Durant were criminally charged with insider trading, only to see those cases dismissed after a federal appeals court changed the law in December 2014.

California Case

The Supreme Court may at last provide guidance. Last month, it agreed to review a case from California in which Rakoff -- who was sitting on the appeals court there as a visiting jurist -- wrote an opinion on benefit that was favorable to prosecutors.

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
In my opinion, the more insider traders get away with exploiting private information the more investors will abandon the market. It's as simple as that. To protect the market you have to both discourage and punish insider trading even if its an accidental mistake.

Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/TidbitsDirectory.htm


Monsanto to Pay $80 Million to Settle Charge of Improper Accounting (for deferred deductions of rebates exposed by whistleblower) ---
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-25.html

According to the SEC’s order instituting a settled administrative proceeding against Monsanto, accounting executives Sara M. Brunnquell and Anthony P. Hartke, and then-sales executive Jonathan W. Nienas:

·         Monsanto’s sales force began telling U.S. retailers in 2009 that if they “maximized” their Roundup purchases in the fourth quarter they could participate in a new rebate program in 2010.

·         Hartke developed and Brunnquell approved talking points for Monsanto’s sales force to use when encouraging retailers to take advantage of the new rebate program and purchase significant amounts of Roundup in the fourth quarter of the company’s 2009 fiscal year.  Approximately one-third of its U.S. sales of Roundup for the year occurred during that quarter.

·         Brunnquell and Hartke, both certified public accountants, knew or should have known that the sales force used this new rebate program to incentivize sales in 2009 and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) required the company to record in 2009 a portion of Monsanto’s costs related to the rebate program.  But Monsanto improperly delayed recording these costs until 2010.

·         Monsanto also offered rebates to distributors who met agreed-upon volume targets.  However, late in the fiscal year, Monsanto reversed approximately $57.3 million of rebate costs that had been accrued under these agreements because certain distributors did not achieve their volume targets (at the urging of Monsanto).

·         Monsanto then created a new rebate program to allow distributors to “earn back” the rebates they failed to attain in 2009 by meeting new targets in 2010.  

·         Under this new program, Monsanto paid $44.5 million in rebates to its two largest distributors as part of side agreements arranged by Nienas, in which they were promised late in fiscal year 2009 that they would be paid the maximum rebate amounts regardless of target performance.

·         Because the side agreements were reached in 2009, Monsanto was required under GAAP to record these rebates in 2009.  But the company improperly deferred recording the rebate costs until 2010

·         Monsanto repeated the program the following year and improperly accounted for $48 million in rebate costs in 2011 that should have been recorded in 2010.

·         Monsanto also improperly accounted for more than $56 million in rebates in 2010 and 2011 in Canada, France, and Germany.  They were booked as selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses rather than rebates, which boosted gross profits from Roundup in those countries.  


Scott W. Friestad, Associate Director in the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, said, “Monsanto devised rebate programs that elevated form over substance, which led to the booking of substantial amounts of revenue without the recognition of associated costs.  Public companies need to have robust systems in place to ensure that all of their transactions are recognized in the correct reporting period.”


Monsanto consented to the SEC’s order without admitting or denying the findings that it violated Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933, the reporting provisions of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and underlying rules 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-11, and 13a-13; the books-and-records provisions of Exchange Act Section 13(b)(2)(A); and the internal accounting control provisions of Exchange Act Section 13(b)(2)(B). 

Continued in article

Bob Jensen's threads on creative accounting ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory02.htm#Manipulation


"Boeing to Face SEC Probe of Dreamliner and 747 Accounting," by Robert Schmidt, Julie Johnsson, and Matt Robinson, Bloomberg, February 11, 2016 ---
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-11/boeing-said-to-face-sec-probe-into-dreamliner-and-747-accounting?cmpid=BBD021116_BIZ 

Bob Jensen's threads on creative accounting ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory02.htm#Manipulation


"Valeant uses rare accounting maneuver for acquisitions that cushions income," by Francine McKenna, Market Watch, February 7, 2016 ---
 http://www.marketwatch.com/story/valeant-uses-rare-accounting-maneuver-for-acquisitions-that-cushions-income-2016-02-11

Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc. is constantly defending its business strategy—spending more to acquire companies with valuable drugs it can market than on research and development of new drugs.

New, original research by MarketWatch, supported by data gathered by financial research firm Calcbench, shows how Valeant VRX, -3.66% uses a rare accounting maneuver to obscure the true details of its many complex deals. In particular, it shows how much it pays for companies over book value and how it adjusts that amount over time without hitting prior income statements.

Last Thursday Valeant’s interim CEO Howard Schiller was subjected to a bipartisan grilling from members of the House Committee on Oversight, who questioned him about the company’s drug pricing tactics. Valeant’s business strategy has been to buy companies with drugs that have little or no generic competition and then raise the prices substantially to capitalize on desperate demand for these drugs. The company has been under scrutiny for its aggressive accounting activities ever since a short seller, Citron, accused it last fall of fraud related to its previously undisclosed specialty pharmacy Philidor. The company has since terminated its relationship with Philidor.

Continued in article

Bob Jensen's threads on creative accounting ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory02.htm#Manipulation


"The World’s Favorite New Tax Haven Is the United States:  Moving money out of the usual offshore secrecy havens and into the U.S. is a brisk new business," Jesse Drucker, Bloomberg, January 27, 2016 ---
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-27/the-world-s-favorite-new-tax-haven-is-the-united-states

Last September, at a law firm overlooking San Francisco Bay, Andrew Penney, a managing director at Rothschild & Co., gave a talk on how the world’s wealthy elite can avoid paying taxes.

His message was clear: You can help your clients move their fortunes to the United States, free of taxes and hidden from their governments.

Some are calling it the new Switzerland.

After years of lambasting other countries for helping rich Americans hide their money offshore, the U.S. is emerging as a leading tax and secrecy haven for rich foreigners. By resisting new global disclosure standards, the U.S. is creating a hot new market, becoming the go-to place to stash foreign wealth. Everyone from London lawyers to Swiss trust companies is getting in on the act, helping the world’s rich move accounts from places like the Bahamas and the British Virgin Islands to Nevada, Wyoming, and South Dakota.

