Table of Contents
FBI Corporate Fraud Hotline (Toll Free)
888-622-0177
Question
The accounting industry purportedly has more influence on the SEC than the
PCAOB.
What is the alleged net result (gossip or fact)?
One answer
Accounting industry and SEC hobble America’s audit
watchdog
SEC ---
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Securities_and_Exchange_Commission
PCAOB ---
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_Company_Accounting_Oversight_Board
December 17, 2015 message from Charles Levinson
Bob,
Iwanted to share my latest Special Report, and the third and final
installment in a series on financial regulatory reform. This one looks at
how the accounting industry and the SEC have hobbled America’s audit
watchdog, the PCAOB. It tells the story of one of the more remarkable
revolving door cases in Washington. Former Senior Deloitte partner James
Schnurr was demoted at Deloitte after a string of damning inspections by the
PCAOB, but was then later appointed by Mary Jo White to be SEC Chief
Accountant, responsible for overseeing the PCAOB.
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-accounting-PCAOB/
Happy Holidays,
Charles
Jensen Comment
Most people in the world think the profession of accountancy is dull. Perhaps
it's not as thrilling as the defense industry or the Mafia or the FBI, but it
does have its source material for novels on intrigue, fraud, and underhanded
dealings.
Of course the there is a lot of material on the
frauds for which accountants go to prison ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
There are the frauds (at worst) and inept
auditing (at worst) where accounting firms settle for billions of dollars in and
are sometimes even fined (e.g. KPMG's $456 million fine by the IRS) ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
But many muckrakers and novelists prefer to
write about intrigue at the highest levels of government. Here's some pretty
good source material ---
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-accounting-PCAOB/
Bob
Jensen's threads on accounting and auditing professionalism ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001c.htm
Hi Elliot,
Audit firms do provide consulting services even though some services were banned
by SOX. The consulting division is supposed to be independently managed and
operated to the extent possible.
The big controversy in this regard is in the UK where authorities are getting
closer to making audit firms sell off consulting divisions or vice versa.
Following Enron and Sox, this became somewhat of a joke after three of the
Big Four firms spun off their consulting divisions and Deloitte did not. But
afterwards consulting divisions just seemed to grow back from the sawed off
limbs of the three auditing firms. You can read more about what happened at
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/09/14/the-revival-of-large-consulting-practices-at-the-big-4-and-audit-quality/
Large Public Accounting Firm Lawsuits
Carl Olson's CPA Watch ---
http://cpawatch.org/index.htm
What has gone wrong with CPA auditors? ---
http://cpawatch.org/CPAsGoneWrong.htm
Huron Consulting Group Book Cooking Scandal
Helpers for Courses on Fraud and Forensic
Accounting
The Fate of the Large Auditing Firms After
the 2008 Banking Meltdown
The Enron, Andersen, and Worldcom Scandal Modules Have Been
Moved to ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm
Bob Jensen's Enron Quiz (and answers) ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnronQuiz.htm
Daily News Sites for Accountancy, Tax, Fraud, IFRS, XBRL, Accounting History,
and More ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/AccountingNews.htm
Business Ethics ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Business_ethics
Lots of Good Links
Introductory Quotations
Creative Earnings Management, Agency Theory, and Accounting
Manipulations to Cook the Books ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#Manipulation
Forensic Accounting
Cooking
the Books
Fraud Updates and Other Updates to the Accounting and Finance
Scandals ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Commercial
Scholarly Journals and Monopoly Publishers Are Ripping Off Libraries and Scholars
Rotten
to the Core: Mutual Fund, Media, Investment Banking Scandals, and Security
Analysis Frauds ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Media Coverage is Very,
Very Good and Very, Very Bad
From Enron to Earnings Reports, How Reliable is the Media's Coverage?
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#Media
The Andersen, Enron, and WorldCom
Scandals
The Saga of Auditor Professionalism and
Independence
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001c.htm
How to Improve Audit Reports
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001c.htm
Risk-Based Auditing Under Attack
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001c.htm
What's Right and What's
Wrong With (SPEs), SPVs, and VIEs ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm
Accounting Scandals
The funny thing is that I never looked up this item before now. Jim Mahar noted
that it is a good link.
A ccounting Scandals
---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accounting_scandals
Bob Jensen's threads on such scandals:
Bob Jensen's threads on audit firm litigation and negligence ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
Current and past editions of my
newsletter called Fraud Updates ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Bob Jensen's fraud
conclusions ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm
Bob Jensen's threads
on auditor professionalism and independence are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001c.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on
corporate governance are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm#Governance
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting scandals are in various documents:
Accounting Firms ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
Fraud Conclusion ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm
Enron ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm
Rotten to the Core ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Fraud Updates ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
American History of Fraud ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudAmericanHistory.htm
Fraud in General ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
Future
of Auditing --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm#FutureOfAuditing
Fraud Detection and Reporting --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm
American
History of Fraud --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/415wp/AmericanHistoryOfFraud.htm
Daily News Sites for Accountancy, Tax, Fraud, IFRS, XBRL,
Accounting History, and More ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/AccountingNews.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on ethics and accounting education are
at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm#AccountingEducation
The Saga of Aud itor
Professionalism and Independence ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001c.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on great
minds in management are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/00overview/GreatMinds.htm
Incompetent and Corrupt Audits are Routine ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm#IncompetentAudits
Computer Fraud Casebook: The Bytes that Bite ---
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2009/Sep/BookshelfReview3.htm
Richard Campbell notes a nice white collar crime blog edited by some law
professors ---
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/
Lexis Nexis Fraud Prevention Site ---
http://risk.lexisnexis.com/prevent-fraud
From the AICPA
Overview of Certified in Financial Forensics (CFF) Credential ---
Click Here
http://www.aicpa.org/InterestAreas/ForensicAndValuation/Membership/Pages/Overview
Certified in Financial Forensics Credential.aspx
Accounting Professor Blogs
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ListServRoles.htm
Example
FraudBytes (Mark Zimbelman) ---
http://fraudbytes.blogspot.com/
2011 PCAOB Standards and Related Rules
Published by the AICPA
http://www.cpa2biz.com/AST/Main/CPA2BIZ_Primary/AuditAttest/Standards/PCAOBStandards/PRDOVR~PC-057207/PC-057207.jsp
Accounting Humor
"Corporate Filers Beware: New “RoboCop” Is On Patrol (detecting
fraud)," by John Carney and Francesca Harker, BakerHostetler, Forbes,
August 9, 2013 ---
http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2013/08/09/how-secs-new-robocop-profiles-companies-for-accounting-fraud/
It may not be the superhuman robotic police officer
who patrolled the lawless streets of Detroit in the 1987 sci-fi thriller,
but corporate filers should be every bit as concerned about the Securities
and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) new Accounting Quality Model (“AQM”),
labeled not-so-affectionately by some in the financial industry as “RoboCop.”
Broadly speaking, the AQM is an analytical tool which trawls corporate
filings to flag high-risk activity for closer inspection by SEC enforcement
teams. Use of the AQM, in conjunction with statements by recently-confirmed
SEC Chairman Mary Jo White and the introduction of new initiatives announced
July 2, 2013, indicates a renewed commitment by the SEC to seek out
violations of financial reporting regulations. This pledge of substantial
resources means it is more important than ever for corporate filers to
understand SEC enforcement strategies, especially the AQM, in order to
decrease the likelihood that their firm will be the subject of an expensive
SEC audit.
The Crack Down on Fraud in Accounting and
Financial Reporting
In his speech nominating Mary Jo White to take over
as chairman of the SEC, President Obama issued a warning: “You don’t want to
mess with Mary Jo.” That statement now seems particularly true for
corporate filers given the direction of the SEC under her command.
Previously a hallmark of the SEC, cases of accounting and
financial-disclosure fraud made up only 11% of enforcement actions brought
by the Commission in 2012. Since taking over as chairman, Ms. White has
renewed the SEC’s commitment to the detection of fraud in accounting and
financial disclosures.
“I think financial-statement fraud, accounting
fraud has always been important to the SEC,” Ms. White said during a June
interview “It’s certainly an area that I’m interested in and you’re going to
see more targeted resources in that area going forward.” She has backed that
statement up with a substantial commitment of resources. In July, the
commission announced new initiatives which aim to crack down on financial
reporting fraud through the use of technology and analytical capacity,
including the Financial Reporting and Audit Task Force and the Center for
Risk and Quantitative Analytics (“CRQA”). These initiatives will put
financial reports under the microscope through the use of technology-based
tools, the most important of which is RoboCop.
RoboCop: Corporate Profiler
RoboCop’s objective – to identify earnings
management – is not a novel one; rather, it is the model’s proficiency that
should worry filers. Existing models on earnings management detection
generally attempt to estimate discretionary accrual amounts by regressing
total accruals on factors that proxy for non-discretionary accruals. The
remaining undefined amount then serves as an estimate of discretionary
accruals. The fatal flaw in this approach is the inevitable high amount of
“false-positives”, rendering it useless to SEC examiners.
The AQM extends this traditional approach by
including discretionary accrual factors in its regression. This additional
level of analysis further classifies the discretionary accruals as either
risk indicators or risk inducers. Risk indicators are factors that are
directly associated with earnings management while risk inducers indicate
situations where strong incentives for earnings management exist. Based on a
comparison with the filings of companies in the filer’s industry peer group,
the AQM produces a score for each filing, assessing the likelihood that
fraudulent activities are occurring.
While the SEC will be keeping their
factor-composition cards close to the chest, the “builder of RoboCop”, Craig
Lewis, Chief Economist and Director of the Division of Risk, Strategy, and
Financial Innovation (“RSFI”) at the SEC, has offered several clues about
the types of information most likely to catch RoboCop’s attention (Is it
just a coincidence that RoboCop’s movie partner was an Officer Lewis?).
“An accounting policy that could be considered a
risk indicator (and consistently measured) would be an accounting policy
that results in relatively high book earnings, even though firms
simultaneously select alternative tax treatments that minimize taxable
income,” said Mr. Lewis. “Another accounting policy risk indicator might be
a high proportion of transactions structured as ‘off-balance sheet.’”
Frequent conflicts with independent auditors,
changes in auditors, or filing delays could also be risk indicators.
Examples of risk inducers include decreasing market share or lower
profitability margins. This factor-based analysis allows for model
flexibility, meaning examiners are able to add or remove factors to
customize the analysis to their specific needs. The SEC will be able to
continually update the model to account for the moves filers are taking to
conceal their frauds.
Next Generation RoboCop
One of the perceived weaknesses of RoboCop is its
dependence on financial comparisons between filers within an industry peer
group. As Lewis points out, “most firms that are probably engaging in
earnings management or manipulation aren’t doing it in a way that allows
them to stand out from everybody else. They’re actually doing it so they
blend in better with their peer group.”
To account for this, the SEC’s current endeavor is
expanding the model’s capabilities to include a scan of the “Management
Discussion & Analysis” (“MD&A”) sections of annual reports. Through a study
of past fraudulent filings, analysts at RSFI have developed lists of words
and phrasing choices which have been common amongst fraudulent filers in the
past. These lists have been turned into factors and incorporated into the
AQM
“We’re effectively going in and we’re saying: what
are the word choices that filers make that maximize our ability to
differentiate between fraudsters in the past and firms that haven’t had
fraud action brought against them yet?” Mr. Lewis explained during a June
conference in Ireland.
“So what we’re doing is taking the MDNA section,
we’re comparing them to other firms in the same industry group, and we’re
finding that in the past, fraudsters have tended to talk a lot about things
that really don’t matter much and they under-report all the risks that all
the other firms that aren’t having these same issues talk quite a bit
about.”
Firms engaged in fraudulent activity have tended to
overuse particular words and phrasing choices which are associated with
relatively benign activities. They have also tended to under-disclose risks
which are prevalent among a peer group. When a filer has engaged in similar
behavior, RoboCop will flag these types of unusual choices for examiner
review.
How the SEC Uses RoboCop
Although the SEC has cautioned that the AQM is not
the “robot police coming out and busting the fraudsters,” filers would be
wise to understand the power of this tool. RoboCop is a fully automated
system. Within 24 hours from the time a filing is posted to EDGAR, it is
processed by the AQM and the results are stored in a database. The AQM
outputs a risk score which informs SEC auditors of the likelihood that a
filing is fraudulent. The SEC then uses this score to prioritize its
investigations and concentrate review efforts on portions of the report most
likely to contain fraudulent information.
The results of RoboCop’s analysis will likely
become the basis for enforcement scheduling and direction of resources in
the near future. A filing’s risk score will determine whether a filing is
given a quick, unsuspecting review, or whether it is thoroughly dissected by
an SEC exam team, possibly leading to an expensive audit. The SEC has also
said it plans to use the risk scores as a means of corroborating (or
invalidating) the approximately 30,000 tips, complaints, and referrals
submissions it estimates will be received each year through its Electronic
Data Collection Systems or completed forms TCR.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on fraud are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
I'm giving thanks for many things this Thanksgiving Day on November 22, 2012,
including our good friends who invited us over to share in their family
Thanksgiving dinner. Among the many things for which I'm grateful, I give thanks
for accounting fraud. Otherwise there were be a whole lot less for me to study
and write about at my Website ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001c.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/AccountingNews.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm
Question
Why is Francine fuming?
"Accountants Skirt Shareholder
Lawsuits," by Jonathan D. Glater, The New York Times, December 27,
2012 ---
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/27/accountants-skirt-shareholder-lawsuits/
The accountants who
service publicly traded companies are likely to have something to be
thankful for this year: shareholders are not filing federal securities fraud
lawsuits against them.
Just 10 years
ago, public company accountants were in the cross hairs of shareholders,
regulators and prosecutors. A criminal indictment destroyed
Enron’s auditor, Arthur Andersen. Congress created
a new regulator, the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
to oversee the profession. And in dozens of lawsuits in the years afterward,
shareholders named accountants as co-defendants when alleging accounting
fraud.
But things
have changed. According to NERA Economic Consulting, which tracks
shareholder litigation and reported on the decline in accounting firm
defendants in
its midyear report in July, not one accounting
firm has been named a defendant so far this year. One of the study’s
co-authors, Ron I. Miller, confirmed that the trend has continued at least
through November.
That prompts the
question, why don’t shareholders sue accountants anymore?
“To the extent that
firms have been burned for a lot of money, they have some pretty strong
incentives to try to behave,” Mr. Miller said. “That’s the hopeful side of
the legal system: You hope that if you put in penalties, that those
penalties change people’s actions.”
The less positive
alternative, he added, is that public companies “have gotten better at
hiding it.”
From 2005 to 2009,
according to the NERA report, 12 percent of securities class action cases
included accounting firm co-defendants. The range of federal securities
fraud class action cases filed per year in that period was 132 to 244.
The absence
of accounting firm defendants this year can probably be explained at least
in part by court decisions; the Supreme Court has issued rulings, as in
Stoneridge Investment Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc.
in 2008, making it more difficult to recover damages
from third parties in fraud cases.
So perhaps more
shareholder suits would take aim at accountants, if the plaintiffs believed
that their claims would survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss. And it is
possible that plaintiffs will add accounting firm as defendants to existing
cases in the future, if claimants get information to support such claims.
Over all, fewer
shareholder class action lawsuits are based on allegations of accounting
fraud, as opposed to other types of fraud. The NERA midyear report found
that in the first six months of 2012, about 25 percent of complaints in
securities class action cases included allegations of accounting fraud, down
from nearly 40 percent in all of 2011.
Perhaps the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the legislative response to the accounting scandals of
the early 2000s, actually worked, Mr. Miller said.
“There’s been a lot
of complaining about SOX, and certainly the compliance costs are high for
smaller publicly traded companies,” he said, but accounting fraud “is to a
large extent what SOX was intended to stop.”
Public
company accountants still have potential civil liability to worry about,
said Joseph A. Grundfest, a former commissioner of the
Securities and Exchange Commission who teaches at
Stanford Law School. Regulators, he said, are investigating potential
misconduct involving accounting firms.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on lawsuits
where CPA firms have not been so lucky ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
Although somewhat dated, Corporate Scandal provides a nice summary of
many of the recent scandals ---
http://www.econstats.com/scandal.htm
Investor Protection Trust ---
http://www.investorprotection.org/
This site provides teaching materials.
The Investor
Protection Trust provides independent, objective information to help
consumers make informed investment decisions. Founded in 1993 as part of a
multi-state settlement to resolve charges of misconduct, IPT serves as an
independent source of non-commercial investor education materials. IPT
operates programs under its own auspices and uses grants to underwrite
important initiatives carried out by other organizations.
Bob Jensen's threads on fraud
prevention and fraud reporting ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm
Bob Jensen's personal finance
helpers ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbob1.htm#InvestmentHelpers
Question
Why is Francine fuming?
"Accountants Skirt Shareholder
Lawsuits," by Jonathan D. Glater, The New York Times, December 27,
2012 ---
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/27/accountants-skirt-shareholder-lawsuits/
The accountants who
service publicly traded companies are likely to have something to be
thankful for this year: shareholders are not filing federal securities fraud
lawsuits against them.
Just 10 years
ago, public company accountants were in the cross hairs of shareholders,
regulators and prosecutors. A criminal indictment destroyed
Enron’s auditor, Arthur Andersen. Congress created
a new regulator, the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
to oversee the profession. And in dozens of lawsuits in the years afterward,
shareholders named accountants as co-defendants when alleging accounting
fraud.
But things
have changed. According to NERA Economic Consulting, which tracks
shareholder litigation and reported on the decline in accounting firm
defendants in
its midyear report in July, not
one accounting firm has been named a defendant so far this year. One of the
study’s co-authors, Ron I. Miller, confirmed that the trend has continued at
least through November.
That prompts the
question, why don’t shareholders sue accountants anymore?
“To the extent that
firms have been burned for a lot of money, they have some pretty strong
incentives to try to behave,” Mr. Miller said. “That’s the hopeful side of
the legal system: You hope that if you put in penalties, that those
penalties change people’s actions.”
The less positive
alternative, he added, is that public companies “have gotten better at
hiding it.”
From 2005 to 2009,
according to the NERA report, 12 percent of securities class action cases
included accounting firm co-defendants. The range of federal securities
fraud class action cases filed per year in that period was 132 to 244.
The absence
of accounting firm defendants this year can probably be explained at least
in part by court decisions; the Supreme Court has issued rulings, as in
Stoneridge Investment Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc.
in 2008, making it more difficult to recover
damages from third parties in fraud cases.
So perhaps more
shareholder suits would take aim at accountants, if the plaintiffs believed
that their claims would survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss. And it is
possible that plaintiffs will add accounting firm as defendants to existing
cases in the future, if claimants get information to support such claims.
Over all, fewer
shareholder class action lawsuits are based on allegations of accounting
fraud, as opposed to other types of fraud. The NERA midyear report found
that in the first six months of 2012, about 25 percent of complaints in
securities class action cases included allegations of accounting fraud, down
from nearly 40 percent in all of 2011.
Perhaps the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the legislative response to the accounting scandals of
the early 2000s, actually worked, Mr. Miller said.
“There’s been a lot
of complaining about SOX, and certainly the compliance costs are high for
smaller publicly traded companies,” he said, but accounting fraud “is to a
large extent what SOX was intended to stop.”
Public
company accountants still have potential civil liability to worry about,
said Joseph A. Grundfest, a former commissioner of the
Securities and Exchange Commission
who teaches at Stanford Law School.
Regulators, he said, are investigating potential misconduct involving
accounting firms.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on lawsuits
where CPA firms have not been so lucky ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
Legal Research References
Daily News Sites for Accountancy, Tax, Fraud, IFRS, XBRL, Accounting
History, and More ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/AccountingNews.htm
March 13, 2010 message from David Albrecht
[albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]
I know that most Big4
lawsuits are settled out of court. Is there anyplace on the web a listing of
Big 4 lawsuits?
Although it might be argued
that settling is a business decision, I think a settlement is a symbolic
defeat by the CPA firm.
David Albrecht
March 14, 2010 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi
David,
Lawyers are going to use their very expensive legal research databases. A
list of sources in the U.S. is provided in
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_Research
I
know of no free Web reference that records all criminal and civil actions
where a Big Four firm is a defendant.
Big Four lawsuits can arise in over 100 nations (recently one of the largest
actions in history was filed in Hong Kong, where the Ernst & Young partner
in charge was actually jailed) ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm#Ernst
The Audit
Analytics database has a lot of the auditor lawsuits classified by year ---
http://www.auditanalytics.com/
Examples for 2006 are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/AuditingFirmLitigationNov2006.pdf
In
the U.S. there are both state and federal jurisdictions. And there can be
individual or class action lawsuits brought by plaintiffs. One of the better
sources for federal securities class action lawsuits is the Stanford
University Law School Federal Class Action Clearinghouse ---
http://securities.stanford.edu/
But this by no means covers most of the lawsuits against large auditing
firms. In fact, the database has surprisingly few hits for Big Four firms.
Many of the SEC lawsuits are not in this database.
Keep in mind that auditors are usually secondary in lawsuits with their
clients being the primary defendants. Most of the lawsuits are probably
filed in the state where a corporate client is licensed as a corporation,
which gives Delaware a lot of lawsuits.
For the past ten years I’ve tried to keep tidbits on the highly publicized
lawsuits involving large auditing firms ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm
Interestingly, auditing firms sometimes win in courts, as recently happened
when Ernst & Young emerged as a winner.
For lawsuits dealing with derivative financial instruments I also have a
tidbit timeline at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds
Of
course the lawyers are going to use their very expensive legal research
databases. A list of sources in the U.S. is provided in
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_Research
I
don’t have time at the moment, but it would be interesting to see how much
PwC provides in the Comperio database. Since this database is heavily used
by clients, my guess is that Comperio is not a good source for searching
auditor lawsuits.
There are also instances where an auditing firm is a plaintiff, usually
where it is suing a former client.
There can also be criminal cases like the recent case where the managing
partner of PwC in England was charged with stealing money from PwC to pay
for the luxurious tastes of his mistress ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm#PwC
Bob Jensen
March 14, 2010 reply from Orenstein, Edith
[eorenstein@FINANCIALEXECUTIVES.ORG]
Some
limited data regarding litigation for the six largest audit firms (U.S. data
only, as of 2007) was provided by the Center for Audit Quality (CAQ) - an
affiliate of the AICPA, in reports to the
U.S. Treasury Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession (ACAP).
For example,
among
CAQ's reports to ACAP,
CAQ's Jan. 23, 2008 report to ACAP included a section on
Litigation. A caveat in the CAQ report states:
"Information regarding litigation is highly sensitive, because of the risk
that the data could be used
unfairly against a firm in litigation. For these reasons, the data presented
in this report were gathered from the six audit firms and aggregated (the
data relate only to claims against the six U.S. firms and do not include
claims in U.S. courts against any non-U.S. firms that are members of the
same networks). To prevent "reverse engineering" of the data to tie specific
facts to a specific lawsuit or firm, the data have been grouped - for
example, aggregating data from several different years. The litigation data
discussed in this report do not include information relating to government
inquiries, investigations, or enforcement actions.31" [Footnote 31 in the
CAQ report states: "2007 litigation data in this report reflect submissions
by five firms of information as of December 20, 2007 and by one firm of
information as of November 30, 2007."]
Additionally,
CAQ's Second Supplement to ACAP (4/16/08) included data on private
actions and shareholder class actions.
Treasury's
ACAP published its
final report in 2008; here is related summary in
FEI blog.
Edith
Orenstein
Director of Accounting Policy Analysis and Communications
Financial Executives International (FEI)
1250 Headquarters Plaza, West Tower, 7th Floor
Morristown, NJ 07932
(973) 765-1046
eorenstein@financialexecutives.org
web:
www.financialexecutives.org
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www.financialexecutives.blogspot.com
twitter:
www.twitter.com/feiblog
March
14,2010 message from Francine McKenna
[retheauditors@GMAIL.COM]
Dave,
I try to keep up
as best I can on litigation against the auditors. It's not easy since I am
not an attorney and do not have access to their databases. I depend of the
"kindness of lawyer strangers" to help me often.
It's not easy
since auditors are often one of many defendants in a class action lawsuit ,
for example. Often news reports or other blog posts do not include all the
defendants if auditors are not the focus of the story. Which they are often
not. Which is why my site is useful.
I look at the
lists compiled by Kevin LaCroix on his site DandODiary.com of securities
litigation and class action suits, Francis Pileggi of DelawareLitigation.com
also mentions suits against or by auditors (as in the Deloitte suit against
their own Vice Chairman ) when they make it to Delaware Chancery Court. They
both keep an eye out for me now and it was Frans=cis who alerted me to both
the judgement against Deloitte's Flanagan and the recent "in pari delicto"
case against pwC.
I also use a site
called Justia to look for all other suits against the firms, often focused
on suits in Federal Courts.
http://dockets.justia.com/
The Stanford Law
School database is also useful for getting the actual filings and documents.
http://securities.stanford.edu/
Interestingly PwC
does a great job tracking everyone else's 10b-5 litigation - except their
own. You will never see auditor litigation broken out in their report. ---
http://10b5.pwc.com/public/Default.aspx
Bob is right to
say that there's a whole slew of suits, at times very large and important
that are outside of the US, such as the ones in Hong Kong against EY. For
that I count on Google Alerts (and my blog readers) to alert me, sometimes
at odd hours of the night, of new developments.
http://retheauditors.com/category/auditor-litigation/
http://retheauditors.com/2009/07/11/mckenna-on-auditor-litigation-securities-dockets-mid-year-update/
fm
Carl Olson's CPA Watch ---
http://cpawatch.org/index.htm
What has gone wrong with CPA auditors? ---
http://cpawatch.org/CPAsGoneWrong.htm
"Audit Flaws Revealed, at Long Last,"
by Floyd Norris, The New York Times, October 20, 2011 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/business/deloittes-failings-revealed-but-only-after-3-years.html?_r=1
Thank you Beryl Simonson for the heads up.
With hindsight, we
now know that auditors in 2007 should have been looking carefully at bank
books.
They should have
drilled into allowances for loan losses, and they should have been
especially alert for signs that the banks were playing games when they sold
loans. Auditors should have carefully reviewed how the banks were valuing
their mortgage-backed securities and loans that they planned to sell.
It won’t surprise
you to learn that in at least one case, the auditor seems to have done a
pretty poor job.
What may be
surprising is that the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board figured
that out at the time, and was harshly critical of Deloitte & Touche, one of
the Big Four audit firms, for not doing the work to check assumptions in
those areas and for being overly reliant on whatever the bank’s management
said was proper.
Those comments were
made after the board’s inspectors reviewed Deloitte’s audit of a bank’s 2006
results, as part of the annual inspection of the firm. The inspection of 61
Deloitte audits concluded in November 2007.
Had the auditor
taken the criticism to heart, it might have gone back in and checked more
thoroughly.
But it did not.
The bank was not
named in the report, even in the previously confidential part released this
week.
I thought it might
have been Washington Mutual, a Deloitte client that collapsed in September
2008, but Deloitte says that was not the case.
Deloitte, in its
response to the board, stated that at the bank, “the audit procedures
performed, the conclusions reached and the related documentation were
appropriate in the circumstances.”
In other words,
Deloitte concluded the board simply did not understand what it was talking
about.
All that became
public in early 2008, when the censored version of the board’s report became
public. But it was little remarked on at the time. Now we have seen the rest
of the report, and it is even more critical.
The report said its
inspections indicated “a firm culture that allows, or tolerates, audit
approaches that do not consistently emphasize the need for an appropriate
level of critical analysis and collection of objective evidence, and that
rely largely on management representations.”
Deloitte responded
by denying almost everything. It did not like the “second guessing” shown by
the regulators. It said “we strongly take exception” to the observation
about its culture, which it said was simply wrong.
In any case, the
firm concluded, “there were only a limited number of instances,” not nearly
enough to justify questioning Deloitte’s quality controls.
The board
inspectors found problems in 27 of the 61 Deloitte audits.
The Sarbanes-Oxley
law that established the board included provisions to protect the public
images of audit firms. If a board inspection found problems with the quality
control systems, that was to be kept confidential unless the firm did not
move to fix the problems over the following year. Then the release could be
delayed while the firm tried to persuade the board to keep the information
private. If that effort failed, the firm could appeal to the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
Only then could the
report be made public. So in this case, it took 41 months from the issuance
of the report — more than three years — for Deloitte’s clients to learn of
the problem.
The board
also has the authority to file enforcement actions against auditors, but
those, too, are private until the S.E.C. rules on an appeal. It is as if
charges of robbery had to be kept confidential until all appeals had been
completed. There is no way to know if the accounting board has taken action
against anyone. An auditor that the board deems to be in violation of rules
may keep working for years while secret proceedings continue.
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
Norris is not telling us subscribers on the AECM anything we've not already
stated before. But it's important for the world to know more about the warts of
CPA auditors.
I myself have repeatedly hit the
failure of audit firms to properly insist on realistic loan losses in my threads
at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#AuditFirms
My archives of CPA lawsuits on these issues are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
My all-time heroes
Frank Partnoy and Lynn Turner contend that Wall Street bank accounting is an
exercise in writing fiction: Watch the video! (a bit slow loading) Lynn Turner
is Partnoy's co-author of the white paper "Make Markets Be Markets" "Bring
Transparency to Off-Balance Sheet Accounting," by Frank Partnoy, Roosevelt
Institute, March 2010 ---
http://makemarketsbemarkets.org/modals/report_off.php
Recently I wrote the following tidbit
about audit reform:
If audit reform swaggered into a Luckenbach, Texas saloon, it would be "all
hat and no horse"
The ladies of the night would die laughing at that "itty-bitty thang" that
walked in
And it would need a ladder to peek over the top of the spittoon
How much voting power lies in shareholder hands?
Teaching Case from The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on
April 27, 2012
Memo to Citi Directors: Wake Up on Pay
by:
Francesco Guerrera
Apr 24, 2012
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
Click here to view the video on WSJ.com ![WSJ Video]()
TOPICS: Executive
Compensation, SEC, Securities and Exchange Commission
SUMMARY: At
Citigroup's annual meeting on April 17, 2012, shareholders voted not to
support the company's executive compensation plan. The article is written by
Francesco Guerrera, the WSJ's Money & Investing editor; this piece is an
opinion item and students are asked to identify that fact. The related video
specifically identifies the Citigroup executive pay proposal on which
shareholders voted as bad "corporate governance" both for proposing that top
management be given bonuses based on a low threshold of performance and for
poorly explaining the reason behind that pay. Questions ask the students to
access SEC filings of both the proxy statement filed prior to the annual
meeting and the report of the results of the meeting.
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: The article is useful in any class covering executive
compensation and SEC disclosure in undergraduate or graduate financial
accounting or auditing classes.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Advanced) Access the Citigroup filing of its proxy statement
for this annual meeting on Schedule 14a on March 8, 2012, available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000119312512104047/0001193125-12-104047-index.htm.
By reviewing the Table of Contents, identify the items that were planned for
consideration at the annual meeting.
2. (Advanced) Access the Citigroup filing with the SEC on Form 8-K
on April 25, 2012 describing the outcome of its shareholder meeting on.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000114420412022937/v310009_8k.htm.
What outcomes were reported to the SEC?
3. (Introductory) Based on the discussion in the article, what was
the most significant outcome of the Citigroup annual meeting?
4. (Advanced) How does the result of this shareholder vote impact
what Citigroup may pay its top executives? In your answer, define the term
"corporate governance."
5. (Introductory) Who is the author of this article? Do you feel
that the author's opinion on this matter is expressed in the article?
Support your answer.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"Memo to Citi Directors: Wake Up on Pay," by:
Francesco Guerrera, The Wall Street Journal, April 24, 2012 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303592404577361762087563238.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC_domainid
Citigroup Inc.'s C +0.59%
shareholders have spoken but is anybody listening?
The rejection of Citi's
compensation plan at last week's annual investor meeting is more than a
stinging rebuke for its board and management.
Citigroup Inc.'s C +0.59%
shareholders have spoken but is anybody listening?
The rejection of Citi's
compensation plan at last week's annual investor meeting is more than a
stinging rebuke for its board and management.
Citigroup Inc.'s C +0.59%
shareholders have spoken but is anybody listening?
The rejection of Citi's
compensation plan at last week's annual investor meeting is more than a
stinging rebuke for its board and management.
Sure, Mr. Pandit can share
with Uncle Sam the credit for pulling Citi back from the brink.
But Citi's shares are down
more than 88% since he took over. The stock has underperformed not just
healthier banks like J.P. Morgan Chase JPM +1.46% & Co. and Wells Fargo WFC
+1.45% & Co. but also fellow problem child Bank of America Corp. BAC +0.12%
And dividend increases and share buybacks for Citi have been halted by
regulators, leaving shareholders with little to celebrate.
This is no time for
lucrative victory laps.
If the pay bump is to
compensate Mr. Pandit for two lean years, let's remember that the decision
to take $1 in salary was his. And that he received at least $165 million in
2007 when Citigroup bought his hedge fund—only to wind it down 11 months
later amid mediocre returns.
The second argument is that,
with the profit-sharing arrangement, Citigroup's directors sought to provide
Mr. Pandit with "a financial incentive to remain as CEO."
That's what Citi's blog
says. What it really means is that, after years during which some
regulators, directors and shareholders privately questioned Mr. Pandit's
leadership of the company, the board of directors wanted to back him
unequivocally.
That's understandable but if
directors are so confident in his ability, they should set much more
demanding performance targets.
Not once has the board
explained how it arrived at the $12 billion figure or how it has calculated
the profit shares of each executive.
Mr. Parsons and fellow
directors are at fault on this: They should have dealt with shareholders'
concerns long before last week's embarrassing vote. Michael O'Neill, the
banking veteran who replaced Mr. Parsons, will have to pick up the pieces.
Mr. O'Neill, who will also
head the board's compensation committee, should review the performance
targets, discuss them with shareholders and then change them.
My suggestion: Set relative
metrics that compare Citigroup's profits to its peers; have more than one
target, so different levels of performance are compensated differently; and
make sure that the CEO's bonus is tied to more-demanding hurdles than his
underlings.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on corporate governance
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm#Governance
Years of Creative Accounting by CitiGroup
My all-time heroes
Frank Partnoy and Lynn Turner contend that Wall Street bank accounting is an
exercise in writing fiction: Watch the video! (a bit slow loading) Lynn Turner
is Partnoy's co-author of the white paper "Make Markets Be Markets" "Bring
Transparency to Off-Balance Sheet Accounting," by Frank Partnoy, Roosevelt
Institute, March 2010 ---
http://makemarketsbemarkets.org/modals/report_off.php
Bob Jensen's threads on outrageous
executive compensation ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm#OutrageousCompensation
"Recent Comments On European and U.S. Audit Reform," by Francine
McKenna, re:TheAuditors, October 4, 2011 ---
http://retheauditors.com/2011/10/04/recent-comments-on-european-and-u-s-audit-reform/
The topic of audit industry reform is hot again.
OK, that’s relative to where you stand on what’s hot. But in the world of
legal and regulatory compliance and auditors the only thing hotter would be
a significant development in the
New York Attorney General’s case against Ernst & Young.
Here in the U.S. the PCAOB has been busy. I’ll
give them – mostly Chairman James Doty and the Investor Advisory Group led
by Board Member Steve Harris – credit for that. The Investor Advisory Group
– rather, the boldest amongst them – recently sent
a letter to the PCAOB to provide comments on the
PCAOB’s June 21, 2011 Concept Release entitled Possible Revisions to
PCAOB Standards Related to Reports on Audited Financial Statements and
Related Amendments to PCAOB Standards.
It is worth noting that a number of other
parties agree that the current form of the auditor’s report fails to
meet the legitimate needs of investors. First, the U.S. Treasury
Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession (ACAP) called for the
PCAOB to undertake a standard-setting initiative to consider
improvements to the standard audit report. The ACAP members support “…
improving the content of the auditor’s report beyond the current
pass/fail model to include a more relevant discussion about the audit of
the financial statements.”
Second, surveys conducted by the CFA Institute
in 2008 and 2010 indicate that research analysts want auditors to
communicate more information in their reports.
Finally, even leaders of the accounting
profession have acknowledged that the audit report needs to become more
relevant. In testimony before ACAP, Dennis Nally, Chairman of PwC
International stated, “It’s not difficult to imagine a world where the …
trend to fair value measurement — lead one to consider whether it is
necessary to change the content of the auditor’s report to be more
relevant to the capital markets and its various stakeholders.”
Finally, leaders of the accounting profession
have previously stated that changes to the audit report should reflect
investor preferences. In their 2006 White Paper, the CEOs of the six
largest accounting firms stated, “The new (reporting) model should be
driven by the wants of investors and other users of company
information …” (their emphasis).
Before we turn to a discussion of the IAG
investor survey, we believe it is important to underscore the
fundamental but often overlooked fact that the issuer’s investors,
not its audit committee or management team or the company itself, are
the auditor’s client. It is therefore not only appropriate, but
essential, that investors’ views and preferences take center stage as
the PCAOB considers possible changes to the format and content of the
audit report.
In the meantime, I’ve written two articles about
the proposals on auditor regulation before the European Commission.
In Forbes, I told you not to count on
Europe to reform the audit model or auditors, in general.
The audit industry is reportedly under siege in
Europe and on the verge of being broken up, restrained, and rotated
until all the good profit is spun out.
This is neither a foregone conclusion nor
highly likely.
The European Commission’s internal markets
commissioner Michel Barnier is talking tough, but the rhetoric should be
no surprise to those who have been following the European response to
the financial crisis closely…
Please read the rest at Forbes.com,
“Don’t Count On Europe To Reform Auditors And Accounting”.
In American Banker, I focused on the
impact of auditor reforms on financial services. Why is the European
Commission taking such strong action now? Why is the U.S. lagging so far
behind?
The clamor for accountability from the auditors
for financial crisis failures and losses has been much louder, much
stronger, and going on much longer in the U.K. and Europe, than in the
United States. Barnier’s most dramatic proposals are viewed by most
commenters as a reaction to the bank failures. “Auditors play an
essential role in financial markets: financial actors need to be able to
trust their statements,” Barnier told the Financial
Times. “There are weaknesses in the way
the audit sector works today. The crisis highlighted them.”
There’s is a concern on both sides of the
Atlantic over long-standing auditor relationships.
The average auditor tenure for the largest 100
U.S. companies by market cap is 28 years. The U.S. accounting regulator,
the PCAOB, highlighted the auditor tenure trap in its recent Concept
Release on Auditor Independence and Auditor Rotation. According to The
Independent, quoting a recent House of
Lords report, only one of the FTSE 100 index’s members uses a non-Big
Four firm and the average relationship lasts 48 years. Some of the U.S.
bailout recipients — General Motors, AIG, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup — and
crisis failure Lehman had as
long or longer relationships with their
auditors…
Please read the rest at American Banker,
“Bank Debacles Drive Europe to Raise the Bar on Audits”.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on
auditor professionalism and independence are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001c.htm
College Business Officers Hear a
Fraud Detective's Cautionary Tales of True Crime," by Scott Carlson,
Chronicle of Higher Education, June 12, 2011 ---
http://chronicle.com/article/College-Business-Officers-Hear/128205/
It's not often that
a conference session feels like a true-crime show. And yet Angela Morelock,
a forensic accountant with the accounting firm BKD, delivered material like
that and more in a talk here that detailed the bad, the really bad, and the
mind-bogglingly bad in the fraud and embezzlement cases that her firm has
investigated.
Her presentation
was designed to educate administrators, gathered here at the annual meeting
of the National Association of College and University Business Officers,
about common fraud scams and patterns that might indicate something is
wrong.
But before going
into the statistics, she posted on a screen a ditty, scribbled out by, and
found in the office of, a fraud perpetrator in the accounting office of a
pharmacy chain: "Oh, what a tangled web we weave when first we practice to
deceive. But once we've practiced for a while, oh my, how we've improved our
style!"
"Fraud cases, every
single time, are hindsight 20/20," she said. "It's a little bit amazing to
me—the subtle clues, the small things, that we will miss. Tell me how this
hangs in the cubicle of someone in an accounting department for an extended
period of time without someone asking about it."
That was one of the
big takeaways from Ms. Morelock's talk: Fraud perpetrators will leave
lifestyle clues that they are up to no good. In her experience, criminals
tend to follow recognizable patterns. They like to give gifts, and they are
compulsive shoppers. Gambling problems are common among them.
They tend to be
long-term employees, who start small and rationalize their thefts over time.
They can be male or female, but statistics say that the big losses usually
happen with more-educated, high-ranking employees. That is in part because
there are all sorts of checks and controls on the financial transactions
handled by low-level employees, whom some assume to be more prone to fraud
and theft. However, the supervisors of those employees are often not
subjected to the same controls and scrutiny, opening a window for abuse. Ms.
Morelock told of a supervisor at one business who collected the cash drawers
from various clerks, and took one home every day for 10 years, until she had
collected $1.3-million.
And then there are
the things that just don't add up, Ms. Morelock said, and she related
another of her many war stories: A bookkeeper at a church organization went
on vacation, and a diamond certificate in her name arrived at her work,
which set off alarm bells. Right off the bat, Ms. Morelock found that the
employee, who was making $45,000 a year, had purchased a $390,000 house,
which her co-workers knew about.
The employee had
paid for the house in cash, skimmed off of the organization. And she bought
a lot more, like big-screen TV's, video games, and appliances. "These
lifestyle clues are the best early warning signs," Ms. Morelock said.
Schemes Involving Vendors
One common
oversight, where fraud dwells, is where employees choose vendors. "That
power, to be the one who chooses the vendor, is a significant power that we
often don't focus on enough," Ms. Morelock said. "That is where fake
vendors, conflicts of interests, kickback schemes, and straw-vendor schemes
originate."
Here is how a
straw-vendor scheme works, based on another real case: A graphic designer
can pick a printer for his work with an organization. He sets up his friend,
who is not a printer, as the vendor and places printing orders through the
friend. The friend goes out and finds a real printer to handle the actual
printing. The friend gets the job printed and bills the organization at an
inflated price, and the organization pays. Then the graphic designer and his
friend pay the printer's lower cost, and split the profits.
For Ms. Morelock,
the case proves that you can find fraud in the most unlikely corners of an
organization. "Most of us would look a graphic designer and think, What kind
of fraud risk could that person possibly be?" she said. In the case Ms.
Morelock uncovered, the graphic designer and his friend netted $600,000 in
their five-year scam.
Fraud cases in
higher education tend to be lower than in other organizations, she pointed
out, but certain parts of higher education have been more troublesome. "We
have seen a lot of athletic-department scams recently, that go everywhere
from travel expenses and ATM cards to misuse of booster funds," she said.
"Although many organizations consider booster funds to be separate from the
college or university, guess whose name hits the front page of the paper
when there is a problem?" she said. She also alluded to a ticket-scalping
scandal that has plagued the University of Kansas.
Continued in this article
Jensen Comment
Frauds and thefts can take place even
where we least expect ti.
Church and School Embezzlement
---
http://churchembezzlement.blogspot.com/
Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Federal securities class action
lawsuits increased 19 percent in 2008, with almost half involving firms in the
financial services sector according to the annual report prepared by the
Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse in cooperation with
Cornerstone Research ---
http://securities.stanford.edu/scac_press/20080106_YIR08_Press_Release.pdf
Especially note the 2008 Year in Review link at
http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2008_YIR/20080106.pdf
COSO
Releases Latest Fraud Study.
May 21, 2010 ---
http://financialexecutives.blogspot.com/2010/05/sec-fasb-pcaob-testimony-posted-for.html
Yesterday,
COSO
announced
the release of a new research study,
Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007, that
examines 347 alleged accounting fraud cases identified by a review of U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Releases (AAER's) issued over a ten-year period ending December 31, 2007.
The COSO Fraud Study updates COSO's previous 10-year
study of fraud and was led by the same core academic research team as COSO's
previous Fraud Study.
COSO's Fraud Study provides an in-depth analysis of the nature, extent and
characteristics of accounting frauds occurring throughout the ten years, and
provides helpful insights regarding new and ongoing issues needing to be
addressed.
COSO is more formally known as The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of
the Treadway Commission, and the five sponsoring organizations are the
AAA,
AICPA,
FEI, IIA, and
IMA. More
COSO info is available on their website,
www.coso.org.
Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on fraud are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
University of Illinois at Chicago Report
on Massive Political Corruption in Chicago
"Chicago Is a 'Dark Pool Of Political Corruption'," Judicial Watch,
February 22, 2010 ---
http://www.judicialwatch.org/blog/2010/feb/dark-pool-political-corruption-chicago
A major U.S. city
long known as a hotbed of pay-to-play politics infested with clout and
patronage has seen nearly 150 employees, politicians and contractors get
convicted of corruption in the last five decades.
Chicago has
long been distinguished for its pandemic of public corruption, but actual
cumulative figures have never been offered like this. The astounding
information is featured in a
lengthy report published by one of Illinois’s
biggest public universities.
Cook County,
the nation’s second largest, has been a
“dark pool of political corruption” for more than
a century, according to the informative study conducted by the University of
Illinois at Chicago, the city’s largest public college. The report offers a
detailed history of corruption in the Windy City beginning in 1869 when
county commissioners were imprisoned for rigging a contract to paint City
Hall.
It’s downhill from
there, with a plethora of political scandals that include 31 Chicago
alderman convicted of crimes in the last 36 years and more than 140
convicted since 1970. The scams involve bribes, payoffs, padded contracts,
ghost employees and whole sale subversion of the judicial system, according
to the report.
Elected
officials at the highest levels of city, county and state
government—including prominent judges—were the perpetrators and they worked
in various government locales, including the assessor’s office, the county
sheriff, treasurer and the President’s Office of Employment and Training.
The last to fall was renowned
political bully Isaac Carothers, who just a few
weeks ago pleaded guilty to federal bribery and tax charges.
In the last few
years alone several dozen officials have been convicted and more than 30
indicted for taking bribes, shaking down companies for political
contributions and rigging hiring. Among the convictions were fraud,
violating court orders against using politics as a basis for hiring city
workers and the disappearance of 840 truckloads of asphalt earmarked for
city jobs.
A few months
ago the city’s largest newspaper revealed that Chicago aldermen keep a
secret, taxpayer-funded pot of cash (about $1.3
million) to pay family members, campaign workers and political allies for a
variety of questionable jobs. The covert account has been utilized for
decades by Chicago lawmakers but has escaped public scrutiny because it’s
kept under wraps.
Judicial
Watch has extensively investigated Chicago corruption, most recently the
conflicted ties of top White House officials to
the city, including Barack and Michelle Obama as well as top administration
officials like Chief of Staff Rahm Emanual and Senior Advisor David Axelrod.
In November Judicial Watch
sued Chicago Mayor Richard Daley's office to
obtain records related to the president’s failed bid to bring the Olympics
to the city.
Bob Jensen's threads on the sad state of
governmental accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#GovernmentalAccounting
Bob Jensen's threads on political
corruption are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#Lawmakers
Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudUpdates.htm
Forensic Accounting Course Materials
November 3, 2009 message from Eileen Taylor
[eileen_taylor@NCSU.EDU]
Need advice on choosing a textbook for an MBA class
on fraud (to be taken mostly by Master of Accounting students).
I am deciding between Albrecht's Fraud Examination
and Hopwood's Forensic Accounting. I also plan to have students read Cynthia
Cooper's book, Journey of a Corporate Whistleblower.
I will be teaching a three-week version of the
course this summer as a study abroad, but also will be converting it into a
16 week semester-long 3 hour course.
Any suggestions would be helpful -
Thank you,
Eileen
November 3, 2009 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Eileen,
I'm really not able to give you an opinion on either
choice for a textbook. But before making a decision I always compared the
end-of-chapter material and the solutions manual to accompany that material.
If the publisher did not pay for good end-of-chapter material I always view
the textbook to be a cheap shot. The end-of-chapter material is much harder
to write than the chapter material itself.
I also look for real world cases and illustrations.
Don't forget the wealth of material, some free, at
the site of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners ---
http://www.acfe.com/
I would most certainly consider using some of this material on homework and
examinations.
Instead of a textbook you might use the ACFE online
self-study materials ($79) ---
Click Here
There is a wonderful range of topics covered ---
http://snipurl.com/acleselfstudy [eweb_acfe_com]
Accounting
and Auditing
Computers
and Technology
Criminology and Ethics
Fraud
Investigation
Fraud
Schemes
Interviewing and Reporting
Legal
Elements of Fraud
Spanish
Titles
Bob Jensen
"A Model Curriculum for Education in Fraud and Forensic Accounting,"
by Mary-Jo Kranacher, Bonnie W. Morris, Timothy A. Pearson, and Richard A.
Riley, Jr., Issues in Accounting Education, November 2008. pp. 505-518
(Not Free) ---
Click Here
There are other articles on fraud and forensic accounting in this November
edition of IAE:
Incorporating Forensic Accounting and Litigation Advisory Services Into
the Classroom Lester E. Heitger and Dan L. Heitger, Issues in Accounting
Education 23(4), 561 (2008) (12 pages)]
West Virginia University: Forensic Accounting and Fraud Investigation (FAFI)
A. Scott Fleming, Timothy A. Pearson, and Richard A. Riley, Jr., Issues
in Accounting Education 23(4), 573 (2008) (8 pages)
The Model Curriculum in Fraud and Forensic Accounting and Economic Crime
Programs at Utica College George E. Curtis, Issues in Accounting
Education 23(4), 581 (2008) (12 pages)
Forensic Accounting and FAU: An Executive Graduate Program George R.
Young, Issues in Accounting Education 23(4), 593 (2008) (7 pages)
The Saint Xavier University Graduate Program in Financial Fraud
Examination and Management William J. Kresse, Issues in Accounting
Education 23(4), 601 (2008) (8 pages)
Also see
"Strain, Differential Association, and Coercion: Insights from the Criminology
Literature on Causes of Accountant's Misconduct," by James J. Donegan and
Michele W. Ganon, Accounting and the Public Interest 8(1), 1 (2008) (20
pages)
Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on fraud ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
FBI Corporate Fraud Chart in August 2008 ---
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/aug2008/ataglance.htm#Chart1.htm
A great blog on securities and accounting fraud ---
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/securities/
Bob Jensen's threads on fraud and forensic accounting
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
Business schools, eager to impart ethics, are paying
white-collar felons to recite the error of their ways
"Using Ex-Cons to Scare MBAs Straight," by Porter, Business
Week, April 24, 2008 ---
Click Here
Bob Jensen's threads on white collar crime include the
following links:
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
"Study Tallies Corporations Not
Paying Income Tax," by Lynley Browning, The New York Times, August
12, 2008 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/business/13tax.html?_r=1&dbk
Two out of every
three United States corporations paid no federal income taxes from 1998
through 2005, according to a report released Tuesday by the Government
Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress.
The study, which is
likely to add to a growing debate among politicians and policy experts over
the contribution of businesses to Treasury coffers, did not identify the
corporations or analyze why they had paid no taxes. It also did not say
whether they had been operating properly within the tax code or illegally
evading it.