“How ironic—no, how perverse—that the USA, which has been so sanctimonious in its condemnation of Swiss banks, has become the banking secrecy jurisdiction du jour,” wrote Peter A. Cotorceanu, a lawyer at Anaford AG, a Zurich law firm, in a recent legal journal. “That ‘giant sucking sound’ you hear? It is the sound of money rushing to the USA.”

Rothschild, the centuries-old European financial institution, has opened a trust company in Reno, Nev., a few blocks from the Harrah’s and Eldorado casinos. It is now moving the fortunes of wealthy foreign clients out of offshore havens such as Bermuda, subject to the new international disclosure requirements, and into Rothschild-run trusts in Nevada, which are exempt.

The U.S. “is effectively the biggest tax haven in the world” —Andrew Penney, Rothschild & Co.

The firm says its Reno operation caters to international families attracted to the stability of the U.S. and that customers must prove they comply with their home countries’ tax laws. Its trusts, moreover, have “not been set up with a view to exploiting that the U.S. has not signed up” for international reporting standards, said Rothschild spokeswoman Emma Rees.

Others are also jumping in: Geneva-based Cisa Trust Co. SA, which advises wealthy Latin Americans, is applying to open in Pierre, S.D., to “serve the needs of our foreign clients,” said John J. Ryan Jr., Cisa’s president.

Trident Trust Co., one of the world’s biggest providers of offshore trusts, moved dozens of accounts out of Switzerland, Grand Cayman, and other locales and into Sioux Falls, S.D., in December, ahead of a Jan. 1 disclosure deadline.

“Cayman was slammed in December, closing things that people were withdrawing,” said Alice Rokahr, the president of Trident in South Dakota, one of several states promoting low taxes and confidentiality in their trust laws. “I was surprised at how many were coming across that were formerly Swiss bank accounts, but they want out of Switzerland.” Why the Wealthy Are Moving Their Money Into the U.S.

Rokahr and other advisers said there is a legitimate need for secrecy. Confidential accounts that hide wealth, whether in the U.S., Switzerland, or elsewhere, protect against kidnappings or extortion in their owners’ home countries. The rich also often feel safer parking their money in the U.S. rather than some other location perceived as less-sure.

“I do not hear anybody saying, ‘I want to avoid taxes,’ ” Rokahr said. “These are people who are legitimately concerned with their own health and welfare.”

Continued in article

Jellum: Why The Treasury's (Tax Shelter) Anti-Abuse Regulation Is Unconstitutional

Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates ---  http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm


15 Most Corrupt Nations in the World ---
http://247wallst.com/special-report/2016/01/27/the-most-corrupt-countries-in-the-world-3/?utm_source=247WallStDailyNewsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_content=JAN282016A&utm_campaign=DailyNewsletter

Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm 


"UK lawmaker piles pressure on watchdog over HBOS accounting probe (of KPMG)," by Huw Jones, Reuters, February 3, 2016 ---
http://www.reuters.com/article/britain-parliament-hbos-idUSL8N15I27G

Feb 3 Britain's accounting watchdog came under further political pressure on Wednesday to undertake a full, independently supervised investigation into the auditing of HBOS's accounts by KPMG before the bank collapsed in 2008.

The Financial Reporting Council said last month it would undertake an initial enquiry into how KPMG and its staff audited HBOS before it went bust at the height of the financial crisis.

That announcement followed calls for a full probe from Andrew Tyrie, chairman of parliament's Treasury Select Committee, who on Wednesday intervened again to detail the conditions he wanted for the FRC enquiry to "command public confidence".

"This work is long overdue. Furthermore, the process by which the FRC has reached this decision, as well as the approach it plans for its preliminary enquiries, both raise a number of concerns," Tyrie said in a letter to the FRC and released to the media.

The FRC, which had no immediate comment, looked at aspects of KPMG's accounts of HBOS during 2013, but found no grounds to take matters further.

In his letter, Tyrie asked why the FRC was still only looking at two elements of the HBOS audit rather than undertaking a broader review.

He said a review of the HBOS collapse by the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority published last November had benefited from independent supervision.

"What provision will be made for independent and external oversight of the FRC's enquiries into the auditing of HBOS ?"

Tyrie asked what deadline the FRC was working to, and whether the findings will be published in full.

Continued in article

Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm 

 


"FTC Sues DeVry Education, Alleging Deceptive Ads Agency says for-profit school overstated employment-success record, " by Josh Mitchell and Brent Kendall, The Wall Street Journal, January 27, 2016 ---
http://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-files-deceptive-advertising-lawsuit-against-devry-1453916905

Federal regulators took aim at another major for-profit chain of colleges Wednesday, suing DeVry Education Group Inc. for allegedly running false television and online advertisements about the employment success and earnings of its graduates.

The Federal Trade Commission, one of several agencies investigating the for-profit education industry, faulted DeVry advertisements that claim 90% of its graduates who sought jobs found them in their field of study within six months of graduation. For example, it accused the school of including business-administration graduates who found retail jobs like selling cars or waiting tables as having found work in their field.

The commission asked a federal judge in California for monetary remedies—including refunds and restitution—for potentially as many as 50,000 students who enrolled at the company’s various campuses since 2008, the period under scrutiny. The FTC’s lawsuit also seeks to bar DeVry from using faulty statistics in its advertisements. Illinois-based DeVry runs more than 55 DeVry University campuses in 18 states, according to its website.

Continued in article

Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates ---  http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm 


Bombshell report accuses tennis officials of ignoring evidence of widespread match-fixing ---
http://www.businessinsider.com/bombshell-report-finds-evidence-of-widespread-match-fixing-in-tennis-2016-1

How to Mislead With Statistics
The University of Maryland's "Incredibly Irresponsible" Research on the Benefits of Chocolate Milk ---
http://www.vox.com/2016/1/16/10777050/university-of-maryland-chocolate-milk

Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm


Top 10 Red Flag Warnings of Fraud --- http://www.accountingweb.com/aa/auditing/top-10-red-flag-warnings-of-fraud

"Former Professor University of San Diego Professor Charged With Defrauding U.S.,"   Inside Higher Ed, January 20, 2016 ---
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2016/01/20/former-professor-charged-defrauding-us?utm_source=Inside+Higher+Ed&utm_campaign=ccf46d4be6-DNU20160120&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1fcbc04421-ccf46d4be6-197565045

"LSU Professor Arrested on Dozens of Fraud Charges," Inside Higher Ed, January 20, 2016 ---
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2016/01/11/lsu-professor-arrested-dozens-fraud-charges?utm_source=Inside+Higher+Ed&utm_campaign=63ed73e22c-DNU20160111&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1fcbc04421-63ed73e22c-197565045

Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates ---  http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm 


Professor Accused of Plagiarism Quits for $200,000 ---
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2016/01/18/professor-accused-plagiarism-quits-200000?utm_source=Inside+Higher+Ed&utm_campaign=84002272f5-DNU20160118&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1fcbc04421-84002272f5-197565045

Once a serial plagiarist always a serial plagiarist
"Alleged Serial Plagiarizer on Leave From Arizona State," Chronicle of Higher Education, September 18, 2015 ---
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2015/09/18/alleged-serial-plagiarizer-leave-arizona-state?utm_source=Inside+Higher+Ed&utm_campaign=52fbbd44c7-DNU20150918&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1fcbc04421-52fbbd44c7-197565045

A professor of history at Arizona State University who’s been accused of plagiarism multiple times was placed on administrative leave this week as the university looks into new allegations of misconduct, The Arizona Republic reported. While previous allegations against Matthew Whitacker involve his published research, the most recent complaint involves Whitacker’s extracurricular consulting business.

Last month, the city of Phoenix demanded a refund of the $21,900 it had already paid the Whitacker Group to develop cultural consciousness training material for its police force, according to The Republic. The city said more than half of some 80 slides Whitaker produced were ripped from the Chicago Police Department, with minor, if any, changes. Lonnie J. Williams Jr., Whitacker’s attorney, said he questioned why the university would investigate a matter in which it’s not involved, and that Whitacker had been up front about his intention to borrow the Chicago material.

Continued in article

From Full to Associate Professor:  A Rare Demotion in the Academy
"Anonymous Charges Vindicated,"  by Scott Jaschik, July 13, 2015 ---
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/07/13/arizona-state-demotes-history-professor-after-investigation-his-book

When an anonymous blog last year accused Matthew C. Whitaker of plagiarizing portions of Peace Be Still: Modern Black America from World War II to Barack Obama, he said that he wouldn't respond to charges presented in that way. His publisher, the University of Nebraska Press, backed him.

The anonymous nature of the charges bothered some at Arizona State University, where Whitaker was a full professor and led a research center. But after the university conducted an investigation and found misconduct, Whitaker now says that he agrees that he made significant mistakes in the book.

Mark S. Searle, Arizona State's interim provost, last week sent an email message to history faculty members in which he said an investigation into the book had "identified significant issues with the content of the aforementioned book." Searle went on to say that "as a result of the outcomes from that investigation, Dr. Whitaker has accepted a position as associate professor without a Foundation Professorship [an honor he previously held], and now co-directs his center."

Searle also forwarded a letter from Whitaker, in which he admitted wrongdoing. Both letters were forwarded by someone other than the authors to Inside Higher Ed.

"I have struggled to overlook the personal nature of the criticisms, and to evaluate and recognize that there was merit to some of them. I alerted ASU administration to the fact that the text contained unattributed and poorly paraphrased material. I accept responsibility for these errors and I am working with my publisher to make the appropriate corrections," he wrote.

Continued in article

"New Book, New Allegations," by Colleen Flaherty, Inside Higher Ed, May 13, 2014 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/05/13/arizona-state-professor-accused-plagiarism-second-time#sthash.OmcGllGb.dpbs 

An investigation into plagiarism allegations against an Arizona State University professor of history in 2011 found him not guilty of deliberate academic misconduct, but the case remained controversial. The chair of his department’s tenure committee resigned in protest and other faculty members spoke out against the findings, saying their colleague – who recently had been promoted to full professor – was cleared even though what he did likely would have gotten an undergraduate in trouble.

Now, Matthew C. Whitaker has written a new book, and allegations of plagiarism are being levied against him once again. Several blogs – one anonymously, and in great detail – have documented alleged examples of plagiarism in the work. Several of his colleagues have seen them, and say they raise serious questions about Whitaker’s academic integrity.

Meanwhile, Whitaker says he won’t comment on allegations brought forth anonymously, and his publisher, the University of Nebraska Press, says it’s standing by him.

Three years ago, several senior faculty members in Whitaker’s department accused him of uncited borrowing of texts and ideas from books, Wikipedia and a newspaper article in his written work and a speech. In response, the university appointed a three-member committee to investigate. The group found that Whitaker’s work contained no “substantial or systematic plagiarism,” but that he had been careless in some instances, as reported by Inside Higher Ed at the time. As a result, the university did not impose serious sanctions on the scholar, who is the founding director of Arizona State’s Center for the Study of Race and Democracy.

In response, Monica Green, professor of history, resigned as department tenure committee chair. Several other professors called the investigation flawed and incomplete in a formal complaint to the university and in public statements.

Whitaker at the time told the university that his colleagues were pursuing a personal vendetta, possibly due to his race and the fact that they disagreed with his promotion, The Arizona Republic reported.

The university backed Whitaker, saying that the investigation had been thorough and carried out by distinguished scholars.

In January, the University of Nebraska Press published Whitaker’s newest book, Peace Be Still: Modern Black America from World War II to Barack Obama. Several prominent professors of history have written blurbs for the book, which won the Bayard Rustin Book Award from the Tufts University Center for the Study of Race and Democracy.

But not everyone is impressed.

Since the book’s publication, a blog called the Cabinet of Plagiarism has detailed numerous alleged instances of plagiarism in the book, including text and ideas taken from information websites and published scholarship. The blog is moderated by someone using the name Ann Ribidoux, who did not return a posted request for comment. There is no one on the Arizona State faculty by that name.

Matthew C. Whitaker Homepage at ASU --- https://webapp4.asu.edu/directory/person/91993

Bob Jensen's threads on Matthew Whitaker at Arizona State University ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Plagiarism.htm#ProfessorsWhoPlagiarize
Scroll down


CDO --- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collateralized_debt_obligation

"JPMorgan to pay $1.42 billion cash to settle most Lehman claims," by Jonatan Stemel, Reuters, January 25, 2016 ---
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorgan-lehman-idUSKCN0V4049

JPMorgan Chase & Co (JPM.N) will pay $1.42 billion in cash to resolve most of a lawsuit accusing it of draining Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc of critical liquidity in the final days before that investment bank's September 2008 collapse.

The settlement was made public on Monday, and requires approval by U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Shelley Chapman in Manhattan.