The study covers
1.3 million corporations of all sizes, most of them small, with a collective
$2.5 trillion in sales. It includes foreign corporations that do business in
the United States.
Among foreign
corporations, a slightly higher percentage, 68 percent, did not pay taxes
during the period covered — compared with 66 percent for United States
corporations. Even with these numbers, corporate tax receipts have risen
sharply as a percentage of federal revenue in recent years.
The G.A.O. study
was done at the request of two Democratic senators, Carl Levin of Michigan
and Byron L. Dorgan of North Dakota. In recent years, Senator Levin has held
investigations on tax evasion and urged officials and regulators to examine
whether corporations were abusing tax laws by shifting income earned in
higher-tax jurisdictions, like the United States, to overseas subsidiaries
in low-tax jurisdictions.
Senator Levin said
in written remarks on Tuesday that “this report makes clear that too many
corporations are using tax trickery to send their profits overseas and avoid
paying their fair share in the United States.”
But the G.A.O. said
that it did not have enough data to address the role of what some policy
experts say is a crucial factor in profits sent overseas.
That factor, known
as transfer pricing, involves corporations’ charging their overseas
subsidiaries lower prices for goods and services, a common move that lowers
a corporation’s tax bill. A number of corporations are in transfer-pricing
disputes with the Internal Revenue Service.
Either way, the
nearly 1,000 largest United States corporations were more likely than
smaller ones to pay taxes.
In 2005, one in
four large United States corporations paid no taxes on revenue of $1.1
trillion, compared with 66 percent in the overall pool. Large corporations
are those with at least $250 million in assets or annual sales of at least
$50 million.
Joshua Barro, a
staff economist at the Tax Foundation, a conservative research group, said
that the largest corporations represented only 1 percent of the total number
of corporations but more than 90 percent of all corporate assets.
The vast majority
of the large corporations that did not pay taxes had net losses, he said,
and thus no income on which to pay taxes. “The notion that there is a large
pool of untaxed corporate profits is incorrect.”
In 2004, a
G.A.O. study said that 7 in 10 of all foreign corporations doing business in
the United States, or foreign-controlled corporations, paid no taxes from
1996 through 2000, compared with 6 in 10 United States corporations.
This article has been revised to
reflect the following correction:
Correction: August 14, 2008
An article on Wednesday about a Government Accountability Office study
reporting on the percentage of corporations that paid no federal income
taxes from 1998 through 2005 gave an incorrect figure for the estimated tax
liability of the 1.3 million companies covered by the study. It is not $875
billion. The correct amount cannot be calculated because it would be based
on the companies’ paying the standard rate of 35 percent on their net
income, a figure that is not available. (The incorrect figure of $875
billion was based on the companies’ paying the standard rate on their $2.5
trillion in gross sales.)
FBI Corporate Fraud Chart in August 2008 ---
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/aug2008/ataglance.htm#Chart1.htm
From Smart Stops of the Web, Journal of accountancy, October
2008 ---
|
HAVE FRAUD FEARS?
Search no further than the AICPA’s offering of
antifraud and forensic accounting resources. Click “Tools and Aids”
to download Managing the Business Risk of Fraud: A Practical
Guide, which outlines principles for establishing effective
fraud risk management. The paper was released jointly by the AICPA,
the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners and The Institute of
Internal Auditors (see “Highlights,”
page 16). The site also offers fraud detection and prevention tips,
including an “Indicia of Fraud” checklist and case studies. There’s
also information on the newly created Certified in Financial
Forensics (CFF) credential (see “News
Digest,” Aug. 08, page 30) and upcoming Web seminars.
BE
CRIME SMART
Think of the most outrageous
business fraud scheme you’ve ever heard of— you’re likely to find
it, plus hundreds of other white-collar crime cases—at this site
from the FBI. Look under “Don’t Be Cheated” for a fraud awareness
test or click on “Know Your Frauds” for access to the FBI’s analysis
of common fraud schemes, including the prime bank note scheme,
telemarketing fraud and up-and-coming Internet scams. CPAs and
financial professionals can access details on options backdating,
securities scams and investment fraud under “Interesting Cases” or
learn about the FBI’s major programs involving corporate, hedge fund
and bankruptcy fraud.
SURF THE FRAUD NET
Jim Kaplan, a government auditor and author of
The Auditor’s Guide to Internet Resources, 2nd Edition,
hosts this Internet portal for auditors, which provides fraud
policies, procedures, codes of ethics and articles on a range of
topics, including internal auditing, fraud risk mitigation and
preventing embezzlement. The site also features a newsfeed, piping
in daily fraud news from around the world.. |
Bob Jensen's threads on fraud are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
Accounting
Education Shares Some of the
Blame --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm#AccountingEducation
Corporate Fraud Reporting
Report on the Transparency International Global
Corruption Barometer 2007 ---
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/27256/410704/file/GCB_2007_report_en_02-12-2007.pdf
E XECUTIVE
SUMMARY
– GLOBAL
CORRUPTION
BAROMETER
2007...................2
PAYING
BRIBES AROUND THE WORLD CONTINUES TO BE ALL TOO COMMON
......3
Figure 1. Demands for bribery, by
region 3
Table 1. Countries most affected by
bribery 4
Figure 2. Experience of bribery
worldwide, selected services 5
Table 2. Percentage of respondents
reporting that they paid a bribe to obtain a service 5
Figure 3. Experience with bribery, by
service 6
Figure 4. Selected Services:
Percentage of respondents who paid a bribe, by region 7
Figure 5. Comparing Bribery: 2006 and
2007 8
C ORRUPTION
IN KEY INSTITUTIONS: POLITICAL
PARTIES AND THE
LEGISLATURE
VIEWED AS MOST CORRUPT ............................................................8
Figure 6. Perceived levels of
corruption in key institutions, worldwide 9
Figure 7. Perceived levels of
corruption in key institutions, comparing 2004 and 2007 10
E XPERIENCE
V. PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION – DO THEY ALIGN?...................10
Figure 8. Corruption Perceptions Index v. citizens’
experience with bribery 11
L EVELS
OF CORRUPTION EXPECTED TO RISE OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS....11
Figure 9. Corruption will get worse,
worldwide 11
Figure 10. Expectations about the
future: Comparing 2003 and 2007 12
P UBLIC
SCEPTICISM OF GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO FIGHT CORRUPTION –
IN
MOST PLACES
.......................................................................................................13
Table 3. How effectively is government fighting corruption?
The country view 13
C ONCLUSIONS
......................................................................................................13
APPENDIX
1: THE
GLOBAL
CORRUPTION
BAROMETER
2007 QUESTIONNAIRE15
APPENDIX
2: THE
GLOBAL
CORRUPTION
BAROMETER
– ABOUT
THE SURVEY17
APPENDIX
3: REGIONAL
GROUPINGS..................................................................20
GLOBAL
CORRUPTION
BAROMETER
2007..........................................................20
APPENDIX
4: COUNTRY
TABLES..........................................................................21
Table 4.1: Respondents who paid a
bribe to obtain services 21
Table 4.2: Corruption’s impact on
different sectors and institutions 22
Table 4.3: Views of corruption in the
future 23
Table 4.4: Respondents' evaluation of their
government's efforts to fight corruption 24
Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Bob Jensen's Rotten to the Core threads are
at ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
The FEI has a new 16-page fraud checklist that can be
downloaded for $50. Access to an online database is $129 ---
Click Here
"New research provides
resources on fraud prevention and financial reporting," AccountingWeb,
January 18, 2008 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=104443
Financial
Executives Research Foundation (FERF), the research affiliate of Financial
Executives International (FEI), has announced the release of two important
new pieces of research designed to aid public company management and
corporate boards in the efficient evaluation of their assessment of
reporting issues and internal controls. A new FERF Study, entitled "What's
New in Financial Reporting: Financial Statement Notes from Annual Reports,"
examines disclosures from 2006 annual reports for the 100 largest
publicly-traded companies which used particularly innovative techniques to
clearly address difficult accounting issues. The study identifies and
analyzes recent reporting trends and common practices in financial
statements.
The report illustrates how
companies addressed specific accounting issues recently promulgated by
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and in doing so, uncovered a number of
trends, which included:
-
Most of the disclosures
selected appear to have been developed specifically for a company's
own operations and industry standards, rather than "boilerplate"
disclosures.
-
Four accounting areas
identified with a considerable variation in disclosures. The
examples cited in these areas used innovative techniques to clearly
address difficult accounting issues.
- Commitments and
contingencies
- Derivatives and
financial instruments
- Goodwill and
intangibles
- Revenue
recognition
Twenty-five out of
100 filers in the 2006 reporting season reported tangible asset
impairments as a critical accounting policy.
Many companies
report condensed consolidating cash flows statements as part of
their segment disclosures, although not required by SFAS No. 131,
Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information.
To further facilitate
use of this report as a reference tool, all of the financial statement
footnotes gathered for the study are available to members on the
Financial Executives International Web site.
"FERF undertook this study
to provide our members with an illustration of how companies have used
innovative techniques to clearly address difficult accounting concerns,"
said Cheryl Graziano, vice president, research and operations for FERF.
"Recent accounting issues publicized by the FASB and the SEC have had a
direct impact on members of the financial community, and the report shows
that many companies are taking action."
"We hope that all financial
executives can utilize the report as both a quick update to summarize recent
trends in the most annual reporting season, as well as a reference to
address common accounting issues. The convenience of the online database
will provide executives with a readily handy tool when drafting their own
annual reports," said Graziano.
A second piece of research
by FEI, entitled the "FERF Fraud Risk Checklist," provides boards of
directors and management with a series of questions to help in assessing the
potential risk factors associated with fraudulent financial reporting and
the misappropriation of assets. These questions were developed from a number
of key sources on financial fraud and offer executives a single framework in
which to evaluate their company's reporting, while providing a sample
structure for management to use in documenting its thought process and
conclusions.
"Making improvements to
compliance with Sarbanes Oxley is a daily practice for financial executives,
and the first step in efficient evaluation of internal controls is the
proper assessment of potential exposures or risks associated with fraud,"
said Michael Cangemi, president and CEO, Financial Executives International.
"Through conversations with members of the financial community, we learned
that, while this type of risk assessment is a routine skill for auditors,
many members of management are not always familiar with this concept. This
checklist combines knowledge from the leading resources on fraud to help
financial management take a proactive step in evaluating their company's
practices and identifying areas for improvement."
The annual report
study, including the full report and access to the online database, and the
fraud checklist, are available for purchase on the
FEI Web site
Bob Jensen's threads on fraud are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
January 29, 2008 message from Sikka, Prem N
[prems@essex.ac.uk]
Dear Bob,
Here is an item for your website.
I have been writing regular blogs for The
Guardian, a UK national newspaper. The articles are available at
http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/prem_sikka/index.html
and offer a critical commentary on
business and accountancy matters. For three days after each article the
website takes readers' comments and colleagues are welcome to add comments,
critical or otherwise. The most recent article appeared on 29 January 2008.
There is now also an extensive database of
corporate and accountancy misdemeanours on the AABA website
(
http://www.aabaglobal.org
<https://exchange5.essex.ac.uk/exchweb/bin/redir.asp?URL=http://www.aabaglobal.org/>
) and may interest scholars, students,
journalists and citizens concerned about the abuse of power.
Regards
Prem Sikka
Professor of Accounting
University of Essex
Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ
UK
Office Tel: +44(0)1206 873773
Office Fax: +44 (01206) 873429
Jensen Comment
I added Professor Sikka's message to the following sites:
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
The Consumer Fraud Portion of this Document Was Moved to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm
Labor Unions Resist Efforts to Require Truthful
Financial Disclosures
Tax Fraud and Scams
How
Technology Can Be Used to Reduce Fraud
Health Care and
Medical Billing Fraud
Online
(Internet) Frauds, Consumer Frauds, and Credit Card Scams
Corporate Governance is in a Crisis
Government
Subsidies, Pork Barrels, and Accountability --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudRotten.htm#Government
The Professions of Investment Banking and Security Analysis are Rotten to
the Core This module was moved to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Derivative Financial Instruments Fraud ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds
FAS 133 Trips of
Freddie Mac --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm#FreddieMac
What is initial public offering (IPO) spinning and
why is it illegal?
Are Women More Ethical and Moral?
Example from the Stanford Law School Database
Future CPA --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/cpaaway.htm
Also see http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/damages.htm
You might enjoy "The AICPA's Prosecution of Dr. Abraham Briloff: Some
Observations," by Dwight M. Owsen --- http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aaa/pi/newsletr/spring99/item07.htm
I think Briloff was trying to save the profession from what it is now going
through in the wake of the Enron scandal.
Bob Jensen's threads on ecommerce and revenue reporting tricks and frauds
--- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce.htm
For revenue reporting frauds --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
Resources
to prevent and discover fraud from the Association of Fraud Examiners --- http://www.cfenet.com/resources/resources.asp
Self-study
training for a career in fraud examination --- http://marketplace.cfenet.com/products/products.asp
Fraud Detection and Reporting ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm
Source for United Kingdom reporting on financial
scandals and other news ---
http://www.financialdirector.co.uk
International Corruption Surveys and Indices --- http://www.transparency.org/cpi/
- TI Bribe Payers Survey
- TI Corruption Perceptions Index
- TI-Kenya Urban Bribery Index
- TI-Mexicana Encuestra Nacional de Corrupcion y Buen Gobierno
- National Survey on corruption and Governance (NSCG) (in Spanish)
- Transparência Brasil Survey
The Enron, Andersen, and Worldcom Scandal Modules Are At --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
Selected Scandals in the Largest Remaining Public
Accounting Firms
The Sad State of Professional Discipline in Public Accountancy
Big 4 Securities Class Action Litigation- Citing Auditor as Defendants ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/AuditingFirmLitigationNov2006.pdf
"SEC Accountant Fines Largely Go Unpaid," SmartPros, June 7, 2006 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x53399.xml
The Securities and Exchange Commission has taken
disciplinary action against more than 50 accountants in 2005 and 2006 for
misconduct in scandals big and small. But few have paid a dime to compensate
shareholders for their varying levels of neglect or complicity.
It also turns out that nearly half of them continue
to hold valid state licenses to hang out their shingles as certified public
accountants, based on an examination of public records by The Associated
Press.
So while the SEC has forbidden these CPAs from
preparing, auditing or reviewing financial statements for a public company,
they remain free to perform those very same services for private companies
and other organizations that may be unaware of their professional misdeeds.
Some would say the accounting profession has taken
its fair share of lumps, particularly with the abrupt annihilation of Arthur
Andersen LLP and the jobs of thousands of auditors who had nothing to do
with the firm's Enron Corp. account. Meantime, the big auditing firms are
paying hundreds of millions of dollars in damages - without admitting or
denying wrongdoing - to settle assorted charges of professional malpractice.
Individual penance is another matter, however, and
here the accountants aren't being held so accountable.
Part of the trouble is that there doesn't appear to
be an established system of communication by which the SEC automatically
notifies state accounting regulators of federal disciplinary actions. In
several instances, state accounting boards were unaware a licensee had been
disciplined by the SEC until it was brought to their attention in the
reporting for this column. The SEC says it refers all disciplinary actions
to the relevant state boards, so the cause of any breakdowns in these
communications is unclear.
Another obstacle may be that some state boards do
not have ample resources to tackle the sudden swell of financial scandals.
It's not as if, for example, the Texas State Board of Public Accountancy had
ever before dealt with an accounting fraud as vast as that perpetrated at
Houston-based Enron.
"We don't have the staff on board to manage the
extra workload that the profession has been confronted with over the last
few years," said William Treacy, executive director of the Texas board. "So
we contracted with the attorney general's office to provide extra
prosecutorial power."
Treacy said his office is usually notified of SEC
actions concerning Texas-licensed CPAs, but the process isn't automatic.
With other states, communications from the SEC
appear less certain. If nothing else, many boards rely upon license renewals
to learn about SEC actions, but that only works if the applicants respond
truthfully to questions about whether they've been disciplined by any
federal or state agency. A spokeswoman for Georgia's board said one CPA
recently disciplined by the SEC had renewed his license online without
disclosing it.
Ransom Jones, CPA-Investigator for the Mississippi
State Board of Public Accountancy, said most of his leads come from other
accountants, media reports and annual registrations.
"The SEC doesn't necessarily notify the board,"
said Jones, whose agency revoked the licenses of key players in the scandal
at Mississippi-based WorldCom.
Some state boards appear more vigilant than others
in policing their membership. The boards in California and Ohio have
punished most of their licensees who have been disciplined by the SEC since
the start of 2005.
New York regulators haven't yet penalized any
locals targeted by the SEC in that timeframe, though they have taken action
against two disciplined by the SEC's new Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board. It is conceivable that cases are underway but not yet disclosed, or
that some individuals have been cleared despite the SEC's findings. A
spokesman for the New York State Education Department said all SEC referrals
are probed, but not all forms of misconduct are punishable under local
statute. New rules now under consideration would strengthen those
disciplinary powers, he said.
Meanwhile, although the SEC deserves credit for
de-penciling those CPAs who've breached their duties as gatekeepers of
financial integrity, barely any of those individuals have been asked to make
amends financially.
No doubt, except for those elevated to CEO or CFO,
most accountants are not paid as handsomely as the corporate elite. That
said, partners from top accounting firms are were [sic] paid well enough to
cough up more than the SEC has sought, which in most cases has been zero.
Earlier this year, in what the SEC crowed about as
a landmark settlement, three partners for KPMG LLP agreed to pay a combined
$400,000 in fines regarding a $1.2 billion fraud at Xerox Corp. One of those
fined still holds his license in New York.
"The SEC has never sought serious money from errant
CPAs," said David Nolte of Fulcrum Financial Inquiry LLP. "Unfortunately,
the small fines in the Xerox case set a record of the amount paid, so
everyone else has also gotten off easy."
It's not that the CPAs found culpable in scandals
don't deserve a right to redemption, or just to earn a living. Most of the
bans against practicing before the SEC are temporary, spanning anywhere from
a year to 10 years.
But the presumed deterrent of SEC action is
weakened if federal and state regulators don't work together on a consistent
message so bad actors don't get a free pass at the local level.
Large Public Accounting Firm Lawsuits
Accounting
Education Shares Some of the
Blame --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm#AccountingEducation
The SEC will not tolerate a pattern of growing
restatements, audit failures, corporate failures and massive investor
losses," Pitt said in a news conference. "Somehow we have got to put a
stop to the vicious cycle that has now been in evidence for far too many
years."
Suggested Reforms
Suggested Reforms (Including those of Warren Buffet and the Andersen Accounting
Firm)
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm
Major New Law in the Wake of the Accounting and
Finance Scandals
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud082002.htm
Bottom-Line Commentary
of Bob Jensen
Bottom-Line
Commentary of Bob Jensen: Systemic Problems That Won't Go Away
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm
Links Related to Andersen, Enron, Worldcom, and
Other Frauds
The Enron, Andersen, and Worldcom Scandal Modules --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners ---
http://www.acfe.com/home.asp
In particular note the Code of Business Ethics and Conduct ---
http://www.acfe.com/documents/code_of_business_ethics.pdf
Fraud Resources Center ---
http://www.acfe.com/fraud/fraud.asp
Fraud Prevention Check-Up ---
http://www.acfe.com/fraud/check.asp
Fraud Prevention CD-ROM ---
http://www.acfe.com/fraud/cd.asp
How to Prevent Small Business Fraud ---
http://www.acfe.com/documents/smallbusinessfraudexcerpt.pdf
Other Downloads ---
http://www.acfe.com/fraud/downloads.asp
Also note the explosion of salaries of Certified Fraud Examiners ---
http://www.acfe.com/documents/2005comp-guide.pdf
PricewaterhouseCoopers - Global Economic Crime Survey 2003 ---
http://www.acfe.com/documents/2003_PwC_CrimeReport.pdf
FraudNet the Government Accountability Office (GAO) --- http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
The Institute of Internal Auditors ---
http://www.theiia.org/
AICPA's Business Valuation and Forensic & Litigation Services Center (not
free to the public) ---
http://bvfls.aicpa.org/
Fraud Position Statement of the Institute of Internal Auditors of the UK and
Ireland ---
http://www.blindtiger.co.uk/IIA/uploads/48dc2e62-f2a7bd939a--7c26/2003FraudPositionStatement.pdf
I snipped this link to
http://snipurl.com/IIAFraudStatementUK
The Fraud Detectives
Consultant Network --- http://www.frauddetectives.com/
This is a helpful site, although I
might add that accountants, attorneys, and others can list themselves free at
this site with no filtering with regard to skills and experience.
Some fraud links from B2B Today ---
http://snipurl.com/B2BfraudLinks
Introductory Quotations
Quotations for the Enron/Andersen scandals were
moved to
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm#Quotations
Turning to business, the board rapidly
approved a series of transactions, according to the minutes and a
report later commissioned by Hollinger. The board awarded a
private company, controlled by Lord Black, $38 million in
"management fees" as part of a move by Lord Black's team
to essentially outsource the company's management to itself. It
agreed to sell two profitable community newspapers to another
private company controlled by Lord Black and Hollinger executives
for $1 apiece. The board also gave Lord Black and his colleagues a
cut of profits from a Hollinger Internet unit. Finally,
the directors gave themselves a raise. The meeting lasted about an
hour and a half, according to the minutes and two directors who
were present.
Robert Frank and Elena Cheney --- Click
here to read part of their article
"Real Accounting Fraud," by Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Free
Market, April 2002 ---
http://www.mises.org/freemarket_detail.asp?control=395&sortorder=articledate
If the Enron bankruptcy proves
anything, it is that there are sinners in all walks of life, and
that the market economy provides mechanisms for rooting out and
punishing systematic liars. Those who clamor for Congress to “do
something” to assure that this kind of thing will never happen
again are delusional if they think Congress has the ability to
legislate away sin or otherwise improve on the market system of
profit and loss. Such delusions are a testament to the
successful brainwashing of generations of public school students
who have been taught to worship the “god” of the state and to
look to it to solve all of life’s problems.
Accounting fraud at Enron is such a big
story because it is so exceptional; only once in a blue moon
does a major corporation destroy itself in this way. In
contrast, “accounting” fraud is an inherent feature of
government.
There is no such thing as real
accounting in government, of course, since there are no
profit-and-loss statements, only budgets. Consequently, there is
no way of ever knowing, in an accounting sense, whether
government is adding value or destroying it. All we know is that
the budget grew by a certain amount, for some ostensible
purpose. And government is constantly lying to the public about
how much of the public’s money is being spent and what it is
being spent on.
As Gene Epstein has reported in
Barron’s, during the Clinton administration, vast sums were
transferred from the Social Security and Federal Highway Trust
Funds to the budget so that Clinton and the Republican Congress
could take “credit” for balancing the budget. Any corporate CEO
who raided his employees’ pension fund and put the money in the
company coffers so that the bottom line would look good and he
could earn himself a fat bonus would end up in prison.
The federal government practices what
it calls “baseline budgeting,” whereby federal agencies announce
that they wish to increase their budgets by, say, 10 percent a
year, and if they only increase them by 5 percent that is called
a 5 percent budget “cut.” There can be no better example of
accounting fraud than calling a budget increase a cut.
The General Accounting Office,
Congressional Budget Office, and other federal agencies also use
“static analysis” when analyzing and reporting to the public on
tax policy changes. That is, they assume that taxation has no
effect whatsoever on economic behavior. So, if we have a $10
trillion economy, and impose a flat 75-percent income tax, these
“authoritative” sources will announce that the IRS expects to
collect $7.5 trillion in revenues, each year, ignoring several
hundred years of economic theory and practice.
Continued in article
Clinton's famously crude remark
And I hope that comes through in the
book (see below for references to the book Infectious
Greed). I am very critical of the
tax law changes that created the incentives for companies to pay
executives with stock options, which were made at the beginning
of the Clinton Administration to appease populist
anti-corporation forces among his supporters by appearing to do
something about what, even then, was alleged to be execessive
pay for corporate executives. Not to mention his
Administration's hands-off approach to Wall Street
(when Arthur Levitt headed the SEC).
There's that great story --- perhaps apocoryphal --- that I
recount in the book about Clinton's famously crude remark when
he discovered that voters cared much more about whether the
stocks were going up than his economic program.
Frank Partnoy, Partnoy's Solutions, welling@weeden,
October 21, 2005
|
Selected works of FRANK PARTNOY
Bob Jensen at Trinity University
1. Who is Frank Partnoy?
Cheryl Dunn requested that I do a review of my
favorites among the “books that have influenced [my] work.”
Immediately the succession of FIASCO books by Frank Partnoy
came to mind. These particular books are not the best among related
books by Wall Street whistle blowers such as Liar's Poker:
Playing the Money Markets by Michael Lewis in 1999 and Monkey
Business: Swinging Through the Wall Street Jungle by John Rolfe
and Peter Troob in 2002. But in1997. Frank Partnoy was the first
writer to open my eyes to the enormous gap between our assumed
efficient and fair capital markets versus the “infectious greed”
(Alan Greenspan’s term) that had overtaken these markets.
Partnoy’s succession of FIASCO books,
like those of Lewis and Rolfe/Troob are reality books written from
the perspective of inside whistle blowers. They are somewhat
repetitive and anecdotal mainly from the perspective of what each
author saw and interpreted.
My favorite among the capital market fraud
books is Frank Partnoy’s latest book Infectious Greed: How Deceit
and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets (Henry Holt & Company,
Incorporated, 2003, ISBN: 080507510-0- 477 pages). This is the most
scholarly of the books available on business and gatekeeper
degeneracy. Rather than relying mostly upon his own experiences,
this book drawn from Partnoy’s interviews of over 150 capital
markets insiders of one type or another. It is more scholarly
because it demonstrates Partnoy’s evolution of learning about
extremely complex structured financing packages that were the
instruments of crime by banks, investment banks, brokers, and
securities dealers in the most venerable firms in the U.S. and other
parts of the world. The book is brilliant and has a detailed and
helpful index.
What did I learn most from Partnoy?
I learned about the failures and complicity of
what he terms “gatekeepers” whose fiduciary responsibility was to
inoculate against “infectious greed.” These gatekeepers instead
manipulated their professions and their governments to aid and abet
the criminals. On Page 173 of Infectious Greed, he writes
the following:
Page #173
When Republicans captured the House of Representatives in
November 1994--for the first time since the Eisenhower
era--securities-litigation reform was assured. In a January 1995
speech, Levitt outlined the limits on securities regulation that
Congress later would support: limiting the statute-of-limitations
period for filing lawsuits, restricting legal fees paid to lead
plaintiffs, eliminating punitive-damages provisions from securities
lawsuits, requiring plaintiffs to allege more clearly that a
defendant acted with reckless intent, and exempting "forward looking
statements"--essentially, projections about a company's future--from
legal liability.
The Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 passed easily, and Congress even overrode the veto of
President Clinton, who either had a fleeting change of heart about
financial markets or decided that trial lawyers were an even more
important
constituency than Wall Street. In any event, Clinton and Levitt
disagreed about the issue, although it wasn't fatal to Levitt, who
would remain SEC chair for another five years.
He later introduces Chapter 7 of Infectious
Greed as follows:
Pages 187-188
The regulatory changes
of 1994-95 sent three messages to corporate CEOs. First, you are
not likely to be punished for "massaging" your firm's accounting
numbers. Prosecutors rarely go after financial fraud and, even when
they do, the typical punishment is a small fine; almost no one goes
to prison. Moreover, even a fraudulent scheme could be recast as
mere earnings management--the practice of smoothing a
company's earnings--which most executives did, and regarded as
perfectly legal.
Second, you should use
new financial instruments--including options, swaps, and other
derivatives--to increase your own pay and to avoid costly
regulation. If complex derivatives are too much for you to
handle--as they were for many CEOs during the years immediately
following the 1994 losses--you should at least pay yourself in stock
options, which don't need to be disclosed as an expense and have a
greater upside than cash bonuses or stock.
Third, you don't need
to worry about whether accountants or securities analysts will tell
investors about any hidden losses or excessive options pay. Now
that Congress and the Supreme Court have insulated accounting firms
and investment banks from liability--with the Central Bank decision
and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act--they will be much
more willing to look the other way. If you pay them enough in fees,
they might even be willing to help.
Of course, not every
corporate executive heeded these messages. For example, Warren
Buffett argued that managers should ensure that their companies'
share prices were accurate, not try to inflate prices artificially,
and he criticized the use of stock options as compensation. Having
been a major shareholder of Salomon Brothers, Buffett also
criticized accounting and securities firms for conflicts of
interest.
But for every Warren
Buffett, there were many less scrupulous CEOs. This chapter
considers four of them: Walter Forbes of CUC International, Dean
Buntrock of Waste Management, Al Dunlap of Sunbeam, and Martin Grass
of Rite Aid. They are not all well-known among investors, but their
stories capture the changes in CEO behavior during the mid-1990s.
Unlike the "rocket scientists" at Bankers Trust, First Boston, and
Salomon Brothers, these four had undistinguished backgrounds and
little training in mathematics or finance. Instead, they were
hardworking, hard-driving men who ran companies that met basic
consumer needs: they sold clothes, barbecue grills, and prescription
medicine, and cleaned up garbage. They certainly didn't buy swaps
linked to LIBOR-squared.
The book Infectious Greed has chapters
on other capital markets and corporate scandals. It is the best
account that I’ve ever read about Bankers Trust the Bankers Trust
scandals, including how one trader named Andy Krieger almost
destroyed the entire money supply of New Zealand. Chapter 10 is
devoted to Enron and follows up on Frank Partnoy’s invited testimony
before the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,
January 24, 2002 ---
http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/012402partnoy.htm
The controversial writings of Frank Partnoy
have had an enormous impact on my teaching and my research.
Although subsequent writers wrote somewhat more entertaining
exposes, he was the one who first opened my eyes to what goes on
behind the scenes in capital markets and investment banking.
Through his early writings, I discovered that there is an enormous
gap between the efficient financial world that we assume in agency
theory worshipped in academe versus the dark side of modern reality
where you find the cleverest crooks out to steal money from widows
and orphans in sophisticated ways where it is virtually impossible
to get caught. Because I read his 1997 book early on, the ensuing
succession of enormous scandals in finance, accounting, and
corporate governance weren’t really much of a surprise to me.
From his insider perspective he reveals a world
where our most respected firms in banking, market exchanges, and
related financial institutions no longer care anything about
fiduciary responsibility and professionalism in disgusting contrast
to the honorable founders of those same firms motivated to serve
rather than steal.
Young men and women from top universities of
the world abandoned almost all ethical principles while working in
investment banks and other financial institutions in order to become
not only rich but filthy rich at the expense of countless pension
holders and small investors. Partnoy opened my eyes to how easy it
is to get around auditors and corporate boards by creating
structured financial contracts that are incomprehensible and serve
virtually no purpose other than to steal billions upon billions of
dollars.
Most importantly, Frank Partnoy opened my eyes
to the psychology of greed. Greed is rooted in opportunity and
cultural relativism. He graduated from college with a high sense of
right and wrong. But his standards and values sank to the criminal
level of those when he entered the criminal world of investment
banking. The only difference between him and the crooks he worked
with is that he could not quell his conscience while stealing from
widows and orphans.
Frank Partnoy has a rare combination of
scholarship and experience in law, investment banking, and
accounting. He is sometimes criticized for not really understanding
the complexities of some of the deals he described, but he rather
freely admits that he was new to the game of complex deceptions in
international structured financing crime.
2. What really happened at Enron?
I begin with the following document the best thing I ever read
explaining fraud at Enron.
Testimony of Frank Partnoy Professor of Law, University of San Diego
School of Law Hearings before the United States Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, January 24, 2002 ---
http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/012402partnoy.htm
The following selected quotations from his
Senate testimony speak for themselves:
- Quote: In
other words, OTC derivatives markets, which for the most part did
not exist twenty (or, in some cases, even ten) years ago, now
comprise about 90 percent of the aggregate derivatives market,
with trillions of dollars at risk every day. By those measures,
OTC derivatives markets are bigger than the markets for U.S.
stocks. Enron may have been just an energy company when it was
created in 1985, but by the end it had become a full-blown OTC
derivatives trading firm. Its OTC derivatives-related assets and
liabilities increased more than five-fold during 2000 alone.
- Quote: And,
let me repeat, the OTC derivatives markets are largely
unregulated. Enron’s trading operations were not regulated, or
even recently audited, by U.S. securities regulators, and the OTC
derivatives it traded are not deemed securities. OTC derivatives
trading is beyond the purview of organized, regulated exchanges.
Thus, Enron – like many firms that trade OTC derivatives – fell
into a regulatory black hole.
- Quote:
Specifically, Enron used derivatives and special purpose vehicles
to manipulate its financial statements in three ways. First, it
hid speculator losses it suffered on technology stocks. Second,
it hid huge debts incurred to finance unprofitable new businesses,
including retail energy services for new customers. Third, it
inflated the value of other troubled businesses, including its new
ventures in fiber-optic bandwidth. Although Enron was founded as
an energy company, many of these derivatives transactions did not
involve energy at all.
- Quote:
Moreover, a thorough inquiry into these dealings also should
include the major financial market “gatekeepers” involved with
Enron: accounting firms, banks, law firms, and credit rating
agencies. Employees of these firms are likely to have knowledge
of these transactions. Moreover, these firms have a
responsibility to come forward with information relevant to these
transactions. They benefit directly and indirectly from the
existence of U.S. securities regulation, which in many instances
both forces companies to use the services of gatekeepers and
protects gatekeepers from liability.
- Quote:
Recent cases against accounting firms – including Arthur Andersen
– are eroding that protection, but the other gatekeepers remain
well insulated. Gatekeepers are kept honest – at least in theory
– by the threat of legal liability, which is virtually
non-existent for some gatekeepers. The capital markets would be
more efficient if companies were not required by law to use
particular gatekeepers (which only gives those firms market
power), and if gatekeepers were subject to a credible threat of
liability for their involvement in fraudulent transactions.
Congress should consider expanding the scope of securities fraud
liability by making it clear that these gatekeepers will be liable
for assisting companies in transactions designed to distort the
economic reality of financial statements.
- Quote: In a
nutshell, it appears that some Enron employees used dummy accounts
and rigged valuation methodologies to create false profit and loss
entries for the derivatives Enron traded. These false entries
were systematic and occurred over several years, beginning as
early as 1997. They included not only the more esoteric financial
instruments Enron began trading recently – such as fiber-optic
bandwidth and weather derivatives – but also Enron’s very
profitable trading operations in natural gas derivatives.
-
Quote: The difficult
question is what to do about the gatekeepers. They occupy a
special place in securities regulation, and receive great benefits
as a result. Employees at gatekeeper firms are among the most
highly-paid people in the world. They have access to superior
information and supposedly have greater expertise than average
investors at deciphering that information. Yet, with respect to
Enron, the gatekeepers clearly did not do their job.
3. What are some of Frank Partnoy’s
best-known books?
Frank Partnoy, FIASCO: Blood in the Water on
Wall Street (W. W. Norton & Company, 1997, ISBN 0393046222, 252
pages).
This is the first of a
somewhat repetitive succession of Partnoy’s “FIASCO” books that
influenced my life. The most important revelation from his
insider’s perspective is that the most trusted firms on Wall Street
and financial centers in other major cities in the U.S., that were
once highly professional and trustworthy, excoriated the guts of
integrity leaving a façade behind which crooks less violent than the
Mafia but far more greedy took control in the roaring 1990s.
After selling a
succession of phony derivatives deals while at Morgan Stanley,
Partnoy blew the whistle in this book about a number of his
employer’s shady and outright fraudulent deals sold in rigged
markets using bait and switch tactics. Customers, many of them
pension fund investors for schools and municipal employees, were
duped into complex and enormously risky deals that were billed as
safe as the U.S. Treasury.
His books have
received mixed reviews, but I question some of the integrity of the
reviewers from the investment banking industry who in some instances
tried to whitewash some of the deals described by Partnoy. His
books have received a bit less praise than the book Liars Poker
by Michael Lewis, but critics of Partnoy fail to give credit that
Partnoy’s exposes preceded those of Lewis.
Frank Partnoy, FIASCO: Guns, Booze and
Bloodlust: the Truth About High Finance (Profile Books, 1998,
305 Pages)
Like his earlier
books, some investment bankers and literary dilettantes who reviewed
this book were critical of Partnoy and claimed that he
misrepresented some legitimate structured financings. However, my
reading of the reviewers is that they were trying to lend credence
to highly questionable offshore deals documented by Partnoy. Be
that as it may, it would have helped if Partnoy had been a bit more
explicit in some of his illustrations.
Preface
1. A Better Opportunity
2. The House of Cards
3. Playing Dice
4. A Mexican Bank Fiesta
5. F.I.A.S.C.O.
6. The Queen of RAVs
7. Don't Cry for Me, Argentina
8. The Odd Couple
9. The Tequila Effect
10. MX
11. Sayonara
Frank Partnoy, FIASCO: The Inside Story of a
Wall Street Trader (Penguin, 1999, ISBN 0140278796, 283 pages).
This is a blistering
indictment of the unregulated OTC market for derivative financial
instruments and the devious million and billion dollar deals
conceived by drunken sexual deviates in investment banking. Among
other things, Partnoy describes Morgan Stanley’s annual drunken
skeet-shooting competition.
This is also one of
the best accounts of the “fiasco” caused by Merrill Lynch in which
Orange Counting lost over a billion dollars and was forced into
bankruptcy.
Frank Partnoy, Infectious Greed: How Deceit
and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets (Henry Holt & Company,
Incorporated, 2003, ISBN: 080507510-0, 477 pages)
Partnoy shows how
corporations gradually increased financial risk and lost control
over overly complex structured financing deals that obscured the
losses and disguised frauds pushed corporate officers and their
boards into successive and ingenious deceptions." Major corporations
such as Enron, Global Crossing, and WorldCom entered into enormous
illegal corporate finance and accounting. Partnoy documents the
spread of this epidemic stage and provides some suggestions for
restraining the disease.
4. What are examples of related books that
are somewhat more entertaining than Partnoy’s early books?
Michael Lewis, Liar's Poker: Playing the
Money Markets (Coronet, 1999, ISBN 0340767006)
Lewis writes in
Partnoy’s earlier whistleblower style with somewhat more intense and
comic portrayals of the major players in describing the double
dealing and break down of integrity on the trading floor of Salomon
Brothers.
John Rolfe and Peter Troob, Monkey Business:
Swinging Through the Wall Street Jungle (Warner Books,
Incorporated, 2002, ISBN: 0446676950, 288 Pages)
This is a hilarious tongue-in-cheek
account by Wharton and Harvard MBAs who thought they were starting
out as stock brokers for $200,000 a year until they realized that
they were on the phones in a bucket shop selling sleazy IPOs to
unsuspecting institutional investors who in turn passed them along
to widows and orphans. They write. "It took us another six
months after that to realize that we were, in fact, selling crappy
public offerings to investors."
There are other
books along a similar vein that may be more revealing and
entertaining than the early books of Frank Partnoy, but he was one
of the first, if not the first, in the roaring 1990s to reveal the
high crime taking place behind the concrete and glass of Wall
Street. He was the first to anticipate many of the scandals that
soon followed. And his testimony before the U.S. Senate is the
best concise account of the crime that transpired at Enron. He
lays the blame clearly at the feet of government officials (read
that Wendy Gramm) who sold the farm when they deregulated the
energy markets and opened the doors to unregulated OTC derivatives
trading in energy. That is when Enron really began bilking the
public.
|
If the Big Four shrinks to the Big Three, some
clients will continuously employ all three firms. Accounting
Firm 1 hired for audits is not allowed to perform tax services or
information system consulting. Accounting
Firm 2 hired for tax services runs a liability risk if it also designs
the information system feeding the tax information.
Accounting Firm 3 hired for information systems consulting is not
allowed to perform audits and probably should not perform tax services.
It will be very confusing unless something is done to distinguish the
external accountants in the client's offices. I suggest color codes.
What will the colors be,
after there are but three?
I wonder if the Big Three will adopt distinct
colors. As I recall Andersen
employees preferred orange shirts when demonstrating outside the Justice
Department (in a pouring rain) around the time Andersen was being tried
for obstruction of justice in the destruction of Enron’s audit files.
White has been pretty well taken up by medical services.
Black has always been the most popular auditor color --- when I
worked for Ernst, I was required to have a black fedora to match my
black suits. But undertakers
also prefer black. Traders
in the commodity pits wear bright colors.
Why can’t accountants do the same?
Seriously, I always thought Andersen's choice of orange was rather
ironic. This is too close to prison-orange for a firm that is trying to
fend off a criminal conviction.
Quotations
At a time when U.S. firms are more reliant than ever
on quality accounting and auditing services, the influential Business Roundtable
is supporting liability caps for auditors. The Roundtable is worried that the
Big Four accounting firms could soon shrink to three or fewer firms if Congress
doesn't act to stem the liabilities the firms face when things go wrong.
"Business Roundtable Supports Auditor Liability Cap," AccountingWeb,
January 18, 2005 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/item/100390
Discontent is rightfully rising over CEO pay versus performance
In fact, the boss enjoyed a hefty raise
last year. The chief executives at 179 large companies that had filed
proxies by last Tuesday - and had not changed leaders since last year -
were paid about $9.84 million, on average, up 12 percent from 2003,
according to Pearl Meyer & Partners, the compensation consultants.
Surely, chief executives must have done something spectacular to justify
all that, right? Well, that's not so clear. The link between rising pay
and performance remained muddy - at best. Profits and stock prices are
up, but at many companies they seem to reflect an improving economy
rather than managerial expertise. Regardless, the better numbers set off
sizable incentive payouts for bosses. With investors still smarting from
the bursting of the tech bubble, the swift rebound in executive pay is
touching some nerves. "The disconnect between pay and performance keeps
getting worse," said Christianna Wood, senior investment officer for
global equity at Calpers, the California pension fund. "Investors were
really mad when pay did not come down during the three-year bear market,
and we are not happy now, when companies reward executives when the
stock goes up $2."
Claudia H. Deutsch, "My Big Fat C.E.O. Paycheck," The New York Times,
April 3, 2005 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/03/business/yourmoney/03pay.html?
Bob Jensen's threads on corporate fraud are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
Bob Jensen's updates on fraud are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudUpdates.htm
Steve Albrecht (former American Accounting Association President and
Professor of Accounting at Brigham Young University) conducted
interviews when Barry Minkow was still in prison. You can read
Steve's account of the ZZZZ Best Fraud at http://www.swcollege.com/vircomm/stice_survey/sts/sts04.html
Question
Why is there so much investment fraud?
Answer
What we have is a perfect fraud storm. In
places across the country with an appreciating housing market, low
interest rates, and consumers dissatisfied with Wall Street returns,
you'll find people ripe for [perpetrators].
"Ten Questions for Barry Minkow," CFO Staff, by CFO
Magazine, January 2005, Page 20 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3516399/c_3516777?f=magazine_alsoinside
The current head of the Fraud Discovery Institute, Barry Minkow, also
served more than seven years in prison for the infamous ZZZZ Best scam.
Barry Minkow says he plans to be remembered
for more than the ZZZZ Best Co. fraud. The 38-year-old Minkow served
more than seven years in prison for the infamous 1980s scam. But he
hopes that his current efforts as head of the Fraud Discovery
Institute and as pastor of The Community Bible Church in San Diego
will supersede his activities as CEO of the carpet-cleaning company.
This month his new book, Cleaning Up (Nelson Current), debuts.
1. Currently, you are fighting the very
crime you were convicted of. Isn't that ironic?
No one failed worse than I did at such a young age. Sure, you can
adjust the dollar amounts and say it was $10 billion with Bernie
Ebbers at WorldCom, but it doesn't matter. I was CEO of a public
company and I failed. [ZZZZ Best] was a fully reporting public company
with a stock that went from $12 to $80. And at 21, I got a 25-year
sentence and a $26 million restitution order, and that's [since been]
turned into $1 billion in fraud uncoverings.
2. What can other white-collar criminals
glean from your mistakes?
Jeff Skilling's and Andy Fastow's best days are ahead of them...if
they admit they did wrong, do whatever they can to pay back their
victims, and use the same talents they used to defraud people to help
them.
3. When you speak to executives about
fraud, what's your main message?
When I speak to executives, I wear my orange prison jumpsuit. It's
gimmicky... [but] the best way to stop fraud is to talk people out of
perpetrating it in the first place by doing two things: increasing the
perception of detection and increasing the perception of prosecution.
4. Are you surprised that the fraud
techniques you used are still out there?
It doesn't surprise me at all. Long before Enron was touring people on
phony trading floors, ZZZZ Best was touring people on buildings for
restoration jobs that we never did. Now the variation on a theme is
always there, but here's what we do: we lie about what we owe and we
lie about what we earn.
5. On what do you blame the rash of
corporate fraud in recent years?
It's a mentality called right equals forward motion and wrong is
anyone who gets in my way. You see, we used to endorse character and
integrity, but today the business ethic that reigns is achievement.
And whenever you establish the worth of someone based on what they can
do and not on who they are, you have created the environment for
fraud.
6. Are you skeptical of efforts, such as
Sarbanes-Oxley, to legislate ethics?
Let me tell you why this legislation is brilliant. Sarbox hit at a
common denominator of corporate fraud: bypassing systems of internal
controls. I would not have been able to perpetrate the ZZZZ Best fraud
if I had not been able to bypass the system of internal controls. And
you know who are heroes now — the internal auditors and the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board. Unless you're a perpetrator, you
don't know how good these moves are.
7. Should the sentencing guidelines for
white-collar criminals be overhauled?
Yes, and judges should have more discretion. My judge is the one who
said that I had no conscience. Two years ago, he dismissed my $26
million restitution order, dismissed me from probation three years
early, and told me to go out and fight corporate fraud. [But] I don't
care if anyone goes to jail. The number-one thing white-collar
criminals need to do is give the money back to those hurt the most.
8. When will you be satisfied that you've
repaid your debt to society?
I won't be. Union Bank had a $7 million loan [against ZZZZ Best], and
I have a long way to go. But I haven't missed a payment in nine years.
They've gotten over $100,000 this year alone.
9. Why is there so much investment fraud?
What we have is a perfect fraud storm. In places across the country
with an appreciating housing market, low interest rates, and consumers
dissatisfied with Wall Street returns, you'll find people ripe for
[perpetrators].
10. What do you say to those who doubt
your conversion to the straight and narrow?
There's this great phrase in the Bible: "When the man's ways
please the Lord, he makes even his enemies be at peace with him."
The biggest critics of Barry Minkow should be law enforcement. They
absolutely know if someone is a fake or real. But they've been my
biggest supporters.
Instead of adding more
regulating agencies, I think we should simply make the FBI tougher on
crime and the IRS tougher on cheats
Our Main Financial Regulating
Agency: The SEC Screw Everybody Commission
One of the biggest regulation failures in history is the way the SEC
failed to seriously investigate Bernie Madoff's fund even after being
warned by Wall Street experts across six years before Bernie himself
disclosed that he was running a $65 billion Ponzi fund.
CBS Sixty Minutes on June 14,
2009 ran a rerun that is devastatingly critical of the SEC. If you’ve
not seen it, it may still be available for free (for a short time only)
at
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5088137n&tag=contentMain;cbsCarousel
The title of the video is “The Man Who Would Be King.”
Between 2002 and 2008 Harry
Markopolos repeatedly told (with indisputable proof) the Securities and
Exchange Commission that Bernie Madoff's investment fund was a fraud.
Markopolos was ignored and, as a result, investors lost more and more
billions of dollars. Steve Kroft reports.
Markoplos makes the SEC look
truly incompetent or outright conspiratorial in fraud.
I'm really surprised that the SEC
survived after Chris Cox messed it up so many things so badly.
As Far as Regulations Go
An
annual report issued by the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) shows
that the U.S. government imposed $1.17 trillion in new regulatory costs
in 2008. That almost equals the $1.2 trillion generated by individual
income taxes, and amounts to $3,849 for every American citizen.
According the 2009 edition of Ten Thousand Commandments: An Annual
Snapshot of the Federal Regulatory State, the government issued 3,830
new rules last year, and The Federal Register, where such rules are
listed, ballooned to a record 79,435 pages. “The costs of federal
regulations too often exceed the benefits, yet these regulations receive
little official scrutiny from Congress,” said CEI Vice President Clyde
Wayne Crews, Jr., who wrote the report. “The U.S. economy lost value in
2008 for the first time since 1990,” Crews said. “Meanwhile, our federal
government imposed a $1.17 trillion ‘hidden tax’ on Americans beyond the
$3 trillion officially budgeted” through the regulations.
Adam Brickley,
"Government Implemented Thousands of New Regulations Costing $1.17
Trillion in 2008," CNS News, June 12, 2009 ---
http://www.cnsnews.com/public/content/article.aspx?RsrcID=49487
Jensen Comment
I’m a long-time believer that industries being regulated end up
controlling the regulating agencies. The records of Alan Greenspan (FED)
and the SEC from Arthur Levitt to Chris Cox do absolutely nothing to
change my belief ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
How do industries leverage the
regulatory agencies?
The primary control mechanism is to have high paying jobs waiting in
industry for regulators who play ball while they are still employed by
the government. It happens time and time again in the FPC, EPA, FDA,
FAA, FTC, SEC, etc. Because so many people work for the FBI and IRS,
it's a little harder for industry to manage those bureaucrats. Also the
FBI and the IRS tend to focus on the worst of the worst offenders
whereas other agencies often deal with top management of the largest
companies in America.
Forensic Accounting
There’s a rather nice module on Forensic Accounting at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forensic_Accounting
This includes links to a journal and career opportunities.
The link to the
following article was forwarded by Charles Wankel
[wankelc@VERIZON.NET]
"Account for
more than hill of beans," The Bay City Times Via The Saginaw News,
December 16, 2007 ---
Click Here
When Kojo Quartey
went to college to learn accounting 25 years ago, many considered
the job a steady, unexciting career.
But financial
scandals in recent years at Enron, WorldCom and other companies have
transformed the field, says Quartey, dean of Davenport University's
Donald W. Maine School of Business.
''When I was an
accounting student, we were all number crunchers. In this day and
age, it's a much more exciting field,'' he said.
Many accountants
today are seeking specialized training to work as detectives who can
sniff out financial fraud. They call themselves forensic
accountants.
Davenport, a Grand
Rapids-based university with branches at 5300 Bay in Kochville
Township and at 3930 Traxler Court in Bay County's Monitor Township,
has two online offerings in the growing field. One is a new
bachelor's degree in business administration in accounting fraud
investigation and the other is a forensic accounting examiner
certificate available to postgraduates.
Forensic accountants
undergo training to mind the books while keeping an eye out for
crime.
Demand for
accountants who have such training is skyrocketing, Quartey told a
group of Bay and Arenac county high school counselors.
In addition to
traditional accounting, forensic accountants may learn from law
enforcement experts about how to detect fraud, and from
psychologists about how to interview people to detect lying, Quartey
said.
Irene Bembenista
teaches classes at Davenport required for the forensic examiner
certificate.
''It's not just how
to do an audit, but what are some of the clues that would indicate
something more is going on? And ideas about where to further
investigate,'' said Bembenista, Davenport's associate business
school dean.
Bembenista said 10
years ago, people did not generally recognize forensic accounting as
a college career path.
A federal law
enacted in 2002 to reform accounting has brought the investigation
field into its own. It's also created job opportunities because it
requires accountants at public entities to maintain a separation of
duties, Bembenista said.
''Accountants aren't
allowed to do double duties, like taxes and audit the company at the
same time,'' she said.
''And businesses are
very interested in accountants with a fraud (detection) background,
because they are looking out for the well-being of the
organization.''
The starting salary
for an accounting fraud investigator is $48,000 to $60,000 a year,
and certified forensic examiners can earn more than $100,000 a year,
Davenport says compensation studies indicate.
Davenport has
about two dozen students enrolled in the forensic accounting
certificate curriculum, Quartey said. The next term begins in
January, and more information is available on the Internet at
www.davenport.edu
Bob Jensen's threads on forensic
accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on accountancy
careers are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
Benford's Law --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benford%27s_law
Mathematical fraud detection, fraud mathematics, number theory
"I've Got Your Number How a mathematical phenomenon can help CPAs uncover fraud and other irregularities,"
Journal of Accountancy, May 1999, ---
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/1999/May/nigrini.htm
"The Effective Use of Benford's Law to Assist in Detecting Fraud in Accounting Data," by Cindy Durtchsi, William Hillison,
and Carl Pacini,
Journal of Forensic Accounting, Vol. 5, 2004, pp. 17-34
http://www.auditnet.org/articles/JFA-V-1-17-34.pdf
Benford's Law Excel Add-in
http://benford.softalizer.com/
Accounting Teachers About Cooking the
Books Get Caught ... er ... Cooking the Books
The media and blogs are conveniently
pinning the Huron debacle on its Andersen roots, and hinting that the
Enron malfeasance bled into Huron.
What I find ironic below is that the
Huron Consulting Group is itself a consulting group on technical
accounting matters, internal controls, financial statement restatements,
accounting fraud, rules compliance, and accounting education. If any
outfit should've known better it was Huron Consulting Group ---
http://www.huronconsultinggroup.com/about.aspx
Huron Consulting Group was formed in May
of 2003 in Chicago with a core set of 213 following the implosion of
huge Arthur Andersen headquartered in Chicago. The timing is much more
than mere coincidence since a lot of Andersen professionals were
floating about looking for a new home in Chicago. In the past I've used
the Huron Consulting Group published studies and statistics about
financial statement revisions of other companies. I never anticipated
that Huron Consulting itself would become one of those statistics. I
guess Huron will now have more war stories to tell clients.
The media and
blogs are conveniently pinning the Huron debacle on its Andersen roots,
and hinting that the Enron malfeasance bled into Huron.
Big Four Blog, August 5, 2009 ---
http://www.blogcatalog.com/blog/life-after-big-four-big-four-alumni-blog/eae8a159803847f6a73af93c063058f9
"Can hobbled Huron Consulting survive
this scandal?" by Steven R. Strahler, Chicago Business,
August 4, 2009 ---
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/cgi-bin/news.pl?id=35019&seenIt=1
An accounting mess
at Huron Consulting Group Inc. that led to the decapitation of top
management and the collapse in its share price puts the survival of
the Chicago-based firm in jeopardy.
Huron’s damaged
reputation imperils its ability to provide credible expert witnesses
during courtroom proceedings growing out of its bread-and-butter
restructuring and disputes and investigations practices. Rivals are
poised to capture marketshare.
“These types of
firms have to be squeaky clean with no exceptions, and this was too
big of an exception,” says Allan Koltin, a Chicago-based accounting
industry consultant. “I respect the changes they made and the speed
(with which) they made them. I’m not sure they can recover from
this.”
Huron executives
declined to comment.
Late Friday, Huron
said it would restate results for the three years ended in 2008 and
for the first quarter of 2009, resulting in a halving of its
profits, to $63 million from $120 million, for the 39-month period.
Revenue projections for 2009 were cut by more than 10%, to a range
of $650 million to $680 million from $730 million to $770 million.
The company said its
hand was forced by its recent discovery that holders of shares in
acquired firms had an agreement among themselves to reallocate a
portion of their earn-out payments to other Huron employees. The
company said it had been unaware of the arrangement.
“The employee
payments were not ‘kickbacks’ to Huron management,” the company
said.
Whatever the
description, the fallout promises to shake Huron to its core. The
company’s stock plunged 70% Monday to about $14 per share, and law
firms were preparing to mount class-action shareholder litigation.
“If the public
doesn’t buy that the house is clean, my guess is some of the senior
talent will start to move very quickly,” says William Brandt,
president and CEO of Chicago-based restructuring firm Development
Specialists Inc. “Client retention is all that matters here.”
Publicly traded
competitors like Navigant Consulting Inc. are unlikely to make bids
for Huron because of the potential for damage to their own stock.
Private enterprises like Mesirow Financial stand as logical
employers as Huron workers jump ship.
“There certainly is
potential out there for clients and employees who may be looking at
different options, but at this point in the process it’s a little
early to tell what impact this will have,” says a Navigant
spokesman.
Huron’s woes led to
the resignation last week of Chairman and CEO Gary Holdren and Chief
Financial Officer Gary Burge, both of whom will stay on with the
firm for a time, and the immediate departure of Chief Accounting
Officer Wayne Lipski.
Mr. Holdren, 59, has
a certain amount of familiarity with turmoil.
He was among
co-founders of Huron in 2002, when their previous employer,
Andersen, folded along with its auditing client Enron Corp. He told
the Chicago Tribune in 2007, “Initially, when we’d call on potential
clients, they’d say, ‘Huron? Who are you? That sounds like Enron,’
or ‘Aren’t you guys supposed to be in jail? Why are you calling us?’
”
This year, it’s been
money issues dogging Huron. In the spring, shareholders twice
rejected proposals to sweeten an employee stock compensation plan.
Mr. Holdren’s total
compensation in 2008 was $6.5 million, according to Securities and
Exchange Commission filings. Mr. Burge received $1.2 million.
A Huron unit in June
sued five former consultants and their new employer, Sonnenschein
Nath & Rosenthal LLP, alleging that the defendants were using trade
secrets to lure Huron clients to the law firm. The defendants denied
the charges. The case is pending in Cook County Circuit Court.
"3 executives at Huron Consulting
Group resign over accounting missteps Consulting firm announces it will
restate financial results for the past 3 fiscal years,"by Wailin
Wong, Chicago Tribune, August 1, 2009 ---
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2009/aug/01/business/chi-sat-huron-0801-aug01
Chief Executive Gary
Holdren and two other top executives are resigning from
Chicago-based management consultancy Huron Consulting Group as the
company announced Friday it is restating financial statements for
three fiscal years.
Holdren’s
resignation as CEO and chairman was effective Monday and he will
leave Huron at the end of August, the company said in a statement.
Chief Financial Officer Gary Burge is being replaced in that post
but will serve as treasurer and stay through the end of the year.
Chief Accounting Officer Wayne Lipski is also leaving the company.
None of the departing executives will be paid severance, Huron said.
Huron will restate
its financial results for 2006, 2007, 2008 and the first quarter of
2009. The accounting missteps relate to four businesses that Huron
acquired between 2005 and 2007.
According to Huron’s
statement and a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the selling shareholders of the acquired businesses distributed some
of their payments to Huron employees. They also redistributed
portions of their earnings “in amounts that were not consistent with
their ownership percentages” at the time of the acquisition, Huron
said.
A Huron spokeswoman
declined to give the number of shareholders and employees involved,
saying the company was not commenting beyond its statement.
“I am greatly
disappointed and saddened by the need to restate Huron’s earnings,”
Holdren said in the statement. He acknowledged “incorrect”
accounting.
Huron said the
restatement’s total estimated impact on net income and earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization for the
periods in question is $57 million.
“Because the issue
arose on my watch, I believe that it is my responsibility and my
obligation to step aside,” said Holdren.
Huron said the
board’s audit committee had recently learned of an agreement between
the selling shareholders to distribute some of their payments to a
company employee. The committee then launched an inquiry into all of
Huron’s prior acquisitions and discovered the involvement of more
Huron employees.
Huron said it is
reviewing its financial reporting procedures and expects to find
“one or more material weaknesses” in the company’s internal
controls. The amended financial statements will be filed “as soon as
practicable,” Huron said.
James Roth, one of
Huron’s founders, is replacing Holdren as CEO. Roth was previously
vice president of Huron’s health and education consulting business,
the company’s largest segment. George Massaro, Huron’s former chief
operating officer who is the board of directors’ vice chairman, will
succeed Holdren as chairman.
James Rojas, another
Huron founder, is now the company’s CFO. Rojas was serving in a
corporate development role. Huron did not announce a replacement for
Lipski, the chief accounting officer.
The company’s shares
sank more than 57 percent in after-hours trading. The stock had
closed Friday at $44.35. Huron said it expects second-quarter
revenues between $164 million and $166 million, up about 15 percent
from the year-earlier quarter.
The company,
founded by former partners at the Andersen accounting firm including
Holdren, also said that it is conducting a separate inquiry into
chargeable hours in response to an inquiry from the SEC.
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting
firm frauds are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm
Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
December 3, 2009 reply from
Francine McKenna
[retheauditors@GMAIL.COM]
I, of course, blame Huron mostly on PwC.
That's my schtick.
http://retheauditors.com/2009/08/10/pwc-and-huron-consulting-goodwill-too-good-to-be-true/
But a little
bit on the AA legacy.
http://retheauditors.com/2009/08/04/huron-consulting-go-on-take-the-money-and-run/
Francine
Jensen Comment
First, kudos to the Audit Committee (John McCartney, Dubose Ausley and
James Edwards) for unearthing this issue and pursuing it fearlessly to
its terrible end at Huron Consulting.
From The Wall Street Journal Weekly Accounting Review on August 6, 2009
Huron Takes Big Hit as Accounting Falls
Short
by Gregory Zuckerman
Aug 05, 2009
Click here to view the
full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Accounting
Changes and Error Corrections, Advanced Financial Accounting,
Mergers and Acquisitions
SUMMARY: Huron
Consulting Group, Inc., was formed in May 2002 by partners from the
now-defunct Arthur Andersen LLP. "Today, fewer than 10% of the
company's employees came directly from Arthur Andersen." The firm
provides "...financial and legal consulting services, including
forensic-style investigative work...." The firm announced
restatement of earnings for fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008 and
the first quarter of 2009 due to inappropriate accounting for
payments made to acquire four businesses between 2005 and 2007. The
payments were made after the acquisitions for earn-outs: additional
amounts of cash payments or stock issuances based on earning
specific financial performance targets over a number of years
following the business combinations. However, portions of these
earn-out payments were redistributed to employees remaining with
Huron after the acquisitions based on specific performance measures
by these employees rather than being based on their relative
ownership interests in the firms prior to acquisition by Huron.
Consequently, those payments are deemed to be compensation expense.
The amounts restated thus reduce net income for the periods of
restatement and reduce future income amounts, but do not affect cash
flows of the firm. Negative shareholder reaction to this
announcement by a firm which provides consulting services in this
area certainly is not surprising.
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Accounting
for allocation of a purchase price in a business combination is
covered in this article.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory)
In general, how do we account for assets acquired in business
combinations? How are cash payments and stock issued to selling
shareholders accounted for?
2. (Introductory)
What are contingent payments in a business combination? What are the
two main types of contingent payments and what are their accounting
implications?
3. (Introductory)
Which of the above 2 types of contingent payments were employed in
the Huron acquisition agreements for businesses it acquired over the
years 2005 to 2008?
4. (Advanced)
Obtain the SEC 8_k filing by Huron for the restatement announcement,
dated July 31, 2009, and the filing answering subsequent questions
and answers as posted on its web site, dated August 3, 2009
available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1289848/000119312509160844/d8k.htm
and
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1289848/000128984809000017/exh99-1.htm
respectively. What was the problem which made the original
acquisition accounting improper? What accounting standard
establishes requirements for handling corrections of errors such as
this? In your answer, explain why the company discloses that
investors must not rely on the previously released financial
statements.
5. (Advanced)
Refer specifically to the August 3, 2009, filing obtained above.
What were the ultimate journal entries made to correct these errors?
Explain the components of these entries.
6. (Advanced)
The author of this article writes that this error in reporting and
subsequently required restatement "...suggests [that] a closer
alliance between consulting and accounting isn't such a bad idea."
What is the SEC requirement that divides consulting and accounting?
Do you think this problem with reporting would have arisen had the
firm been allowed to perform both auditing, accounting, and
consulting services to its clients? Support your answer.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"Huron Takes Big Hit as Accounting Falls Short," by Gregory Zuckerman,
The Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2009 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124943146672806361.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
Financial downturns often expose accounting problems at companies,
but scandals have been noticeably absent in the recent turmoil. Not
so anymore.
Late Friday, Huron Consulting Group Inc. said it would restate the
last three years of financial results, withdraw its 2009 earnings
guidance and lower its outlook for 2009 revenue. The accounting
snafu, which has decimated the company's shares, was all the more
surprising because Huron traces its roots to Arthur Andersen LLP,
the accounting firm at the heart of the last wave of scandals.
A dose of added irony is that Huron makes its money providing
financial and legal consulting services, including forensic-style
investigative work, and tries to help clients avoid these types of
mistakes.
"One of their businesses is forensic accounting -- they're experts
in this," says Sean Jackson, an analyst at Avondale Partners in
Nashville, Tenn., who dropped his rating to the equivalent of "hold"
from "buy." "Investors are saying, 'These guys had to know what
happened with the accounting, or they should have known.'"
Investors fear the accounting issues, which will reduce net income
by $57 million for the periods in question, might damage the firm's
credibility. Huron's shares fell 70% on Monday, well below the price
of its initial public offering in 2004. On Tuesday, Huron shares
rose four cents to $13.73.
Huron, based in Chicago, was started in May 2002 by refugees from
Arthur Andersen who fled the firm after it was indicted for its role
in the collapse of Enron Corp. At the time, the group said that it
would specialize in bankruptcy and litigation work, as well as
education and health-care consulting, and that it would work with
more than 70 former clients of Arthur Andersen. Arthur Andersen's
guilty verdict was later overturned, but it was too late to save the
firm, which was dismantled. Today, fewer than 10% of the company's
employees came directly from Andersen, according to a Huron
spokeswoman.
Huron on Friday also announced preliminary second-quarter revenue
that was shy of analyst expectations, along with the resignation of
Gary Holdren, its board chairman and chief executive, along with the
resignations of finance chief Gary Burge and chief accounting
officer Wayne Lipski. "No severance expenses are expected to be
incurred by the company as a result of these management changes,"
Huron's regulatory filing said.
After its founding by 25 Andersen partners and more than 200
employees, Huron grew rapidly. It soon had 600 employees and counted
firms like Pfizer, International Business Machines and General
Motors as clients. Growing scrutiny of accounting firms that also
did consulting made Huron's consulting-only business look promising,
and shares soared from below $20 five years ago to nearly $44 before
the news on Friday.
That is when Huron dropped its bombshell -- one that suggests a
closer alliance between consulting and accounting isn't always such
a bad idea. Huron is restating financial statements to correct how
it accounted for certain acquisition-related payments to employees
of four businesses that Huron purchased since 2005.
Huron said the employees shared "earn-outs," or financial rewards
based on the performance of acquired units after the transaction was
completed, with junior employees at the units who weren't involved
in the original sale. They also distributed some of the proceeds
based on performance of employees who remained at Huron, not based
on the ownership interests of those employees in the businesses that
were sold.
The payments were legal. The problem was how Huron accounted for
these payouts. The compensation should have been booked as a noncash
operating expense of the company. Huron said the payments "were not
kickbacks" to Huron management, but rather went to employees of the
acquired businesses.
The method the company used to book the payments served to increase
its profit. The adjustments reduced the company's net income,
earnings per share and other measures, though it didn't affect its
cash flow, assets or liabilities.
Part of investors' concern is that they aren't entirely sure what
happened at Huron. The company's executives aren't speaking with
analysts, some said on Tuesday.
Employees and big producers now might bolt from Huron, Avondale
Partners' Mr. Jackson says.
"It's still unclear what happened, but it's almost irrelevant at
this point," says Tim McHugh, an analyst at William Blair & Co., who
has the equivalent of a "hold" on the stock, down from a "buy" last
week. "The company's brand has been impaired and turnover of key
employees is a significant risk."
"Shocking Accounting Scandal at Huron Consulting Group," The Big
Four Blog, August 5, 2009 ---
http://bigfouralumni.blogspot.com/2009/08/shocking-accounting-scandal-at-huron.html
First, kudos to the Audit Committee (John McCartney, Dubose Ausley
and James Edwards) for unearthing this issue and pursuing it
fearlessly to its terrible end.
Second, shame on senior management to succumb to greed and not
complying strictly with accounting standards
Third, shame also on the auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers for failing
to spot this issue, especially in 2008, when the amount of money
kept in goodwill was $31 million, three times the true net income of
Huron of only $10 million
Fourth, shame on Huron itself for providing accounting, internal
audit, internal controls, Sarbanes, and similar advice to its
corporate clients, while following shady accounting practices.
Physician, heal thyself first.
Finally, our sympathies for all the hard working and honest Huron
consultants who had nothing to do with acquisitions or their
accounting, and are likely as mad as anyone that this could happen
to them.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on earnings management and creative accounting are
at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#Manipulation
Bob Jensen's threads on audit professionalism ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001c.htm
Andersen Partners in the Aftermath of Enron:
Protiviti and Huron in Particular
Some Andersen partners stayed on at the Andersen firm (that is no longer an
auditing firm) and some continued to make their living at Andersen's training
facility in St. Charles, Illinois. In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned
Andersen's conviction for obstruction of justice ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_Andersen_LLP_v._United_States
The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the conviction of the Arthur Andersen
accounting firm for destroying documents related to its Enron account before the
energy giant's collapse. The ruling is not based upon guilt or innocence. It is
based only on a technicality in the judge's instructions to the jury. The ruling
will not lead to a revival of this once great firm that in the years preceding
its collapse became known for some terrible audits of firms like Waste
Management, Enron, Worldcom and other clients. For details see
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4596949.stm
Also see
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x48441.xml
Former Andersen partners who formed two consulting firms are not fairing
so well at the moment. But the things at Protivii are a bit more rosy than
things at Huron.
First there's the huge book cooking (creative accounting) scandal at Huron
Consulting that has now sucked in PwC as well ---
Huron Consulting Group was formed in May of 2003 in Chicago with a core
set of 213 following the implosion of huge Arthur Andersen headquartered in
Chicago. The timing is much more than mere coincidence since a lot of Andersen
professionals were floating about looking for a new home in Chicago. In the past
I've used the Huron Consulting Group published studies and statistics about
financial statement revisions of other companies. I never anticipated that Huron
Consulting itself would become one of those statistics. I guess Huron will now
have more war stories to tell clients.
See the module above.
Protiviti was formed largely of Andersen's former internal auditing
consultants and has a history outlined below.
"Protiviti Responds to Tough Financial Crisis, Now More Bullish," The
Big Four Blog, February 8, 2010 ---
http://www.bigfouralumni.blogspot.com/
Protiviti, as many will recall, was principally
Andersen’s internal audit service line, and these professionals joined the
multi-billion dollar organization Robert Half International ($RHI) in 2002
to form their own division, separate from the staffing units for which RHI
is better known for – Accountemps, Office Team and Management Resources.
Starting with just over 700 employees in 25 locations, Protiviti has
certainly grown in size and scope, and now is a global business consulting
and internal audit firm providing risk, advisory, and transaction services;
with 2,500 professionals in 62 locations in 17 countries worldwide. The
Protiviti division accounts for 13% of total parent company RHI revenues;
and within Protiviti itself, international operations were 30% of total
Protiviti revenues.
All the senior management at Protiviti continue to be Andersen alumni:
Joseph A. Tarantino, President and Chief Executive
Officer, ex-head of Arthur Andersen’s Financial Services Assurance practice
for metropolitan New York
Carol M. Beaumier, Executive Vice President, Global Industry Programs,
ex-partner in Arthur Andersen’s Regulatory Risk Services practice
Robert B. Hirth Jr., Executive Vice President, Global Internal Audit,
ex-partner with Arthur Andersen
James Pajakowski, Executive Vice President, Global Risk Solutions,
ex-partner with Arthur Andersen
Gary Peterson, Executive Vice President, International Operations,
ex-partner at Arthur Andersen
We haven’t focused on Protiviti for the longest
time, but our attention was brought back after seeing RHI’s full year 2009
results. We were quite surprised to see that despite its size, Protiviti had
a full year 2009 loss. Yes, a loss of $30 million for the entire year on
revenues of $384 million.
To dig deeper into this situation, we had to go
back all the way to 2007, analyze a whole series of quarterly earnings and
read through multiple earnings transcripts (courtesy: SeekingAlpha.com).
An interesting picture emerges from our analysis,
vividly demonstrating the intensity and rapidity of the global slowdown, and
consequent management efforts to cope with business shrinkage.
In 2007, Protiviti had revenues of $552 million,
gross margin of $175 million (32% of revenues), and operating income of $21
million (4% of revenues). In 2008, revenues held reasonably flat at $547
million, but gross margin had decreased by $20 million to $155 million (28%
of revenues), and operating income fell by $14 million, a full 66% to $7
million (1% of revenues). In 2009, the situation had rapidly deteriorated,
with revenues falling 30% to $384 million, gross margin plunging by $75
million to $80 million (21% of revenues), and operating income declining
precipitously by $38 million to a net loss figure of $(31) million (negative
8% of revenues). In a matter of just 24 months, Protiviti’s top line had
eroded by 30% and its operations had gone from a healthy profit to a huge
loss.
A deeper look at the quarterly earnings for two
full years, 2008 and 2009, reveals the full extent of the situation.
In 2007, Protiviti had good operating results, with
3,300 employees, up a whopping 16% from 2006, as management hired talent in
sync with increased demand for its services.
From Q1-2008 to Q3-2008, in the first three
quarters of 2008, revenues continued at the 2007 quarterly run-rate of about
$140 million, but total costs, principally direct compensation costs from
all the increased staff levels were up 4%, increasing from 68% of revenues
in 2007 to 72% of revenues in the first three quarters of 2008. Things were
still on a decent footing at that time, operating income was a few million
dollars profit on the average each quarter, not at 2007 levels, but
certainly not at losses either. The expected increase in 2008 revenues had
not been seen, and the increased cost line continued to pressure Protiviti’s
profits. A review of the Q3-2008 quarterly earnings call shows that
management was cautiously optimistic about Protiviti’s performance and
prospects, and there were initial efforts to bring costs in line with flat
revenues. Given that RHI had not ever managed Protiviti through a downturn,
senior management could not provide decent guidance on revenues for the
upcoming fourth quarter.
Then, with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008, the financial crisis became really severe in Q4-2008.
In Q4-2008, Protiviti’s revenues fell to $125
million, $15 million below the run rate seen in the last three quarters, but
Protiviti had already started moving to reducing its cost base. Both direct
costs and SG&A costs were quickly reined in, and the cost base in Q4-2008
was reduced by $12 million in comparison to Q3-2008, to almost offset the
$15 million loss in revenue. Overall, operating income for Q4-2008 decreased
to $1 million from $4 million in Q3-2009.
At the end of 2008, Protiviti had seen flat
revenues to 2007, but a sharp drop in profits. The firm had 3,200 employees,
100 lower than the 3,300 at the end of 2007, through some initial layoffs.
Its likely no-one imagined how 2009 would turn out.
In Q1-2009, Protiviti’s revenue fell to $100
million, $25 million below Q4-2008 (some of this was attributed to
seasonally slow first quarters), but this is when Protiviti really started
to manage its employee base. It took an $8 million extraordinary charge in
the quarter for severance costs, with an intent to manage its employee
compensation costs in line with falling revenues. There was also a
contemporaneous reduction in SG&A, but the quarter still ended with a $11
million operating loss, as total costs in the quarter could not come down
far enough with the rapid decline in revenue.
In Q2-2009, quarterly revenues had fallen another
$10 million to $90 million, however, the cost base also fell by $10 million
from the previous quarter and the operating loss position of $11 million
held steady from the prior quarter. Protiviti took an additional $2 million
employee severance restructuring charge in the quarter. By this time,
management had recognized the severity of the issue and were taking active
steps to manage costs in line with declining revenues. Management said that
US operations had better profitability than international operations, which
were being scrutinized in detail. Also, the division was taking steps to
diversify away purely from Internal Audit and Sarbox type work into IT audit
and co-sourcing to create a larger set of non-correlated service lines.
By Q3-2009, the positive cost impact of the
reductions in staff were showing on the bottom line. Q3-2009 revenues were
$96 million, a good $6 million better than the $90 million in Q2-2009 in
terms of revenue, with the third quarter being sequentially generally better
than the second quarter. Costs in Q3-2009 were also $7 million better than
Q2-2009, with the net result that operating profit increased by $12 million
from Q2-2009 to Q3-2009. Q3-2009 turned in a small operating income of $1
million. Q3-2009 gross margin% matched what were historical levels in the
first half of 2008.
In Q4-2009, the operating situation was quite
similar to Q3-2009, as revenues and costs generally held steady and flat.
Revenue was $96 million, staff utilization improved and operating income was
essentially zero.
Protiviti ended 2009 with $384 million in revenue,
30% lower than 2008, and with an operating loss of $21 million (net of
restructuring charges) compared with $7 million of operating profit in 2008.
The big change in 2009 was the employee base, the year ended with 2,500
employees, 700 employees lower than the end of the previous year. This was a
gut-wrenching 22% reduction in staff, in that 1 out of every 5 professionals
with Protiviti who was working at the end of 2008 was no longer at the firm
in 2009.
As we turn into 2010, management appears much more
bullish about Protiviti’s 2010 prospects and indicated generally that the
division will aim to generate positive operating profit for this year. The
problem seems to lie in Protiviti’s operations outside the US, which are
offsetting a higher level of US profitability, and there seems to be serious
effort to turn that around. It indicates that operating costs levels have
now been sized to a $400 million revenue business; and anecdotal evidence at
Protiviti consultants indicates there is growing confidence that there will
higher levels of business in this year.
Anyone who has passed through this crisis will
recall with clarity how difficult the last quarter of 2008 and the first
half of 2009 really was. This is a case study on Protiviti, but likely
representative of all consulting and accounting firms, who faced and
continue to face a crisis unprecedented in modern times. The decline in
Protiviti (a Big 4 firm spin off) is in line with the decreases in Advisory
service lines at the Big Four firms, however the magnitude of the fall is
much higher at Protiviti, much to its smaller size and smaller footprint in
higher-growth emerging countries of the world.
While we have been able only to tell the story from
the public financials, we do recognize there is a deep human cost, in terms
of lost jobs, continued unemployment, potentially poor morale, and tough
disengagement and working conditions. We invite Protiviti alumni to join the
Big4 LinkedIn group, which has a robust discussion and job board to extend
their network and keep abreast of developments. And if any of our readers
have first-hand or deeper knowledge of this situation, we welcome your
comments.
February 9, 2010 reply from Francine McKenna
[retheauditors@GMAIL.COM]
Another Andersen legacy
partners firm is FRA. it consists of only 6 or so partners
who do SEC/GAAP/IFRS consulting, no audit. Scott Taub of SEC
fame is part of the team, based in Chicago.
http://www.finra.com/scott.html
An interview I did with
Scott Taub at the Compliance Week Annual Conference in June
2009 is a big portion of this piece for Accountancy Magazine
in the UK.
http://retheauditors.com/2009/07/07/mckenna-in-accountancy-magazine/
fm
"Predicting Material
Accounting Misstatements"
Patricia M. Dechow University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of
Business
Weili Ge University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business
Chad R. Larson Washington University, St. Louis
Richard G. Sloan Haas School of Business, UC Berkeley
SSRN, November 16, 2009
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=997483
Abstract:
We examine 2,190 SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs)
issued between 1982 and 2005. We obtain 676 firms that are alleged
to have misstated their quarterly or annual financial statements. We
examine the characteristics of misstating firms along five
dimensions: accrual quality; financial performance; non-financial
measures; off-balance sheet activities; and market-based measures.
We compare misstating firms to themselves during non-misstatement
years and misstating firms to the broader population of all publicly
listed firms. The results reveal that during misstatement years,
accruals and cash and credit sales are unusually high, while return
on assets and the number of employees are declining. In addition,
misstating firms finance more of their assets through operating
leases and have relatively less PP&E. We find that market pressures
appear to affect incentives to misstate. Misstating firms are
raising new financing, have higher market-to-book ratios, and strong
prior stock price performance. We develop a model to predict
accounting misstatements. The output of this model is a scaled
logistic probability that we term the F-Score, where values greater
than one suggest a greater likelihood of a misstatement.
Bob Jensen's threads on
Quality of Earnings, Restatements, and Core Earnings are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#CoreEarnings
Accounting Teachers About
Cooking the Books Get Caught ... er ... Cooking the Books
The media and blogs are conveniently
pinning the Huron debacle on its Andersen roots, and hinting that the
Enron malfeasance bled into Huron.
What I find ironic below is
that the Huron Consulting Group is itself a consulting group on
technical accounting matters, internal controls, financial statement
restatements, accounting fraud, rules compliance, and accounting
education. If any outfit should've known better it was Huron Consulting
Group ---
http://www.huronconsultinggroup.com/about.aspx
Huron Consulting Group was
formed in May of 2003 in Chicago with a core set of 213 following the
implosion of huge Arthur Andersen headquartered in Chicago. The timing
is much more than mere coincidence since a lot of Andersen professionals
were floating about looking for a new home in Chicago. In the past I've
used the Huron Consulting Group published studies and statistics about
financial statement revisions of other companies. I never anticipated
that Huron Consulting itself would become one of those statistics. I
guess Huron will now have more war stories to tell clients.
The
media and blogs are conveniently pinning the Huron debacle on its
Andersen roots, and hinting that the Enron malfeasance bled into Huron.
Big Four Blog, August 5, 2009 ---
http://www.blogcatalog.com/blog/life-after-big-four-big-four-alumni-blog/eae8a159803847f6a73af93c063058f9
"Can hobbled Huron
Consulting survive this scandal?" by Steven R. Strahler, Chicago
Business, August 4, 2009 ---
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/cgi-bin/news.pl?id=35019&seenIt=1
An
accounting mess at Huron Consulting Group Inc. that led to the
decapitation of top management and the collapse in its share price
puts the survival of the Chicago-based firm in jeopardy.
Huron’s
damaged reputation imperils its ability to provide credible expert
witnesses during courtroom proceedings growing out of its
bread-and-butter restructuring and disputes and investigations
practices. Rivals are poised to capture marketshare.
“These
types of firms have to be squeaky clean with no exceptions, and this
was too big of an exception,” says Allan Koltin, a Chicago-based
accounting industry consultant. “I respect the changes they made and
the speed (with which) they made them. I’m not sure they can recover
from this.”
Huron
executives declined to comment.
Late
Friday, Huron said it would restate results for the three years
ended in 2008 and for the first quarter of 2009, resulting in a
halving of its profits, to $63 million from $120 million, for the
39-month period. Revenue projections for 2009 were cut by more than
10%, to a range of $650 million to $680 million from $730 million to
$770 million.
The company
said its hand was forced by its recent discovery that holders of
shares in acquired firms had an agreement among themselves to
reallocate a portion of their earn-out payments to other Huron
employees. The company said it had been unaware of the arrangement.
“The
employee payments were not ‘kickbacks’ to Huron management,” the
company said.
Whatever
the description, the fallout promises to shake Huron to its core.
The company’s stock plunged 70% Monday to about $14 per share, and
law firms were preparing to mount class-action shareholder
litigation.
“If the
public doesn’t buy that the house is clean, my guess is some of the
senior talent will start to move very quickly,” says William Brandt,
president and CEO of Chicago-based restructuring firm Development
Specialists Inc. “Client retention is all that matters here.”
Publicly
traded competitors like Navigant Consulting Inc. are unlikely to
make bids for Huron because of the potential for damage to their own
stock. Private enterprises like Mesirow Financial stand as logical
employers as Huron workers jump ship.
“There
certainly is potential out there for clients and employees who may
be looking at different options, but at this point in the process
it’s a little early to tell what impact this will have,” says a
Navigant spokesman.
Huron’s
woes led to the resignation last week of Chairman and CEO Gary
Holdren and Chief Financial Officer Gary Burge, both of whom will
stay on with the firm for a time, and the immediate departure of
Chief Accounting Officer Wayne Lipski.
Mr. Holdren,
59, has a certain amount of familiarity with turmoil.
He was
among co-founders of Huron in 2002, when their previous employer,
Andersen, folded along with its auditing client Enron Corp. He told
the Chicago Tribune in 2007, “Initially, when we’d call on potential
clients, they’d say, ‘Huron? Who are you? That sounds like Enron,’
or ‘Aren’t you guys supposed to be in jail? Why are you calling us?’
”
This year,
it’s been money issues dogging Huron. In the spring, shareholders
twice rejected proposals to sweeten an employee stock compensation
plan.
Mr.
Holdren’s total compensation in 2008 was $6.5 million, according to
Securities and Exchange Commission filings. Mr. Burge received $1.2
million.
A Huron
unit in June sued five former consultants and their new employer,
Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, alleging that the defendants were
using trade secrets to lure Huron clients to the law firm. The
defendants denied the charges. The case is pending in Cook County
Circuit Court.
"3 executives at Huron
Consulting Group resign over accounting missteps Consulting firm
announces it will restate financial results for the past 3 fiscal years,"by
Wailin Wong, Chicago Tribune, August 1, 2009 ---
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2009/aug/01/business/chi-sat-huron-0801-aug01
Chief
Executive Gary Holdren and two other top executives are resigning
from Chicago-based management consultancy Huron Consulting Group as
the company announced Friday it is restating financial statements
for three fiscal years.
Holdren’s
resignation as CEO and chairman was effective Monday and he will
leave Huron at the end of August, the company said in a statement.
Chief Financial Officer Gary Burge is being replaced in that post
but will serve as treasurer and stay through the end of the year.
Chief Accounting Officer Wayne Lipski is also leaving the company.
None of the departing executives will be paid severance, Huron said.
Huron will
restate its financial results for 2006, 2007, 2008 and the first
quarter of 2009. The accounting missteps relate to four businesses
that Huron acquired between 2005 and 2007.
According
to Huron’s statement and a filing with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the selling shareholders of the acquired businesses
distributed some of their payments to Huron employees. They also
redistributed portions of their earnings “in amounts that were not
consistent with their ownership percentages” at the time of the
acquisition, Huron said.
A Huron
spokeswoman declined to give the number of shareholders and
employees involved, saying the company was not commenting beyond its
statement.
“I am
greatly disappointed and saddened by the need to restate Huron’s
earnings,” Holdren said in the statement. He acknowledged
“incorrect” accounting.
Huron said
the restatement’s total estimated impact on net income and earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization for the
periods in question is $57 million.
“Because
the issue arose on my watch, I believe that it is my responsibility
and my obligation to step aside,” said Holdren.
Huron said
the board’s audit committee had recently learned of an agreement
between the selling shareholders to distribute some of their
payments to a company employee. The committee then launched an
inquiry into all of Huron’s prior acquisitions and discovered the
involvement of more Huron employees.
Huron said
it is reviewing its financial reporting procedures and expects to
find “one or more material weaknesses” in the company’s internal
controls. The amended financial statements will be filed “as soon as
practicable,” Huron said.
James Roth,
one of Huron’s founders, is replacing Holdren as CEO. Roth was
previously vice president of Huron’s health and education consulting
business, the company’s largest segment. George Massaro, Huron’s
former chief operating officer who is the board of directors’ vice
chairman, will succeed Holdren as chairman.
James
Rojas, another Huron founder, is now the company’s CFO. Rojas was
serving in a corporate development role. Huron did not announce a
replacement for Lipski, the chief accounting officer.
The
company’s shares sank more than 57 percent in after-hours trading.
The stock had closed Friday at $44.35. Huron said it expects
second-quarter revenues between $164 million and $166 million, up
about 15 percent from the year-earlier quarter.
The
company, founded by former partners at the Andersen accounting firm
including Holdren, also said that it is conducting a separate
inquiry into chargeable hours in response to an inquiry from the
SEC.
Bob Jensen's threads on
accounting firm frauds are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm
Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates
are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Cooking the Books
Before reading
this, you may want to read about creative
accounting and earnings management at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earnings_management
From Jim Mahar's
blog on November 5, 2007 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
Does
short-term debt lead to more "earnings
management"?
In another paper from the
FMAs,
Gupta and Fields
look at whether more short
term debt leads to more "earnings management."
Does short-term debt lead to more "earnings
management"?
Short answer: YES.
Longer answer:
Intuitively the idea behind the paper is that if
a firm has to go back to the capital markets,
they do not want to do so when times are bad. Of
course, sometimes times are bad. In those times,
management may be tempted to "manage" earnings
so that things do not appear as bad as they may
be.
The findings? Sure enough, managers seemingly
manage their firm's earnings more when the firm
has more short term debt.
A few look-ins:
From the Abstract (this is the best summary of
the entire paper):
"...results indicate that (i) firms with
more current debt are more susceptible to
managing earnings, (ii) this relation is
stronger for firms facing debt market
constraints (those without investment grade
debt) and (iii) auditor characteristics such
as auditor quality and tenure help diminish
this relation...."
Which fits intuition. Why?
* The more the constraints, the more incentive
the management has to manage earnings since if
they do not, they may not be able to refinance.
* Auditors would frown upon this behavior and
the stronger the auditor, the less likely it is
that the manager would manage earnings.
How does this "earnings management" manifest
itself? The most common way (although not the
only way) that managers manipulate earnings is
through the use of accruals . Thus, the authors
examine this and find:
"A one standard-deviation increase in
short-term debt (total current liabilities)
increases discretionary accruals by 1.69%
and increase total accruals by 2.28%. Our
evidence supports the idea that debt
maturity significantly impacts the tendency
of firms to manage earnings."
Which is a really interesting finding!
Sharing Site of Note --- http://www.dartmouth.edu/~msimmons/
Thank you Mark Simmons at Dartmouth for sharing internal
auditing and fraud investigation resources.
|
This site focuses on topics that deal
with Internal
Auditing and Fraud
Investigation with certain links
to other associated and relevant sources. It is dedicated to
sharing information.
Internal
Auditing
is an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity
designed to add value and improve an organization's
operations. It helps an organization accomplish its
objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to
evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management,
control, and governance processes. (Institute of
Internal Auditors)
Fraud
Investigation
consists of the multitude of steps necessary to resolve
allegations of fraud — interviewing witnesses, assembling
evidence, writing reports, and dealing with prosecutors and
the courts. (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners)
|
Bob Jensen's threads on fraud are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on fraud detection and reporting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm
"Rash of Restatements Rattles," by K.C. Swanson, TheStreet.com,
March 17, 2004
http://www.thestreet.com/tech/kcswanson/10149112.html
Confession season is upon us, but the problem
so far isn't companies owing up to earnings shortfalls. Instead, they're
admitting past financial results were simply wrong.
Unnerved by a sterner accounting culture,
companies have been increasingly reaching back years to ratchet down
reported profits by tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars. Eyeing
the March 15 filing deadline for calendar 2003 annual reports,
Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMY:NYSE) , P.F. Chang's (PFCB:Nasdaq)
, Veritas (VRTS:Nasdaq) and Nortel (NT :Nasdaq) this week
joined a fast-growing string of public companies to say prior financial
reports inflated real business trends.
The number of restated audited annual financial
statements hit a record high of 206 last year, according to
Chicago-based Huron Consulting Group. Observers say 2004 is already
shaping up as a banner year for revisions.
"There are certainly more high-profile
restatements and you're hearing about them more" compared to past years,
said Jeff Brotman, an accounting professor at the University of
Pennsylvania.
For Bristol-Myers Squibb, Nortel and Network
Associates (NET:NYSE) , recent restatements came on top of prior
restatements, much to the irritation of investors. In at least two
cases, the embarrassing double restatements prompted internal shifts;
Nortel put two of its financial executives on leave as part of a
bookkeeping probe. Network Associates fired PricewaterhouseCoopers,
according to various news reports, after the auditor cited "material
weakness" in its internal controls in the company's annual report.
Probably the biggest reason for the wave of
honesty is a host of new corporate governance and accounting rules in
the wake of the corporate reform legislation known as Sarbanes-Oxley,
which went into effect a year and a half ago. Also, accounting firms
have grown far more cautious, cowed by the collapse of auditor Arthur
Andersen in 2002 after massive fraud at its client Enron.
The upshot is that both managers and auditors
are now more likely to err on the side of conservative accounting.
"A lot of things in accounting are judgment
calls, gray areas," said Peter Ehrenberg, chair of the corporate finance
practice group at Lowenstein & Sandler, a Roseland, N.J.-based law firm.
"If there are issues in any given company and we were in 2000, a person
acting in good faith might easily say, 'We can pass on that.' But that
same person looking at the same facts today might say, 'There's too much
risk.'
"Certainly regulators in general are more
credible because they're much less likely to give the benefit of the
doubt in this environment," he added. "The auditors know that and
they're [therefore] less likely to stick their necks out."
Case in point: Last week Gateway (GTW:NYSE)
said longtime auditor PricewaterhouseCoopers won't work for it anymore.
PwC did the books back in 2000 and 2001 -- an era of aggressive
accounting that still haunts Gateway, though it's now under different
management.
From Executive Suite to Cell Block
Tougher law enforcement against corporate
offenders is also fueling more prudent behavior. The long-underfunded
Securities and Exchange Commission, which is now required to review
the financial statements of public companies every three years, has
finally been given more dollars to hire staff. In 2003, the SEC's
workforce was 11% higher than in 2001. This year, the agency's budget
allocation should allow it to expand its payroll an additional 9%, to
nearly 3,600 employees.
On the corporate side, CEOs and CFOs have had
to certify their financial reports since August 2002, also as a result
of Sarbanes-Oxley. "I think Sarbanes-Oxley makes executives ask the hard
questions they should have always asked," said Jeffrey Herrmann, a
securities litigator and partner in the Saddle Brook, N.J.-based law
firm of Cohn Lifland Pearlman Herrmann & Knopf. "Maybe today an
executive says to his accounting firm: 'I'm not going to regret anything
here about how we handled goodwill or reserves, am I? It isn't coming
back to haunt us, is it?' "
Recent government prosecutions against
high-level executives such as Tyco's Dennis Kozlowski,
Worldcom's Bernie Ebbers, and Enron's Andrew Fastow and Jeffrey
Skilling starkly underscore the penalties managers may face for playing
fast-and-loose with accounting.
Meanwhile, auditing firms are starting to
rotate staff, bringing in newcomers to take a fresh look at clients'
accounting. Also, new rules handed down by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board have prompted reassessments of past accounting methods,
which can lead to earnings revisions reaching back five years (the
period for which financial data is included in annual reports).
Another level of checks and balances on
accounting shenanigans arrived last April when the SEC ruled that
corporate audit committees must be composed entirely of members
independent from the company itself. "Audit committees are getting more
active and making sure that when they learn of problems, they're going
to be dealt with," said Curtis Verschoor, an accounting professor at
DePaul University.
In this environment of heightened scrutiny,
however, the notion that a restatement was tantamount to a financial
kiss of death has faded, too.
"We have now seen companies that issued
restatements that have lived to do business another day," said Brotman.
"The stock hasn't crashed; nobody's been fired or gone to jail; they
haven't lost access to the capital markets; there haven't been any more
shareholder lawsuits than there would have already been. If a company
does a restatement early, fully and explains exactly what it is and why,
it's not a lethal injection."
Meanwhile, corporate reform rules are being put
in place that could lead to yet more accounting cleanups down the road.
One provision will make companies find a way for whistleblowers to
confidentially report possible wrongdoings, noted Verschoor.
Still, "the pendulum swings both ways," said
Herrmann. "If the government continues to prosecute people in high-level
positions, maybe that will last for a while. It probably will send a
message and the fear of God will spread. But my guess is that politics
being what it is, somewhere down the line the spotlight will be off and
there will be fewer prosecutions."
A Round-Up of Recent Earnings Restatements
Some firms are no stranger to the restatement
dance |
Company |
Financial Scoop |
Number of restatements in past
year |
Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMY:NYSE) |
Restating fourth-quarter and full-year results for
2003 due to accounting errors. Follows an earlier restatement of
earnings between 1999 and 2002, as of early 2003 |
Twice |
P.F. Chang's China Bistro (PFCB:Nasdaq) |
Will delay filing its 10K; plans to restate
earnings for prior years, including for calendar year 2003 |
Once |
Veritas (VRTS:Nasdaq) |
Will restate earnings for 2001 through 2003 |
Once |
Nortel (NT:NYSE) |
Will restate earnings for 2003 and earlier periods;
Nortel already restated earnings for the past three years in October
2003 |
Twice |
Metris (MXT:NYSE) |
Restated its financial results for 1998 through
2002 and for the first three quarters of 2003 following an SEC
inquiry |
Once |
Quovadx (QVDX:Nasdaq) |
Restating results for 2003 |
Once |
WorldCom |
Restated pretax profits from 2000 and 2001; this
month former CEO Bernie Ebbers indicted on fraud charges in
accounting scandal that led to 2002 corporate bankruptcy |
Once |
Service Corp. International (SRV:NYSE) |
Restating results for 2000 through 2003 |
Once |
Flowserve (FLS:NYSE) |
Restating results for 1999 through 2003 |
Once |
OM Group (OMG:NYSE) |
Restating results for 1999 through 2003 |
Once |
IDX Systems (IDXC:Nasdaq) |
Restated results for 2003 |
Once |
Network Associates (NET:NYSE) |
Restated results for 2003 this month; restated
earnings for periods from 1998 to 2003 after investigations by the
SEC and Justice Department |
Twice |
Take-Two (TTWO:Nasdaq) |
In February, restated results from 1999 to 2003
following investigation by the SEC |
Once |
Sipex (SIPX:Nasdaq) |
In February, restated results from 2003, marking
the second revision of third-quarter '03 results |
Twice |
Source:
SEC filings, media reports. |
March 1, 2004 message from Mike
Groomer
Bob,
Do you have any
idea about who coined the phrase “Cooking the Books? What is the lineage
of these magic words?
Mike
Hi Mike,
The phrase "cooking the books"
appears to have a long history. Several friends on the AECM found some
interesting facts and legends.
However, there may be a little
urban legend in some of this.
I suspect that the phrase may
have origins that will never be determined much like double entry
bookkeeping itself with unknown origins. And I'm not sure were the term
"books" first appeared although I suspect it goes back to when ledgers
were bound into "books."
Bob Jensen
March 1 messages from David
Albrecht
[albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]
-----Original
Message-----
From: David Albrecht
Sent: Monday, March 01, 2004 9:56 PM
Subject: Acct 321: Cooking the books
The phrase
"Cooking the Books" has been part of our linguistic heritage for over
two hundred years. Here is a discussion of the origination of the
phrase. Enjoy! Dr. Albrecht
http://www.wordwizard.com/clubhouse/founddiscuss1.asp?Num=3093
Just found another page.
from
http://www.wordwizard.com/clubhouse/founddiscuss1.asp?Num=3093
I'm doing a google search.
Interesting links so far:
Cost to society of cooking the
books - from Brookings Institute
http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb106.htm
Cookie jar accounting -
http://www.investorwords.com/1121/cookie_jar_accounting.html
The bubbling corporate ethics
scandal and recipes for avoiding future stews. -
http://research.moore.sc.edu/Publications/B&EReview/B&E49/Be49_3/cooking.htm
Andersen cartoon -
http://www.claybennett.com/pages/andersen.html
Cooking the Books with Mike -
http://www.moneytalks.net/book.asp
Cartoons -
http://www.cartoonstock.com/directory/c/cooking_the_books.asp
Cooking the books, an old
recipe -
http://www.accountantsworld.com/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabid=2&faid=290
--> "No one knows for sure when all the ingredients in the phrase
'cooking the books' were first put together. Shakespeare was the first
to refer to "books" as a business ledger (King Lear, Act III, Scene iv,
"Keep...thy pen from lenders books"). The American Heritage Dictionary
of Idioms cites 1636 as the first time the word 'cook' was used to mean
falsify (but it didn't also include the word 'books'). Combining 'cook'
and 'books' may be a 20th century innovation. Even the origin of
"cooking the books" is controversial.
This is all I have time to
search,
David Albrecht
March 1, 2004 reply from Roy
Regel [Roy.Regel@BUSINESS.UMT.EDU]
A related term
is "cookbooking," as used in Gleim's 'Careers in Accounting: How to
Study for Success.' Per Gleim ". . .cookbooking is copying from the
chapter illustration, step-by-step. Barely more than rote memorization
is required to achieve false success. Do not cookbook!"
Isn't English
wonderful? :)
Roy Regel
March 1, 2004 reply from Richard
C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
According to
http://www.businessballs.com/clichesorigins.htm , the phrase dates
back to the 18th century, to an (unattributed) report that used the
phrase "the books have been cooked." The report dealt with the conduct
of George Hudson and the accounts of the Eastern Counties Railways.
Richard Sansing
Following up on Richard Sansing's
lead, Mike answered his own question ---
http://www.businessballs.com/clichesorigins.htm
Bob Jensen
Original
Message-----
From: Groomer, S. Michael [mailto:groomer@indiana.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, March 02, 2004 9:40 AM
To: Jensen, Robert Subject: RE: Acct 321: Cooking the books
Hi Bob,
Yes… very
interesting… See below… Thanks for your efforts.
Best regards,
Mike
cook the books
- falsify business accounts - according to 18th century Brewer, 'cook
the books' originally appeared as the past tense 'the books have been
cooked' in a report (he didn't name the writer unfortunately) referring
to the conduct George Hudson (1700-71), 'the railway king', under whose
chairmanship the accounts of Eastern Counties Railways were falsified.
Brewer says then (1870) that the term specifically describes the
tampering of ledger and other trade books in order to show a balance in
favour of the bankrupt. Brewer also says the allusion is to preparing
meat for the table. These days the term has a wider meaning, extending
to any kind of creative accounting. Historical records bear this out,
and date the first recorded use quite accurately: Hudson made a fortune
speculating in railway shares, and then in 1845, which began the period
1845-47 known as 'railway mania' in Britain, he was exposed as a
fraudster and sent to jail. Other cliche references suggest earlier
usage, even 17th century, but there appears to be no real evidence of
this. There is an argument for Brewer being generally pretty reliable
when it comes to first recorded/published use, because simply he lived
far closer to the date of origin than reference writers of today. If you
read Brewer's Dictionary of Phrase and Fable you'll see it does have an
extremely credible and prudent style. The word 'book' incidentally comes
from old German 'buche' for beech wood, the bark of which was used in
Europe before paper became readily available. The verb 'cook' is from
Latin 'coquere'
Risk-Based
Auditing Under Attack
Selling New
Equity to Pay Dividends: Reminds Me About the South Sea Bubble of
1720 ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sea_bubble
"Fooling Some People All the Time"
"Melting
into Air: Before the financial system went bust, it went
postmodern," by John Lanchester, The New Yorker, November 10,
2008 ---
http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2008/11/10/081110crat_atlarge_lanchester
This is also why the
financial masters of the universe tend not to write books. If you
have been proved—proved—right, why bother? If you need to tell it,
you can’t truly know it. The story of David Einhorn and Allied
Capital is an example of a moneyman who believed, with absolute
certainty, that he was in the right, who said so, and who then
watched the world fail to react to his irrefutable demonstration of
his own rightness. This drove him so crazy that he did what was, for
a hedge-fund manager, a bizarre thing: he wrote a book about it.