It resolves the bulk of an $8.6 billion lawsuit accusing JPMorgan of exploiting its leverage as Lehman's main "clearing" bank to siphon billions of dollars of collateral just before Lehman went bankrupt on Sept. 15, 2008, triggering a global financial crisis.

Lehman's creditors charged that JPMorgan did not need the collateral and extracted a windfall at their expense.

Monday's settlement also resolves Lehman's challenges to JPMorgan's decision to close out thousands of derivatives trades following the bankruptcy, court papers showed.

The accord would permit a further $1.496 billion to be distributed to the creditors, including a separate $76 million deposit, court papers showed.

Continued in article

"Goldman Reaches $5 Billion Settlement Over Mortgage-Backed Securities:  Pact marks largest settlement in history of Wall Street firm," by Justin Baer and Chelsey Dulaney, The Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2016 ---
http://www.wsj.com/articles/goldman-reaches-5-billion-settlement-over-mortgage-backed-securities-1452808185?mod=djemCFO_h

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. agreed to the largest regulatory penalty in its history, resolving U.S. and state claims stemming from the Wall Street firm’s sale of mortgage bonds heading into the financial crisis.

In settling with the Justice Department and a collection of other state and federal entities for more than $5 billion, Goldman will join a list of other big banks in moving past one of the biggest, and most costly, legal headaches of the crisis era.

Goldman said litigation legal expenses stemming from the accord would trim its fourth-quarter earnings by about $1.5 billion, after taxes. The firm is scheduled to report results Wednesday.

“We are pleased to have reached an agreement in principle to resolve these matters,” Lloyd Blankfein, Goldman’s chief executive, said in a statement.

Government officials previously won multibillion-dollar settlements from J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp. and Citigroup Inc. The probes examined how Wall Street sold bonds tied to residential mortgages, and whether banks deceived investors by misrepresenting the quality of underlying loans.

The government’s inquiry into Goldman related to mortgage-backed securities the firm packaged and sold between 2005 and 2007, the years when the housing market was soaring and investor demand for related bonds was still strong.

Continued in article

New Rules for CDOs
"Statement at Open Meeting: Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure and Registration," by Commissioner Kara M. Stein, SEC, August 27, 2014 ---
http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370542772431#.VBgvYBZS7rx

I begin my remarks by echoing others and commending the work of the team that has been working on this rule, including Rolaine Bancroft, Hughes Bates, Michelle Stasny, Kayla Florio, Heather Mackintosh, Silvia Pilkerton, Robert Errett, Max Rumyantsev, and Kathy Hsu. 

Heather and Sylvia have been working on the data tagging and preparing EDGAR to accept this new data.  This is no small endeavor. 

I want to give a special thank you to Paula Dubberly, who retired last year from the SEC and is in the audience today.  She has been a champion for investors through her leadership on asset-backed securities regulation from the development of the initial Reg AB proposal through the rules that are being considered today.

This rule is an important step forward in completing the mandated Dodd-Frank Act rulemakings.[1]  The financial crisis revealed investors’ inability to actually assess pools of loans that had been sliced and diced, sometimes multiple times, by being securitized, re-securitized, or combined in a dizzying array of complex financial instruments.  The securitization market was at the center of the financial crisis.  While securitization structures provided liquidity to nearly every sector in the U.S. economy, they also exposed investors to significant and non-transparent risks due to poor lending practices and poor disclosure practices. 

As we now know, offering documents failed to provide timely and complete information for investors to assess the underlying risks of the pool of assets.[2]   Without sufficient and accurate loan level details, analysts and investors could not gauge the quality of the loans – and without an ability to distinguish the good from the bad, the secondary market collapsed.

Congress responded and required the Commission to promulgate rules to address a number of weaknesses in the securitization process.[3]

Six years after the financial crisis, the securitization markets continue to recover.  While certain asset classes have rebounded, others continue to struggle.

The rule the Commission issues today partially addresses the Congressional mandate.  In effect, today’s rules provide investors with better information on what is inside the securitization package.  The rules today do for investors what food and drug labeling does for consumers – provide a list of ingredients.

This rule also addresses certain critical flaws that became apparent in the securitization process, including a dearth of quality information and insufficient time to make informed assessments of the underlying investments.  This rule is an important step toward providing investors with tools and data to better understand the underlying risks and appropriately price the securities. 

There are several important and laudable aspects of today’s rule that merit specific mentioning.

First, the rule requires the underlying loan information to be standardized and available in a tagged XML format to ensure maximum utility in analysis.[4]   As noted in the Commission’s 2010 Proxy Plumbing Release: “If issuers provided reportable items in interactive data format, shareholders may be able to more easily obtain information about issuers, compare information across different issuers, and observe how issuer-specific information changes over time as the same issuer continues to file in an interactive format.”[5]  The same is true for underlying loan information.  Investors can unlock the value and efficiency that standardized, machine readable data allows. 

Today’s rule also improves disclosures regarding the initial offering of securities and significantly, for the first time, requires periodic updating regarding the loans as they perform over time.  This information will provide a more nuanced and evolving picture of the underlying assets in a portfolio to investors.

The rule also requires that the principal executive officer of the ABS issuer certify that the information in the prospectus or report is accurate.  These kinds of certifications provide a key control to help ensure more oversight and accountability.

As for the privacy concerns that prompted a re-proposal, the staff has worked hard to balance investor needs for loan level data with concerns that the data could lead to identification of individual borrowers.   I believe the rule achieves a workable balance between these two competing needs, while still providing invaluable public disclosure.

Finally, I believe that the new disclosure rule will provide investors with the necessary tools to see what is “under the hood” on auto loan securitizations.  In its latest report on consumer debt and credit, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York noted a recent spike in subprime auto lending.  As the report shows, although consumer auto debt balances have risen across the board, the real growth has been in riskier loans.[6] The disclosure and reporting changes that the Commission is adopting today will help investors see the quality of the loans in a portfolio and the performance of those loans over time. 

While today’s rules are an important step forward, more work needs to be done regarding conflicts of interest.   We now know that many firms who were structuring securitizations before the financial crisis were also betting against those same securitizations. 

In April 2010, the Commission charged the U.S broker-dealer of a large financial services firm for its role in failing to disclose that it allowed a client to select assets for an investment portfolio while betting that the portfolio would ultimately lose its value.  Investors in the portfolio lost more than $1 billion.[7]  

In October 2011, the Commission sued the U.S broker-dealer of a large financial services firm for among other things, selling investment products tied to the housing market and then, for their own trading, betting that those assets would lose money.  In effect, the firm bet against the very investors it had solicited.  An experienced collateral manager commented internally that a particular portfolio was “horrible.”  While investors lost virtually all of their investments in the portfolio, the firm pocketed over $160 million from bets it made against the securitization it created.[8]

The Dodd-Frank Act directed the Commission to adopt rules prohibiting placement agents, underwriters, and sponsors from engaging in a material conflict of interest for one year following the closing of a securitization transaction. Those rules were required to be issued by April 2011.[9]   The Commission initially proposed these rules in September 2011, and still has not completed them.[10]  We need to complete these rules as soon as possible, hopefully, by the end of this year.  These rules will provide investors with additional confidence that they are not being hoodwinked by those packaging and selling those financial instruments. 

Unfortunately, the Commission has put on hold its work to provide investors with a software engine to aid in the calculation of waterfall models.  Although the final rule provides for a preliminary prospectus at least three business days before the first sale, this is reduced from the proposal, which provided for a five-day period.   With only three days to conduct due diligence and make an investment determination, such a software engine could be an important and much needed tool for investors to use in analyzing the flow of funds.  Such waterfall models can help investors assess the cash flows from the loan level data.  We should return to this important initiative to provide investors with the mathematical logic that forms the basis for the narrative disclosure within the prospectus.

 

Bob Jensen's threads on CDO accounting scandals and new rules ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory02.htm#CDO


From the CFO Journal's Morning Ledger on January 13, 2016

Suit says Fiat Chrysler falsified sales reporting
An Illinois dealer sued Fiat Chrysler Automobiles NV, accusing the fastest-growing of the major auto makers of manipulating new-vehicle sales reporting in the U.S. Fiat Chrysler employed a program that used “strong-arm” tactics to get dealers to falsify sales reports to benefit the auto maker by creating “the appearance that [Fiat Chrysler’s] performance is better than, in reality, it actually is,” the suit claims.

Consumer Reports List of the Least Reliable Cars and Small Trucks ---
http://www.autoguide.com/auto-news/2015/10/top-10-most-reliable-and-least-reliable-cars.html

  1. Fiat (least reliable)
  2. Jeep
  3. Ram
  4. Cadillac
  5. Infiniti
  6. Dodge
  7. Chrysler
  8. Mercedes-Benz
  9. Chevrolet
  10. GMC

Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm 


CDO --- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collateralized_debt_obligation

"Goldman Reaches $5 Billion Settlement Over Mortgage-Backed Securities:  Pact marks largest settlement in history of Wall Street firm," by Justin Baer and Chelsey Dulaney, The Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2016 ---
http://www.wsj.com/articles/goldman-reaches-5-billion-settlement-over-mortgage-backed-securities-1452808185?mod=djemCFO_h

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. agreed to the largest regulatory penalty in its history, resolving U.S. and state claims stemming from the Wall Street firm’s sale of mortgage bonds heading into the financial crisis.

In settling with the Justice Department and a collection of other state and federal entities for more than $5 billion, Goldman will join a list of other big banks in moving past one of the biggest, and most costly, legal headaches of the crisis era.

Goldman said litigation legal expenses stemming from the accord would trim its fourth-quarter earnings by about $1.5 billion, after taxes. The firm is scheduled to report results Wednesday.

“We are pleased to have reached an agreement in principle to resolve these matters,” Lloyd Blankfein, Goldman’s chief executive, said in a statement.

Government officials previously won multibillion-dollar settlements from J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp. and Citigroup Inc. The probes examined how Wall Street sold bonds tied to residential mortgages, and whether banks deceived investors by misrepresenting the quality of underlying loans.

The government’s inquiry into Goldman related to mortgage-backed securities the firm packaged and sold between 2005 and 2007, the years when the housing market was soaring and investor demand for related bonds was still strong.

Continued in article

New Rules for CDOs
"Statement at Open Meeting: Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure and Registration," by Commissioner Kara M. Stein, SEC, August 27, 2014 ---
http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370542772431#.VBgvYBZS7rx

I begin my remarks by echoing others and commending the work of the team that has been working on this rule, including Rolaine Bancroft, Hughes Bates, Michelle Stasny, Kayla Florio, Heather Mackintosh, Silvia Pilkerton, Robert Errett, Max Rumyantsev, and Kathy Hsu. 

Heather and Sylvia have been working on the data tagging and preparing EDGAR to accept this new data.  This is no small endeavor. 

I want to give a special thank you to Paula Dubberly, who retired last year from the SEC and is in the audience today.  She has been a champion for investors through her leadership on asset-backed securities regulation from the development of the initial Reg AB proposal through the rules that are being considered today.

This rule is an important step forward in completing the mandated Dodd-Frank Act rulemakings.[1]  The financial crisis revealed investors’ inability to actually assess pools of loans that had been sliced and diced, sometimes multiple times, by being securitized, re-securitized, or combined in a dizzying array of complex financial instruments.  The securitization market was at the center of the financial crisis.  While securitization structures provided liquidity to nearly every sector in the U.S. economy, they also exposed investors to significant and non-transparent risks due to poor lending practices and poor disclosure practices. 

As we now know, offering documents failed to provide timely and complete information for investors to assess the underlying risks of the pool of assets.[2]   Without sufficient and accurate loan level details, analysts and investors could not gauge the quality of the loans – and without an ability to distinguish the good from the bad, the secondary market collapsed.

Congress responded and required the Commission to promulgate rules to address a number of weaknesses in the securitization process.[3]

Six years after the financial crisis, the securitization markets continue to recover.  While certain asset classes have rebounded, others continue to struggle.

The rule the Commission issues today partially addresses the Congressional mandate.  In effect, today’s rules provide investors with better information on what is inside the securitization package.  The rules today do for investors what food and drug labeling does for consumers – provide a list of ingredients.

This rule also addresses certain critical flaws that became apparent in the securitization process, including a dearth of quality information and insufficient time to make informed assessments of the underlying investments.  This rule is an important step toward providing investors with tools and data to better understand the underlying risks and appropriately price the securities. 

There are several important and laudable aspects of today’s rule that merit specific mentioning.