The story
began on May 15, 2002, when Einhorn, who runs a hedge fund called
Greenlight Capital, made a speech for a children’s-cancer charity in
Hackensack, New Jersey. The charity holds an annual fund-raiser at
which investment luminaries give advice on specific shares. Einhorn
was one of eleven speakers that day, but his speech had a twist: he
recommended shorting—betting against—a firm called Allied Capital.
Allied is a “business development company,” which invests in
companies in their early stages. Einhorn found things not to like in
Allied’s accounting practices—in particular, its way of assessing
the value of its investments. The
mark-to-market accounting that Einhorn
favored is based on the price an asset would fetch if it were sold
today, but many of Allied’s investments were in small startups that
had, in effect, no market to which they could be marked. In
Einhorn’s view, Allied’s way of pricing its holdings amounted to
“the you-have-got-to-be-kidding-me method of accounting.” At the
same time, Allied was issuing new
equity, and, according to Einhorn, the
revenue from this could be used to fund the dividend payments that
were keeping Allied’s investors happy.
To Einhorn, this looked like a potential Ponzi scheme.
The next day,
Allied’s stock dipped more than twenty per cent, and a storm of
controversy and counter-accusations began to rage. “Those engaging
in the current misinformation campaign against Allied Capital are
cynically trying to take advantage of the current post-Enron
environment by tarring a great and honest company like Allied
Capital with the broad brush of a Big Lie,” Allied’s C.E.O. said.
Einhorn would be the first to admit that he wanted Allied’s stock to
drop, which might make his motives seem impure to the general
reader, but not to him. The function of hedge funds is, by his
account, to expose faulty companies and make money in the process.
Joseph Schumpeter described capitalism as “creative destruction”:
hedge funds are destructive agents, predators targeting the weak and
infirm. As Einhorn might see it, people like him are especially
necessary because so many others have been asleep at the wheel. His
book about his five-year battle with Allied, “Fooling Some of the
People All of the Time” (Wiley; $29.95), depicts analysts,
financial journalists, and the S.E.C. as being culpably complacent.
The S.E.C. spent three years investigating Allied. It found that
Allied violated accounting guidelines, but noted that the company
had since made improvements. There were no penalties. Einhorn calls
the S.E.C. judgment “the lightest of taps on the wrist with the
softest of feathers.” He deeply minds this, not least because the
complacency of the watchdogs prevents him from being proved right on
a reasonable schedule: if they had seen things his way, Allied’s
stock price would have promptly collapsed and his short selling
would be hugely profitable. As it was, Greenlight shorted Allied at
$26.25, only to spend the next years watching the stock drift
sideways and upward; eventually, in January of 2007, it hit
thirty-three dollars.
All this has a
great deal of resonance now, because, on May 21st of this year, at
the same charity event, Einhorn announced that Greenlight had
shorted another stock, on the ground of the company’s exposure to
financial derivatives based on dangerous subprime loans. The company
was Lehman Brothers. There was little delay in Einhorn’s being
proved right about that one: the toppling company shook the entire
financial system. A global cascade of
bank implosions ensued—Wachovia, Washington Mutual, and the
Icelandic banking system being merely some of the highlights to
date—and a global bailout of the entire system had to be put in
train. The short sellers were proved
right, and also came to be seen as culprits; so was mark-to-market
accounting, since it caused sudden, cataclysmic drops in the book
value of companies whose holdings had become illiquid. It is
therefore the perfect moment for a short-selling advocate of marking
to market to publish his account. One can only speculate whether
Einhorn would have written his book if he had known what was going
to happen next. (One of the things that have happened is that, on
September 30th, Ciena Capital, an Allied portfolio company to whose
fraudulent lending Einhorn dedicates many pages, went into
bankruptcy; this coincided with a collapse in the value of Allied
stock—finally!—to a price of around six dollars a share.) Given the
esteem with which Einhorn’s profession is regarded these days, it’s
a little as if the assassin of Archduke Franz Ferdinand had taken
the outbreak of the First World War as the timely moment to publish
a book advocating bomb-throwing—and the book had turned out to be
unexpectedly persuasive.
Heavy
Insider Trading ---
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/ownership/ownership.asp?symbol=ALD
Allied's
independent auditor is KPMG
KPMG has a lot of
problems with litigation ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm
Bob
Jensen's threads on the collapse of the Banking System are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm
Bob
Jensen's threads on fraud are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
Also see Fraud Rotten at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Bob
Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm
Also see the theory of fair value accounting at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#FairValue
History of Fraud in America
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/415wp/AmericanHistoryOfFraud.htm
"Heads Up Play With David
Einhorn," by Bess Levin, DealBreaker, December 21, 2010 ---
Click Here
http://dealbreaker.com/2010/12/heads-up-play-with-david-einhorn-a-qa/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+dealbreaker+%28Dealbreaker%29
If you’re
going to commit financial fraud, you probably don’t want to find
yourself sitting at a table across from David Einhorn, who will know
what you’re up to and share it with the world. Similarly, if you’ve
never played poker and have only ever had a 15 minute tutorial on
the game, you probably should avoid playing with the Greenlight
Capital founder, whose vastly superior skills will demonstrate just
how much you suck. As I like to live on the edge, yesterday in an
undisclosed location, I choose not to heed the wisdom of the latter.
Over several hands, Einhorn and I discussed the new edition of his
2008 book, “Fooling Some Of The People, All Of The Time.”
The
latest version includes an epilogue, and concludes the story of
Allied and Einhorn’s years of trying to get other people to listen
when he said something was up. As we
now know, Allied’s shares collapsed, Greenlight collected $35
million, and the hedge fund made another big (and correct) call on a
bank called Lehman Brothers, whose failure was, according to Einhorn,
“the Allied story all over again,” just on a bigger scale, with more
resounding consequences. Even after
the last crisis, which should have been a wake-up call, Einhorn
doesn’t think we’ve changed much and if anything, the reforms passed
only “encourage poor behavior and will likely foster an even bigger
crisis.” He and I chatted about that exciting event, Quantitative
Easing, Steve Eisman’s illicit pleasure of choice and more, plus
poker tips for people who really, really need them.
Continued in article
How to Pass Price Risk Along to Uncle Sam
Agribusiness Lobby Reaps the Biggest Harvest in Washington DC
A farmer can sell his crop early at a high
price, say, in a futures contract, and still collect a subsidy check
after the harvest from the government if prices are down over all. The
money is not tied to what the farmer actually received for his crop. The
farmer does not even have to sell the crop to get the check, only prove
that the market has dropped below a certain set rate.
"Big Farms Reap Two Harvests With Subsidies a Bumper Crop," by
Timothy Egan, The New York Times, December 26, 2005 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/26/national/26farm.html?oref=login
The roadside sign welcoming people into this
state reads: "Nebraska, the Good Life." And for farmers
closing out their books at the end of a year when they earned more
money than at any time in the history of American agriculture, it
certainly looks like happy days.
But at a time when big harvests and record
farm income should mean that Champagne corks are popping across the
prairie, the prosperity has brought with it the kind of nervousness
seen in headlines like the one that ran in The Omaha World-Herald in
early December: "Income boom has farmers on edge."
For despite the fact that farm income has
doubled in two years, federal subsidies have also gone up nearly 40
percent over the same period - projected at $15.7 billion this year,
and $130 billion over the last nine years. And that bounty is drawing
fire from people who say that at this moment of farm prosperity, the
nation's subsidy system has never made less sense.
Even those deeply steeped in the system
acknowledge it seems counterintuitive. "I struggle with the same
question: how the hell can you have such high government payments if
farmers had such a great year?" said Keith Collins, the chief
economist for the Agriculture Department.
The answer lies in the quirks of the federal
farm subsidy system as well as in the way savvy farmers sell their
crops. Mr. Collins said farmers use the peculiar world of agriculture
market timing to get both high commodity prices and high subsidies.
"The biggest reason is with record
crops, prices have fallen," he said. "And farmers are taking
advantage of that."
A farmer can sell his crop early at a high
price, say, in a futures contract, and still collect a subsidy check
after the harvest from the government if prices are down over all. The
money is not tied to what the farmer actually received for his crop.
The farmer does not even have to sell the crop to get the check, only
prove that the market has dropped below a certain set rate.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on futures contracts and other derivative financial
instruments are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm
References
Risk-Based
Auditing Under Attack
From Smart Stops on the Web, Journal of Accountancy, January
2004, Page 27 ---
Accountability Resources Here
www.thecorporatelibrary.com
CPAs can read about corporate governance in the real
world in articles such as “Alliance Ousts Two Executives” and “Mutual
Fund Directors Avert Eyes as Consumers Get Stung” at this Web site.
Other resources here include related news items from wire services and
newspapers, details on specific shareholder action campaigns and links
to other corporate governance Web stops. And on the lighter side,
visitors can view a slide show of topical cartoons.
Cartoon archives ---
http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/cartoons/tcl_cartoons.htm
Cartoon 1: Two kids competing on the blackboard. One
writes 2+2=4 and the other kid writes 2+2=40,000. Which kid as
the best prospects for an accounting career?
Cartoon 36: Where the Grasso is greener (Also see Cartoon 37)
Show-and-Tell
www.encycogov.com
This e-stop, while filled with information on corporate
governance, also features detailed flowcharts and tables on bankruptcy,
information retrieval and monitoring systems, as well as capital,
creditor and ownership structures. Practitioners will find six
definitions of the term corporate governance and a long list of
references to books, papers and periodicals about the topic.
Investors, Do Your Homework
www.irrc.org
At this Web site CPAs will find the electronic version
of the Investor Responsibility Research Center’s IRRC Social Issues
Reporter, with articles such as “Mutual Funds Seldom Support Social
Proposals.” Advisers also can read proposals from the Shareholder Action
Network and the IRRC’s review of NYSE and Sarbanes-Oxley Act reforms, as
well as use a glossary of industry terms to help explain to their
clients concepts such as acceleration, binding shareholder proposal
and cumulative voting.
Get Information Online
www.sarbanes-oxley.com
CPAs looking for links to recent developments on the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 can come here to review current SEC rules and
regulations with cross-references to specific sections of the act.
Visitors also can find the articles “Congress Eyes Mutual Fund Reform”
and “FBI and AICPA Join Forces to Help CPAs Ferret Out Fraud.”
Tech-minded CPAs will find the list of links to Sarbanes-Oxley
compliance software useful as well.
Direct From the Source
www.sec.gov/spotlight/sarbanes-oxley.htm
To trace the history of the SEC’s rule-making policies
for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, CPAs can go right to the source at this Web
site and follow links to press releases pertaining to the commission’s
involvement since the act’s creation. Visitors also can navigate to the
frequently asked questions (FAQ) section about the act from the SEC’s
Division of Corporation Finance.
PCAOB Online
www.pcaobus.org
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board e-stop
offers CPAs timely articles such as “Board Approves Registration of 598
Accounting Firms” and the full text of the Sarbanes-Oxley rules. Users
can research proposed standards on accounting support fees and audit
documentation and enforcement. Accounting firms not yet registered with
the PCAOB can do so here and check out the FAQ section about the
registration process.
Where are some great
resources (hard copy and electronic) for teaching ethics?
"An Inventory of Support Materials
for Teaching Ethics in the Post-Enron Era,” by C. William Thomas,
Issues in Accounting Education, February 2004, pp. 27-52 ---
http://aaahq.org/ic/browse.htm
ABSTRACT:
This paper presents a "Post-Enron" annotated bibliography of resources
for accounting professors who wish to either design a stand-alone course
in accounting ethics or who wish to integrate a significant component of
ethics into traditional courses across the curriculum. Many of the
resources listed are recent, but some are classics that have withstood
the test of time and still contain valuable information. The
resources listed include texts and reference works, commercial books,
academic and professional articles, and electronic resources such as
film and Internet websites. Resources are listed by subject
matter, to the extent possible, to permit topical access. Some
observations about course design, curriculum content, and instructional
methodology are made as well.
Bob Jensen's threads on resources
for accounting educators are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/000aaa/newfaculty.htm#Resources
"Kmart officials as purposely
violating accounting principles with the knowledge of the
company's auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers."
"Jury in Michigan Sides with
SEC in Kmart Case," SmartPros, June 1, 2009 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x66692.xml
The former
head of Kmart Corp., who told jurors he was hired to save the
venerable retailer, was found liable Monday for misleading investors
about company finances before a bankruptcy filing in 2002.
The verdict
in the civil fraud trial followed 10 days of testimony in federal
court in Ann Arbor. The case was a fresh look at Charles Conaway's
brief tenure and the desperate scramble to keep Kmart afloat before
one of the largest bankruptcies in retail history.
The
Securities and Exchange Commission accused him of failing to
disclose that the retailer was delaying payments to suppliers to
save cash. The trial centered on a conference call with analysts and
Kmart's quarterly report to regulators, both in November 2001.
"It was a
clean sweep," SEC trial lawyer Alan Lieberman said of the verdict.
"It is
never enough for the numbers to be right. For the average investor,
the numbers being right do not tell the whole story," he said. "They
need to know the material information that management knows. The
foundation of the markets is full and honest disclosure."
The SEC
blamed Conaway for not sharing details in the report's
management-analysis section. He testified that he didn't write it,
didn't read it and relied on his chief financial officer and others.
During a
call with Wall Street analysts, Conaway said sales were poor - and
the stock took a 15 percent hit - but he didn't talk about the
vendor strategy or an ill-timed purchase of $800 million in
merchandise.
He
testified that Kmart had $1 billion in cash and credit when the call
was made and the quarterly report was filed. Conaway said it "never"
crossed his mind that he was withholding critical news.
The jury,
however, found that he acted "with intent to defraud or with
reckless disregard for the truth."
Despite
Conaway's testimony, the jury found that delaying payments to
vendors was a "material liquidity deficiency" affecting Kmart's
finances and should have been publicly reported.
Conaway's
lawyer, Scott Lassar, said they were disappointed with the verdict
and would pursue an appeal.
U.S.
Magistrate Judge Steven Pepe will handle the penalty phase. Conaway,
48, could be fined and banned from serving as an executive or
director at a public company.
He had a
successful career in the drugstore industry when he agreed in 2000
to try to turn around Kmart, which was no match for discount rivals
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. and Target Corp. Conaway was gone less than two
years later.
Kmart
emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy as a smaller company and now is
part of Sears Holdings Corp., based in Hoffman Estates, Ill.
The lawsuit
against Conaway and his former CFO, John McDonald Jr., was filed in
2005, three years after the bankruptcy.
Ronald
Kiima, formerly an assistant chief accountant at the SEC, said when
a company fails "there's a lot of `What did you know and when did
you know it?'"
"If
you don't give the sausage-making of what happened during a quarter,
that could be an issue," Kiima said in an interview. "For a CEO to
say he didn't lay eyes on the report is pretty damning."
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
Discount retailer Kmart came under investigation for irregular
accounting practices in 2002. In January an anonymous letter initiated
an internal probe of the company's accounting practices. The Detroit
News obtained a copy of the letter that contains allegations
pointing to senior Kmart officials as purposely violating accounting
principles with the knowledge of the company's
auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers.
http://www.accountingweb.com/item/82286
Bankrupt retailer Kmart
explained the impact of accounting irregularities and said employees
involved in questionable accounting practices are no longer with the
company.
http://www.accountingweb.com/item/90935
Kmart's CFO Steps up to Accounting Questions

|
AccountingWEB US - Sep-19-2002 - Bankrupt retailer
Kmart explained the impact of accounting irregularities in a
Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) this week. Chief Financial Officer Al Koch
said several employees involved in questionable
accounting practices are no longer with the company.
Speaking to the concerns about vendor allowances recently
raised in anonymous letters from in-house accountants, Mr.
Koch said, "It was not hugely widespread, but neither was it
one or two people."
The
Kmart
whistleblowers who wrote the letters said they were
being asked to record transactions in obvious violation of
generally accepted accounting principles. They also said
"resident auditors from PricewaterhouseCoopers are hesitant
to pursue these issues or even question obvious changes in
revenue and expense patterns."
In
response to the letters, the company admitted it had
erroneously accounted for certain vendor transactions as
up-front consideration, instead of deferring appropriate
amounts and recognizing them over the life of the contract.
It also said it decided to change its accounting method.
Starting with fourth quarter 2001, Kmart's policy is to
recognize a cost recovery from vendors only when a formal
agreement has been obtained and the underlying activity has
been performed.
According to this week's Form 10-Q, early recognition of
vendor allowances resulted in understatement of the
company's fiscal year 2000 net loss by approximately $26
million and overstatement of its fiscal year 2001 net loss
by approximately $78 million, both net of taxes. The 10-Q
also said the company has been looking at historical
patterns of markdowns and markdown reserves and their
relation to earnings.
Kmart is under investigation by the SEC and the Justice
Department. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is
handling the investigation for the U.S. Attorney, said its
investigation could result in criminal charges. In the
months before Kmart's bankruptcy filing, top executives took
home approximately $29 million in retention loans and
severance packages. A spokesperson for PwC said the firm is
cooperating with the investigations.
|
24 Days:
How Two Wall Street Journal Reporters Uncovered the Lies that Destroyed
Faith in Corporate America, by John R. Emshiller and Rebecca Smith (Haper
Collins, 2003, ISBN: 0060520736)
Here's a powerful Enron Scandal book in the words of the lead whistle
blower herself:
Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse of
Enron
by
Mimi Swartz,
Sherron Watkins
ISBN: 0385507879
Format: Hardcover, 400pp
Pub. Date: March 2003 |
 |
Publisher: Doubleday & Company,
Incorporated
Edition Description: 1ST
|
“They’re still trying to hide the weenie,”
thought Sherron Watkins as she read a newspaper clipping about Enron two
weeks before Christmas, 2001. . . It quoted [CFO] Jeff McMahon
addressing the company’s creditors and cautioning them against a rash
judgment....
Related Books
Chronicling the inner workings of Andersen at
the height of its success, Toffler reveals "the making of an Android," the
peculiar process of employee indoctrination into the Andersen culture; how
Androids - both accountants and consultants--lived the mantra "keep the
client happy"; and how internal infighting and "billing your brains out"
rather than quality work became the all-important goals. Final Accounting
should be required reading in every business school, beginning with the
dean and the faculty that set the tone and culture." - Paul Volker, former
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.
The AccountingWeb, March 25, 2003.
Barbara Ley
Toffler is the former Andersen was the partner-in-charge of
Andersen's Ethics & Responsible Business Practices Consulting Services.
Title:
Final Accounting: Ambition, Greed and the Fall of Arthur Andersen
Authors: Barbara Ley Toffler, Jennifer Reingold
ISBN: 0767913825
Format: Hardcover, 288pp Pub.
Date: March 2003
Publisher: Broadway Books
Book Review from
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/stores/detail/-/books/0767913825/reviews/002-8190976-4846465#07679138253200
Book
Description A withering exposé of the unethical practices that triggered
the indictment and collapse of the legendary accounting firm.
Arthur
Andersen's conviction on obstruction of justice charges related to the
Enron debacle spelled the abrupt end of the 88-year-old accounting firm.
Until recently, the venerable firm had been regarded as the accounting
profession's conscience. In Final Accounting, Barbara Ley Toffler,
former Andersen partner-in-charge of Andersen's Ethics & Responsible
Business Practices consulting services, reveals that the symptoms of
Andersen's fatal disease were evident long before Enron. Drawing on her
expertise as a social scientist and her experience as an Andersen
insider, Toffler chronicles how a culture of arrogance and greed
infected her company and led to enormous lapses in judgment among her
peers. Final Accounting exposes the slow deterioration of values that
led not only to Enron but also to the earlier financial scandals of
other Andersen clients, including Sunbeam and Waste Management, and
illustrates the practices that paved the way for the accounting fiascos
at WorldCom and other major companies.
Chronicling the
inner workings of Andersen at the height of its success, Toffler reveals
"the making of an Android," the peculiar process of employee
indoctrination into the Andersen culture; how Androids—both accountants
and consultants--lived the mantra "keep the client happy"; and how
internal infighting and "billing your brains out" rather than quality
work became the all-important goals. Toffler was in a position to know
when something was wrong. In her earlier role as ethics consultant, she
worked with over 60 major companies and was an internationally renowned
expert at spotting and correcting ethical lapses. Toffler traces the
roots of Andersen's ethical missteps, and shows the gradual decay of a
once-proud culture.
Uniquely
qualified to discuss the personalities and principles behind one of the
greatest shake-ups in United States history, Toffler delivers a chilling
report with important ramifications for CEOs and individual investors
alike.
From the Back
Cover "The sad demise of the once proud and disciplined firm of Arthur
Andersen is an object lesson in how 'infectious greed' and conflicts of
interest can bring down the best. Final Accounting should be required
reading in every business school, beginning with the dean and the
faculty that set the tone and culture.” -Paul Volker, former Chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board
“This exciting
tale chronicles how greed and competitive frenzy destroyed Arthur
Andersen--a firm long recognized for independence and integrity. It
details a culture that, in the 1990s, led to unethical and anti-social
behavior by executives of many of America's most respected companies.
The lessons of this book are important for everyone, particularly for a
new breed of corporate leaders anxious to restore public confidence.”
-Arthur Levitt, Jr., former chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission
“This may be
the most important analysis coming out of the corporate disasters of
2001 and 2002. Barbara Toffler is trained to understand corporate
‘cultures’ and ‘business ethics’ (not an oxymoron). She clearly lays out
how a high performance, manically driven and once most respected
auditing firm was corrupted by the excesses of consulting and an
arrogant culture. One can hope that the leaders of all professional
service firms, and indeed all corporate leaders, will read and reflect
on the meaning of this book.” -John H. Biggs, Former Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of TIAA CREF
“The book
exposes the pervasive hypocrisy that drives many professional service
firms to put profits above professionalism. Greed and hubris molded
Arthur Andersen into a modern-day corporate junkie ... a monster whose
self-destructive behavior resulted in its own demise." -Tom Rodenhauser,
founder and president of Consulting Information Services, LLC
"An intriguing
tale that adds another important dimension to the now pervasive national
corporate governance conversation. -Charles M. Elson, Edgar S. Woolard,
Jr., Professor of Corporate Governance, University of Delaware
“You could not
ask for a better guide to the fall of Arthur Andersen than an expert on
organizational behavior and business ethics who actually worked there.
Sympathetic but resolutely objective, Toffler was enough of an insider
to see what went on but enough of an outsider to keep her perspective
clear. This is a tragic tale of epic proportions that shows that even
institutions founded on integrity and transparency will lose everything
unless they have internal controls that require everyone in the
organization to work together, challenge unethical practices, and commit
only to profitability that is sustainable over the long term. One way to
begin is by reading this book. –Nell Minow, Editor, The Corporate
Library
About the
Author Formerly the Partner-in-Charge of Ethics and Responsible Business
Practices consulting services for Arthur Andersen, BARBARA LEY TOFFLER
was on the faculty of the Harvard Business School and now teaches at
Columbia University's Business School. She is considered one of the
nation's leading experts on management ethics, and has written
extensively on the subject and has consulted to over sixty Fortune 500
companies. She lives in the New York area. Winner of a Deadline Club
award for Best Business Reporting, JENNIFER REINGOLD has served as
management editor at Business Week and senior writer at Fast Company.
She writes for national publications such as The New York Times, Inc and
Worth and co-authored the Business Week Guide to the Best Business
Schools (McGraw-Hill, 1999).
Also see the review at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/23/business/yourmoney/23VALU.html
March 8, 2004
message from neil glass [neil.glass@get2net.dk]
Note that you can download the first chapter of his book for free.
The book may be purchased as an eBook or hard copy.
Dr. Jensen,
I just came across your website and was pleased
to find you talk about some of the frauds and other problems I reveal in
my latest book. If you had a moment, you might be amused to look at my
website only-on-the-net.com where I am trying to attract some attention
to my book Rip-Off: The scandalous inside story of the Management
Consulting Money Machine.
best wishes
neil glass
The link is
http://www.only-on-the-net.com/
The AICPA's Prosecution of Dr. Abraham Briloff, Some Observations ---
http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aaa/pi/newsletr/spring99/item07.htm
Art Wyatt admitted:
"ACCOUNTING PROFESSIONALISM: THEY JUST DON'T GET IT" ---
http://aaahq.org/AM2003/WyattSpeech.pdf
Here is some earlier related
material you can find at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudVirginia.htm
Lessons Learned From
Paul Volker:
The Culture of Greed Sucked the Blood Out of Professionalism
In an effort
to save Andersen's reputation and life, the top executive officer,
Joe Berardino, in Andersen was replaced by the former Chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board, Paul Volcker. This great man,
Volcker, really tried to instantly change the culture of greed that
overtook professionalism in Andersen and other public
accounting firms, but it was too little too late --- at least for
Andersen.
The bottom line:
I have a
mental image of the role of an auditor. He’s a kind of umpire or
referee, mandated to keep financial reporting within the
established rules. Like all umpires, it’s not a popular or
particularly well paid role relative to the stars of the game. The
natural constituency, the investing public, like the fans at a
ball park, is not consistently supportive when their individual
interests are at stake. Matters of judgment are involved, and
perfection in every decision can’t be expected. But when the
“players”, with teams of lawyers and investment bankers, are in
alliance to keep reported profits, and not so incidentally the
value of fees and stock options on track, the pressures multiply.
And if the auditing firm, the umpire, is itself conflicted,
judgments almost inevitably will be shaded.
Paul Volcker (See below)
"Volcker says "new
Andersen" no longer possible," by Kevin Drawbaugh, CPAnet, May 17,
2002 ---
http://www.cpanet.com/up/s0205.asp?ID=0572
WASHINGTON, May 17 (Reuters) - Former Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Paul Volcker, who took charge of a rescue team at
embattled accounting firm Andersen (ANDR), said on Friday that
creating "a new Andersen" was no longer possible.
In a
letter to Sen. Paul Sarbanes, Volcker said he supports the
Maryland Democrat's proposals for reforming the U.S. financial
system to prevent future corporate disasters such as the collapse
of Enron Corp. (ENRNQ).
"The
sheer number and magnitude of breakdowns that have increasingly
become the daily fare of the business press pose a clear and
present danger to the effectiveness and efficiency of capital
markets," Volcker said in the letter released to Reuters.
"FINALLY, A TIME FOR
AUDITING REFORM"
REMARKS BY PAUL A. VOLCKER
AT THE CONFERENCE ON CREDIBLE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES
KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
EVANSTON, ILLINOIS
JUNE 25, 2002
http://www.fei.org/download/Volker_Kellogg_Speech_6-25-02.pdf
How
ironic that we are meeting near Arthur Andersen Hall with the
leadership of the Leonard Spacek Professor of Accounting. From all
I have learned, the Andersen firm in general, and Leonard Spacek
in particular, once represented the best in auditing. Literally
emerging from the Northwestern faculty, Arthur Andersen
represented rigor and discipline, focused on the central mission
of attesting to the fairness and accuracy of the financial reports
of its clients.
The sad
demise of that once great firm is, I think we must now all
realize, not an idiosyncratic, one-off, event. The Enron affair is
plainly symptomatic of a larger, systemic problem. The state of
the accounting and auditing systems which we have so confidently
set out as a standard for all the world is, in fact, deeply
troubled.
The
concerns extend far beyond the profession of auditing itself.
There are important questions of corporate governance, which you
will address in this conference, but which I can touch upon only
tangentially in my comments. More fundamentally, I think we are
seeing the bitter fruit of broader erosion of standards of
business and market conduct related to the financial boom and
bubble of the 1990’s.
From
one angle, we in the United States have been in a remarkable era
of creative destruction, in one sense rough and tumble capitalism
at its best bringing about productivity-transforming innovation in
electronic technology and molecular biology. Optimistic visions of
a new economic era set the stage for an explosion in financial
values. The creation of paper wealth exceeded, so far as I can
determine, anything before in human history in relative and
absolute terms.
Encouraged by ever imaginative investment bankers yearning for
extraordinary fees, companies were bought and sold with great
abandon at values largely accounted for as “intangible” or “good
will”. Some of the best mathematical minds of the new generation
turned to the sophisticated new profession of financial
engineering, designing ever more complicated financial
instruments. The rationale was risk management and exploiting
market imperfections. But more and more it has become a game of
circumventing accounting conventions and IRS regulations.
Inadvertently or not, the result has been to load balance sheets
and income statements with hard to understand and analyze numbers,
or worse yet, to take risks off the balance sheet entirely. In the
process, too often the rising stock market valuations were
interpreted as evidence of special wisdom or competence,
justifying executive compensation packages way beyond any earlier
norms and relationships.
It was
an environment in which incentives for business management to keep
reported revenues and earnings growing to meet expectations were
amplified. What is now clear, is that insidiously, almost
subconsciously, too many companies yielded to the temptation to
stretch accounting rules to achieve that result.
I
state all that to emphasize the pressures placed on the auditors
in their basic function of attesting to financial statements.
Moreover, accounting firms themselves were caught up in the
environment – - to generate revenues, to participate in the new
economy, to stretch their range of services. More and more they
saw their future in consulting, where, in the spirit of the time,
they felt their partners could “better leverage” their talent and
raise their income.
I have a
mental image of the role of an auditor. He’s a kind of umpire or
referee, mandated to keep financial reporting within the
established rules. Like all umpires, it’s not a popular or
particularly well paid role relative to the stars of the game. The
natural constituency, the investing public, like the fans at a
ball park, is not consistently supportive when their individual
interests are at stake. Matters of judgment are involved, and
perfection in every decision can’t be expected. But when the
“players”, with teams of lawyers and investment bankers, are in
alliance to keep reported profits, and not so incidentally the
value of fees and stock options on track, the pressures multiply.
And if the auditing firm, the umpire, is itself conflicted,
judgments almost inevitably
Continued at
http://www.fei.org/download/Volker_Kellogg_Speech_6-25-02.pdf
"We're The Front Line For
Shareholders," by Phil Livingston (President of Financial
Executives International), January/February 2002 ---
http://www.fei.org/magazine/articles/1-2-2002_president.cfm
At FEI's
recent financial reporting conference in New York, Paul Volcker
gave the keynote address and declared that the accounting and
auditing profession were in a "state of crisis." Earlier that
morning, over breakfast, he lamented the daily bombardment of
financial reporting failures in the press.
I agree with
his assessment. The causes and contributing factors are numerous,
but one thing is clear: We as financial executives need to do
better, be stronger and take the lead in restoring the credibility
of financial reporting and preserving the capital markets.
If you
didn't already know it and believe it deeply, recent cases prove
the value of a financial management team that is ethical, credible
and clear in its communications. A loss of confidence in that team
can be a fatal blow, not just to the individuals, but to the
company or institution that entrusts its assets to their
stewardship. I think the FEI Code of Ethical Conduct says it best,
and it is worth reprinting the opening section here. The full code
(signed by all FEI members) can be found
here.
. . .
So how did
the profession reach the state Volcker describes as a crisis?
- The
market pressure for corporate performance has increased
dramatically over the last 10 years. That pressure has produced
better results for shareholders, but also a higher fatality rate
as management teams pressed too hard at the margin.
- The
standard-setters floundered in the issue de jour quagmire,
writing hugely complicated standards that were unintelligible
and irrelevant to the bigger problems.
- The
SEC fiddled while the dot-com bubble burst. Deriding and
undermining management teams and the auditors, the past
administration made a joke of financial restatements.
- We've
had no vision for the future of financial reporting. Annual
reports, 10Ks and 10Qs are obsolete. Bloomberg and Yahoo!
Finance have replaced the horse-and-buggy vehicles with summary
financial information linked to breaking news.
- We've
had no vision for the future of accounting. Today's mixed model
is criticized one day for recognizing unrealized fair value
contractual gains and alternatively for not recognizing the fair
value of financial instruments.
- The
auditors dropped their required skeptical attitude and embraced
business partnering philosophies. Adding value and justifying
the audit fees became the mandate. Management teams and audit
committees promoted this, too.
- Audit
committees have not kept up with the challenges of the
assignment. True financial reporting experts are needed on these
committees, not the general management expertise required by the
stock exchange rules.
Beta Gamma Sigma
honor society ---
http://cba.unomaha.edu/bg/
I’ve been a member of BGS for 40
years, but somehow I’ve managed to overlook B-Zine
From Beta Gamma
Sigma BZine Electronic Magazine ---
http://cba.unomaha.edu/bg/
CEOs may need to speak up
by Tim Weatherby, Beta Gamma Sigma
As more Fortune 500 companies and their executives are
sucked into the current crisis, it may be time for the good
guys to put their two cents in. The 2002 Beta Gamma Sigma
International Honoree did just that in April.
http://www.betagammasigma.org/news/bzine/august02feature.html
How Tyco's CEO
Enriched Himself
by Mark Maremont and Laurie P. Cohen, The
Wall Street Journal
The latest story of corporate abuse surrounds the former
Tyco CEO. This story provides a vivid example of the abuses
that are leading many to question current business practices.
http://www.msnbc.com/news/790996.asp
A Lucrative
Life at the Top
by MSNBC.com
Highlights pay and incentive packages of several former
corporate executives currently under investigation.
http://www.msnbc.com/news/783953.asp
A To-Do List for Tyco's CEO
by William C. Symonds, BusinessWeek online
The new CEO of Tyco has a tough job ahead of him cleaning
up the mess left behind.
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_32/b3795050.htm
Implausible Deniability: The SEC Turns Up CEO Heat
by Diane Hess, TheStreet.com
The SEC's edict requires written statements, under oath,
from senior officers of the 1,000 largest public companies
attesting to the accuracy of their financial statements.
http://www.thestreet.com/markets/taleofthetape/10029865.html
Corporate Reform: Any Idea in a Storm?
by BusinessWeek online
Lawmakers eager to appease voters are trying all kinds of
things.
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_32/b3795045.htm
Sealing Off the Bermuda Triangle
by Howard Gleckman, BusinessWeek online
Too many corporate tax dollars are disappearing because of
headquarters relocations, and Congress looks ready to act.
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jun2002/nf20020625_2167.htm
"Adding Insult to Injury: Firms Pay Wrongdoers' Legal Fees," by
Laurie P. Cohen, The Wall Street Journal, February 17, 2004
---
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB107697515164830882,00.html?mod=home%5Fwhats%5Fnews%5Fus
You buy shares in a company. The
government charges one of the company's executives with fraud. Who
foots the legal bill?
All too often, it's you.
Consider the case of a former Rite Aid
Corp. executive. Four days before he was set to go to trial last
June, Frank Bergonzi pleaded guilty to participating in a criminal
conspiracy to defraud Rite Aid while he was the company's chief
financial officer. "I was aggressive and I pressured others to be
aggressive," he told a federal judge in Harrisburg, Pa., at the
time.
Little more than a month later, Mr.
Bergonzi sued his former employer in Delaware Chancery Court,
seeking to force the company to pay more than $5 million in unpaid
legal and accounting fees he racked up in connection with his
defense in criminal and civil proceedings. That was in addition to
the $4 million that Rite Aid had already advanced for Mr.
Bergonzi's defense in civil, administrative and criminal
proceedings.
In October, the Delaware court sided with
Mr. Bergonzi. It ruled that Rite Aid was required to advance Mr.
Bergonzi's defense fees until a "final disposition" of his legal
case. The court interpreted that moment as sentencing, a time that
could be months -- or even years -- away. Mr. Bergonzi has agreed
to testify against former colleagues at coming trials before he is
sentenced for his crimes.
Rite Aid's insurance, in what is known as
a directors-and-officers liability policy, already has been
depleted by a host of class-action suits filed against the company
in the wake of a federal investigation into possible fraud that
began in late 1999. "The shareholders are footing the bill"
because of the "precedent-setting" Delaware ruling, laments Alan
J. Davis, a Philadelphia attorney who unsuccessfully defended Rite
Aid against Mr. Bergonzi.
Rite Aid eventually settled with Mr.
Bergonzi for an amount it won't disclose. While it is entitled to
recover the fees it has paid from Mr. Bergonzi after he is
sentenced, the 58-year-old defendant has testified he has few
remaining assets. "We have no reason to believe he'll repay" Rite
Aid, Mr. Davis says.
Rite Aid has lots of company. In recent
government cases involving Cendant Corp.; WorldCom Inc., now known
as MCI; Enron Corp.; and Qwest Communications International Inc.,
among others, companies are paying the legal costs of former
executives defending themselves against fraud allegations. The
amount of money being paid out isn't known, as companies typically
don't specify defense costs. But it totals hundreds of millions,
or even billions of dollars. A company's average cost of defending
against shareholder suits last year was $2.2 million, according to
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin. "These costs are likely to climb much
higher, due to a lot of claims for more than a billion dollars
each that haven't been settled," says James Swanke, an executive
at the actuarial consulting firm.
Continued in the article
Corporate Accountability: A Toolkit for Social Activists
The Stakeholder Alliance (ala our friend Ralph Estes and
well-meaning social accountant) ---
http://www.stakeholderalliance.org/
From the Chicago Tribune,
February 19, 2002 ---
http://www.smartpros.com/x33006.xml
International Standards Needed, Volcker Says
WASHINGTON, Feb. 19, 2002 (Knight-Ridder / Tribune News Service) —
Enron Corp.'s collapse was a symptom of a financial recklessness
that spread during the 1990s economic boom as investors and
corporate executives pursued profits at all costs, former Federal
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker told a Senate committee Thursday.
Volcker
-- chairman of the new oversight panel created by Enron's auditor,
the Andersen accounting firm, to examine its role in the financial
disaster -- told the Senate Banking Committee he hoped the debacle
would accelerate current efforts to achieve international
accounting standards. Such standards could reassure investors
around the world that publicly traded companies met certain
standards regardless of where such companies were based, he said.
"In the
midst of the great prosperity and boom of the 1990s, there has
been a certain erosion of professional, managerial and ethical
standards and safeguards," Volcker said.
"The
pressure on management to meet market expectations, to keep
earnings rising quarter by quarter or year by year, to measure
success by one 'bottom line' has led, consciously or not, to
compromises at the expense of the public interest in full,
accurate and timely financial reporting," he added.
But the
74-year-old economist also blamed the new complexity of corporate
finance for contributing the problem. "The fact is," Volcker said
"the accounting profession has been hard-pressed to keep up with
the growing complexity of business and finance, with its
mind-bending complications of abstruse derivatives, seemingly
endless varieties of securitizations and multiplying,
off-balance-sheet entities. (Continued in the article.)
|
May 15, 2003 message from Dave Albrecht
[albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]
I've been teaching Intermediate Financial Accounting for several
years. Recently, I've been thinking about having students read a
supplemental book . Given the current upheaval, there are several
possibilities for additional reading. Can anyone make a recommendation?
BTW, these books would make great summer reading.
Dave Albrecht
Benston et. al. (2003). Following the Money:
The Enron Failure and the State of Corporate Disclosure.
Berenson, Alex. (2003). The Number: How the
Drive for Quarterly Earnings Corrupted Wall Street and Corporate
America.
Brewster, Mike. (2003). Unaccountable: How the
Accounting Profession Forfeited an Public Trust.
Brice & Ivins. (2002.) Pipe Dreams: Greed, Ego
and the Death of Enron.
DiPiazza & Eccles. (2002). Building Public
Trust: The Future of Corporate Reporting.
Fox, Loren. (2002). Enron, the Rise and Fall.
Jeter, Lynne W. (2003). Disconnected: Deceit
and Betrayal at WorldCom.
Mills, D. Quinn. (2003). Wheel, Deal and Steal:
Deceptive Accounting, Deceitful CEOs, and Ineffective Reforms.
Mulford & Comiskey. (2002). The Financial
Numbers Game: Detecting Creative Accounting Practices.
Nofsinger & Kim. (2003). Infectious Greed:
Restoring Confidence in America's Companies.
Squires, Susan. (2003). Inside Arthur Andersen:
Shifting Values, Unexpected Consequences.
Swartz & Watkins. (2003). Power Failure: The
Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron.
Toffler, Barbara. (2003). Final Accounting:
Ambition, Greed and the Fall of Arthur Andersen
May 15, 2003 reply from Bruce Lubich
[blubich@UMUC.EDU]
I would add Schilit, Howard. (2002) Financial
Shenanigans.
Bruce Lubich
May 15, 2003 reply from Neal Hannon
[nhannon@COX.NET]
Suggested Additions to Summer Book List:
Financial Shenanigans : How to Detect
Accounting Gimmicks & Fraud in Financial Reports by Howard Schilit
(McGraw-Hill Trade; 2nd edition (March 1, 2002))
How Companies Lie: Why Enron Is Just the Tip of
the Iceberg by Richard J. Schroth, A. Larry Elliott
Quality Financial Reporting by Paul B. W.
Miller, Paul R. Bahnson
Take On the Street: What Wall Street and
Corporate America Don't Want You to Know by Arthur Levitt, Paula Dwyer
(Contributor)
And for fun: Who Moved My Cheese? An Amazing
Way to Deal with Change in Your Work and in Your Life by Spencer, M.D.
Johnson, Kenneth H. Blanchard
Neal J. Hannon, CMA Chair, I.T. Committee,
Institute of Management Accountants Member, XBRL_US Steering Committee
University of Hartford (860) 768-5810 (401) 769-3802 (Home Office)
Book Recommendation from The AccountingWeb on April 25, 2003
The professional service accounting firm is
being threatened by a variety of factors: new technology, intense
competition, consolidation, an inability to incorporate new services
into a business strategy, and the erosion of public trust, just to name
a few. There is relief. And promise. And hope. In The Firm of the
Future: A Guide for Accountants, Lawyers, and Other Professional
Services, confronts the tired, conventional wisdom that continues to
fail its adherents, and present bold, proven strategies for restoring
vitality and dynamism to the professional service firm.
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0471264245/accountingweb
Question
What is COSO?
Answer ---
http://www.coso.org/
COSO is a voluntary private sector organization
dedicated to improving the quality of financial reporting through
business ethics, effective internal controls, and corporate governance.
COSO was originally formed in 1985 to sponsor the National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting, an independent private sector initiative
which studied the causal factors that can lead to fraudulent financial
reporting and developed recommendations for public companies and their
independent auditors, for the SEC and other regulators, and for
educational institutions.
The National Commission was jointly sponsored
by the five major financial professional associations in the United
States, the American Accounting Association, the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, the Financial Executives Institute, the
Institute of Internal Auditors, and the National Association of
Accountants (now the Institute of Management Accountants). The
Commission was wholly independent of each of the sponsoring
organizations, and contained representatives from industry, public
accounting, investment firms, and the New York Stock Exchange.
The Chairman of the National Commission was
James C. Treadway, Jr., Executive Vice President and General Counsel,
Paine Webber Incorporated and a former Commissioner of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission. (Hence, the popular name "Treadway
Commission"). Currently, the COSO Chairman is John Flaherty, Chairman,
Retired Vice President and General Auditor for PepsiCo Inc.
Title: ENRON: A Professional's Guide to the Events, Ethical
Issues, and Proposed Reforms
Authur: L. Berkowitz, CPA
ISBN: 0-8080-0825-0
Publisher: CCH ---
http://tax.cchgroup.com/Store/Products/CCE-CCH-1959.htm?cookie%5Ftest=1
Pub. Date: July 2002
Title: Take On
the Street: What Wall Street and Corporate America Don't Want You to Know,
Authors: Arthur Levitt and Paula Dwyer (Arthor Levitt is the
highly controversial former Chairman of the SEC)
Format: Hardcover, 288pp. This is also available as a MS
Reader eBook ---
http://search.barnesandnoble.com/booksearch/ISBNinquiry.asp?userid=16UOF6F2PF&isbn=0375422358
ISBN: 0375421785
Publisher: Pantheon Books
Pub. Date: October 2002
See
http://search.barnesandnoble.com/booksearch/isbnInquiry.asp?userid=16UOF6F2PF&isbn=0375421785
This is
Levitt's no-holds-barred memoir of his turbulent tenure as chief
overseer of the nation's financial markets. As working Americans poured
billions into stocks and mutual funds, corporate America devised
increasingly opaque strategies for hoarding most of the proceeds. Levitt
reveals their tactics in plain language, then spells out how to
intelligently invest in mutual funds and the stock market. With
integrity and authority, Levitt gives us a bracing primer on the
collapse of the system for overseeing our capital markets, and sage,
essential advice on a discipline we often ignore to our peril - how not
to lose money.
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0375421785/accountingweb
Don Ramsey called my attention
to the following audio interview:
For a one-hour audio archive of Diane
Rehm's recent interview with Arthur Levitt, go to this URL:
http://www.wamu.org/ram/2002/r2021015.ram
A free video from Yale University and the AICPA (with an introduction
by Professor Rick Antle and Senior Associate Dean from Yale). This
video can be downloaded to your computer with a single click on a button
at http://www.aicpa.org/video/
It might be noted that Barry Melancon is in the midst of controversy with
ground swell of CPAs and academics demanding his resignation vis-a-vis
continued support he receives from top management of large accounting
firms and business corporations.
A New
Accounting Culture
Address by Barry C. Melancon
President and CEO, American Institute of CPAs
September 4, 2002
Yale Club - New York City
Taped immediately upon completion
From The Conference Board
Corporate Citizenship in the New Century: Accountability,
Transparency, and Global Stakeholder Engagement
Publication Date: July 2002
Report Number: R-1314-02-RR ---
http://www.conference-board.org/publications/describe.cfm?id=574
My new and updated
documents the recent accounting and investment scandals are at the
following sites:
Bob Jensen's threads on the Enron/Andersen scandals are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
Bob Jensen's SPE threads are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
Bob Jensen's
Summary of Suggested Reforms ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm
Bob Jensen's
Bottom Line Commentary ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm
The Virginia Tech
Overview: What Can We Learn From Enron? ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudVirginia.htm
Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom,
by Lynne W. Jeter
Inside Arthur Andersen: Shifting Values, Unexpected Consequences
by Lorna McDougall, Cynthia Smith, Susan E. Squires, William R. Yeack.
Final Accounting: Ambition, Greed and the Fall of Arthur Andersen
by Barbara Ley Toffler and Jennifer Reingold
Bisk CPEasy's "Accounting Profession Reform: Restoring Confidence in
the System" ---
http://www.cpeasy.com/
"The
fall of Andersen," Chicago Tribune ---
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/showcase/chi-andersen.special
Chicago's
Andersen accounting firm must stop auditing publicly traded companies
following the firm's conviction for obstructing justice during the
federal investigation into the downfall of Enron Corp. For decades,
Andersen was a fixture in Chicago's business community and, at one time,
the gold standard of the accounting industry. How did this legendary
firm disappear?
Civil war splits Andersen
September 2, 2002.
Second of four parts
The fall of Andersen
September 1, 2002. This
series was reported by Delroy Alexander, Greg Burns, Robert Manor, Flynn
McRoberts and E.A. Torriero. It was written by McRoberts.
Greed tarnished golden reputation
September 1, 2002. First
of four parts
'Merchant or Samurai?'
September 1, 2002. Dick
Measelle, then-chief executive of Andersen's worldwide audit and tax
practice, explores a corporate cultural divide in an April 1995
newsletter essay to Andersen partners.
What will the
U.S. accounting business look like when the dust settles on Arthur
Andersen?
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud041202.htm#Future
Also see
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm
The Washington Post put
together a terrific Corporate Scandal Primer that includes reviews and
pictures of the "players," "articles,", and an "overview" of each major
accounting and finance scandal of the Year 2002 ---
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/scandals/primer/index.html
I added this
link to my own reviews at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Governance
The AccountingWeb recommends a number of books on accounting fraud ---
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0471353787/accountingweb/103-6121868-8139853
- The Fraud Identification Handbook by George B. Allen (Preface)
- Financial Investigation and Forensic Accounting by George A. Manning
- Business Fraud by James A. Blanco, Dave Evans
- Document Fraud and Other Crimes of Deception by Jesse M. Greenwald,
Holly K. Tuttle (Illustrator)
- Fraud Auditing and Forensic Accounting by Jack Bologna, et al
- The Financial Numbers Game by Charles W. Mulford, Eugene E. Comiskey
- How to Reduce Business Losses from Employee Theft and Customer Fraud
by Alfred N. Weiner
- Financial Statement Fraud by Zabihollah Rezaee, Joseph T. Wells
- Transnational Criminal Organizations, Cybercrime, and Money
Laundering by James R. Richards
The three books below are reviewed in the December 2002 issue of the
Journal of Accountancy, pp. 88-90 ---
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/dec2002/person.htm
Two Books on Financial Statement Fraud
Financial Statement Fraud: Prevention and Detection
by Zabihollah Razaee (Certified Fraud Examiner and Accounting Professor
at the University of Memphis)
Format: Hardcover, 336pp.
ISBN: 0471092169
Publisher: Wiley, John & Sons, Incorporated
Pub. Date: March 2002
http://search.barnesandnoble.com/booksearch/isbnInquiry.asp?userid=16UOF6F2PF&isbn=0471092169
The Financial Numbers Game: Detecting Creative Accounting
Practices
by Charles W. Mulford and Eugene Comiskey (good old boys from the
Georgia Institute of Technology)
Format: Paperback, 408pp.
ISBN: 0471370088
Publisher: Wiley, John & Sons, Incorporated
Pub. Date: February 2002
http://search.barnesandnoble.com/booksearch/isbnInquiry.asp?userid=16UOF6F2PF&isbn=0471370088
One New Book on Accounting Professionalism and Public Trust
Building Public Trust: The Future of Corporate Reporting
by Samuel A. DiPiazza, Jr (CEO of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC))
and Robert G. Eccies (President of Advisory Capital Partners)
Format: Hardcover, 1st ed., 192pp.
ISBN: 0471261513
Publisher: Wiley, John & Sons, Incorporated
Pub. Date: June 2002
http://search.barnesandnoble.com/booksearch/isbnInquiry.asp?userid=16UOF6F2PF&isbn=0471261513
Books on Fraud --- Enter the word "fraud" in the search box at
http://www.bn.com/
Yahoo's choices for top fraud sites ---
http://dir.yahoo.com/Society_and_Culture/Crime/Types_of_Crime/Fraud/Finance_and_Investment/
You might enjoy "The AICPA's Prosecution of Dr. Abraham Briloff: Some
Observations," by Dwight M. Owsen ---
http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aaa/pi/newsletr/spring99/item07.htm
I think Briloff was trying to save the profession from what it is now
going through in the wake of the Enron scandal.
My Interview With The Baltimore Sun ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudBaltimoreSun.htm
My Philadelphia Inquirer
Interview 1 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/philadelphia_inquirer.htm
My Philadelphia Inquirer
Interview 2 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudPhiladelphiaInquirere022402.htm
My Interview With National Public Radio ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudNPRfeb7.htm
Articles on Internal Auditing and
Fraud Investigation
Web Site of Mark R. Simmons, CIA CFE
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~msimmons/
Internal
auditing is an independent, objective assurance and consulting
activity designed to add value and improve an organization's operations.
It helps an organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a
systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the
effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance
processes. (Institute of Internal Auditors)
Fraud
Investigation consists of the multitude of steps necessary to
resolve allegations of fraud - interviewing witnesses, assembling
evidence, writing reports, and dealing with prosecutors and the courts.
(Association of Certified Fraud Examiners)
This site focuses on topics
that deal with
Internal Auditing and
Fraud Investigation with certain
hyper-links to other associated and relevant sources. It is
dedicated to sharing information.
Other Shared and Unshared Course Material
You might find some useful material at
http://www.indiana.edu/~aisdept/newsletter/current/forensic%20accounting.html
I have two cases and some links to John Howland's course materials at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5342/262wp/262case1.htm
You might find some materials of interest at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/assurance.htm
Also see
http://www.networkcomputing.com/1304/1304ws2.html
Micromash has a bunch of courses, but I don't think they share
materials for free ---
http://www.cyberu.com/classes.asp
Important Database --- From the Scout
Report on February 1, 2001
LLRX.com: Business Filings Databases
http://www.llrx.com/columns/roundup19.htm
This column from Law Library Resource Xchange (LLRX)
(last mentioned in the September 7, 2001 Scout Report) by Kathy Biehl
becomes more interesting with every revelation of misleading corporate
accounting practices. This is a straightforward listing of state
government's efforts to provide easy access to required disclosure
filings of businesses within each state. Each entry is clearly
annotated, describing services offered and any required fees (most
services here are free). The range of information and services varies
considerably from very basic (i.e. "name availability") to complete
access to corporate filings. The noteworthy exception here is tax
filings. Most states do not currently include access to filings with
taxing authorities.
|
List of
Securities Fraud Class Actions
SORTED BY COMPANY NAME
|
|
IMPORTANT
NOTE:
If another district or date than the one for which
you searched appears in the "Court" column, the explanation may be that
the district/date for which you searched is related to this case but is
not singled out as our "First Identified District". This list may be
considered inclusive.
|
Example from the Stanford Law School Database
From the Stanford Law School
Securities Fraud Database ---
http://securities.stanford.edu/1022/TTWO01-01/
Take-Two Interactive CASE INFORMATION
Summary:
According to a Press Release dated December 21, 2001, the complaint
alleges that during the Class Period defendants materially
misrepresented Take-Two's financial results and performance for each of
the quarters of and full year of fiscal 2000, ended October 31, 2000,
and each of the first three quarters of fiscal 2001, ended January 31,
2001, April 30, 2001 and July 31, 2001, respectively, by improperly
recognizing revenue on sales to distributors. On August 24, 2001, the
truth about the Company's financial condition began to emerge when the
effects of defendants' scheme began to negatively impact the Company's
financial results. It was not until December 14, 2001 and December 17,
2001, however,
that the market began to learn that defendants had caused the Company to
improperly recognize revenue for products shipped to distributors, where
the distributors did not have a binding commitment to pay for the
products, in direct contravention of GAAP.
Significantly, defendants' unlawful accounting practices enabled
defendants to portray Take-Two as a financially strong company that was
experiencing dramatic revenue growth, and which was poised for future
success when, in fact, the Company's purported success was the result of
improper accounting practices. On December 14, 2001, following rumors of
a possible restatement of Take-Two's financial results, Take-Two's
common stock fell 31% --$4.72 a share to $10.33 per share. During the
Class Period, Take-Two shares traded as high as $24.50 per share.
Defendants were motivated to misrepresent the Company's financial
results, by among other things, their desire to sell approximately
900,000 shares of Take-Two common stock during the Class Period at
artificially inflated prices for proceeds of over $15 million.
INDUSTRY
CLASSIFICATION: SIC Code: 7372 Sector: Technology Industry: Software &
Programming
NAME OF COMPANY
SUED: Take-Two Interactive Software Inc.
COMPANY TICKER:
TTWO COMPANY WEBSITE:
http://www.take2games.com
FIRST
IDENTIFIED COMPLAINT IN THE DATABASE Fischbein, et al. v. Take-Two
Interactive Software Inc., et al. COURT: S.D. New York DOCKET NUMBER:
JUDGE NAME: DATE FILED: 12/18/2001 SOURCE: Business Wires CLASS PERIOD
START: 02/24/2000 CLASS PERIOD END: 12/17/2001 TYPE OF COMPLAINT:
Unamended/Unconsolidated PLAINTIFF FIRMS IN THIS OR SIMILAR CASE:
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, LLP (New York, NY) One
Pennsylvania Plaza, New York, NY, 10119-1065 (voice) 212.594.5300, (fax)
, Rabin & Peckel LLP 275 Madison Avenue, New York, NY, 10016 (voice)
212.682.1818, (fax) , email@rabinlaw.com Schiffrin & Barroway, LLP 3
Bala Plaza E, Bala Cynwyd, PA, 19004 (voice) 610.667.7706, (fax)
610.667.7056, info@sbclasslaw.com
TOTAL NUMBER OF
PLAINTIFF FIRMS: 3
February 28, 2002 message from
Allen Plyler
Bob,
Take-Two
Interactive just restated their last restatement.
Allen Plyler
Keller Graduate School of Management, Chicago, Illinois.
Important
Database --- From the Scout Report on February 1, 2001
LLRX.com:
Business Filings Databases
http://www.llrx.com/columns/roundup19.htm
This column
from Law Library Resource Xchange (LLRX) (last mentioned in the
September 7, 2001 Scout Report) by Kathy Biehl becomes more interesting
with every revelation of misleading corporate accounting practices. This
is a straightforward listing of state government's efforts to provide
easy access to required disclosure filings of businesses within each
state. Each entry is clearly annotated, describing services offered and
any required fees (most services here are free). The range of
information and services varies considerably from very basic (i.e. "name
availability") to complete access to corporate filings. The noteworthy
exception here is tax filings. Most states do not currently include
access to filings with taxing authorities.
I added the above to my
evolving monster on accounting and securities fraud at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
From The Wall Street Journal
Accounting Educators' Review on May 23, 2002
TITLE: SEC Broadens Investigation
Into Revenue-Boosting Tricks; Fearing Bogus Numbers Are Widespread, Agency
Probes Lucent and Others
REPORTER: Susan Pulliam and Rebecca Blumenstein
DATE: May 16, 2002
PAGE: A1
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1021510491566948760.djm,00.html
TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Statement Analysis
SUMMARY: "Securities and Exchange
Commission officials, concerned about an explosion of transactions that
falsely created the impression of booming business across many industries,
are conducting a sweeping investigation into a host of practices that pump
up revenue."
QUESTIONS:
1.) "Probing revenue promises to be a much broader inquiry than the
earlier investigations of Enron and other companies accused of using
accounting tricks to boost their profits." What is the difference between
inflating profits vs. revenues?
2.) What are the ways in which
accounting information is used (both in general and in ways specifically
cited in this article)? What are the concerns about using accounting
information that has been manipulated to increase revenues? To increase
profits?
3.) Describe the specific
techniques that may be used to inflate revenues that are enumerated in
this article and the related one. Why would a practice of inflating
revenues be of particular concern during the ".com boom"?
4.) "[L90 Inc.] L90 lopped $8.3
million, or just over 10%, off revenue previously reported for 2000 and
2001, while booking the $250,000 [net difference in the amount of wire
transfers that had been used in one of these transactions] as 'other
income' rather than revenue." What is the difference between revenues and
other income? Where might these items be found in a multi-step income
statement? In a single-step income statement?
5.) What are "vendor allowances"?
How might these allowances be used to inflate revenues? Consider the case
of Lucent Technologies described in the article. Might their techniques
also have been used to boost profits?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman,
University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
--- RELATED ARTICLES ---
TITLE: CMS Energy Admits Questionable Trades Inflated Its Volume
REPORTER: Chip Cummins and Jonathan Friedland
PAGE: A1
ISSUE: May 16, 2002
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1021494984503313400.djm,00.html
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on
May 27, 2004
TITLE: SEC Gets Tough With Settlement in Lucent Case
REPORTER: Deborah Solomon and Dennis K. Berman
DATE: May 17, 2004
PAGE: A1
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108474447102812763,00.html
TOPICS: Criminal Procedure, Financial Accounting, Legal Liability,
Revenue Recognition, Securities and Exchange Commission, Accounting
SUMMARY: After a lengthy investigation into the accounting practices
of Lucent Technologies Inc., the Securities and Exchange Commission is
expected to file civil charges and impose a $25 million fine against the
company. Questions focus on the role of the SEC in financial reporting.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)? When was the
SEC established? Why was the SEC established? Does the SEC have the
responsibility of establishing financial reporting guidelines?
2.) What role does the SEC currently play in the financial reporting
process? What power does the SEC have to sanction companies that violate
financial reporting guidelines?
3.) What is the difference between a civil and a criminal charge?
What is the difference between a class-action suit by investors and a
civil charge by the SEC?
4.) What personal liability do individuals have for improper
accounting? Why does the SEC object to companies indemnifying
individuals for consequences associated with improper accounting?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
Bob Jensen's threads on revenue accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm
One-time Internet booster Henry
Blodget, who recently left Merrill Lynch, is reportedly one of several
stock analysts being probed for alleged conflicts of interest ---
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,48992,00.html
From The Wall Street Journal's
Accounting Educator Reviews on January 24, 2002
TITLE: Ex-Official at Leslie Fay
Gets Nine-Year Sentence for Accounting Fraud
REPORTER: Staff Reporter DATE: Jan 21, 2002
PAGE: B2
LINK:
http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011571420328020280.djm
TOPICS: Accounting, Accounting Fraud, Accounting Law, Fraudulent Financial
Reporting, Legal Liability, Negligent Misrepresentation
SUMMARY: Paul F. Polishan, the
former chief financial officer and senior vice president of Leslie Fay,
was convicted of 18 felony counts for his role in overstating the earnings
of Leslie Fay between 1989 and 1993. Mr. Polishan was sentenced to serve
nine years in prison. Questions deal with accountants' liability and
consequences of fraudulent financial reporting.
QUESTIONS:
1.) In what situations is overstating earnings a crime? What other
penalties could result from overstating earnings? Do you think overstating
earnings should result in a prison sentence? Support your answer.
2.) Were Leslie Fay's financial
statements audited? What responsibility does the auditor bear concerning
the earnings overstatement?
3.) In what situations would an
independent auditor be liable under common law for overstated earnings?
What defenses are available to the auditor?
4.) In what situations would an
independent auditor be liable under civil law for overstated earnings?
What defenses are available to the auditor?
5.) In what situations would an
independent auditor be liable under criminal law for overstated earnings?
What defenses are available to the auditor?
6.) Who is harmed by overstated
earnings? How are each of these groups harmed?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman,
University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
In
particular, it has raised awareness of “hollow swaps”, where two
telecoms companies exchange identical amounts of network capacity, then
book the purchase cost as capital expense and the sale as revenue.
Although C&W says it does not use hollow swaps, it has recently
admitted to using another controversial accounting method to book the sale
of “indefeasible right of use” (IRU) contracts. C&W booked the
contracts, which give access to its telecoms network, as upfront revenue
even though they were spread over periods of up to 15 years. Such deals
— which were outlawed in 1999 by regulators in America — boosted
C&W’s revenues by £373 million in 2001.
Chris Ayres and Clive Mathieson, London Times Online, March 1, 2002
---
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/0,,5-222235,00.html
Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners ---
http://www.cfenet.com/home.asp
The Association
of Certified Fraud Examiners is an international, 25,000-member
professional organization dedicated to fighting fraud and white-collar
crime. With offices in North America and chapters around the globe, the
Association is networked to respond to the needs of anti-fraud
professionals everywhere.
In the April 2002 issue of
Journal of Accountancy, Joseph Wells, chairman of the Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners (CFE), reviews the results of a survey by CFE
and discusses the implications for CPAs.
http://www.accountingweb.com/item/77418
In Congressional testimony on
February 14, James G. Castellano, the chairman of the American Institute
of CPAs said the Institute plans to release a draft of a new standard by
the end of February. The objective of the new standard is to help auditors
detect new types of management fraud.
http://www.accountingweb.com/item/72560
A message from Andrew Priest on
February 34. 2002
Yahoo! is
carrying this news story in respect of Tyco International. Apparently
the firm spent $US8 billion in its past three fiscal years on more than
700 acquisitions that were never announced to the public. The story is
at
http://au.news.yahoo.com/020205/2/3vlo.html .
Is this another
Andersen client? :-) Seriously does anyone know who the auditor is on
this one?
Thanks
Andrew Priest
The auditor is
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC)
"Convicted former CFO seeks $60 million
from Tyco," by Karen Freifeld, Reuters, May 7, 2012 ---
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/sns-rt-us-tyco-swartzbre84617r-20120507,0,3939041.story
Former Tyco
International Chief Financial Officer Mark Swartz, who is serving a
prison sentence for looting the company, has sued for $60 million in
retirement and other money he says he is owed.
The lawsuit, which
was made public on Monday, accuses Tyco of breach of contract and
unjust enrichment for not paying him some $48 million from an
executive retirement agreement, $9 million in reimbursement for New
York taxes, and other money.
"We know of no basis
on which Swartz could recover from the company," Tyco spokesman Paul
Fitzhenry said in an email, although the company had not yet been
served with the complaint.
Swartz was convicted
of grand larceny and securities fraud in 2005, along with former
Chief Executive Dennis Kozlowski. They are each serving sentences of
8-1/3 to 25 years.
In his lawsuit,
filed in New York state Supreme Court, Swartz charges the company
knew the Manhattan District Attorney intended to bring criminal
charges against him when it approved the main contract at issue in
the lawsuit.
"The directors and
management of Tyco approved the subject agreement with actual
knowledge that he was shortly to be indicted," the lawsuit said.
Tyco has a separate
suit against Swartz pending in U.S. District Court in the Southern
District of New York. That case, to fix the amount Swartz must pay
Tyco, is scheduled for trial in September, Fitzhenry said.
Tyco also brought a
similar suit in federal court against Kozlowski. In that case, the
judge dismissed Kozlowski's counterclaims for pay and benefits after
1995. The remaining issues are scheduled for trial in August,
Fitzhenry said.
Swartz was chief
financial officer of the industrial conglomerate from 1995 through
2002. He was indicted in September 2002 and convicted in June 2005.
Besides the prison sentence, he paid $72 million in court-ordered
restitution and fines.
Since September,
Swartz has been assigned to Lincoln Correctional Facility in New
York city, a minimum-security facility where Kozlowski also is
based, according to the state Department of Corrections.
Swartz is on a
furlough schedule where he can leave on Wednesdays and return on
Monday. He is scheduled to appear before the Parole Board in
September 2013.
Kozlowski, whose
purchase of a $6,000 shower curtain made him a symbol of corporate
greed, was denied parole in April.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on Tyco are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
Search for Tyco at the above site.
Unlike many companies that failed after their top executives went to
prison, Tyco was and remained financially very sound because of
successful acquisitions engineered by the top executives that went to
prison for criminal activities along the way, including stealing from
the company.
SEC News, Regulations, and
Litigation Summaries ---
http://www.sec.gov/
On May 20, 2002 the Securities and Exchange Commission announced
proceedings against Big Five firm Ernst & Young. The case reaches back to
the years before E&Y's consulting practice was sold to Cap Gemini. It
involves alleged independence violations due to product sales and
consulting fees related to PeopleSoft software, while PeopleSoft was an
E&Y audit client.
http://www.accountingweb.com/item/81348
Update on June 1, 2002 ---
http://www.as411.com/AcctSoftware.nsf/00/prDBD2F8AEEF51127686256BEC00167F9F
In a ruling Tuesday, Brenda Murray, the chief administrative law
judge at the SEC, granted Ernst & Young's motion for summary judgment
and dismissed the case without prejudice. Ms. Murray agreed with Ernst &
Young that more than one SEC commissioner needed to approve the action
for it to be valid.
From Double Entries on July 5,
2002
In the
first-ever auditor independence case against a foreign audit firm, the
Securities and Exchange Commission has brought a settled enforcement
action against Moret Ernst & Young Accountants (Moret), a Dutch
accounting firm now known as Ernst & Young Accountants. The case arises
from Moret's joint business relationships with an audit client. In
today's order, the SEC censured Moret for engaging in "improper
professional conduct" within the meaning of Rule 102(e) of the SEC's
Rules of Practice, and ordered Moret to comply with certain remedial
undertakings, including the payment of a $400,000 civil penalty. This is
the first time that the SEC has ordered any audit firm to pay a civil
penalty for an auditor independence violation. Moret consented to the
order without admitting or denying the SEC's findings. Full details from
the SEC in our full article.
Just click on through
"SEC List of Accounting-Fraud
Probes Grows, Stretching Agencies Resources," The Wall Street Journal,
July 6, 2001 ---
http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB994366683510250066.djm
WSJ Interactive
Questions on July 12, 2001
1.) "The most
visible indicator of improper accounting-and source of new
investigations-is the growing number of restated financial reports."
Based on your knowledge of APB Opinion 23, why is this statement true?
What other sources of information does the SEC use to trigger
investigations?
2.) Why would
the SEC want to "ferret out" questionable accounting practices before
"word of a company's accounting problems has leaked and battered its
stock price"? How does this goal relate to the SEC's responsibilities?
What steps are they undertaking to accomplish this goal?
3.) What is
fraudulent financial reporting (as opposed to an accounting error)? Why
might the current economic circumstances lead to greater incidences of
fraudulent financial reporting?
4.) Read the
summary of a research study entitled "Fraudulent Financial Reporting:
1987-1997: An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies" at the AICPA web site
http://www.aicpa.org/news/p032699b.htm How do the factors
identified in this study provide a basis for helping the SEC to detect
questionable accounting practices earlier than is now the norm?
5.) How are
executives' compensation packages tied to share prices? What are the
benefits of such compensation arrangements? Why do current market
conditions enhance the risk that executives may be willing to undertake
earnings management practices to enhance their own salaries? What market
reactions to earnings announcements exacerbate these incentives to
manage earnings?
American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants ---
http://www.aicpa.org/index.htm
There are many articles on fraud in the back issues of the Journal of
Accountancy ---
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/joahome.htm
AICPA Issues Proposed Standard On
Fraud Detection
On February 28, 2002, the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA) released a
draft of a revised audit standard on Consideration of Fraud in a Financial
Statement Audit. If adopted, this updated standard will replace the
current standard with the same name, (Statement on Auditing Standards No.
82).
http://www.accountingweb.com/item/73718
From the Journal of
Accountancy in July 2002 ---
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/jul2002/index.htm
Risk
Management/Internal Audit
BEYOND TRADITIONAL AUDIT TECHNIQUES
Paul E. Lindow and Jill D. Race
Instead of just reviewing required controls, internal auditors can
broaden their approach both within and outside the audit process to
identify areas for risk management improvements. Here’s a case study
on how the internal audit group at California Federal Bank redefined its
role to add more value and become key advisers to the company.
Risk Management/Litigation Services
FIVE TIPS TO STEER CLEAR OF THE COURTHOUSE
Paul Sweeney
As litigation costs continue to mount, businesses want to develop
efficient strategies to identify and monitor vulnerabilities and avoid
lawsuits. CPAs have the expertise to offer clients solutions to several
corporate risk management problems.
From The Wall Street Journal
Accounting Educators' Review on March 7, 2002
TITLE: Auditing Standard for
Detecting Fraud Is Posed
REPORTER: Dow Jones Newswires
DATE: Mar 01, 200
PAGE: A4
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,BT_CO_20020228_009080.djm,00.html
TOPICS: Auditing
SUMMARY: The article implies that a
new auditing standard on fraud actually has been issued, but the actual
document issued was an exposure draft of a proposed standard.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Access the AICPA web site to
read the actual document issued by the Auditing Standards Board at
http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/auditstd/consideration_of_fraud.htm
The article begins with the
statement that "the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants issued expanded fraud guidance
for U.S. auditors..." Is this statement correct?
2.) In the second paragraph of the
article, the author states, "The guidance comes at a time when
questionable accounting practices have surfaced in the wake of
bankruptcy-law filings by...Enron Corp. and Global Crossing Ltd."
Were these recent scandals the reason behind the new auditing standard
proposal? If not, what were the ASB's reasons for proposing the new
standard? (Hint: again see the actual document at the AICPA's
web site.)
3.) The proposed new standard would
mandate specific requirements to search for fictitious entries and perform
other tests to search for fraud under certain circumstances. Compare
and contrast this proposal to current auditing requirements to search for
fraud.
SMALL GROUP ASSIGNMENT: The proposed
auditing standard requests feedback from respondents to assess each of the
major areas of the new standard (e.g., classification of risk
factors for fraud, identification of revenue recognition as the major area
for risk of fraud, consideration of the risk of management override of
fraud, inquiry of audit committees about fraud, and the attitude of
professional skepticism). Divide the class into small groups and
assign one section to each group to draft a response to the questions
posed in the exposure draft.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman,
University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
Institute of Internal Auditors
(IIA) ---
http://www.theiia.org/
Can Internal Auditors truly be
independent while being employed by the entity and seen as working for the
management to achieve organizational goals? In theory, External Auditors
are more likely to be perceived as independent, but is it not the case
that Internal Auditors appear to have little or no independence?
http://www.accountingweb.com/item/65704
Articles on Internal Auditing and
Fraud Investigation
Web Site of Mark R. Simmons, CIA CFE
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~msimmons/
Internal
auditing is an independent, objective assurance and consulting
activity designed to add value and improve an organization's operations.
It helps an organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a
systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the
effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance
processes. (Institute of Internal Auditors)
Fraud
Investigation consists of the multitude of steps necessary to
resolve allegations of fraud - interviewing witnesses, assembling
evidence, writing reports, and dealing with prosecutors and the courts.
(Association of Certified Fraud Examiners)
This site focuses on topics
that deal with
Internal Auditing and
Fraud Investigation with certain
hyper-links to other associated and relevant sources. It is
dedicated to sharing information.
Certified Forensic
Investigators in Canada --- FAQs ---
http://www.homewoodave.com/frequently%20asked%20question.htm
"Regulators Check the New
Economy's Books," by Karl Schoenberger, The New York Times, August
19, 2001 ---
http://college2.nytimes.com/guests/articles/2001/08/19/864842.xml
Responding to
widespread concerns that investors were not always given reliable
financial information in that time of frantic revenue growth, regional
offices of the S.E.C., the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
United States attorney's office here are cooperating in a legal
crackdown on accounting violations.
A tough
law-enforcement response to accounting irregularities, of course, is not
new. In the past year, federal investigators have pursued cases of
irregularities at companies like Waste Management (news/quote), Cendant
(news/quote) and Sunbeam. But now the government is turning up the heat
in Silicon Valley, home to a preponderance of questionable accounting,
particularly among software companies, during the Internet boom.
Over the last
four years, nearly one in five accounting restatements — red flags for
potential misconduct — have been by companies in California, according
to a study by Arthur Andersen, the accounting firm. (Arthur Andersen was
itself the recent subject of an S.E.C. civil sanction for the way it
audited the books of Waste Management, the trash-disposal company, and
agreed to a settlement without admitting or denying civil fraud
allegations.) In the same four- year period, the total number of
restatements for all industries has nearly doubled, Arthur Andersen's
report said.
So far in the
technology sector, federal investigators and prosecutors here have set
their sights on relatively small companies, where a high proportion of
problems center on what accountants call improper "revenue
recognition" — the recording of revenue that does not exist. It
could be, for example, from a pending sale that is misclassified as
completed, or a service contract in which money has not yet changed
hands.
The Arthur
Andersen study of accounting restatements from 1997 to 2000 showed that
27 percent of the restatements nationwide had been filed in the software
and computer industries. About 62 percent of the software companies
involved had annual gross revenue of less than $100 million.
The rise of
accounting fraud investigations, specifically related to overstatement
of revenue, reflects a serious white-collar crime trend in the
high-technology sector in recent years, said Leslie B. Caldwell, chief
of the securities fraud section for the United States attorney's office
here.
"The pressure
to do this in the technology industry was intense because the
expectation for growth was so high, and it wasn't sustainable," she
said, without commenting on specific cases.
The inquiry at
Indus International focused on revenue for the third quarter of 1999.
According to the shareholder lawsuits against the company and former
executives, the revenue total included sales derived from "irregular
contracts," money that was not received during the quarter in question.
Last October, Indus International agreed to settle the suits for $4.3
million without admitting or denying wrongdoing.
Previously, Ms.
Caldwell said, her office waited for the S.E.C. to refer cases for
criminal investigation. But now, "we're taking the bull in our own
hands," she said.
"There are
a number of matters under investigation of corporations that cooked
their books to meet Wall Street's expectations — expectations that the
companies themselves created," she added.
Harris Miller,
president of the Information Technology Association of America, a trade
group, said accounting problems in the software industry had arisen
because of what he called vague rules covering sales of licensing
agreements, which resulted in many companies claiming revenue that they
expected to receive.
"The rules for
revenue recognition were a bit cloudy, not just for software companies
but for any company that delivers services over time," Mr. Miller said.
His organization, he said, was not making excuses for executives who
intentionally violated regulations. "Yes, there was pressure to drive
the top line," he said. "But you can never justify misconduct."
Ms. Caldwell's
unit of seven lawyers, responsible for expediting complicated and
paper-intensive securities investigations, was created in February 2000
by Robert S. Mueller, United States attorney for the Northern District
of California, whom President Bush chose to serve as director of the
F.B.I.
Matthew J.
Jacobs, a spokesman for the United States attorney's office here, said
Mr. Mueller had made the prosecution of accounting fraud a major
objective because of its prevalence in both economic booms and declines.
Mr. Mueller was not available for comment, the United States attorney's
office said on Friday.
In its most
prominent case to date, Ms. Caldwell's team obtained indictments last
September against two former executives at McKesson, the pharmaceutical
and medical technology company based here. The defendants were charged
with accounting fraud related to the 1999 merger of McKesson and HBO &
Company, a software company based in Atlanta. Prosecutors said $9
billion in shareholder losses resulted. The defendants pleaded not
guilty to the charges, and the case is in the pretrial phase.
The F.B.I. and
federal prosecutors here are investigating about 50 cases of possible
criminal securities fraud in the district, more than a dozen of them
focusing on companies suspected of accounting fraud.
In addition to
Indus International, at least six small and medium-size software
companies in Northern California are under federal criminal and civil
investigation, according to officials. Among them is Critical Path, a
San Francisco company that sells e-mail messaging technology to other
businesses and reported $135.7 million in sales last year. In February,
after an internal investigation that led to the departure of its chief
executive and two other executives, Critical Path restated revenue for
the third and fourth quarters of 2000, subtracting a total of $19.4
million from what it had claimed. The company's share price plummeted
and class-action suits were filed, contending deception and fraud.
Critical Path has said it is cooperating with investigators.
In another
case, the S.E.C. filed a civil complaint last September in Federal
District Court here against three former executives of the Cylink
Corporation (news/quote), a Santa Clara company that makes cryptographic
software for computer network security, accusing them of violating
accounting rules by recognizing spurious transactions as sales in
quarterly earnings statements. The complaint said Cylink recognized more
than $900,000 in revenue in the second quarter of fiscal 1998 for sales
in which some customers were given a three-month window to cancel their
orders.
"When senior
officers are involved in this kind of conduct we're going to hold them
responsible," Robert L. Mitchell, head of the S.E.C.'s enforcement
office in San Francisco, said when the complaint was issued. "Companies
only act through individuals." The S.E.C. settled a separate
administrative "cease and desist" proceeding with the corporation. In
the civil litigation against three former Cylink executives, each was
accused of securities fraud, circumvention of Cylink's internal controls
and falsification of records.
In July,
according to court records, one of the former Cylink executives, Thomas
Butler, who had been vice president for sales, signed a consent decree,
without admitting or denying the charges, agreeing to pay a $100,000
fine and forfeit a $25,000 bonus he had been awarded by Cylink for his
sales performance. Litigation against the two other defendants is still
pending. Robert Fougner, Cylink's general counsel, said that he and
other company executives could not comment on the case.
In cases in
which criminal charges are brought against company executives, potential
penalties can be harsh. In addition to fines imposed by the S.E.C., a
conviction of an executive on a criminal securities fraud charge can
result in a prison sentence of up to 10 years and a fine as high as $1
million. Conviction on a lesser charge, like wire fraud or conspiracy,
carries a maximum five- year sentence and $250,000 fine.
Until recently,
the pace of these investigations had been plodding, owing to their
complexity and a shortage of resources. For example, Scorpion
Technologies, a software company that was based in Los Gatos, Calif.,
and is now defunct, was accused of fraudulently claiming as much as $3.6
million of its $12.4 million in reported 1991 revenue. The S.E.C. filed
civil charges and federal prosecutors indicted company executives on
securities fraud charges in 1996. The last of the Scorpion defendants,
John T. Dawson, was indicted in 1999. Last November, he pleaded guilty
to charges that he had helped create offshore companies that masqueraded
as buyers of Scorpion software products. Mr. Dawson's sentencing hearing
is set for Oct. 2.
The Justice
Department has a high threshold for criminal prosecution in these cases,
with a distinction being made between misleading accounting practices
and criminal fraud, Ms. Caldwell said. A suspicious accounting trick, by
itself, cannot be the basis for seeking an indictment without other
facts establishing deliberate fraud, she said.
Some major
technology companies, including Lucent Technologies (news/quote), have
been subject to recent class- action suits contending irregularities in
the way the companies accounted for their growing revenue before their
businesses weakened. The S.E.C. started examining Lucent's books last
November, after the company had disclosed an accounting problem, fired
an employee and filed a restatement lowering its revenue for its fiscal
year 2000 by $679 million.
Lucent,
however, seems an exception. For now, at least, it appears to be the
smaller technology companies that are receiving the most scrutiny.
Continued at
http://college2.nytimes.com/guests/articles/2001/08/19/864842.xml
The Securities and Exchange Commission has filed suit against the
founder and five other former top officers of Waste Management Inc. for
massive fraud. The complaint charges the defendants with inflating profits
to meet earnings targets.
http://www.accountingweb.com/item/76329
Note that Waste Management just announced that it was changing
auditors. The auditor up to now was (guess?) Arthur Andersen.
"Channel stuffing" refers to the practice of building
inventories in distribution channels. On July 11, 2002 Bristol-Myers
Squibb, one of the world's largest pharmaceutical companies, confirmed
that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has launched an
"informal inquiry" into its sales practices.
http://www.accountingweb.com/item/85930
Channel stuffing was (is?) common in the tobacco industry
where companies load up sales revenues on deliveries that they know they
will have to take back after the freshness dates on packages expire.
More cartons were (are?) sent to customers than can ever be sold before
expiration dates.
You can read about more revenue reporting tricks at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm
Lurking in the shadows behind the public spotlight on
Andersen and Enron has been a criminal case against
BDO Seidman for failing to report that a client had
misappropriated investor funds. Legal steps this week follow a settlement
in April with a goal of removing all criminal charges against the firm.
http://www.accountingweb.com/item/84264/ee2eE47/3825
BDO Seidman snags guilty verdict
National CPA firm BDO Seidman LLP has been found
grossly negligent by a Florida jury for failing to find fraud in an audit that
resulted in costing a Portuguese Bank $170 million. The verdict opens up the
opportunity for the bank to pursue punitive damages that could exceed $500
million.
"BDO Seidman snags guilty verdict," AccountingWeb, June 26, 2007 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=103667
Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=103667
PricewaterhouseCoopers accused of lax audits of Gazprom
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EUROPEAN
BUSINESS
Gazprom:
Russia's Enron?
Angry investors
are accusing PricewaterhouseCoopers of lax audits of Gazprom. Did the
accounting firm ignore the energy giant's insider dealing and shady
asset transfers?
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_07/b3770079.htm?c=bweuropefeb13&n=link1&t=email
NEWS ANALYSIS
Can UBS Tame
Enron's Wild Traders?
That's the key
question facing the Swiss bank as it prepares to take over the Texas
company's energy-trading business
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/feb2002/nf2002026_4221.htm?c=bweuropefeb13&n=link2&t=email
"Economic slowdown brings rise in
accounting trickery," by Rachel Beck, The Detroit News, August 18,
2001 ---
http://detnews.com/2001/business/0108/20/business-272230.htm
There are
growing concerns that the nation's economic downturn is compelling
companies to aggressively seek out ways to make their financial
statements look better than they really are.
Just this
year, dozens of companies have been caught in the act. Among them:
--
Xerox Corp. restated earnings after admitting that it did not properly
follow certain accounting rules at a Mexican division.
-- ConAgra Foods Inc. reduced earnings by more than $100 million
after discovering fictitious sales and earnings at one of its
subsidiaries.
-- Kroger Co., the giant supermarket chain, revised down its earnings
for 1998-2000, saying executives at its Ralphs Grocery subsidiary
conspired to hide cash from auditors and senior management.
Accounting
manipulation has become so prevalent that lawmakers in Washington are
considering hearings on the issue, while the Securities and Exchange
Commission has seen a sharp rise in the number of companies under
investigation.
"There is a
big question looming out there: Why is there such a massive
deterioration in accounting practices and can it be stopped?" said
Joseph Carcello, an accounting professor at the University of Tennessee.
Last year there
were 156 financial restatements, up from 150 in 1999 and 91 in 1998. The
restatements in the last three years add up to more than the combined
total for the previous eight years, according to the Financial
Executives International, a Morristown, N.J.-based group representing
senior corporate financial officers.
About $31.2
billion in market value was wiped out following restatements, as
investors sold stock in such companies, according to FEI.
Many companies
claim restatements don't mean they have broken any rules, saying that
accounting standards are open to interpretation. Often courts are left
to decide whether laws were violated. Most problems stem from how
revenue is counted. Corporations can falsely boost sales figures by
recording revenue before delivering products or asking customers to
receive goods before they need them. Sometimes they will claim sales
before the goods are sold at all.
"There is not a
"one-shoe-fits-all" mentality that works in accounting," said Mary Ellen
Carter, assistant professor of accounting at Columbia University's
Graduate School of Business. "Management is in the best position to know
what accounting choices capture their business ... but they also know
what accounting choices don't."
Companies hire
outside auditors to verify their financial statements, mainly to check
if accounting standards are met. Yet accounting firms are known to
overlook irregularities, sometimes in an attempt to hold on to their
audit contracts and more lucrative consulting services for the same
companies.
In June,
accounting titan Arthur Andersen LLP agreed to pay a $7 million civil
fine to settle federal allegations that it issued false and misleading
audit reports for Waste Management Inc. from 1993 to 1996 that inflated
the trash hauler's profits by more than $1 billion. Andersen neither
acknowledged nor denied the allegations.
"There is
supposed to be checks in the system that prevent management from being
able to do such things, but it is clear that the checks have eroded,"
said Michael Lange, a partner in Berman DeValerio Pease Tabacco Burt &
Pucillo, a Boston law firm that handles investor lawsuits. At
Centennial Technologies, top executives fabricated sales of "Flash 98,"
a nonexistent product, to friends of former CEO Emmanuel Pinez. The
company also created false sales records by shipping fruit baskets to
Pinez' friends and recording the shipments as $2 million in revenues.
The maneuvers made it look like Centennial made a profit of $12 million
in 1996, when in reality the company lost $28 million. Based on
the earnings reports, shares of Centennial increased 450 percent in 1996
to $55.50 a share. Faraone managed to get in at $46 a share, but after
the fraud was uncovered in early 1997, the stock plunged to $3.
Last year,
Pinez was convicted in federal court, and sentenced to five years in
prison and a $150 million fine. Other companies -- blue-chips and
startups -- have employed similar schemes. Sunbeam Corp. and its
former CEO Albert Dunlap are accused of creating the illusion of a
speedy turnaround after he arrived at the company in 1996. An SEC
lawsuit filed in May alleges that the company shifted revenues to
inflate losses under the old management and added the sales back to
inflate income under Dunlap. The lawsuit also charges that Sunbeam
offered discounts to customers that stocked up on merchandise months
ahead of schedule, but failed to disclose that such revenue would hurt
future results. Dunlap has denied the allegations.
Xerox, the
troubled business machine maker, restated earnings from 1998 to 2000 in
May after acknowledging that its Mexican subsidiary improperly booked
sales and hid bad debts. Questions over its accounting practices helped
push its stock down more than 60 percent in the last year.
ConAgra, whose
brands include Bumble Bee tuna and Butterball turkeys, said in May that
falsified sales at its United Agri Products Cos. subsidiary would force
it to lower earnings from 1998 to 2000 by about $123 million. The
company and the SEC are informally investigating the accounting
practices.
Last month,
software maker AremisSoft Corp. announced it was cooperating with a SEC
probe into unaccounted-for revenues. The company claimed $7.1 million in
sales to the Bulgarian government last year, but auditors have confirmed
receipt of only $1.7 million.
The SEC has
become increasingly aggressive in its crackdown against alleged
offenders. About 260 investigations now under way, a substantial jump
from years past. Lawmakers are also expressing concern about
accounting fraud. Rep. Richard Baker, R-La., chairman of a House
subcommittee on capital markets, said last month that he may call
hearings on the issue. There's also been a rise in the number of
shareholder lawsuits. A recent study by the audit and consulting firm
PricewaterhouseCoopers found that of the 201 class-action federal and
state lawsuits filed against corporations in 2000, some 53 percent
contained accounting allegations. That's up from less than 40 percent in
1995.
"The spectrum
of lawsuits goes across all industries, and all sizes of business" said
Harvey Kelly, partner in the corporate investigations practice at
PricewaterhouseCoopers. "It shows that no one is immune to these kind of
challenges." Faraone joined a class-action lawsuit against
Centennial, never expecting to see any of his losses returned. A
settlement of the case in 1998 got him 666 shares back, then valued at
about 50 cents each, and he sold them immediately. The company,
however, was bought this year by Solectron Corp. for $108 million.
Centennial stockholders collected $13.79 for every share they owned. If
Faraone had waited, he could have recovered nearly $9,200. He,
however, has no regrets about selling the stock.
"This company
did me wrong in a sneaky way," he said. "I wasn't willing to take any
more chances."
Ernst & Young (EY)
Daily News Sites for Accountancy, Tax, Fraud, IFRS, XBRL,
Accounting History, and More ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/AccountingNews.htm
Daily News Sites for Accountancy, Tax, Fraud, IFRS, XBRL, Accounting
History, and More ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/AccountingNews.htm
From the CFO Journal's Morning Ledger on July 17,
2020
Good morning. Germany’s
top financial supervisor received detailed warnings about deceptive
financial practices at Wirecard starting
in 2008, but repeatedly failed to investigate the allegations,
raising questions about the country’s ability
to enforce securities rules that
protect investors.
Documents show the Federal Financial
Supervisory Authority, or BaFin, saw Wirecard’s former CEO as more
trustworthy than his critics because he bought a large chunk of
shares in the company at a key moment. BaFin also decided against
assuming direct oversight of Wirecard, which could have increased
its ability to probe the company. Wirecard recently filed for
insolvency proceedings after it failed to account for $2
billion in funds.
Ernst & Young,
Wirecard’s longtime auditor, in a separate case in China said its
local entity Ernst & Young Hua Ming LLP bears
no responsibility for Luckin
Coffee Inc.’s
2019 financial statements and what it called the company’s
fraudulent misconduct. Earlier this year, Luckin revealed that more
than $300 million of its 2019 sales were fabricated by a group of
employees.
The quality of audits by EY and other
“Big Four” audit firms, including Deloitte, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers,
also is under scrutiny in the U.K. The country’s accounting
regulator said earlier this week audit quality has deteriorated
further.
WeWork: Auditor EY didn’t warn about the risks ---
https://thedig.substack.com/p/wework-auditor-ey-didnt-warn-about
Are EY's IPO clients "special" or is a lack of ICFR
warnings a key risk indicator?
Why is it that Ernst & Young LLP’s IPO clients appear
to be like the citizens of Lake Wobegon — stronger, better-looking,
and above average?
None of its
2019 IPO clients, including WeWork, disclosed material weaknesses in
internal controls over financial reporting in their S-1s, according
to my reporting on September 4.
However,
more than 20% of the audit clients of all the other Big 4 firms —
Deloitte, KPMG and PwC—include management disclosures of ICFR
weaknesses in their S-1s.
EY’s audit
clients also have a lower percentage of going concern opinions than
average, according to recent research.
Much has
been written about WeWork’s canceled IPO.
Here’s how Professor John
C. Coffee, Jr., the Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law at Columbia
University Law School and Director of its Center on Corporate
Governance
summed it up:
Clearly,
this failure was overdetermined, as many competing causes can
explain it, including: (1) the extraordinary level of self-dealing
that its CEO, Adam Neumann, regularly engaged in; (2) the corporate
governance structure that locked up all voting power and control in
him; (3) a system of non-GAAP metrics that more than raised
eyebrows; (4) an extraordinarily high valuation for a company that,
despite its claims of being a high-tech start-up, was closer to a
simple real estate firm; and (5) the unstable personality of its
founder (who, on a continuum from Elon Musk (brilliant but reckless)
to Martin Shkreli (a felon with pretensions), seems closer to the
latter end).
WeWork’s first S-1 was
filed on August 14, and then two amended S-1s were filed on
September 4th and 13th. It was the one made public on September 4th
that
I wrote about,
with my former MarketWatch colleague Ciara Linnane.
Once they
read about them in the S-1, just about everyone but EY, and the SEC,
was concerned about all the related-party transactions and conflicts
of interest WeWork’s CEO Adam Neuman had with the company.
Continued in article
Painting Gold to Look Like Silver in Dubai
An E&Y whistleblower claims his former employer is guilty of suppressing
information about money laundering and other wrongdoing in its audit of a Dubai
gold company ---
http://www.businessinsider.com/whistleblower-sues-ey-alleged-corruption-2018-1
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board has
barred William Trainor, former partner at EY, over its allegations that
Trainor bungled the 2013 audit of internal control over financial
reporting for Forest Oil Corp. ---
https://goingconcern.com/ex-ey-audit-partners-lousy-audit-judgment-landed-him-a-25000-fine-from-the-pcaob/
From the CFO Journal's Morning Ledger on October16, 2017
Ernst & Young,
auditor fined for misconduct
Ernst & Young LLP
and a senior statutory auditor have been fined after admitting
misconduct in relation to the audit of financial statements of
Tech Data Ltd., formerly known as Computer 2000 Distribution
Ltd., for the financial year ended Jan. 31, 2012.
"Jury Says Ernst & Young Liable for Madoff
Investor’s Losses: E&Y found negligent in role as auditor for feeder fund,"
by Jacquiline Palank, The Wall Street Journal, November 13, 2015 ---
http://www.wsj.com/articles/jury-says-ernst-young-liable-for-madoff-investors-losses-1447453162?alg=y#livefyre-comment
Thank you Tom Selling for the heads up.
Reply from Bob Jensen on November 15,
2015
Hi Tom,
What I find somewhat worrisome in
the article is the following quotation from EY:
EY was not the
auditor of any Madoff entity; we were among the many auditors of
funds that chose to use Madoff as their investment adviser.
While we regret the investors’ losses, no audit of a Madoff-advised
fund could have detected this Ponzi scheme,” Ernst & Young’s Amy
Call Well said in an email.
This raises questions about the
extent to which an auditor must verify third party investment,
insurance, and deposit quality. Consider a hypothetical example.
When EY auditors receive a verification that their client does
indeed have casualty insurance in the amount of $10 million from
Every State Life and Casualty Company to what extent is the auditor
responsible to verify the quality of that insurance beyond verifying
that Every State is indeed licensed in every state to sell life and
casualty insurance and the auditor's reading of the insurance
contract terms? The auditors might even go a step further to
determine that Every State was indeed audited by KPMG. But KPMG is
not likely to share inside working paper information with EY
regarding Every State.
To what extent is EY liable above an
beyond the KPMG audit report on the financial statements of Every
State?
My guess is that EY would not be
liable to FutureSelect Portfolio Management Fund for its Madoff
Losses had the Madoff Fund been properly audited. But the Madoff
Fund was not audited by a NY-licensed auditor where the fund was
headquartered. Perhaps EY is more liable in cases where EY relied on
investment verification that was not properly audited.
I am not an expert on the fine print
of the rules of auditing and never taught auditing. To what extent
are auditors liable to verify the quality of deposits in banks,
receivables from third parties, insurance coverage, etc.? Years ago,
when I was a lowly staff auditor in the Denver Office of EY, I can't
recall that we went beyond verifying that the client's accounts
existed in the correct balances reported by the client.
This touches on something that
always made me uneasy about test checking inventory. One of our
Denver Office audit clients was a piston manufacturer in Pueblo,
Colorado. When we showed up on Sunday mornings to count pistons we
found two types of containers at the end of each production line.
The company said one container had pistons that met quality control
standards. The other container was for rejects. But as an auditor I
could not tell any difference between a good piston and a bad
piston. We simply took the client's word that those pistons it
called satisfactory were indeed satisfactory, including the pistons
that were boxed up and purportedly ready to ship to customers.
Fortunately our client was more honest than a well known
manufacturer of salad oil at the time.
It would really be interesting to
know how this FutureSelect case would have been decided for EY
if the Madoff Fund had been audited by KPMG.
Thanks,
Bob Jensen
Toshiba Accounting Scandal Draws Record ($60 million) Fine From Regulators
---
http://www.wsj.com/articles/toshiba-accounting-scandal-draws-record-fine-from-regulators-1449472485?mod=djemCFO_h
Ernst & Young trying to figure out how
it's auditors missed a multi-year $1+ billion accounting fraud in
Toshiba's financial statements
"E&Y Japan arm launches internal probe of Toshiba audit," Reuters
Technology, July 31, 2015 ---
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/01/us-toshiba-accounting-e-y-idUSKCN0Q62UD20150801
The
Japanese affiliate of Ernst & Young LLC has launched an in-house
investigation (using over 150 investigators) into its audit of
Toshiba Corp in the wake of the electronics maker's $1.2 billion
accounting scandal, a person with knowledge of the matter said.
Ernst &
Young ShinNihon LLC has established a team of about 20 executives to
investigate whether there were any problems with how it conducted
its audits of Toshiba, the person said.
The person
spoke on condition of anonymity. No one could be reached at the
company's offices in Tokyo on Saturday.
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
Audit firms traditionally defend themselves that they're not hired to be fraud
detectors unless the frauds materially affect financial statements. The Toshiba
accounting fraud had a monumental impact on financial statements.
From the CFO Journal's
Morning Ledger on July 15, 2015
Toshiba executives likely to step down over
accounting scandal
http://www.wsj.com/articles/toshiba-executives-expected-to-step-down-over-accounting-scandal-1436870307?mod=djemCFO_h
Toshiba Corp.
President Hisao Tanaka and several other executives are likely to
step down soon over an accounting scandal at the Japanese company
involving profit inflated by more than $1 billion. The other
executives that people familiar with the situation expect to leave
Toshiba include Norio Sasaki, a former president who is currently
vice chairman. The board is also likely to undergo significant
membership changes.
. . .
Toshiba has detailed a number of cases in which business units
failed to book adequate costs for executing contracts, causing
the company to overstate profit. Toshiba said in June that it
would need to
reduce operating profit for the 2009
through 2013 fiscal years by a total of ¥54.8 billion. People
familiar with the matter said the figure has now ballooned to at
least ¥150 billion ($1.2 billion). Toshiba declined to comment.
During
those years, the company’s combined operating profit totaled
¥1.05 trillion, so even at the higher level, the reduction would
amount to less than 15% of the company’s operating profit over
the five years.
Continued in WSJ
article
Bob Jensen's threads on
creative accounting ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory02.htm#Manipulation
Bob Jensen's threads on EY
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
"Some Ernst & Young Audits Had
Deficiencies, PCAOB Says, by Michael Rapoport, The Wall Street Journal,
June 30, 2015 ---
http://www.wsj.com/article_email/some-ernst-young-audits-had-deficiencies-pcaob-says-1435692093-lMyQjAxMTE1MDA2MTQwMzE0Wj
The
government’s audit regulator found deficiencies in 20 audits
conducted by Ernst & Young LLP in the latest annual inspection of
the Big Four accounting firm.
The
deficient audits found by the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board represent 36% of the 56 reviewed by the board in its 2014
inspection report of Ernst & Young, issued Tuesday. That is an
improvement from last year’s report, in which the board found 28
deficient audits at E&Y out of 57 audits or partial audits surveyed,
a deficiency rate of 49%.
A
deficiency, as defined by the PCAOB, means the audit firm hadn’t
obtained enough evidence to support its approvals of a company’s
financial statements and internal controls. It doesn’t mean the
financial statements are inaccurate or that the problems found
haven’t since been addressed.
In a
statement, E&Y said it is “fully committed to delivering
high-quality audits.” The firm said it believes its audit quality
and that of the profession as a whole are “improving and we are
committed to continuing this process.”
Among the
types of deficiencies the inspectors found in E&Y’s audits were
insufficient testing of controls related to revenue recognition,
problems with testing of controls related to oil and gas properties
and insurance reserves, and a failure to identify that a company had
miscalculated its loss on conversion of its convertible notes.
In two of
the audits surveyed, E&Y revised its opinion of the company’s
internal controls after the inspection to issue a negative opinion,
the PCAOB said.
The PCAOB
didn’t identify the companies involved in each deficient audit, in
accordance with its usual practice.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on
Ernst & Young ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on
professionalism in auditing ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001c.htm
From the CFO Journal's Morning
Ledger on May 26, 2015
EY
knew of Wal-Mart Mexico bribery allegations, group claims
http://www.wsj.com/articles/shareholder-group-ctw-says-ernst-young-knew-about-wal-mart-mexico-bribery-allegations-1432580954?mod=djemCFO_h
A small shareholder group, CtW
Investment Group, says Wal-Mart Stores Inc.’s
longtime auditor, Ernst & Young, knew about
possible bribery in Mexico long before the company disclosed it to
U.S. authorities. CtW said in a letter to the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board that Ernst & Young likely should have
reported the suspected bribery to the SEC and should be investigated
by the PCAOB, because the acts under investigation and how the
investigation was handled could have affected the retailer’s
financial statements.