First, the rule requires the underlying loan information to be standardized and available in a tagged XML format to ensure maximum utility in analysis.[4]   As noted in the Commission’s 2010 Proxy Plumbing Release: “If issuers provided reportable items in interactive data format, shareholders may be able to more easily obtain information about issuers, compare information across different issuers, and observe how issuer-specific information changes over time as the same issuer continues to file in an interactive format.”[5]  The same is true for underlying loan information.  Investors can unlock the value and efficiency that standardized, machine readable data allows. 

Today’s rule also improves disclosures regarding the initial offering of securities and significantly, for the first time, requires periodic updating regarding the loans as they perform over time.  This information will provide a more nuanced and evolving picture of the underlying assets in a portfolio to investors.

The rule also requires that the principal executive officer of the ABS issuer certify that the information in the prospectus or report is accurate.  These kinds of certifications provide a key control to help ensure more oversight and accountability.

As for the privacy concerns that prompted a re-proposal, the staff has worked hard to balance investor needs for loan level data with concerns that the data could lead to identification of individual borrowers.   I believe the rule achieves a workable balance between these two competing needs, while still providing invaluable public disclosure.

Finally, I believe that the new disclosure rule will provide investors with the necessary tools to see what is “under the hood” on auto loan securitizations.  In its latest report on consumer debt and credit, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York noted a recent spike in subprime auto lending.  As the report shows, although consumer auto debt balances have risen across the board, the real growth has been in riskier loans.[6] The disclosure and reporting changes that the Commission is adopting today will help investors see the quality of the loans in a portfolio and the performance of those loans over time. 

While today’s rules are an important step forward, more work needs to be done regarding conflicts of interest.   We now know that many firms who were structuring securitizations before the financial crisis were also betting against those same securitizations. 

In April 2010, the Commission charged the U.S broker-dealer of a large financial services firm for its role in failing to disclose that it allowed a client to select assets for an investment portfolio while betting that the portfolio would ultimately lose its value.  Investors in the portfolio lost more than $1 billion.[7]  

In October 2011, the Commission sued the U.S broker-dealer of a large financial services firm for among other things, selling investment products tied to the housing market and then, for their own trading, betting that those assets would lose money.  In effect, the firm bet against the very investors it had solicited.  An experienced collateral manager commented internally that a particular portfolio was “horrible.”  While investors lost virtually all of their investments in the portfolio, the firm pocketed over $160 million from bets it made against the securitization it created.[8]

The Dodd-Frank Act directed the Commission to adopt rules prohibiting placement agents, underwriters, and sponsors from engaging in a material conflict of interest for one year following the closing of a securitization transaction. Those rules were required to be issued by April 2011.[9]   The Commission initially proposed these rules in September 2011, and still has not completed them.[10]  We need to complete these rules as soon as possible, hopefully, by the end of this year.  These rules will provide investors with additional confidence that they are not being hoodwinked by those packaging and selling those financial instruments. 

Unfortunately, the Commission has put on hold its work to provide investors with a software engine to aid in the calculation of waterfall models.  Although the final rule provides for a preliminary prospectus at least three business days before the first sale, this is reduced from the proposal, which provided for a five-day period.   With only three days to conduct due diligence and make an investment determination, such a software engine could be an important and much needed tool for investors to use in analyzing the flow of funds.  Such waterfall models can help investors assess the cash flows from the loan level data.  We should return to this important initiative to provide investors with the mathematical logic that forms the basis for the narrative disclosure within the prospectus.

 

Bob Jensen's threads on CDO accounting scandals and new rules ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory02.htm#CDO

 


"Lawsuit By 12 Graduates Against Thomas Jefferson Law School Over Placement Data Heads To Trial In March," by Paul Caron, TaxProf Blog, December 12, 2015 ---
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2015/12/lawsuit-by-12-graduates-against-thomas-jefferson-law-school-over-placement-data-heads-to-trial-in-ma.html

Nikki Nguyen left a $50,000-a-year job at Boeing Co. in 2006 to pursue a law degree at Thomas Jefferson School of Law in San Diego, her sister's successful career as a corporate attorney providing a glimpse of the possibilities she imagined ahead of her.

Instead, she struggled for more than a year to find a job after she graduated and watched her student loan debt of over $180,000 balloon.

Nguyen, 34, is among 12 former Thomas Jefferson students who are suing the university in a California court, accusing it of inflating its graduates' employment figures and salaries to attract students. "They weren't transparent," said Nguyen, whose case is scheduled to go to trial in March. "People who have a dream of law school should go into it with their eyes wide open." ...

Nguyen's lawsuit is among more than a dozen similar ones filed in recent years against law schools, including Golden Gate University School of Law in San Francisco and the University of San Francisco School of Law. Though most of the suits have been dismissed, critics say they point to a need for greater regulation and transparency for law schools, so prospective students know their employment prospects, the debt they will incur and even their chances of successfully passing the bar.

"Schools are setting up a lot of people to fail," said Kyle McEntee, executive director of Law School Transparency, a nonprofit legal education policy group that had no involvement with the lawsuits.

Thomas Jefferson reported post-graduation employment figures that exceeded 70 percent and topped 90 percent in 2010, but did not disclose that those figures included part-time and non-legal work such as a pool cleaner and a sales clerk at Victoria's Secret and were based on a small sample of graduates, according to Nguyen's lawsuit and her attorney, Brian Procel. The lawsuit further alleges that the school routinely reported unemployed students as employed and shredded surveys and other documents that reflected a more accurate employment picture. ...

The lawsuits against Golden Gate University and the University of San Francisco also alleged the schools were misrepresenting their post-graduate employment figures. The Golden Gate lawsuit was settled, with each of the five plaintiffs receiving $8,000, according to a May 2015 court filing. The case against the University of San Francisco was dismissed in May. ...

Nguyen said she now owes more than $200,000. Though she works in a paralegal-type position and lives with her sister, she said she has not been able to touch the principal on her loan

Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm 

 


Jensen Comment
Note that the following article has enormous implications for what is taught in most Ph.D. programs in the social sciences, business, accounting, finance, and other academic disciplines.  Regression analysis has become the key to the kingdom of academic research, a Ph.D. diploma, journal article publication, tenure, and performance rewards in the Academy. Now the sky is falling, and soon researchers skilled mostly at performing regression analysis are faced with the problem of having to learn how to do real research.

Regression Analysis --- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regression_analysis

Richard Nisbett --- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_E._Nisbett

Edge
"The Crusade Against Multiple Regression Analysis A Conversation With Richard Nisbett," Edge, January 21, 2016 ---
http://edge.org/conversation/richard_nisbett-the-crusade-against-multiple-regression-analysis

A huge range of science projects are done with multiple regression analysis. The results are often somewhere between meaningless and quite damaging. ...                             

I hope that in the future, if I’m successful in communicating with people about this, that there’ll be a kind of upfront warning in New York Times articles: These data are based on multiple regression analysis. This would be a sign that you probably shouldn’t read the article because you’re quite likely to get non-information or misinformation. RICHARD NISBETT is a professor of psychology and co-director of the Culture and Cognition Program at the University of Michigan. He is the author of Mindware: Tools for Smart Thinking; and The Geography of Thought. Richard Nisbett's Edge Bio Page.

THE CRUSADE AGAINST MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
The thing I’m most interested in right now has become a kind of crusade against correlational statistical analysis—in particular, what’s called multiple regression analysis. Say you want to find out whether taking Vitamin E is associated with lower prostate cancer risk. You look at the correlational evidence and indeed it turns out that men who take Vitamin E have lower risk for prostate cancer. Then someone says, "Well, let’s see if we do the actual experiment, what happens." And what happens when you do the experiment is that Vitamin E contributes to the likelihood of prostate cancer. How could there be differences? These happen a lot. The correlational—the observational—evidence tells you one thing, the experimental evidence tells you something completely different.

The thing I’m most interested in right now has become a kind of crusade against correlational statistical analysis—in particular, what’s called multiple regression analysis. Say you want to find out whether taking Vitamin E is associated with lower prostate cancer risk. You look at the correlational evidence and indeed it turns out that men who take Vitamin E have lower risk for prostate cancer. Then someone says, "Well, let’s see if we do the actual experiment, what happens." And what happens when you do the experiment is that Vitamin E contributes to the likelihood of prostate cancer. How could there be differences? These happen a lot. The correlational—the observational—evidence tells you one thing, the experimental evidence tells you something completely different.

In the case of health data, the big problem is something that’s come to be called the healthy user bias, because the guy who’s taking Vitamin E is also doing everything else right. A doctor or an article has told him to take Vitamin E, so he does that, but he’s also the guy who’s watching his weight and his cholesterol, gets plenty of exercise, drinks alcohol in moderation, doesn’t smoke, has a high level of education, and a high income. All of these things are likely to make you live longer, to make you less subject to morbidity and mortality risks of all kinds. You pull one thing out of that correlate and it’s going to look like Vitamin E is terrific because it’s dragging all these other good things along with it.

This is not, by any means, limited to health issues. A while back, I read a government report in The New York Times on the safety of automobiles. The measure that they used was the deaths per million drivers of each of these autos. It turns out that, for example, there are enormously more deaths per million drivers who drive Ford F150 pickups than for people who drive Volvo station wagons. Most people’s reaction, and certainly my initial reaction to it was, "Well, it sort of figures—everybody knows that Volvos are safe."

Continued in article

Drawing Inferences From Very Large Data-Sets

David Johnstone wrote the following:

Indeed if you hold H0 the same and keep changing the model, you will eventually (generally soon) get a significant result, allowing "rejection of H0 at 5%", not because H0 is necessarily false but because you have built upon a false model (of which there are zillions, obviously).

"Drawing Inferences From Very Large Data-Sets,"   by David Giles, Econometrics Beat:  Dave Giles� Blog, University of Victoria, April 26, 2013 ---
http://davegiles.blogspot.ca/2011/04/drawing-inferences-from-very-large-data.html

. . .

Granger (1998; 2003has reminded us that if the sample size is sufficiently large, then it's virtually impossible not to reject almost any hypothesis. So, if the sample is very large and the p-values associated with the estimated coefficients in a regression model are of the order of, say, 0.10 or even 0.05, then this really bad news. Much, much, smaller p-values are needed before we get all excited about 'statistically significant' results when the sample size is in the thousands, or even bigger. So, the p-values reported above are mostly pretty marginal, as far as significance is concerned. When you work out the p-values for the other 6 models I mentioned, they range from  to 0.005 to 0.460. I've been generous in the models I selected.

Here's another set of  results taken from a second, really nice, paper by
Ciecieriski et al. (2011) in the same issue of Health Economics:

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
My research suggest that over 90% of the recent papers published in The Accounting Review use purchased databases that provide enormous sample sizes in those papers. Their accountics science authors keep reporting those meaningless levels of statistical significance.

What is even worse is when meaningless statistical significance tests are used to support decisions.

"Statistical Significance - Again " by David Giles, Econometrics Beat:  Dave Giles� Blog, University of Victoria, December 28, 2013 ---
http://davegiles.blogspot.com/2013/12/statistical-significance-again.html

Statistical Significance - Again

 
With all of this emphasis on "Big Data", I was pleased to see this post on the Big Data Econometrics blog, today.

 
When you have a sample that runs to the thousands (billions?), the conventional significance levels of 10%, 5%, 1% are completely inappropriate. You need to be thinking in terms of tiny significance levels.

 
I discussed this in some detail back in April of 2011, in a post titled, "Drawing Inferences From Very Large Data-Sets". If you're of those (many) applied researchers who uses large cross-sections of data, and then sprinkles the results tables with asterisks to signal "significance" at the 5%, 10% levels, etc., then I urge you read that earlier post.

 
It's sad to encounter so many papers and seminar presentations in which the results, in reality, are totally insignificant!

 

How Standard Error Costs Us Jobs, Justice, and Lives, by Stephen T. Ziliak and Deirdre N. McCloskey (Ann Arbor:  University of Michigan Press, ISBN-13: 978-472-05007-9, 2007)
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/temp/DeirdreMcCloskey/StatisticalSignificance01.htm

Page 206
Like scientists today in medical and economic and other sizeless sciences, Pearson mistook a large sample size for the definite, substantive significance---evidence s Hayek put it, of "wholes." But it was as Hayek said "just an illusion." Pearson's columns of sparkling asterisks, though quantitative in appearance and as appealing a is the simple truth of the sky, signified nothing.

 

pp. 250-251
The textbooks are wrong. The teaching is wrong. The seminar you just attended is wrong. The most prestigious journal in your scientific field is wrong.