"The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy D: The Role of Ernst & Young"
Authors
Rosalind Z. Wiggins Yale University - Yale Program on Financial
Stability
Rosalind L. Bennett FDIC, Division of Insurance and Research
Andrew Metrick Yale School of Management ; National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER)
SSRN, October 1, 2015
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2588551
Abstract:
For many years prior to its demise, Lehman Brothers employed Ernst &
Young (EY) as the firm’s independent auditors to review its
financial statements and express an opinion as to whether they
fairly represented the company’s financial position. EY was supposed
to try to detect fraud, determine whether a matter should be
publicly disclosed, and communicate certain issues to Lehman’s Board
audit committee. After Lehman filed for bankruptcy, it was
discovered that the firm had employed questionable accounting with
regard to an unorthodox financing transaction, Repo 105, which it
used to make its results appear better than they were. EY was aware
of Lehman’s use of Repo 105, and its failure to disclose its use. EY
also knew that Lehman included in its liquidity pool assets that
were impaired. When questioned, EY insisted that it had done nothing
wrong. However, Anton R. Valukas, the Lehman bankruptcy examiner,
concluded that EY had not fulfilled its duties and that probable
claims existed against EY for malpractice. In this case,
participants will consider the role and effectiveness of independent
auditors in ensuring complete and accurate financial statements and
related public disclosure.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22
Keywords: Systemic Risk, Financial Crises,
Financial Regulation
From the CFO Journal's Morning Ledger on April 16, 2015
Ernst & Young settles with N.Y. AG.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/ernst-young-n-y-attorney-general-close-to-10-million-settlement-over-lehman-1429116634?mod=djemCFO_h
Ernst & Young LLP
agreed
Wednesday to pay $10 million to settle
allegations from the New York attorney general’s office that the Big Four
accounting firm had turned a blind eye when its client Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc. misled investors before its 2008 collapse.
Jensen Comment
I think this is on top of an earlier $99 million settlement in the Lehman
Brothers repo accounting scandal ---
"$99 Million Buys
EY Ticket Out Of Private Lehman Litigation, Finally," by Francine McKenna,
re:TheAuditors, October 21. 2013 ---
http://retheauditors.com/2013/10/21/99-million-buys-ey-ticket-out-of-private-lehman-litigation-finally/
Ernst & Young ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernst_%26_Young
"Ernst & Young's PCAOB Inspection Report Results Managed to
Get Much Worse," by Caleb Newquist, Going Concern, August 6, 2013 ---
http://goingconcern.com/post/ernst-youngs-pcaob-inspection-report-results-managed-get-much-worse-0
"Guide to PCAOB Inspections," Center for Audit Quality, 2012 ---
http://www.thecaq.org/resources/pdfs/GuidetoPCAOBInspections.pdf
Note this has a good explanation of how the inspection process works.
PCAOB Inspection Report Database ---
http://pcaobus.org/inspections/reports/pages/default.aspx
"PCAOB to consider proposing new auditor’s
reporting model," by Ken Tysiac, Journal of Accountancy,
August 8, 2013 ---
http://journalofaccountancy.com/News/20138496.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on professionalism and
independence in auditing and financial reporting ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001c.htm
"E&Y fined and reprimanded over audit work (in England)".
by Kevin Reed, Accountancy Age, March 13, 2012 ---
http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/news/2159027/-fined-reprimanded-audit
E&Y had similar reprimands by the PCAOB in the U.S. only the fines
were bigger ---
See below
From the CFO Journal's Morning Ledger on April 16, 2015
Ernst & Young settles with N.Y. AG.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/ernst-young-n-y-attorney-general-close-to-10-million-settlement-over-lehman-1429116634?mod=djemCFO_h
Ernst & Young LLP
agreed
Wednesday to pay $10 million to
settle allegations from the New York attorney general’s office that
the Big Four accounting firm had turned a blind eye when its client
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. misled investors
before its 2008 collapse.
Jensen Comment
I think this is on top of an earlier $99 million settlement in the
Lehman Brothers repo accounting scandal ---
"$99 Million
Buys EY Ticket Out Of Private Lehman Litigation, Finally," by Francine
McKenna, re:TheAuditors, October 21. 2013 ---
http://retheauditors.com/2013/10/21/99-million-buys-ey-ticket-out-of-private-lehman-litigation-finally/
Noble Group ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noble_Group
From the CFO Journal's Morning Ledger on April 10, 2015
Noble Group faces fresh attack on its accounting practices
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/1/#inbox/14ca2fd477bbb090
Commodities trader Noble Group Ltd.’s
accounting practices came under attack from short seller
Muddy Waters LLC, the third outfit this year to question
its financial statements. Muddy Waters said Noble “seems to exist
solely to borrow and burn cash,” and alleged its 2011 acquisition of
PT Alhasanie was designed to reduce a quarterly
loss reported that year.
"Noble Group Faces Fresh Attack From Muddy Waters," by Jake Maxwell
Watts And Mia Lamar, The Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2015 ---
http://www.wsj.com/articles/noble-group-faces-fresh-attack-from-muddy-waters-1428552536?mod=djemCFO_h
SINGAPORE—U.S. short-seller Muddy Waters
LLC has joined in the criticism being lobbed at
Noble Group Ltd.
, becoming the third outfit this year to
publicly question the commodities trader’s management and financial
statements.
In a 14-page report dated Wednesday and
published on its website, Muddy Waters said Noble “seems to exist
solely to borrow and burn cash,” and alleged its 2011 acquisition of
Indonesian coal-mining service company PT Alhasanie was designed to
reduce a quarterly loss reported that year, Noble’s first as a
public company.
Noble has repeatedly denied any wrongdoing.
In a statement Thursday, it said it “completely rejects the
allegations” while noting that Muddy Waters had publicly stated that
it has a short position in Noble’s shares. “The company is studying
the report in detail,” it said.
Noble is the second Singapore-listed
commodities trader that Muddy Waters has criticized. In 2012, it
attacked
Olam International
Ltd.
’s accounting practices and
investments, which left Muddy Waters facing off with Singapore
state-investment firm Temasek Holding Pte. Ltd. Temasek eventually
helped lead a buyout of Olam.
Muddy Waters had more success with a 2011
attack on Chinese forestry company Sino-Forest Corp., which was
later delisted in Toronto and filed for bankruptcy. Prominent U.S.
hedge-fund manager
John Paulson has said his firm, Paulson &
Co., suffered millions of dollars in losses from a stake in
Sino-Forest.
Noble first came under attack in February
when an anonymous outfit calling itself Iceberg Research claimed
Noble’s balance sheet overvalued its commodities contracts and
associate companies. Hong Kong-based GMT Research has also published
critical reports on Noble, including one this week that questioned
the company’s valuation of Mongolian mining assets.
“Muddy Waters’ entrance into the fray
validates some genuine concerns that exist over Noble’s financial
statements,” GMT founder Gillem Tulloch said Thursday. “We believe
Noble’s financial statements are some of the most curious we’ve seen
in Asia.”
Noble earlier rebutted some of Iceberg
Research’s allegations. In March, it
filed a lawsuit in Hong Kong against Iceberg and
a former Noble employee it said it suspected was behind the reports.
Singapore-listed shares of Noble, which is
headquartered in Hong Kong and trades in commodities such as oil and
coal, fell as much as 9% in Thursday trading. They closed at 0.86
Singapore dollars (63 U.S. cents), down 5.5% for the day and more
than 28% since the Iceberg report was published in mid-February.
In its report, Muddy Waters echoed
Iceberg’s criticism of Noble’s acquisitions.
“When we scratched the surface of [the PT
Alhasanie] transaction, we found numerous red flags and aggressive
actions by Noble,”
Muddy Waters founder Carson Block
wrote.
For instance, the report alleged, the commodities trader paid
$300,000 for PT Alhasanie and immediately booked a gain of more than
$46 million.
Continued in article
"Noble Group Says Auditor (Ernst & Young) Needs More Time to Review
Accounts," by Yuriy Humber, Bloomberg News, February 26, 2015 ---
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-26/noble-group-says-auditor-needs-more-time-to-review-accounts
Full Annual Report for the Noble Group ---
http://www.thisisnoble.com/ar2011/pdfs/2011/Noble Annual
Report 2011.pdf
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value (mark-to-market) accounting ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory02.htm#FairValue
"Ernst & Young
Settles Over Audits of Sino-Forest, Second Chinese Company:
E&Y to Pay $7.2 Million to Settle Allegations By the Ontario Securities
Commission," by Ben Dummett, The Wall Street Journal,
September 30, 2014 ---
http://online.wsj.com/articles/ernst-young-settles-over-audits-of-sino-forest-another-company-1412101002
TORONTO—Ernst & Young LLP agreed to pay 8
million Canadian dollars ($7.2 million) to settle allegations by
Canada's biggest securities regulator that it didn't adequately
audit the financial statements of Sino-Forest Corp. and another
Chinese company.
The accounting firm admitted no wrongdoing
in the settlement, which came after it and the Ontario Securities
Commission reached a tentative agreement earlier this month.
The E&Y-Sino-Forest case, the
higher-profile of the two cases, was related to the collapse in 2012
of what was then one of the largest publicly traded forest-products
companies in Canada following allegations the company inflated the
value of its timber assets.
The OSC alleged late in 2012 that E&Y
breached provincial securities laws by failing "to perform
sufficient audit work to verify the ownership and existence of
Sino-Forest's most significant assets" in China between 2007 and
2010. It also alleged in 2013 that E&Y didn't follow accounting
rules for its auditing of Zungui Haixi Corp.'s financial statements,
ahead of the Chinese shoe maker's 2009 initial public offering and
subsequent stock listing on the junior Canadian TSX Venture
Exchange.
"We believe that this settlement…is in the
best interests of all parties" and "enables us to put this matter
behind us," a spokeswoman for Ernst & Young said in an email.
The regulator had planned to hold
administrative hearings for both cases, but decided a settlement
agreement was a more efficient way to handle the cases.
The settlement "will avoid two complex and
lengthy hearings dealing with the interpretation and application of
auditing standards in connection with audits of financial statements
of reporting issuers, the exercise of professional judgment and the
conflicting reports of multiple expert witnesses," according to the
settlement agreement.
Continued in article
Question
When can an auditor having sex with the Chief Accounting Officer (CAO)
be an appropriate application of "detail testing?"
Possibility
It may beat statistical sampling and analytical review combined. Maybe
it should not ipso facto get a bad rap. But it does become more
difficult to remain independent.
Yeah it probably should get a bad rap for the same reason teachers
should not assign grades to students with whom they are "sleeping."
"Ventas Fires EY as Auditor Over Independence Violation," by
Adrienne Gonzalez, Going Concern, July 10, 2014 ---
http://goingconcern.com/post/ventas-fires-ey-auditor-over-independence-violation
And sent out
a press release, no less:
Ventas, Inc. (NYSE: VTR) (“Ventas” or
the “Company”) today announced that the Company has dismissed
Ernst & Young (“E&Y”) as its public accounting firm, effective
July 5, 2014, due to E&Y’s determination that it was not
independent solely as a result of an inappropriate personal
relationship between an E&Y partner and Ventas’s former Chief
Accounting Officer and Controller. Ventas also announced that,
following such dismissal, its Audit Committee has engaged KPMG
LLP (“KPMG”) as the Company's independent public accounting
firm.
E&Y has advised the Company that,
solely due to the inappropriate personal relationship, it
determined that it was not independent of the Company during the
periods in question. As a result of such determination, E&Y
stated that it was obligated under applicable law and
professional standards to withdraw (and it has withdrawn) its
audit reports on the Company’s financial statements for the
years ended December 31, 2012 and 2013, and its review of the
Company’s results for the quarter ended March 31, 2014. E&Y’s
decision to withdraw such audit reports and review was made
exclusively due to the personal relationship in question, and
not for any reason related to Ventas’s financial statements, its
accounting practices, the integrity of Ventas’s controls or for
any other reason.
The crony in question, one Robert J. Brehl, has "separated
himself" from his duties as Chief Accounting Officer and Controller.
Continued in article
Added Jensen comment?
Are the working papers on this audit X-rated?
Bob Jensen's threads on audit firm independence and
professionalism ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001c.htm
"Ernst & Young Sued Over Georg Schaeffler Tax Probe,"
by Patricia Hurtado, Bloomberg Businessweek, February 26, 2014
---
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-25/ernst-young-sued-over-georg-schaeffler-tax-probe.html
Ernst & Young LLP was accused by
the U.S. of failing to comply with an Internal Revenue Service
request for documents in an investigation of the tax liability of
the billionaire chairman of industrial-bearing maker Schaeffler AG.
The agency had asked for testimony
and “books, records and other data” tied to a probe of Georg F. W.
Schaeffler, the office of
Manhattan U.S. Attorney
Preet Bharara said in a lawsuit filed yesterday.
The company, jointly owned by
Schaeffler and his mother, Maria-Elisabeth Schaeffler, is struggling
to reduce debt from an attempt spearheaded by former Chief Executive
Officer Juergen Geissinger to buy a limited stake in car-component
maker Continental AG that backfired amid the global recession of
2008.
Schaeffler, 49, has a net
worth of $7.8 billion, according to the Bloomberg Billionaires
Index, and he ranks 168th on the index. He owns 80 percent of
Schaeffler, which is based in Herzogenaurach,
Germany, and is the
world’s second-largest maker of automotive, aerospace and industrial
roller bearings.
The probe is tied to Schaeffler’s
personal tax liabilities dating back to 2004, according to a
declaration by Paul Doerr, an IRS agent investigating the case. The
investigation also covers 2005, 2009 and 2010, Doerr said in the
declaration filed in a Manhattan federal court lawsuit brought by
Schaeffler last year against the IRS.
Tax Liability
Doerr said he previously conducted
an investigation into Schaeffler’s tax liabilities for 2007 and
2008.
The agency previously investigated
“the valuation of assets related to the restructuring and
refinancing transactions that occurred in 2009 and 2010, after the
acquisition of Continental AG,” Doerr said.
Continued in article
Follow the Herd: "All the Firms are Doing It"
"EY Bets The Farm On Advisory With Vision 2020," by Mark O’Connor as
Guest Post on Frnacine's blog re:TheAuditors, June 30, 2013 ---
http://retheauditors.com/2013/06/30/ey-bets-the-farm-on-advisory-with-vision-2020-a-guest-post-from-mark-oconnor/
Francine sked Mark O’Connor, CEO and
Co-founder of Monadnock
Research, to comment on the
Going Concern post
about Ernst & Young’s “Vision 2020″ announcement.
Caleb Newquist at
GoingConcern.com thinks Ernst & Young’s goals are a bit ambitious.
One of our
sources at EY thought so [too] and told us there are a few
key things that would have to happen for the firm to come
even remotely close to achieving it:
1) A rapidly
expanding advisory business
2) More
acquisitions and
3) A lot more
Partners, Principals, and Executive Directors.
Caleb also mentions
the “I” word.
As the advisory
business expands, the more potential there will be for
conflicts with the firm’s audit clients. Since EY and the
rest of the Big 4 want to be known as trusted business
advisors rather than simply auditors or tax preparers, the
advisory business gravy train will continue to be a priority
and circumventing independence will become an ongoing
exercise. We’ve already seen EY
cross the line in this area with
the revelation that it was lobbying on behalf of audit
clients, so it stands to reason they can make make arguments
in other cases for the sake of expanding business lines that
expand their influence can command larger fees while the
audit business gets pushed into the background.
Really, the timing of all this is
perfect for EY because all
the firms are doing it
and they
don’t give a damn if people think they’re less independent.
The advisory businesses have momentum and since independence
is in the eye of the beholder, it’s easy for any firm to
say, “That’s just, like, your opinion, man.”
The reality is
the consulting practices of the Big Four audit firms
– and of their lesser competitors – exist in a
regulatory no-man’s land. The PCAOB legally can only address
audit quality and SEC won’t touch it unless there’s an
independence issue with consulting to
audit clients. The SEC’s enforcement actions for independence
violations have, since Sarbanes-Oxley initiated the additional nine
prohibitions against consulting to audit clients, been few and far
between. That’s in spite of
numerous examples that
independence violations are
still occurring and
occurring in a big way.
It’s up to renegade regulators like
Ben Lawsky and private plaintiffs to keep
the consulting side of the audit firms honest.
Here are Mark O’Connor’s comments on Ernst
& Young’s Vision 2020 strategy.
One important aspect of
Ernst & Young’s “Vision 2020” is a
global strategic initiative to reach $50 billion in revenues by
2020. That’s a very aggressive goal, and there are a few
important reasons why that might be both out of reach and bad
for global business.
Lofty goals like EY’s Vision 2020 serve
a promotional purpose to attract top talent, and create the
rationalization for promises of vast internal opportunities to
keep top performers engaged. Beyond that, it allows current “EY”
partners to move from the global advisory leadership sidelines
to join principals at other Big Four firms reaping the rewards
of higher-margin consulting work. But it is on this point that
unintended consequences would likely foreclose any real
possibility that the $50 billion aspect of EY’s 2020 strategic
plan could be executed as currently conceived.
Big Four firms tend move in lock-step
without huge percentage year-over-year gains relative to one
another in any line of business without large M&A transactions –
buying or selling. Unless the firm’s strategy was to lower its
quality or margin expectations in an attempt to go after the
audit business of other Big Four firms and large auditors around
the world, almost all of EY’s proposed growth will need to come
from advisory. Otherwise, such dramatic growth in assurance
would come at the expense of lower margins across a sector that
already has very low margins. Anything far beyond the current
Big Four average audit growth rate of 3.4% is unlikely, so any
EY scenario with $50 billion in revenues by 2020 based primarily
on assurance practice growth has a probability close to zero.”
Given this, virtually all of EY’s
extraordinary growth would need to come from advisory. EY had
around $13.5 billion in non-assurance revenues in fiscal 2012,
so it would need to grow that by around 266% to reach that goal.
That would require an 11. 5% compound annual growth rate (CAGR)
coming out of our “great global recession”, assuming that the
assurance revenues independently grow at a 3.5% annual rate.
EY’s 2012 advisory non-assurance non-tax growth was close to
13%, so in isolation an 11.5% sustained advisory CAGR might seem
aggressive, but reasonable.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on audit firm professionalism and
independence ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001c.htm
Tom Selling takes on what he claims is a "self-serving" Ernst & Young
"Do Survey Results Mean that External Audits Don’t Protect Against Earnings
Manipulation? (What a Surprise!)," by Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion,
May 10, 2013 ---
Click Here
http://accountingonion.com/2013/05/do-survey-results-mean-that-external-audits-dont-protect-against-earnings-manipulation-what-a-surprise.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+typepad%2Ftheaccountingonion+%28The+Accounting+Onion%29
Jensen Comment
This time I think Tom is on to something. It would be great if E&Y would
reply to his blog post, but I doubt that this is going to happen. The
usual reply is that external auditors are not paid to detect fraud
unless the fraud is material to the audited financial statement
outcomes. It would seem that the survey results in this instance would
mostly affect financial statements in great gobs.
Bob Jensen's threads on creative accounting ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory02.htm#Manipulation
"Ontario court approves
$117M settlement between Ernst & Young, Sino-Forest: It’s believed
to be one of the largest settlements involving an auditor in Canadian
history," The Star, March 20, 2013 ---
http://www.thestar.com/business/2013/03/20/ontario_court_approves_117m_settlement_between_ernst_young_sinoforest.html
The Ontario
Superior Court has approved a $117-million class-action settlement
involving Sino-Forest Corp. and its former auditor, Ernst &
Young.
The agreed
deal will see the accounting firm pay toward a fund to compensate
shareholders of the troubled Chinese-Canadian company, which has
been accused of fraudulently overstating its assets.
It’s
believed to be one of the largest settlements involving an auditor
in Canadian history.
The
class-action had alleged that directors, officers, auditors and
underwriters at timber trader misled investors with its accounting.
Several
shareholders had originally objected to the settlement.
The
company was first accused in 2011 of being a Ponzi scheme by Muddy
Waters Research, prompting investigations by the Ontario regulator
and the RCMP.
Continued in article
"Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Agreement With Ernst & Young LLP To Pay
$123 Million To Resolve Federal Tax Shelter Fraud Investigation," New York
State's Attorney's Office, March 1, 2013 ---
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/March13/EYNPAPR.php
Bob Jensen's threads on the legal troubles of Ernst & Young ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
Was Ernst & Young a
corporate spy?
From the CFO Morning Ledger newsletter on February 19, 2013
Express Scripts
sues E&Y.
Express Scripts has filed a lawsuit against
Ernst & Young
and a former employee for allegedly stealing at least 20,000 pages
containing confidential information and trade secrets, the WSJ’s
Jon Kamp and Michael Rapoport report. Express
Scripts hired E&Y to provide consulting services while combining its
business with Medco Health Solutions. The pharmacy-benefit company
accused E&Y of taking “competitively sensitive cost and pricing
information” and “highly proprietary” documents involving business
and integration strategies, projections and performance metrics. E&Y
confirmed there was a violation of company policies, and that the
individual “at the center of these allegations”–who the Express
Scripts lawsuit said was a Health Care IT Partner named Donald
Gravlin–”is no longer with the firm.” But E&Y also said it will
“vigorously contest the claims” in the lawsuit.
Teaching Case from The Wall
Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on February 23, 2013
Express Scripts Sues Ernst & Young Alleging Document
Theft
by: Jon Kamp and Michael Rapoport
Feb 19, 2013
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Auditing, Big Four Firms,
Consulting, Ernst & Young, Litigation, Trade Secrets, Accounting
SUMMARY: Pharmacy-benefit giant
Express Scripts Holding Co. has filed a lawsuit against accounting
firm Ernst & Young LLP and a former employee for allegedly stealing
at least 20,000 pages of data containing confidential information
and trade secrets. St. Louis-based Express Scripts hired E&Y to
provide consulting services while combining its business with Medco
Health Solutions. The lawsuit seeks "substantial punitive damages,"
and to stop E&Y from using or disclosing the information at issue.
E&Y confirmed there was a violation of company policies, and that
the individual "at the center of these allegations is no longer with
the firm." But E&Y also said it will "vigorously contest the claims"
in the lawsuit. The accounting firm noted it "immediately took all
necessary steps" to secure the data at issue once it became aware of
the matter, and that it's not aware of any instance where the data
was used inappropriately or transmitted to a third party. Express
Scripts uses PricewaterhouseCoopers for auditing work and Deloitte
for tax accounting.
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: This is an
interesting peak into the Big 4 world. This case shows an accounting
firm's potential for liability for employee actions. It also
mentions that the client, Express Scripts, employs three Big 4
accounting firms for three different types of work provided by those
firms: auditing, tax, and consulting.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) What are the facts of this lawsuit? Who
is the plaintiff and who are the defendants? What is the issue in
the case?
2. (Advanced) What is a "Big Four" accounting firm? What
firms are in the Big Four? What are all the various services offered
by Big Four accounting firms? How are Big Four firms different from
other accounting firms? How are they similar?
3. (Advanced) How can companies protect themselves from
accountants and consultants stealing confidential information and
using it for other purposes? In what ways can accountants and
accounting firms be sanctioned for such behavior?
4. (Advanced) The article states that Express Scripts uses
three different firms to do auditing work, tax, and consulting. Why
would a company use different CPA firms for different tasks? On the
other hand, why would a company use one firm for several tasks? With
these factors in mind, how should firms market their array of
services?
Reviewed By: Linda Christiansen, Indiana University
Southeast
"Express Scripts Sues
Ernst & Young Alleging Document Theft," by Jon Kamp and Michael
Rapoport, The Wall Street Journal, February 19, 2013 ---
http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324616604578306650614568108.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC_domainid&mg=reno64-wsj
Pharmacy-benefit giant Express Scripts Holding Co. ESRX -1.14% has
filed a lawsuit against accounting firm Ernst & Young LLP and a
former employee for allegedly stealing at least 20,000 pages of data
containing confidential information and trade secrets.
St.
Louis-based Express Scripts hired E&Y to provide consulting services
while combining its business with Medco Health Solutions. Express
Scripts bought Medco last year to form the largest pharmacy-benefit
manager by prescriptions handled.
These
firms, known as PBMs, managed drug benefits for health plans and
corporate clients, using their buying clout to secure rebates from
drug manufacturers. Express Scripts said in the lawsuit that its
investigation did not show E&Y's actions affecting any patient or
protected health information.
“Express
Scripts hired Ernst to provide consulting services in last year's
Medco deal.”
But Express
Scripts did accuse the big-four accounting giant of taking
"competitively sensitive cost and pricing information" and "highly
proprietary" documents involving business and integration
strategies, projections and performance metrics.
Express
Scripts didn't have a comment on the matter beyond the content of
the court filing, which seeks "substantial punitive damages," and to
stop E&Y from using or disclosing the information at issue. The
lawsuit was filed Thursday in the Circuit Court in St. Louis County,
Mo., and reviewed by Dow Jones Newswires.
E&Y in a
statement Friday confirmed there was a violation of company
policies, and that the individual "at the center of these
allegations"--who the Express Scripts lawsuit said was a Health Care
IT Partner named Donald Gravlin--"is no longer with the firm."
But E&Y
also said it will "vigorously contest the claims" in the lawsuit.
The accounting firm noted it "immediately took all necessary steps"
to secure the data at issue once it became aware of the matter, and
that it's not aware of any instance where the data was used
inappropriately or transmitted to a third party.
According
to Express Scripts' allegations, an investigation launched last
August determined Mr. Gravlin was sending confidential information
from another E&Y employee's Express Scripts email account to an
outside email account. The company accused him of "sneaking into
Express Scripts' headquarters and stealing confidential and
proprietary information" for months.
The PBM
also alleged that E&Y was motivated to facilitate this activity
because it stood to gain from the confidential information, which
could be used to grow and develop additional business both with
Express Scripts and competitors.
Continued in article
"Tax Pays: HP Pays Ernst & Young Two
Million To Testify," by Francine McKenna, re:TheAuditors,
February 18, 2013 ---
http://retheauditors.com/2013/02/18/tax-pays-hp-pays-ernst-young-two-million-to-testify/
The issue of tax
avoidance by corporations is a hot one. In the US and in the UK,
legislators and pundits seeking “tax justice” have changed the
discussion from one of tax breaks that stimulate “jobs and growth”
to one of tax fairness to provide much needed funds for public works
and public commitments in time of economic hardship.
In December
2012, I wrote in the UK publication Accountancy on the
subject of offshore profit shifting by corporations such as
Starbucks, Google, Amazon, and other US multinationals. The UK is
mad as hell and not going to take it anymore. It seems US
multinationals move profits out of the UK via circuitous supply
chain routes leaving no profits, no tax liability and, therefore, no
tax revenue there, for all their hoopla here about success abroad.
Shifting
Multinationals are under
increasing scrutiny for income
shifting and offshoring profits.
Francine McKenna reports
US corporations with activities in
relatively high tax UK avoid tax on
profits by moving income to tax
havens. Loopholes in the US tax code
allow corporations to do this with
impunity. Governments continue to prioritise
a ‘competitive tax environment for
business’ in the hope corporations
will convert profits into economic
growth and jobs. Tax justice and a
fair spread of the deficit reduction
burden have been ignored.
Multinationals
headquartered in the US often reduce
income taxes by shifting profits
offshore. Profit shifting erodes the
corporate tax base and reduces
overall tax revenues. Lower revenues
are squeezing governments all over
the world trying to provide services
during a prolonged period of
economic uncertainty and high
sovereign debt. There are now
significant differences in the tax
burden among corporate taxpayers and
an overall unequal burden on all
taxpayers in the US and in the UK.
Here’s
the PDF of that article from the
December 2012 issue of Accountancy.
So it was
quite a shock for me to learn that, when the debate landed
in the US,
HP paid Ernst & Young, probably
the preeminent tax advisor of the Big Four accounting firms
at least for US multinationals, for testimony before the
Senate Subcommittee on Investigations in September.
Maybe
it doesn’t seem strange to you to see $2 million in “Other”
fees to the auditor show up on the HP proxy. Maybe you
weren’t aware Ernst & Young is already being investigated by
the SEC for independence violations related to tax lobbying.
According to Reuters, Ernst &
Young provided tax lobbying services to audit clients.
The last
time we had a big Big Four independence rules crackdown, it
was 2004. It was Ernst & Young again, sanctioned for its
systems integrator relationship with PeopleSoft, an audit
client. Ernst & Young was suspended from accepting new
public company audit clients for six months.
I bet
you can’t tell me about an SEC or PCAOB enforcement order
for a similar firm-level independence offense since. But
they do occur with some regularity, in my observation. There
was
one in Australia against KPMG that
resulted in an enforcement order. It was suspiciously
similar to what I reported regarding tax services provided
by KPMG to audit client GE. The
KPMG GE issue went away quietly.
And I
reported over the holidays about
PwC’s systems integration relationship with audit client
Thomson Reuters, an inappropriate
business alliance that’s very similar to the PeopleSoft
case. An SEC inquiry of the potential independence was
inadvertently confirmed by PwC, to my editors at Forbes,
when a PwC spokesman complained to them about my recent
reporting. PwC told Forbes editors the SEC had called them
about it even though I had “not given them much time that
morning to respond to the story.” PwC did not request a
retraction or a correction to the story, only a chance to
talk me and Forbes out of it.
That’s not
going to happen.
Here’s what
Ernst & Young did for HP – and Microsoft – in September of
2012. Microsoft was also called by Senator Carl Levin to
testify. Microsoft is a tax lobbying client of Ernst &
Young.
Let’s hope
EY didn’t charge Microsoft for the same appearance.
Continued in artilce.
"Labor group asks
Hewlett-Packard to replace auditor E&Y,"by Dena Aubin Reuters,
January 18, 2013 ---
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/18/us-usa-audit-hewlett-ernst-idUSBRE90H19N20130118
A U.S.
investor activist group affiliated with large labor unions is asking
Hewlett-Packard Co to replace its auditor, Ernst & Young, over the
technology giant's troubled acquisition of UK software company
Autonomy.
Change to
Win Investment Group (CtW), based in Washington, D.C., also is
seeking a revamp of HP's audit committee, which is responsible for
overseeing Ernst & Young's long-standing relationship as the auditor
that reviews HP's books.
Spokesmen
for HP and Ernst & Young declined to comment.
Labor union
pension funds own large stakes in many U.S. companies and often use
them as platforms to push for changes in how those corporations are
managed. Union pension funds tied to CtW invest more than $200
billion in stocks, including shares in HP, said CtW in a letter to
an HP board member on Thursday.
CtW
questioned why Ernst & Young did not spot problems at Autonomy. "HP
is clearly a company facing serious challenges," CtW said in its
letter. "Unfortunately, the highly conflicted, decade-long
relationship between Ernst & Young and HP cannot provide
shareholders with the reassurance they need."
Auditors
are outside accounting firms retained by corporations to vet their
books regularly and offer an opinion on the validity of financial
results. The four firms that dominate auditing worldwide - Ernst &
Young, KPMG, Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers - are faced with
ever-rising scrutiny of their role in investor losses and accounting
lapses.
The CtW
letter was addressed to Rajiv Gupta, chairman of the corporate
governance committee of HP's board. It was signed by William
Patterson, executive director of CtW Investment Group.
Gupta could
not be reached for comment.
HP,
AUTONOMY CLASH
HP said in
November that it overpaid for Autonomy in 2011. HP accused Autonomy
of serious accounting improprieties. Autonomy has rejected the
allegations and said HP was looking for "scapegoats."
CtW urged
HP to name an independent special master to investigate and report
to shareholders on the Autonomy deal, as well as on an earlier
acquisition of Electronic Data Systems Corp (EDS), which CtW said
was "equally disastrous."
HP has said
it is deferring to U.S. and UK regulators to investigate the
allegations it has made against Autonomy.
HP in
August swung to an $8.9 billion quarterly loss as it swallowed a
write-down linked to its $13.9 billion purchase of EDS. That was
followed in November by an $8.8 billion writedown on Autonomy's
value, which HP blamed largely on improper accounting at the
software company.
Ernst &
Young was not Autonomy's auditor. But according to CtW, the
accounting firm had an opportunity to spot Autonomy's problems when
it reviewed the goodwill, or intangible value, that HP recorded for
its acquisition of Autonomy.
However,
one risk expert said CtW was putting the blame in the wrong place. A
separate due diligence team, not the auditor, was responsible for
determining the value of Autonomy, said Peter Bible, chief risk
officer at EisnerAmper, an accounting and consulting firm.
"The
auditors didn't buy the company, HP did. And the people inside HP
ought to be the ones held accountable for the purchase price that
was paid," Bible said.
CtW
questioned whether Ernst & Young was independent enough to audit HP
because of the large amount of non-audit services Ernst provided to
HP, including tax consulting and lobbying.
Washington
Council, a tax lobbying firm acquired by Ernst in 2000, lobbied for
HP from 2000 to 2004, CtW said.
AUDITING,
LOBBYING EYED
Government
lobbying records and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filings
show that Ernst & Young was HP's auditor while Washington Council
was registered as a lobbyist for HP.
Reuters
reported last week that the SEC was investigating whether Ernst
violated auditor rules by letting its lobbying unit perform work for
some major audit clients.
Ernst has
said all of its services for audit clients undergo considerable
scrutiny to be sure they are within the rules.
U.S.
independence rules bar auditors from serving in an "advocacy role"
for audit clients. The goal of this rule is to ensure that auditors
are objective regarding companies they audit so that they can serve
as watchdogs for investors.
It is not
clear what type of lobbying activities would be barred under the
prohibition against advocacy.
The 2002
Sarbanes-Oxley Act restricted the type of non-audit services that
audit firms can provide, but broad exceptions were granted for tax
consulting services.
CtW said
that HP was out of step with its peers in using Ernst for
significant services other than audit work. The other fees paid to
Ernst are much higher than those paid by Dell Inc and Apple Inc to
their audit firms, CtW said.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on
Ernst & Young ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
"Exclusive: SEC probes
Ernst & Young over audit client lobbying," by Sarah N. Lynch and
Dena Aubin, Chicago Tribune, January 7, 2013 ---
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/sns-rt-us-usa-accounting-ernst-secbre9060vx-20130107,0,5471559.story
The
Securities and Exchange Commission is investigating whether auditing
company Ernst & Young violated auditor rules by letting its lobbying
unit perform work for several major audit clients, people familiar
with the matter told Reuters.
The SEC
inquiry began shortly after Reuters reported in March 2012 that
Washington Council Ernst & Young, the E&Y unit, was registered as a
lobbyist for several corporate audit clients including Amgen Inc,
CVS Caremark Corp and Verizon Communications Inc [ID:nL2E8DL649],
according to one of the sources.
The SEC's
enforcement division and its Office of the Chief Accountant are
looking in to the issue, according to the two sources, who spoke in
recent days and who could not be named because the investigation is
not public.
It is
unclear how far along the probe is, or whether it could result in
the SEC filing civil charges against Ernst & Young, one of the
world's largest audit and accounting firms.
An SEC
spokesman declined to comment.
Ernst &
Young spokeswoman Amy Call Well declined to comment on whether the
company was being investigated. "All of our services for audit
clients undergo considerable scrutiny to confirm they are consistent
with applicable rules," she said.
U.S.
independence rules bar auditors from serving in an "advocacy role"
for audit clients. The goal is to allow auditors to maintain some
degree of objectivity regarding the companies they audit, based on
the idea that auditors are watchdogs for investors and should not be
promoting management's interests.
The SEC's
rule does not definitively say whether lobbying could compromise an
auditor's independence. It is more focused on barring legal
advocacy, such as expert witness testimony.
In
interviews last year, former SEC Chief Accountant Jim Kroeker told
Reuters that certain lobbying activities could potentially be
covered under the general prohibition on advocacy. Kroeker is now an
executive at Deloitte, a rival of Ernst & Young.
'ABUNDANTLY
CLEAR' LINE
Harvard
Business School Professor Max Bazerman said on Monday that it was
"abundantly clear" that a firm that is lobbying for a company is no
longer capable of independently auditing that company.
Ernst &
Young has previously said it complied with independence rules. It
also said that it did not act in an advocacy role and that the work
performed by its lobbying unit was limited to tax issues.
Tax
consulting is a permissible activity under auditor independence
rules if it does not involve public advocacy.
About two
months after publication of the Reuters story, federal records
showed Washington Council Ernst & Young was no longer registered as
a lobbyist for Amgen, CVS Caremark or Verizon Communications.
A spokesman
for Amgen did not immediately respond to calls seeking comment.
Verizon and CVS spokesmen declined to comment.
Ernst &
Young also terminated a lobbying relationship with a fourth company,
Nomura Holdings Inc, which also used an E&Y affiliate for auditing
services.
Obtaining an independent view on the books is the main reason
companies are required to hire outside auditors, said Richard
Kaplan, law professor at the University of Illinois.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on
Ernst & Young are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on
audit firm professionalism and independence are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001c.htm
"Ernst & Young
'covered up judge bribe case’," by Jonathan
Russell, London Telegraph, June 30, 2012 ---
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financial-crime/9367075/Ernst-and-Young-covered-up-judge-bribe-case.html
A senior
partner closed an investigation into a £100,000 “bribe” despite
colleagues suspecting the money had been paid to a judge overseeing
a multi-million-pound tax case the company was fighting.
The
allegations were disclosed by former E&Y partner and whistle-blower
Cathal Lyons, who is suing the accountant for $6m for breach of
contract.
He claims
medical insurance he was relying on to treat injuries sustained in a
car accident was withdrawn after he raised the issue of the alleged
bribe with the accountant’s global head office in London.
Mr Lyons
was a partner with E&Y’s Russian practice when the alleged
wrongdoing came to light. It was originally investigated by James
Mandel, E&Y’s general counsel in Moscow. In a witness statement
supplied in support of Mr Lyons’s case, Mr Mandel said he suspected
the payment may have been corrupt and wrote a report to that effect.
“I had the
suspicion that this payment was not a proper payment for legal fees,
but was an illegal payment possibly made to facilitate a positive
outcome of a tax case,” he claimed in his witness statement.
He
suspected that the €120,000 payment via a Russian law firm was made
to influence a 390m rouble (£8.4m) court case brought by Russian tax
authorities investigating a tax avoidance scheme E&Y was using to
pay its Russian partners. E&Y was later cleared of liability in the
case.
The
accountant has admitted there was an investigation into allegations
of bribery, but said the case was closed by Herve Labaude, a senior
partner, in January 2010.
Mr Lyons
claims that after he reported his concerns about the case to E&Y’s
global head office, his medical insurance was withdrawn and he was
dismissed.
In his writ
he says the dismissal flowed from “personal animosity against him
rising from a discussion in late 2010 between the claimant and Maz
Krupski [E&Y’s director of global tax and statutory] regarding
alleged corruption by the practice.”
Mr Lyons relied on his medical insurance to cover the
cost of treatment flowing from a serious car accident he suffered in
2006. The accident left him with permanent disabilities and partial
amputation. It is estimated medical cover in his current condition
would cost $300,000 per year. He is suing for 20 years’ cover, or
$6m.
Continued in article
"Ernst & Young
dismissed from IndyMac shareholder case," by Amanda Bronstad,
Law.com, June 8, 2012 ---
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202558691320&Ernst__Young_dismissed_from_IndyMac_shareholder_case&slreturn=1
Jensen Comments
The courts have been very kind to large auditing firms that allowed
clients to grossly underestimate bad debt reserves and failed to detect
(or at least report) insider frauds and going concern questions for
nearly 2,000 clients that went bankrupt after 2007. This particular
IndyMac case judge was also not a bit sympathetic with the SEC's case in
general.
"An (Almost) Unnoticed $497
Million Accounting Error," by Jonathon Weil, Bloomberg, May
2, 2012 ---
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-02/an-almost-unnoticed-497-million-accounting-error.html
One
telltale sign of a
bull market
is that investors don't care as much about dodgy corporate
accounting practices. A case in point: the public reaction -- or
lack thereof -- to a financial restatement disclosed late yesterday
afternoon by Williams Cos., the natural-gas producer.
Williams
didn't issue a press release about the
restatement. As far as I can tell, there have been no news reports
about the company's accounting errors, which Williams divulged in a
filing with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. They aren't a small matter, though.
As a result
of the restatement, Williams said its shareholder equity fell $497
million, or 28 percent, to $1.3 billion as of Dec. 31. Additionally,
the company said it had "identified a material weakness in internal
control over financial reporting," which is never a good sign. Net
income wasn't affected.
Shares of
Williams were trading for $33.65 this afternoon, down 73 cents,
after setting a 52-week high yesterday. The stock is up 88 percent
since Oct. 4.
Williams,
which is audited by Ernst & Young, said the restatement was
necessary to correct errors in deferred tax liabilities related to
its investment in Williams Partners LP, a publicly traded master
limited partnership in which it owns a 68 percent stake. A Williams
spokesman, Jeff Pounds, declined to comment when asked why the
company didn't issue a press release flagging the restatement.
The answer
seems obvious, though: The company didn't want anyone to write about
it. Oh well.
Bob Jensen's threads on
Ernst & Young are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
"Audit Watchdog Fines Ernst
& Young $2 Million," by Michael Rapoport, The Wall Street Journal,
February 8, 2012 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204136404577211384224280516.html
Ernst &
Young LLP agreed to pay $2 million to settle allegations by the
government's auditing regulator that the firm wasn't skeptical
enough in assessing how a client, Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp.,
accounted for a reserve covering product returns.
The Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board also sanctioned four current or
former partners of the Big Four accounting firm, including two whom
it barred from the public-accounting field. Ernst & Young and the
four partners settled the allegations without admitting or denying
the board's findings.
The $2
million fine is the largest monetary penalty imposed to date by the
board, which inspects accounting firms and writes and enforces the
rules governing the auditing of public companies.
The board
said Ernst & Young and its partners didn't properly evaluate
Medicis's sales-returns reserve for the years 2005 through 2007. The
firm accepted the company's practice of imposing the reserve for
product returns based on the cost of replacing the product, instead
of at gross sales price, when the auditors knew or should have known
that wasn't supported by the audit evidence, the board said.
Medicis
later revised its accounting for the reserve and restated its
financial statements as a result.
Continued in article
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on
January 27, 2012 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204301404577171531838421366.html?mod=djemEditorialPage_t
Ernst Chief Seeks Balance as Industry's Woes Add Up
by: Leslie Kwoh
Jan 24, 2012
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
Click here to view the video on WSJ.com ![WSJ Video]()
TOPICS: Accounting, Audit Firms, Audit Quality,
Auditing, Auditing Services, Fraudulent Financial Reporting, PCAOB,
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
SUMMARY: The article covers an interview with Ernst
& Young CEO James Turley. He comments on the change in the
accounting profession from being self-regulated to highly regulated,
E&Y's performance in regulatory reviews, the performance of the
accounting profession following the financial crisis stemming from
the burst housing bubble, and the situation E&Y faces through its
client Olympus which has admitted to presenting fraudulent financial
statements.
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article is useful in
auditing classes or other classes covering ethics and prevention of
fraudulent financial reporting.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) What are the accounting "industry's woes"
indicated in the title of this article? Base your answer on the
article, the related article, and other knowledge you have.
2. (Introductory) Who regulates the accounting profession?
Describe the process of regulatory review of the accounting and
auditing profession as you understand it. What have been the recent
findings from those reviews at E&Y?
3. (Advanced) The interviewer asks whether "...accounting
firms are scapegoats when clients get into trouble for irresponsible
financial practices." Why do you think accounting firms could be
considered "scapegoats" in these situations?
4. (Advanced) Consider Mr. Turley's response to the
question above. Why do auditors have a responsibility to "lift
confidence in financial reporting"?
5. (Advanced) In the related video, Mr. Turley states that
few companies had to restate financial statements following the
financial crises in contrast to the time period around the Enron
collapse and resulting crisis. When are companies required to
restate financial statements? How does this fact indicate that the
accounting profession has functioned well within the time frame of
the financial crisis following the burst housing bubble?
SMALL GROUP ASSIGNMENT:
E&Y CEO James Turley states that during the 35 years he has worked
in accounting, the profession has gone from being self-regulated to
being highly regulated. Prepare a timeline of that progress in the
accounting profession. Properly cite your sources for this
information. (Hint: begin at the web site of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) on the web at
http://pcaobus.org/About/Pages/default.aspx)
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
RELATED ARTICLES:
Olympus Casts Spotlight on Accounting
by Kana Inagaki
Nov 08, 2011
Online Exclusive
"Ernst Chief Seeks Balance as
Industry's Woes Add Up," by: Leslie Kwoh, The Wall Street Journal,
January 24, 2012 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203750404577173373289374952.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC_domainid
Ernst & Young LLP
and its fellow auditors have spent some uncomfortable time in the
spotlight.
The company has been
under scrutiny since October for its role in the $1.7 billion
accounting scandal at Olympus Corp. A panel appointed by Olympus
cleared Ernst & Young and KPMG Azsa LLC of any wrongdoing last week,
but Japanese regulators continue to investigate the matter.
Meanwhile, a U.S.
watchdog said in December it found deficiencies in one-fifth of the
audits it inspected at Ernst & Young as part of a broader inspection
that found flaws at all the Big Four audit firms. The privately held
company is also still fighting a 2010 lawsuit filed by the New York
attorney general's office alleging it helped Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc. hide its financial woes before the bank's 2008
collapse.
Chairman and Chief
Executive James Turley remains optimistic about Ernst & Young's
global prospects. Last year, Mr. Turley steered the firm toward
growth across its tax, assurance and advisory services, with strong
results in Brazil, India, Africa and China. Global revenues for the
privately owned partnership rose to $22.9 billion for the 2011
fiscal year ending last June, from $21.3 billion a year earlier.
It is a bittersweet
end to a decade-long run for Mr. Turley, who plans to retire in June
2013 after joining the company 35 years ago as a fresh graduate of
Rice University. He will be succeeded by Mark Weinberger, who runs
Ernst & Young's global tax practice.
The 56-year-old CEO
recently talked to The Wall Street Journal about the responsibility
of accounting firms and what should be done to regulate the
profession. Edited excerpts:
WSJ: Has the nature
of the accounting profession changed in the last few years?
Mr. Turley: I've
been in the profession some 35 years now, and it's changed a lot
during those times, from capital market requirements, to the
responsibility we have to investors, to how we work with independent
audit committees. When I started, this was a self-regulated
profession. Today, we're highly regulated.
WSJ: In December,
the government's auditing-oversight board said it found 13
deficiencies in 63 audits at Ernst & Young, and identified flaws at
all Big Four firms. Was this a matter of oversight?
Mr. Turley: This was
a matter of execution. It's a matter of us now analyzing the root
causes of [flawed audits] and figuring out how we continue to
improve our performance in delivery of audits. It's a matter we take
extraordinarily seriously and work closely with our regulator in
this country, the PCAOB [Public Company Accounting Oversight Board],
to continue to improve.
WSJ: Ernst & Young's
Japanese arm, Ernst & Young ShinNihon LLC, is still being
investigated over its role as an auditor in the Olympus accounting
scandal. What's the latest?
Mr. Turley: I can't
say much about a matter that's in the process of being analyzed. But
you should understand that in this two-decades-long issue at
Olympus, we arrived on the scene about a year ago. So we came in
pretty late in the game.
WSJ: Ernst & Young
has been caught up in a string of litigation involving clients
including HealthSouth and Lehman Brothers. How do you maintain
stability?
Mr. Turley: We're in
a very litigious world, and inevitably, when a company of any type
fails or has any problems, one of the Big Four accounting firms
typically has been delivering that work. So we, like all our
competitors, have matters of litigation. Our people understand that.
WSJ: Do you think
accounting firms are scapegoats when clients get into trouble for
irresponsible financial practices?
Mr. Turley: We have
a responsibility to do everything we can to lift confidence in
financial reporting. That doesn't mean we get it right every time.
But in any kind of a crisis, like the world has gone through,
they're trying to point fingers. We all wish—we in this profession,
we in society—we could have seen around the corner and seen that
housing prices were going to tumble, liquidity challenges were going
to come. Unfortunately, no one saw that, and we couldn't see around
the corner any better than anyone else.
WSJ: What else can
be done to improve the quality and transparency of accounting?
Mr. Turley: More
trend information, more qualitative information, more key
performance indicators from companies. Right now, we're essentially
asked to give an on-off switch on how we feel about a set of
financial statements. Are there different ways to communicate with
investors that would be more informative?
WSJ: Ernst & Young
is now in more than 140 countries. In which markets do you see the
most promise and growth?
Mr. Turley: Last
year or so, our fastest-growing market was Brazil. We continue to
see great growth in both China and Southeast Asia. India and Eastern
Europe, especially Russia, continue to perform very well. We're
seeing strong growth in actually all of our businesses now, and in
most of our geographies. Europe is the most challenged, because of
the aftermath of the ongoing crisis that you read about every day.
WSJ: What do you
plan to do after you retire?
Mr. Turley: I
haven't any idea at this point. Most people I talk with who are
retired would say don't make any decisions too fast.
Continued in article
"Dismissed' partner accuses Ernst &
Young of corruption: Accountant Ernst & Young is facing an
allegation of corruption at one of its global headquarters as part of a
whistleblowing case brought by one of its ex-managing partners," by
Jonathan Russell, The Telegraph, December 4, 2011 ---
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/8933219/Dismissed-partner-accuses-Ernst-and-Young-of-corruption.html
The allegation is
made in a High Court case brought against the Big Four accountant by
former employee Cathal Lyons. The ex-E&Y partner claims he was
dismissed from the company and had hundreds of thousands of pounds
worth of medical cover withdrawn after he reported the alleged
corruption to the practice’s director of global tax.
Mr Lyons’ claim in
the High Court relates to his employment by E&Y’s Russian practice.
In 2006 he suffered
a serious road accident resulting in permanent disabilities and
partial amputation. Despite suffering serious medical complications
Mr Lyons continued to work for Ernst & Young, albeit in a reduced
capacity, until he claims he was dismissed in 2010.
Following his
dismissal, the medical insurance cover provided by Ernst & Young was
withdrawn. Mr Lyons claims this was in direct breach of an agreement
he had reached with E&Y that he would be covered by the medical
insurance for life.
His dismissal and
the subsequent removal of his medical insurance were a direct result
of him reporting his concerns about corruption, he claims.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on Ernst & Young
are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
Remember The New Yorker Cartoon
with the CEO saying to the Chief Accounting Officer:
"The only thing that can save us now Digby is an accounting miracle."
"CAN A NEW ACCOUNTING CHIEF SAVE
GROUPON’S ACCOUNTING," by Anthony H. Catanach and J. Edward Ketz, Grumpy
Old Accountants Blog, September 11, 2012 ---
http://blogs.smeal.psu.edu/grumpyoldaccountants/archives/769
Monday September 10 Groupon named a new Chief Accounting Officer,
Brian Stevens, formerly a partner with KPMG.
The question, of course, is whether this move is enough to save face
with the investment community, after the many fiascos we have
discussed, such as our “Still
Accounting Challenged” and “First
10-K.”
So, in a move to
provide some constructive advice, we offer Mr. Stevens a few simple
suggestions. First, do not merely mouth “transparency” as some sort
of mantra, but embrace financial reporting transparency, believe it,
live it, and report transactions and events as if your economic life
depended on it. That means no more gross/net revenue games, no more
peculiar or low quality gains, as investment gains can be, and no
more disclosures about inventory management systems when there is no
inventory account on the balance sheet.
Continued in article
"Groupon Revisited: New
Mission, New Reporting Issues," Anthony H. Catanach, Jr., Grumpy
Old Accountants, March 29, 2013 ---
http://grumpyoldaccountants.com/blog/2013/3/29/groupon-revisited-new-mission-new-reporting-issues
Bob Jensen's threads on Groupon
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
Do a word search for Groupon
Teaching Case from The Wall Street Journal Weekly Accounting
Review on August 17, 2012
Digging Into Online Coupon Firms' Dealings
by: Rolfe Winkler
Aug 12, 2012
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
Click here to view the video on WSJ.com ![WSJ Video]()
TOPICS: Revenue Recognition
SUMMARY: Groupon, Inc reported its second quarter
earnings after the close of the market on Monday, August 13, 2012.
This article, written in advance of that earnings announcement,
cautions investors "to dig deeply into the results....Last fall, Groupon started...to sell discounted products, in addition to its
core daily deals for restaurants, spas, and [other] such
[services]....Notable is how the accounting treatment of this
business inflates net revenue growth...[When] Groupon takes the
products into inventory [as in 75% of the first-quarter Groupon
Goods deals, the company] accounts for sales on a gross basis, not a
net basis....As Groupon Goods accounts for more net revenue growth,
it could be masking weakness in the core daily deals business." The
related article discusses the actual quarterly results that were
reported and the video also was prepared after the quarterly filing.
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article may be used to
introduce topics in revenue recognition, particularly between sales
of goods as a principal and offering services as an agent.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) From your own knowledge and use of the
service or from another source, describe Groupon's business model.
Cite any sources you use other than your own knowledge of the
business.
2. (Introductory) What new business has Groupon recently
launched?
3. (Introductory) As described in the article, compare the
accounting treatment for Groupon's newly launched business with its
original one.
4. (Advanced) In your opinion, should this difference in
accounting treatment exist? Support your answer.
5. (Advanced) Why does the author conclude that "Groupon is
making it tough [for investors and other financial statement users]
to understand its business"?
6. (Introductory) Refer to the related article. What
results shown in the actual financial statement filing are related
to the issues discussed in the main article?
7. (Introductory) Refer to the related video prepared after
the quarterly financial statement filing. According to the
interviewee--Mr. George Stahl, Dow Jones Newswires Deputy Managing
Editor--what is "confusing" about the company's revenue?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
RELATED ARTICLES:
The New Deal at Groupon Isn't Enough
by Rolfe Winkler
Aug 14, 2012
Page: C8
"Digging Into Online Coupon Firms' Dealings," by: Rolfe
Winkler, The Wall Street Journal, August 12, 2012 ---
http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444900304577581660314854018.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC_domainid&mg=reno-wsj
Not every dollar of Groupon's GRPN -6.40%
revenue is created equal anymore. Will investors get a full
explanation when the Internet coupon company reports second-quarter
earnings Monday?
Groupon reported a surprising acceleration
in its North American business in the first quarter, with net
revenue rising 33% from the previous quarter. That was up from the
fourth quarter's 11% increase. That improvement, said Chief
Executive Andrew Mason, was due to technology that targets customers
with coupons they are more likely to buy. That may give investors
comfort, because it suggests Groupon isn't relying just on a huge
marketing budget to drive growth. Trouble is, it doesn't appear to
be the whole story. Related Reading
Groupon Staff Feel the Heat Ahead of
Groupon Earnings, Investors Bet on a Big Move
Investors will want to dig deeply into the
results, which are expected to show net revenue increased 2% quarter
over quarter to $573 million and earnings stayed flat at minus two
cents a share. Last fall, Groupon started a business called Groupon
Goods to sell discounted products, in addition to its core daily
deals for restaurants, spas and such. That business took off in the
first quarter, driving roughly 10% of North American gross billings,
data provider Yipit says. Notable is how the accounting treatment of
this business inflates net revenue growth overall. About 75% of
first-quarter Groupon Goods deals were so-called first party deals,
Yipit estimates. For these, Groupon takes the products into
inventory and accounts for sales on a gross basis, not a net basis.
That contrasts with regular Internet
coupons in which net revenue reflects only Groupon's share of what a
customer pays, typically about 40%. Analyst Ken Sena of Evercore
Partners estimates that Groupon Goods accounted for a bit more than
half of first-quarter net revenue growth. As Groupon Goods accounts
for more net revenue growth, it could be masking weakness in the
core daily deals business. Yipit data suggest Groupon's North
American gross billings declined 2% in the second quarter from the
first. Considering Europe's slowdown, Groupon's international
business—about 60% of the total— may have slowed even more.
Continued in article
"GROUPON’S FEEBLE TAX ASSETS:
WE TOLD YOU SO…AGAIN!" by Anthony H. Catanach and J. Edward Ketz, Grumpy
Old Accoutants Bllog, June 11, 2012 ---
http://blogs.smeal.psu.edu/grumpyoldaccountants/archives/685
Bob Jensen's threads on Groupon
Search for "Groupon" at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
Multiple Teaching Cases
About Accounting at Groupon
Teaching Case on Groupon
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on
April 6, 2012
SEC Probes Groupon
by: Shayndi Raice and Jean Eaglesham
Apr 03, 2012
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
Click here to view the video on WSJ.com ![WSJ Video]()
TOPICS: Cash Flow, Contingent Liabilities, Internal
Controls, Reserves, Restatement
SUMMARY: As described by Colin Barr in the related
video, "One month after they came out with their fourth quarter
numbers, '[Groupon] said--guess what-- "Oh, those were wrong..." The
company reissued is report for the quarter and year ended December
31, 2011 because they had not booked a sufficient reserve for
customer refunds. In the first quarter of 2012, customer refunds
under the company's policy exceeded the amount that management had
expected because the company faces higher refund rates when selling
Groupons for higher priced goods.
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article is useful in a
financial reporting class to cover corrections of errors,
restatements, accruals for contingent liabilities, and the
difference between earnings and cash flows. The article conveys a
sense of the need for confidence in financial reporting in order for
investors and others to have confidence in management's abilities.
Also mentioned in the article is the firm's auditor, Ernst & Young,
stating that this event clearly represents a material weakness in
internal control.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) Based on the information in the article
and the related video, what problem is Groupon now having to
correct?
2. (Advanced) Access the press release announcing the
revised fourth quarter and full year 2011 results, available on the
SEC web site at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1490281/000110465912022869/a12-8401_3ex99d1.htm.
What accounts are affected by the revision? What was the nature of
the accounting problem?
3. (Advanced) Why does first quarter 2012 activity result
in accounting changes to fourth quarter 2011 results of operations?
4. (Advanced) What accounting standards require reissuing
Groupon's financial statements as the company has done under these
circumstances? What disclosures must be made in these circumstances?
Provide references to authoritative accounting standards for these
requirements.
5. (Advanced) As noted in the press release, there was no
change to the company's previously reported operating cash flows.
Why not?
6. (Introductory) What sense is portrayed in the article
and the video about Groupon's operations and the maturity of its
leadership in handling a public company? How does this viewpoint
stem from the accounting problems that they have faced in the first
quarter of operating as a public company?
7. (Advanced) How has the company's stock price reacted to
this announcement?
8. (Advanced) (Refer to the related article) What is a
material weakness in internal control?
9. (Advanced) (Refer to the related article) Do you think
that Groupon's auditor Ernst & Young needed to perform any systems
testing to make the statement about internal control that was quoted
in the article? Explain your answer.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
RELATED ARTICLES:
Groupon Forced to Revise Results
by Shayndi Raice and John Letzing
Mar 31, 2012
Page: A1
"SEC Probes Groupon," by: Shayndi Raice and Jean Eaglesham, The
Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2012 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577319870715221322.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC_domainid
The Securities and Exchange Commission is
examining Groupon Inc.'s GRPN -2.48% revision of its first set of
financial results as a public company, according to a person
familiar with the situation.
The regulator's probe into the popular
online-coupon company is at a preliminary stage and the SEC hasn't
yet decided whether to launch a formal investigation into the
matter, the person said.
The SEC decision to examine the
circumstances surrounding Groupon's surprise revision is the
start-up's latest run-in with the regulator. Groupon twice revised
its finances before its November IPO. An SEC spokesperson declined
to comment, as did a spokesman for Groupon.
Groupon shares plunged Monday, ending the
day down nearly 17% at $15.27, far below its $20 IPO price. The
selloff came despite damage control efforts by Groupon's top two
executives, Chief Executive Andrew Mason and finance chief Jason
Child.
The Chicago company also closed ranks
around Mr. Child, even as accounting experts and investors
criticized his performance. People familiar with the situation said
Mr. Child, who joined Groupon from Amazon.com Inc. in December 2010,
continues to have the support of Mr. Mason and others at the
company.
Groupon said Friday it was revising its
results for the fourth quarter after discovering executives had
failed to set aside enough money for customer refunds. The company
had reported a loss of $37 million for its fourth quarter. The
accounting changes reduced the company's revenue for the quarter by
$14.3 million and widened its loss by $22.6 million.
The revision came after an unsettling
discovery in late February. That's when Groupon's chief accounting
officer told Messrs. Mason and Child that many customers had
returned their coupons in January, said a person familiar with the
matter. Read More
Heard: Disclosure Could Aid Groupon Therapy
Deal Journal: Analysts Question Groupon Model After Groupon, Critics
Wary of JOBS Act Groupon Forced to Revise Results 3/31/12
What's worse: the four-year-old company
didn't have enough money set aside in its reserves to cover those
refunds, according to this person.
The duo questioned whether this meant
people weren't interested in buying daily deals anymore, according
to this person: "It made [the executives] think there's got to be
something [they] don't understand. A business just doesn't go
sideways and go in another direction overnight." Related Video
Groupon shares slid Monday as several Wall
Street analysts questioned the stability of the company's business
following a revision of its fourth-quarter results, Dan Gallagher
reports on digits. Photo: AP.
Ultimately both men got comfortable after
an internal analysis found only certain types of coupons were being
returned, this person said.
The moment of crisis illustrates how deep
the growing pains are at Groupon as it comes to grips with its
status as a newly public Web company. In addition to revising its
quarterly results, the company on Friday revealed a "material
weakness in its internal controls." Insight from CFO Journal
Investor Outreach Having Big Effect on
Say-on-Pay Results Lufthansa Convertibles Monetize JetBlue Stake
Multiemployer Pension Plans May Be in Hot Water
According to people familiar with the
situation, Groupon expects to address the material weakness by the
time it reports its first-quarter earnings on May 14.
Groupon has also hired a second accounting
firm, KPMG, in addition to its current accountant Ernst & Young.
KPMG's role is to make Groupon compliant with Sarbanes-Oxley,
federal regulations around accounting and disclosures of public
companies. In addition, Groupon plans to hire more accounting and
finance staff, said a person familiar with the matter.
The revision threw open the question of
"whether there is any real corporate governance at Groupon
whatsoever," wrote professors Anthony Catanach of Villanova
University and Ed Ketz of Penn State University on their Grumpy Old
Accountants blog.
Others fingered Groupon's fast growth—its
revenue was $1.62 billion last year, up from $14.5 million in
2009—as the culprit for its recent mishaps. Groupon previously had
to change its accounting twice before its IPO in response to SEC
concerns.
"I view this as growing pains," said one
Groupon investor who declined to be named. "This is like a high
school kid who is a five-foot sophomore and becomes seven feet by
the time he's a senior."
At the heart of Groupon's most recent
problem is something known as the "Groupon Promise" which allows
customers to return one of its coupons. The company has no plans to
change its policy, said a person familiar with the matter, since it
uses it to compete with rivals like LivingSocial Inc.
But that policy led to a meeting in late
February between Mr. Child and his chief accounting officer Joe Del
Preto, just a few weeks after Groupon had reported its first
earnings report as a public company.
For the month of January, Mr. Del Preto
told Mr. Child the number of refunds had exceeded all previous
models Groupon had built to predict its customers' behavior, said a
person familiar with the matter.
Continued in article
"Groupon: You Must Have
Fallen From The Sky," by Francine McKenna, re:TheAuditors,
April 7, 2012 ---
http://retheauditors.com/2012/04/07/groupon-you-must-have-fallen-from-the-sky/
Multiple Teaching Cases About Accounting at Groupon
Teaching Case on Groupon
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on April 6,
2012
SEC Probes Groupon
by: Shayndi Raice and Jean Eaglesham
Apr 03, 2012
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
Click here to view the video on WSJ.com ![WSJ Video]()
TOPICS: Cash Flow, Contingent Liabilities, Internal
Controls, Reserves, Restatement
SUMMARY: As described by Colin Barr in the related
video, "One month after they came out with their fourth quarter
numbers, '[Groupon] said--guess what-- "Oh, those were wrong..." The
company reissued is report for the quarter and year ended December
31, 2011 because they had not booked a sufficient reserve for
customer refunds. In the first quarter of 2012, customer refunds
under the company's policy exceeded the amount that management had
expected because the company faces higher refund rates when selling
Groupons for higher priced goods.
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article is useful in a
financial reporting class to cover corrections of errors,
restatements, accruals for contingent liabilities, and the
difference between earnings and cash flows. The article conveys a
sense of the need for confidence in financial reporting in order for
investors and others to have confidence in management's abilities.
Also mentioned in the article is the firm's auditor, Ernst & Young,
stating that this event clearly represents a material weakness in
internal control.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) Based on the information in the article
and the related video, what problem is Groupon now having to
correct?
2. (Advanced) Access the press release announcing the
revised fourth quarter and full year 2011 results, available on the
SEC web site at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1490281/000110465912022869/a12-8401_3ex99d1.htm.
What accounts are affected by the revision? What was the nature of
the accounting problem?
3. (Advanced) Why does first quarter 2012 activity result
in accounting changes to fourth quarter 2011 results of operations?
4. (Advanced) What accounting standards require reissuing
Groupon's financial statements as the company has done under these
circumstances? What disclosures must be made in these circumstances?
Provide references to authoritative accounting standards for these
requirements.
5. (Advanced) As noted in the press release, there was no
change to the company's previously reported operating cash flows.
Why not?
6. (Introductory) What sense is portrayed in the article
and the video about Groupon's operations and the maturity of its
leadership in handling a public company? How does this viewpoint
stem from the accounting problems that they have faced in the first
quarter of operating as a public company?
7. (Advanced) How has the company's stock price reacted to
this announcement?
8. (Advanced) (Refer to the related article) What is a
material weakness in internal control?
9. (Advanced) (Refer to the related article) Do you think
that Groupon's auditor Ernst & Young needed to perform any systems
testing to make the statement about internal control that was quoted
in the article? Explain your answer.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
RELATED ARTICLES:
Groupon Forced to Revise Results
by Shayndi Raice and John Letzing
Mar 31, 2012
Page: A1
"SEC Probes Groupon," by: Shayndi Raice and Jean Eaglesham, The
Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2012 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577319870715221322.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC_domainid
The Securities and Exchange Commission is
examining Groupon Inc.'s GRPN -2.48% revision of its first set of
financial results as a public company, according to a person
familiar with the situation.
The regulator's probe into the popular
online-coupon company is at a preliminary stage and the SEC hasn't
yet decided whether to launch a formal investigation into the
matter, the person said.
The SEC decision to examine the
circumstances surrounding Groupon's surprise revision is the
start-up's latest run-in with the regulator. Groupon twice revised
its finances before its November IPO. An SEC spokesperson declined
to comment, as did a spokesman for Groupon.
Groupon shares plunged Monday, ending the
day down nearly 17% at $15.27, far below its $20 IPO price. The
selloff came despite damage control efforts by Groupon's top two
executives, Chief Executive Andrew Mason and finance chief Jason
Child.
The Chicago company also closed ranks
around Mr. Child, even as accounting experts and investors
criticized his performance. People familiar with the situation said
Mr. Child, who joined Groupon from Amazon.com Inc. in December 2010,
continues to have the support of Mr. Mason and others at the
company.
Groupon said Friday it was revising its
results for the fourth quarter after discovering executives had
failed to set aside enough money for customer refunds. The company
had reported a loss of $37 million for its fourth quarter. The
accounting changes reduced the company's revenue for the quarter by
$14.3 million and widened its loss by $22.6 million.
The revision came after an unsettling
discovery in late February. That's when Groupon's chief accounting
officer told Messrs. Mason and Child that many customers had
returned their coupons in January, said a person familiar with the
matter. Read More
Heard: Disclosure Could Aid Groupon Therapy
Deal Journal: Analysts Question Groupon Model After Groupon, Critics
Wary of JOBS Act Groupon Forced to Revise Results 3/31/12
What's worse: the four-year-old company
didn't have enough money set aside in its reserves to cover those
refunds, according to this person.
The duo questioned whether this meant
people weren't interested in buying daily deals anymore, according
to this person: "It made [the executives] think there's got to be
something [they] don't understand. A business just doesn't go
sideways and go in another direction overnight." Related Video
Groupon shares slid Monday as several Wall
Street analysts questioned the stability of the company's business
following a revision of its fourth-quarter results, Dan Gallagher
reports on digits. Photo: AP.
Ultimately both men got comfortable after
an internal analysis found only certain types of coupons were being
returned, this person said.
The moment of crisis illustrates how deep
the growing pains are at Groupon as it comes to grips with its
status as a newly public Web company. In addition to revising its
quarterly results, the company on Friday revealed a "material
weakness in its internal controls." Insight from CFO Journal
Investor Outreach Having Big Effect on
Say-on-Pay Results Lufthansa Convertibles Monetize JetBlue Stake
Multiemployer Pension Plans May Be in Hot Water
According to people familiar with the
situation, Groupon expects to address the material weakness by the
time it reports its first-quarter earnings on May 14.
Groupon has also hired a second accounting
firm, KPMG, in addition to its current accountant Ernst & Young.
KPMG's role is to make Groupon compliant with Sarbanes-Oxley,
federal regulations around accounting and disclosures of public
companies. In addition, Groupon plans to hire more accounting and
finance staff, said a person familiar with the matter.
The revision threw open the question of
"whether there is any real corporate governance at Groupon
whatsoever," wrote professors Anthony Catanach of Villanova
University and Ed Ketz of Penn State University on their Grumpy Old
Accountants blog.
Others fingered Groupon's fast growth—its
revenue was $1.62 billion last year, up from $14.5 million in
2009—as the culprit for its recent mishaps. Groupon previously had
to change its accounting twice before its IPO in response to SEC
concerns.
"I view this as growing pains," said one
Groupon investor who declined to be named. "This is like a high
school kid who is a five-foot sophomore and becomes seven feet by
the time he's a senior."
At the heart of Groupon's most recent
problem is something known as the "Groupon Promise" which allows
customers to return one of its coupons. The company has no plans to
change its policy, said a person familiar with the matter, since it
uses it to compete with rivals like LivingSocial Inc.
But that policy led to a meeting in late
February between Mr. Child and his chief accounting officer Joe Del
Preto, just a few weeks after Groupon had reported its first
earnings report as a public company.
For the month of January, Mr. Del Preto
told Mr. Child the number of refunds had exceeded all previous
models Groupon had built to predict its customers' behavior, said a
person familiar with the matter.
Continued in article
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review in
February 4, 2012
Groupon and Its 'Weird' CEO
by: Shayndi Raice
Jan 31, 2012
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
Click here to view the video on WSJ.com ![WSJ Video]()
TOPICS: Cash Flow, Financial Reporting, Financial
Statement Analysis, SEC, Securities and Exchange Commission, Segment
Analysis
SUMMARY: The article quotes excerpts from Groupon,
Inc. CEO Andrew Mason's comments in an interview with the WSJ. The
related video shows Mr. Mason's responses to written questions
flashed on screen. Accounting topics addressed in the interview are
two topics with which the SEC was concerned during the company's IPO
process: (1) the company's use of "Adjusted Consolidated Segment
Operating Income, which showed the company's revenue minus certain
marketing costs" and (2) Mr. Mason's writing of a memo about the
firm to employees which was then leaked to the press during a quiet
period imposed by SEC just prior to the IPO. The stock is now
trading at $21.49 as of the date of this writing, slightly above the
$20/share IPO price.
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article is useful in
discussing segment reporting requirements, handling of marketing
costs, and the overall IPO process.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) What two accounting and financial
reporting issues impacted Groupon during its process of becoming a
publicly traded company?
2. (Introductory) What is Groupon CEO Andrew Mason's
assessment of having used an unusual accounting metric in the
company's first filing for its initial public offering (IPO)?
3. (Advanced) Refer to the related article. What was the
unusual accounting metric? How is this metric justified in Mr.
Mason's current interview with TWSJ?
4. (Advanced) Consider the requirements for segment
reporting. How may operating income as reported by business segment
differ from total consolidated operating income presented on the
income statement? State your source for accounting requirements that
allow this treatment.
5. (Introductory) What is an S-1 registration statement and
what is a "quiet period"? How and why did Mr. Mason violate this
requirement for a quiet period?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
RELATED ARTICLES:
Groupon's Accounting Lingo Gets Scrutiny
by Shayndi Raice and Nick Wingfield
Jul 28, 2011
Page: A1
"Groupon and Its 'Weird' CEO," by: Shayndi Raice, The Wall
Street Journal, Jan 31, 2012,---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203920204577193181377853716.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC_domainid
Groupon
Inc. Chief Executive Andrew Mason wants to prove his company is
worth the fuss after its roller-coaster ride to an initial public
offering last year.
The
31-year-old founder took his Chicago-based daily deals site public
in November at a valuation of $13 billion, well below the $15
billion to $20 billion price tag Groupon once thought it could
command. The IPO also brought on questions about another bubble in
the Internet sector and the viability of the daily-deals business
model.
Critics
pointed out that Groupon was unprofitable and was spending heavily
to acquire new subscribers amid a flood of competition from
daily-deal clones. The company also raised eyebrows at the
Securities and Exchange Commission over an unusual accounting metric
called Adjusted Consolidated Segment Operating Income, which showed
the company's revenue minus certain marketing costs.
Groupon's
stock soared 31% above its $20 IPO price on its first day of
trading, but withered in following weeks. Shares closed at $19.63,
down 2.1%, in 4 p.m. trading Monday. The company is set to report
its first quarterly results as a public company next week.
Mr. Mason,
who sometimes posts online videos of himself in his underwear doing
yoga or dancing, sat down for a recent interview in his Chicago
office to discuss challenges facing the company and his ability to
handle them. Edited excerpts:
WSJ: Do you
think you're mature enough to be the CEO of a multi-billion dollar
company?
Mr. Mason:
I got the company this far. To the degree I was weird, I was weird
before we were a public company and managed to get it worth whatever
it's worth. I'm going to continue doing my thing and work my butt
off to add value for shareholders and as long as they and the board
see fit to keep me in this role, I feel enormously privileged to
serve.
WSJ:
Groupon has been criticized by analysts and investors for not being
profitable. How important is profitability?
Mr. Mason:
We believe that the most important thing for us to be focused on is
growing the business, building something that our consumers and our
merchant partners love. And when you focus on those inputs, revenue
and profitability is the output and it follows naturally.
WSJ: Some
critics say the daily deal model is too easy to replicate.
Mr. Mason:
There's proof. There are over 2,000 direct clones of the Groupon
business model. However, there's an equal amount of proof that the
barriers to success are enormous. In spite of all those competitors,
only a handful are remotely relevant.
WSJ: Why?
Mr. Mason:
People overlook the operational complexity. We have 10,000 employees
across 46 countries. We have thousands of salespeople talking to
tens of thousands of merchants every single day. It's not an easy
thing to build.
WSJ: You
had a rough IPO. What was the hardest part?
Mr. Mason:
After filing the S-1, we entered a quiet period that greatly
restricted our ability to have a conversation with the public. It
was frustrating to not be able to directly address many of the
concerns that people raised about the business.
WSJ:
Including discussing "Adjusted Consolidated Segment Operating
Income?" You were accused by critics of trying to hide your high
marketing costs from investors.
Mr. Mason:
Groupon spends money on marketing in a way that's different from
traditional Internet and e-commerce companies. Our marketing spend
is designed to drive subscribers to our daily mailing list. A
traditional e-commerce company is driving transactions. Our own
proprietary advertising network can continually advertise to our
customers at virtually no additional cost. There's an upfront
investment that we know pays off over the long-term.
WSJ: Was it
a mistake to include that metric?
Mr. Mason:
In retrospect, I think it was naive, and I wouldn't have included
it. The list of companies that have added their own financial
metrics is not a savory group. It created a distraction that wasn't
worth the benefit.
WSJ: The
SEC also took issue with a memo you wrote to employees during the
quiet period that was leaked to the press.
Mr. Mason:
I wrote the memo because 23-year-olds were coming into my office and
asking how they should respond to their parents when they ask if
Groupon is about to go bankrupt. The risks of not communicating to
my employees were greater than the risks of doing otherwise.
If I knew
it was going to leak, I would have been less bizarre, and I wouldn't
have made a joke about my now-wife. She was upset. (He joked that
his then-girlfriend asked him why he never said anything nice about
her.)
WSJ:
Groupon's stock price is trading below its IPO price of $20. Why?
Mr. Mason:
Luckily there are people smarter than me in this world that know the
answers to those kinds of questions. I leave that to the financial
community.
Continued in article
"Groupon: You Must Have
Fallen From The Sky," by Francine McKenna, re:TheAuditors,
April 7, 2012 ---
http://retheauditors.com/2012/04/07/groupon-you-must-have-fallen-from-the-sky/
Last week
was Groupon’s big week, although not in a good way. What happened?
Well, the premier source of daily deal dish got knocked down a few
more pegs after announcing a revision to 4th quarter earnings and
the announcement by management that there was a material weakness in
internal controls over financial reporting that was causing their
disclosure controls to be ineffective. Groupon went public just a
few months ago, last November, and the annual report was the
company’s first filing as a public company.
Here’s one of the few journalists who got the details right,
Jonathan Weil of Bloomberg, explaining
why, in this case, the news was especially bad:
Didn’t
Groupon know before its initial public offering that its
controls were weak? A company spokesman, Paul Taaffe, declined
to comment. Let’s assume for the moment, though, that its
executives did know. Even then, they wouldn’t have had to tell
investors beforehand.
That’s
because there is no requirement to disclose a control weakness
in a company’s IPO prospectus. Groupon would have had no
obligation to disclose the problem until it filed its first
quarterly or annual report as a public company — which is what
it did. Sandbagging IPO investors in this manner is perfectly
legal, it turns out.
The
reason lies with a gaping hole in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which
Congress passed in 2002 in response to the accounting scandals
at Enron Corp. and WorldCom Inc. That statute had two main
sections related to companies’ internal controls, which are the
systems and processes that companies are supposed to have in
place to ensure the information they report is accurate. Those
provisions apply only to companies that are public already, not
ones that have registered for IPOs.
One
section, called 302, requires public companies’ top executives
to evaluate each quarter whether their disclosure controls and
procedures are effective. The other section, known as 404, is
better known. It requires public companies in their annual
reports to include assessments by management and outside
auditors about the effectiveness of their internal controls over
financial reporting. Congress left it to the Securities and
Exchange Commission to write the rules implementing those
provisions.
Here’s
where it gets tricky. Groupon reported the weakness in its
financial-reporting controls through a Section 302 disclosure,
not a Section 404 report. In other words, the problem was
serious enough that it amounted to a shortcoming in the
company’s overall disclosure controls.
Groupon
won’t have to comply with Section 404’s requirements until its
second annual report, due next year, under an exemption the SEC
passed in 2006 for newly public companies. Likewise,
Groupon’s auditor, Ernst & Young LLP, to date has expressed no
opinion on the company’s internal controls in its audit reports.
From the
moment Groupon announced the revision on March 30,
there were two important facts that almost all major media financial
journalists got wrong:
1) The
announcement of lower revenue and lower income for the fourth
quarter was a revision of an earnings release, not a
restatement. Groupon never filed a 10Q so there was no
SEC filing to restate. Fessing up to the right numbers in the annual
report was the first time the company was bound to report those
numbers and, at that time, they corrected previously announced
earnings for the 4th Quarter.
2)
Management made the assessment of the material weakness in internal
controls over financial reporting that caused disclosure controls to
be ineffective, not auditor Ernst & Young.
Ernst & Young deserves no credit for the announcement, nor any
blame, just yet, for the fact that the weaknesses had to be finally
admitted. There is no transparency regarding the auditor’s agreement
or disagreement previously with Groupon, any public documentation of
their discussions or any reason to believe Ernst & Young either
encouraged or discouraged Groupon to get their act together sooner.
We just
don’t know.
Continued in article
Various Teaching Cases Featuring Groupon ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
Search on the word "Groupon"
"THE “BEAUTY” OF INTERNET
COMPANY ACCOUNTING," by Anthony H. Catanach Jr. and J. Edward Ketz,
Grumpy Old Accountants Blog, April 9, 2012 ---
http://blogs.smeal.psu.edu/grumpyoldaccountants/archives/604#more-604
And the same can be said
for financial reporting as practiced by internet companies given
their “new business models” that require “new accounting.” Internet
company financial statements seem to mean different things to
different people, not unlike a piece of artwork. Unfortunately,
some of this accounting “artwork” is junk, as we have recently
reported in the case of Groupon (First
10K: April Fool’s!). At times like this
beauty rests in the I of the artist.
How can
management and directors and auditors see one thing, when the
complete opposite reflects reality? And why do internet IPOs seem
particularly vulnerable? Well, we think the problem is with the
accounting “standards” (and we use that term loosely) that apply to
these companies. As we stated in an earlier post:
Internet company accounting is suspect given all the unsupported
assertions and assumptions that must be made to comply with
generally accepted accounting principles…
Think about
it. The internet company balance sheet is generally dominated by
intangible assets whose values are based on assumptions that are
works of art themselves. And then there’s revenue recognition in
these companies with management making all kinds of assumptions
about primary obligors, selling price hierarchies, and virtual
sales. Yes, what makes internet company accounting “special” is
that so many of the applicable accounting rules require major
assumptions, many of which could be better characterized as “giant
leaps of faith.” Clearly, the accounting rules used for internet
companies should not be called “standards,” as their many judgments
make any meaningful comparison an impossibility! Enough
pontificating…
Given
Groupon’s recent accounting struggles we thought it might be
interesting to see if there were any other internet company
accounting issues lurking within today’s “hot” internet companies.
So, we looked at the most recent 10K filings of Demand Media,
Facebook, Groupon, Linked In, and Zynga, focusing primarily on
revenue and expense recognition, “unusual” accounting issues, and of
course some of our favorites: intangible assets, cash flows, and
non-GAAP financial metrics. Here is what we found.
Revenue
Two of the
five companies (Demand Media and Facebook) generate a significant
amount of their revenue from advertising. The way these companies
record revenue appears to be relatively straight-forward.
Generally, ad revenue is recognized either when the ad content is
delivered, or for click-based ads, when a user clicks on an ad.
Nothing very interesting or complicated here.
Linked In,
on the other hand, has a much more subjective revenue recognition
method for its hiring and marketing solutions. Most of the
Company’s contractual arrangements include multiple
deliverables, i.e., several products packaged together
which Linked In swears can’t be pulled apart to record revenue
separately. Gee, if the Company’s cost accounting system keeps
track of product and service costs separately, why can’t revenue be
estimated separately? Interesting question, huh? Anyway,
Linked In uses convoluted GAAP criteria to record revenue, the
relative selling price method, based on a selling price hierarchy.
In short, management decides what revenue will be based on vendor
specific evidence, third party evidence, or management’s best
estimate of selling price, in that order of priority. Which one do
you thing management likely favors?
Then,
there’s our poster child for bad internet company accounting,
Groupon. As you may recall, the Company was busted by the SEC for
improper revenue recognition last September. See “Groupon
Finally Restates Its Numbers.” Basically,
Groupon ignored accounting guidance (that’s a much better word than
“standard”) in Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) 99-19, as well as
SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 101 (question 10), and recorded the
gross amounts it received on Groupon sales as
revenues. Since being forced to restate its financial statements,
the Company now records revenue at the net amount
retained from the sale of Groupons (gross collections less an agreed
upon percentage of the purchase price due to the featured merchant
excluding any applicable taxes), since it is acting as the
merchant’s agent in the transaction.
It should
be noted that Demand Media also faces the “gross vs. net”
revenue issue discussed in EITF 99-19. For revenue sharing
arrangements in which the Company is considered the primary obligor,
it reports revenue on a gross basis. But for those situations where
it distributes its content on third-party websites and the customer
acts as the primary obligor, it records revenue on a net basis.
And
last, but not least, there is Zynga with its consumable or durable
virtual goods! For the sale of consumable virtual
goods (goods consumed by player game actions), revenue is recognized
as the goods are consumed. On the other hand, revenue from the sale
of durable virtual goods (goods accessible to a player over an
extended period of time) is recognized ratably over the estimated
average playing period of paying players for the applicable game.
Confused yet? Basically, we have to rely on Zynga to provide us
with a best estimate of the lives of both consumable and virtual
goods to book revenue. As we indicated in “Zynga’s
First 10K: Zestful Zephyrs,” by
merely changing the game’s rules, the Company can change what it
books as revenue! This is all too arbitrary. Are we really
surprised?
So, when it
comes to recording revenue, it appears that booking advertising
income is relatively easy, compared to the management estimates
needed for multiple deliverables (Linked In) and virtual good sales
(Zynga), or deciding who the “primary obligor” is (Demand Media and
Groupon). We would not be surprised if some internet companies
don’t intentionally complicate their product offerings to make
revenue recognition a function of management guesstimates!
Cost Capitalization
Given that
several of these companies are struggling to achieve or maintain
profitability, it is not surprising that they would try to record as
an asset what really is an expense. And sure enough, we find
several instances of this. For example, Demand Media capitalizes
many different types of costs including content costs, registration
and acquisition costs for undeveloped websites and internally
developed software, as well as intangible assets acquired in
acquisitions. How significant is this? Over 72 percent of the
Company’s $590.1 million in total assets are intangible in nature!
Now that takes cost capitalization to a new height…we’d probably try
that too if we were losing as much money every year as they are
(2011’s net loss was $18.5 million).
Linked In
also plays this “game,” but with a new twist. The Company does do
something quite interesting…it defers expensing $13.6 million in
commissions already paid on non-cancelable subscription contracts,
presumably to match the commission costs with the related revenue
streams. Why stop there? Couldn’t you make the same argument for a
whole host of other expenses as well? Maybe they did, but Deloitte
didn’t buy it.
Groupon and
Zynga also have played a slightly different version of the cost
capitalization game, by recording tax assets that presumably will
lower future tax liabilities. In recording these tax
assets, the companies reduce income tax expense in the income
statement, thus improving the bottom line. The only problem is that
a company must have future taxable income in order to use
these alleged tax assets! Well, if the companies did this to
mitigate their operating losses, the game has ended for Zynga, and
soon will end for Groupon.
In 2011
Zynga recorded a $113.4 million allowance against its deferred tax
assets, almost fully reserving these assets, and effectively wiping
them off the books. This suggests that the Company may have had a
reality check as to its future prospects, given that it no longer
projects a future that includes profitability, more specifically
taxable income.
As
for Groupon, we highlighted this same tax issue earlier in
Groupon’s First 10K: Looking Under the Hood.
In 2011, the Company increased its valuation
reserve for deferred tax assets by $72.3 million reducing reported
deferred tax assets to $65.3 million. Although Groupon gave no
reason for the increased reserve, it likely was forced to record it
for the same reason as Zynga, i.e., little likelihood of generating
taxable income in the foreseeable future against which deferred tax
assets could be used. So, who would have thought…the income tax
note might actually shed some light on what a company really thinks
its profit forecast is (as opposed to the press release)!
Other Accounting Issues
Our
internet company reviews also turned up a couple of interesting
points, which give us insight into managements’ attitude toward
financial reporting transparency…and believe it or not, Groupon is
NOT involved!
The
first involves cash, naturally, and how Demand Media “defines”
cash. You may recall that we first reported on the increasing trend
of companies to manipulate reported cash balances in “What’s
Up With Cash Balances?” And, yes, Demand
Media is overstating its balance sheet cash by including accounts
receivable as cash even though it has yet to receive the monies.
Here is what the Company’s accounting policy note says:
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
In the 1990s tech boom, startup companies in particular were not making
any profits and had cash shortage problems. These companies tried to
shift the focus to revenues and devised all sort of (mostly fraudulent)
schemes to record non-cash revenue. The EITF worked overtime trying to
plug the dikes against new revenue reporting schemes ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm
Various Teaching Cases Featuring Groupon ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
Search on the word "Groupon"
Question
How can a company that's "technically insolvent" have any sort of IPO
success?
"GROUPON IS TECHNICALLY
INSOLVENT," by Anthony H. Catach Jr. and J. Edward Ketz, Grumpy
Old Accountants, October 21, 2011 ---
http://blogs.smeal.psu.edu/grumpyoldaccountants/archives/362
Two Update Teaching Cases on Groupon:
IPO, Working Capital, and Cash Flow
From The Wall Street Journal Weekly
Accounting Review on November 11, 2011
Case 1
Exclusive Deal Floats Groupon
by: Rolfe Winkler
Nov 05, 2011
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
Click here to view the video on WSJ.com ![WSJ Video]()
TOPICS: business combinations, Financial Analysis,
Goodwill, Impairment
SUMMARY: Groupon filed its initial public offering (IPO) on
Friday, November 4, 2011, selling only a total of 6.4% of the
company's total shares. The IPO proceeds brought in $805 million,
the third smallest total for all IPOs since 1995, only larger than
the IPOs of Vonage Holdings and Orbitz in total proceeds. In terms
of the percent of outstanding shares sold, only Palm has sold a
smaller percentage in that same time frame. Quoting from the related
article, "Silicon Valley and Wall Street took Groupon's stock market
debut as a sign that investors are still willing to make risky bets
on fast-growing but unprofitable young Internet companies....Groupon
shares rose from their IPO price of $20 by 40% in early trading, and
ended at the 4 p.m. market close at $26.11, up 31%. The closing
price valued Groupon at $16.6 billion...."
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Questions focus on measuring the
implied fair value of an entire business from the value of only a
portion. The concept is used in accounting for business combinations
and in goodwill impairment testing.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) Summarize the Groupon initial public
offering (IPO). How many shares were sold? At what price?
2. (Introductory) Describe the market activity of the stock
on its first day of trading. How does that activity show that
"investors are...willing to make risky bets on...young Internet
companies"?
3. (Advanced) How has the Groupon stock fared to the date
you write your answer to this question?
4. (Advanced) Define the term "implied fair value". How did
sale of only 6.3% of the shares outstanding translate into an
overall firm valuation of $12.8 billion? Show your calculation.
5. (Advanced) Given the range of trading reported in the
article and your answer to question 3 above, what is the range of
total firm value shown during this short time of public trading of
Groupon stock? Again, show your calculations. How does the small
percentage of shares contribute to the size of this range?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
RELATED ARTICLES:
Groupon IPO Cheers Valley
by Shayndi Raice and Randall Smith
Nov 05, 2011
Page: B3
"Exclusive Deal Floats Groupon,"
by: Rolfe Winkler, The Wall Street Journal, November 5, 2011 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203716204577017892088810560.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC_domainid
Even by dot-com
standards, Groupon's initial public offering is puny in terms of the
number of shares it actually sold to the public. According to
Dealogic, dating back to 1995 just three U.S. tech companies floated
a smaller percentage of their shares in their IPOs. Palm sold 4.7%
of its shares in a $1 billion offering; Portal Software sold 6.2% in
a tiny $64 million offering, and Ciena sold 6.2% in a $132 million
offering. Then comes Groupon, which sold 6.3% this week as part of
its $805 million offering.
That is well below
the median of 21% for the 50 largest technology IPOs dating back to
1995, according to Dealogic.
Groupon's limited
float strategy isn't new. Two of this year's other big Internet
IPOs, LinkedIn and Pandora Media also sold a limited number of
shares, just 9.4% of the total outstanding for both companies. Those
deals were also led by Morgan Stanley.
Considering doubts
about Groupon's business model, in order to ensure a strong first
day's trading, the underwriters not only limited the free-float, but
they also scaled back their original valuation target.
At Friday's close of
trading, Groupon shares were at $26.11 apiece, 31% above the IPO
price. That puts Groupon's market capitalization at about $17
billion, or roughly eight times next year's likely revenue. That is
steep, considering that the daily-deals Internet company is still
unprofitable and that growth appears to be slowing quickly.
Case 2
Groupon Holds Cash Tight
by: Sarah E. Needleman and Shayndi Raice
Nov 10, 2011
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
Click here to view the video on WSJ.com ![WSJ Video]()
TOPICS: Cash Flow, Cash Management, Financial Statement
Analysis
SUMMARY: Groupon finally completed its IPO on Friday,
November 4, 2011, and interest in the company is therefore naturally
high. Competitors to Groupon attempt to obtain market share from the
newly public company by offering quicker payment terms to the small
business which provide the merchant benefits offered by Groupon.
Small businesses need their working capital as fast as possible and
therefore some complain about the Groupon terms. Groupon argues that
its terms are designed to ensure that merchant suppliers cannot use
Groupon for a quick infusion of cash just prior to closing
operations.
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Questions ask students to analyze
Groupon's financial statements-particularly its working capital
components-to assess the issues with the company's payment terms.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) What are Groupon's payment terms? How do
those terms help Groupon's customers, the buyers of its electronic
coupons?
2. (Introductory) How do Groupon's payment terms help
Groupon's own financial position and operating results? In your
answer, define the financial concepts of cash flow and working
capital mentioned in the article.
3. (Advanced) Groupon issued its initial public offering of
stock (IPO) on Friday, November 4, 2011. Access the S-1 registration
statement filed with the SEC for this offering on June 2, 2011. It
is available on the SEC web site at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1490281/000104746911005613/a2203913zs-1.htm
Click on the link to the Table of Contents, then on Index to
Consolidated Financial Statements, then on Consolidated Balance
Sheets. As of December 31, 2010, how much working capital did the
company have? Did this amount improve through the quarter ended
March 31, 2011?
4. (Advanced) Given your measurement of Groupon's working
capital, how easy do you think it would be for Groupon to address
its competition by changing its payment terms? Support your answer.
5. (Advanced) Continue working with the Groupon audited
consolidated financial statements as of December 31, 2010 and the
unaudited quarterly statements. What items comprise Groupon's
Accounts Receivable? How collectible are these amounts?
6. (Advanced) What items comprise Groupon's Accounts
Payable, accrued Merchants Payable, and Accrued Expenses? Given your
knowledge of Groupon's payment terms, can you identify how soon each
of these payments must be made?
7. (Advanced) Consider how you would schedule a detailed
estimate of the timing of Groupon's cash flows for the three current
liabilities discussed above.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"Groupon Holds Cash Tight by: Sarah E.
Needleman and Shayndi Raice, The Wall Street Journal, November
10, 2011 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204358004577027992169046500.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC_domainid
Rivals of Groupon
Inc. are threatening the daily deal site leader by offering quicker
payment to merchants, possibly jeopardizing a key part of Groupon's
business model.
Groupon keeps itself
in cash by collecting money immediately when it sells its daily
coupons to consumers while extending payments to the merchants over
60 days. For instance, a hair salon might run a deal offering $100
of services for just $50 on Groupon's website, which then keeps as
much as half of the total collected and sends the remainder to the
salon in three installments about 25 to 30 days apart.
"The payment timing
is so erratic you can't count on any of that money helping to pay
your bills," says Mark Grohman, owner of Meridian Restaurant in
Winston-Salem, N.C.
After running three
Groupon promotions this year and last, Mr. Grohman says he won't use
the service again in part because it puts too big a strain on his
cash flow. "With smaller margins in restaurants, you need that
capital in the bank as fast as possible," he says.
Heissam Jebailey,
co-owner of two Menchie's frozen-yogurt franchises in Winter Park,
Fla., says he also has begun to view Groupon's installment payments
as too slow.
Enlarge Image
SBGROUPON SBGROUPON
"You want to get
paid in full as quickly as possible," says Mr. Jebailey, who has run
deals with both Groupon and its rival LivingSocial Inc. offering
customers $10 of frozen yogurt for $5. He says both promotions were
successful but that he'd only use Groupon again if the service
promises to pay faster. "We're the ones that have to cover the cost
of goods for giving away everything at half price," he says. "I will
not do another deal with Groupon unless they agree to my terms."
Groupon executives
have no plans to change payments terms, said a person familiar with
the matter. Because Groupon has a backlog of 49,000 merchants in
line to offer a deal with the site, executives feel confident that
they don't need to make any changes to payment terms, said another
person.
While Groupon pays
merchants in installments of 33% over a period of 60 days,
LivingSocial and Amazon.com Inc.'s Amazon Local pay merchants their
full share in 15 days. Google Inc.'s Google Offers promises 80% of
the merchant's cut within four days, and the remainder over 90 days.
Groupon pays in
installments for a reason, according to a person familiar with the
matter: It has seen some merchants try to use Groupon to get a quick
infusion of cash before going out of business, leaving customers
with vouchers that can't be redeemed.
The Chicago-based
start-up has a policy of offering refunds to customers who aren't
satisfied, and as a result it is cautious about doing deals with
merchants who may not carry through on their end, says the person
familiar with the matter.
Groupon also says it
pays merchants before they provide services to customers and will
accelerate payments if merchants experience unusually fast consumer
redemption.
"We believe
Groupon's payment terms are fair to merchants and important to
protect consumers," says Julie Mossler, director of communications
for Groupon.
It also is in
Groupon's best interest to stretch out payments to its customers for
as long as possible, says John Hanson, a certified public accountant
and executive director at Artifice Forensic Financial Services LLC
in Washington, D.C. "It makes their cash position look stronger on
their books."
Steady cash flow has
helped fuel the valuation of Groupon, which first sold shares to the
public last week. Groupon's stock was down nearly 4% Wednesday,
bringing its share price of $23.98 closer to the company's IPO price
of $20 a share. Based on the 5.5% of shares that trade, the company
has a valuation of about $15 billion. But its working-capital
deficit has ballooned to $301.1 million as of Sept. 30, and the
amount it owes its merchants is also way up.
Groupon's "accrued
merchant payable" balance increased to $465.6 million as of Sept.
30, from $4.3 million at year-end 2009, its filings say. This
merchant payable balance exceeded Groupon's cash and contributed to
the company's working capital deficit, according to the company's
filing.
Offering merchants
faster payment terms could hurt its cash flow and force it to raise
funds to cover its day-to-day cash needs, Groupon said in a recent
securities filing. In international markets, the company pays
merchants only once a coupon has been redeemed.
Every one-day
reduction in Groupon's merchant payables represents a risk of about
$14 million in free cash flow, according to estimates by Herman
Leung, a Susquehanna analyst. "It's a key driver of cash flow
dollars and a key assumption in the Groupon model," he says of the
60-day payment period. "It's highly sensitive."
To be sure,
Groupon has faced waves of competition for more than a year, and
many of those challengers already have come and gone.
Continued in article
Teaching cases on the accounting
scandals at Groupon (especially overstatement of revenues) and its
auditor (Ernst & Young) ---
See Below
"GROUPON’S FIRST 10-K: APRIL
FOOL’S!," by Anthony H. Catanach Jr. and J. Edward Ketz, Grumpy Old
Accountants Blog, April 1, 2012 ---
http://blogs.smeal.psu.edu/grumpyoldaccountants/archives/593
What’s all the hoopla about Groupon’s latest “revision” to its
financial reports and lack of internal controls? Why is everyone
acting so surprised? You should have known something was up when
the Groupon’s 10K was so long in coming after earnings were
originally released on February 8th. Moreover, we warned
you all in
“Trust No One, Particularly Not Groupon’s Accountants,”
that this day would soon come. Remember this?
It is absolutely ludicrous to think that
Groupon is anywhere close to having an effective set of internal
controls over financial reporting having done 17 acquisitions in a
little over a year. When a company expands to 45 countries, grows
merchants from 212 to 78,466, and expands its employee base from 37
to 9,625 in only two years, there is little doubt that internal
controls are not working somewhere. Any M&A expert will agree. And
don’t forget that Groupon admitted to having an inexperienced
accounting and reporting staff.
We just
can’t resist: TOLD YOU SO! We just wonder what took E&Y so long to
figure this out…after all, as Groupon’s auditors, they get to see
the Company’s books and records, and we don’t. Maybe it’s just a
case of not being able to see the forest for all of the trees.
That’s not very comforting is it?
And could
it be any more appropriate that this latest “revision” release comes
so close to April Fool’s Day?
For those
of you that have real lives and may have missed it, here’s what
happened:
-
On February 8, 2012, Groupon issued a press release reporting
revenues of $506.5 million, free cash flows of $155.1 million,
and operating profits of $15.0 million (among other things). See
the
Company’s 8K filed on this date for
more details.
-
Then, this past Friday after the markets’ close, the Company
announced a “revision” to its original earnings press release.
2011 revenues and operating profits were both revised downward,
revenues down to $492.2 million and operating profits flipping
to a loss of $15 million. See
Groupon’s 8K filed on March 30, 2012 for more details.
- But the biggest
“surprise,” or confirmation of trouble, can be found in Item 9A
of the
Company’s 2011 10K, also filed on
March 30, where Groupon admits to having a material weakness in
internal control over financial reporting. The following
Company admissions are particularly damning:
We did
not maintain financial close process and procedures that were
adequately designed, documented and executed to support the accurate
and timely reporting of our financial results.
We did
not maintain effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that
accounts were complete and accurate and agreed to detailed support,
and that account reconciliations were properly performed, reviewed
and approved.
We did
not have adequate policies and procedures in place to ensure the
timely, effective review of estimates, assumptions and related
reconciliations and analyses, including those related to customer
refund reserves. As noted previously, our original estimate
disclosed on February 8 of the reserve for customer refunds proved
to be inadequate after we performed additional analysis.
So, what
should all this mean for investors and market regulators? Well,
first of all, the Groupon’s earnings revision which was prompted by
an increased reserve requirement for customer refunds, highlights
the subjectivity and uncertainty associated with any accounting
assumptions (or judgments) made by relatively “new” companies,
operating in “new” industries, with inexperienced management:
yes, internet companies! In short, internet company
accounting is suspect given all the unsupported assertions and
assumptions that must be made to comply with generally accepted
accounting principles, not to mention the likely internal control
weakness issue.
Next,
we question whether there is any real corporate governance at
Groupon whatsoever. Usually, when material weaknesses surface,
heads roll…not at Groupon! Instead, the board of directors rewarded
the Company’s chief financial officer with a salary increase and
bonus. According to a
Groupon 8K filed on March 19, 2012:
Mr.
Child’s base salary was increased from $350,000 to $380,000 per
year. This increase will be effective on April 1, 2012…Mr. Child’s
annual bonus guarantee of $350,000 will remain in place for 2012,
and he will receive half of the guaranteed bonus in June 2012. The
remainder of the guarantee plus any additional bonus earned under
the plan will be paid in the first quarter of 2013.
Absolutely
unbelievable! Not only does the guy who is responsible for the
aforementioned system of internal control bust get to keep his job,
but he gets a raise and a bonus! Need we say more?