You are searching, we know, for ways to avoid being wrong. Science, as Jeffreys said, is mainly a series of approximations to discovering the sources of error. Science is a systematic way of reducing wrongs or can be. Perhaps you feel frustrated by the random epistemology of the mainstream and don't know what to do. Perhaps you've been sedated by significance and lulled into silence. Perhaps you sense that the power of a Roghamsted test against a plausible Dublin alternative is statistically speaking low but you feel oppressed by the instrumental variable one should dare not to wield. Perhaps you feel frazzled by what Morris Altman (2004) called the "social psychology rhetoric of fear," the deeply embedded path dependency that keeps the abuse of significance in circulation. You want to come out of it. But perhaps you are cowed by the prestige of Fisherian dogma. Or, worse thought, perhaps you are cynically willing to be corrupted if it will keep a nice job

 

Bob Jensen's threads on the often way analysts, particularly accountics scientists, often cheer for statistical significance of large sample outcomes that praise statistical significance of insignificant results such as R2 values of .0001 ---
The Cult of Statistical Significance: How Standard Error Costs Us Jobs, Justice, and Lives ---
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/temp/DeirdreMcCloskey/StatisticalSignificance01.htm

Those of you interested in tracking The Accounting Review's  trends in submissions, refereeing, and acceptances'rejections should be interested in current senior editor Mark L. DeFond's annual report at
http://aaajournals.org/doi/full/10.2308/accr-10477
This has become a huge process involving 18 editors and hundreds of referees. TAR is still the leading accountics science journal of the American Accounting Association. However, there are so many new specialty journals readers are apt to find quality research in other AAA journals. TAR seemingly still does not publish commentaries and articles without equations and has not yet caught on the the intitiatives of the Pathways Commission for more diversification in research in the leading AAA research journal. Virtually all TAR editors still worship p-values in empirical submissions.

"Not Even Scientists Can Easily Explain P-values," by Christie Aschwanden, Nate Silver's 5:38 Blog, November 30, 2015 ---
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/not-even-scientists-can-easily-explain-p-values/

P-values have taken quite a beating lately. These widely used and commonly misapplied statistics have been blamed for giving a veneer of legitimacy to dodgy study results, encouraging bad research practices and promoting false-positive study results.

But after writing about p-values again and again, and recently issuing a correction on a nearly year-old story over some erroneous information regarding a study’s p-value (which I’d taken from the scientists themselves and their report), I’ve come to think that the most fundamental problem with p-values is that no one can really say what they are.

Last week, I attended the inaugural METRICS conference at Stanford, which brought together some of the world’s leading experts on meta-science, or the study of studies. I figured that if anyone could explain p-values in plain English, these folks could. I was wrong.

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
Why all the fuss? Accountics scientists have a perfectly logical explanation. P-values are numbers that are pumped out of statistical analysis software (mostly multiple regression software) that accounting research journal editors think indicate the degree of causality or at least suggest the degree of causality to readers. But the joke is on the editors, because there aren't any readers.

November 30, 2015 reply from David Johnstone

Dear Bob, thankyou for this interesting stuff.

 

A big part of the acceptance of P-values is that they easily give the look of something having been found. So it’s an agency problem, where the researchers do what makes their research outcomes easier and better looking.

 

There is a lot more to it of course. I note with young staff that they face enough hurdles in the need to get papers written and published without thinking that the very techniques that they are trying to emulate might be flawed. Rightfully, they say, “it’s not my job to question everything that I have been shown and to get nowhere as a result”, nor can most believe that something so established and revered can be wrong, that is just too unthinkable and depressing. So the bandwagon goes on, and, as Bob says, no one cares outside as no one much reads it.

 

I do however get annoyed every time I hear decision makers carry on about “evidence based” policy, as if no one can have a clue or form a vision or strategy without first having the backing of some junk science by a sociologist or educationist or accounting researcher who was just twisting the world whichever way to get significant p-values and a good “story”. This kind of cargo-culting, which is everywhere, does great harm to good or sincere science, as it makes it hard for an outsider to tell the difference.

 

One thing that does not get much of a hearing is that the statisticians themselves must take a lot of blame. They had the chance to vote off P values decades ago when they had to choose between frequentist and Bayesian logic. They split into two camps with the frequentists in the great majority but holding the weakest ground intellectually. The numbers are moving now, as people that were not born when de Finetti, Savage, Lindley, Kadane and others first said that p-values were ill-conceived logically. Accounting, of course, being largely ignorant of there being any issue, and ultimately just political, will not be leading the battle of ideas.

 

Bob Jensen's threads on statistical mistakes ---
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/rjensen/temp/AccounticsScienceStatisticalMistakes.htm

How Accountics Scientists Should Change: 
"Frankly, Scarlett, after I get a hit for my resume in The Accounting Review I just don't give a damn"

http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/temp/AccounticsDamn.htm
One more mission in what's left of my life will be to try to change this
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/temp/AccounticsDamn.htm

"A Scrapbook on What’s Wrong with the Past, Present a nd Future of Accountics Science," by Bob Jensen, Working Paper 450.06, Date Fluid ---
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/temp/AccounticsWorkingPaper450.06.pdf

The purpose of this paper is to make a case that the accountics science monopoly of our doctoral programs and publish ed research is seriously flawed, especially its lack of concern about replication and focus on simplified arti ficial worlds that differ too much from reality to creatively discover findings of greater relevance to teachers of accounting and practitioners of accounting. Accountics scientists themselves became a Cargo Cult.

Gaming for Tenure as an Accounting Professor ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/TheoryTenure.htm
(with a reply about tenure publication point systems from Linda Kidwell)

 

 

 


 

 




Other Links
Main Document on the accounting, finance, and business scandals --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm 

Bob Jensen's Enron Quiz --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnronQuiz.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on professionalism and independence are at  file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/dbowling/Local%20Settings/Temporary%20Internet%20Files/OLK36/FraudUpdates.htm#Professionalism 

Bob Jensen's threads on pro forma frauds are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#ProForma 

Bob Jensen's threads on ethics and accounting education are at 
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm#AccountingEducation

The Saga of Auditor Professionalism and Independence ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm#Professionalism
 

Incompetent and Corrupt Audits are Routine ---
http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm#IncompetentAudits

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm 

Future of Auditing --- http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm#FutureOfAuditing 

 

 


 

The Consumer Fraud Portion of this Document Was Moved to http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm 

 

 

 

 

Bob Jensen's home page is at http://faculty.trinity.edu/rjensen/