Finally, do
you really believe that this material weakness in internal control
(and related refund issue) mysteriously appeared in the fourth
quarter of 2011? Of course not, but by assigning it to the fourth
quarter of 2011, Groupon and E&Y can avoid the embarrassment of
admitting that the financial statements included in the Company’s
IPO filing were incorrect. This is probably not a bad strategy from
their perspective given the impending securities litigation that is
now lurking.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on Groupon
are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
Search on the word "Groupon"
"GROUPON IS TECHNICALLY
INSOLVENT," by Anthony H. Catach Jr. and J. Edward Ketz, Grumpy Old
Accountants, October 21, 2011 ---
http://blogs.smeal.psu.edu/grumpyoldaccountants/archives/362
Today
(October 21) Groupon issued
amendment Number 6 to its S-1 filing. The
most interesting data are on page 9 of the report, which we repeat
below.
What stands
out to us is that stockholders’ equity on September 30 is
negative—the
firm has become technically insolvent!
Our prediction that Groupon has a high probability of failure
remains intact.
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
This illustrates that on occasion insolvent firms may have value
depending upon the net value of all the things that don't get posted to
the balance sheet under GAAP. Common examples include contingency
assets/liabilities that are not yet booked, intangibles such as the
value of employees, and a boatload of other items that accountants just
cannot measure with enough confidence and stability to put into the
general ledger.
One of the best examples is the
early years of Amazon.com that every year incurred relatively large
losses in the income statement but managed to continue to sell equity
shares because investors sniffed out huge value in the air surrounding
the net assets.
Groupon of course is another
matter, Catenach and Ketz, the grumps, have never liked the stench
surrounding the air over Groupon as if it was a pile of something that
smells very bad.
Trust No one, Particularly Not
Groupon's Accountants and Auditors (Ernst & Young)
From The Wall Street Journal Weekly
Accounting Review on September 30, 2011
Groupon Unsure on IPO Time
by: Shayndi Raice and Randall Smith
Sep 26, 2011
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
Click here to view the video on WSJ.com ![WSJ Video]()
TOPICS: Accounting Changes and Error Corrections, Audit
Report, Auditing, Disclosure, Disclosure Requirements, Financial
Accounting, Financial Reporting, SEC, Securities and Exchange
Commission
SUMMARY: This article presents financial reporting and
auditing issues stemming from the Groupon planned IPO. Groupon
originally filed for an initial public offering in June 2011. At the
time, the filing contained a measure Adjusted Consolidated Segment
Operating Income that is a non-GAAP measure of performance. The SEC
at the time required the company to change its filing to use
GAAP-based measures of performance. The SEC has continued to
scrutinize the Groupon financial statements and has required the
company to report revenue based only on the net receipts to the
company from sales of its coupons after sharing proceeds with the
businesses for which it makes the coupon offers.
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article is useful in financial
accounting and auditing classes. Instructors of financial accounting
classes may use the article to discuss reporting of the change in
measuring revenues and related costs. Instructors of auditing
classes may use the article to discuss non-standard audit reports.
Links to SEC filings are included in the questions. The video is
long; discussion of Groupon's issues stops at 5:30.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) According to the article, what accounting
and disclosure issues have delayed the initial public offering of
shares of Groupon, Inc.? What overall economic and financial factors
are also affecting this timing?
2. (Introductory) What was the problem with Groupon CEO
Andrew Mason's letter to Groupon employees? Do you think Mr. Mason
intended for this letter to be made public outside of Groupon?
Should he have reasonably expected that to happen?
3. (Advanced) What accounting change forced restatement of
the financial statements included in the Groupon IPO filing
documents? You may access information about this restatement
directly at the live link included in the online version of the
article.
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/grouponrestatement20110923.pdf
4. (Introductory) According to the article, by how much was
revenue reduced due to this accounting change?
5. (Introductory) Access the full filing of the IPO
documents on the SEC's web site at
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1490281/000104746911008207/a2205238zs-1a.htm
Proceed to the Consolidated Statements of Operations on page F-5.
How are these comparative statements presented to alert readers
about the revenue measurement issue?
6. (Advanced) Move back to examine the consolidated balance
sheets on page F-4. Do you think this accounting change for revenue
measurement affected net income as previously reported? Support your
answer.
7. (Advanced) Proceed to footnote 2 on p. F-8. Does the
disclosure confirm your answer? Summarize the overall impact of
these accounting changes as described in this footnote.
8. (Advanced) What type of audit report has been issued on
the Groupon financial statements in this IPO filing? Explain the
wording and dating of the report that is required to fulfill
requirements resulting from the circumstances of these financial
statements.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Groupon's Fast-growing Business Faces a Churning Point
by: Rolfe Winkler
Sep 26, 2011
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
Click here to view the video on WSJ.com ![WSJ Video]()
TOPICS: Cost Accounting, Cost Management, Disclosure,
Financial Statement Analysis, Managerial Accounting
SUMMARY: This article focuses on financial statement
analysis of the Groupon IPO filing documents including some
references to cost measures. "Forget the snappy 'adjusted
consolidated segment operating income.' That profit measure...was
rightly rejected by regulators. It is the complete absence of
details on subscriber churn that is more problematic. How often are
folks unsubscribing from Groupon's daily emails?...The issue is
important since...the cost of adding new subscribers has increased
quickly."
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article may be used in a
financial statement analysis or managerial accounting class.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) What is the overall concern about
Groupon's business condition that is expressed in this article?
2. (Advanced) The author states that the cost of adding new
subscribers has increased. How was this cost determined? How does
this calculation make the cost assessment comparable from one period
to the next?
3. (Advanced) What does Groupon CEO Andrew Mason say about
the company's cost of acquiring customers? What income statement
expense item shows this cost? How does the increasing unit cost
discussed in answer to question 2 above bring the CEO's assertion
into question?
4. (Advanced) In general, how does the author of this
assess the quality of the filing by Groupon for its initial public
offering? Why should that assessment impact the thoughts of an
investor considering buying the Groupon stock when it is offered?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"Groupon: Comedy or Drama?" by
Grumpy Old Accountants Anthony H. Catanach Jr. and J. Edward Ketz,
SmartPros, July 2011 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x72233.xml
"Trust No one, Particularly Not
Groupon's Accountants," by Anthony H. Catanach Jr. and J. Edward
Ketz, Grumpy Old Accountants Blog, August 24, 2011 ---
http://blogs.smeal.psu.edu/grumpyoldaccountants/
"Is Groupon "Cooking Its Books?"
by Grumpy Old Accountants Anthony H. Catanach Jr. and J. Edward Ketz,
SmartPros, September 2011 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x72233.xml
Teaching Case
When Rosie Scenario waved goodbye "Adjusted Consolidated Segment
Operating Income"
From The Wall Street Journal Weekly
Accounting Review on August 19, 2011
Groupon Bows to Pressure
by: Shayndi Raice and Lynn Cowan
Aug 11, 2011
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, SEC, Securities and
Exchange Commission, Segment Analysis
SUMMARY: In filing its prospectus for its initial public
offering (IPO), Groupon has removed from its documents "...an
unconventional accounting measurement that had attracted scrutiny
from securities regulators [adjusted consolidated segment operating
income]. The unusual measure, which the e-commerce had invented,
paints a more robust picture of its performance. Removal of the
measure was in response to pressure from the Securities and Exchange
Commission...."
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article is useful to introduce
segment reporting and the weaknesses of the required management
reporting approach.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) What is Groupon's business model? How
does it generate revenues? What are its costs? Hint, to answer this
question you may access the Groupon, Inc. Form S-1 Registration
Statement filed on June 2, 011 available on the SEC web site at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1490281/000104746911005613/a2203913zs-1.htm
2. (Advanced) Summarize the reporting that must be provided
for any business's operating segments. In your answer, provide a
reference to authoritative accounting literature.
3. (Advanced) Why must the amounts disclosed by operating
segments be reconciled to consolidated totals shown on the primary
financial statements for an entire company?
4. (Advanced) Access the Groupon, Inc. Form S-1
Registration Statement filed on June 2, 011 and proceed to the
company's financial statements, available on the SEC web site at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1490281/000104746911005613/a2203913zs-1.htm#dm79801_selected_consolidated_financial_and_other_data
Alternatively, proceed from the registration statement, then click
on Table of Contents, then Selected Consolidated Financial and Other
Data. Explain what Groupon calls "adjusted consolidated segment
operating income" (ACSOI). What operating segments does Groupon,
Inc., show?
5. (Introductory) Why is Groupon's "ACSOI" considered to be
a "non-GAAP financial measure"?
6. (Advanced) How is it possible that this measure of
operating performance could be considered to comply with U.S. GAAP
requirements? Base your answer on your understanding of the need to
reconcile amounts disclosed by operating segments to the company's
consolidated totals. If it is accessible to you, the second related
article in CFO Journal may help answer this question.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
RELATED ARTICLES:
Groupon's Accounting Lingo Gets Scrutiny
by Shayndi Raice and Nick Wingfield
Jul 28, 2011
Page: A1
CFO Report: Operating Segments Remain Accounting Gray Area
by Emily Chasan
Aug 15, 2011
Page: CFO
"Groupon Bows to Pressure," by: Shayndi
Raice and Lynn Cowan, The Wall Street Journal, August 11, 2011
---
https://mail.google.com/mail/?shva=1#inbox/131e06c48071898b
Groupon Inc. removed
from its initial public offering documents an unconventional
accounting measurement that had attracted scrutiny from securities
regulators.
The unusual measure,
which the e-commerce had invented, paints a more robust picture of
its performance. Removal of the measure was in response to pressure
from the Securities and Exchange Commission, a person familiar with
the matter said.
In revised documents
filed Wednesday with the SEC, the company removed the controversial
measure, which had been highlighted in the first three pages of its
previous filing. But Groupon's chief executive defended the term
Wednesday. [GROUPON] Getty Images
Groupon,
headquarters above, expects to raise about $750 million.
Groupon had
highlighted something it called "adjusted consolidated segment
operating income", or ACSOI. The measurement, which doesn't include
subscriber-acquisitions expenses such as marketing costs, doesn't
conform to generally accepted accounting principles.
Investors and
analysts have said ACSOI draws attention away from Groupon's
marketing spending, which is causing big net losses.
The company also
disclosed Wednesday that its loss more than doubled in the second
quarter from a year ago, even as revenue increased more than ten
times.
By leaving ACSOI out
of its income statements, the company hopes to avoid further
scrutiny from the SEC, the person familiar with the matter said. The
commission declined comment.
Groupon in June
reported ACSOI of $60.6 million for last year and $81.6 million for
the first quarter of 2011. Under generally accepted accounting
principles, the company generated operating losses of $420.3 million
and $117.1 million during those periods.
Wednesday's filing
included a letter from Groupon Chief Executive Andrew Mason
defending ACSOI. The company excludes marketing expenses related to
subscriber acquisition because "they are an up-front investment to
acquire new subscribers that we expect to end when this period of
rapid expansion in our subscriber base concludes and we determine
that the returns on such investment are no longer attractive," the
letter said.
There was no mention
of when that expansion will end, but the person familiar with the
matter said the company reevaluates the figures weekly.
Groupon said it
spent $345.1 million on online marketing initiatives to acquire
subscribers in the first half and that it expects "to continue to
expend significant amounts to acquire additional subscribers."
The latest SEC
filing also contains new financial data. Groupon on Wednesday
reported second-quarter revenue of $878 million, up 36% from the
first quarter. While the company's growth is still rapid, the pace
has slowed. Groupon's revenue jumped 63% in the first quarter from
the fourth.
The company's
second-quarter loss was $102.7 million, flat sequentially and wider
than the year-earlier loss of $35.9 million.
Groupon expects to
raise about $750 million in a mid-September IPO that could value the
company at $20 billion.
The path to going
public hasn't been easy. The company had to file an amendment to its
original SEC filing after a Groupon executive told Bloomberg News
the company would be "wildly profitable" just three days after its
IPO filing. Speaking publicly about the financial projections of a
company that has filed to go public is barred by SEC regulations.
Groupon said the comments weren't intended for publication.
Continued in article
"Groupon, Zynga and Krugman's Frothy
Valuations," by Jeff Carter, Townhall, September 2011 ---
http://finance.townhall.com/columnists/jeffcarter/2011/09/13/groupon,_zynga_and_krugmans_frothy_valuations
Jensen Comment
In the 1990s, high tech companies resorted to various accounting
gimmicks to increase the price and demand for their equity shares ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm
Bob Jensen's threads about cooking
the books ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory02.htm#Manipulation
Teaching Case on How to Overstate Revenues
Auditor Ernst & Young is also named in the $7 billion lawsuit
Jensen Comment
I don't know what it is about The Wall Street Journal, but it is
very common for me to be forced to go elsewhere to find the names of the
audit firms included in client lawsuits. It's like the WSJ tries to
protect audit firms.
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on
September 2, 2011
Sino-Forest CEO Gives Up Position
by: Isabella Steger
Aug 29, 2011
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Audit Quality, Auditing, Ethics, Financial
Accounting, Financial Statement Analysis, Financial Statement Fraud,
Fraud, Fraudulent Financial Reporting
SUMMARY: Sino-Forest Corp. is traded on the Toronto
Stock Exchange (TSX) with the symbol TRE. The exchange suspended
trading in the company's shares for 15 days beginning Friday, August
26. TSX also ordered the chief executive and other key managing
executives to resign on Friday, though that order was then delayed
to allow for a hearing first. The current article indicates the
executives "resigned voluntarily" over the weekend of August 27 to
28 after "Canadian regulators said the company may have committed
fraud." These proceedings began based on "allegations...published by
short seller Muddy Waters LLC" (see the related article). This
short-selling analyst alleged the company may have overstated
revenues and timber holdings; the Ontario Securities Commission also
said that the company "'appears to have engaged in significant
non-arm's length transactions which may have been contrary to
Ontario securities laws and the public interest.'"
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article is second in
this week's coverage of accounting and auditing issues at Chinese
companies traded on North American exchanges. This case involves
accounting for revenues and natural resources-timber reserves-and
highlights potential issues from non-arm's-length transactions
conducted through subsidiaries. Questions on accounting and auditing
these areas are posed, but the auditing questions may be deleted for
instructors wishing to focus on only the accounting-related issues.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) What steps has Sino-Forest undertaken in
response to allegations that the company may have committed fraud?
List all that you find described in the main and related articles.
2. (Introductory) What areas of accounting are specifically
of concern at Sino-Forest Corp.?
3. (Advanced) Name some audit steps that are designed to
detect potential accounting problems in these areas of specific
concern at Sino-Forest. In your answer, state the audit objectives
you would try to achieve by conducting these tests and identify
whether they are transaction-related audit objectives or
balance-related audit objectives.
4. (Advanced) If Sino-Forest and its management have
committed fraud as alleged by analysts and Canadian regulators, are
these audit steps that you list above designed to detect this fraud
with absolute certainty? Explain your answer.
5. (Advanced) What is a "non-arm's-length transaction"?
What is a subsidiary? What potential accounting measurement concerns
arise if Sino-Forest has undertaken this type of transaction? Why
does conducting the actions through a subsidiary potentially
exacerbate these accounting measurement concerns?
6. (Advanced) Name some audit steps that are designed to
detect these potential accounting measurement problems stemming from
non-arm's-length transactions. In your answer, state the audit
objectives you would try to achieve by conducting these tests and
identify whether they are transaction-related audit objectives or
balance-related audit objectives.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
RELATED ARTICLES:
Regulator Challenges Sino-Forest Claims
by Caroline Van Hasselt
Aug 27, 2011
Online Exclusive
Special Report: The "Shorts" Who Popped a China Bubble
by Daniel Bases, Ryan Vlastelica, and Clare Bal of the
International Business Times
Aug 05, 2011
Online Exclusive
"Sino-Forest CEO Gives Up
Position," by: Isabella Steger, The Wall Street Journal, August
29, 2011 ---
http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904199404576536154293011240.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC_domainid
HONG
KONG—Sino-Forest Corp. said its chairman and chief executive
resigned and three employees have been temporarily suspended, after
Canadian regulators said the company may have committed fraud.
The
forestry company said Sunday that Allen Chan voluntarily stepped
down as chairman and CEO pending completion of the company's review
of fraud allegations published two months ago by short seller Muddy
Waters LLC.
Mr. Chan
will assume the title of founding chairman emeritus of the
Chinese-operated company, shares of which are listed in Toronto. He
wasn't available for comment.
William
Ardell, lead director and chairman of Sino-Forest's independent
committee conducting the investigation, will succeed Mr. Chan as
chairman. Sino-Forest Vice Chairman Judson Martin, an executive
director, will become chief executive. Mr. Martin also is chief
executive of Sino-Forest's Greenheart Group Ltd. unit, shares of
which are listed in Hong Kong.
Sino-Forest
said Mr. Chan would continue to assist the company's internal
investigation and that he had planned to resign before the Ontario
Securities Commission on Friday ordered a 15-day trading halt for
the company's shares.
The
commission issued the order after saying regulators had found that
the company may have "misrepresented some of its revenue and/or
exaggerated some of its timber holdings." The commission said the
company, through its subsidiaries, also "appears to have engaged in
significant non-arm's-length transactions which may have been
contrary to Ontario securities laws and the public interest."
The
commission on Friday ordered executives to resign but revoked the
order the same day, saying it would require a hearing.
Sino-Forest's stock is down 72% for the year. The shares took a
beating in June when Muddy Waters published its allegations of
questionable accounting. The shares closed Thursday at 4.81 Canadian
dollars (US$4.90), down 5.7%.
Continued in article
"Beleaguered Sino-Forest
facing $7-billion lawsuit," Pulp & Paper Canada, September 1,
2011 ---
http://www.pulpandpapercanada.com/news/beleaguered-sino-forest-facing-7-billion-lawsuit/1000550204/
..
. .
The lawsuit
seeks money for those who bought Sino-Forest shares on the stock
market and through the company's public offering.
The
claim names several Sino-Forest executives, including former CEO
Allen Chan, auditor
Ernst & Young, and financial
institutions that acted as underwriters for the company's 2009
prospectus offering. They include TD Securities, Dundee Securities,
RBC Securities, Scotia Capital, and CIBC World Markets.
The lead
plaintiffs in the suit are the Labourers' Pension Fund of Central
and Eastern Canada and the International Union of Operating
Engineers Local 793 pension plan.
If the suit
is granted class-action status, any judgements or settlements would
be available to all members of the class.
The
allegations against Sino-Forest have not been proven in court.
Continued in Article
Bob Jensen's threads on
Ernst & Young are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on August 4,
2011
Ex-E&Y Auditors Barred by PCAOB
by: Michael Rapoport
Aug 02, 2011
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Audit Firms, Audit Quality, Auditing,
PCAOB, Public Accounting, Public Accounting Firms
SUMMARY: The Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB) barred two former Ernst & Young LLP employees, Peter
C. O'Toole and Darrin G. Estella, "...from auditing public
companies, alleging they provided misleading documents to inspectors
who were evaluating the accounting firm's work... [The men also have
been barred] from associating with public accounting firms for at
least three years and at least two years, respectively."
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article is useful to
cover ethics, the function of the PCAOB, and the reputational
foundation for the public accounting profession-typical topics in an
opening chapter of an auditing text.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Advanced) What is the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB)? What are the organization's
responsibilities?
2. (Introductory) According to the PCAOB, what did Peter C.
O'Toole and Darrin G. Estella do to some audit workpapers?
3. (Advanced) What options for action are available to the
PCAOB when finding something such as Messrs. O'Toole and Estella
did? What actions did the PCAOB take and what has been the result?
4. (Advanced) An attorney for Mr. O'Toole "...noted that
the PCAOB didn't allege any deficiencies in the audit, nor...[that]
the men were trying to hid any audit failure or lie about the work
that was actually done...." Then how has the announcement of these
men's actions by the PCAOB harmed the accounting and auditing
profession?
5. (Advanced) Do you think what Messrs. O'Toole and Estella
did was ethically acceptable? Support your answer.
SMALL GROUP ASSIGNMENT:
Question for small group discussion: Suppose you are asked by a
superior to introduce an audit workpaper or alter an audit workpaper
after completing an audit engagement. What would you do? What impact
will your decision have on your immediate future? On your potential
long term future?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"Ex-E&Y Auditors Barred by PCAOB," by:
Michael Rapoport, The Wall Street Journal, August 2, 25011 ---
http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB20001424053111904292504576482550957477580.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC_domainid
The government's
audit overseer barred two former Ernst & Young LLP employees from
auditing public companies, alleging they provided misleading
documents to inspectors who were evaluating the accounting firm's
work.
The Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board barred Peter C. O'Toole and Darrin G.
Estella, a former partner and former senior manager in E&Y's Boston
office, from associating with public accounting firms for at least
three years and at least two years, respectively. Mr. O'Toole also
was fined $50,000.
The PCAOB said Mr.
O'Toole's three-year bar was the longest it had ever imposed on a
partner of a Big Four accounting firm. The two men agreed to
settlements with the PCAOB but didn't admit or deny the board's
findings. Mr. O'Toole and Mr. Estella may apply to remove their bars
after three and two years, respectively.
The PCAOB said that
shortly before its inspectors were to scrutinize an E&Y audit of an
unidentified company in 2010 as part of its regular inspections of
the firm, Mr. O'Toole and Mr. Estella created, backdated and placed
in the audit file a document concerning the valuation of one of the
audit client's investments, the most important issue in the audit.
Mr. O'Toole also allegedly authorized other members of the audit
team to alter other working papers in advance of the inspection. The
changes weren't disclosed to the PCAOB, the board said.
Ernst & Young said
in a statement that it had "separated" both men from the firm after
it determined that its policy prohibiting supplementing or changing
audit documents had been violated. E&Y said it cooperated fully with
the PCAOB's investigation, and that Mr. O'Toole's and Mr. Estella's
conduct had no impact on the client's financial statements or on
E&Y's audit conclusions.
Continued in article
Win Some and Lose Some:
Some Good News for Ernst & Young
"High Court Denies Suit Against E&Y Over Time-AOL Deal," by
Samuel Howard, Law360.com, June 13, 2011 ---
http://www.law360.com/topnews/articles/250918/high-court-denies-suit-against-e-y-over-time-aol-deal
Thank you Caleb Newquist for the heads up!
The U.S.
Supreme Court on Monday declined to hear an appeal brought by an AOL
Inc. investor alleging that Ernst & Young LLP approved tainted
financial statements related to Time Warner Inc.'s merger with AOL.
In
rejecting the petition for certiorari, the high court dashed AOL
investor Dominic Amorosa and co-petitioner attorney Christopher
Gray’s claims that the Second Circuit failed to properly apply the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 when it
dismissed the fraud suit in February.
The
decision brings an end to 2003 suit claiming that Ernst & Young, the
independent auditor for AOL, Time Warner and the merged company,
engaged in fraud and abetted the companies' fraud when it issued
audited financial statements approving the companies' allegedly
faulty accounting.
"My client
and I believe that the certiorari petition raised significant and
unsettled questions of law concerning an 'opt-out' securities
plaintiff’s right to pursue individual claims under the Securities
Exchange Act and state law," petitioner Christopher Gray said.
"While we are disappointed with the denial of certioriari, obviously
not every case can be heard by the U.S. Supreme Court on the merits
and we look forward to moving on to other matters."
The Second
Circuit found that Amorosa had failed to state a claim for loss
causation because none of the events he identified as corrective
disclosures addressed AOL’s accounting practices or in any way
implicated Ernst & Young’s June 1999 audit opinion.
The
petitioners argued that the high court previously established that a
corrective disclosure explicitly reflecting the alleged false
statement is not required state such a claim.
Amorosa and
Gray also challenged the Second Circuit's finding in its Feb. 2
dismissal that SLUSA preempted Amorosa's state law claims.
SLUSA
defines cases that are to be considered preempted as covered class
actions — cases that seek damages for more than 50 people and that
are joined, consolidated or otherwise proceed as a single action —
but it does not preempt state law claims in individual securities
lawsuits like Amorosa's, the petitioners argued.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on
Ernst & Young are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
"Video: Ernst & Young Fined Over Equitable Life," by Emma
Hunt, Accountancy Age, June 11, 2010 ---
http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/video/2264616/video-ernst-young-fined
"Ernst & Young must face class action over
Broadcom's option backdating," by Carol J. Williams, Los Angeles
Times, April 14, 2011 ---
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2011/04/ernst-young-broadcom-options-backdating-scheme-class-action-appeals-court.html
A federal appeals court Thursday
reinstated a class-action lawsuit filed by Broadcom Corp. investors
against Ernst & Young, saying the auditors should have known about
an option-backdating scheme at the Irvine tech company.
A lower-court judge had dismissed
the case against Ernst & Young after concluding the plaintiffs
hadn’t shown that the auditors knew that the value of Broadcom’s
stock was probably inflated by the company’s manipulation of its
financial statements.
Thursday’s ruling by the U.S. 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco reversed that dismissal
and scolded Ernst & Young for not acting to stop the $2.2-billion
backdating scheme.
Ernst & Young "apparently accepted
management at its word, never received requested documentation and
issued an unqualified opinion on the accuracy of Broadcom’s
financial statements," the 9th Circuit panel ruled in overturning
the lawsuit’s dismissal by U.S. District Judge Manuel L. Real in Los
Angeles.
Ernst & Young’s audit "amounted to
no audit at all," the appeals court said.
A spokesman for Ernst & Young
declined to comment on the ruling, saying the firm was still
reviewing it.
Continued in article
Recall that Lehman opted to record sales of poisoned securities in a
questionable arms length sale to former employees in what was literally
a situation where 100% of the sold securities would be returned at 5% or
8% higher prices.
As Lehman auditors, Ernst & Young is now contending in a lawsuit that
they had no choice to account for these as sales under
FAS 140
even though that accounting was deceptive for investors and hid
financial risks.
The Lehman Bankruptcy Judge stomped down heavily upon Ernst & Young.
Links to this report and other media quotations regarding the
repo
sales disgrace can be found at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm#Ernst
A lawsuit against Ernst & Young was brought by the Attorney General of
New York and is not pending in court. The SEC ducked this one like a
miserable coward.
Ernst & Young
AccountingLink |
|
29 April 2011
To the Point:
Repo
accounting amendments finalized
The Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
today amended its guidance on accounting for repurchase
agreements. The amendments simplify the accounting by
eliminating the requirement that the
transferor demonstrate it has adequate collateral to
fund substantially all the cost of purchasing replacement
assets. As a result, more arrangements could be accounted
for as secured borrowings rather than sales.
The attached To the Point summarizes what you need to
know about the new guidance. It is
also available online. |
It's about time!
When I suggested this in a meeting and later in an email message a
couple of years ago a FASB board member gave me the brush off.
"FASB WILL TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT REPO ACCOUNTING," by Anthony H.
Catanach Jr. and J. Edward Ketz, Grumpy Old Accountants, March 22, 2012
---
http://blogs.smeal.psu.edu/grumpyoldaccountants/archives/585
The FASB announced yesterday that it will
take a look at repo accounting. Again. As we don’t expect much
improvement, we wonder why it bothers.
Michael Rapoport of The Wall Street Journal
reports, “The Financial Accounting Standards Board agreed Wednesday
to look at further revisions to how companies must account for their
use of repurchase agreements, or ‘repos,’ a form of financing for
securities-trading firms, following a previous revision last year.
In particular, the board will look at ‘repos to maturity,’ a
potentially risky variant that contributed to MF Global’s collapse
last year.”
The Lehman Brothers collapse led to some
small, insignificant changes in the repo rules. With the
collapse of MF Global, the board thinks it
desirable to consider some incremental but insignificant
amendments. As last year’s revision was impotent, we expect more of
the same from any revision this year.
What the board should have done a decade or
two ago was to focus on the economic substance of the transaction,
and the substance of a repurchase agreement is that it is a secured
borrowing. Pure and simple. Thus, all repurchase agreements should
be accounted for as secured borrowings.
The FASB’s statement yesterday says more
about it than it does repo accounting. The board is incredibly slow
and, with old age, is slowing down even further. The board is
reactive instead of proactive; apparently, it cannot think about an
issue unless there is some type of financial crisis. The board
cannot think simple; instead, it seems to complexify whatever issue
is at hand. Finally, the board seems beholden to banks and has been
for some time. It appears to carry water for bankers, whether the
topic is special purpose entities, derivatives, fair value
accounting, or repurchase agreements.
Forget
reforming repo accounting. Let’s reform FASB instead. (so say
Catanach and Ketz)
Jensen Comment
Question
Where did the missing MF Global $1+ billion end up?
Hint:
The the word "repo" sound familiar?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Repurchase_agreement
"MF Global and the great Wall St re-hypothecation scandal," by
Chrisopher Elias, Reuters, December 7, 2011 ---
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Securities/Insight/2011/12_-_December/MF_Global_and_the_great_Wall_St_re-hypothecation_scandal/
Teaching Case
From The Wall Street Journal Weekly Accounting Review on April 24, 2015
PwC to Pay $65 Million to Settle Lawsuit Over MF
Global
by: Michael Rapoport
Apr 18, 2015
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Auditing
SUMMARY: PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP agreed to pay $65 million to settle class-action litigation over
failed brokerage MF Global Holdings Ltd., a case in which investors
claimed PwC botched its audits of the firm before it collapsed into
bankruptcy in 2011. The lawsuit had said MF Global used customer
funds to meet the increased liquidity demands of the firm's bets on
European sovereign debt. MF Global didn't have sufficient internal
controls to deal with that, a deficiency that PwC ignored.
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: This
is a good article to use in an auditing class to show how costly
audit errors or omissions can be.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) What are the facts of the lawsuit
discussed in the article? Who are the plaintiffs and who is the
defendant?
2. (Advanced) What did the plaintiffs allege in the
lawsuit? What was PwC's involvement in MF Global Holdings' business
or bankruptcy? Why would PwC have any liability exposure in this
situation?
3. (Advanced) What were the terms of the settlement? Why
did PwC settle the case? Was this a good decision?
4. (Advanced) What could accounting firms do to prevent or
to reduce the chances of these situations occurring?
Reviewed By: Linda Christiansen, Indiana University Southeast
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Mar 13, 2015
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"PwC to Pay $65 Million to Settle Lawsuit Over MF Global," by Michael
Rapoport, The Wall Street Journal, April 18, 2015 ---
http://www.wsj.com/articles/pwc-to-pay-65-million-to-settle-lawsuit-over-mf-global-1429302372?mod=djem_jiewr_AC_domainid
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP agreed Friday to
pay $65 million to settle class-action litigation over failed
brokerage MF Global Holdings Ltd., a case in which investors claimed
PwC botched its audits of the firm before it collapsed into
bankruptcy in 2011.
MF Global shareholders had contended that
PwC’s audits gave MF Global a clean bill of health even though the
accounting firm knew or should have known that the firm’s financial
statements were erroneous and its internal controls weren’t
effective.
PwC denied any wrongdoing. In a statement
Friday, the firm said it is “pleased to resolve this matter and
avoid the cost and distraction of prolonged securities litigation.”
The firm “stands behind its audit work and its opinions on MF
Global’s financial statements,” PwC said.
The settlement, which is subject to court
approval, was reached after the two sides went through a mediation
process presided over by a former federal judge, according to court
documents. The proceeds will be distributed among investors in MF
Global securities.
MF Global filed for bankruptcy in October
2011 after customers balked at the firm’s big, risky bets on
European sovereign debt. About $1.6 billion in customer funds were
found to be missing, though customers have been reimbursed. The firm
has agreed to pay $200 million in civil fines. Jon S. Corzine, MF
Global’s former chairman and chief executive and a former New Jersey
governor, still faces civil charges from the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission for failure to supervise.
The lawsuit had said MF Global used
customer funds to meet the increased liquidity demands of the firm’s
bets on European sovereign debt. MF Global didn’t have sufficient
internal controls to deal with that, a deficiency that PwC ignored,
according to the lawsuit.
Continued in article
"Who Is The PwC Partner Responsible For MF Global? Someone With A
Lot of Baggage," by Francine McKenna, re:TheAuditors, June
14, 2013 ---
Click Here
http://retheauditors.com/2013/06/14/who-is-the-pwc-partner-responsible-for-mf-global-someone-with-a-lot-of-baggage/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+ReTheAuditors+%28re%3A+The+Auditors%29
I respectfully decline to answer based on my
constitutional rights.
Edith O'Brien taking the Fifth
MF Global
"A Year Later, All Eyes Still on 'Edie' ," by Aaron Lucchettl, Julie
Steinberg, and Mike Spector, The Wall Street Journal, October 30,
2012 ---
http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204789304578088892963139264.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection&mg=reno-wsj
Who broke the law by raiding customer
accounts at
MF Global Holdings
MFGLQ 0.00%
Ltd.?
Investigators seem no closer to the answer
than they were when the New York brokerage firm filed for bankruptcy
exactly a year ago Wednesday, owing thousands of farmers and
ranchers, hedge funds and other investors an estimated $1.6 billion.
Their money was supposed to be stashed safely at MF Global, but
company officials used much of it for margin calls and other
obligations.
The last, best hope for a breakthrough in
the probe is Edith O'Brien, the former assistant treasurer at MF
Global. Working in the company's Chicago office, she was the go-to
person for emergency money transfers as MF Global flailed for its
life.
"She really kept the place running," says
Matthew Gopin, MF Global's former head of internal audit for North
America, referring to her everyday duties approving money transfers.
One transfer in particular has drawn
outsize attention.
Ms. O'Brien hasn't budged from her refusal
to cooperate with investigators unless she is shielded from
prosecution, and in March she cited her constitutional right against
self-incrimination in refusing to testify before a congressional
panel.
Earlier this year, her lawyers told the
government what she would testify to in exchange for an immunity
deal. Those talks didn't go anywhere, and prosecutors subsequently
signaled that she isn't a target of the criminal probe, according to
a person involved in the case. She still could face civil charges
from regulators.
It isn't clear if Ms. O'Brien knew that the
transfers she approved in MF Global's final days violated U.S. rules
on the use of customer funds or deepened a deficit in customer
accounts. In some cases, Ms. O'Brien has told friends, she relied on
calculations prepared by other MF Global employees that turned out
to be wrong. In others, employees bungled transactions that she
approved.
Friends say she has been worried about
becoming the "fall guy" in the probe, especially since former MF
Global Chief Executive Jon S. Corzine told lawmakers in December
that she assured him the $175 million transfer was proper.
In private conversations, Ms. O'Brien has
bristled at and disagreed with Mr. Corzine's comments. "They may
have thought they had a chump, but they've got the wrong chump," she
told several friends while drinking Chardonnay at a bar in Chicago,
according to someone who was there.
One email from Ms. O'Brien reviewed by the
Journal shows her informing Mr. Corzine of an MF Global account the
money came from, as opposed to providing explicit assurances that
the transfer was proper. The email didn't note, however, that the
funds originated from a customer account.
Mr. Corzine declined to comment. Bankruptcy
lawyers winding down the company have since found money to cover
most of the estimated $1.6 billion customers couldn't get.
Continued in article
MF Global Was Another Repo Scandal
"FASB WILL TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT REPO ACCOUNTING," by Anthony H.
Catanach Jr. and J. Edward Ketz, Grumpy Old Accountants, March 22, 2012
---
http://blogs.smeal.psu.edu/grumpyoldaccountants/archives/585
The FASB subsequently decided that most repos are to be booked as
secured borrowings rather than repo sales.
"MF Global Mystery: The
Beginning of the End or the End of The Beginning?" by Francine
McKenna, re:TheAuditors, January 10, 2011 ---
http://retheauditors.com/2012/01/10/mf-global-mystery-the-beginning-of-the-end-or-the-end-of-the-beginning/
Bob Jensen's threads on the MF Global scandal ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
Search on the phrase "MF Global"
Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
The FAS 140 Lifeboat Leaked
"$99 Million Buys EY Ticket Out Of Private Lehman
Litigation, Finally," by Francine McKenna, re:TheAuditors,
October 21. 2013 ---
http://retheauditors.com/2013/10/21/99-million-buys-ey-ticket-out-of-private-lehman-litigation-finally/
Last defendant standing. Not an
enviable place for EY in the case, In re Lehman Brothers
Securities and Erisa Litigation.
Everyone else had folded their
tent, paid the price to cross this dog off the list. Lehman
underwriters agreed in 2011 to a $426.2 million settlement. UBS, one
of the underwriters, held out and settled last August for another
$120 million. Even before the UBS and EY settlements,
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann, attorneys for the plaintiffs,
claimed the combined
recovery of $516,218,000 is the third largest recovery to date in a
case arising from the financial crisis.
The $99 million EY will pay is
more than Lehman’s officers and directors, who settled for $90
million. That’s a big deal considering the executives typically say,
“The auditors said it was ok,” and the auditors say, “Management
duped us.” But it’s not that much considering that EY agreed to pay
C$117 million ($117.6 million) last December to settle claims in a
Canadian class action suit against Sino-Forest Corp, a Chinese
reverse merger fraud. That settlement is the largest by an auditor
in Canadian history, according to the the law firms.
And it’s not as much as some
thought EY would pay for Lehman. In fact, many thought Lehman would
finish off EY for good.
John Carney, now of CNBC,
writing for Business Insider
at the time:
“The Examiner concludes that
sufficient evidence exists to support colorable claims against
Ernst & Young LLP (“Ernst & Young”) for professional malpractice
arising from Ernst & Young’s failure to follow professional
standards of care with respect to communications with Lehman’s
Audit Committee, investigation of a whistleblower claim, and
audits and reviews of Lehman’s public filings.”
That may not sound like a
mortal threat against Ernst & Young. But the damages here could
be enormous. A successful lawsuit against E&Y could result in a
court finding that the failure to properly advise the audit
committee prevented Lehman from taking genuine steps to
substantially reduce its leverage, which may have saved the firm
from bankruptcy. Which is to say, E&Y could find itself blamed
for all the losses to Lehman
shareholders. That
would be a stretch—such a claim would be speculative—but it
still should be scaring the heck out of the partners.
When the bankruptcy examiner’s
report on Enron came out, the language about Arthur Andersen was
quite mild. It merely noted there was “sufficient evidence from
which a fact-finder could conclude that Andersen: (1) committed
professional negligence in the rendering of accounting services
to Enron…” It went on to note that Andersen likely had a strong
defense against liability since so many Enron executives were
implicated.
“Enron brought down Arthur Andersen,”
Felix Salmon notes. “Will Lehman do the same for E&Y?”
In July of 2011, New
York Federal Court Judge Lewis Kaplan decided
to allow substantially all of the
allegations against Lehman executives and at least one of the
allegations against Ernst & Young to move forward to discovery and
trial. One month later Lehman Brothers executives, including its
former chief executive Richard S. Fuld Jr., agreed to pay $90
million to settle. Insurance proceeds paid for their settlement.
What was the
remaining allegation
against Ernst & Young? That the auditor had reason to know Lehman’s
2Q 2008 financial statements could be materially misstated because
of the extensive use of Repo 105 transactions.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on Ernst & Young ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
"Auditors Face Fraud Charge: New York Set to
Allege Ernst & Young Stood By as Lehman Cooked Its Books," by Liz
Rappaport and Michel Rapoport, The Wall Street Journal, December
20, 2010 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704138604576029991727769366.html?mod=djemalertNEWS
New York prosecutors are poised to
file civil fraud charges against Ernst & Young for its alleged role
in the collapse of Lehman Brothers, saying the Big Four accounting
firm stood by while the investment bank misled investors about its
financial health, people familiar with the matter said.
State Attorney General Andrew
Cuomo is close to filing the case, which would mark the first time a
major accounting firm was targeted for its role in the financial
crisis. The suit stems from transactions Lehman allegedly carried
out to make its risk appear lower than it actually was.
Lehman Brothers was long one of
Ernst & Young's biggest clients, and the accounting firm earned
approximately $100 million in fees for its auditing work from 2001
through 2008, say people familiar with the matter.
The suit, led by Mr. Cuomo, New
York's governor-elect, could come as early as this week. It is part
of a broader investigation into whether some banks misled investors
by removing debt from their balance sheets before they reported
their financial results to mask their true levels of risk-taking, a
person familiar with the case said. The state may seek to impose
fines and other penalties.
Mr. Cuomo's office has sought
documents and information from several firms, including Bank of
America Corp., which earlier this year disclosed six transactions
that were wrongly classified. Jerry Dubrowski, a Bank of America
spokesman, said the bank's practice is to cooperate with any inquiry
from regulators.
It is possible that Ernst & Young
will try to settle before any suit is filed. The firm declined to
comment. A spokesman for the Lehman Brothers estate also declined to
comment.
The transactions in question,
known as "window dressing," involve repurchase agreements, or repos,
a form of short-term borrowing that allows banks to take bigger
trading risks. Some banks have systematically lowered their repo
debt at the ends of fiscal quarters, making it appear they were less
risk-burdened than they actually were most of the time.
Lehman Brothers dubbed
transactions of this type "Repo 105." The maneuver came to light in
March, when the bankruptcy examiner investigating the firm's
collapse more than two years ago found that it moved some $50
billion in assets off its balance sheet. Lehman labeled those
transactions as securities sales instead of loans, which led
investors to believe the firm was financially healthier than it
really was.
The bankruptcy examiner's report
and the attorney general's investigation found that Lehman Brothers
carried out the Repo 105 transactions on a quarterly basis in 2007
and 2008 without telling investors. Mr. Cuomo's investigation found
that Repo 105 transactions started as far back as 2001, said the
person familiar with the probe.
The attorney general's
investigation, which began after the bankruptcy examiner's report,
found that Ernst & Young specifically approved of Lehman's use of
Repo 105 transactions and provided the investment bank with a
complete audit opinion from 2001 through 2007, said the person.
Mr. Cuomo's office has also been
investigating suspected window-dressing transactions at other banks,
said the person, and is probing whether they similarly misled
investors.
An analysis earlier this year by
The Wall Street Journal found that other banks were reducing their
level of debt at quarter-end.
The attorney general's office has
sought documents and information from several firms, including Bank
of America Corp., which earlier this year disclosed six transactions
that were wrongly classified. The Journal's analysis found that Bank
of America was among the most active banks in reducing its debt at
reporting time.
The state's investigations into
other firms' window dressing are less advanced than its Ernst &
Young probe, said a person familiar with the probes.
Other regulators have said they
are looking into window dressing as well. The Securities and
Exchange Commission's investigation into Lehman's collapse is
focusing on Repo 105 transactions, said people familiar with the
matter. It has proposed new types of disclosures to help investors
identify when banks are window dressing. But the SEC has said it
hasn't found any widespread inappropriate practices in that area.
Britain's Financial Reporting
Council, which oversees corporate reporting rules, is also
investigating Ernst & Young's role in the Lehman collapse.
The Lehman bankruptcy examiner's
report also stated that there may be evidence to support negligence
and malpractice claims against Ernst & Young regarding Lehman's
audits and its lack of response to a whistle-blower at Lehman who
raised red flags about the repo trades.
The whistle-blower was Matthew
Lee, a Lehman Brothers senior vice president. He had complained to
his boss, and eventually wrote a letter in May 2008 to senior Lehman
executives expressing concern that the Repo 105 transactions
violated Lehman's ethics code by misleading investors and regulators
about the true value of the firm's assets. Days later, Mr. Lee was
ousted from the firm.
According to the Lehman bankruptcy
examiner's report, Ernst & Young auditors saw the letter, and later
interviewed Mr. Lee after he was let go from Lehman. Ernst & Young
previously said in a statement that Lehman management determined Mr.
Lee's "allegations were unfounded." Mr. Lee couldn't be reached for
comment.
Continued in article
"Ernst & Young — Cuomo Initiates Settlement Talks With Filing,"
by Walter Pavlo, Forbes, December 24, 2010 ---
http://blogs.forbes.com/walterpavlo/2010/12/24/ernst-young-cuomo-initiates-settlement-talks-with-filing/?boxes=financechannelforbes
Thanks to David Albrecht for the heads up.
Andrew Cuomo, New York’s attorney general,
filed a civil complaint again Ernst & Young claiming that the
accounting firm helped Lehman Brothers mislead investors by using
transactions called Repo 105s (aka Cooking The Books). Anyone who
thinks that E&Y and the state of New York are going to make it to a
courtroom to settle this in front of a jury has got to be kidding.
Last time I checked, there were four major accounting firms (The Big
4) and there have been numerous calls that a fifth is needed to take
the place of the ill-fated Arthur Andersen. A guilty verdict for
E&Y would mean we would have “The Big 3” (look how well that number
worked out for the automotive industry). A settlement is imminent.
We have all seen this type of theater play
out before. A prosecutor calls out a company for some “massive
wrongdoing” then settles within a year for a new record dollar
figure (Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, AIG, etc.). This filing by
Cuomo simply gets the negotiations started with E&Y. But are these
types of settlements effective?
Corporate Counsel’s
Sue Reisinger did an in-depth piece as to
whether these large settlements work in deterring future bad
behavior. Her conclusion…THEY DON’T. A look at BP alone provides
plenty of evidence of this. Back in 2005, a BP facility was cited
for over 300 safety violations at a plant that had an explosion
killing 15 and injuring 270. To correct this bad behavior, BP got a
$21 million fine as a deterrent. This past April that same BP
facility released thousands of pounds of cancer-causing chemicals
into the air for 40 days…another fine. Then the BP oil spill in the
Gulf of Mexico, killing 11 and impacting lives all along America’s
Gulf Coast. So how do you punish the company to correct the
behavior? My son was even perplexed when we bought gas at the local
BP station, “should we purchase gas elsewhere to protest the oil
spill or purchase it here to help pay for the cleanup?” I didn’t
have an answer, but I do know this, put someone in jail that was
responsible and these questions go away.
So what should be done? Start locking
people up and here’s why:
1) We need people as examples, not
companies. Shareholders are shouldering most of the financial
penalty, not the individuals responsible.
2) Prison is effective punishment.
While I will argue that prison sentences for some are too long, the
experience does get your mind right. White-Collar recidivism is
negligible for a reason….the punishment works.
3) Hold People Accountable. I would
rather see the CEO of a company go to jail saying he was sorry, than
see one more commercial about how sorry the company is about the
wrong they did (a la BP).
4) Arresting one person will lead you to
the real person responsible. Once someone is arrested they will
start talking, and so on, and so on.
The corporate veil has a place in business
but it should not protect those that are guilty of crimes…and it
seems to me that more than a few bad guys have gotten away. Civil
litigation has become too easy for both the prosecutors and the
defense, so let’s up the game and put some butts on the line. I’m
speaking from experience, prison hurts, is a great deterrent and
will go a long way to clean things up in corporate wrongdoing.
Bob Jensen's threads on white collar crime are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm#CrimePays
"Ernst & Young defends its Lehman work in letter to clients,"
AccountingWeb, March 31, 2010 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/topic/firm-news/ernst-young-defends-its-lehman-work-letter-clients
Also see
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/22/lehman-ernstyoung-idUSN2221089720100322
"Ernst & Young's defense in the Lehman fraud case is
nonsense," by Jonathan Weil, Bloomberg, December 26, 2010 ---
http://www.tampabay.com/news/ernst-amp-youngs-defense-in-the-lehman-fraud-case-is-nonsense/1141848
Lehman Repo 105/109 Scandal Involving Ernst & Young ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm#Repo
"Lehman Troubles Not Over For Ernst & Young," by Francine
McKenna, Forbes, December 13, 2012 ---
http://www.forbes.com/sites/francinemckenna/2012/12/13/lehman-troubles-not-over-for-ernst-young/
Ernst & Young chalked up one small victory
in
New York State Supreme Court this week
over claims by the New York Attorney General that the firm committed
fraud leading to the failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Justice
Jeffrey Oing said the New York Attorney General cannot claim $150
million in fees that Ernst & Young earned from Lehman Brothers
Holdings from 2001-2008, when the firm filed bankruptcy.
Attorney David Ellenhorn of the NYAG
claimed the fees represented “disgorgement” of “ill gotten gains”
since the Attorney General says Ernst & Young repeatedly committed
“fraudulent acts” as auditor of Lehman Brothers all those years.
When Ellenhorn tried to explain this to the judge, Oing told
Ellenhorn he had the wrong remedy.
Not good when you have to explain too much
to the judge.
Fortunately for the New York Attorney
General, the fees disgorgement strategy is Plan B. (It’s literally
“Letter B” in the list of remedies the
NYAG seeks for Ernst & Young’s alleged fraudulent acts.) The New
York Attorney General can still pursue its request that Ernst &
Young “pay restitution, disgorgement and damages caused, directly or
indirectly, by the fraudulent and deceptive acts and repeated
fraudulent acts and persistent illegality complained of herein plus
applicable pre-judgment interest.”
The New York Attorney General,
you may recall from my previous reports,
has the powerful Martin Act on its side. Back in December of 2010,
The Wall Street
Journal’s
Ashby Jones at the Law Blog
explained
just how powerful this law is.
In the lawsuit filed against accounting firm Ernst & Young,
Andrew Cuomo brought four claims, three of them under New York’s
Martin Act, one of the most powerful prosecutorial tools in the
country. Technically speaking, the Martin Act allows New York’s
top law enforcer to go after wrongdoing connected to the sale or
purchase of securities. Nothing too noteworthy there.
But what is noteworthy is the power the act confers upon its
user. It enables him to subpoena any document from anyone doing
business in New York and, if he so desires, keep an
investigation entirely secret. People subpoenaed in Martin Act
cases aren’t afforded a right to counsel or the right against
self-incrimination. “Combined, the act’s powers exceed those
given any regulator in any other state,” wrote Nicholas Thompson
in this
2004 Legal Affairs article.
And we haven’t even gotten to the kicker. Courts in civil Martin
Act cases have held that “fraud” under the Martin Act “includes
all deceitful practices contrary to the plain rules of common
honesty and all acts tending to deceive or mislead the public,
whether or not the product of scienter or intent to defraud.” In
other words, in order to prove a Martin Act violation, the
attorney general is not required to prove that the defendant
intended to defraud anyone, only that a defrauding act was
committed…
Mr. Ellenhorn, however, is all, “We’ll
never make it…”, like
Glum in Gulliver’s Travels. He worried
aloud to the judge,
according to Reuters, that the private
class action litigation still facing Ernst & Young over Lehman will
beat him to the punch in claiming compensation for investor losses.
In July of 2011, New
York Federal Court Judge Lewis Kaplan decided to
allow substantially all of the allegations against Lehman executives
and at least one of the allegations against Ernst & Young to move
forward to discovery and trial. That
case is proceeding.
The remaining allegation in the class
action litigation against Ernst & Young? That Ernst & Young had
reason to know that Lehman’s 2Q 2008 financial statements could be
materially misstated because of the extensive use of Repo 105
transactions.
Ellenhorn is worried because the NYAG’s
remaining remedy is for investors’ damages. Investors, however, have
their own ongoing lawsuits against Ernst & Young to recover the same
damages. If the investors are successful first in their lawsuits,
the state cannot pursue a double recovery for the same damages.
Ernst & Young claimed victory at the time
of Judge Kaplan’s decision, t | |